

*Segufta Hossain*

## **NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR TEST: IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY**

---

---

### **Abstract**

North Korea's nuclear test was not a major strategic surprise. However, tensions were immediately heightened, with universal condemnation. The impact of the test on the existing global non-proliferation efforts could extend far beyond East Asia, which could create greater instability in the region and in the Asian continent and world as a whole. In reaction to North Korea's nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council unanimously imposed multilateral sanctions on Pyongyang. The present paper attempts to identify the causes of recent nuclear test, the reactions and responses after the test, and the implications of the test for East Asian security. It has been argued in the paper that regional initiatives are necessary to prevent North Korea from pursuing a nuclear programme, which could lead to the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free East Asia.

### **1. Introduction**

On October 9, 2006, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) of North Korea (formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) announced that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test. The test was reported to have taken place at 10:36AM, local time, in Hwaderi, near Kilju city, in North Hamkyung province and had a

---

**Ms. Segufta Hossain** is Research Officer, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BISS), Dhaka. Her e-mail address is: [segufta@biiss.org](mailto:segufta@biiss.org)

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BISS), 2006.

yield equivalent to 550 tons of TNT.<sup>1</sup> The test makes North Korea the eighth country in the world to openly carry out a nuclear test after the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

The test took place a day after the anniversary of Kim Jong Il's accession to the post of General Secretary of the National Workers' Party in 1997, and a day prior to the 61<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Party. The test also took place on the day Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe arrived in South Korea for his first visit there in his new capacity as Prime Minister. The test also follows a United Nations Security Council presidential statement of October 6, 2006 warning North Korea against conducting a nuclear test.

Though the news did not come as a major strategic surprise as North Korea had made open declarations of its intentions to go in for nuclear tests, tensions were immediately heightened, with nearly universal condemnation of the test. North Korea's action is one more blow to the existing global non-proliferation order and will generate greater instability in East Asia and in the Asian continent and world as a whole. The present paper attempts to find out the reactions of the world community after the test, the response of North Korea and the implications of the test for East Asian security.

## 2. Domestic Situation of North Korea

North Korea is a small and backward country with limited resources. It can hardly survive and develop without outside assistance. During the Cold War, because of the special location as a frontline country, it received large amount of economic and technological assistance from the Soviet Union, China and the Warsaw Pact countries. The situation changed drastically after the end of the Cold War as Russia and China changed their policies. North Korea fell into economic stagnation and retrogression and even found it difficult to sustain simple reproduction.

---

<sup>1</sup> "Nuclear Weapons Testing", available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm>, accessed on: October 20, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Philippe Naughton and Sam Knight, "World searches for response to North Korea nuclear test", TIMES ONLINE, available at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-2395600,00.html>, accessed on: October 20, 2006.

Catastrophic natural disasters of several years in a row further deteriorated the livelihood of the people. Famine influenced people to escape from the country. The ever-increasing security threat from outside world forced North Korea to put its limited natural and human resources to the military, giving rise to more economic difficulties.

North Korea is widely known as a Communist Country in the Western world, but the government has formally replaced references to Marxism-Leninism in its constitution with the locally developed concept of Juche or self-reliance. Due to internal limitations in the idea of Juche, a series of poor policy decisions concerning military expenditures and mining industries, and radical changes in international oil prices by the late 1970s the North Korean economy began to slow down. These decisions eventually affected the whole economy and led having to acquire external debts. At the same time, North Korea's policy of self-reliance and the antagonism of America and its allies made it difficult for Pyongyang to expand foreign trade or secure credit.

North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages brought about by the combined effects of an isolated regime, successive natural disasters, structural constraints- such as little arable land and a short growing season- as well as the fact that food products are deliberately diverted away from citizens and into the military. North Korea has been in a food emergency for more than a decade and in the 1990s experienced a famine that may have claimed one million lives. North Korea has relied on foreign aid to feed its 23 million people since its state-run farming system collapsed in the 1990s following decades of mismanagement and the loss of Soviet subsidies.<sup>3</sup> In response to international appeals, the United States provided 500,000 tons of humanitarian food aid in the period July 1999-June 2000 through UN World Food Programme and through US private voluntary organizations.<sup>4</sup>

### **3. North Korea's Nuclear Test: An Overview**

#### **3.1. North Korea's Nuclear Programme**

North Korea's desire for nuclear weapons was first raised in the late 1980s and almost resulted in their withdrawal from the NPT in 1994.

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> "Background Note: North Korea", Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of States, available at: [http://www.nkmissions.com/10part\\_report/Articles/state.gov%20North%20Korea%20\(10-00\).htm](http://www.nkmissions.com/10part_report/Articles/state.gov%20North%20Korea%20(10-00).htm), accessed on: October 21, 2006.

However, the Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) temporarily resolved the crisis by having the US and several other countries agree that, in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons programme, two light-water reactors (LWRs) would be provided. Beginning of the nuclear programme of North Korea and the recent nuclear test are discussed below:

### **3.1.1. Beginning of the nuclear programme**

The North Korean nuclear weapons programme dates back to the 1980s. It started with Soviet help in the 1980s, on condition that it would join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 kilometres north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1985, under international pressure, North Korea agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, North Korea refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In a de-nuclearization agreement signed in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea pledged not to possess nuclear weapons, plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection system. In 1992, North Korea signed a 'full scope safeguards agreement' with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by North Korea's 1985 adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>5</sup> Under the terms of the safeguards agreement, North Korea was required to declare and accept IAEA inspections of all nuclear material and facilities. This promising development was halted by Pyongyang's refusal to allow special inspections of two unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste. On February 10, 1993, North Korea refused to permit the IAEA to conduct special inspections. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT effective from June 12, 1993, due to the insistence of the IAEA on exercising inspection rights under the NPT.

---

<sup>5</sup> Gary Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis", *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Spring 2003.

An Agreed Framework<sup>6</sup> was signed between the US and North Korea in Geneva on October 21, 1994 capping the on-and-off bilateral negotiations which altogether had lasted for more than a year and a half. The framework agreement is essentially aimed at eliminating North Korea's ability to make nuclear arms.

This agreement broke down in 2001 as relations with the US soured. North Korea then announced it would withdraw from the NPT in 2003 after the US accused the country in late 2002 of continuing its nuclear weapons programme in contravention of the NPT. Pyongyang at the time denied these allegations and insisted upon its right to produce nuclear energy for civilian purposes, as allowed by Article X of the NPT.

Following this withdrawal, North Korea's neighbours quickly sought a diplomatic solution to an escalating crisis. This resulted in a series of meetings held periodically in Beijing from 2003, known as the Six-Party Talks. Its success has been questioned as US-North Korea bilateral relations have been the main aggravating factor. For example, North Korea declared on February 10, 2005 that it had nuclear weapons. In response, the US froze North Korean bank assets. This resulted in an indefinite postponement of the six-party talks lasting to this day.

There is currently no detailed information on the assistance Pakistan might have offered to North Korea. But, according to some sources, North Korea in its nuclear and missile programme got covert help from its neighbouring China and Pakistan. Pakistan's leading atomic scientist A. Q. Khan made as many as 13 trips to North Korea and his Kahuta

---

<sup>6</sup> The 1994 Agreed Framework, negotiated between the United States and North Korea, outlined the U.S. commitment to provide North Korea with a package of economic, diplomatic, and energy-related benefits, and North Korea's consent to halt its nuclear programme. Specifically, the agreement provided for the shutdown of North Korea's plutonium facilities, to be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in exchange for the annual delivery to North Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy oil and the construction in North Korea of two light water nuclear reactors. A separate protocol signed in 1995 by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, established the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the Agreed Framework. The European Union later joined. After confronting North Korea about a secret uranium programme, the United States suspended shipments of oil, and KEDO suspended work on the reactors in December 2003.

Research Laboratory had a close connection with that country.<sup>7</sup> *The Washington Times* reported that China sold to North Korea 20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP), a chemical used to extract fissile material from spent nuclear fuel.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union provided North Korea with a small research reactor in the 1960s. North Korean nuclear scientists continued to receive training in the Soviet Union up to the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991.<sup>9</sup> East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Over the last few years, the intelligence community has fiercely debated potential nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran. The nuclear programmes of these two countries were accelerated with the help of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan.<sup>10</sup>

### 3.1.2. Six-party talks

In an effort to de-escalate the tensions caused by the North Korean nuclear programme and to prevent its destabilizing consequences for regional and global security, the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea began their search for effective political methods to resolve the problem. Since August 2003 these states and North Korea have held three rounds of Six-Party Talks in Beijing.<sup>11</sup> The establishment of the Six-Party Talks was a positive improvement on the bilateral approach used by the Clinton administration.

The first two rounds of the Six-Party Talks produced little agreement. The United States has sought to use the Talks largely as a vehicle to bring coordinated, international pressure on North Korea to

---

<sup>7</sup> Saurabh Shukla, "Korean Bombshell", *India Today*, October 23, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Bill Gertz, "China Ships North Korea Ingredient for Nuclear Arms", *The Washington Times*, December 17, 2002, available at: <http://www.nti.org/db/China/koreachr.htm>, accessed on: October 26, 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Larry A. Nicksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program", CRS Report for Congress, August 1, 2006, available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/71870.pdf>, accessed on: November 05, 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Eli Lake, "Bush Warns Pyongyang over A-bomb Test", *The New York Sun*, October 10, 2006, available at: <http://www.nysun.com/article/41198>, accessed on: November 06, 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Gennady Chufirin, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis", Social Science Research Council, available at: <http://northkorea.ssrc.org/Chufirin/>, accessed on: October 27, 2006.

abandon its nuclear activities and has refused to provide anything to Pyongyang that could be considered as a reward for its participation in the Talks or any provisional moves on its nuclear programme. The United States has also rejected calls to engage in any formal bilateral negotiations with North Korea, which the latter has long sought, that might be interpreted as a reward for its past behaviour. North Korea, for its part, has tried to use the Talks as a way of extracting recognitions from the United States and other countries and has also tried to influence the Talks by demanding rewards simply for participating in them.

The US position at the Talks changed significantly at their third round, which began on June 21, 2004. At the influence of South Korean and Japanese officials, the United States offered a detailed proposal for ending North Korea's nuclear programme. This proposal included US support for incentives for North Korea to be provided by other states - particularly South Korea and Japan, a major change from previous US policy. The proposal called for a new declaration to be made by North Korea, to include all plutonium production and uranium enrichment capabilities, nuclear materials, weapons and related equipments and for the elimination of all of these to begin after a three-month preparatory period.

The results of the third round of Talks produced a measure of cautious optimism among some participants and observers. The United States continued to insist on the termination of all North Korean nuclear programmes, including those for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, a demand that Pyongyang called unacceptable. North Korea was also strongly offended by some public statements made during the US presidential campaign, including those by President Bush himself, about the nature of the North Korean regime. All this resulted in Pyongyang's refusal to attend the fourth round of Six-Party Talks scheduled for September 2004. On February 10, 2005, the North Korean government made a statement claiming that it actually possessed nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the country announced suspension of its participation in the Six-Party Talks for an indefinite period. The official statement released by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this occasion said, "We had already taken a resolute action of pulling out of the NPT and have manufactured nukes for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. Our nuclear weapons will remain nuclear deterrent for self-defence under

any circumstances.”<sup>12</sup> On September 19, 2005, North Korea agreed to a “Statement of Principles” at the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks whereby North Korea committed to “abandoning all of its nuclear programmes and return to the NPT at an early date”<sup>13</sup> Another round of talks was held in November 2005, but implementation of the “Statement of Principles” has delayed as the parties have different interpretations of the obligations under the agreement. North Korea essentially pulled out of the talks demanding that the United States lift financial sanctions as a condition for returning to the process.

### **3.2. Recent Nuclear Test**

It is quite difficult to determine the motivations of the North Korean authority to test the nuclear weapon now. Probably it is a combination of some factors which triggered North Korea to test its nuclear ability. The factors that influenced North Korea to test its nuclear weapon now are as follows:

#### **3.2.1. Attempt to secure bilateral talks**

According to some analysts, the nuclear test was a desperate effort by the North Koreans to secure bilateral negotiations with the United States. The Bush administration has consistently refused to engage in direct talks with North Korean negotiators outside the Six-Party Talks process. Selig Harrison, an Asian expert with exceptional access to North Korean officials, argues that top North Korean officials want bilateral talks in order to implement the denuclearization agreement concluded at the last round of the Six-Party talks in Beijing in September 2005.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> “N Korea’s statement in full”, BBC News, February 10, 2005, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4252515.stm>, accessed on: October 19, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing”, September 19, 2005, U.S. Department of State, available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>, accessed on: October 29, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Selig Harrison, “In a Test, a Reason to Talk”, *Washington Post*, October 10, 2006, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR2006100901035.html>, accessed on: October 17, 2006.



### **3.2.2. Ensure security of the country**

The nuclear test could have been motivated by North Korea's deep sense of insecurity and fear of an attack by the United States. After being considered as part of the 'axis of evil' by President Bush in 2002, probably North Korea has drawn a lesson from the invasion of Iraq. It may be surmised that North Korea's planners believed that developing and demonstrating a nuclear capability would dissuade a possible US attack. Though it is not clear how a small nuclear weapon could effectively be used by North Korea in the event of general war, it is believed that the mere possession of the weapon would discourage such a war being initiated by the United States and its allies. North Korea may believe that the rest of the world will adjust to it being a nuclear power after the initial rounds of criticism, similar to the experiences of India and Pakistan after testing nuclear weapons in 1998.

### **3.2.3. Domestic political factors**

There are some possible domestic political factors behind North Korea's nuclear test. In the wake of the partially failed missile tests in July 2006, the military leadership in North Korea may have pressed for another indication of their resolution. The North Korean leader Kim Jong Il needs to maintain the support of the military in order to hold on to power. Another possible domestic factor may be the necessity for North Korea to assert itself, as South Korea was winning wide recognition because of the election of Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary General.

### **3.2.4. Possible threat to the regime**

Regime change has played a significant role in American security policy since World War II. As long as the United States remains the major military power in the world, regime change will continue to be a desired outcome of the US strategy. The United States would still prefer regime change in states such as Iran and North Korea. President Bush has emphasized regime change in North Korea more than other presidents have in the past. The United States government certainly wants a nuclear-free North Korea now and probably over the long run a united and democratic Korean Peninsula. The Bush administration has shown it would like to resolve its problems with North Korea and Iran in the same way it did with Iraq through regime change. This scenario

argues that the North Korean leaders feel threatened by the US military capabilities and by the US talk about regime change and preventative strikes. The North Korean leaders may perhaps have concluded that nuclear weapons are the only way to assure the regime survival from such threats.

### **3.2.5. US bogged down in global political arena**

The United States has its hands tied in the global political arena. It remains bogged down in an unpopular war in Iraq. Washington is deeply embroiled in the Iraq imbroglio. Some 2,500 US servicemen have so far died in Iraq. The United States has spent US\$300 billion in Iraq.<sup>15</sup> President George W. Bush is now facing mounting pressure from the common people for his policy in Iraq. The U.S. war in Afghanistan has not ended and the country is now confronting the nuclear challenge from Iran at present. An attack by the United States against North Korea would also definitely be opposed by China and Russia. Probably these are the reasons that motivated North Korea to test its nuclear weapon at the present opportune time.

## **4. Responses to North Korea's Nuclear Test**

North Korea faced global condemnation and calls for harsh sanctions after it announced that it had set off an atomic weapon underground. Reactions of the world community and North Korea's response are given below:

### **4.1. Reactions of the World Community**

North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has been of great concern to major actors in the region, especially China, South Korea, Russia, Japan and the United States, which have organized negotiations aimed at ending that programme. The reactions after the nuclear test of North Korea were swift, furious and unanimous.

---

<sup>15</sup> Shen Dingli, "Implications of a DPRK Nuclear Test", available at: [http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article\\_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=321291&rel\\_no=1](http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=321291&rel_no=1), accessed on: November 23, 2006.

#### 4.1.1. United Nations

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met on October 9, 2006 in New York in an emergency session to discuss the issue and condemned North Korea over its claim of a nuclear test. All five permanent members of the UNSC, including China, once North Korea's most supportive neighbour, condemned the nuclear test. Wang Guangya, the Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had earlier stated that "no one is going to protect North Korea" if it engages in "bad behaviour". However, on October 10, 2006 dissensions emerged within the Council over how exactly to tackle the problem. Japan and the United States pressed for sanctions with the threat of military action, with US Permanent Representative to the United Nations John Bolton stating that while the United States had a "clear preference" for a diplomatic solution, the threat of force was on the table. Chinese President Hu Jin Tao, however, called for the United States to "avoid actions that may lead to escalation or loss of control of the situation". The newly elected Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, in his address to the General Assembly at the UN Headquarters told that he intends to seek an active role in finding a peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue.<sup>16</sup>

The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unanimously imposed multilateral sanctions on North Korea on October 14, 2006, in reaction to Pyongyang's nuclear test. All five permanent members stated that the sanctions, set out in UNSC Resolution 1718<sup>17</sup>, were intended to penalize the country's regime, not inhabitants. After hard negotiations, this softer version establishes a restriction on military and technological materials, as well as luxury goods, but does not include reference to military intervention. The US compromised on its initial desire to block all imports of military equipment, and to have an unlimited reference to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so providing a legal justification for future military action, in order to gain full support for the resolution. Furthermore, the resolution demands the freezing of North Korea's financial assets with the exception of funds

---

<sup>16</sup> "Next UN chief promises to end crisis of confidence", TurkishPress.com, October 24, 2006, available at: <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=147990>, accessed on: October 27, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> See for details- ANNEX III.

necessary to meet basic needs.<sup>18</sup> They also stated that if North Korea were willing to cooperate and complied with all the measures contained in the resolution, the sanctions would be lifted.

#### **4.1.2. USA**

In contrast to his policy in Iraq, President George W. Bush in recent years has emphasized the importance of multinational diplomacy in dealing with North Korea. Though the United States would never give up the military option, it continues to emphasize diplomacy as it seeks a UNSC resolution tightening sanctions on North Korea. Aware of the desperate poverty of the North Korean population, the United States wants to target sanctions against the elite in Pyongyang and against the military. President Bush in his response identified this kind of test as a threat to international peace and security and told that the proclaimed actions taken by North Korea were unacceptable and deserved an immediate response by the United Nations Security Council.<sup>19</sup> US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also called North Korea's threat a bad idea, saying that Pyongyang is aware of the consequences.<sup>20</sup>

Washington's primary concern is that North Korea might try to sell nuclear weapons technology to other countries, or even to terrorist organizations. Weapons sales have been an important source of revenue for North Korea in the past.

#### **4.1.3. China**

Immediately after the nuclear test, Beijing issued a toughly-worded statement criticizing the nuclear test of North Korea as "brazen", which was an unusually harsh expression from Pyongyang's biggest provider of

---

<sup>18</sup> "Sanctions Against North Korea", Global Policy Forum, available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/indexkor.htm>, accessed on: November 10, 2006.

<sup>19</sup> "President Bush's Statement on North Korea Nuclear Test", The White House, October 9, 2006, available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061009.html>, accessed on: October 22, 2006.

<sup>20</sup> "North Korean test 'went wrong', U.S. official says", CNN News, October 11, 2006, available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/10/korea.nuclear.test/index.html>, accessed on: October 19, 2006.

aid, and its only friend. It even hinted at scraping a 'Treaty of Friendship' signed with North Korea in 1961 according to which China was committed to defending North Korea if it was attacked. Shortly thereafter China reverted to calling for "calm" and "dialogue" in resolving the crisis, in an indication that Beijing may not join in the Chapter VII draft. China opposed inserting the Chapter VII clause in the first resolution, arguing that the US could use it to seek an Iraq-like military strike on North Korea. China was anxious to exclude any threat of military force and keen to limit the scope of sanctions.

#### **4.1.4. Russia**

Russia has strong national interests in Northeast Asia. The Russian reaction to the North Korean test was swift and unequivocal. Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a meeting with Cabinet members that "Russia unconditionally condemns the test conducted by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. It is not only North Korea that really counts, but the tremendous harm caused to the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world."<sup>21</sup> In the United Nations Russia supported a pragmatic approach to the draft UN resolution on the reclusive communist state.

#### **4.1.5. South Korea**

South Korea shares China's concerns about a possible collapse of the North Korean government. In addition to the likely surge of refugees, the economic costs of stabilizing and perhaps reuniting with North Korea would be tremendous.

South Korea also opposes military action against the North. A military action would be devastating to South Korea. Sometimes overlooked in the debate about North Korea's nuclear weapons is its large conventional force. Analysts doubt that the North could sustain a prolonged military campaign, but it could do tremendous damage to Seoul which is within artillery range of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in a very short time.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Russia condemns NKorea's nuclear test — Putin", ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, October 9, 2006, available at: <http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=10869205&PageNum=0>, accessed on: October 20, 2006.

In recent years, South Korea has pursued a “Sunshine Policy”<sup>22</sup> of engagement with the North, promoting trade, tourism and dialogue across the DMZ. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says that policy will be reviewed.

#### **4.1.6. Japan**

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called North Korea’s nuclear test “unpardonable” and said that the region was “entering a new, dangerous nuclear age”.<sup>23</sup> Japan has imposed its own unilateral sanctions, which are more restrictive than those called for in the UN resolution, banning all North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and restricting imports and most North Korean nationals from entering Japan. Japan is the prime sponsor of tough sanctions against North Korea at the UN. Japan, which now holds the rotating chairmanship of the 15-member Security Council, is drafting a resolution calling for tougher sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing the use of military force in the event of the North failing to comply.<sup>24</sup>

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have a special significance in Japan, the only country to have suffered nuclear attack. But Prime Minister Abe has said he will not seek nuclear weapons as prevention against North Korea. After the reported nuclear weapons test, Abe told

---

<sup>22</sup> The Sunshine Policy is the current South Korean doctrine towards North Korea. It emphasizes peaceful cooperation, seeking short-term reconciliation as a prelude to eventual Korean reunification. Since its articulation in 1998 by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, the policy has resulted in greater political contact between the two countries and several high-profile business ventures and brief meetings of separated family members. Critics believe that it ignores what they call the fundamentally repressive and aggressive nature of North Korea and has resulted mainly in a propping up of the regime of Kim Jong Il. In 2000, Kim Dae Jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of the Sunshine Policy.

<sup>23</sup> “North Korea claims nuclear test”, BBC News, October 9, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6032525.stm>, accessed on: October 24, 2006.

<sup>24</sup> Shim Jae Hoon, “North Korea’s Nuclear Gamble”, available at: <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=8274>, accessed on: October 29, 2006.

lawmakers, “There will be no change in our non-nuclear arms principles.”<sup>25</sup>

#### **4.1.7. Bangladesh**

Bangladesh has termed the nuclear test by North Korea ‘very unfortunate’, expressing concerns about the ramifications for the region and possible long-term consequences in the race for global military supremacy. According to former Foreign Minister M. Morshed Khan, “This will make the whole region unstable and should be considered as a threat to peace and stability in East Asia and will also have a detrimental effect on global peace,”<sup>26</sup> Bangladesh strongly recommends that the six-nation negotiating team should be activated once again to engage North Korea in deescalating its nuclear propensities.

#### **4.2. North Korea’s Response**

After claiming that the country has successfully conducted a nuclear test, the North Korean envoy to the UN said it would be better for the Security Council to offer its congratulations rather than pass “useless” resolutions.<sup>27</sup>

On October 11, 2006, the Associated Press reported that North Korea has threatened war if attempts are made to penalize them through further sanctions.<sup>28</sup> On the same day, the North’s Foreign Ministry warned in a statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency that “If

---

<sup>25</sup> “China Issues Warning to North Korea”, NewsMax.com, available at: <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/10/10/72152.shtml>, accessed on: October 20, 2006.

<sup>26</sup> “Bangladesh terms North Korean nuclear test unfortunate”, IRNA, October 9, 2006, available at: <http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-236/0610090565182948.htm>, accessed on: October 19, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Peter Heinlein, “US Asks for Tough UN Sanctions on North Korea”, Voice of America, October 9, 2006, available at: <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-10/2006-10-09-voa41.cfm?CFID=74543431&CFTOKEN=73232543>, accessed on: October 17, 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Hans Greimel, “North Korea Threatens War Over Sanctions”, Associated Press, October 11, 2006, available at: <http://apnews.myway.com/article/20061011/D8KMG5AG0.html>, accessed on: October 18, 2006.

the US keeps pestering us and increases pressure, we will regard it as a declaration of war and will take a series of physical corresponding measures.”<sup>29</sup>

On October 17, 2006, North Korea denounced UN sanctions over its nuclear test as a declaration of war. Meanwhile, the United States and other nations suspect that North Korea may try a second bomb test despite international condemnation.<sup>30</sup>

On October 20, 2006, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il expressed regret about his country's nuclear test to a Chinese delegation and said Pyongyang would return to international nuclear talks if Washington backs off a campaign to financially isolate the country. He was quoted by a Chinese delegation as saying, “If the US makes a concession to some degree, we will also make a concession to some degree, whether it be bilateral talks or Six-Party Talks.” He also said that he had no future plans to test another nuclear device.<sup>31</sup>

On October 31, 2006, North Korea agreed to rejoin six-nation nuclear disarmament talks. The agreement was struck in a day of unpublicized discussions between the senior envoys from the United States, China and North Korea at a government guesthouse in Beijing. The Talks could begin in November or December.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> “North Korea: Increased U.S. Pressure Would Be Act Of War”, FOX NEWS, October 11, 2006, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,219620,00.html>, accessed on: October 18, 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Jack Kim, “N. Korea defiant amid fears of second nuclear test”, Yahoo News, October 17, 2006, available at: [http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20061017/ts\\_nm/korea\\_north\\_dc\\_121;\\_ylt=AhSKxS47d5H8IVaO9STyzquCscEA;\\_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNIYwMIJV RPUCU1](http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20061017/ts_nm/korea_north_dc_121;_ylt=AhSKxS47d5H8IVaO9STyzquCscEA;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNIYwMIJV RPUCU1), accessed on: October 17, 2006.

<sup>31</sup> “Report: Kim ‘sorry’ about N. Korea nuclear test”, NBC, MSNBC and news services, October 20, 2006, available at: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15341349/>, accessed on: October 22, 2006.

<sup>32</sup> “North Korea Agrees to Rejoin Disarmament Talks”, Associated Press, October 31, 2006, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,226378,00.html>, accessed on: November 01, 2006.



## **5. Implications for East Asian Security**

North Korea's nuclear development activities have political and military as also local, regional and global implications. Pyongyang's nuclear capability and its ability to fire a missile across vast distances now becomes a critical part of the security scenario in East Asia. Indeed, the implications extend beyond East Asia.

### **5.1. East Asian Security Concerns**

The security situations on the Korean Peninsula attract close attention at the beginning of the 21st century. The international community remains deeply concerned about the state of security in this area and has repeatedly undertaken efforts to de-escalate tensions and normalize the situation in the region. The renewed occurrence of the North Korean nuclear crisis created new tensions in the region that may result in an armed conflict, possibly even a nuclear one.

Following the end of the Cold War, people in the region have witnessed improvement in the relationship between and among the major powers like the United States, Russia, Japan and China. Different forms of strategic relationship have been established between them. Yet, in each of the bilateral relationships between the major powers, there are some problems. Some major powers are still sticking to the Cold War perceptions. They always try to take some other countries as their enemies. To contain the enemy, they persist in enhancing the military alliances which were the outcome and product of the Cold War, and try to seek absolute security by trying to dominate advanced technologies.

Although East Asian economy has been growing very fast, the financial crisis started in 1997 has fully indicated the fact that the Asian economy is very fragile. The economic problem has brought about internal instability in some countries of East Asia. These countries have done very little to promote the development of regionalism in the region.

Remarkable achievements have been witnessed in international arms control and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world after the end of the Cold War. East Asia has been the most dynamic region in arms build-up and proliferation. Because of the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits, the parties concerned have been making their efforts to build up their arms, thus leading to the arms development and race. Furthermore,

some western countries, the United States in particular, have fuelled the arms race and proliferation in the region.

Non-traditional threats are taking place in the region in the recent years. The traditional military threat has been diminishing gradually with the end of the military confrontation between the United States and Russia. Non-traditional threats have been found in terrorist attacks, piracies, drug-smuggling, uneven development, worsening environment, political instability in some countries, hacker attacks through computers, etc. Although these threats are non-traditional, they are posing threats to almost all countries in the region.

East Asia is not only one of the most important but also one of the most tension-filled regions in the present-day world. North Korea's nuclear test has raised widespread concern for a domino effect in Asia. Relations between East Asian countries are being affected by increased nationalistic fervour in China, Japan and South Korea, aggravating long-standing disputes over territorial claims and different interpretations of history. Most territorial disputes in the region are over uninhabited islands and partially submerged rocks, whose status remains ambiguous under international law, including Tokdo or Takeshima, jointly claimed by South Korea and Japan; Senkaku or Diaoyu, jointly claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan; and the Kuril or Northern Territories, jointly claimed by Russia and Japan. The importance of most of these lies not so much in their fundamental value, but in the surrounding economic zones. The economic rise of China, generational shifts in South Korea and the waning of Japan's economic dominance have stimulated xenophobia that occasionally spills over into violence. The fragile security balance in East Asia will continue to reflect China's military, economic, and political posture with respect to the Korean peninsula. The security issue on the Korean peninsula is of serious concern not only to North and South Korea, but also to the US and the major powers in the region.

East Asia has become a region dominated with nuclear weapons and missiles with the exception of Japan and South Korea. The continued military confrontation between North Korea, South Korea and its ally the United States represents the main source of instability in East Asia. The Korean Peninsula now turns into a nuclear flashpoint of the world. The strategic balance of power in East Asia shifts against the United States strategic control of the region. The consequent strategic situation in East Asia depends on how skilfully China plays its cards.

## **5.2. Foreign Relations of North Korea**

The foreign relations of North Korea are often tense and unpredictable. Its government has been largely isolationist, becoming one of the world's most authoritarian since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Technically, the country is still in a state of war with South Korea and the United States. North Korea has maintained close relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and often limited ones with other nations.

North Korea has often had poor relations with its neighbouring countries. After 1945, the Soviet Union supplied the economic and military aid that enabled North Korea to mount its invasion of the South in 1950. In addition, the assistance of Chinese volunteers during the war and the presence of the troops until 1958 gave China some degree of influence in North Korea. In 1961, North Korea concluded formal mutual security treaties with the Soviet Union and China, which have not been formally ended. For most of the Cold War period, North Korea followed a policy of equidistance between the Soviet Union and China by accepting favours from both while avoiding a clear preference for either. In the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea's relations with its two major communist allies became strained for various reasons. Following Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in 1984, there was a dramatic improvement in Soviet- North Korea relations, resulting in renewed deliveries of advanced Soviet weapons to North Korea and increases in economic aid. Since the late 1980s, North Korea's nuclear program has become the most pressing issue in international affairs.

South Korea has maintained a "Sunshine policy" towards North Korea since the 1990s, stressing re-unification of the two countries and thus often going to great lengths to avoid antagonizing the leadership of the country. South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and the People's Republic of China in 1992, which put a serious strain on relations between North Korea and its traditional allies. Furthermore, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 had resulted in a significant drop in communist aid to North Korea. Despite these changes and its past dependence on the military and economic assistance, North Korea proclaims an independent stance in its foreign policy in accordance with its official ideology of self-reliance. At the same time, North Korea maintains membership in a variety of multilateral organizations. It

became a member of the UN in September 1991. North Korea is also expanding its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries gradually.

### **5.3. Implications of the Nuclear Test**

North Korea is located in the centre of East Asia and is very important in terms of strategic position. Its nuclear test could lead to an arms race in East Asia. Any major development would threaten stability in the strategically vital region, in which the United States has long exercised its power diplomatically as well as militarily.

The immediate consequences of the nuclear test have reinforced the North's isolation and induced fuller international collaboration to monitor and prevent any North Korean involvement in nuclear weapons transactions. Though China and Russia insisted upon exclusion of the use of force as an enforcement mechanism, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 for the first time justified enhanced sanctions against the North under Chapter VII provisions. The resolution obligated all UN member states to heighten cargo inspections and related restrictions on financial and economic transactions involving North Korea 'in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law'.

China remains deeply worried about any move that might cause instability in North Korea, with which it shares 1,400 kilometres of border. No country has more influence over North Korea than China does. Both countries are ruled by communist parties. China sends desperately needed food and energy assistance to North Korea. Yet even China was unable to discourage North Korea from conducting its nuclear weapon test.

China could impose tremendous economic and military pressure on North Korea but is unwilling to do so, fearing collapse of the North Korean regime. This collapse could lead to even more insecurity on the peninsula and waves of refugees pouring across the border into China. It also could draw the South Korean military and its US allies into North Korea - at China's doorstep.

As a result, China opposes calls for stringent international sanctions and military action against the North. According to China's UN Ambassador Wang Guangya, "I think there has to be some punitive

actions, but also I think these actions have to be appropriate. The UN Security Council must give a firm, constructive but prudent response.”<sup>33</sup> China is not at all convinced that an escalation of sanctions would help either. As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, China can use its veto to prevent robust Council action against North Korea.

China fears that the North Korean nuclear test could trigger the desire of Japan and even South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons. Although Japan has formally restated its policy that it would not acquire a nuclear arsenal, a discussion is underway in Japanese ruling circles about changing its position. North Korea’s nuclear test violates China’s implicit understanding with the US to keep North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons if the US kept its allies—Japan and South Korea—from doing the same. The test has left China with a dilemma. If it fails to reign in North Korea, China will increasingly be targeted by the Bush administration for supporting a “rogue state”.

The nuclear test also badly undermined South Korea’s engagement strategy towards North Korea. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun had invested much political capital and financial assistance in opening doors to the North, even as North Korea resumed its nuclear programme. His policy of “Peace and Prosperity” with North Korea has come under extreme scrutiny. Roh is under significant pressure to end joint North-South economic cooperation, but the government has declared that Mt. Kūmgang tourism project and the Kaesōng Industrial complex in the North will continue. Seoul has been less severe in its reaction to the test, although it has suspended humanitarian aid.

Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, wants to amend his country’s Constitution, adopt a more assertive foreign policy and strengthen military cooperation with Japan’s strongest ally, the United States. North Korea’s nuclear weapons test of October 2006 will further intensify the debate and perhaps give a boost to him.

---

<sup>33</sup> “N Korea must be punished, says China”, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China, available at: [http://www.koreaemb.org.cn/contents/news/news\\_info.aspx?type=information&bm=2&sm=4&fm=1&CurrntPage=2&id=5472](http://www.koreaemb.org.cn/contents/news/news_info.aspx?type=information&bm=2&sm=4&fm=1&CurrntPage=2&id=5472), accessed on: October 31, 2006.

Although the economic implications of the North Korean nuclear test for East Asia are not disastrous, it would not be benign. Of all of North Korea's neighbours, South Korea is the most vulnerable to destabilizing shocks emanating from the nuclear test. Japan is less vulnerable economically than South Korea. North Korean action could encourage a medium to long-term process of re-militarization in Japan. Although China's direct economic exposure to the vagaries of North Korean behaviour is relatively slight, Pyongyang's provocations could ultimately carry profound economic and political effects should disagreements over North Korea contribute to a deterioration in China's economic relationships with the United States, Japan and the EU, with which China's continued economic success are inextricably linked. A peaceful resolution to the standoff with North Korea runs counter to US interests. China has already displaced the US as the largest trade partner of South Korea and Japan. The integration of North Korea into the region's dynamic economies would increase the potential for a trade bloc against the US, accompanied by demands from South Korea and Japan for the removal of US military bases.

## **6. Conclusion**

The North Korean nuclear test has put the agreement between South and North Korea for the 'Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' in jeopardy, threatening peace in East Asia. The nuclear test will not bring a long-awaited end to the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, it is likely to rather encourage more sanctions from the United States, and could initiate the re-emergence of Japanese militarism. Further steps towards increased militarization and nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula cannot result in anything but a disaster.

North Korea's nuclear test is the failure of the West's non-proliferation policy. The impact of the test on non-proliferation efforts could extend far beyond East Asia. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capabilities represent a serious threat to regional security and to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT regime is on the verge of collapse. North Korea's test may also threaten the viability of the NPT, the bedrock of the non-proliferation regime. It demonstrates the need to return to the proven methods of multilateral disarmament.

The 'Peaceful Resolution' to the nuclear problem and 'Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' cannot be compromised. Working towards a peaceful resolution is the only way to prevent a disastrous war on the Korean Peninsula and to maintain the Korean people's existence. It is time for political and civil societies, regardless of their own interests, to work hard to find peaceful ways to solve the crisis caused by North Korea's nuclear test.

Despite the present impasse over North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, food and fuel should not be used as weapons of compulsion, because doing so would target innocent civilians, particularly children, the aged, and the ill. Millions of North Koreans, who have no control over the actions of their government, are facing hunger due to recent floods and crop failures.

Sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution maintain the rule of international law embodied by the NPT and relevant Security Council resolutions. All countries should be held responsible to the norms established by the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Enforcement of UNSC Resolution and the NPT, through penalizing measures such as focused sanctions, is important, but only as a preface of resuming multilateral talks and beginning direct bilateral talks between the US and North Korea to achieve voluntary compliance.

However, sanctions are not an end. They are means of gaining agreement with international law and to motivate governments to negotiate. The sanctions of the UNSC will not solve the nuclear problem of North Korea. To develop peaceful initiatives to address the current problem of nuclear proliferation in North Korea, the US should give up its "regime change" goal for North Korea and try real diplomacy particularly with all the countries of East Asia. One new strategy may be direct, bilateral talks between the US and North Korea. Providing US security assurance – a promise not to attack – to North Korea may be a key to start talks.

The challenge and responsibility of the United Nations as also all the nations now is to ensure the diplomatic aspects of the resolution particularly the call for the resumption of the Six-party talks. Regional initiatives are also necessary to prevent North Korea from pursuing a weapons programme by offering it security assurances, generous agricultural and industrial assistance, and food and fuel aid. Such arrangements can lead to the creation of a nuclear weapon-free East Asia.

**ANNEX I****Table 1: Chronology of North Korea's Nuclear Programme**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Nuclear Programme</b>
<b>1980s</b>	
1985	North Korea joins nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans non nuclear states from acquiring nuclear arms. But it refuses to submit to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by the treaty.
1989	US satellite pictures reveal a nuclear reprocessing plant at North Korea's Yongbyon complex. Washington accuses North Korea of actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Pyongyang denies the charge.
<b>1990s</b>	
1991	North Korea and South Korea agree to denuclearize the Peninsula.
1992	North Korea promises to allow IAEA Inspections.
1993	North Korea shocks world by saying it will quit the NPT, later suspends its withdrawal.
1994	North Korea and the US sign agreement in Geneva. North pledges to freeze, eventually dismantle, nuclear weapons programme in exchange for help to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.
August 31, 1998	North Korea fires a multistage Taepodong-1 missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
September 13, 1999	North Korea pledges to freeze long-range missile tests.
September 17, 1999	President Clinton agrees to first major easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since Korean War's end in 1953.
<b>2000</b>	
July 2000	North Korea threatens to restart nuclear programme if Washington does not compensate for loss of electricity due to delays in building nuclear power



	plants.
June 2001	North Korea warns it will reconsider missile test moratorium if Washington doesn't resume contacts aimed at normalizing relations.
July 2001	State Department reports North Korea developing long-range missile.
December 2001	President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea will be "held accountable" if they develop weapons of mass destruction.
January 29, 2002	Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil" in State of the Union speech.
September 2002	North Korea pledges in summit talks with Japan to extend its moratorium on missile tests beyond 2003.
October 4, 2002	North Korea tells visiting US delegation it has second covert nuclear weapons programme.
January 10, 2003	North Korea says it will withdraw from the NPT.
April 16, 2003	US, Chinese and North Korean officials announce talks in Beijing aimed at ending nuclear standoff.
April 24, 2003	North Korea says it has nuclear weapons and may test, export or use them depending on US actions.
August 27-29, 2003	North Korea joins first round of Six-Party Nuclear Talks in Beijing, which include China, US, Japan, Russia and South Korea.
February 25-28, 2004	Second round of Six-Party Talks.
May 2004	North Korea reaffirms its missile moratorium in summit talks with Japan.
June 23-26, 2004	Third round of Six-Party Talks.
September 2004	North Korea refuses to attend fourth-round talks, accusing US of "hostile" policies.
May 2005	North Korea fires a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan.
February 10, 2005	North Korea announces it has nuclear weapons.
July 26-August 7, 2005	Fourth round of Six-Party Talks; North Korea in attendance.
September 15, 2005	The US imposes restrictions on Macau-based bank after its alleged involvement in North Korean illegal activity, including counterfeiting.
September 19, 2005	North Korea pledges to dismantle nuclear programmes in exchange for pledges of energy assistance; US pledges not to invade and to respect North's sovereignty in an agreement ending talks.

November 9-11, 2005	Fifth round of Six-Party Talks.
<b>2006</b>	
January 3, 2006	North Korea says it won't return to talks unless the US lifts sanctions imposed for its alleged currency counterfeiting and other illegal activities.
March 8	North Korea fires two short-range missiles.
May 18	Japan says North Korea has moved a missile to a launch site. Media reports identify it as a long-range Taepodong-2.
June 18	North Korea vows to increase its "military deterrent" to cope with what it called US attempts to provoke war.
June 21	President Bush warns North Korea faces further isolation if it testfires a long-range missile.
July 5	North Korea launches seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, including a Taepodong-2.
September 26	North Korea rejects further talks on its nuclear programme, claims Washington wants to rule the world.
October 3	North Korea says it will conduct a nuclear test in the face of what it claimed was "the US extreme threat of a nuclear war."
October 9	North Korea declares to have conducted its first nuclear test, drawing a unanimous condemnation from the 15 members of the UN Security Council.
October 10	Some western scientists had doubts as to whether the nuclear weapon test that took place on October 9, 2006 was in fact successful.
October 14	The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test on October 9, 2006. However, the sanctions do not have the full support of communist China, or the former Soviet Union.

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

Table 2: North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure<sup>34</sup>

Name/ Location of Facility	Type/ Status	IAEA Safeguards
<b>Power Reactors</b>		
Sinpo-1 Kumho <sup>35</sup>	Light-water, PWR, 1,040 MWe, construction suspended	No
Sinpo-2 Kumho	Light-water, 1,000 MWe, construction suspended	No
Yongbyon	Gas-graphite, nat. U, 50 MWe, construction halted, no evidence that it has resumed	No
Taechon	Gas-graphite, nat. U, 200 MWe, construction halted, no evidence that it has resumed	No
<b>Research Factors</b>		
IRT Yongbyon	Pool-type, HEU (80 percent), 8 MWt, operating	No <sup>36</sup>
Yongbyon	Critical assembly, 0.1 MWt	No
Pyongyang	Subcritical assembly	No

<sup>34</sup> Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, pp. 292-293.

<sup>35</sup> The Sinpo-1 and Sinpo-2 light-water reactors were being constructed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Construction has been suspended since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in late 2002 and early 2003, respectively.

<sup>36</sup> According to the IAEA, because the IRT research reactor and the critical assembly located at Yongbyon were acquired from the Soviet Union, both are subject to safe-guards regardless of whether or not North Korea is a party to the NPT. Neither of these facilities is currently under safeguards, however, because North Korea has not permitted inspectors to return to the country since expelling them at the end of 2002.

<b>Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction)</b>		
Radiochemical Laboratory Yongbyon <sup>37</sup>	Operational <sup>38</sup>	No
Pyongyang	Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale hot cells, status unknown <sup>39</sup>	
<b>Uranium Processing</b>		
Pyongsan	Uranium ore processing, status unknown	No
Sanchon-Wolbingson mine Pakchon	Uranium ore processing, status unknown	No
Pyongsan	Uranium ore processing, status unknown	No
Pakchon	Uranium ore processing, status unknown	No
Yongbyon	Uranium purification (UO <sub>2</sub> ) facility, operating	No
Yongbyon	Fuel-fabrication facility, partially operational, partially under maintenance	No
Yongbyon	Pilot-scale fuel-fabrication facility, dismantled, according to North Korean officials	No

**Abbreviations**

HEU- Highly Enriched Uranium    Nat. U - Natural Uranium MWe - Megawatts Electricity    MWt- Megawatts Thermal    PWR- Pressurized Water Reactor


<sup>37</sup> According to North Korean officials, capable of reprocessing 110 tons of spent fuel per year.

<sup>38</sup> According to Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory who visited the Yongbyon nuclear facility in January 2004, North Korean officials claimed that they had successfully extracted plutonium from all 8,000 spent-fuel rods stored at Yongbyon between January and June 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Jared S. Dreicer, "How Much Plutonium could have been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?", *Science & Global Security*, Vol. 8 2000, pp. 273-286.

**ANNEX II**

**Figure 1: North Korea's nuclear facilities and missile facilities**



Source: *The Economist*, October 14, 2006.

**ANNEX III**  
**UN Security Council Resolution on North Korea<sup>40</sup>**

**SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS NUCLEAR TEST BY  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

**UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1718 (2006)**

**Action Prevents Provision of Nuclear Technology, Large-Scale Weapons,  
Luxury Goods to Country; Permits Inspection of Cargo to Ensure  
Compliance**

Expressing the gravest concern over the claim by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test, the Security Council this afternoon condemned that test and imposed sanctions on the DPRK, calling for it to return immediately to multilateral talks on the issue.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, but barring automatic military enforcement of its demands under the Charter's Article 41, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1718 (2006), which prevents a range of goods from entering or leaving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear-weapon programme.

Through its decision, the Council prohibited the provision of large-scale arms, nuclear technology and related training to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as luxury goods, calling upon all States to take cooperative action, including through inspection of cargo, in accordance with their respective national laws.

The Council stressed that such inspections should aim to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials.

Regarding the freezing of assets, the Council provided specific exemptions for the transfer of monies to meet various financial obligations and humanitarian needs, specifying humanitarian exemptions for the travel ban, as well.

---

<sup>40</sup> UN Security Council Resolution on North Korea, available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>, accessed on: December 01, 2006.

To monitor and adjust the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Council decided to establish a committee consisting of all 15 members of the body, which would provide a report every 90 days, beginning with the passage of the resolution.

Following the vote, several members of the Council condemned what many called an irresponsible step by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, stressing the importance of the Council's swift and decisive action and emphasizing that, should the country implement the provisions of the new resolution, the sanctions could be lifted.

The United States representative said the test posed "one of the gravest threats to international peace and security that this Council has ever had to confront". The resolution adopted today would send a strong and clear message to North Korea and other would-be proliferators that they would meet with serious repercussions should they choose to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it would send an unequivocal and unambiguous message for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop its procurement programmes and to verifiably dismantle existing weapons of mass destruction programmes.

"All of us find ourselves in an extraordinary situation, which requires the adoption of extraordinary measures", the representative of the Russian Federation said. Today's text contained a set of carefully considered and targeted measures, aimed at resolving the main issue: to make the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reconsider its dangerous course, come back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and resume, without preconditions, its participation in the six-party talks. That could be done only through political and diplomatic means. He insisted on the Council's strong control over the measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and noted that the resolution reflected concern over the humanitarian consequences of strict measures.

China's representative agreed that the Council's actions should both indicate the international community's firm position and help create conditions for the peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue. As the resolution adopted today basically reflected that spirit, his delegation had voted in favour of the text. However, sanctions were not the end in themselves. China did not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, and urged the countries concerned to adopt a responsible attitude in that regard, refraining from taking any provocative steps that could intensify the tension. China still believed that the six-party talks were the realistic means of handling the issue. It also firmly opposed the use of force.

Japan's representative said that the combination of ballistic missile capability and, now, the claim of nuclear capability in the hands of a regime known for reckless irresponsible behaviour, created nothing less than a grave threat to peace and security. He not only supported the Council's sanctions, but also outlined a set of national measures undertaken by his country, including closure of Japanese ports to DPRK vessels; denial of imports from the DPRK; and prohibition of entry for DPRK nationals into Japanese territory.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, however, "totally rejected" the text, saying that it was "gangster-like" of the Security Council to adopt such a coercive resolution against his country, while neglecting the nuclear threat posed by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was a clear testament that the Council had completely lost its impartiality and was persisting in applying double standards to its work.

Also taking the floor today were representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Argentina and the Republic of Korea.