WAYS AND MEANS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
AND SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

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Wherever and whenever hegemonism and power politics run rampant, small states are sure to be victimized. The existing hot spots in Asia, Africa and Latin America are sad examples. In the countries in the hot spots, people are being killed, their property is being destroyed and their territories are being trampled upon. And their neighbouring countries are very much worried as their security is thus being threatened. China has its own security problem as small states do. So the present paper focuses on the question of the security of small states. The Chinese viewpoints and perspectives on the issue are also outlined in the concluding section.

I

There are two major tasks facing the Third World countries today. One is to defend world peace, the other is to strive for their own development in all fields. But the hard reality is that there are many "hot spots" in the world. If we let them develop and spread, they are sure to affect world peace and development of the Third World countries. With this view in mind, it may be around that security, peace and development are inter-related.

Great changes have taken place in the post-war years. Among them the most important historical change is the rapid collapse of the centuries-old colonial system in the face of powerful national liberation movements. A large number of colonial and semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have shaken off the colonial shackles and won national independence. Not only that these countries are playing an increasingly significant role in the international affairs.
Over the last 40 years, peace has by and large been maintained and no world war has broken out, thanks to the sustained and indomitable struggles that have been waged by those countries and their people and thanks to the balance of power that has been reached between the two superpowers. But this peace is an extremely unstable one. Regional conflicts and small scale wars have erupted one after another in the past 40 years. The rivalry between the two superpowers has played a very evil role in them. These two countries have professed a desire to defend peace, but as a matter of fact, they have been all along engaged in a large scale arms race in the hope to get strategic superiority over one another. They are at the same time locked in a bitter rivalry for world hegemony by every foul means such as military attack on, and invasion of other countries. This is the salient features of the post-War international politics and relations, and the key factor affecting the world situation.

In South Asia, the invasion of Afghanistan, a small non-aligned country, by one of the superpowers has not only pushed the Afghan people into an abyss, but has also constituted a threat to the security of its neighbouring countries.

In the Middle East, close neighbour of South Asia, there broke out, one after another, four wars after the World War II. And small scale armed conflicts have never ceased. Millions of the Palestinian people have lost their homes, and are still leading a vagrant life. Many people of the Middle Eastern countries were killed and their property was ruined. Supported and armed by one of the two superpower the Israelis persisted in a policy of aggression and expansion. That is the main source of destabilization of the situation in this region.

In all the hot spots in the world, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Central America, the superpowers have a hand in the conflicts. They exploit the local contradictions and conflicts to make a gain for themselves. In the process a bad situation turns into a worse one and the countries and their people in these regions have fallen victims to their rivalry.

Another important factor threatening the security of small countries is the fact that the existing unfair international economic order that aggravates poverty and backwardness of most Third World countries, including the small countries. The unfair economic relations result
in heavy burden of foreign debts, stemming from the payment of high rate of interest eating up their financial resources, and unequal exchange of commodities. All these have worsened the economic situation in many countries bringing their social conflicts to a head and making their political situation more turbulent. The superpowers have turned the turbulent situation to their advantage by means of interference and invasion, thus expanding their spheres of influence in the interest of their world hegemony. Obviously it is not possible to maintain world peace and tranquility and guarantee the security of small countries if the situation goes on like this.

Thus in the final analysis, the superpowers' rivalry for world hegemony and their invasion of small countries and interference in their affairs are the fundamental factors that threaten the security of small countries.

II

The people throughout the world especially the people of the small and medium-sized countries have been relentlessly fighting for world peace and the security of their countries for years. In their fight against power politics and hegemonism, they demand that a new international order of peaceful coexistence be established. In their opposition to aggression and expansionism, they contrive to maintain their national independence and sovereignty. In their fight against armament and war preparations they are engaged in a struggle for a peaceful international environment in which they can develop their national economies and use modern technology to improve their living standards. Some of them even have revised their domestic policies or carried out some reforms, so as to develop their economy, gradually raise their people's living standards, eliminate disturbing factors and make their countries stable.

They have accumulated valuable experience in their long struggle against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism. It would be pertinent to highlight some of these experiences of great importance and universal significance.

First, many countries have pursued an economic policy suitable to their national conditions making their economies independent and their people better off. As the Chinese saying goes, the best way to rule a country is first of all to make the people rich. After their political independence won, the Third World countries have turned to put stress on
economic construction and try to establish an independent economy. In order to develop production and liberate productive forces, they have also attempted necessary reforms, tackled the question of the cost of living of their people, especially that of farmers and herdsman who make the majority of the population. They have tried to lighten the tax burden on the people so as to improve their living standard. In order to develop their economies, they have adopted a policy of self-reliance with their attention focused on the domestic conditions, and at the same time have tried to make good use of foreign capital and technology and useful foreign experience in management, for the purpose of developing their economies. The outcome, however, has not always been encouraging. In recent years, the Third World countries have attached greater importance to developing regional economic cooperation and South-South cooperation. The regional cooperation of South Asia is one of the examples. Regional economic cooperation and the South-South cooperation are something new to the Third World countries. They have great potentialities and a bright future though there are many difficulties.

Second, many countries have attempted consolidation of the unity of all nationalities, people of different strata, political parties and political forces, and elimination of internal disturbing factors. The best internal guarantee of their national security is to make the people live and work in happiness, harmony and solidarity, leaving no room for the hegemons to play a role in their affairs. In the final analysis, a country's security has to rely on its own people. The unity of the people of the whole country is the bastion of iron safeguard to their security.

Third, many countries have adopted an independent and non-aligned foreign policy. Today, more and more countries (small and medium-sized) have realized that to adopt such a foreign policy is wise and in the interests of their own people, and that to aligned with big powers or to attach their destiny to any big power is not beneficial to their own security. Since the beginning of the sixties, non-aligned movement has been developing and growing, and now it has become a very important force in maintaining world peace and security.

Fourth, the overwhelming majority of the Third World countries have pursued a good neighbourhood policy. Due to imperialist and colonialist domination in history, there have been disputes among many
small countries. So long as they adhere to the principles of mutual understanding and accommodation their disputes are not hard to solve through negotiations. If they resort to force, it would not contribute to the solution of the disputes but harm their relationship as neighbours. And the superpowers would make easy use of their disputes.

Fifth, many countries have worked for regional security and world peace. The security of small countries cannot be separated from world peace and international security. Small countries are not powerful individually. But people have realized that small countries must unite, because “unity is strength”. They have formed regional organizations and groups, using collective force to maintain regional peace and security, and at the same time, urged the United Nations and other international organizations to play a more active role in strengthening international peace and safeguarding the security of small countries.

We should advocate that in dealing with relations between countries, we should strictly follow the Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence and U.N. Charter, oppose hegemnonism and power politics, impel the international society to make real efforts to erase “hot spots”, to put an end to foreign invasion, interference and occupation because the security of small countries can be guaranteed only under the condition of regional and international peace.

Another important factor in maintaining international peace and security is to improve North-South relations. Now more and more people including politicians and men of insight in the west have realized that the steady growth of world economy not only depends on the growth of economy of developed countries, but is also decided to a large extent, on whether the developing countries can extricate themselves from difficulties and vitalize their economy. Especially, the “south” countries, who account for 80 per cent of the world’s population continue to be bogged down in poverty, social unrest and political turbulence, while the superpowers are utilizing the situation to their advantage, how is it possible to maintain world peace and tranquility?

On the question of development, countries of the North and South share common interests, and they should coordinate with each other. This must be made clear to all so as to make the world public opinion stronger in order to promote and improve North-South relations,
The above-mentioned are only some of the experiences that the Third World countries have accumulated. They are well worth summing up, for these are the valuable experiences they have got through their arduous and ceaseless struggles. In this aspect, China has its own experiences as well as profound lessons.

The maintenance of small countries' security is a long process of struggles and can not be won for good overnight. The security of small countries can be maintained as long as the people of various countries unite themselves on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and support each other in their resolute fight against hegemonism and power politics, oppose the check arms race and aggression and expansion, enforce the "South-South" cooperation to help obtain the Third World's prosperity and security and promote the establishment of a new international economic order.

III

China belongs to the Third World. A basic principle of its foreign policy is to strengthen its solidarity and cooperation with the third world.

China holds that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, should be treated as equals. It is firmly opposed to the big bullying the small, the rich oppressing the poor and the strong lording over the weak. The affairs of a country should be managed by its own people, and the affairs of the world should be managed by all countries in consultation, and not by one or two superpowers, who should not have final say. China will never seek hegemony and it resolutely opposes hegemonism, no matter who practices it and no matter what form it takes. China firmly sides with the other Third World countries and stands for fairness and justice.

China had fully suffered from foreign invasion, interference and oppression over a hundred years before liberation. Now we are also facing the threat from outside. We can fully understand and sympathize with the developing countries, especially the sufferings of small bullied countries. That's why we sincerely support the people of small countries in their struggles against hegemonism, power politics, and for their independence sovereignty. China takes it as its own sacred international duty to uphold fairness and justice for the small and poor countries. This
is the fundamental attitude China has adopted and it would not change this attitude under any circumstances.

Now the common tasks facing us are:

(i) The Third World countries must unite, make common efforts to form a powerful political and moral force so as to remove existing "hot spots";

(ii) The conflicts or disputes among the Third World countries should be settled through peaceful negotiations. Otherwise the superpowers would interfere, and potential hot spots would become real "hot spots";

(iii) The Third World countries must strengthen their cooperations, and do their best to promote development of their nations and the stabilities of the society so as to put an end to interference by superpowers.
The security of small or smaller states is contingent upon a wide variety of factors and how they interact at given levels at different times. What seems to contribute to the security of small states like Switzerland are such factors as multiculturalism as reflected in general toleration and appreciation of ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, consensual rather than adversarial approaches to decision making and implementing processes, and ideological moderation.

In the area of foreign policy, political neutrality coupled with defense preparedness has been and will continue to be among the major reasons behind the long record of success a small country like Switzerland has had in ensuring its security. As domestic factors have assured internal security, so have foreign policy factors contributed to Switzerland's external security. In most political systems, however, extra regional concern for security reflects and affects the inter- and intra-regional concerns for similar national objectives.1

In the Swiss case, a combination of domestic and international factors have emerged over the centuries2 to meet the historical reality of cultural diversity and local autonomy, and a deep public commitment to freedom. It was for reasons of security that impelled small Swiss communes surrounded as they were by powerful states to the signing of the Pact of Perpetual Mutual Alliance on August 1, 1291, which formally marked the founding of the Swiss Confederacy.3 The confederation has since matured into a federation through three historical periods under scoring respectively religious, territorial/linguistic, and constitutional conflicts and their resolutions through negotiation and bargaining. Certainly history has made the Swiss possibly the finest bargainers on all issues for all seasons.
One of the major contentions of this paper is that the phenomenon of mutual toleration which fosters multiculturalism and neutrality and is reinforced by them can be positively correlated with the consensus building process of small as well as large countries, which is, more often than not, conducive to building conceptual bridges and thereby creating domestic balance and international understanding. In such a political environment, a small state’s problem of maintaining national security becomes much less difficult. An attempt will also be made here, on the basis of Swiss politico-cultural experience, to establish a link between the micro (area studies) and macro (comparative studies) level of analysis of the problem of security. The Swiss model may or may not be applicable to other states, particularly in the South Asian context, but the proposed exercise will at least serve the heuristic purpose of clarifying relationships between selected politico-cultural factors and the issue of security for small states.

Four facets of the Swiss model, namely multiculturalism, the consensus building process, ideological temperance and political neutrality will be examined with a view to evaluating the relevance of each to the understanding of small states’ security problems. In the latter half of the paper, security problems of South Asian states, with a special emphasis on the smaller ones, will be assessed from political, economic and cultural perspectives. This will be done with a view to understanding the extent to which elements of four factors of the Swiss model can be applied to perceived security problems of South Asian states.

Multiculturalism

Switzerland’s religious (58.5 per cent protestant and 20.8 per cent catholic) and ethnic/linguistic (71.37 per cent German, 21.47 per cent French, 15.77 per cent Italian and 1.4 per cent Romansch) diversity is relatively recent, meaning that it dates back only to the nineteenth century. The first three centuries of Swiss political history belonged to the German-speaking people. Since the sixteenth century the French-Italian and Romansch-speaking groups began to get increasingly involved in the decision making process of the Confederation, ultimately establishing their communal, district and cantonal autonomy in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Both historical forces and the determination of the elites of the
different religio-linguistic groups have led to the creation of a multicultural system in which, regardless of their difference, the Swiss have created a secure society—both politically and economically—capable of achieving unity through national cohesion without compromising the spirit of individual freedom and local autonomy. In fact, multiculturalism and its corresponding concept of coexistence and local autonomy was an important factor in attracting and retaining the allegiance of the subordinate areas in the formative phase of the Swiss Confederacy. Meyer suggests that “a strong heritage of communal independence which can be traced back to the beginning of Switzerland helped to mediate a tendency to dominate the minority language groups by the ruling cantons”.

A pluralistic society par excellence with a monistic approach to national identity, the Swiss have struck a delicate but enduring balance between Bern’s authority over specific areas of national interest and cultural/regional autonomy of the cantons in problem solving. The multicultural Swiss have also found a parallel balance between their political and economic cultures through what political scientists term as corporatism, which will be discussed later.

In the area of socialization and cultural reinforcement, the Swiss have been able to develop one of the finest education systems in the world through which values of multiculturalism have been effectively inculcated in the young, in spite of occasional differences in the interpretation of Swiss history by Swiss French and Swiss German textbook writers. Attitudinal surveys have indicated that the younger generations have indeed developed an appreciation of each other’s cultures regardless of their affinity towards countries with same ethnicity. Their awareness of diversity seems to have raised their consciousness to a higher level of mutual coexistence and appreciation, at which level the prospects of maintaining both internal and external security have improved significantly.

Consensual Decision Making

Swiss multiculturalism is intricately tied to a political system which has evolved over time to meet the challenges of religious and ethnic/linguistic diversity of the people. From a confederal alliance of the original thirteen cantons (not unlike the later experience of the thirteen American
with a definable central authority. This occurred after Napoleon’s invasion in 1798 and the framing of a constitution the same year which for the first time created a common Swiss nationality, a national Parliament, abolished all privileges and guaranteed equality of individuals and territories. But the Helvetic Republic, by which name Switzerland was called under the 1798 constitution, was short lived. Forced unity led to revolts making the constitution inoperational. The new constitution of 1803, the result of Napoleon’s initiative, restored cantonal autonomy but maintained individual, linguistic and territorial equality gained under the earlier Helvetic Constitution. The process of federalization was reversed after the downfall of Napoleon. These steps backwards brought the country to the verge of civil war. Under the influence of the Allied powers, however, the Swiss reached an understanding on another constitution in 1815, known as the Federal Pact. Concerning the excessive regional autonomy and cultural conflict which was later to result in a civil war, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, in the 1830’s, “Democracy (Swiss variety) was less a regular form of government than a weapon habitually used to destroy, and sometimes to defend, the old society.” Over the issue of the enforcement of the Federal Pact’s guarantee of the maintenance of religious orders in the cantons, a twenty-five-day Civil War broke out in 1847 between the autonomy-oriented Catholic and the centralism-oriented Protestant cantons. Although the victors (mostly Protestants) could have imposed upon Switzerland a centralized authority, they decided to follow a middle course between loose federalism of olden days and complete centralization demanded by the Radicals. What emerged, therefore, was another constitution (in 1848) which in its basic aspects remains the constitution of today’s Switzerland.

As the framers of the American Constitution sought to benefit from the Swiss confederal model in 1787, so did the Swiss seek to gain from the American federal model while framing the 1848 (and revised in 1874) Swiss Constitutional instrument. The result was interesting and constructive. It incorporated the concept of checks and balance at both national and cantonal level on one hand and between representative democracy and direct democracy on the other. By turning the executive branch from a majority based to a collegial based institution, the new constitution ensured proportional representation at the highest decision making levels from Catholics, farmers and workers. A policy process that
values coordination of conflicting objectives through uninterrupted political bargaining within and between different policy making levels has been moving Switzerland to a "bargaining democracy" from a "voting democracy". 10

Theeventful political history of Switzerland and the determination of the country's heterogenous leadership has led to the institutionalization of political bargaining as the only way of resolving political cultural and economic conflicts. There has emerged as a result a multi-tiered network for policy formulation and implementation. For sheer political survival the Swiss replaced their traditional adversarial approach with a new consensual strategy for making policies. Consensus formation through policy making involves the national level (both executive council and two legislative houses), the cantonal level (miniature parliaments of interest groups), the consultation with interest groups, and, finally the submission of consensus-based bills to Parliaments where delegated representatives from different interest groups actively participate in debates. At the implementation stage, many permanent advisory commissioners, composed of representatives of different interest groups, are involved as well. Ultimately the citizenry has the final say about policies through the institutions of direct democracy, particularly those bills that require referenda. As a matter of fact, on any important issue, a minimum of consensus between the head of the relevant federal department and the groups most affected or likely to be affected by the proposed policy is needed to start the decision sequence. 11

Although Switzerland's direct democracy seems to be geared to consensual politics (initiative, recall and referendum have since been incorporated by most American states), it has at times impeded legislative innovation and political leadership as it did in the 1970s when Swiss voters rejected major legislative bills on regional planning, fiscal policy, federal security forces, taxation and health insurance. This perhaps prevented the Swiss from the shock of global economic slump ensuring once again their continued security—at home and abroad.

The Swiss penchant for bargaining, and compromise as the best alternative to a negotiated settlement, was once again highlighted by their political resolution concerning the fate of the district of Jura. The Bernese constitution was amended with relative ease, unlike most other constitutions, in order to give full expression to the popular will. In the spirit of accommodation of local interests and recognition of local
autonomy, the Jura question was resolved through the creation of a new Canton, which, incidentally, is the oldest conflict resolution technique in Swiss history.\textsuperscript{12}

Accommodation of competing interests through corporatism also helps the consensual process. Swiss corporatism is characterized by an interlocking arrangement between politics and business. The institution of proportional representation (proport) of religious, linguistic and regional groups also extends to economic interest groups. In fact, around 130 of the 200 legislators of the Parliament were working for different interest groups in the late 1960's.\textsuperscript{13} Their involvement in twenty-plus economic and professional interest group caucuses transcended party limits.

**Ideological Moderation**

As the Jura conflict demonstrated, ultra-nationalism at cantonal level can undermine national integration and security. But multiculturalism, together with an elaborate process of forming consensus has brought about a significant moderation of the Swiss attitude toward and practice of ideologies. Switzerland's cultural diversity divides organized group life along ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional lines, preventing a Left-Right continuum from emerging as the focal point for political conflict. Sub-cultural identification of workers with parties of the Left is weakened by the extension of linguistic division into religious, class-based and regional groupings.\textsuperscript{14}

Swiss federalism also inhibits ideological conflict by weakening the development of overarching loyalties, \textit{e.g.,} a national or class consciousness, and instead reinforces a strong particularism in the shape of both constituent and local-issue orientation. Class-based politics cannot occur in the Swiss political culture of localism and consensual federalism. "Yet underneath the consensual surface and prosperity of Switzerland politics", observes Steiner, "lurks the split between Left and Right. On religious and linguistic issues subcultural segmentation is weakening. But this is not true among the young for issues relating to social class."\textsuperscript{15}

With the exception of the past ultranationalist separatist movement about the political status of Jura, most central issues in Swiss politics are generated by class cleavage. But as the Swiss in the past succe-
ded in resisting ideological extremism, as for example when striking workers rejected the overtures of Marxism in the 19th Century, so are they most likely to continue on the path of ideological moderation. This trend is buttressed by the fact that parties only get involved in policy deliberation at a late stage of the consensus forming processes. Not unlike American parties, Swiss parties must appeal to heterogenous voters which mutes any planned emphasis on any specific ideology. The Swiss efforts to strike a balance between the individual incentive of capitalism and the social responsibility of socialism also serve to reassure for them a middle ideological road to achieving economic well-being and political security.

Political Neutrality

The security of Switzerland, with a little over 6 million people landlocked in an area of bout 15 thousand square miles and divided into diverse cultures, has been continuing and will continue to be ensured through a neutral, non-aligned foreign policy. Over the last 200 years the Swiss have changed their constitution five times, but not once their policy of neutrality. Even during the Napoleonic domination of Europe, at which time the country's constitutions was changed twice by Bonaparte, the Swiss were allowed to pursue their neutrality with the result that they were spared the devastation of war.

The Swiss foreign policy of non-alignment was further strengthened by their unusually high level of commercial, trade related and banking activities. Economic stability for the Swiss was tuned to political neutrality through corporatism, as mentioned earlier. Swiss neutrality in European power politics and its economic prosperity were also in the interest of warring European states. They not only found the country the safest place to bank, but also a constant source of recruitment of highly efficient mercenaries.

Swiss neutrality also rests on its ability to impress upon outside nations the high price of invasion, as was clearly demonstrated during World War II. The Swiss army service, which is universal and compulsory for all male citizens, has a strong nationalizing influence. Impacted by constitutionally mandated Canton-based recruitment and battalion assignments, the Army reinforces multiculturalism within a federal spirit of unity in diversity.
The Swiss Army's constant preparedness, its rapid mobilization and war simulation exercises stem from its perception of threats coloured by Switzerland's own history of struggle for independence and survival. Both Hitler and later, Stalin, were unwilling to tangle with Switzerland because of the high costs of overcoming Swiss defense and as well of closing an open channel of communication (which was often very helpful) between the warring nations of Europe. The non-alignment of Switzerland and its strong self-defense has been epitomized by Winston Churchill in his letter to Anthony Eden:

Of all the neutrals Switzerland has the greatest right to distinction. She has been the sole international force linking the hideously sun­dered nations and ourselves..... She has been a democratic state, standing for freedom among her mountains, and in thoughts, in spite of race (over 70% German), largely on our side.18

Implications of the Swiss Model for South Asia

Before addressing the question of applicability of a politico-cultural model to a significantly different cultural environment, let us recapitulate the salient characteristics of the model. First, alliances among territorial units, chiefly for defense purposes, underscore a basic feature of the model. Second, the cultural diversity between alliance units was used by them to bring about intercultural toleration, mutual appreciation and general progress. Third, although at times tension-ridden alliances led to divisions and civil wars, the Swiss always managed to emerge from these wars with minimum damage. They followed an evolved process of complex multi-level, political bargaining to create a middle ground, which at times resulted in difficult compromises, e.g., amending the constitution in order to give a territorial unit the option to secede. Fourth, the model reinforces peaceful coexistence between culturally diverse groups. Fifth, it shows the benefits of consensual rather than adversarial process of decision making and implementation. Sixth, the sequencing of interest articulation and aggregation, so important for sound policy making in particularly a heterogenous society, is done through direct involvement of interest groups in the policy deliberation of Parliament and as well in Policy implementation by the bureaucracy.

Seventh, it shows the practicability and effectiveness of combining representative democracy with certain important processes of direct
democracy, e.g. referendum, initiative and recall. Eighth, the Swiss model suggests a balance between government and business for insuring economic and political security. Ninth, it hints at the benefits of political neutrality and non-alignment. Tenth, the model highlights ideological moderation as a sound basis for domestic and foreign policy formulation. Eleventh, the model underscores the need for compulsory military service and training. Lastly, it stipulates the need for mobilization, military discipline and constant preparedness of the army.

South Asian Environment for Small States

Before the application of the Swiss model to small countries of South Asia, let us understand certain specific problems confronting them. First, every small state of the region has problems with minority groups. Second, in each there exists a significant lack of linguistic, ethnic, religious and regional equality between majority and minority populations. Third, there is also a significant lack of understanding and toleration between and among majority and minority groups both at domestic and intra-regional levels. Fourth, five of the six smaller-countries share their borders with their giant neighbour—India—and none between themselves. Sixth, demographically some of the small countries have disproportionately large populations. Seventh, all of the smaller countries feel intimidated by the sheer size of their biggest neighbour India. Eighth, their threat perceptions are mostly construed as conspiracies by India. Ninth, all except one of the small states in the past have committed their foreign policy to non-alignment. Tenth, India and the most powerful of the small states espouse similar political ideology but cultivate friendship with different superpowers. Eleventh, the role of leadership in the area of inter-regional cooperation has been less than effective. Twelfth, ideological clashes between national elites within each country are quite intense, but tend to lapse into meaningless rhetorical exercises. Lastly, military discipline and training is of high standard in two of these countries, with the third enjoying a well-founded reputation for producing crack infantry battalions.19

Considering the foregoing aspects of the question of security of small states in South Asia, an attempt may now be made to gauge the degree of relevance of the characteristic of the Swiss model to the political reality, including security issues of South Asian small states.
Relevance of Swiss Nation Building and Security Experience for South Asian Small States

At the outset, the difficulties of the application of the Swiss model to South Asia must be recognized. The greatest problem of applicability of this model is geopolitical. The area of Switzerland is little over one-third the size of Bangladesh and has one-sixteenth of its population. Over the last decade the size of the Swiss population has not changed significantly which has obvious positive effects on economic and political security of the country. Whereas, at 2.5 to 3.00 growth rate countries of South Asia, like Bangladesh, have experienced a doubling of population in three decades which puts increasing pressure on their economic and political security. Technologically, too, the Swiss model is difficult to apply to South Asia.

As for geopolitical considerations, the strategic location of Switzerland sharing common borders with its larger neighbors, i.e., Italy, France and Germany, the natural security provided by the Swiss Alps, and the level of its military technology together with mass mobilization and a constant state of military preparedness make the application of the Swiss model to security questions of South Asian small states rather problematic or at least amorphous. On the other hand experimentally the Swiss model may serve a very useful purpose for South Asian states in clarifying their domestic, intra and extra-regional relationships which are vital to their security.

Inter-group Relationships in the Domestic Context

All countries of South Asia, both small and large, can benefit from the long and hard experience of the Swiss with nation building. The Swiss have so far shown that coexistence between religions, ethnic, linguistic and regional groups is not only possible but desirable for enduring peace and, therefore, security. They have also shown that such coexistence gradually brings about mutual understanding and appreciation which, in turn, reinforces the values of bargaining, negotiations and compromise in resolving various types of social and political conflicts. Above all, the Swiss model suggests that conflict resolution demands a deep commitment from the top leadership and the elites alike to equity, justice and cultural/regional autonomy between and among diverse groups.

Although Hindus and Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists, Hindus
and Sikhs, Muslims and Sikhs, and Muslims and Buddhists have been coexisting for centuries and most of the time harmoniously, the 20th century, particularly the second half, witnessed an alarming and dangerous trend of erosion of coexistence and mutual toleration. The two hundred years of colonial history of "divide and rule" is, of course, an important contributing factor, but the most important one is self-aggrandizement and the lack of trust in negotiated settlement of cultural and political conflicts on the part of South Asian leaders. Instead of involving themselves in honest and, at times, complex bargaining for compromise, the leadership often took recourse to questionable techniques of bargaining, projecting a less-than-honest image of themselves. Instead of making honest and serious efforts to tolerate, understand and appreciate one another and their respective points of view, the leaders have often used force to resolve conflicts only to their advantage. The conflicts between regional groups in Pakistan before 1972, between ethnic/linguistic groups in Sri Lanka, between religious groups in India are a few instances in point.

As for government contacts with different ethnic and social groups and their accessibility to the decision-making the implementing processes, South Asian countries can immensely benefit from the Swiss model which incorporates active participation of "delegated representatives" from different interest groups in Parliamentary debates and different commissions' deliberations. Although South Asian countries, particularly the largest one, have developed a constitutional tradition of having the majority party to nominate representatives from women, scheduled castes, depressed regions and tribal areas to the legislative body, this institution of group representation has been very neglected and, consequently, remains to be developed.

An established system of special-interest representation in the policy making process would considerably increase the capability of South Asian states to aggregate the demands of different regional, ethnic/linguistic and religious groups, thereby making available an opportunity to resolve inter-group conflicts peaceably. Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi leaders are yet to make noticeable strides in making interest representation in the decision making processes. Conversion of demands through interest articulation-cum-aggregation involving bargaining and negotiated compromise would contribute to internal security. Techniques of direct democracy, likewise, have not been fully used.
in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal to help build consensus on crucial issues of internal security.

**Intra-Regional Relationships**

Intra-regional security problem of South Asia essentially stems from troubled intra-regional relationships. Again, colonial history played an important role in preventing the concept of unity in diversity from taking firm roots in South Asia. Even after the division of the Subcontinent along religious lines, there were opportunities for India and Pakistan to forge an alliance in order to insure a peaceful and secure coexistence for themselves and their small South Asian neighbours. By their alliance and joint development, the leadership of the most powerful countries of the region could have created an environment of mutual toleration, trust and appreciation which would possibly have kept intra-regional group conflicts within reasonable, and, therefore, manageable bounds. As the Swiss model suggests, coexistence between independent nation states tends to foster stable relations between diverse cultural groups having religious, ethnic and linguistic ties to populations of neighboring states. Intellectual, religious and political leaders not only cooperated to maintain a stable relationship between these groups in the Swiss case, but as well they coordinated a dissemination programme through their education system to inculcate in the young the values of mutual understanding, respect and appreciation of diversity. In this area of intellectual leadership and direction South Asia has moved rather slowly.

Security problems of divided nations often reach a confrontational level over territorial boundaries, majority-minority relations and resource sharing/tapping issues. Perhaps, these factors were partly responsible for the traumatic experiences of the 1970s in South Asia which witnessed (i) a civil-cum-liberation war leading to the dissolution of old Pakistan and the transformation of former East Pakistan into an independent nation of Bangladesh; (ii) a full blown war between India and Pakistan; (iii) serious communal conflicts in India and Sri Lanka; and (iv) superpower intervention in Afghanistan. "Perhaps the acute crises of the seventies and early eighties" as I have pointed out in another paper, "finally brought a significant change of attitude of the elites of South Asian region making them to look inwardly and to themselves for survival and progress." It was the most opportune moment for
President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh to float the idea of the grouping of South Asian countries to promote “peace and stability in the region” on the basis of such principles as “non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes”, among others. Since the movement for South Asian regional cooperation began, inter-state cooperation in South Asia has taken an interesting turn. Bilateral issues still remain unresolved preventing normalization of relations and diffusion of threat perceptions but, at the same time, the cooperation movement has created a healthy climate of routine top level interactions between opinion-building elites through periodic conferences such as this one.

Moreover, at the official level, the leaders of the seven countries of South Asia have been interacting more than ever before as a result of the cooperation movement. Commentators, however, have expressed reservation about the ultimate success of the movement citing such reasons as (i) great resource differences between member countries; (ii) the absence of a common perception of threat from outside of the region; (iii) small states’ fear of India; (iv) India’s apprehension of the small states using the regional association to present a united front; (v) the deep seated ideological difference between member states; and (vi) their divided relationships between the superpowers. Most of these factors can be controlled through a shared commitment of South Asian leaders to dialogue instead of force to resolve conflicts. Two Summits of the heads of governments and/or states of South Asia have already demonstrated the positive effects of such dialogues, which the Greek political historian-Thucydides—in the fifth century B.C. called the basis of civilization.

The new climate of coexistence and increased leadership interactions have injected in South Asian political environment an element of rationality which was seldom visible before. Rajiv Gandhi’s rejection of secessionism as an answer to the Tamil problem is consistent with his opposition to the Khalistan movement by militant Sikhs in India and elsewhere. This has served somewhat to allay the fears of leaders of India’s small neighbours about any possible official encouragement by India to one of its ethnic groups to destabilize a neighbouring state. The fact that mutual suspicion can be transformed into mutual trust through communication, as the Swiss model suggests, was demonstrated after the 1985 Summit when President Jayewardene stated, “It was Rajiv Gandhi who could truly ensure the success of SAARC.”
Obviously, his previous mistrust of India which almost destroyed the Movement in 1984, was changed due to Gandhi’s commitment to dialogue as the means for resolving conflicts. After the 1986 Summit meeting, the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers shared their apprehensions of perceived security threats and received assurances from each other respectively on India’s non-offensive troops movement and Pakistan’s non-support of Sikh terrorists. In general, the top leaders of South Asia lauded the Bangalore Declaration adopted by the 1986 SAARC Summit as a reaffirmation of their faith in principles of sovereign equality, mutual trust, people of the region. As a further non-interference and commitment to seek a better future for the one billion sign of expanding cooperation between leaders of South Asia, two new subjects, namely war against drugs and terrorism were added to the original list of nine areas of regional cooperation. An agreement was also reached to establish the organization’s secretariat in Nepal with Bangladesh’s ambassador in Pakistan serving as its first Secretary General.

Exter-regional Relations

The territorial and ideological conflicts between the two biggest countries of South Asia, Indian and pre-1972 Pakistan, always kept the tension between the two at a high level preventing a normalization of relations. Their perceptions of threats from one another and the resulting concern for their security propelled them in opposite directions in formulating their foreign policies. India’s non-alignment was perceived by Pakistan as a facade and Pakistan’s military pacts with the Western Bloc categorized that country as a client state of the U.S. in the eyes of India. Since India was yet to prove its military supremacy over Pakistan, because of the undecided war between the two countries in 1948 and 1965, the U.S. continued to provide military aid to Pakistan with a view to maintaining a balance of power in South Asia and as well to projecting the image of a militarily strong Pakistan as a bulwark against communist adventurism from outside the region. The defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war changed the “balance of power” rationale of the U.S. resulting in America’s recognition of India as the primordial character in the South Asian drama. Perhaps the Soviets felt less pressure in reaction to America’s new attitude, to continue its adversarial stance toward Pakistan. Partly because of this change in superpower roles in subcontinental affairs and partly because of inner com-
pulsions, President Ziaur Rahman sounded out his idea of an association of only South Asian countries on the leadership of the region between 1977 and 1979.30

But Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, responding, supposedly, to Kabul’s request for help, reversed the decade-long trend of relaxation of the Superpowers-South Asian relations. In reaction to the Soviet move, the U.S. not only revived its former aid policy in regard to Pakistan, but significantly increased the level of such aid and the sale of sophisticated military hardware to Islamabad to the dismay of New Delhi.

In the clash of giants, Zia’s plan to launch a regional cooperation movement almost fell apart. Only his personal, unrelenting and almost quixotic global ambitions, together with his commitment to “accommodation” as a basis of conflict resolution, saved his plan. He had worked hard to persuade Indira Gandhi that the proposed organization was in no way designed to advance the interest of any superpower, i.e., U.S. and that the organization could not be used by other states to present a united front against India. The plan of regional cooperation consists of four basic principles, e.g., (i) non-political areas of cooperation; (ii) (i) a two-tier decisional process with the ultimate authority vested in the yearly Summit of seven heads of states; and (iv) the continuation of any bi-and/or multilateral relations with any exteRgional power by any member country. The plan, therefore, essentially reflected the spirit of bargaining and honest negotiations and its clarity and utility finally changed Mrs. Gandhi’s attitude toward the goal it outlined: a purely regional association of seven countries involving ideologically, religion-wise, ethnically and linguistically disparate participating entities.

In spite of reservations concerning the future of superpowers-SAARC relations, so far the movement has shown perceptible signs of growth. Although, for the time being, owing to the superpowers involvement in the region, and bilateral tension between the regional powers, the movement has not picked up full steam, that is, no indication that the movement is going to get stuck forever between a state of polarization and a state of cooperation,31 nor is the movement likely to deviate “from the course of being an instrument of socio-economic development and become instead a club of the oppressors” in the coordinated efforts of the seven governments to wage a war against international terrorism.32
Multiculturalism and Neutraliy

Conclusion

Security of modern nation states irrespective of their size is a complex question involving an ever changing combination of internal and external variables to find an acceptable answer at given points in history. Efforts have been made in this paper to apply the politico-historical lessons learned from Switzerland’s experience as a viable small state enjoying both internal and external security, inspite of internal diversity and external pressures, to the understanding of security problems of small states in South Asian context.

External stability and security of a state are essentially the reflection of its internal equilibrium. Although there are factors of vulnerability in South Asian political cultures which make the task of applying the Swiss model difficult, as discussed earlier, there are however, certain other characteristics which can certainly have meaningful implications for the security of small states individually and collectively in South Asia.

Among factors found in the Swiss model contributing to that country’s internal and external security are a few, e.g., multi-culturalism, consociational decision-making, ideological toleration and political non-alignment, which can be applied for a clear understanding of the political scenario emerging in South Asia. Such understanding can conceivably help the opinion-building elites to provide new direction in ensuring security of these small states without demeaning humanity. “But apart from military and diplomatic measures,” goes the report on the security of small states by the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies Study Group, “it becomes apparent that the best guarantee against subversion... from without or within, is the firm establishment of democracy and its buttressing by economic development.”

Considering the relative success of such regional cooperation movements as ASEAN, EEC, ESCAP, GCC, OECD, OAS, OAU, using the Swiss model to the South Asian case may no longer be an outlandish approach. The seeming awareness of the benefits of non-zero-sum games in regional cooperation is changing the political elite’s attitude to bargaining and compromise as the most reliable mechanism for conflict resolutions. This is happening because to do otherwise will ultimately be suicidal for all. Successful bargaining at any given level of interaction both reflects and affects negotiations at other levels.
In today's world "dialogue" not only continues to be the basis of civilization, but it is as well increasingly becoming the basis of the question of whether or not the civilization that we know is going to survive in the future.

Notes
1 For a fine analysis of linkage between three sets of concerns for security of small states, see S.D. Munir, "SAARC and Security", paper presented at the 15th Wisconsin Conference on South Asia, UW-Madison, 7-9 November, 1986.

2 Although the systems methodology and model is not followed in this paper, Kissinger, Resencerance and Kaplan's approaches to historical periods for macro analysis of events may be advantageous. For a fine survey see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Plaltzgraff, Jr. Contemporary Theories of International Relations, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986). Time periods cover 13-14 century, 15-19 century and 20th century of Switzerland's political history.

3 For politico-historical analysis, see Carol I. Schmid, Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

4 C.L. Schmid, op. cit. p. 3


6 C.L. Schmid, op. cit, 41-82.

7 Ibid, 101-124.


16 The women, and males rejected by the army, are assigned to *Service Complementaire* for 100 days of non-combat duty over a ten year period—Albert Einstein served as one.


19 The Gurkhas of Nepal. The British maintains a standing regiment of Gurkhas, which was deployed in the recent war against Argentina over the control of Falkland Islands. For an interesting analysis of the Sub-continental army, see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1971, 52-ff.


25. Zia foresaw a Summit of the heads of South Asian countries in which declarations such as the above would be made. See "Working Paper Proposed by Bangladesh on the Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia," Dhaka: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Nov. 1980. Zia's dreams of regional cooperation finally came true in the 1985 Summit in Dhaka. Credit also goes to President Hossain Mohammad Ershad, for an effective follow-up of the original plan.


28. Ibid.


