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THE ROLE OF A STATE AS A THIRD PARTY IN MANAGING CONFLICTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract

Conflict is an inseparable part of all human social relations. Today, the world is literally covered with ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts. Although resolving a conflict is desirable and should be the aim of any negotiation, due to mutual distrust very often disputants fail to bring any peaceful and permanent solution of the conflict. Hence, scholars emphasize conflict management, a process that reduces the level of intensity of a conflict, and uses channels of communication for gradual solution of the problem. This article examines the criteria, motives and strategies of a mediator in managing a conflict. It brings in a debate on the importance of impartiality and leverage as the most important criteria when choosing a mediator. Finally, this study argues that a state in particular a major power, which is impartial in a conflict and has leverage on the disputants, can be an acceptable and affective mediator. As a diplomatic strategy, the major power can simultaneously employ its Track I and Track II diplomacy for conflict management.

Keywords: Mediation, Conflict and Conflict Management, State, Diplomacy, Third party, Track I, Track II.

Introduction

Conflict is a natural and inseparable part of human social relations. Conflicts occur at all levels of society — ranging from

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interpersonal to international level. Conflict may be defined as escalated, natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige.[1] Conflict can also be described as a struggle or clash between two opposing forces about values, ideologies, interests, desires and perceptions. A conflict could take place when one wants to gain its interests at the cost of other's interests. In other words, when a group or a state cannot go beyond their narrow interests, then a conflict becomes inevitable.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a widespread expectation that the world would be a safer and peaceful place. Nevertheless, the record of the last one and half decades is mixed. Although the number of states involved in serious conflicts has dropped by almost half in the post-Cold War period,[2] the wars (both intra-state and inter-state) that have been going on for many years in places like Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq have been responsible for several millions killed, most of them civilian.[3] The bipolar system of the Cold War period was changed to unipolar, multipolar or uni-multipolar, which altered the power distribution in the international politics. However, the new international system is as conflict-prone as any previous system.[4] Therefore, conflicts are going to remain with us, and as long as conflicts are with us the possibility of serious damage exists, as does the need to resolve such conflicts.

Although resolving a conflict is desirable and should be the aim of any negotiation, very often it is difficult to have a concrete resolution that can satisfy both parties in conflict. Therefore, scholars emphasize the study of conflict management. Conflict management

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[1] James Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict," in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, (eds.), *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Application*, Frances Publishers, London, 1987, pp. 17-29.

[2] John Davies and Edy Kaufman, "Second Track/ Citizen's Diplomacy: An Overview," in John Davies and Edy Kaufman, (eds.), *Second Track/Citizen Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2003, p. 1.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Jacob Bercovitch, "Introduction: Thinking about Mediation," in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, London, 1996, p. 1.

is a process that reduces the level of intensity of a conflict and save human lives and prevent damage of resources, and uses channels of communication for gradual solution of the problem. The primary mission of conflict management is to terminate the immediate crisis before it escalates or spreads.[5]

There are different methods for conflict management and resolution: cultural conciliation, economic cooperation, political commitment, conflict avoidance, negotiation, and third party intervention.[6] Third party intervention has various forms: good office, facilitation, arbitration, military intervention and mediation. However, mediation has been one of the most significant devices for conflict management throughout the human history.[7] Although mediation is a complex process and the number of the successful mediation of conflicts is low, it has been applied more than other conflict management methods. Hence the study attempts to search the answers to the following questions: Why third party mediation is important for conflict management? What are the criteria to be an effective mediator? What are the motives and strategies of a mediator in managing a conflict? And who is the ideal mediator?

This article consists of four sections. *The first section* attempts to provide significance and definition of third party mediation. *The second section* focuses on the criteria of a third party mediator. *The third section* focuses on various actors involved in mediation and their motives in managing conflicts. *The final section* argues that state, especially a major power which has leverage on the disputants, and has been impartial in the conflict could be an effective mediator

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[5] During the high tense period in May-June 2003, when India and Pakistan were very close to a nuclear war, the international community gave diplomatic pressure to both India and Pakistan to withdraw the troops on the Line of Control in Kashmir. The decision to withdraw troops constituted a change to India and Pakistan's behaviour. This can be cited as an instance of conflict management. See, Harun ur Rashid*, An Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies,* The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2005, p. 65.

[6] Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in Jacob Bercovitch, *op. cit.*, p. 11. ; See also, Harun ur Rashid, *ibid.*, pp. 66-68.

[7] Jacob Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management,* Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1992, pp. 1-2.

in managing conflict. As a mediation strategy, the major power can simultaneously employ its Track I and Track II diplomacy for conflict management.

1. Third Party Mediation in Managing Conflicts

1.1 *Why Third Party Mediation is Important?*

Mediation has been practiced for as long as two people have fought while a third party tried to bring their fight to an end. Jeffrey Rubin noted that "Mediation in international relations has not only been practiced frequently, but has emerged as an important instrument of international diplomacy."[8] Zartman and Touval argued that international conflicts are frequently the subject of third party mediation. It has been a frequent occurrence for at least last 200 years.[9] Bercovitch noted that in the present international system, where conflicts are multiplied and manifold, and where there is no central authority with the power to regulate international behavior, mediation can be seen as an ideal way of dealing with differences and setting conflicts between hostile states.[10]

If one compares mediation with the other forms of third party intervention, one can find that a third party, acting as a 'facilitator' or providing 'good offices', has a more limited role than a mediator, usually involving no more than helping to bring the parties in conflict into direct negotiations. Like a mediator, a facilitator or good officer cannot analyse the conflict and propose agenda and directions for negotiation. Arbitration, another form of third party intervention, is a quasi-judicial mode of settlement among states in which the parties agree to one or more arbitrators to make a decision on a conflict. Usually disputants are reluctant to accept this method for conflict management. On the other hand, military intervention is the aggressive method of resolving a conflict. The second Gulf War on Iraq in 2003 is a case in point. However, the application of military forces does not necessarily root out the seeds of the conflict. Therefore, compared to the other mechanisms, mediation, a non-

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[8] Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Conclusion: International Mediation in Context", *ibid*, p. 249.

[9] William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D. C, 1997, p. 445.

[10] Bercovitch, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

coercive mechanism, has more scope for and can be effective in managing a conflict.

In addition, if one examines the prevalence of mediation *vis-à-vis* other conflict management activities, one gets a fairly clear picture of how widespread is the choice to mediation as a form of international conflict management. Bercovitch and Houston identified total 241 disputes from 1945 to 1990, and 137 of that were actually mediated. Some disputes were mediated once, others experienced multiple mediations.[11] The statistic reveals the distribution of mediation outcomes from 1945 to 1990. It shows that 55 percent of mediation were unsuccessful, compared to 45 percent of successful cases. Full settlement outcomes were low.[12] Nonetheless, the following figure clearly reveals that during the same period third party mediation was applied more than other conflict management methods.


Figure 1: Conflict Management Types used in Different Conflicts from 1945 to 1990[13]

From personal relations to international relations, whenever conflicts occur, very often adversaries cannot solve a dispute. Therefore, they request a third party to mediate the conflict, or sometimes a third party willingly wants to mediate the dispute. The third party may want to mediate the conflict just for humanitarian cause or be motivated by its own interests. However, whatever the

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[11] Bercovitch and Houston, *op. cit.,* pp. 16-17.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 19.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

motives behind the mediation, if the mechanism helps the parties to resolve, then the mediation should be welcomed. Bercovitch and Houston noted that as a form of conflict management, mediation is important when *First,* a conflict has gone on for some time and is ripe for mediation and solution. *Second,* the efforts of the adversaries have reached a mutual hurting stalemate. *Third,* the cost of the war (in terms of death toll, damage of resources) is high, and neither actor is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute. *Fourth,* both parties welcome some form of mediation and are ready to engage in direct or indirect dialogue.[14] To add to their views the author argues that when a conflict directly or indirectly affects the international stability or the interests of a third country, then mediation also occurs.

1.2 *Definition of Third Party Mediation*

Mediation is a kind of negotiation designed to promote the settlement of a conflict. In this negotiation a distinctive role is played by a third party, which is not directly involved in the dispute. There are various definitions of third party mediation in the existing literatures. Bercovitch defines mediation as, "A process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law."[15] Berridge argues, "Mediation is the active search for a negotiated settlement to an international or intrastate conflict by an impartial third party."[16] Young defines mediation as "Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis."[17] Ronald Fisher defines mediation as the intervention of a skilled and impartial third party working to facilitate a mutually acceptable settlement for both disputants.[18] Zartman and Touval noted that mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict and it is not based on the direct use of force and is not aimed at helping one of the participants to win. Its purpose

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[14] Bercovitch, p. 12.

is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable to both parties.[19]

Third party mediation is a process that helps the disputants to terminate their conflicts. The aim of the mediation is to bring about a win win situation for the parties in conflict. It is noted that most of the definitions focus on the activities and the quality of a third party mediator. A great number of definitions stress the importance of one particular attribute; namely, impartiality. Finally, the author defines that *Third Party mediation is a dynamic search of negotiation in which an impartial third party motivated by its self interest and/or to establish justice can exercise its leverage on the disputants to settle a conflict for a mutually acceptable solution.* Moreover, the third party provides a guarantee of the agreement to both parties during the settlement.

2. The Criteria of a Third Party in Managing Conflicts

Successful management of a conflict largely depends on the quality of a mediator. The identity and characteristics of a mediator have been cited by some scholars as predictors of success.[20] There are several criteria to become a third party mediator in managing a conflict: a state or organisation, which 1) is not involved in the conflict and free from dependence on either political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the conflict at hand; 2) has been impartial in the conflict; 3) has leverage on parties in conflict; 4) has skilled individual and experts on mediation and negotiation; and finally, 5) has self-interest in resolving the conflict. The self-interest drives the country or organisation to see a resolution of the conflict. The author analyses the two most important criteria of a mediator in more detail below.

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[15] Bercovitch in Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[16] G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, (Second Edition), Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 188.

[17] Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967, p. 34.

[18] Ronald J. Fisher, *Methods of Third Party Intervention*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2001, p. 4.

[19] Zartman and Touval, *op. cit.*

[20] Bercovitch and Houston, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

2.1 *Impartiality*

A number of scholars underline impartiality as one of the most important criteria for becoming a third party mediator. Berridge argues that the third party must be substantially *impartial* in the dispute, at least once the negotiation has started.[21] This study also argues that when the adversaries fail to resolve a conflict and seek a third party, usually they search a third party, which has been impartial in the conflict. Young noted that in most cases a meaningful role for a third party mediator will depend on the party's impartial participation in the conflict. He claims that "a high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations."[22] If the third party is perceived as partial to one side or other, it loses its status as a true third party mediator. In order to play an impartial mediatory role, the third party must be independent from any disputants.

2.2 *Leverage*

Having "leverage" on the antagonists is another important requirement for a third party mediator. Some even argue that it is the most important criteria for effective mediation. Touval and Zartman observed that the mediation process succeeds not when a mediator is unbiased or impartial, but when he or she possesses resources and leverage that either disputant values.[23] Touval observed that mediators require leverage in order to be successful in managing a conflict. Leverage comes, *first,* from the parties' need for a solution that the mediator can provide; *second,* from the parties' vulnerability to the shifting weight that the mediator can apply; and *third,* from the parties' interests in side payments that the mediator can either offer (carrots) or withhold (sticks).[24] Leverage is the source of power, influence, and capability of a state (third party), which can be political, economic, or military, or a combination of them, to persuade the adversaries for accepting third party mediation or a peaceful solution in a dispute. Leverage of a third party, carrots and

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[21] G.R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 188.

[22] Young, *op. cit.,* p. 81.

[23] Touval and Zartman, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[24] Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," in Bercovitch and Jeffery Z. Rubin, (eds.), *op. cit.,* p. 233.

sticks, is used either to make the present situation more unpleasant for the conflicting parties or to make the future situation of mediated peace more pleasant.

2.3 *A Debate on the Importance of Impartiality and Leverage*

There is a debate on the importance of impartiality and leverage when choosing a mediator. Some scholars, for instance, Touval and Zartman suggest that impartiality is not necessary for successful mediation.[25] They argue, "If the acceptance of mediation is based on a cost-benefit calculation, then assumption that mediators must be perceived as impartial needs to be revised."[26] They also argue, "Good relationship with one of the parties may be an aid to communicating, to developing creative proposals, and to converging the two parties' position."[27] Touval and Zartman considered the capability of a third party to bring about acceptable outcomes rather than mediator's impartiality should be the determinant for choosing a third party. Related to this, they provided several examples such as American mediation between Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan in Tashkent.[28] In these cases mediators were not impartial.

However, this study argues that a third party that has the ability but lacks impartiality is probably not the first or best choice. Related to this, Welton and Pruit noted that if both parties come to believe that the mediator is hostile or biased against them, then the disfavoured party will be less likely to pay attention to the mediator's suggestions for a settlement, and less likely to accept the mediator as a mediator in the first place.[29]

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[25] Saadia Touval and William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory," in Saadia Touval and William Zartman, (eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, School of Advanced International Studies, Boulder, 1985, p. 15.

[26] Zartman and Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in Chester A. Crocker & others, *op. cit.,* p. 450.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] For more details, see, Zartman and Touval, *ibid,* p. 451.

[29] G. L. Welton and D.G. Pruitt, "The Effects of Mediator Bias and Disputant Power Over the Mediator on the Mediation Process," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 13, 1987, pp. 123-133; Also see Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation," in Bercovitch *op. cit.,* p. 41.

A further look at the above two cases, U.S. mediation in Arab-Israel, and Soviet mediation in India- Pakistan conflict, indicates that only the weak parties (Arab and Pakistan) accepted both the U.S. and Soviet Union respectively as third party mediators as they had no better choice. Touval and Zartman noted that in case of several mediations between Arabs and Israel, the Arabs' belief that the close American-Israel ties would enable the U.S. to deliver Israeli concessions, made American mediation attractive to them. On the other hand, in the case of India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan perceived that the Soviet Union wanted to improve relations with it, and as a friend of India, the Soviet Union could help bring about an agreement.

Touval and Zartman were correct in their arguments. Nonetheless, from a different perspective, in the case of Israel-Palestine conflict, if the UN or any other impartial and capable third party were available to mediate the conflict, Palestine (the weak party) probably would have chosen them rather than the U.S. Although the Arab has accepted the West, particularly US mediation, they have always been in fear whether they will be given the justice or not. In the case of the India and Pakistan conflict, Pakistan (weak party) accepted the Soviet Union, because only the Soviet Union was willing to mediate at that time. Pakistan, which had been looking for international mediation in the Kashmir problem, took it as a positive step for face saving and for improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Cosmetic and superficial measures to manage or resolve a conflict cannot bring a permanent and peaceful solution as it is evident especially in case of Palestine. There is a need to seek resolution of the Kashmir and Palestine conflicts by taking the will of the suppressed people. Since these conflicts have resulted in large scale violence and the excessive use of force by the Israeli and Indian security forces, the outcome is the emergence of extremist religious groups which often resort to terrorist activities.[30]

Therefore, based on the above arguments it is not too much to say that for making a real peace, impartiality is and should be the

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[30] Moonis Ahmar, "Why Rethink the Paradigms of Conflict Resolution?," in Moonis Ahmar (ed.), *Paradigms of Conflict Resolution in South Asia,* The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2003, p. 25.

first criteria that a mediator should meet. Sometimes, it is said that the more ties the mediator has with a party, the greater the possibility of pressing that party by suspending ties. However, from another perspective, suspended ties also mean reduced influence on the party. Moreover, a big stick can make the parties in conflict decide that it can do just well without carrots in its diet.

3. Different Actors in Mediation and Motivating Factors

Due to distrust, antagonism and lack of political will, when two rivals fail to manage or resolve their dispute, a third party very often tries to mediate between them for a peaceful resolution. The third party provides the context in which disputants are able to come together for peaceful solution of a conflict.[31] However, now the questions are: Who are the mediators? What motivates them to mediate a conflict? And why do parties in conflict accept their mediation? This section attempts to answer these questions.

Mediation is carried out by different actors. State (big or small), the UN, regional organisations, non state actors, and individuals like the former U.S. President Carter have played mediation role in various conflicts in various parts of the world. Here, actors involved in mediation are sorted out into three categories. *First,* Individual mediator; *Second,* Institutions (International, regional and non-governmental); *Third,* State (major power, small power, and multiparty major powers). Although apparently it is seen that the aim of mediation is to manage a dispute, many hidden and declared factors are associated with the process of mediation. It is a mechanism that brings mutual benefit, a win-win situation for adversaries, and also benefits for the mediator. Touval noted that "mediators, like brokers, are in it for profit."[32] Therefore, motives of a third party mediator are important for an effective mediation. There are a variety of motives behind third party mediation. These motives differ from actor to actor. For examples, states' motives for mediation may differ from the motives of international or regional organisation. However, generally the following motives may drive an actor to be a mediator. *First,* dispute resolution and global peace;

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[31] Herbert Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy," in John Davies and Edy Kaufman, *op. cit.,* p. 91.
[32] Cited in G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 190.

Second, self interests; *Third,* international political power game; *Fourth,* to become prominent in the international arena; *Fifth,* improving relations with adversaries; *Sixth,* to establish justice. This section sheds some light on different mediators and their motives separately.

3.1 *Mediation by Individuals*

An individual actor can mediate national or international conflict. Usually, former political leaders, diplomats, scholars, practitioners can be the mediator. For instance, the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has mediated many domestic and international disputes. One of the good examples of his mediation role is the Nairobi Agreement between Sudan and Uganda in December 1999.[33]

It is noted that there is confusion on the identity of the individual mediator. For example, the individual mediator who is normally an official representative of his/her government in formal interactions with high level officials from the disputing countries cannot be described as individual mediator. The individual just represents the view of his /her state or formal organisation. Individual mediation means mediation that is carried out by individuals who are not government officials or political incumbents. However, Bercovitch divided individual mediation into formal and informal mediation. Formal mediation takes place when a government representative acts in his/her "private capacity" to mediate a conflict between the official representatives of other states (e.g., Dennis Ross in his role as the U.S. State Department's special Middle East coordinator, and Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia).[34] Informal mediation, on the other hand, refers to the efforts of mediators who have a long-standing experience and a deep commitment to international conflict resolution, or to the efforts of scholars whose professional experience give them the opportunity to engage in mediation with real conflict parties (e.g., the efforts of scholars such as Burton,

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[33] For more detailed see "Peace Program," in *The Carter Center,* available at *http://www.cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/program12.htm*, accessed on 20 August, 2007.
[34] Bercovitch, *op. cit.*

Doob, and Kelman). The motives behind individual mediation are as follows:

I)   Scholars and practitioners desire to use their scholarly ideas and experience on mediation for conflict management. The new ideas they create encourage them to contribute in resolving a crisis.

II) They do it mostly for establishing global and local peace. A desire to be instrumental in changing the pattern of a long-standing conflict also motivates them.

III) The individual mediators may do it for their self interest too. They sell their skill, knowledge, and expertise on mediation. The organisations the individuals work for want to increase their image as peace maker.

3.2 *Mediation by International, Regional, and Non Governmental Organisations*

The political, economic, and security situations in the contemporary world have become more complicated than ever before. It is argued that state alone is not enough to face the manifold and multi-type conflicts of this world. Consequently, we have witnessed a phenomenal growth in the number of international, regional, and other non-state actors."[35] The role and motives of international organisations are discussed below.

International Organisations (The United Nations)

Since its birth on October 24, 1945, the UN has been involved in mediating many international and intra-state conflicts. Anthony Baird noted, "Transnational organizations, of which the UN is the most eminent, have, in the last 50 years, taken a prominent role in third-party mediation of conflict negotiations."[36] The list of UN Security Council resolutions indicates that compared to the Cold War days of the 1950s or 1960s, today the organization is facing double

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[35] *Ibid,* p. 13.
[36] Anthony Baired, "An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Trans-Caucasian Conflicts," *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, November 1999, available at *http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm*, accessed on15 October, 2006.

or triple disputes to resolve.[37] However, the UN has experienced both success and failure in managing or resolving conflicts in different parts of the world over the last six decades. The UN has contributed to the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the peace process in Cambodia, and so on.[38] On the other hand, the UN experiences in Kashmir and Israel have shown its failure or lack of ability in managing the two oldest conflicts.

Concerning the merit and demerit of the UN as a mediator, Baird observed, "The main advantage to institutional mediation is its impartiality, which also gives its authority more legitimacy than power-based mediation, whose strongest guiding principle is the interests of the mediating state."[39] Nevertheless, many practitioners and scholars argue that such mediation is like a lion without teeth. They argue that because of the lack of military peacekeepers or its passive mandate, institutional mediation has no power to mediate a conflict. From a different perspective, as an intergovernmental organisation the UN is often unable to engage in mediating activities when one or more of the adversary parties are not a state, as it is better equipped and oriented to deal with state.[40] Although peacemaking is the aim of the UN, however, the organisation is also subject to the particular policies and interests of its member-states. It is evident that the UN was frequently paralysed by the Cold War and engaged in peacemaking much less than its Charter suggested it should.[41] The motives of the UN to mediate a conflict are:

I)   The UN wants to resolve or manage a conflict in a peaceful way. It wants to resolve the issue mainly for humanitarian cause. Upholding the international law and norms also motivates it to manage and resolve a dispute.

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[37] See, UNSC Resolutions, UN Document Center, available at *http://www.un.org/documents/*, accessed on 12 June, 2006.
[38] Kjell Skjelsbaek and Gunnar Fermann, "The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes," in Bercovitch, *op. cit.,* p. 75.
[39] Anthony Baird, *op. cit.*
[40] Louis Kriesberg, "Verities of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Relations," in Bercovitch, *op. cit.,* p. 277.
[41] *Ibid.*

II) The UN seeks the mediator's mantle in order to defuse crises
that threaten the global stability, including global economic
stability, in which the organisations have such an important
stake.[42]

III) The UN would like to mediate a dispute for its self interests. It
wants to promote its influence in the international political
arena.

Regional Organisations

Since the demise of the Cold War, American and Russian
interest in regional conflict management has declined. However, the
post-Cold War period has experienced increasing religious, ethnic,
clan, even sub-clan conflicts in various regions around the world.
Due to this situation, regional organisations freed from bipolar
constraints have rushed into mediation and conflict management.
Related to this, the name of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), currently known as African Union (AU), has been frequently
mentioned in the previous literature. The Charter of the OAU allows
it to mediate inter-state and intra-state conflicts in Africa. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediated
conflicts in their midst. The complementary roles of OAU and the
UN in managing conflicts have been notable. For instance, the
collective efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special
Representative and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS helped in
the signing of a Peace Agreement for Liberia, in Cotonou, Benin on
July 25, 1993. With regards to Somalia, OAU has fully cooperated
with the UN in the efforts to bring about an end to the conflict.

Some other regional organisations like the Arab League in the
Middle East and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in East Asia have
played their respective roles in regional conflict management.
However, these organisations could bring a little change in conflict
management. On the other hand, South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed to play any role in
managing conflicts in South Asia.[43] Regarding regional organisation,

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[42] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 190.
[43] It can be said that according to the SAARC Charter, SAARC does not have the
mandate to negotiate or mediate any security issues in South Asia. Although, it is

Touval and Zartman noted that regional organisations have limitation in managing a conflict between its members, because mediation requires agreement among the organisations' most influential members, as well as acceptance by the other parties directly involved.[44] The primary motives of regional organisations are:

I)   Regional organisations want to resolve a dispute for the regional integration.

II) Regional organisations seek to reduce the interference of outside powers' in regional political issues.

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been considered important actors in post-Cold War diplomacy for conflict management and resolution. The former U.S. President Jimmy Carter noted, "NGOs can lessen tensions between parties and facilitate the peaceful negotiating process. Central to the effectiveness of any NGO in mediating a conflict, however, is its credibility and neutrality with warring parties."[45] Andrew S. Natsios mentioned that NGOs can help in a variety of peacemaking scenarios. They are a unique instrument of conflict resolution.[46]

There are numerous NGOs working for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Berridge mentioned that "as for NGOs, the current edition of the *Directory of Conflict Prevention Organization* published by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention now lists 475 organizations active in this area."[47] The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP), an important NGO for conflict prevention and resolution, recently published the *Asia*

observed that India and Pakistani leaders sometimes use the forum to address their bilateral disputes or sometimes indirectly pose claims towards each other in their speeches, the forum cannot take any measures in managing conflicts. However, the 13th SAARC summit announced a holistic united effort to combat terrorism, a security issue, in this region. Therefore, the author argues that time is ripe for South Asian people either to amend the SAARC Charter or build a separate regional security forum to discuss and manage the security issues.

[44] Zartman and Touval, *op. cit.*

[45] Jimmy Carter, "Foreword," in Bercovitch, *op. cit.,* p. ix.

[46] Andrew S. Natsios, "An NGO Perspective," in Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, (eds.), *op. cit.,* pp. 338-339.

[47] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* pp. 193-194.

Pacific Conflict Prevention Directory in 2004 in which there is a list of total 491 NGOs and Research Centers dealing with conflict and development issues in the Asia-Pacific region.[48] The JCCP has played an important role in peace building in Cambodia and in the current peace process in Sri Lanka.

Among the other NGOs, some religious/secular NGOs have dedicated themselves to conflict prevention and resolution. The Quaker's American Friends Service Committee (AFS) is one example in this regard.[49] NGOs have many limitations in managing conflicts. The key limitation is lack of resources and leverage on the conflicting parties. Sometimes NGOs are influenced by the interests of the state it originates. The main reasons that motivate NGOs to play mediatory role are:

I) NGOs want to promote humanitarian situation in the conflict area and to establish peace; and

II) NGOs want to increase their self interest and influence by playing mediatory role and get more funds.

3.3 *States as Mediator*

States are the key player in managing domestic and international conflict. States use mediation as a foreign policy or diplomatic instrument. Berridge argued, "The most important mediators, in international relations, are states, whether acting singly or collectively, or via the international organizations such as the United Nations that are largely their creatures."[50] Bercovitch noted that as a political actor the state is one of the most successful and enduring forms of social and political organisation. Most mediation is carried on by states or by their representatives. Although the number of the various organisations has increased in the last few decades, states are still widely regarded as the most significant actors in international politics. [51] States pursue resources, markets, and leverage for conflict

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[48] *The Asia Pacific Conflict Prevention Directory in 2004* is available at *http://www.jccp.gr.jp/*, accessed on 25 November, 2006.
[49] Andrew S. Natsios, *op. cit.*
[50] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 190.
[51] Bercovitch, *op. cit.,* p. 12.

management. States role and motives can be categorised into major power state and small power state.

States' status can be sorted out into major power states and small power states. Bercovitch mentioned that "By using the term "major power" state and "small power" state, we do not mean the "size" of the state, but its "weight" in the international system."[52] Five factors can be identified as affecting the "weight" of a state; *First,* population and territory; *Second,* military strength; *Third,* economic development; *Fourth,* level of industrialisation; and *Fifth,* GNP per capita.[53] The author considers that all of these criteria are important to determine a country's status in the international political arena, nonetheless the second, third, and fourth criteria (with technological power) are more important criteria in contemporary world.

Many states, regardless of their weight and status, have contributed in mediation of various conflicts in different parts of the world. However, it is argued that mainly major powers have been involved in most of the international conflicts since 1945.[54] Major powers can employ their leverage and influence on the parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Touval noted that the political influence and the vast material capabilities enable the major powers to apply "sticks" and "carrots" policy on disputants. By using the stick and carrot policy, they can change disputant's motives.

During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union mediated many international conflicts.[55] Among the various conflicts that are currently mediated by major powers, the U.S. mediation in Israel-Palestine conflicts, and Japan's mediation or facilitation role between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers can be noted.[56] In these mediations or facilitations, the major powers have used their political and economic leverage on the disputants.

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[52] *Ibid,* p. 13
[53] Bercovitch in Bercovitch and Rubin, *op. cit.,* p. 28.
[54] Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," *op. cit.,* p. 232.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] "Japan Envoy Upbeat over Salvaging Sri Lanka Peace Process," *South Asia Monitor,* available at
http://www.southasiamonitor.org/diplomacy/2004/nov/2dip1.shtml, accessed on 20 July, 2006.

Small states, on the other hand, have also mediated in different disputes. Algerian mediation between the U.S. and Iran on the issue of American hostage crisis in 1980, is one of the good examples.[57] A small country normally waits for an invitation to mediate. When they do intervene, their strategies tend to be mostly low-profile strategies of dialogue and communication. Norway's mediation effort between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers is such an example. However, compared to major powers, small states have few alternative foreign policy instruments at their disposal. They lack resources, influence and strategies to mediate a conflict.

On the other hand, multi party major powers mediation can be found in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. The U.S., Russia, the EU, and NATO were involved in managing the conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, in case of Bosnia and Kosovo crisis in 1999, major powers such as the U.S., Russia, France, Germany and Britain played mediatory role to resolve the disputes, increasing their respective political influence.[58]

Some Specific Motives of State for Mediation

The motives of the states are very important for a successful mediation. States have different motivations in the mediation of a conflict. Some important motives are noted below:

I) Dispute Resolution: Conflict management or resolution is the declared motive of all major or small power states. States desire to mediate when conflicts (e.g. Israel-Palestine and India-Pakistan conflict) seriously threaten the global peace and security.

II) Self Interest: Mediators often seek to gain political, economic, and strategic benefits by involving in conflict management. Mediators have interests and incentives that motivate their involvement in conflict. Nevertheless, the desire to make peace is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics. To understand these motives, it is useful to use cost-benefit approach. Mediators are interested in outcomes of the conflict, otherwise they would not mediate.

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[57] Randa M. Slim, "Small States Mediation in International Relations: Mediation of the Iranian Hostage Crisis," in Bercovitch and Jeffery Z. Rubin, *op. cit.,* p. 206.
[58] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.*

As a mediator major powers' goals can be divided into "defensive goal" and "offensive goal." Mediators act defensively when a continuing conflict between others threatens the mediator's interests. If two of the mediator's allies engage in a conflict, it can disrupt and weaken the alliance or damage the parties' relations with the third party.[59] For example, a conflict between two U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, can damage U.S. interests and relationships with these countries. On the other hand, offensive motive is the desire to extend major powers' influence. In this case, the solution of the conflict has no direct importance for the mediator and is only a vehicle for improving relations with one or both parties. Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan in 1966 was inspired by an offensive motive.

III) International Political Power Game: One of the important motives of the major powers for mediation is the desire to expand influence in the international arena. In the era of the Cold War, countries, in particular, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, often mediated in international conflicts simply to increase their own power and limit its rival's opportunity to enlarge its influence through a mediation role. As mentioned earlier, in case of Bosnia and Kosovo crisis in 1999, major powers such as the U.S., Russia, France, Germany and Britain, played mediation role to increase their respective political influence.

IV) Humanitarian Cause and Improving Relationship: States wish to mediate between two enemies for humanitarian cause, and save lives and assets. Sometimes states want to build good relations with disputed countries through mediation. For instance, although the primary motives of Algeria in mediating between the U.S. and Iran on the issue of American hostage release in 1980 was humanitarian,[60] it was also motivated by a desire to improve its relationship with the U.S.[61] One of main motives of Japan's and Norway's efforts in managing the Sri Lankan long civil war is humanitarian. Gaining respect and gratitude from the disputants also motivate the states to play the mediatory role.

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[59] Zartman and Touval, *op. cit.,* p. 446.
[60] Randa M. Slim, *op. cit.,* p. 224.
[61] *Ibid.*

3.4 *Parties' Motives for Accepting Mediation*

One of the important tasks of a third party is to precisely evaluate the motives of the parties as well as the legitimacy of their desire to reach a mutually acceptable settlement."[62] Therefore, it is important to know the parties' motives. Although parties do not have same assessment, they accept mediation and cooperate with the mediator if it feels that rejection of mediation proposal might cause even greater harm. Adversaries in a conflict have several motives for accepting mediation: 1) parties consider that mediation may actually help them reduce the risks of an escalating conflict and get them closer to a settlement; 2) each party may embrace mediation expecting that the mediator will actually influence the other party; 3) both parties may see mediation as public expression of their commitment to an international norm of peaceful conflict management; 4) parties in conflict may desire mediation because a mediator can observe, verify, and guarantee any eventual agreement[63]; and 5) mediator's offer for economic assistance in reconstructing the conflict zone and parties' over all economic development also encourages them to accept third party mediation.

3.5 *Who is the Ideal Mediator?*

It is difficult to identify an ideal mediator because the necessity and merit of a mediator depend on the nature of conflicts and disputant's attitude to the mediator. In this regard, Berridge noted, "Obviously the attributes of the ideal mediator will vary according to the nature of the conflict with which it is called upon or aspires to deal."[64] It has been observed that most of the time, individual mediator, organisations and small states may be impartial to mediate a conflict. Nonetheless, these actors lack leverage and resources that are very important for an effective mediation. Concerning individual mediators Paul Hare noted that "private individuals acting as mediators may possess freedom of movement and latitude of decision that is often denied to their official counterparts, but lack

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[62] Ronald Fisher, *op. cit.,* p. 7.
[63] *Ibid.,* p. 450.
[64] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 196.

resources or leverage". [65] In case of the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran from 1979 to 1980, for example, individual and non-state actors failed to play any role as the Iranian side was not interested in individual or non-governmental mediation. When the Algerian government offered mediation to resolve it, the Iranian government accepted the mediation. This case indicated the limitation of individual or other non-state actors' diplomacy.[66]

On the other hand, the UN and regional organisations also lack direct leverage and influence on disputants. In addition, due to involvement of many states, the UN and regional organisation complicate the decision making process for conflict resolution. The UN is often hampered by disagreements between Security Council members because of the need to reach consensus on any Security Council resolution. For example, in the Kosovo crisis, the UN was completely neutralised and sidelined by the initiative of one single member, Russia, who is entirely opposed to NATO actions in the region.[67] The UN has too few resources to deal with the many global crises. At the same time, regional organisations cannot mediate a dispute if rivalry exists between two strong countries in a region. For example, due to India and Pakistan's rivalry in South Asia, SAARC, the only regional organisation in South Asia, has been unable to play any conflict management role between them.

States, particularly major powers are the main and most significant actor in international politics. A major power has leverage (carrot and stick), strategy, and incentives in mediating a conflict. For conflict management, the decision making process of a major power is simple compared to the UN or regional organisations. At the same time, since a major power is not only driven by humanitarian interests but also self interests, it may seek a quick solution of the conflict. In contrast, individuals, NGOs, and international organisations lack resources, influence and direct interests in a conflict. Finally, based on the above discussion, it can be argued that a major power which has both impartiality and

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[65] A. Paul Hare, "Informal Mediation by Private Individuals," in Bercovitch *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[66] Randa M. Slim, *op. cit*.

[67] Shalini Chawla, "NATO's Response to Kosovo Crisis," *Strategic Analyses,* Vol. XXIV, September 2000.

leverage (at least to a certain level where a major power can use its carrot and stick policy) and employ diplomatic strategies for conflict management can be an effective mediator.

To make the above argument more reasonable to the reader, as an example here, this study argues that considering the mediation of the Kashmir conflict, which has been a grave concern for the international community for six decades, if one examines the role of the major powers like the US, Russia, China and Japan, one can clearly find that Japan, the top donor to both India and Pakistan, is in a strong position to be a good candidate for mediation. It has a friendly relationship with both India and Pakistan and has always been impartial in India-Pakistan conflict. On the other hand, China and Russia have sided with Pakistan and India respectively for a long time. China lacks credibility regarding India while Russia faces the same problem with regard to Pakistan. Besides, these countries do not have much economic or political leverage on disputants. On the other hand, although the U.S. has much leverage on India and Pakistan, it lacks credibility as it has changed its strategy and priority several times since the Cold War. Both India and Pakistan have been skeptical of U.S. motives in this region. Japan has impartiality, credibility and it can use its aid as leverage on both India and Pakistan. If Japan can promote its diplomatic strategies through various channels, it can play a significant role in the Kashmir conflict. Japan should ask and convincingly pursue both India and Pakistan to accept the benefits of its role as a third party mediator for the management of the Kashmir dispute. Both Japan and other South Asian countries will mutually benefit from a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

4. The Role of a State as a Mediator in Managing Conflicts through Track I and Track II Diplomacy

In this section the study raises the questions: How does a major power mediate a conflict? What is the strategy of a major power in managing a conflict? In the previous literature, the state's role mainly focused on Track I or governmental role for third party mediation. However, this author suggests that a major power's strategy for mediation-and this is a key argument of the article-should include both its official Track I and unofficial Track II

diplomatic channels. Cooperation and coordination between Track I and Track II diplomatic channels, in other words, can bring a more fruitful outcome for conflict management.

Track I Diplomacy is a term used to describe government-to-government negotiations among designated representatives of sovereign states. This form of diplomacy is conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority. Government official or Track I diplomats are responsible for negotiating, signing, and ratifying treaties and other agreements. In reality, however, it is well understood that Track I diplomacy has various limits that tend to hamper the confidence-building and conflict-management processes. The people in the official diplomacy have some kind of obligations to their respective governments or people that usually restrain them from openness and transparency in dialogue. Very often, they cannot advance beyond narrow national interests. Due to mutual suspicions, they usually fear to accept any new formal proposal made by the opposite party. One example of the limitation or failure of the official diplomacy, especially in South Asia is the Agra Summit in 2001 where Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President failed to make even a joint statement on the Kashmir dispute.[68] From another perspective, governments are often reluctant to negotiate openly with armed groups, believing it would confer upon them legitimacy or encourage other such armed movements. Yet, peace requires discussions with such groups. Such talks can be carried on in unofficial or "Track II" ways which the government can deny later if need be.

4.1 *Definition and Significance of Track II Diplomacy*

In contrast to the official Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy is commonly known as 'unofficial diplomacy' or 'citizen diplomacy.'[69]Joseph Montville, an American diplomat, coined the term "Track II diplomacy" for the first time in 1981, which covers a wide range of unofficial contact and interaction aimed at resolving conflicts between the parties. He defined Track II diplomacy as "Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public

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[68] *The Daily Star,* 25 October, 2001.
[69] Davies and Kaufman, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict."[70]

It is important to note here that Track II diplomacy is not a substitute for Track I diplomacy, but a supplemental or parallel operation to help improve relationships at various levels and among different individuals."[71] Track II diplomats can facilitate the successful conduct of Track I diplomacy – as witnessed in the Oslo components of the Middle East Peace Process. Herbert Kelman argued that Track II diplomacy is an integral component of the larger diplomatic process, and is often the only means through which members of opposing parties can safely meet.[72] Berridge noted that Track II diplomacy has a potential in managing a conflict especially in a context where one of the disputants considers that Track I diplomacy can give too much legitimacy to its rival, or where the major powers are reluctant to involve themselves directly but would sincerely like to see a peaceful resolution of the conflict.[73]

Track II diplomacy engages influential citizens such as civil society leaders, individual experts, academic and NGOs professionals, former diplomats and politicians, religious leaders, and others who have access to their governments, and can influence mass media and public opinion.[74] This study argues that as a Track II institution, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has been widely recognised for its activities in pursuing security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.[75] However, it should be noted that Track II diplomacy has limitations too. Sometimes,

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[70] Joseph V. Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in John W. Mc Donald and Diane B. Bendahmane, (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 1995, p. 9.

[71] J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century," in Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, (eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D. C., 1997, p. 43.

[72] Herbert Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy," in Davis and Kaufman, *op. cit.,* pp. 81-106.

[73] G. R. Berridge, *op. cit.,* p. 196.

[74] Davis and Kaufman, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[75] Joseph A. Camilleri, "Regionalism and Globalism in Asia Pacific," in Majid Tehranian (ed.), *Asian Peace: Security and Governance in the Asia Pacific Region,* I.B. Tauris, London: 1999, pp. 61-62.

Track II diplomats are biased and influenced by the Track I politics, and cannot advance beyond their narrow national interests.

4.2 *State's Mediation Strategy: Cooperation and Coordination between Diplomatic Channels*

Based on the above discussion, it can be said that when conflicts are manifold and complicated in today's world, state's official diplomacy alone is not enough to resolve a difficult problem. Therefore, state should emphasize on cooperation and coordination between official Track I and unofficial Track II actors for the mediation of a conflict. No single actor or activity can create sustainable peace and security. Both Track I and Track II diplomats need cooperation from each other. Cooperation among official and unofficial actors can enhance the potential for achieving shared and complementary goals. Cooperation between Track I and Track II is an issue of increasing attention within both governmental and non-governmental circles in the U.S. and many other parts of the world. Both Track I and Track II diplomats increasingly recognise that the prevention and resolution of complex conflicts depend on a wide range of activities by diverse actors, and that coordination and cooperation maximise the opportunities for complementarity and synergy.[76] The study argues that track I and track II should: 1) share information; 2) plan together; 3) share resources; and finally 4) work in collaboration.

One good example of Track I and Track II cooperation was "The International Workshop on Kashmir" in Yokohama, Japan on July 2, 2005. The most significant aspect of the workshop was the presence of the two representatives from the two parts of disputed Kashmir. It was organised by the Keiko Research International (KRI) and Centre for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS), and supported by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an organization of the Japanese government. Hence, like JICA's role in Yokohama, Track I can provide resources, funds, venue, and information to the Track II process and in exchange, Track II can articulate new ideas and policy recommendations as a testing ground. The study provides a model

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[76] Louis Kriesberg, "Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts," *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 12, 1996.

for third party mediation in Track I and Track II diplomatic channels for conflict management.

Figure 2: State's Role as a Third Party in Managing Conflict through Track I and Track II Diplomatic Channels

Figure 2 shows that State A and State B have been involved in a conflict and have failed to manage or resolve the conflict by themselves. A third party major power which has leverage on both disputants, and has been impartial in the conflict attempts to mediate between them. The major power simultaneously exercises its Track I and Track II diplomatic channels to resolve the disputes between State A and State B.

It has been already mentioned that formal diplomacy has limitations and most of the time it is refused by the disputants. Therefore, if State A and State B or any of them is suspicious about the motives of the major power, they could refuse the formal mediation offered by the third party. To avoid the risk, at the beginning the major power should and can propose informal

diplomacy for mediation instead of direct or Track I diplomacy. Disputants usually accept the Track II or informal dialogue as it does not have any legitimacy. Of course, the third party can officially address their concern about the dispute and its implication on both disputants and international peace and security. When new agendas and policy recommendations are discussed at the Track II level, if the disputants find their mutual benefit or a "win-win situation," then the third party and the disputants can start dialogue at the Track I or official level. However, Track II without having resources and feedback by Track I cannot go far to reach their target. As Figure 2 shows Track I and Track II function at the top level and bottom level. Even though dialogue for mediation gets set back in Track I level, dialogues can always continue at Track II level.

Figure 2 also explains Track I and Track II diplomacy of a third party major power as "Hard Approach" and "Soft Approach" respectively. As a "Hard Approach" Track I can utilise its leverage and resources to press the disputants for a peaceful solution. If the disputants, State A and State B, listen to the third party to solve the dispute through peaceful ways, they will be awarded, but if they choose war to solve the problem then they will be punished. It should be noted that even though the author use the word Hard Approach for Track I diplomacy, it is mainly to distinguish from the Track II diplomacy which is always "Soft Approach" or non-coercive diplomacy. The mediator takes the Hard Approach as a last resort to press the disputants. Of course, it should be noted that taking the Hard Approach does not mean that a mediator can impose a solution on the disputants. As an example, Japan's potential role to mediate between two arch rival India and Pakistan is already mentioned in this paper. As a diplomatic strategy, Japan can simultaneously employ its Track I and Track II diplomatic channels in managing the Kashmir conflict as it is shown in the Figure 2.

Conclusion

This article argues that compared to the other actors, a state in particular a major power has more leverage, incentives and strategies for a successful mediation of a conflict. If the major power, which is impartial in a conflict and seriously wants to mediate, can convince the disputants for accepting its mediation by utilising its carrot and

stick policy, and, on the other hand, if the disputants consider that the major power has been impartial in their conflict, and also feel pressure for its carrot and stick policy, then mediation could take place.

Concerning diplomatic strategy of a major power in managing a conflict, this study recommends that a major power state can and should include unofficial Track II diplomacy with official Track I diplomacy in its mediation strategy. Track I diplomacy has inherent limitations while Track II diplomacy has more scope to discuss and articulate new ideas for management of the conflict. As a second line of communication, Track II could be only a test ground for new proposals in the mediation or negotiation between the adversaries. However, it is Track I which will eventually implement the agreement and provide the guarantee of the agreement. Therefore, the cooperation and coordination between official Track I and unofficial Track II diplomacy should be given priority for mediating a conflict.

The hidden and declared motives of a major power in mediating a conflict have been discussed earlier. The self interests motivate a major power to mediate a conflict. If the self interests overlap with the humanitarian interests then the outcome of the mediation process can be better. Finally, it is argued that mediation process can and should address the "human needs" and "justice" for the people who are the victims of the conflict. If there is no guarantee that conflict management will lead to justice, and the seeds of the conflict are not uprooted, conflict must revive even after a long time. There are examples of reviving conflicts in history. Major powers playing the role of mediator and the conflicting parties should not ignore the suggested strategies elucidated in this article.