During Pakistan's history, the orientation of its foreign policy has taken several decisive turns. From a beginning under aspects of non-alignment (links with the Muslim world, recognition of China, support of third world liberation movements etc.) which was, however, hampered by inherited conflict with its neighbours, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan in 1954 took a sharp turn towards alignment with the West and even became the United States' "most allied ally". Although the new relationship served important interests of both these partners, the divergence was a basic one: the US wanted to contain the USSR and China while Pakistan sought strength vis-a-vis India. The clash of perceptions came into the open over American and British arms aid to India, after the 1962 Himalayan war. This caused a disillusioned Pakistan to turn to China, and the two fundamentally different countries founded what has since been rightly called an "enduring entente". Successful diplomacy after the indecisive 1965 war with India led to an astonishing degree of menage a quatre, i.e. rather balanced relations with the United States, the USSR, and China.

After 1954 and 1963, the third watershed came in the wake of the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. Pakistan's foreign policy options seemed much reduced but Z.A. Bhutto made the most of new opportunities that opened up, particularly vis-a-vis the Middle
East. The 1974 Islamic Summit in Lahore was proof of it. Bhutto also initiated the end of Pakistan's alliances with the West although this came about formally only after his removal from the scene. In fact, up to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the martial law government in Islamabad hardly altered the principal foreign policy course adopted after 1971, only nuances changed such as a much closer link with Riyadh (at the cost of some warmth with Qadhafi's Libya).

It is arguable that the Afghan shock of December 1979, too, did not immediately lead to a decisive new foreign policy orientation in Islamabad. It took some time for Pakistan to take it in, to judge international opinion and the strength of its own position. Formal non-alignment was a new experience and, as it turned out, of a certain, but limited value. Support from the Muslim world was not unanimous, revolutionary Iran in particular was far from being a reassuring neighbour. There was only little knowledge about and experience with the Soviet Union; the Afghan buffer had been quite effective in this respect. As also in the West, hopes were entertained for an early withdrawal of the Soviet "limited contingent", after some political solution; therefore, the increasing number of Afghan refugees did not yet cause alarm in Islamabad. The strong reaction of the United States was at first of limited help for Islamabad, due to Washington's loss of credibility in the entire region after the fall of the Shah. Geostategically most important to Pakistan was the India factor: New Delhi initially sought Islamabad's support for a "regional solution" which, however, would have meant Pakistani recognition of the Karmal regime and no support for the Afghan resistance. All these elements were to develop, as in a chemical process, before a new crystallisation took place which from 1981 onwards has changed the framework of Pakistan's foreign policy in a similar way as at the decisive previous turns, in 1954, 1963 and following 1971. Some of the factors that have contributed to such change shall now be discussed.
Focus of Superpower Interests

After the Reagan administration started to put teeth into the Carter Doctrine, Pakistan was suddenly much upgraded in Washington. As a consequence, it saw itself at the intersection of both superpowers' strategies, comparable to the 1950s and 1960s but in a clearly more exposed position. In the US concept of Gulf security, it was meant to form the eastern flank, conveniently connected with Saudi Arabia. For the USSR, Pakistan's attitude towards Afghanistan will be a critical factor for holding on to its conquest. With a non-cooperative, basically hostile Pakistan, Moscow cannot hope to "pacify" Afghanistan, particularly in view of the stubborn attitude of Iran. To make its influence in Pakistan felt accordingly, by carrot and by stick, is therefore, an indispensable feature of Soviet "south policy". Friendship with India will not suffice to achieve this aim.

As long as Pakistan entertains a close security relationship with the US, Moscow cannot hope to make much headway in the desired direction. As there is also not much prospect of a new government in Islamabad that would be more forthcoming in this respect, the Soviet Union has recently applied the screws more tightly, by threats and by actions (bombing of border areas) without leaving the second track which mainly consists of economic and technical assistance on quite a large scale. Given the fact that US-Pakistan relations will remain liable to disturbances, the Soviets may hope that in a medium term perspective the laws of geography will make themselves felt in Pakistan, and that the distant superpower will lose its hold in favour of the proximate one.

At present, the US does not seem to be in the mood to give up easily. Pakistan is indispensable for Washington too as long as the present configuration of power and forces around the Persian Gulf continues. Even without providing the US with military access and prepositioning facilities (such as Oman and other countries in the Indian Ocean region), Pakistan is highly important.
in the context of USCENTCOM. In recent years, it accordingly received the third highest amount of military assistance in that area, behind Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

It is difficult for Islamabad to steer its own course, partly against each of these two mighty currents. As distinct from earlier periods, non-alignment now has achieved a certain importance for Pakistan, as a means to preserve some freedom of action; so has the Islamic International. Vis-a-vis the US, Pakistan has been able to ward off too obvious an inclusion in a “strategic consensus” (the Saudi connection is useful as a level of cooperation different from that with a superpower). Vis-a-vis the USSR, it has up to now allowed for a double-track course: seeking improved bilateral relations wherever feasible but sticking to principles regarding Afghanistan (Soviet troop withdrawal).

Pakistan does not hold very strong cards in dealing with both superpowers: Washington mainly objects to its nuclear programme (see below) and to the prolongation of martial law whereas Moscow gets increasingly irritated about continuing support for the Afghan resistance from Pakistan territory and about on-going military assistance from the US. Regarding both issues, the Pakistani government must be wary not to transcend a line of tolerance for Moscow; it is surely fully conscious of the various ways and methods by which the Soviet Union could bring pressure to bear, both directly and indirectly. Recently the Soviet ambassador to Islamabad openly threatened: “If the present situation continues, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will have to envisage a common action in order to terminate it”. The Soviets moreover know that the Afghan refugee problem is a most sensitive issue for any government in Islamabad; consequently, they can expect a growing readiness to find a solution which could free Pakistan from at least part of that burden.

In the Pakistani public—and, it can be assumed, in parts of its leading bodies as well—there is an unmistakable current of anti-Americanism which could also play into the hands of the Soviets. Official US utterances to the effect that Pakistan is being valued
nearly exclusively in an anti-Soviet context evoke much criticism there. Symptomatic of this seems a recent article in *Dawn* (Karachi) that takes up the Senate debate on the Cranston amendment in October 1984, in the course of which it was argued (Senator McClure) that Pakistan had only two options, security relations with the US or nuclear armament.

"But Pakistan has a third option also and it is to mend fences with the Soviet Union, enter into direct negotiations with Afghanistan and pursue more vigorously the goal of establishing a durable peaceful relationship with India".

Whether this is indeed an option for a Pakistani government, as distinct from an opposition unhappily removed from responsibility, is open for questioning. To act accordingly would mean for Pakistan to lose in one fell swoop much of its present foreign support, not only from the US but from most of the Western world, from China and from the Islamic world. It would also mean unpredictable unrest in the tribal border area with Afghanistan. Any government in Islamabad would certainly think more than twice about this, mainly in view of the consequences for the country's economy and for development at large.

For the Soviet Union, a respective shift of Islamabad would bring the fulfilment of its hopes connected with its earlier proposal of collective security for Asia which is still very much a guideline of long-term Soviet Asia policy. An accommodating Pakistan would allow "pacification" of Afghanistan, and it could bring about an uninterrupted zone of Soviet influence in the main part of South Asia. This would change the general 'correlation of forces' much to the Soviets' advantage and would not fail to also influence developments in Iran and the Gulf region.

The main question mark regarding *Dawn*’s recipe for Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation is to be put, however, behind the chances to "establish a durable peaceful relationship with India". This has been tried since the Simla accord of 1972 and it has never led to more than a turning-off and turning on of conflict.
New Elements in the Relationship with India and the Nuclear Issue

In the latest turning-off period (1982 up to the autumn of 1983) negotiations about some major bilateral agreement (no-war pact, treaty of friendship) clearly showed the limits of mutual accommodation: Pakistan insisted that a pact related to military security would be the necessary first step for confidence building. India held that such a step must come last, after a series of non-military measures such as free exchange of people and ideas, trade etc. India further asked Pakistan to expressly renounce in a treaty to raise the Kashmir issue in international fora and to allow US bases on its territory. Pakistan declared that it was not willing to do so, because the Kashmir issue continued to be an open case and regarding bases, because it would be a curtailment of its national sovereignty to formally renounce such an option; it would, however, not consider to do anything that would conflict with its status as a non-aligned state. In the summer of 1984, after a fast escalation of bilateral tension, negotiations were postponed until the next turn-on phase. 7

While Kashmir and Pakistan’s US connection have been staple themes for the last 30 and more years, and while the differences between opinion-free Indian and largely controlled Pakistani society clearly limit the exchange of people and of ideas, one new element has entered the equation: the nuclear one. Since 1979 when it became clear that Pakistan was stealthily building up both a plutonium reprocessing and an uranium enrichment facility, there has been an intensive discussion in India how to counter the potential threat arising from this development. Pakistan’s foremost aim, it can be assumed, is to create a deterrent against perceived Indian aggressive designs and an instrument against coercive nuclear diplomacy. In the logic of things, the Indian strategic community perceived this as a most destabilising development, as its own conventional superiority would be offset by the sudden appearance of a Pakistani bomb. It was, therefore, argued in New Delhi that such a situation in which India could in
India's main argument against Pakistan's nuclear activities is that they are clearly aimed at military use while India's own endeavours leave some room for dual purpose interpretation. Pakistan can indeed give no plausible rationale for both its reprocessing and enrichment installations, as the planned Chashma plant is still far beyond the horizon and a fast-breeder programme is also nowhere in sight. What remains for Pakistan to claim is the same as in India's case: to point out the necessity to keep abreast with advanced science and technology in order to make peaceful but independent use of their results wherever feasible. A full command of the nuclear fuel cycle could indeed be highly important for the energy needs of the future.

At present, both Pakistan and India are still in the phase of pursuing the nuclear option. Neither seems prepared to switch to an open weapons programme but each is using ways and methods to give the option a more definite meaning. Pakistan has the advantage of a breakthrough in enrichment technology and could hypothetically manufacture a hydrogen bomb. How long it would take to reach such a stage is open for conjecture, it might be very long (several test series would be indispensable) and perhaps will never happen, due to lack of political will, of finances, of technical ingenuity. India has the much more tangible advantage of being quite close to a missile delivery system, it seems only a matter of time until an IRBM might be able to reach Pakistani territory from a safe distance while Pakistan, for the foreseeable future, would have to depend for delivery on planes which are vulnerable to interdiction. An Indian missile capability would, of course, also have a bearing vis-a-vis China. This is part of the basic asymmetry in the India-Pakistan-China nuclear relationship.
Both Pakistan and India seem to be at the crossroads. Responsible people in both countries have recognised the danger that if certain limits would be overstepped, compulsions in the direction of full-scale armament would be irresistible. Consequently, the political language used is ambivalent, it matches the practice of continuing to keep the option open.

Indo-Pakistan tensions are the result of the two countries' widely divergent self-images. While India, inspite of some opposite evidence, holds up the principle of secularism, Pakistan pointedly declares itself an "ideological state", with Islam as its sole guide-line. It is worth pondering whether Nehru's prediction made shortly after partition has stood the test of time:

"It is inevitable that India and Pakistan would draw closer to one another, or else they will come into conflict. There is no no middle way, for we have known each other too long to be indifferent neighbours".8

Pakistan has distanced itself more from India than had been conceivable some decades ago. This, however, does not mean that all-out conflict is the necessary consequence. On the contrary, it could well mean that with a certain estrangement frictions also will diminish. Looked at from afar it seems that more distance and divergence might benefit normalisation and reduce the awkward big brother-small brother syndrome. For Pakistan, to look increasingly west is surely one way of getting away from its India complex. How far it may go in that direction will, however, be determined by geography, cultural and ethnic links as well as history which are strong enough anchors to keep it in place in the subcontinent.

**The Gulf Link: Islam, Petro-dollars, and the Iran-Iraq War**

From its inception, Pakistan tried, as part of its search for a national identity, to establish links with the Islamic Middle East. Success was limited, not least because Nasser's Egypt acted much in tandem with India. After 1971 and the loss of its east wing, Pakistan renewed its efforts with much greater sense of pur-
pose. Islam was deliberately upgraded to provide the basis of national identity, and with the rise of oil power after 1973 the links with Persian Gulf countries were considerably strengthened. They could make use of Pakistani labour, both skilled and unskilled, and of qualified technical and managerial personnel. Military expertise and training were also in demand.\(^9\)

Upto 1979, respective Pakistani activities were quite strong on both shores of the Gulf, the Persian and the Arabic one. With the revolution in Iran, the Pakistani military regime saw itself sharply attacked by Khomeini as an American stooge. This was to be taken more seriously as there was (and is) a correlation between Shia militance in Iran and the sizeable (nearing 20) Shia minority in Pakistan. There have been recent clashes between Shia and Sunni communities in Pakistan\(^10\) as well as between Shia representatives and the government in Islamabad over issues of Islamisation.

However, from 1981 onwards relations were moved back onto a more even keel, mainly because, Iran in view of its isolated international position, developed an interest in it and Pakistan was keen to reciprocate. The Afghan issue brought them together although their practices in supporting the resistance vary quite distinctly; Iran is very selective in this respect and its control of Afghan refugees is much stricter than in Pakistan (including the persecution of drug dealers). A more recent phenomenon is Iran's stake in increased trade relations with Pakistan; since 1982-83, it has become the number one importer of Pakistani goods (textiles, primary commodities), ahead of Saudi Arabia and Japan\(^11\). In 1983-84 Iran also took the initiative to revive the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which had been dormant since the demise of CENTO in 1979; Pakistan was cautious in view of its privileged relations with the Arabic Gulf states (and so was Turkey)\(^12\) but agreed under the condition of slightly changing the brand name (to 'Regional Economic Cooperation').

The Iran-Iraq war is Pakistan's main handicap for a freer development of this neighbourly relationship. It has been very careful
in stressing its neutral position vis-a-vis the belligerents and at an early date undertook to mediate on behalf of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Meanwhile, however, frustration has crept in. President Zia-ul-Huq has apportioned the greater blame for the stalemate to Iran: "There is a lack of will on both sides to end the war. In comparison with Iran, I find President Saddam Hussain of Iraq more flexible....We find Iran has been rigid". On the other hand Pakistan has pleaded at Islamic meetings not to isolate Iran and has thus earned Iran's good will. Pakistan's dilemma is obvious: it must humour its difficult neighbour without losing the confidence of its friends on the Arab Gulf littoral.

For one full decade (1975-1985) Pakistan has retained its position as the largest supplier of non-Arab labour to the Arab Gulf states. Remittances (more than 3 billion US dollars annually) represent about 8% of the gross national product and are thus of high significance for Pakistan's economy and for the well-being of large parts of its population. A sudden end of this symbiotic relationship could well shatter Pakistan's body-politic. Predictions, however, do not envisage a drastic reduction in the near future. Islamabad's close political links with most of the Arabic Gulf states are an important factor in this respect.

In the view of these thinly-populated countries, some of them miniscule emirates, "Pakistan looms as a major regional power". "It can be a reliable and predictable force on the eastern marches of the Gulf. On the other hand, disintegration in Pakistan would profoundly worsen the politico-strategic environment in the Gulf".

In assessing Pakistan's overall external manoeuvrability and fall-back positions, the military connection with Gulf countries, with Saudi Arabia in the first place, also rates highly. In its self-image, the Pakistani army prefers the projection as an Islamic force, to defend the Ummah this has met squarely with Saudi requirements, and the Kingdom has been prepared to pay for it. Addressing the Majlis-e-Shoora in Islamabad on the subject of defense, President Zia declared in 1984:
"Our thanks go to one friend, the Government and people of Saudi Arabia, who have always helped us at every critical juncture. We are grateful to them for their cooperation in buying weapons for Pakistan"\(^{16}\).

Again, Pakistan's dilemma becomes obvious as in this context it is being drawn into an anti-Iran posture. In June 1984 President Zia reportedly met in Jeddah with King Fahd, King Hussein of Jordan and the Egyptian Chief of Staff to discuss plans for protecting Saudi Arabia against Iranian air attacks\(^{17}\). Upto the present, Pakistan has shown remarkable dexterity in handling the conflicting issues resulting from the protracted Gulf war and even in drawing benefit for its national interests by carefully dosed support for each of the conflicting parties.

This could not have been achieved without a secure position in the superstructure of Islamic bodies. Zia-ul-Haq has done his utmost to be regarded as a prominent custodian of Islamic interests in the international arena. This has the positive side-effect of high subsidies from Islamic organisations, including investment in Pakistan\(^{18}\).

On the other hand, the process of Islamisation in that country is being watched with particular interest, and both Islamic and non-Islamic observers cannot fail to recognise that the martial law government in Islamabad has not been very successful in obtaining something resembling a national consensus on this loaded issue. The Islamic parties ('defunct' as they are) have in their majority opposed Zia-ul-Haq's course of non-party "shooracracy" in which "the most pious" is to be elected and, following that, "you have no business to oppose him"\(^{19}\). Any arbitrary interpretation of the precepts of Islam regarding the people's participation in the political process will not easily be accepted at home. Viewed from the West, a government "elected" in this manner would not be credited with much legitimacy.

**Summary and a Look Ahead**

Pakistan has entered a new phase of foreign policy orientation. While the guidelines set up after 1971 proved valid for one decade,
several separate developments have since changed the framework for respective operation. As a consequence of US Gulf policy and of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—events of an apparently lasting character—Pakistan has been upgraded in the assessment of both superpowers; their interests intersect there. As a consequence, Pakistan has to perform a highly strenuous balancing act.

Relations with India have worsened, mainly as a result of domestic disturbances in each country which have transcended the national border, but also due to the new dimension of nuclear policy, after Pakistan has made fast progress in the direction of a "nuclear capability". This might change the traditional bilateral equation to India's disadvantage. Another development which has heightened concern in New Delhi is its neighbour's commitment to Islamisation which is deliberately meant to transform Pakistan into an "ideological state", the opposite of India's officially professed secularism. Pakistan's motives in looking westward towards the Islamic Middle East are indeed very strong but ideological, economic and other links cannot alter its basic adherence to the South Asian subsystem. At the same time, it might be beneficial for the future of Indo-Pakistan relations if the latter takes some distance from the subcontinent.

Pakistan's Gulf connections have provided it with a set of options and advantages hardly to be overestimated. But this new priority has also entailed dilemmata, in the first place those in connection with the Gulf War. Pakistan has been careful to be neutral but could not help to act in ways which could not please one or the other conflicting party. Post-revolutionary Iran, as a neighbour, requires Pakistan's full attention; at the same time, Islamabad could not afford to estrange its close friends on the Arabic Gulf side.

As compared to the 1970s, Pakistan has gained in international stature but it is in a much more precarious position. Regarding its relations with the superpowers, it stresses on non-alignment, receives military and other assistance from the United States and
sees itself exposed to both threats and enticements from the Soviet Union. There are those in Pakistan who advocate accommodation with Moscow, starting with an acknowledgment of the status quo in occupied Afghanistan. This could also ease the path for an understanding with India. The present government in Islamabad does not seem to be prepared to act in a way that would cost Pakistan sympathies in and support from the west, from China, and from the Islamic world. At the same time, it has assured the Soviets of its non-antagonistic stance and it has tried to convince India of its desire to improve relations.

At this juncture, various courses are open. Pakistan's regional and international environment is in the process of swift change. Flexibility is the quality in demand. Constants such as the friendship with China are few and doubly precious, variables have come up nearly everywhere else. With regard to neighbouring India, after the dramatic events of the last day of October 1984, there is the chance for a new beginning to which both parties would have to contribute equally by shedding old habits of distrust. Any move in such a direction would be highly welcomed in western European capitals, as indeed any move in the direction of a more comprehensive understanding between the constituent parties of the South Asian regional system. "Foreign hands" will be stayed if the countries concerned seriously opt for cooperation.
NOTES

3. Defence Minister Ustinov, at his India visit in early 1984, seems to have made it clear that the Soviet Union pursued its own Pakistan policy which was still in the making. See *India Today*, 31 March 1984, p. 84.
10. The most violent ones took place in Karachi, in 1983 and 1984, and Iran was at least indirectly involved.
13. Interview with *Arab News*. Jeddah, 22 September 1984
17. *International Herald Tribune*, 28 June 1984