The end of the Cold War has unleashed several hopes and aspirations as well as concerns and worries not only for Europe and America but also for the rest of the world. The very beginning of the process of ending the Cold War initiated by Gorbachev's "new thinking" made its benign impact felt in many ways on the security situation in the Third World. The series of disarmament agreements concluded between the Super powers and in Europe, like the INF Treaty (June 1990), the Paris Treaty (November 1990, on "farthest reaching arms cuts in history") and the Moscow Treaty (August 1991) and the possible promises of further reductions in conventional arms and armed forces, have created an atmosphere that may be seen as conducive to world peace and security.

The Third World, though not directly involved in this disarmament process has not remained unaffected by the ending of the Cold War. The reduction in tensions and rivalries between the Super powers and their military blocs has had a direct impact on the resolution of some of the intense and long drawn regional conflicts in the Third World such as in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and the Horn of Africa. There is now a growing hope that there would be no revival of the Cold War inputs from the Super powers or their allies into the Third world to perpetuate and intensify various regional and bilateral conflicts there. In addition to abstaining from such negative inputs, there are also signs on the part of the Super powers to exert their influence on many of the traditional Third World rivals to moderate their conflicts and seek avenues and areas of mutual understanding, adjustment and co-operation. Some movement in this direction may be
discerned between India and Pakistan; India and China; countries of Indo-China and the ASEAN, South Africa and the Frontline States, etc. Hopes have also been aroused among a number of developing countries that at least a part of the savings made from the wide ranging arms cuts and disarmament measures between the Super powers and in Europe, may be diverted to them for meeting the challenge of poverty and underdevelopment.

These are all, of course, hopes and expectations. What happens to them would much depend upon the way the post-Cold War world order unfolds itself. For there are several other aspects of the end of the Cold War processes that are not all that positive or encouraging for peace, security and development in the Third World. These not so positive aspects are some times even more powerful and effective than those arousing hopes and expectations. For a balanced and comprehensive assessment of the prospects in the Third World, these negative implications of the end of the Cold War in the areas of arms flows, regional and internal conflicts and problems of economic development in the Third World also deserve careful attention.

Flows of Arms

Arms reductions in Europe and between the two Super powers have generated a climate for similar reductions in the Third World. This climate is building into a pressure as a result of developments like the moves for resolution of Third World regional conflicts and progress in the confidence building measures between such former adversaries like China and the Soviet Union. One is however, not certain if this new post-Cold War climate indeed lead to the reduction of arms flows to the Third World. Because a number of factors militate against this climate. To begin with, the arms cut and disarmament agreements in Europe have suddenly resulted in the surplus arms and surplus production capacities of the arms industry (both in east and west Europe) which must find an outlet in the Third World. Destruction of these surplus weapons and conversion of the excess production capacities are costly (both financially and socio-politically, in terms of the number of jobs involved), difficult (technologically), hazardous (environmentally) and time
taking. For instance, according to one estimate, the world has 500,000 tons of mustard gas stockpiled and to destroy one kilogram of this gas without causing environmental damage may cost DM 1100. Similarly, the consumption of fuel and emission of smoke, shoot and heat in destroying thousands of tanks may be too much to bear.

There are several alternatives being worked out to deal with this problem of surpluses in arms and production capacities, like the Soviet suggestion of using tanks for internal security purposes, and converting them later as tractors and ploughs for agricultural use. But this may not take care of all the surpluses available. Among these alternative uses, one was to supply them to the Third World on rock bottom prices and easy supply procedures in view of ready demand there. Before conclusion of the Paris Treaty of November 1990, one could see a considerable activity in this context. A number of Third World countries sent powerful delegations to eastern Europe to finalise deals of the transfer of surplus modern weapons on attractive terms. Comments were made at that time that countries holding such surpluses may find it cheaper and more convenient to give these arms even free to their Third World friends. For instance, the sale of French Mirage fighter planes by Australia to Pakistan at a discount price in early 1990, since Australia was equipping itself from better and easily available equipments from Europe, may be recalled here. Similarly, Britain had come forward in a big way to help Malaysia modernise its armed forces through a package of US $ 1 bn worth of arms supply in 1989. In that year Britain also supplied arms worth US $ 400 mn to Brunei, a country that hardly faces any threat from anywhere. A good deal of US arms supplies to Saudi Arabia, before and during the recent Gulf crisis was also the result of moves to dump the surpluses and cut the losses of the arms industry.

The US arms supplies to Saudi Arabia and other West Asian countries like Egypt before the Gulf crisis was perhaps a part of the emerging new national security strategy outlined by President Bush in his Aspen Institute Speech on 2nd August 1990, ironically the day when Saddam Hussain moved into Kuwait, precipitating the Gulf crisis. Because, soon after
the war and contrary to the claims about the control of arms supplies to the Gulf, the White House proposed, to the Congress to sell hi-tech weapons, including F-16 fighters, patriot and other anti-missile systems, multi-rocket launchers and M-1 tanks worth US $ 18 bn, to the five US allies in the Gulf, namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Turkey. The US plans to stockpile modern weapons in Israel have already been disclosed at the very high levels of policy making, Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney. Reacting to objections to such plans, he defended them during his visit to Egypt in May 1991 and said that Egypt was also being given necessary support to manufacture M-1 Tanks. All this, he said was a part of the US plans to evolve a stable structure of peace in Middle East and Gulf. In the new National Security Strategy as being spelled out by the Bush Administration, there is a clear emphasis on the regions of Near East, Southwest Asia, and Far Fast, with countries like Israel and South Korea being specifically mentioned as allies and friends to be protected. Moves in accordance with this strategy would obviously result in a selective build-up of these countries through the supply of hi-tech arms and economic assistance. This in turn will lead to new strategic imbalances in these Third World regions. Those adversely affected would naturally turn to all other available sources of supply. This would also result into creating new tensions and intensifying prevailing ones among the Third World rivals and adversaries; thus providing a new impetus to arms race in the Third World regions.

Pressures of the arms industry in the West has always played a key role in spurting arms race in the Third World. Two implications of such pressures are clearly discernible in relation to the flows of arms to the Third World in the emerging situation. First is the fierce competition amongst the manufacturers to find new and viable markets in the Third World at a time when Europe is disarming and there is a considerable surplus of arms as well as production capacities, as we noted earlier. We also noted that conversion of military industry into that of civilian manufactures is going to take a long time. The implication, therefore, is clear: that even when the defence establishments and military industry
of the great powers imbibe sincerely the spirit of the post-Cold
War order, the industry will not go out of production
immediately and it will have to continue to sell. In doing so,
new rationale will be evolved and new threats to the security
of the country concerned will be conceived and articulated. An
instance of this can be seen in a major US firm, the General
Dynamics' briefing to the Pentagon wherein the US defence
Department was asked to purchase and fund for new weapon
systems (the advanced Tomahawk missile) by projecting a
possible threat from the Third World countries like India.

The pressure of industry has always been an important
factor behind the Western allies' reluctance to evolve a
mutually agreed suppliers restraint regime on sale of arms
and transfer of military technologies to the Third World
countries. US attempts to evolve such a regime including
among its NATO colleagues did not succeed prior to the Gulf
War. Earlier, in 1990, the US also had gone along with other
western allies in relaxing COCOM (Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls) licensing restrictions on a
number of hi-tech exports facilitated nuclear weapons
programmes of countries like Iraq and Pakistan.

After the Gulf War however, the US efforts to establish a
suppliers restraint regime, particularly in relation to West
Asia and the Gulf, have been stepped up. This was evident in
the five power (France, U.S., U.K., Soviet union and China)
consultations in June 1991 on controlling flow of hi-tech
weapons to the Gulf and the subsequent mention of such
restraint in the London Summit Declaration of G-7 Group in
July, 1991. Notwithstanding these measures, there are
serious doubts if any suppliers restraint regime will function
effectively owing to the influence of industry and its
associated vested interests in decision-making establish­
ments. Even the present US restraints on destabilizing
transfers of conventional arms as well as weapons of mass
destruction and associated technology "left scope to permit"
States in the region to acquire the conventional capabilities,
they legitimately need to deter and defend against military
aggression. There are also reports that a large number of
countries are seeking hi-tech weapons from the US after the
Gulf War. It remains to be seen if the US industry would let
go this newly emerged market unexploited and the US strategic considerations would not be tempted to harness the enhanced potential to buildup political influence in the Third World through arms sales\textsuperscript{13}.

The second implication of the role of Western arms industry in giving spurt to the arms race in the Third World has been closely related to the first discussed above. The pressure of competition among the suppliers in the past years resulted in a wider and speedier diffusion of military technologies and production capacities (and licences) among a number of willing and capable Third World countries. The result has been the creation of new and powerful Third World sources of export of modern weapons in the Third World \textsuperscript{14}. Names of countries like China, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Taiwan, India, Pakistan etc. may be mentioned in this respect. The significant growth of the production of new electronic items by West Asian Arms industry in the recent years has been a clear result of transfer of technologies from the West\textsuperscript{15}. These Third World exporters of arms are not going to be restrained in their sales by the end of the Cold War. Quite to the contrary, this is providing encouragement to these countries to export more. Particularly so, because the traditional great power exporters are busy evolving suppliers-restraint regime. Also because many of these countries have surplus and unutilised production capacities which they cannot allow to remain idle in view of economic pressures. Since their military imports are becoming expensive, they must earn hard currencies to supplement their resources. A typical case in this regard has been that of China which has asked its arms industry and the military to utilize 85\% of its export earnings for their modernization and technological updating. This incentive is reflected in China's growing drive for military exports in West Asia and other Third World countries. This was also the reason why China openly disapproved of the US attempts to establish a suppliers-restraint regime\textsuperscript{16}. Similarly, India decided a couple of years back to step-up its military exports to ease the defence-burden. Recently its new Defence Minister Sharad Pawar declared that India's aim was to increase its military-exports from the previous year's level of US $ 30 mn to that of
approximately US $ 400 mn during 1991-92\textsuperscript{17}. Pakistan, Egypt, Singapore and Australia are also emerging as notable arms exporters in the Third World.

The factors discussed above therefore, clearly suggest that prospects of restraints on flow of arms to the Third World countries are not very encouraging in the post-Cold War period. What is likely is that the supply of some hi-tech weapons may come under stricter regulations from the Western suppliers with a view that possession of such weapons by a Third World country may not pose any challenge to the strategic interests of the supplier great power or its allies in the given region. This is a direct consequence of the Iraqi defiance of Western power that precipitated the Gulf War. This will restrict options for some of the powerful Third World countries and allow great powers to manipulate regional military balances in the Third World. This does not provide any comfort for the Third Word security situation, as the restraints in the supply of selected hi-tech weapon systems (if they succeed at all) will be more than made up by greater flow of arms of secondary and lower levels of technologies.

**Regional Conflicts and Security Situation**

While the flow of arms to the Third World will continue to be governed by a number of international factors, demands and justification for such flow of arms will be created by the security situation in the Third World. During the Cold War period, rivalries and conflicts between the Super powers and their allies constituted a significant input into the Third World regional conflicts. This input may no longer be present, at least in the same intensity and import, in the post-Cold War era. In fact, as noted in the beginning of this paper, the Super powers may even join hands in moderating and resolving some of the Third World regional conflicts, as was evident in the cases of Afghanistan and Kampuchea. This however, may not ensure resolution of Third World conflicts on any lasting basis.

It must be borne in mind that the roots of many of the persisting as well as potential conflicts lie within the respective Third World regions. There have been the questions of unsettled boundary disputes, water and other
resource conflicts, ethnic, religious and political conflicts of cross-border nature and ideological and power rivalries. The end of the Cold War and the consequent moderation on the part of the Super powers has not (remember Afghanistan and Kampuchea again!) and will not eliminate these regional roots of tensions. On the contrary, the possibility of persisting regional conflicts exploding and the new and potential ones surfacing is very much there. Because the Cold War input while fuelling and intensifying regional conflicts and tensions also acted as a restraining influence in deterring many a Third World rivals from starting or prolonging their wars. The example of Indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1971 were incredibly short and protracted mainly due to such restraining influence. The absence of this restraining influence on the part of the Super powers as a result of the end of the Cold War may thus induce a given regional conflict in the Third World to erupt, intensify or prolong.

An element of this situation could be seen in the eight year long Iran-Iraq war during the eighties, as the Super powers showed no inclination to deter the combatants. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that in the recent Gulf crisis, Iraq was encouraged initially to move into Kuwait in August 1990 only after reassuring itself, though inaccurately (as it turned out to be in the subsequent developments), that due to the end of the Cold War, the US was not to restrain it from doing so. Under the Cold War conditions, neither could Iraq draw such misleading inferences nor could the US and the Western allies wage a totally unequal war against Iraq as they did.

It is the strength of the regional roots of conflicts in the Third World that has so far sustained Afghanistan and Kampuchean conflicts even after the Super powers' desire to end them. In case of Afghanistan, Pakistan's involvement in the conflict has remained in tact due to its historical and geo-strategic stakes. The late Pakistani President Zia made no secret of his displeasure with the Geneva Agreement of 1987 on Afghanistan. Even after Zia, the Pakistani Army's interest in backing the Mujahideen groups have not abetted as could be seen in some of these groups military victory in early 1991 in the strategic town of Khost. In South Asia, Indo-Pak
tensions flared up in the late 1989 and the early 1990 to such an extent that war looked imminent. Even now, the low intensity conflict going on the Indian side of the border can lead to the outbreak of military hostilities between them any day. Commenting on the Post-Cold War world, a perceptive American scholar Lewis Gaddis has said:

“It is also worth remembering that the first post-Cold War year saw, in addition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the near outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, an intensification of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a renewed Syrian drive to impose control over Lebanon and a violent civil war in Liberia. Conflict in the Third World is not going to go away just because the Cold War has, indeed it may well intensify 20.

Gaddis also contends that the Cold War ideological competition and Super power rivalry is likely to be replaced in the post-Cold War period with “just as stark and just as pervasive” competition and contest between the “forces of integration and fragmentation” that is gradually unfolding itself 21. This new contest will further exacerbate conflicts in the Third World. Besides the regional roots of bilateral conflicts, diverse pressures within the Third World countries on which the international environment and the great powers may have no or very little control will create situations of insecurity in Third World countries and regions. Chipman has identified five sets of such pressures, namely: ... the persistence of feudal or traditional structures and the desire for modern systems of State management; the pressure for democracy and the perceived need of political leaders to maintain more autocratic forms of order; the challenge of maintaining national cohesion and the attractiveness of regional systems of political organisation, the aspirations to political and economic independence and the reality of reliance on external aid; and the pre-eminent desire for military self-reliance that sometimes obscures the urgency of non-military threats to security. 22

An important aspect of the security situation in the Third World is the changing global strategic order. Two somewhat interrelated factors which deserve attention in this regard are: (a) the one Super power situation and (b) the emergence of regional influential. The one Super power situation that enshrines the US as the only willing and capable power to project military force on global scale has been the result of the end of the Cold War; characterised by unilateral and nearly complete (for the time being at least) retreat of the Soviet
Union. The outcome of the Gulf War has consolidated US as the only Super power. This one Super power situation compares broadly to something that existed during the late forties and mid-fifties. It is, therefore, erroneous to describe the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War situation as that of a multi-polar order since the economic major powers like Japan and European Community (with United Germany's weight in it) are neither willing nor capable to challenge the US dominance, particularly in the military-strategic sense. The end of the Cold War has not only structurally contributed to the one Super power situation, but even materially helped it concretise. For instance, in the event of the Cold War still operating, the US could not have asserted itself militarily in the Gulf in the manner it has done now. Without the reduction of forces in Europe, it was not possible for the US to shift its manpower and material from the European theatre to carry out the “operation Desert Storm” and “Operation Desert Shield”. Above all, it could not have secured legitimacy and support from the UN for whatever it wanted to do and did in the Gulf.

In the one Super power situation, the U.S. naturally enjoys greater initiative, influence and strength to design the regional strategic order(s) in the Third World, within the framework of its perceived long and short term geo-strategic interests. Such interests were outlined by President Bush and others under the new National Security Strategy of the US. The US interests and initiatives in shaping the post-Cold War world can not but impinge militarily as well as politically in a number of Third World regions; particularly the Gulf (access to oil), the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific. In these regions, there is a clear perception that some of the Third World regional influentials may even directly challenge US and Western interests and stakes; as was done by Iraq recently.

The US may choose various ways to deal with the so called “threat from the Third World” which is nothing but a pretext to rationalize and legitimize its persisting urge to dominate the affairs of the world, keeping in view the Soviet retreat and the European and Japanese subservience. There are already clear attempts by the US to encourage a selected
number of Third World countries in given regions. Support and encouragement to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf to contain Iraq and Iran may be recalled here. A policy of parallel support in economic matters but restraints in military and strategic areas towards India and Pakistan is also discernible. In the Asia-Pacific region, encouragement to Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Indonesia is also a part of the carefully designed regional strategic restructuring by the US. Such regional restructuring is being attempted through the instrumentalities of economic incentives and pressures; political support and brow beating and supply of or restraint on sensitive industrial and military technologies. As a consequence of this strategic restructuring of the Third World regions, new imbalances, tensions and potential for conflicts are being created. And to deal with their adverse implications for the US interests, permanent or semi-permanent military presence and pre-positioning of equipments, rights to access in some countries etc are being suggested and pursued.

When it comes to protecting its perceived strategic interests, in the Third World, the US may not hesitate to use force directly or indirectly. Some of the objectives for which the US may use force in the Third World include "access to Persian Gulf oil"; "preservation of the independence of Israel and South Korea", and "halting the spread of nuclear weapons and terrorism." In an otherwise sober analysis of the post-Cold War strategy of the US, Stephen V. Evera said that the US should not

"..... forswear all use of force in the Third World. If intervention would end massive human rights violations like those in Cambodia during 1975-79, and could do so with high confidence at small cost, ethical considerations may recommend Third World States as in Korea, their presence serves a humanitarian purpose by preventing violence. If the United States owes moral debts, as to Israel, it may be compelled to repay in the currency of military commitment. If Third World States sponsor wanton terrorism, a forceful response may be appropriate."

Viewed from the perspective of Third World's political independence, sovereignty and freedom of action in internal and regional affairs; this is a long and frightening agenda of intervention. More so because the ongoing ferment in the Third World on account of the release of democratic and
developmental assertion, assertion of ethnic identities and religious fundamentalism and inherent weaknesses of political and economic systems, the US can find any and easily available excuse to intervene in safe-heavens (for Kurds refugees) are all uncomfortable and unhappy reminders of a difficult world order for the Third World in the post–Cold War period.

Dilemmas of Development

Implications of the end of the Cold War for the Third World are not confined to strategic and security aspects alone. Its economic fallout will pose equally, if not more, formidable challenges to the task of development in the Third World. The persisting trend of the break-down of North-South negotiations may be consolidated in the years to come. This could be seen in the manner in which the Uruguay Round on Trade was called by the North "with an agenda devised to further its global interests". 30

Flow of resources from North to the South provided an important developmental nexus between the two. This nexus has been vitiated by a situation of reverse flow of resources that became discernible by the beginning of the eighties and has persisted since then. According to one estimate, a shift from the positive flow of US $43 bn to the Third World from the industrialised countries in 1981 to a negative flow of US $33 bn was recorded in 1988. In Latin America particularly between 1983 and 1987, about US $90 bn more was paid to developed countries than what was received from them. 31

The overall foreign debts of the Third World have crossed the figure of US $1.3 trillion which requires US $200 bn annually as servicing charges. A sizeable portion of these debts have been accumulated as a result of arms purchases by the Third World countries. However, it may be borne in mind that the nature of debt burden and the extent of arms purchases are unevenly disbursed in the Third World and in many cases, the two i.e., arms purchases and debt burdens, do not coincide. For instance, many of the larger arms importers in the Gulf do not have any debt burden. And yet the linkages between the two cannot be ignored altogether. According to World Bank estimates in 1989 for instance, for some of the major Third World arms importers, one third of their debt
burden can be attributed to their arms purchases.\textsuperscript{32}

The collapse of North-South negotiations and the deteriorating economic situation for the Third World have been effectively articulated in various documents like the \textit{The Challenge to the South} (South Commission’s Report) and the UN Strategy for the Next Development Decade\textsuperscript{33} This situation is being worsened for the Third World as a result of political, strategic and economic changes taking place in the wake of the post-Cold War transformations in the world at large and the Soviet Union and East Europe in particular. The First World, it seems, has found its own (racially akin) Third World in Eastern Europe and is diverting its economic resources and political attention to rebuild the former communist societies\textsuperscript{34}. There is a new enthusiasm among the Western firms and corporate interests to economically activate the Eastern Europe. The West put together a lending facility of US $ 12 bn on the lines of World Bank under a French chairman with location in London. This facility is aimed at supporting the Eastern Europe against a tough competition from the Third World countries in securing loans and credit facilities\textsuperscript{35}. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who is meeting the challenge of German unification has been asking for greater support for East European countries. With the emergence of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as major competitors of the Third World in search of investments, credits, grants and technology transfers from the developed economies (which in turn are facing recession and low growth prospects), the Third World is in for harder times.

There is some hope for the Third World in the post-Cold War prospects of greater economic competition among the emerging economic giants like Japan, post-1992 European Community (including the United Germany), the US and some of the newly industrialised countries\textsuperscript{36}. As a result, these economic major powers are being driven into hitherto forbidden regions and sectors of economic activity. The US economic activism in relation to the Gulf; South Asia and Indo-China (Kampuchea and Vietnam); Japan’s growing interaction with the Gulf and Africa and Germany’s efforts to strengthen its economic ties with Africa, Gulf and the Asia-Pacific region may be recalled here. In support of this
competition, the economic major powers are offering aid and investments in these Third World regions but on a highly selective basis. There appeared serious dissensions among the donors in the ESCAP meeting (April 1991) on the question of aid to the poorer countries. The selective disbursement of aid is used to promote the donor countries' political as well as economic interests. Thus on the one hand, the recipients are pressurized to take measures like anti-drug and anti-terrorism policies; cut in defence expenditures, curbs on migration of their populations, etc., on the other hand they are asked to liberalise and privatise their economies to facilitate penetration of multinational firms.

The competition among the major economic powers like Japan, European Community, and the U.S. is also manifesting itself into a powerful movement towards regionalisation of global economy in the form of the emergence of cohesive trading blocs. Three of such blocs have clearly emerged. One is the North American hemispheric common market. This bloc which at present comprises of the U.S., Canada and Mexico may grow in its membership. The second bloc is of Europe, which will emerge as a solid economic grouping. According to available estimates, the European Community which had 60 per cent of its trade with outside world in 1960, keeps over 60% of its trade now within the Community. This percentage will grow further in the years ahead. The third bloc is of Asia-Pacific community, supposedly under the Japanese leadership. Though this is the smallest in terms of its economic share (of world trade and GDP), the Asia-Pacific Community is also the fastest growing one. All these three blocs put together account for more than 65 per cent of the world trade, leaving a meager 30 to 35 per cent to be shared by the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe and the Third World. The emergence of trading blocs may thus lead to further hardships and marginalisation of the Third World countries. This is being feared not only by the poorer Third World countries but also by the comparatively well to do newly industrialised countries of Asia. The Malaysian leader and the South Korean President came out openly against the affluent industrialised countries of the West for carving out economically preferred blocs.97. Such bloc
formation will most likely lead to economic fortification and further protectionism which may be harmful not only to the developing but also the industrialised countries and the world economy as a whole in the long run. The possibilities of competition among these trade blocs and their respective leaders may offer limited advantages to a very small number of economically resilient Third World countries like India, Brazil, South Korea etc., but a majority of poorer countries would suffer. Their dismal economic prospects may lead consequently to greater social unrest, political turmoil and overall insecurity in a number of developing countries.

A number of Western analysts have drawn attention to the question of “peace dividend” resulting from the post-Cold War disarmament process and projected the possibility of this “peace dividend” contributing to the enhanced prospects of development in the Third World. The UN Disarmament Session and reports of the Independent Commissions like that of the late Swedish Prime Minister Palme (Common Security) and the West German leader Willy Brandt (Common Crisis, and North-South) had earlier argued about such Disarmament-Development linkages. It is however, doubtful if any real advantage of “peace dividend” in the North would reach South. To begin with, the nature and extent of savings from disarmament process is extremely uncertain. Defence savings of the NATO members from the disarmament agreements (START I and II) will not be of much consequence. As for the Super power savings, a commentator said about the START-I Agreement (June 1990):

“The Treaty does not outlaw modernisation within the above limits; so both sides are free to replace existing missiles with new versions. The enormous number of weapons that each country is still allowed means that droplets of money saved by cuts in warheads and missiles will probably vanish without a trace in ocean-sized spending on new systems as modernisation programmes go ahead” 38.

The same can be said about START-II (August 1991). It must be understood clearly that the compulsions behind the end of the Cold War included unbearable economic costs of over-stretched defence burdens and growing social pressures, even within the West, for greater financial allocations towards meeting the demands of housing, employment, health services, old age benefits, etc. The “peace dividend” would,
therefore, be utilized in meeting these pressures, improving economic performance and providing social securities and services to the citizens of these countries. Very little would thus be left to share with the Third World keeping in view the emerging demands of East European economies. However, it cannot be denied that global economic activism, fuelled by "peace dividend" in the developed countries will benefit the Third World, mostly in an indirect and long-term manner. The only positive development which the Third World may expect is that reduced defence burdens in the North will improve the general health of world economy. This in turn may enhance prospects of growth and dynamism at the global level, creating some opportunities for the developing countries.

Conclusions

What emerges from the foregoing survey is that the post-Cold War world does not offer hopes and better prospects for the vast majority of the Third World countries. In the strategic and security field, the Third World countries may have to confront a formidable challenge of living with conflicts and tensions externally and to grapple with turmoil and instability internally. To this will be added the possibilities of pressures and interventions (subtle or direct) from the major powers. This put together may even lead to what Richard Falk once described as the "Lebanonization" of many a weak and vulnerable Third World countries.

Economic prospects present a mixed-bag of both challenges and opportunities; more of the former than the latter. In meeting these challenges or taking advantage of the opportunities offered, much would depend upon the political will and capacity of the specific Third World countries to make use of enhanced global economic activism and relate itself advantageously to the possible economic space created by the competition among the global economic giants.

For the Third World countries to respond to these political, strategic and economic challenges of the emerging post-Cold War world order, there are not many viable and attractive options. There are significant regional actors which may be tempted to ally themselves with either the only Super power, the US or its major western allies to secure short-
term political or economic advantages. But there will always be price to be paid for that, and often such price would be heavy. There is a possibility of some of the Third World regions’ putting emphasis on building collective resilience and mutual help in coping with the challenges of the emerging world order. But here again, approaches of regional cooperation, will have to be pursued within the framework of prevailing international political, strategic and economic development. In pursuing approaches to regional cooperation, the Third World countries will also have to shed-off their traditional stigmas vis-a-vis each other and build bridges of confidence and understanding instead. They will also have to take hard economic and strategic decisions at home to streamline the general performance of their economic and socio-political systems. Failure on these domestic fronts will reflect strongly in their failure to cope with the post-Cold War transformations.
Notes and References

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1. A study recently prepared by German Economists for the Deutsche Bank, while highlighting the prospects of Peace Dividend as a result of the Gulf war and the end of the Cold War accepted the difficulty in the conversion of arms industries into those of civilian production in Europe and the Developed World. Business and Political Observer (New Delhi), April 10, 1991.


10. John Fialka and Eduardo Lachica, “Easing of Technology Export


12. Text of President Bush’s proposal for such consultations was given in the “White House Fact Sheet” (29 May, 1991) issued by USIS, New Delhi.

13. Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence; Thomas A. Brooks said that at least 40 countries were seeking ‘low observable’ weapons technologies such as used in F-117 Stealth fighters deployed to cripple Iraq’s air defence system during the Gulf War, The Times of India, April 4, 1991 (carried from its New York Service); The Hindustan Times, April 11, 1991.

14. A recent study prepared by the nonpartisan office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. concluded that the “United States is contributing substantially to the proliferation of conventional arms as the world’s major exporter of sophisticated military technology", International Herald Tribune, June 22-23, 1991.


17. Times of India (New Delhi), August 3, 1991. The Defence Minister disclosed this in the newly elected parliament.


21. Ibid.


24. On the new U.S. National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War World, see President Bush's Aspen Institute Address on August 2, 1991; *op. cit.* (n. 4); also the study by Tritten, "America Promises to come Back", *op. cit.* (n. 4).

25. Scenarios of threat from the Third World have been painted in the U.S. Strategic Calculations since the late 1980s. See, for instance, the report by Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, set-up under the then Assistant Secretary of Defence, Fred Ikle, in late 1987; *Discriminate Deterrence*, U.S. Department of Defence, January 1988, Washington D.C. For the latest evidence of such scenarios, see U.S. Department of Defence, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, March 1991, Washington D.C.

For a political argument stressing threat from the Third World, see, U.S. Congressional Arms control and Foreign Policy Caucus's Report entitled *The Developing World: Danger Points for U.S Security*:

Arguments of this Report have been summed up in Mark O. Halfied and Mathew F. Mc Hugh, "After Containment: A New Foreign policy for the 1990s", *SAIS Review* (Washington D.C.); Winter-spring, 1991, vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 1-10. It may be useful to note here that even a Soviet observer argued that the U.S. was aware of the "threat from the Third World" and the USSR should also realize it. Dimitri Yevstafyev, "Third World's Changing Face: Is Soviet Diplomacy Ready", *New Times* (Moscow), No. 41, October 9, 1990.


31. *SIPRI YEAR BOOK* 1990, pp. 203-217. Also, Campbell and Weiss,
'The Third World in the Wake of Eastern Europe’, op. cit.

32. SIPRI Year Book 1990, Ibid.
33. The Challenge to the South, op. cit.; for the views of Gamani Corea, the Chairman of the Committee of the whole on International Development Strategy for the 4th UN Development Decade, on the plight of the Third World see his ‘Global Stakes Require a New Consensus’, IFDA Dossier (Switzerland), No. 78, July/September, 1990, p.75.
37. The Group of Fifteen (G-15) Southern nations in a meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1990, also criticized the holding of Uruguay Round Table negotiations that ignored the interests of the poorer countries, Financial Times (London), June 4, 1990; also Sardan Kerim, “Group of Fifteen Summit”, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), June 20, 1990. Also the official document of G-15 issued from Geneva, June, 1991.
39. Muchkund Dubey, India’s former Foreign Secretary has argued along these lines in his writings and speeches.