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**UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING
THE MUSHARRAF REGIME: US POLICIES,
STRATEGIES, AND THE OUTCOMES**

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Abstract

United States-Pakistan relations and devising appropriate policy responses surfaced as one of the most critical foreign policy challenges for the United States since late 2007. The heightened US concern followed the simmering growth of suicide terrorism and extremism in Pakistan as well as the unprecedented increase in al Qaeda and the Taliban attack on the US allied forces in Afghanistan staged from the “safe haven” of Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Scholars, analysts and the policymakers started to venture what is wrong with US-Pakistan relations. After the tragic event of 11 September 2001, the United States renewed its relationship with Pakistan, and declared it as an “indispensable ally” against the “global war on terror”. It has also been incorporated as a “frontline state” in fighting the US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Ironically, this post-11 September deep alliance between the US and Pakistan also coincided with the latest round of military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf regime might help us in explaining the problems that their bilateral relations are currently facing and may shed light in formulating future policies for Pakistan afresh. The present paper therefore, focuses on three aspects of the US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf regime. First, it intends to assess United States’ policy objectives during the Musharraf era. Obviously, fighting and eradicating terrorism and extremism was a dominant objective, but there were other objectives as well viz., Pakistan’s and global security, nuclear non-proliferation, US’s economic and strategic opportunities in South Asia, and democracy promotion in the Muslim world.

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Second, an attempt is made to analyse the strategies that were followed to pursue the objectives? Economic and security assistances are well-known strategies, but, was implicit support to Musharraf's military regime also a part of US strategy? If yes, what explains such strategy especially since it is contradictory to US's grand strategy of democracy promotion? And finally, what results were achieved by pursuing those policies in such particular way? Therefore, the paper would seek answers to such questions: Were the policies pursued by the US appropriate? Were the ways in which they were pursued the most effective way? Is the present situation in Pakistan an outcome of wrong policies or the wrong strategies? And what explains the lack of US' success?

1. Introduction

Since late 2007, foreign relations with Pakistan and devising appropriate policy responses are perhaps, the most critical foreign policy challenges faced by the United States, the sole superpower in the post Cold War era that has recently been rattled both by the act and the continuing threat of transnational terrorism. With the latest shift in the locus of transnational terrorism from Afghanistan to Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the importance of Pakistan in the ambit of US foreign relations has never been so critical. Jessica Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace remarked, "Now more than ever, the fates of the United States and Pakistan are tightly intertwined. From counterterrorism to nuclear non-proliferation, effective cooperation with Pakistan is a *sine qua non* for the success of critical US foreign policy goals."¹ A more recent statement by Malou Innocent, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute indicates, "For better and for worse, Pakistan will remain the fulcrum of US policy in the region –."² On the other hand, Devin T Hagerty³ in retrospect defines US-Pakistan relations as a "marriage of convenience between two incompatible states whose strategic interests suddenly converge from time to time", and he defines the post 9/11 US-Pakistan alliance as the "third time entente".⁴ After the catastrophic event of 11 September 2001, Pakistan was declared as an "indispensable ally" in the war on terrorism,⁵ during a period when the country was experiencing its fourth round of military dictatorship following a depressing decade of trial and error with democratic experiment.

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¹ Jessica T Mathews, "Forward", in Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p.viii.

² Malou Innocent, "Pakistan and the Future of US Policy", *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, No. 636, April 2009, p.1.

³ Devin T Hagerty, "The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time's a Charm?", in Craig Baxter (ed.), *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society*. Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004, p.1.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Deepening US Engagement in Asia", Remarks by Christina B Rocca, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, US State Department, to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 10 October, 2002, quoted in Devin T Hagerty, *op.cit.*, p.1.

The contemporary situation in Pakistan is one of the worst in its short history. Religious extremism is on the rise and can be termed as all time high, suicide terrorism - once a very rare phenomena - now becoming a daily life event for the Pakistani people, and more alarmingly the Taliban and the al Qaeda remnants having secured a safe refuge in its tribal areas popularly known as FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), mounting serious offensive both against the state of Pakistan and against the Allied Forces in Afghanistan. Question can be raised as to what is wrong with Pakistan. Despite having a close relationship with a superpower throughout its history (excluding the periods of discord and antipathy), and receiving considerable aid from the same, what explains Pakistan's current situation of a failing state? Is it because of Pakistan's staggering failure in consolidating democracy throughout its history? Is it because the military maintained a close relationship with the Islamists to enlist their support in securing its position in the society thereby remaining in power? Or is it the relationship with the superpower itself, particularly the post 9/11 entente - to pursue the 'war against terror' - that is responsible for Pakistan's disappointing demise into a very weak state?

Some analysts maintain that US policies towards Pakistan since 11 September 2001 were partially responsible in producing the current drift of the Pakistani nation toward religious extremism⁶ to such an extent that the very foundation of the country is in ruins. Since this period coincided with the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, an analysis of US-Pakistan relations during the regime might help us in explaining some of the present predicament faced by both the USA and Pakistan. When Musharraf came to power in October 1999 through a bloodless coup d'état, the US imposed "Democracy Sanctions" on Pakistan prohibiting all US economic and military aid to Pakistan. After 9/11, 2001 all these sanctions were waived. The US also waived or rescheduled all outstanding debt of Pakistan through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and other debtors viz., European Union, the Asian Development Bank and Japan, followed suit. A striking fact is that the United States while formulating its policies to pursue democracy promotion all over the world, especially in the Middle East, formed a deep alliance with a military authoritarian regime in South Asia. The immediate necessity of fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan may warrant such alliance but again questions can be raised as to US's continued support toward the Musharraf regime even in the face of severe mass protest against the regime in late 2007. And yet the present situation in Pakistan does not indicate United States' success in pursuing its objectives. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf regime is crucial to understanding the current

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⁶ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005.

challenges of their relations as well as formulating future foreign policy options for both the countries.

The present paper focuses on three aspects of the US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf regime. First, it intends to assess United States' policy objectives during the Musharraf era. Obviously, fighting and eradicating terrorism and extremism was the dominant one, but there were other objectives viz., Pakistan's and global security, nuclear non-proliferation, US's economic and strategic opportunities in South Asia, and democracy promotion in the Muslim world.⁷ Second, an attempt would be made to analyse the strategies that were followed to pursue the objectives? Economic and security assistances were well-known strategies, but, was implicit support to Musharraf's military regime also a part of US strategy? If yes, what explains such strategy especially since it is essentially contradictory to US's grand strategy of democracy promotion? And finally, what results were achieved by pursuing those policies in such particular way? Therefore, the paper would seek answers to the following questions: Were the policies pursued by the US appropriate? Were the ways in which they were pursued the most effective way? Is the present situation in Pakistan an outcome of wrong policies or the wrong strategies? And what explains the lack of US' success?

To discuss these issues, the paper is divided into four sections where introduction constitutes section 1 of the paper. Section 2 discusses US-Pakistan relations from Musharraf's assumption of power till the event of 11 September 2001. Section 3 on the other hand, deliberates on their bilateral relations in the post-11 September 2001 period up to the end of General Musharraf's regime. However, section 3, commensurate with the focus of the paper – analysing the three aspects i.e., US policies and strategies towards Pakistan, and the outcomes thereof - is further divided into three sub-sections.⁸ Sub-section 1 discusses the major US policy objectives pursued by the Bush Administration whereas sub-section 2 intends to identify the strategies that were followed by the same. In sub-section 3, an effort has been made to show the outcomes of the US policies and strategies in relation to the contemporary situation in Pakistan. This section ends with further discussion on the reasons of the outcomes i.e., reasons for the

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⁷ See Touqir Hussain, "US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond", *USIP Special Report No. 145*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005.

⁸ It is important to note that, section 2 of the paper is not divided into sub-sections in line with the three aspects of the US-Pakistan relations mainly for two reasons. First, the period covered in the section i.e., from October 1999 to 10 September 2001 is not long-enough to divide it into sub-sections corresponding the policies, strategies, and the outcomes. And secondly, the US policy towards Pakistan before 9/11 is more of a continuation of the policies pursued by the US throughout the 1990s except some new sanctions (democracy sanctions) were imposed when Musharraf came to power. However, interesting changes in US policies towards Pakistan during the Musharraf period preceding 11 September 2001 are discussed in this section of the paper.

apparent failings of the United States in realising its desired objectives in Pakistan although there exist considerable disagreements among the scholars about the causes that are responsible for Pakistan's contemporary demise into a failing state.

2. US-Pakistan Relations from Musharraf's Accession to Power till 11 September 2001

Pervez Musharraf was appointed Chief of Army Staff (COAS), by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1998. Two generals senior to General Musharraf were passed over by Nawaz Sharif on the expectation that being a Mohajir⁹ and therefore, one with no constituency in the army – an entirely baseless myth¹⁰ – Musharraf would be pliable and not be able to stage a coup in case of friction between the government and the army.

The discord between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif however, started with the 'blame game' in the aftermath of the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in May-July 1999. After occupying the Kargil heights, Pakistan could not retain it for long. The Pakistani move was matched by massive Indian military deployment backed by the Indian Air Force that created a sort of panic among the Nawaz government. Nawaz Sharif decided to withdraw and ordered the evacuation of Kargil. This withdrawal caused huge resentment all over Pakistan. Musharraf being the Army Chief could not give any excuse in public but privately blamed Nawaz Sharif for spoiling a brilliant operation. Conversely, Nawaz Sharif blamed the army, claiming that he was not even aware of the plan. This inevitably put the army and the Nawaz government on a collision course, "fuelling a spiral of mutual suspicion and distrust."¹¹

On 12 October 1999, while General Musharraf was flying back from a trip to Sri Lanka, Nawaz Sharif sacked him and appointed General Zia-ud-din, then director general of the ISI as the new army chief. Nawaz instructed the aviation authorities not to allow the plane carrying Musharraf to land at Karachi airport. However, the army moved in, and took control of the airport. The landing of the plane in the Karachi airport ended the Sharif-Musharraf tussle and, Musharraf being the winner became the man-in-charge of Pakistan. He suspended the Parliament, the Constitution (although partially) and, pronounced himself Pakistan's new "chief executive" instead of Chief Martial Law Administrator

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⁹ The term "Mohajirs" is used in Pakistan to identify the community who migrated to Pakistan during or after the Partition of India in 1947. Musharraf was born in New Delhi in August 1943, and his family moved to Pakistan on the very day of 15 August 1947. See for details, Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰ Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.180.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.175.

(CMLA)¹². However, the responses of the international community in general and the US in particular were not welcoming enough.

The Musharraf coup was disliked by the Clinton administration. Some Pakistani political analysts believe that Nawaz Sharif tried to dislodge Musharraf with US support and that Musharraf takeover was “the first time the army seized power without the approval of Washington.”¹³ A few weeks before the coup, the US State Department had warned that the United States would “strongly oppose” any attempt by “political and military actors” in Pakistan to take power unconstitutionally.¹⁴ State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin in a briefing on 12 October 1999 confirmed this stance by saying that “we were concerned about the extraconstitutional measures” and that “Pakistan’s constitution must be respected not only in its letter but in its spirit.”¹⁵

Consequently, the Clinton administration responded with “democracy sanctions”, invoking section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits all US economic and military aid toward Pakistan. Some argue that these democracy sanctions had little “immediate impact” because of the pre-existing nuclear sanctions. Hagerty nevertheless, remarked that “Pakistan felt the sting of Washington’s ire when President Clinton waived nuclear-related economic sanctions on India only two weeks after the Musharraf coup.”¹⁶

After the October 1999 coup until 10 September 2001, US policy towards Pakistan can be defined as a continuity of the 1990s. Despite Pakistan’s violation of nuclear non-proliferation related provisions and nuclear tests, for which the United States had imposed sanctions, the United States still needed Pakistan to counter the Taliban government in Afghanistan and to capture al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. After the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which Osama bin Laden was held responsible, the US increased its diplomatic pressure on the Taliban, and asked for full cooperation from Pakistan in this regard. “The Taliban were promised everything (by the US), including at times formal US recognition, if they handed over bin Laden.”¹⁷

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¹² When asked by a Journalist why he decided to call himself chief executive – an odd title for a military dictator – Musharraf answered, “for your (the media’s) consumption – it’s a very palatable name instead of chief martial law administrator, which is draconian in concept and name. I want to give it a civilian façade.” – Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, New York: Penguin Books, 2009, p.44.

¹³ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalism: Crusades, Jihadis, and Modernity*, London: Verso, 2002, p.200, quoted in Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.181.

¹⁴ Hassan Abbas *op.cit.* p. 180.

¹⁵ Quoted in *ibid*, p. 180.

¹⁶ Devin T Hagerty, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.16.

However, in the post 1999 coup period, the Clinton administration was trying to do some damage-control in its relations to Pakistan - resulting from the nuclear-related sanctions and the recently imposed democracy sanctions - as is evident from President Clinton's visit to Pakistan in March 2000. He met Musharraf although avoided being seen in pictures shaking hands with him. The major issues discussed were Pakistan's foreign policy vis-à-vis the Kashmir insurgency and the Taliban policy of allowing Osama bin Laden to use Afghanistan as his base camp. It should be noted here, a month earlier, on 16 February 2000 the US distributed photos of bin Laden and offered US\$ 5 million reward for his arrest.¹⁸ Musharraf was much more forthcoming on the Osama issue, although on Kashmir he was not willing to de-escalate unilaterally.

US policy towards Pakistan during the Clinton-Musharraf era, especially with regard to countering terrorism can further be explained by the US State Department's report entitled, "Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1999", released in April 2000.¹⁹ This report, for the first time designated South Asia as a major centre of international terrorism. The report noted that Pakistan "has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory" besides supporting "groups that engage in violence in Kashmir."²⁰ In the report, the United States urged Musharraf regime to close certain *Madrasas* "that actually serve as conduits for terrorism." Afghanistan was cited for helping and providing safe haven for known terrorists and for refusing to turn over Osama bin Laden.

When George W Bush came to power in January 2001, he basically followed President Clinton's policy towards Pakistan. Moreover, Bush's new national security team was intent on expanding the regional policy it inherited.²¹ India's fast-growing economy, its expanding information-technology sector, and its political stability persuaded the United States to deepen their bilateral ties with India. For its part, Pakistan was charged with not taking enough action against religious extremism. All of this came to a head just a week before 11 September 2001, when the US imposed another round of missile sanctions against Pakistan. That was the state of relationship between the United States and Pakistan till 10 September 2001. The next day, 11 September changed the course of their relationships.

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, on 13 September 2001, Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, handed over General Mehmood,²² (who

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¹⁸ Scott Kofmehl, "Chronology of Important Events in Pakistan", in Craig Baxter (ed.), *Pakistan on the Brink*, *op.cit.*, p.223.

¹⁹The Report is available at: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999_report/intro.html, accessed on: August 15, 2010.

²⁰ Quoted in Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.193.

²¹ Devin T Hagerty, *op.cit.*, p.6.

²² General Mehmood Ahmad was appointed as ISI director general by Musharraf after the 1999 coup.

happened to be in Washington DC at the time), a one-page list of seven US demands. It categorically asked Pakistan to do the following things:

1. Stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for bin Laden;
2. Give the United States blanket over flight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations;
3. Provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda;
4. Provide the United States with intelligence information;
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist attacks;
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan;
7. If the evidence implicated bin Laden and al Qaeda, and the Taliban continued to harbour them, to break relations with the Taliban government.²³

There was also a secret demand for US access to Pakistan's nuclear facility as noted by Tariq Ali.²⁴

On 14 September, Musharraf convened a meeting of his nine corps commanders based around the country to discuss the US demands and the ultimatum. According to Ahmed Rashid, there was considerable disagreement in the meeting ... raising serious objections to the US demands, pointing out that Pakistan was getting nothing in return and that there would be dangerous domestic fallout.²⁵ However, Musharraf convinced his generals by saying the same words that he later said publicly, "we were on the borderline of being or not being declared a terrorist state."²⁶ This was a real possibility since India had spent years trying to persuade the US administration to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism because of its support to militants in Kashmir. On the same day, late at night, Musharraf called the then US ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain and let her know his acceptance of all the demands. Getting Pakistan on board so swiftly was an enormous success for Powell and Armitage. Bush later said it was the most important thing Powell did after 9/11. "He single-handedly got Musharraf on board."²⁷

Musharraf's acceptance of US demands led to the renewal of US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan was declared "an indispensable ally" and granted some

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²³ Tariq Ali, *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power*, New York: Scribner, 2008, p.146. These demands are also included in the 9/11 Commission Report.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.147.

²⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.29.

²⁶ Quoted in *ibid*, p.29.

²⁷ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, quoted in Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.12.

quick compensation. The United States withdrew all nuclear-related sanctions in September/October 2001. The congress passed P.L. 107-57, which waived the 'democracy sanctions' on Pakistan for FY 2002 and granted presidential authority for another waiver through FY 2003. President Bush exercised this waiver six times up until 2008, and after the 2008 elections when the "Bush administration issued an April 2008 determination that a democratically elected government had been restored in Islamabad after a 101-month hiatus"²⁸, the 'democracy sanctions' became void. The United States also wrote off US\$ 3 billion debt that Pakistan owed, and later in 2003, President Bush pledged US\$ 3 billion aid package to Pakistan to be disbursed over five years. Apart from these immediate benefits, Pakistan since 2001 also received large amount of military and security aid that will be discussed later in the paper.

Now, a closer look at the seven-points US demands indicate that they were immediate requirements of the United States to take punitive actions against the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks, or to go for a war if the demand for handing over bin Laden was not met by the Taliban. In 2001, when the US attacked Afghanistan, the Taliban regime fell down in few weeks. It was not conceived at the time that al Qaeda could rebound and the Taliban would instigate a deadly insurgency against allied forces. Therefore, the specific demands made by the US on the eve of 11 September, were not long-term policies. But now after almost a decade-long War in Afghanistan we can make an effort to identify and analyse the policies pursued by the United States to counter the transnational terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and the increasing religious extremism in Pakistan.

3. US-Pakistan Relations in the Post-11 September 2001 period to the End of Musharraf Regime

The United States had has numerous interests and varied foreign policy objectives for its relations with Pakistan in the post-11 September 2001 period. These have ranged from regional and global terrorism, Afghan stability, nuclear non-proliferation, democratisation and human rights protection, the Pakistan-India conflicts over Kashmir, and, social and economic development in Pakistan. However, during the Musharraf regime, three objectives viz., fighting the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, countering terrorism and religious extremism in Pakistan, and securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons emerged prominent over other objectives. These are discussed below in more detail.

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²⁸ K Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations", *CRS Report*, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 November 2008, p.90.

3.1 US Policy Objectives

The unprecedented²⁹ attack of 11 September 2001 redefined United States foreign policy and strategic objectives. The statement, “every nation, in every region has a decision to make, you are either with us or you are with the terrorists”³⁰, made the ‘global war on terror’ the United States’ defining element of bilateral relationship. Similar redefinition of foreign policy and strategic objectives occurred with regard to Pakistan.

3.1.1 Fighting the War against Terrorism in Afghanistan

After arriving at the decision that al Qaeda was responsible for the 11 September attack, the Bush administration was in disarray about how to respond. The US military was reluctant to invade Afghanistan, given the fate of the British and Soviet armies in that country during the past two centuries.³¹ Moreover, the US Central Command or CENTCOM, which had responsibility for the Middle East region, had no ready-made plan to invade Afghanistan, and it would take weeks before it could prepare one.³² On the contrary, there was this enormous urge for the “need to move swiftly. Near term target needs – go massive – sweep it all up, things related or not”.³³

At this moment, the CIA planners came up with an audacious plan,³⁴ a package that involves teaming up of CIA and US Special Operations Forces with the Northern Alliance’s³⁵ ground troops. It would also combine US air power using sophisticated technology. On 15 September 2001, the CIA Director George Tenet and his aides presented the plan at a meeting at Camp David. With

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²⁹ The September 11 attack was unprecedented only for the American people, but it should not be considered as inconceivable especially by the administration and the intelligence agencies as there were a number of intelligence reports that al Qaeda was preparing for attack on the United States. The FBI issued 216 internal threat warnings about the possibility of an attack by al Qaeda between January and September 2001, while the National Security Agency (NSA) reported 33 intercepts indicating possible al Qaeda attacks. On July 10, the CIA prepared a briefing paper for President Bush, emphatically saying, “We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against US and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks...attack preparations have been made...and will occur with little or no warning.” Even on August 6, the CIA’s daily brief to the president was headlined, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”. Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-60.

³⁰ President Bush’s address to the Joint Session of the Congress on 20 September, 2001.

³¹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.61.

³² *Ibid*, p.61.

³³ Donald Rumsfeld made the statement to his aide Stephen Cambone, quoted in *ibid*, p.64.

³⁴ Ahmed Rashid described the Plan in his book, *Descent into Chaos*, *op.cit.*, p.62.

³⁵ Northern Alliance was a group of mostly non-Pashtun tribal leaders opposed to the Taliban regime.

no other options on the table and the Pentagon having no plans to mount a full-scale invasion, Tenet’s idea was readily accepted. Bush signed an order on 17 September, giving enormous power to CIA, allowing it to conduct the war in Afghanistan. Up to US\$ 900 million was allocated to the CIA for covert operations.³⁶

Within twenty-four hours of 11 September, the US also secured full support from its NATO allies. NATO invoked Article 5 of its constitution and declared the attack on the US as an attack on NATO. The US also received the UN Security Council mandate on 28 September through the Resolution 1373, authorising the use of force against terrorists. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld received the first draft of a battle plan from General Tommy Franks, Commander of CENTCOM, on 21 September. On 2 October, President Bush approved the four-phase plan. The United States would deploy four aircraft carrier battle groups comprising thirty-two naval vessels, forty thousand soldiers and four hundred aircrafts.³⁷ Britain would deploy some eighteen ships, fifty aircrafts, and twenty thousand troops. But the real work would be done by the one hundred and fifteen CIA officers and three hundred US Special Operations Forces personnel inside Afghanistan working with the Northern Alliance’s leader.³⁸ Finally, on 7 October 2001, the US initiated the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan by launching “fifty cruise missiles and dozens of laser-guided bombs on thirty-one military targets, hitting airports, anti-aircraft defences, and radar installations around all the major cities.”³⁹

Pakistan’s geographical location and its long-standing relationship with the Taliban, made it a “necessary ally” of the US in its war effort in Afghanistan. Therefore, securing Pakistan’s support to fight the war against al Qaeda and its Taliban cohorts became the predominant objective of the United States. Pakistan was also one of the three countries that recognised the Taliban government in Afghanistan (the two others were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

However, Pakistan provided the United States significant logistical support in its war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Approximately 75 per cent of US supplies in Afghanistan, including 40 per cent of the vehicle fuel, passed through or over Pakistan.⁴⁰ As demanded by the US, Pakistan made three air force bases, two naval bases and its airspace available to the US military, and

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³⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.62.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.74.

³⁸ *Ibid*.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.80.

⁴⁰ Jay Solomon and Yochi J Dreazen, “US Maps Scenarios for Pakistan”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 November 2007. Quoted in Owen Bennett-Jones, “US Policy Options toward Pakistan: A Principled and Realistic Approach”, The Stanley Foundation, *Policy Analysis Brief*, February 2008, p.6.

sealed off its western border.⁴¹ All these services were instrumental in staging and winning the war against the Taliban regime. Pakistan also shared intelligence with the United States – a significant contribution, since no one knew better about the Taliban than Pakistan – and helped capture and hand over al Qaeda terrorists. As Christine Fair in her monograph, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, noted, US officials acknowledge that “Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists, and committed more troops than any other nation in the GCTF (Global Counterterrorism Force)”. Moreover, as Touqir Hussain noted, “all of the top al-Qaeda leaders captured to date have been apprehended in Pakistan with the government’s help, while Pakistan itself has arrested more than seven hundred terror suspects”,⁴² who were alleged al Qaeda operatives.

3.1.2 Countering Terrorism in Pakistan

Pakistan is a home to fifty-eight religious political parties and twenty-four armed religious militias, the latter category also popularly known as jihadi groups.⁴³ The mushrooming of extreme right-wing militant organisation in Pakistan began with groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in the early 1980s, which were focused on the Afghan jihad. In 1993 these groups merged to form Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), for directing its resources and energies supporting militancy or freedom fighters in Indian-controlled Kashmir. As these groups were ideologically associated with the Deobandi religious party, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), its competitor Jamaat-i-Islami also launched its militant wing Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, to operate in Kashmir. Many other minor jihadi groups involved in the Afghan war also sprang up to establish new outfits to penetrate in Kashmir, attracting Saudi donors and ISI funding. After the Taliban ascendancy in Afghanistan, many of these militant groups, for instance, HUA although originally dedicated to the Kashmir cause, developed close ties with the Taliban and in turn with the al Qaeda. In the post-11 September period, these groups continued to support al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants, and perpetrated terrorist activities against the Pakistani state. Therefore, countering these groups and preventing them from supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants have become an important foreign policy objective of the United States. Moreover, various sectarian religious groups also active in Pakistan. These groups over time developed relationship with the militant jihadi groups as well. The US has rendered considerable pressure as well as support to the Pakistani government to engage in countering these religious extremist groups and consequently end their support to the Taliban.

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⁴¹ Tauqir Hussain, *op.cit.*, p.6.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.201.

To counter terrorism inside Pakistan and in recognition of Pakistan's inability to respond adequately to the rising internal security threats, the United States provided considerable support to improve Pakistan's civil security infrastructure. Most of this support came in the form of law enforcement assistance and reform programmes enacted through the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Justice (DoJ). The majority of organisations operating under the DoS in providing "internal security assistance" to Pakistan, were within the purview of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), though several other agencies like the Office of Counterterrorism (S/CT), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) were also involved at varying levels.⁴⁴

The INL initiated assistance programmes designed to strengthen control of and access to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border; to improve Pakistan's law enforcement capacity and interagency cooperation; and to bolster the country's counter-narcotics capabilities.⁴⁵ To attain these objectives, the INL programmes included the introduction of a computerised Personal Identification Security, Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), establishment of an air wing in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Quetta, Baluchistan, to facilitate counter-terror and counter-narcotics operations, the paving of border security roads in FATA, and basic police training and introduction of an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).

The S/CT programmes were aimed at providing Pakistan means to decisively confront domestic extremist threats and therefore, most of the funding under these programmes were directed towards augmenting Pakistan's basic investigative capabilities. The most significant endeavour in this regard was the establishment of a dedicated Counter-terrorism Special Investigation Group (SIG) at the National Police Academy in Rawalpindi. On the other hand, the security assistance from the DoJ was provided under the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The basic objectives of the ICITAP included enhancing border security, law enforcement reform and training, creating a national criminal database, and assistance with forensics. Training under these programmes took place in Quetta and Peshawar with emphasis on institution building within the Frontier Corps (the main security detachment in FATA), the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), customs intelligence agencies, and the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA).

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⁴⁴ Shanthie D'Souza, "US-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Dynamics and Challenges", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 30, No. 3, July 2006, p.531.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

However, in response to US objectives of countering terrorism inside Pakistan, the Musharraf government also acted upon. Five extremist groups viz., Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (guerrilla groups fighting for secession in Indian Kashmir), Jaish-e-Mohammed (Kashmiri secessionist, with close ties with the Taliban), Sipah-e-Sahaba (the most violent Sunni Muslim group), Tehrik-e-Fiqah Jafria (hardline Shia group), and Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Mohammedi (TNSM) (Sunni group operating in northwest Pakistan aiming to impose Taliban-like system in Pakistan) were banned.⁴⁶ His government also stopped funding 115 *Madrasas* for their involvement in extremism and militancy.⁴⁷

3.1.3 Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been a dominant reason for US engagement in the region since 1970s. During the period of covert nuclearisation up until 1998, the Pakistan-India nuclear arms race was the focus of US non-proliferation efforts in South Asia. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, securing Pakistan's nuclear capability became a principal concern for United States in the region as well as for its bilateral relations with Pakistan.

However, the US administration's fear of security threats to Pakistan's nuclear arsenals was grounded mainly on two possibilities: the religious extremists' access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology, and illicit proliferation from insiders. A radical Islamist take-over of the government in Pakistan has been a major concern for the United States especially after the 2002 general elections. The Muttahida Majlish-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of six religious parties, scored victory in the western provinces of Pakistan, and formed governments in the Provinces of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Baluchistan. This rise of religious parties to power raised US fear that such governments might be susceptible to their extremist sympathisers and hand over to them the state's nuclear arsenals. However, the likelihood of such scenario is remote. The MMA's victory was a temporal phenomenon, probably caused by the frustration of the people with both the politicians and the military, and therefore, an effort for giving a chance to the Islamists. Consequently, in the 2008 elections, the Islamist parties failed to make any headway and Pakistanis voted for "populist-socialist, left-of-centre political parties i.e., the Pakistan People's Party."⁴⁸

Moreover, after the US offensive against the Taliban, the fear of religious extremists seeking nuclear weapons was heightened. This fear peaked during the political instabilities in Pakistan in late 2007. Faced with such political

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⁴⁶ Available at: <http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?746-Data-On-Banned-Extremist-Groups&s=223a2f84344f6628e1ea3490fa01b280> accessed on: 22 August 2010.

⁴⁷ *Asian Age*, India, 03 June 2002.

⁴⁸ Malou Innocent, *op.cit.*, p.19.

uncertainties, the US administration even feared a militant coup by the extremists and complete takeover of political power and thus of the nuclear arsenals. Moreover, as Michael Krepon, a renowned American expert on South Asian nuclearisation remarked, “a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country’s President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief could jeopardise the army’s unity of command, which is essential for nuclear security.”⁴⁹ The US administration also feared that the militants could manage to get their hands on a small amount of nuclear material that could then be used to make a dirty bomb.⁵⁰

Fears of illicit proliferation also loomed large during the Musharraf period. The 2004 revelations about the renowned Pakistani Scientist A Q Khan running a clandestine nuclear proliferation network heightened United States’ fear about illicit proliferation from Pakistan. The US administration believed that the A Q Khan network had supplied nuclear material and technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Director of National Intelligence John D Negroponte in a 11 January 2007 statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence remarked, “Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A Q Khan network.”⁵¹ The possibility of illicit proliferation appeared especially dangerous when the US administration found intelligence that al Qaeda had also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States, “received fragmentary information from an intelligence service” that in 1998 bin Laden had “sent emissaries to establish contact” with the network.⁵² According to a 2005 report, al Qaeda had also established “contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.”⁵³

However, security of the nuclear assets involves mainly integrity of the command and control structure and ensuring weapon’s physical security. The Musharraf regime continued its effort to ensure the physical security of the nuclear arsenal and maintained the integrity of the command and control mechanism. To ensure physical security Pakistani authority employed the method of keeping their weapons separate from delivery systems and nuclear cores separate from their detonators. Therefore, the warheads, detonators and

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⁴⁹ Quoted in Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues”, *CRS Report*, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009 p.11.

⁵⁰ Owen Bennet-Jones, *op.cit.*, p.8.

⁵¹ Quoted in Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *op.cit.*, p.15.

⁵² George Tenet and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, New York: Harper Collins, 2007, p.261. Quoted in Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *op.cit.*, p.15.

⁵³ Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *op.cit.*, p.15.

missiles are kept scattered across the country's 6-10 high-security military bases with standard safeguards, such as iris scanners, code-locked doors etc. Some 10,000 military guards headed by a two-star general secure Pakistan's nuclear facilities. To ensure the security of the command of nuclear weapon deployment the Pakistan authority employed Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, which requires a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. And reportedly, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people to authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.⁵⁴

All the fears of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of the extremists led the United States to extend assistance to Pakistan to ensure their security especially after 11 September 2001. Most of these assistances, whether in cash, training or technology were covert in nature. However, according to a report, Washington had spent almost US\$ 100 million in secret programmes to train Pakistani officers to secure their nuclear arsenals.⁵⁵ The US assistance reportedly also included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorised or accidental use of nuclear weapons as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personal reliability.⁵⁶ The PALs employed by Pakistan were also reportedly provided by the US.

3.2 US Strategies

To pursue the above discussed objectives, the strategies pursued by the United States in the post-11 September 2001 period can be analysed under three headings: coercive diplomacy in the immediate aftermath of 11 September to get Pakistan on board, aid, both economic and military, to counter terrorism both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and above all uncritical support for Musharraf's military regime. It should be noted here, the counter-terrorism strategy followed by the US with regard to Pakistan involves mostly security assistance – training, military hardware, reimbursement of security related expenses – therefore, they are discussed under the general heading of aid to Pakistan.

3.2.1 Coercive Diplomacy

Pakistan's reason for supporting the US War against terrorism in Afghanistan is substantially different than its participation in the war against Soviets in the 1980s. Pakistan's support for the United States proxy war in Afghanistan in 1980s was partly motivated by the convergence of interests of both Pakistan and the US. As Marvin Weinbaum stated, "Pakistan's determination to oppose communist domination of Afghanistan and willingness

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⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.14.

⁵⁵ David E Sanger and William J Broad, "US Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms", *The New York Times*, USA, 18 November 2007.

⁵⁶ Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *op.cit.*, p.13.

to block any Soviet military adventures represented strategic objectives convergent with those of the United States.”⁵⁷

On the contrary, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attack, the United States followed the strategy of coercive diplomacy to get Pakistan on board to pursue the war against terrorism. Of all the reasons behind Musharraf’s prompt consent to the seven-point US demands, the pressure and the threat of military intervention were the leading ones. If we look at the statements made by the US officials and by Musharraf himself, it becomes evident that the pressure and the threats were real.

Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, while meeting with General Mehmood and Pakistani Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi on 12 September 2001, communicated to General Mehmood that President Bush was about to make a TV address where he would say, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”, and Armitage asked, “Where would Pakistan Stand?”. Next day, on 13 September 2001, a cabinet meeting in Washington concluded that if Pakistan did not help the United States, “it would be at risk of attack.”⁵⁸ Moreover, Collin Powell, in the National Security Council (NSC) meeting at the White House made the statement, “We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan, this is show time”.⁵⁹

The statements made by Musharraf also show the kind of pressure and threat that he had experienced during those hours. On 18 September, Musharraf argued that the decision to extend “unstinting support” to the United States was taken under tremendous pressure and in the face of fears, that in case of refusal, a direct military action by a coalition of the United States, India, and Israel against Pakistan was a real possibility.⁶⁰ Later in his memoir, Musharraf describes receiving a message from General Mehmood about his conversation with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in “most undiplomatic terms....Armitage told him not only did we have to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone age”.⁶¹ Ashley J Tellis therefore, commented, “there is no doubt that General Musharraf initially cast his lot with the United States mainly as a result of deep fears about what U.S. enmity might imply for Pakistan’s longstanding rivalry with India, its efforts at economic revival, its nuclear weapons program, and its equities in the conflict over Kashmir”.⁶²

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⁵⁷ Marvin G Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship”, in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 6, June 1991, p.497.

⁵⁸ The 9/11 Commission Report, quoted in Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.28.

⁵⁹ Bob Woodward, *op.cit.*, p.32, quoted in Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.217.

⁶⁰ Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.221.

⁶¹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, *op.cit.*, p. 201.

⁶² Ashley J Tellis, *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 3.

Alexander George describes coercive diplomacy as diplomacy that “attempts to reverse actions that are already occurring or have been undertaken by an adversary.”⁶³ He distinguishes this from deterrence “which attempts to dissuade an opponent from undertaking action that has yet been initiated.”⁶⁴ George further describes coercive diplomacy as “essentially a diplomatic strategy backed by the threat of force.” As our above discussion shows there were enough threats for the use of force in case of Musharraf’s non compliance and as the seven-point demands show, the US was clearly asking Pakistan to change its policy of supporting the Taliban. “In Musharraf’s own words, ‘9/11 came as a thunderbolt’ to his regime, forcing him to transform the previous policies of the state to align with US national security interests.”⁶⁵ Moreover, as Hassan Abbas stated, “Pakistan had taken a historical U-turn in its policy toward the Taliban by fully supporting the US military campaign.”⁶⁶

All these imply Pakistan’s ‘unstinting support’ for the US-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Although there were some expectations of compensations in the form of grant, aid, removal of Sanctions (which the US did) and also perhaps Musharraf had a plan for himself (securing his position as a military dictator for the next six years), the existence of real threat that compelled him to acquiesce to the US demands adequately fit with the modalities of coercive diplomacy.

3.2.2 Aid: Economic and Security Assistances

Foreign aid has always been a widely used strategy to achieve the ends of the foreign policy of a state. David Jordon in his book *World Politics in Our Time* observes, “...to gain the objectives of the State....the more useful and the widely employed ones to attain the aims of foreign policy are the economic ones which have traditionally been used by donor or creditor countries.” However, the United States employed both economic and military aid to Pakistan to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Immediately after 11 September, the United States extended US\$ 1 billion to Pakistan. Subsequently, the removal of all sanctions enabled the Bush administration to resume its discontinued military assistance to Pakistan as well as providing aid under new programmes.

Since 2001, Pakistan has received large US assistance packages and reimbursements for militarised counterterrorism efforts. By the end of FY 2008, Pakistan had received about US\$ 12 billion, the majority of this in the form of coalition support reimbursements, with another US\$ 3.1 billion for economic

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⁶³ Alexander George et al., *Force and Statecraft*, (4th ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.200.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Quoted in Farhana Ali, “US-Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond”, *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, No. 4, June 2007, p.1.

⁶⁶ Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.222.

purposes and nearly US\$ 2.2 billion for security-related programmes (see Table 1 in Appendix 1).⁶⁷ However, the most detailed and comprehensive study of US aid programmes to Pakistan since 9/11 found that the official overt aid to Pakistan “has likely been matched, if not exceeded, by classified funds that have gone toward intelligence and covert military action.”⁶⁸ Programmes in the covert funding streams include support to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), training Pakistani officers in nuclear safety, and cash payments to tribal leaders hired to fight al Qaeda elements in their areas.⁶⁹ Therefore, the real figure for US aid to Pakistan since 9/11 is closer to US\$ 20 billion.⁷⁰ However, the overt US assistance to Pakistan is made up of four funding streams: Coalition Support Funds, Budget Support, Security Assistance, and Development Aid. The enormous amounts of resources provided to Pakistan during the Musharraf period under these four funding streams are discussed below.⁷¹

Coalition Support Funds (CSF)

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) were established by the Congress in the post-11 September 2001 period to appropriate reimbursements to Pakistan and other nations for their operational and logistical support to the US-led counterterrorism operations. As of November 2008, more than US\$ 9 billion had been appropriated or authorised for FY2002-2008 Pentagon spending for CSF for “key cooperating nations.” Although the CSF is officially not designated as assistance⁷², since 2001, it accounts for the bulk of US financial assistance to Pakistan. According to Pentagon documents, CSF reimbursement to Islamabad account for some US\$ 6.7 billion or an average of US\$ 79 million per month, which is also about four-fifths of the total Pentagon reimbursement for all cooperating nations.⁷³

Economic Support Funds (ESF)

The United States provided significant amounts of assistance to Pakistan under the Economic Support Funds (ESF) programme established by the Foreign Assistance Act in the post-2001 period. Immediately following the 11 September attacks, the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (PL 107-38)

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⁶⁷ Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.90.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Owen Bennett-Jones, *op.cit.*, p.2.

⁶⁹ Greg Miller, “US Military Aid to Pakistan Misses Its Al Qaeda Target”, *Los Angeles Times*, USA, 5 November 2007, quoted in Owen Bennet-Jones, *op.cit.*, p.2.

⁷⁰ Craig Cohen, “A Perilous Course: US Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan”, *CSIS Report*, August 2007, pp. 32-33.

⁷¹ Discussion on US aid to Pakistan is drawn from Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-94, and pp. 60-63.

⁷² Some analysts consider CSF as security assistance.

⁷³ Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.93.

appropriated US\$ 600 million in cash transfers for Pakistan under ESF. Upon Congress's approval, Pakistan in the subsequent years of FY 2003 and FY 2004, used the ESF allocations to pay off about US\$ 1.5 billion of concessional debt to the US government.

The US government's FY2005-FY2009 assistance plan for Pakistan included US\$ 200 million of ESF each year (two-thirds of the programme total) as "budget support" to the country to enable Islamabad "to spend additional resources on education, improving macroeconomic performance, and the quality of and access to healthcare and education."⁷⁴ These funds were used for goals set out by Pakistan in accordance to its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). However, there were criticisms of this type of funds on the grounds that poor oversight and its inherent fungibility could allow Pakistan's military-dominated government to use them for purposes other than those intended.

Security Assistance

US-Pakistan security cooperation accelerated rapidly after 2001. In 2002, the United States resumed its commercial sale of military equipment that enabled Pakistan to "refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft."⁷⁵ In 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO US ally in the region. In 2005, Washington announced, it was resuming sales of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan after a 16-year long interval. A high-level US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group (DCG) – moribund from 1997 to 2001 was also revived in the post-2001 period, to discuss the modalities of US-Pakistan military cooperation, security assistance, and support for anti-terrorism activities.

Security assistance to Pakistan also included major government-to-government arms sales and grants that included items useful for counterterrorism operations as well as some heavy military hardware more suited to conventional warfare. Arms sales were made under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) account and according to Pentagon total FMS agreements with Pakistan for FY2002-FY2007 worth US\$ 4.55 billion. About three-quarters of this account consisted of in-process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment.

Since 2001, the United States has also provided US\$ 1.6 billion to Pakistan in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to purchase US military equipment. Major purchases made by Pakistan with FMF funds include eight P-3c Orion maritime patrol aircraft (valued at US\$ 474 million), about 5,250 TOW anti-armour missiles (worth US\$ 186 million, 2007 delivered), more than 5,600 military radio sets (worth US\$ 163 million), six AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars (US\$

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⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.93

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.60.

100 million), and six C-130E transport aircraft (US\$ 76 million).⁷⁶The FMF also included a “base programme” of US\$ 300 million per year beginning in FY2005.

Moreover, the US military grants to Pakistan have been provided under the Excess Defence Articles (EDA) programme. Major EDA grants since 2001 included 14 F-16A/B combat aircraft and 16 T-37 military trainer jets.⁷⁷ Pakistan has also been granted 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters worth US\$ 48 million (12 delivered, 8 pending refurbishment). Other security-related assistance for Pakistan included US-funded road-building projects in the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and FATA region aimed at bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism and border security efforts. Border security assistance programmes also included the supply of night-vision equipment, communication gear, protective vests, and transport helicopters and aircrafts. The United States has undertaken training programmes for Pakistan Army Air Assault units, and provided military education and training programmes to enhance professionalism of Pakistan’s senior-level military officers.

Development Aid

Apart from the budget support intended to provide funding for education, developmental and health-related programmes, the United States has also provided US\$ 286 million as development aid to Pakistan since 2001 (see Table 1). Other economic aid since 2001 included funding for Child Survival and Health (CSH) programme (US\$ 157 million), Human Rights and Democracy Funds (HRDF) (US\$ 17 million), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) programme (US\$ 42 million). The US also provided separate development assistance for the FATA, beginning in 2003, to improve the quality of education, develop healthcare services, and increase opportunities for economic growth. Later in FY 2007, the Bush Administration devised a new plan to devote US\$ 750 million in development aid to Pakistan’s tribal areas over a five-year period. The Bush administration also pushed for establishing a Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in the FATA and neighbouring Afghanistan, which would provide duty-free access into the US market for certain goods produced in those areas. But the related bill failed to emerge from House Subcommittee.

It is evident from the above-mentioned aid figures that the US developmental aid to Pakistan is scanty compared to its military assistance. An analyst noted that only about one-tenth of US aid to Pakistan was being directed toward development, governance and humanitarian programmes.⁷⁸ Therefore, it can be argued that US aid to Pakistan in the post-2001 period had been intended to fight the war against terrorism in Afghanistan as well as assisting Pakistan in its own

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⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.61.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*.

⁷⁸ Craig Cohen, *op.cit*.

counterterror efforts rather than facilitating economic development in the country.

3.2.3 Support for General Musharraf

As discussed earlier in the paper, after the October 1999 coup the US condemned unconstitutional takeover of power by Musharraf. As a response, the Clinton administration also imposed the ‘democracy sanctions’. President Clinton’s visit in Pakistan for very short period of time compared to five-day stay in India, and Clinton’s avoidance of not being seen as shaking hands with Musharraf are symbolic indications of the US’s disapproval of Pakistan’s military government. Moreover, as Ahmed Rashid pointed out, the United States did not even like Musharraf that much. “Since 1999, when Musharraf as army chief had ordered Pakistani troops into Indian Kashmir, nearly provoking a nuclear conflict, he was viewed in the West as rash, unpredictable, and easily manipulated by extremist generals.”⁷⁹

All these reproach and rebuke of the Musharraf regime turned into an “Our Man” approach to General Pervez Musharraf in the aftermath of the 11 September attack. Following Musharraf’s acceptance of all the US demands, the Bush administration immediately waived all the nuclear-related sanctions. The Congress waived the democracy sanctions and gave the US president authority to waive these sanctions further. The removal of all these sanctions cleared the way for economic and military aid, and security assistance to Pakistan paving the inflow of billions of dollars from Washington to Islamabad after 2001.

The appeal of Musharraf to the US administration was best explained by the statement of Colin Powel, “General Musharraf is the right man in the right place at the right time”.⁸⁰ In a similar fashion, the “9/11 Commission Report identified the government of President Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it recommended that the US make a long-term commitment to provide support for Islamabad”.⁸¹ However, a closer look reveals that support for Musharraf was dictated by many US interests.

US acceptance of the military dictatorship in Pakistan might have been dictated by its objective of maintaining the status quo. With destabilised Afghanistan, an unfriendly regime in Pakistan would be a nightmare for the US administration. Since Musharraf already showed his full allegiance to the US demands and US objectives, and the uncertainty involved in the event of a

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⁷⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.32.

⁸⁰ Sunanda Datta, “On the Slow Road to End Kashmir’s Trauma”, *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 24 February 2004., quoted in Abid Ullah Jan, *The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to Inevitable Demise*, Ottawa: Pragmatic Publishing, 2005, p.21.

⁸¹ Kronstadt, *op.cit.*

regime change especially after the 2002 elections, the US policy makers turned a blind eye to the military dictatorship of Pakistan.

The Bush administration might also have considered Musharraf more manageable than a democratically elected president who might have to pay attention to the opinion and demands of his electorate, which given the persisting anti-American sentiment in Pakistani society would not have coincided with the US interests. Moreover, as Malou Innocent stated, “as a matter of political expediency, coordinating issues of military intelligence and operational and tactical level planning is much simpler when done through a single authoritarian leader than with the warring factions of a dysfunctional parliament.”⁸²

Musharraf regime was also considered as preventing *Jihadis* from getting their finger onto the trigger of the nuclear weapon. Some analysis maintains that Musharraf used his good relations with the Islamist parties as a bargaining chip with the United States. “By tolerating the MMA and keeping them politically alive as a possible alternative for Pakistan, Musharraf is adroitly passing a message to the US, that the non-military option would be much worse.”⁸³ In essence Musharraf built up the strength of the religious parties to validate the need for a military state.

However, the most disappointing factor is that throughout the Musharraf regime there was no visible and meaningful pressure from the US to revert back to democracy. The US administration adopted a long-term approach to democratic consolidation rather than designing an immediate road map for democracy in Pakistan. As stated by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher in a December 2007 statement before a Senate panel:

The United States wants to see Pakistan succeed in its transition to an elected civilian-led democracy, to become a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights and the rule of law. All of our assistance programs are directed toward helping Pakistan achieve these goals. This is a long-term undertaking that will require years to accomplish.⁸⁴

Probably this long-term approach of the Bush administration also led President Bush to waive the Democracy Sanctions every year, which sent a positive signal to the autocratic regime of General Musharraf whilst a negative signal to the people of Pakistan, who were becoming frustrated with the Musharraf dictatorship. Yet the US administration continued all the economic and military aid, which by some observers could have been used as a leverage compelling the military regime to pave the way for democracy.

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⁸² Malou Innocent, *op.cit.*, p.16.

⁸³ Ashutosh Misra, “Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects”, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2003, p.14.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.81.

The US support for Musharraf was at its worst during the Lawyer's movement in Pakistan in June 2007 that ultimately turned into a mass uprising. There was no visible pressure from the US government on the Musharraf regime to comply with the public opinion. An article appearing in *The Washington Post* on 7 June 2007, claimed:

The Bush administration is continuing to back [Musharraf] as he faces the most serious challenge to his eight-year dictatorship. The United States is supporting him to the hilt. The message to the Pakistani public is clear: To the Bush White House, the war on terrorism tops everything, and that includes democracy.

The US administration even remained silent and let Musharraf impose the 'emergency' in November 2007. All this support for Musharraf reflected his cooperation in fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. To what extent both the US and Musharraf were successful in their objectives will be evident when we discuss the contemporary situation in Pakistan. And this discussion will also unpack the consequences or outcomes of the US policies toward Pakistan during the reign of Musharraf.

3.3 *The Outcomes*

K Alan Kronstadt, a specialist in South Asian Affairs at Congressional Research Service remarked ".....the outcomes of US policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have seen a failure to neutralise anti-Western militants and reduce religious extremism in that country, and a failure to contribute sufficiently to the stabilisation of neighbouring Afghanistan."⁸⁵ However, it might be difficult to show the exact cause and effect of the policies, strategies and the outcomes but the recent scenarios in Pakistan may be linked with the policies and strategies pursued by the US.

3.3.1 *Shift of centre of gravity from Afghanistan to Afghanistan-Pakistan border*

The central goal of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), according to an Indian scholar, was "the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the neutralisation of the al Qaeda and Taliban combine, dismantling the Taliban regime, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan."⁸⁶ Therefore, the operational objectives of the OEF left out a very important question, 'where would the Taliban and the al Qaeda members go (if not killed or apprehended)?' As a consequence, after the initial success of the OEF that dismantled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a large number of Taliban forces and al Qaeda operatives crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border into the FATA region of Pakistan. In fact, a large number of Taliban fighters were originated from this region of Pakistan, and their return to these ancestral

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⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Shanthie D'Souza, *op.cit.*, p.526.

lands was not surprising.⁸⁷ Over the next few years they regrouped, gained in strength and since 2007 have mounted an insurgency against the US and NATO allied forces in Afghanistan.

The leadership of the Taliban movement even went further inside Pakistan. Although the exact location of the supreme leadership cannot be established, Afghan military and civilian intelligence officials as well as NATO commanders today believe that the *rahbari shura* (leadership council) centred on Mullah Mohammed Omar and his close associates eventually found refuge in Quetta, the largest city and capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. According to Col. Chris Vernon, NATO's chief of staff for southern Afghanistan, "the thinking piece of the Taliban (operates) out of Quetta in Pakistan. It's the major headquarters – they use it to run a series of networks in Afghanistan."⁸⁸ These Afghanistan networks are believed to be directed by "four subsidiary *shuras* based in Quetta, Miran Shah, Peshawar, and Karachi: the first three actually control or coordinate most of the ongoing terrorist operations occurring, respectively, along the southern, central, and northern "fronts" in Afghanistan (see Figure in the Appendix 2), whereas the fourth is believed to connect the Taliban with the logistics, financial, and technical assistance conduits emanating from the wider Islamic world."⁸⁹

More importantly al Qaeda had also taken up sanctuary in the FATA, particularly in South Waziristan initially. The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland" concluded that al Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Pakistan FATA, operational lieutenants, and its top leadership."⁹⁰

Another group emerged as a coherent extremist grouping in late 2007 located mainly in the FATA region namely the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Beitullah Mehsud. This "Pakistani Taliban" is said to have representatives from each of Pakistan's seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the "settled" districts abutting the FATA. Its principal aims are threefold: (1) to unite disparate pro-Taliban groups active in the FATA and NWFP; (2) to assist the Afghan Taliban in its conflict across the Durand Line; and (3) to establish a Taliban-style Islamic state in Pakistan and perhaps beyond.⁹¹

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⁸⁷ Ashley J Tellis, *op.cit.*, p.5.

⁸⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, p.6.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Quoted in Alan Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.8.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

The functioning of al Qaeda and the Taliban from the FATA region fairly indicates that the epicentre of transnational terrorism has essentially shifted from Afghanistan to Afghanistan-Pakistan border around the FATA region.

3.3.2 Rise in Religious Extremism in Pakistan

Religious extremism is nothing new in Pakistan. Throughout the 1990s numerous *jihadi* groups emerged in Pakistan to fight in the Kashmir insurgency against India.⁹² A number of sectarian groups also emerged during this period, and since then have engaged in violence very often. But what is new in the post-11 September 2001 period and especially since 2007, is an unprecedented rise in suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This phenomenon was almost non-existent before 2001. Only two suicide bombings were reported in Pakistan in all of 2002; that number grew to at least 57 in 2007. Moreover, the US National Counterterrorism Center's annual report found the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan in 2007 up by 137 per cent over the previous year, with 1,335 terrorism-related deaths placing the country at third in the world, after Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹³

This rise in the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan can directly be attributed to the shift in the 'centre of gravity' of transnational terrorism from Afghanistan to Afghanistan-Pakistan border. There is a strong connection between the increasing US-Pakistan offensive against the al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants inside Pakistan, and the rise in terrorism in Pakistan. As Teresita Schaffer commented, "the Pakistani government's actions against the militants, however, came at the price of a sharp increase in domestic violence in Pakistan."⁹⁴ Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants adopted a strategy of establishing operational relations with the local Jihadi groups and together they carry out terrorist activities in Pakistan. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a good example of such collusion, which emerged only in 2007, borrowing the ideologies and the objectives of the Afghan Taliban. And to pursue those objectives they are following the same terrorist strategy of al Qaeda and the Taliban, wrecking havoc in Pakistan.

The trends in the Swat region of Pakistan were another example of increasing extremism in Pakistan. Since late 2007, a "neo-Taliban" insurgency in the scenic Swat Valley just 100 miles northwest of the capital posing serious challenges for the Pakistani security forces. A radical pro-Taliban cleric, Maulana Fazlullah was leading the banned Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws (TNSM) to establish a parallel government in the region. He used an unlicensed FM radio broadcast to propagate his hard-line views and inspire militants to bomb girls' schools, preventing children from getting polio vaccines

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⁹² Ashley J Tellis, *op.cit.*, p.5.

⁹³ *Ibid*

⁹⁴ Teresita Schaffer, "US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, p.174.

(considered a Western plot to sterilise young Muslims), and blowing up video and CD shops. The government deployed 2,500 Frontier Corps soldiers to the Swat Valley and later the army took charge of the counterinsurgency effort massing about 15,000 regular troops. Instability in the Swat Valley and the military option pursued by the Musharraf regime also contributed to the increase in terrorist activities in Pakistan.

Sectarian violence has also increased in the post 2001 period. Although the Musharraf regime had banned Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tehrik-e-Fiqah Jafria the two most violent Sunni and Shia groups, their offshoots Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad have remained active since 2003 and engaged in violent bouts of bloodletting within the country. Christine Fair remarked, "The scale of sectarian violence in Pakistan is staggering, with hundreds of people killed or injured in such attacks each year."⁹⁵ According to a New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management, sectarian violence alone claimed close to 5,000 lives in Pakistan since 1989, with "incidents involving everything from targeted killings of high-profile civilians, to bombings of mosques and drive-by shootings of innocents, to pitched gun battles in major population centers."⁹⁶ From 2003-2006, terrorism directed against the Shia minority including suicide bombings killed scores of people and comprised the most serious domestic terrorism in Pakistan. Therefore, there is no denying of the fact that terrorism is on rise in Pakistan.

3.3.3 *Democratisation Faltered*

The track-record of democracy in Pakistan is upsetting. Since its independence, the country had tasted the bitter experience of four military dictatorships. None of the elected civilian governments have ever been able to complete its full term.⁹⁷ The latest military rule of General Pervez Musharraf lasted for eight years.

Like his predecessors, Musharraf usurped the political power of Pakistan with high promise to advance true democracy in the Pakistani society. In a televised speech to the nation five days after the coup, Musharraf announced that the military had "no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan."⁹⁸ Then again like his predecessors, he could not live up to his commitment of

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⁹⁵ Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007, p.2, quoted in Ashley Tellis, *op.cit.*, p.4

⁹⁶ Ashley Tellis, *ibid*, p.4

⁹⁷ Mohamed A El-Khawas, "Musharraf and Pakistan: Democracy Postponed", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2009, p.94.

⁹⁸ Pamela Constable, "Pakistan's Predicament," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2001, p.20.

establishing sustainable democracy in Pakistan. On the contrary, throughout his rule he made repeated move to strengthen and consolidate his own power undermining people's aspirations for democracy in Pakistan.

As a first step to consolidate his power, Musharraf decided to create "a new cadre of independent politicians who would support the government's agenda at the grassroots level."⁹⁹ Therefore, between December 2000 and mid-2001, local elections were held in five stages on a non-party basis in administrative and electoral districts. Since political parties were kept out of the contest, local tribes and religious groups got actively involved, and played a major role in choosing candidates for the election. This strategy of electing local government representatives on non-partisan basis, who would be pliable to the regime to get local patronage and services, resulted in "increasing the central government's administrative control of politics and weakening the provincial governments."¹⁰⁰

Next, in April 2002, Musharraf decided to hold a referendum asking people if they wanted him as the President of Pakistan for the next five years. He stated, it was necessary to complete his plans for establishing democracy and ending sectarianism and extremism. The referendum was held on 30 April 2002, and the government reported that the participation rate was 70 per cent (the opposition claimed that the turnout was between 5 and 15 per cent) of which 98 per cent voted for Musharraf.

However, the biggest move was made by Musharraf to consolidate his regime when he secretly formed a political party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), and just before the 2002 general elections, issued the Legal Framework Order, giving president the power to dissolve parliament, to dismiss an elected prime minister, and to appoint provincial governors. He also made a number of changes in the election laws to weaken other political parties. In July 2002, the government raised the bar for nomination, requiring that a candidate must have a college bachelor's degree or equivalent military academy or seminary degree. Any person had been convicted on charges of corruption or abuse of power, had defaulted on a bank loan, or had absconded from court proceedings was disqualified. This rule essentially prevented former prime ministers and their close associates from running for the election.

The 2002 election was held on 10 October, and the majority of the seats were, of course, won by the PML-Q, popularly known as the "king's party". Of 272 National Assembly seats, PML-Q won 118 seats, followed by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) with 81 seats. The coalition of Islamist parties MMA won a surprising 60 seats. Since the King's Party did not win a clear majority and failed to reach an agreement with both PPP and MMA, Musharraf followed a

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⁹⁹ Mohamed El-Khawas, *op.cit.*, p.97.

¹⁰⁰ Mohammad Waseem, *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.71.

strategy of wooing elected legislators to leave their party and join the PML-Q. Among other examples, twenty members of PPP left the party and formed their own party - Pakistan People's Party Parliamentary Patriot - before joining the PML-Q.¹⁰¹ This resulted in the PML-Q controlling enough votes to approve its candidate, Zafarullah Khan Ismail, as prime minister of Pakistan. Consequently, Musharraf continued dominating the political structure as "He had a prime minister he could work with, legislators he could manipulate to push his own agenda, and a political party he could control."¹⁰²

During all these years, from 2002 until the crisis of 2007, the Bush administration never really pushed Musharraf for a meaningful transition to democracy. The White House maintained the rhetoric that the "US-Pakistan strategic partnership is based on the shared interests of the two countries in building a stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe."¹⁰³ In practice, the Bush administration continued to express confidence on Musharraf and democratisation became a secondary consideration. Many critics assert that, "the Islamabad government was for more than five years given a 'free pass' on the issue of representative government, in part as a means of enlisting that country's continued assistance in the US-led counterterrorism efforts."¹⁰⁴

The crisis in 2007 started with the dismissal of the Supreme Court's Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, in early March. "It became the spark that ignited widening popular protest against Musharraf and gave both secular and religious opposition an issue to rally around."¹⁰⁵ Later, Musharraf's refusal to reinstate Chaudhry contributed to turning a judicial crisis into a full-fledged political crisis that threatened his regime. Musharraf followed the repressive measures and moved to control the media which backfired, and made journalists joining the protest. Consequently, in June 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the firing of chief justice Chaudhry was illegal and ordered his reinstatement.

The agitation against the Musharraf regime grew again when in July he announced that he was not going to give up his position as COAS, as he promised earlier. He defended his COAS position on the ground that a civilian government "would not be strong enough to control extremism", the same card he played throughout his regime for Washington as well. On 3 November 2007, he declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution, and stated that

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¹⁰¹ Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, London: Pluto, 2007, p.100.

¹⁰² Mohamed El-Khawas, *op.cit.*, p.102.

¹⁰³ "Fact Sheet: United States and Pakistan: Long-Term Strategic Partners", available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2006/03/20060304-4.html>, quoted in Shanthie D'Souza, *op.cit.*, p.528.

¹⁰⁴ Alan Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.81.

¹⁰⁵ Mohamed El-Khawas, *op.cit.*, p.105

these were necessary to prevent Pakistan from falling apart. These actions only contributed to the mounting of opposition against his regime and finally in late November Musharraf resigned from his post of Army Chief.

During the November emergency, criticism against the Bush administration's support to Musharraf regime also grew in the United States. Two former senior Clinton Administration officials criticised Bush administration for choosing to "back the dictator" rather than offer clear support for democracy and rule of law in Pakistan.¹⁰⁶ In late 2007, in Senate testimony, one former US diplomat noted that, "overall US policy toward Pakistan until very recently gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy in Pakistan."¹⁰⁷

Many commentators also criticised the Bush administration's perceived overemphasis on Musharraf and the Pakistani military. As articulated by Hussain Haqqani (current Pakistani ambassador to the US) in a statement before the House Armed Services Committee, on 10 October 2007:

The United States made a critical mistake in putting faith in one man- General Pervez Musharraf – and one institution - the Pakistani military—as instruments of the U.S. policy to eliminate terrorism and bring stability to the Southwest and South Asia. A robust U.S. policy of engagement with Pakistan that helps in building civilian institutions, including law enforcement capability, and eventually results in reverting Pakistan's military to its security functions would be a more effective way of strengthening Pakistan and protecting United States policy interests there.

Such policy of engagement to build civilian institutions and sending back the military to their barrack had never been pursued by the US during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf. However, at this point, it is worth discussing why the Bush administration finally decided to withdraw its support from Musharraf and welcomed the Pakistanis' demand for democratically elected government.

Why the Bush administration had to abandon Musharraf?

Since 11 September 2001, the Bush administration developed close ties with Musharraf. As a *Washington Post* article reported, "For years, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had no stronger supporter than President Bush."¹⁰⁸ However, the US administration's disenchantment with Musharraf ensued in July 2007, when Musharraf announced his intention to keep his post of Army Chief. As Mohamed El-Khawas noted, "The Bush administration was surprised by the July announcement, which was contrary to Musharraf's promise to give up his military post."¹⁰⁹ It is at this point, the US administration for the first time during the Musharraf regime, made a move for a democratically elected civilian

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¹⁰⁶ Alan Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.81.

¹⁰⁷ Quoted in Alan Kronstadt, *ibid.*, p.81.

¹⁰⁸ "As Musharraf Faltered, US Stayed at a Distance", *Washington Post*, USA, 19 August, 2008.

¹⁰⁹ Mohamed El-Khawas, *op.cit.*, p.107.

government in Islamabad. This move might have also been motivated by the mass protest against the regime during the Lawyer's movement in June 2007.

The US administration brokered a power-sharing deal between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf. In July 2007, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested the deal to Bhutto, by which she would support Musharraf's bid for a second term as president in exchange for his dropping the corruption charges against her.¹¹⁰ The deal would also allow Bhutto to contest in the next general election, and if she was elected prime minister, to share power with President Musharraf.

The rising trend of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan in late 2007 might have also led to the realisation in the US administration that Musharraf had failed to deliver in countering terrorism. As Michael J Green, former top Asia official at the White House commented, "You could count on him to make tough decisions, even though you could never count on him to completely follow through."¹¹¹ The securing of "safe haven" by al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan was also viewed by the US administration resulting from a lacklustre counter terror effort of Musharraf. Therefore, as Stephen Cohen commented in late 2007, "more Americans now see (Musharraf) as a liability, and this begins with the US military who have encountered Pakistan-based Taliban."¹¹²

Therefore, after the February 2008 elections, which produced victory for Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP) and Nawaz's Muslim League (PML-N), Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte offered little public defence of Musharraf and called his future status "a matter to be determined by the internal Pakistani political process".¹¹³ But privately, the Bush administration continued its effort to secure Musharraf's position in the government by pressing the election winner Asif Ali Zardari to follow through whatever agreements were made between his wife Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf in July 2007. On the contrary, the Bush administration faced with the biggest challenge by the coalition formation between Zardari and Nawaz, and their intention to proceed with the Impeachment. Finding no other way to rescue Musharraf, the Bush administration finally concluded that Musharraf's time was up and manoeuvred for a "soft landing" for Musharraf, and at the end secured 'immunity' before his resignation on 18 August 2008. Therefore, as predicted by Tariq Ali, a few years back that "Should he falter domestically, Musharraf will be ditched without sentiment by the suzerain",¹¹⁴ his exit followed the anticipation.

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¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ "As Musharraf Faltered, US Stayed at a Distance", *Washington Post*, USA, 19 August, 2008.

¹¹² Quoted in Tariq Ali, *The Duel, op.cit.*, p.254.

¹¹³ Alan Kronstadt, *op.cit.*, p.43.

¹¹⁴ "The Colour Khaki," *New Left Review* 19 (January-February 2003), quoted in Tariq Ali, *The Duel, op.cit.*, p.269.

Now before we conclude, it is worthwhile to discuss a few points that can be held responsible for United States' apparent failings in realising its desired objectives in Pakistan especially during the regime of General Musharraf.

3.3.4 Reasons for the US Failings

The following factors can be identified as the major problems of US strategies that led to the US's failure in achieving its most objectives in Pakistan.

First, the US ideals of democracy promotion have not been put into practice. In Pakistan, the US continued to support a military regime to attain its objectives. Consistent with the providential mission, the Bush administration in the post-11 September period put specific emphasis on promoting democracy as a means of fighting terrorism. Bush vowed that the United States "will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants....[and] will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."¹¹⁵ Free nations, it was contended, are not likely to engender terrorism, but are more inclined towards cooperation and peaceful cohabitation with other nations. Therefore, the Bush administration revealed a grand strategy of transformation targeting the Muslim nations under the rule of dictators. But the Bush administration never pursued such a policy with regard to Pakistan.

Second, the US administration while supporting a military regime failed to comprehend the fact that over the years a close relationship has developed between the Pakistani military and the islamists. Two factors contributed to such relationship. Both General Ayub Khan and General Zia ul-Haq took measures to Islamise the Pakistani army, consistent with their overall effort of Islamising Pakistani society. The use of Islamic ideology for the indoctrination of the army was manifest during Ayub Khan's regime. The Armed Forces Day during Ayub's era was celebrated with much fanfare and the soldiers were given to believe that they were not only defending their homeland against a belligerent and vicious neighbour but also in the cause of Islam against the 'idolator infidels'.¹¹⁶ This indoctrination process continued during Zia's regime. Zia had given the Pakistan army a new motto: "Faith, piety and struggle in the path of Allah". The motto was derived from the title of an article by Abul Ala Maududi, founder (and ideologue) of the Pakistan Jamat-i-Islami. This Islamisation process contributed to the infiltration of the Islamists inside the army and army officers became sympathisers of the Islamists. On the other hand, the army also maintained a close relationship with the Islamists to secure their position in the society and to remain in power. This relationship between the army and the

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¹¹⁵ George W Bush, "Address to the American Legion National Convention," Salt Lake City, Utah, 31 August 2006.

¹¹⁶ Saleem Qureshi, "Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered", *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 1972-73, p.568, quoted in Partha S Ghosh, *op.cit.*, p.110.

Islamists has been a major hindrance in the US-led counterterrorism effort in Pakistan during the military rule of Musharraf.

Third, compared to the military aid and security assistances, the US economic aid to Pakistan since 2001, were very limited. As Table 1 shows, of US\$ 11.9 billion total aid, military reimbursement (CSF) comprised more than half of it (US\$ 6.6 billion) whereas only US\$ 3.1 billion has been provided as economic aid. And of economic aid only US\$ 17 million was given for promoting democracy. This overemphasis on security at the expense of development contributed to the persistence of reasons that breed extremism and terrorism.

Fourth, in fighting the war against terror in Afghanistan and countering terrorism in Pakistan, the biggest blunder made by the US administration was misunderstanding or not understanding the nature and rationale of Pakistan's support to the Taliban. When the Northern Alliance, believed to be friendly to India was put in control of Kabul by the US, despite Pakistan's opposition, it was a 'strategic debacle' for "army officers committed to avoiding a situation where Pakistan was sandwiched between two hostile states."¹¹⁷ Although Pakistan changed its policy, and continued to work with the US, it never gave up on the Taliban to maintain its only leverage against Afghanistan if it turns unfriendly.

Finally, the Iraq war became a diversion for the US policymakers. Getting involved in another war, before finishing the job in Afghanistan diverted considerable attention and direction of the US strategists to the Iraq war – depriving the need of Afghanistan as well as of Pakistan. To quote Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, "Huge resources were devoted to Iraq, which focused away from nation building in Afghanistan. The billions spent in Iraq were the billions that were not spent in Afghanistan."¹¹⁸ And the US attack on Iraq was critical to convincing Musharraf that the United States was not serious about stabilising the region, and that it was safer for Pakistan to preserve its own national interest by clandestinely giving the Taliban refuge.¹¹⁹

4. Conclusion

The paper shows that in the post-11 September 2001 period, the United States redefined its policy objectives in Pakistan commensurate with its global policy objectives of fighting and countering terrorism and extremism in every continent of the world. The main policy objectives pursued by the US were ensuring Pakistan's continued cooperation and active participation in fighting the war in Afghanistan, assisting Pakistan in countering terrorism and extremism

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¹¹⁷ Schaffer, *op.cit.*, p.174.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.XLI.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

within its own boundary, and securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the religious extremists. To ensure Pakistan's immediate cooperation in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the US pursued a strategy of coercive diplomacy, and successfully and promptly secured Pakistan's full support. However, to maintain Pakistan's continued support, the United States provided massive aid to Pakistan as well as sustained close relationship with the military regime of Musharraf. Nevertheless, the tenure of Musharraf regime was characterised by rising incidents of suicide terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, and the Taliban and al Qaeda remnant's secured a safe refuge in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, and finally the democratisation process faltered in Pakistan. The United States therefore, evidently failed to achieve most of its objectives.

The paper argues that it was the limitation of the US policy objectives and the lacuna in the strategies employed to pursue those limited objectives were mostly responsible. While democracy promotion has been adopted by the Bush administration as a global strategy of transformation to fight terrorism and extremism in nations mostly Muslim majority countries, such policy has never been pursued in Pakistan. The over-emphasis on security assistance at the expense of development aid had also led to the persistence of the causes that bred extremism. Finally, the strategy of deep cooperation with Musharraf emboldened the military regime and the army, defying the US policy objectives of countering terrorism that eventually resulted in the Taliban and the al Qaeda acquiring renewed strength and, wreck havoc on the US allied forces in Afghanistan.

In any analysis, the US-Pakistan relations during the Musharraf regime were complicated. The leader of the free world had to cooperate with a dictator to achieve its foreign policy objectives and national interest. On the other hand, Pakistan's rationale for maintaining the relationship with the sole superpower was more parochial. The Musharraf regime viewed its relations with the US through the prism of securing heightened flow of aid, and support for the military regime rather than developing a strong relationship based on mutual interests. Doing so served the interests of its military ruler fairly well whereas the aspirations of the Pakistanis for democratic governance rarely received serious attention. Moreover, the trust deficit between the two countries also hindered the development of a long-term and healthy relationship. The alienation of the people of Pakistan was complete when the Bush administration continued to support the Musharraf regime during the mass protests in late 2007. The US administration appeared naïve in acknowledging the problems of Pakistan and depended only on one person to solve all its problems even when that person in some instances was indeed responsible for the problem.

Success of any bilateral relationship depends on mutual trust and interests. During the Musharraf regime, the US administration had failed to pay attention

to the security problems of Pakistan in the region. All the misdeeds committed by the Musharraf regime that the US did not want him to do had their origin in the Pakistan-India conflict. From supporting local extremists to aiding the Taliban all were linked one way or the other to Pakistan's bilateral problems with India. Therefore, pursuing the resolution of Pakistan-India conflict would have been an effective way to earn the trust of the Pakistani people. As an Indian scholar remarked, "no amount of bilateral dialogue would help as India had the competitive advantage in such a dialogue."¹²⁰ Therefore, only an international mediation or third-party intervention can resolve the Kashmir dispute and here the US can be more active rather than accepting the status quo. Pakistan should also realise the importance of its relations with the US. The country now has to act for its own interests since once again the interests of the US and of Pakistan converged in fighting and countering terrorism and extremism in the region of South Asia.


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¹²⁰ Partha S Ghosh, "The Muslims, South Asia, and the United States: A Post-9/11 Analysis", *South Asian Survey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, p.103.

Appendix-1

Appendix-2

Figure 1: Location of the Three Major Fighting Fronts in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas



Source: Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game," *Survival*, 49:1 (2007), p. 20.