The discourse on security in South Asia has mainly been state-centric. Competing nation-building strategies have also hardened national security concerns. The nation-building process has been conflict-ridden and violent. The history of the post-colonial states in South Asia is replete with experiences of nationalist, ideological and religious-inspired violence. Since the 1990s, the intensity of violent conflicts has been on the increase. This has coincided with the easy and growing access to small arms and light weapons in the region. The armed conflicts have generated their hidden economies and created vested interests that have sustained the conflicts and led to increased levels of violence. While violence is either a reflection of resistance to the state or is used for a reordering purpose, some of the methods used by the groups resorting to violence as a tool of political action can at best be termed as terrorism, as they have made no distinctions between the symbols of state power and ordinary citizens. Quite often innocent individuals have become the victims of counter-state and state violence. There is clearly a disregard for the security of individuals under the threat of violence and terrorism. The states have been failing in their security-providing role to secure their citizens from the threat of violence. Groups espousing violence have also not been concerned about the safety and security of ordinary individuals. Unless the numerous conflicts in South Asia are resolved, it is unlikely that we will witness a subsiding of the violence.

The conflicts, which have gradually become violent, are located in the complexities of nature and the political economy of the states involved. South Asian states are not neutral apparatuses but function in the interest of either a coalition of classes and ethnic groups or a military-bureaucratic oligarchy. Those groups or classes exercising power within the state apparatus bear upon the development policies adopted by the state. Thus, the nature and political economy of the
state in South Asia is important in the understanding of the problem of distribution of resources. In Pakistan, the dominance of the much larger nationalities of Punjabis and Pashtuns in the military bureaucratic oligarchy enabled them to corner a larger share of the resources and opportunities in comparison to the Baluchis and the Muhajirs. Sinhala majoritarianism in Sri Lanka also skewed the pattern of resource allocation against the Tamils. In the case of India, the nature of the state and its policies heightened conflicts in those cases where ethno-national or ethno-religious contradictions and rivalries persisted. Nepal's feudal monarchical system where institutions of accountable governance and delivery mechanisms have been eroded over the years, increasing class and regional disparities and sowing the seeds for the growth of the Maoist movement with its objectives to bring structural transformation of the Nepali polity by means of an armed struggle.

The contradictions generated by the development process have been instrumental in the emergence of most conflicts in South Asia. The model of development that was adopted by the South Asian states was based on the urge to emulate and catch up with the developed countries. This was based on the erroneous assumption that rapid economic development would reduce the potential for violent conflict in the heterogeneous South Asian societies. It was believed that the processes of economic development would erode and break down proximate identities. In reality, however, the reverse process is underway with the assertion of various linguistic, religious and ethnic identities. The development process also produced a structure of opportunities that was inequitable. The emphasis on capital accumulation for rapid industrialisation resulted in the uneven distribution of resources to the detriment of some regions and the poor classes. And this pattern was observable not only in regard to the resources that were at the disposal of the state but also of the resources that originally belonged to the people or to which they had free and easy access. Initially, it was thought that the inequalities and disparities—between classes and regions—were transitory, largely due to the inevitable lag between capital accumulation and redistribution, and would dissipate with further economic growth. But in some cases the outcomes have been devastating. And as a result, the majority of the masses continue to suffer silently.

The development process has resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases and relatively faster development in others. Both conditions offer grounds for the growth of violent movements. The pace, content
and dynamics of the uneven development patterns in South Asia, rather than the lack of development has been the predominant cause of violence in South Asia. The levels of violence among the groups that have been economically neglected has not been very high. The levels of violence amongst groups that have had a perception of relative deprivation have been relatively higher. The reasons why those groups have been able to sustain a high level of violence is either because of the rise of a young petty bourgeois class which has been successful in articulating their demands or because of a generational shift in the leadership which has brought forward a young petty bourgeois class to the forefront in some struggles. It is ironic that it was the welfare measures adopted by the states that have resulted in the emergence of such a class. Most South Asian states are today subjected to violence because of the incapacity of the states to fulfil the aspirations of this class.

The successful mobilisation in support of violence that some of these groups have made is due to their command over normative and coercive resources. States have been finding it difficult to respond to violence and the outcome of the contest between state and opposition groups essentially seems to be determined by the group which has a better command over normative and coercive resources. None of the South Asian states have a policy framework to respond to violence. If there has been any policy framework at all, it has been of a reactive character. States have shown a remarkable incapacity in assessing conflict situations and intervening before the onset of violence. The interventions have generally followed agitations or insurgency situations. Very rarely has there been a policy which has contained or de-escalated the levels of violence by a political response.

The overall consequences or impact of violence has been overwhelming. It has undermined human security directly as a result of ordinary citizens being victims of terrorism, at times uprooting their lives and livelihoods, and indirectly as a result of the impact of violence on state, society and economy. These processes together create an environment of insecurity. The sense of freedom from fear has been undermined in many ways. The impact of violence on the state and society is that it increases their militarisation. It forces the states to augment their coercive apparatuses. Militarisation of state and societies has led to the growth of a culture of violence. Terrorism has injected an element of political instability into the system of governance and has been a
serious drain on the regional economies in terms of destruction of physical infrastructure and security expenditures and the loss of development potential.

The uneven development process in the conception of freedom from want has engendered violence, and in turn violence has been highly disruptive in the developmental process. It is a major factor in distracting the states from their developmental agendas. Scarce resources are consumed and lost in the containment of violence. There is little doubt that a tremendous amount of developmental potential has been lost in the violence-ridden societies of South Asia. Resources lost in meeting the costs of violence could have been saved and invested in social expenditures. Peace and stability are preconditions to bring peace-dividends in violence-ridden societies like South Asia’s. Violence as one of the available modes of political action in the pursuit of socio-economic and political change does result in some amount of redistribution of resources. This may be viewed as positive, even though it may be against our normative cognisance, in balancing out the structural inequalities inherent or created in societies. The experience in South Asia is that the ruling classes do in fact succumb to the idiom of violence even while they have been devising means and methods to cope with violence.

Though violence is an outcome of the nature of state structures and political economy, ruling classes rarely take cognisance of this. In this regard, Lucian Pye has commented “Few governments can accept the view that it was their own policy deficiencies which drove people to violence. Governments more frequently prefer to picture insurrections as caused by misguided people lured on by some false prophet or evil conspiracy. Such a characterisation has the virtue of making officials appear to be on the side of reason and their enemies are essentially fools.”1 Because of such a perception, therefore, it is difficult to find a coherent response to violence. Invariably, and only with certain exceptions, the attempt is to explain violence as not emanating from within one’s respective societies but something that is induced from outside by enemy states or neighbouring countries that wish them to be unstable. This has only strengthened the resolve of the states in their justification to use force and augment and strengthen their coercive resources.

As the levels of violence have increased, so also has there been a simultaneous strengthening of the coercive state apparatus and the

capacity to sustain democratic processes under strain from creeping authoritarianism, as in the case of Pakistan and Nepal. Most states have felt the necessity for emergency powers and special laws to tackle the problem of violence and terrorism, even though it has been felt that the existing laws deal with the problem. The worrying aspect, and probably of much more serious concern, is the ability of most South Asian states to make use of intangible, unformalised, extra-constitutional and extra-legal agencies of state violence in their counter-violence strategies so that the questions of legality and accountability can be side-stepped. Whenever such situations have prevailed they have been the cause of heightened insecurity amongst ordinary individuals. In such situations the state itself becomes a threat to human security. This erodes people's confidence in the state and their response might be more violence.

The role of personalities has also played an important part in the kind of interventions that the state has made in various situations. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's response to the Sikh agitation in India and President J. R. Jayewardene's response to Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka are examples of the way in which political leaders have displayed insensitivity by adopting a hard-line approach right from the beginning in responding to emerging militancy. A similar insensitivity to the new Baluch insurgency is discernible in Gen. Musharraf's approach. Sometimes, the problems have been compounded by administratively manipulated solutions, which have reduced the scope for negotiations as was the case in Assam. Congress leaders used the immigrant's support as a crucial vote bank for their electoral and mobilisational success. In India, the lack of responsiveness in general at the centre after 1980s contributed to the desperation of some of the insurgent groups.

The lack of sensitivity to people's needs—political, economic and cultural—has driven a large number of groups to despair and so many groups have increasingly resorted to violence to articulate their demands. The inadequate responses to freedom from want were to result in an environment, which could not ensure freedom from fear. Increasingly, there has been a realisation that without addressing the development needs of the people or sharing power there cannot be a proper response to violence and the security of the people thus cannot be ensured. In India the Mizo National Front (MNF) was weaned back to the parliamentary process through substantial concessions made to them in terms of political power. The same was the case with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) who also accepted a compromise instead of
their demand for a 'Free Tripura'. This approach was also employed in tackling the ULFA and Bodo insurgencies. While the ULFA has not relented, the Bodos have been agreeable to a solution based on a greater share in power.

Violence and terrorism are still seen as challenges to national or state security. In the discourse on state security there is a need to concede space to the insecurity of individuals arising from violence and terrorism. The states and the international community have been taking a large number of measures to address the issue of violence and terrorism. However, these are fragmented steps. States must create a coherent synthesis out of these measures.

6.1 MEASURES AND POLICY PROPOSITIONS

There is no clear policy framework by individual states and the international community to address human security concerns. Political violence and terrorism are critical issues confronting the international community today and it is well recognised but there is no clear perspective on how they affect human security. The problem is in the complexity of the phenomena of terrorism. Given the complex meanings of terrorism—open to multiple interpretations and its cognitive associations with justness or a normative aberration—consensual understanding in the short-term or even in the long-term looks like a difficult proposition. Individual states find it difficult to deal with it given the complex nature of terrorism sustained by hidden economies and transnational networks. However, a large number of measures are now being taken to either address developmental needs or tackle the problem of terrorism. From the perspective of ensuring human security, these may appear to be fragmentary steps that address only part of the problem. Existing measures address the issue of terrorism, light weapons diffusion, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc. There has to be more concerted efforts on the global, regional and national levels. Let us examine some of the existing measures as well as the policy propositions that are currently being undertaken and critically evaluate them.

6.1.1 Global Measures

Political violence as a mode of political action available to disaffected groups is a problem the international community has not been able to come to grips with. There is ambivalence as regard to how to best tackle
the issue. This is reflected in the inability of the UN to come up with a universally accepted definition of terrorism and develop a common course of action. The international community has found it difficult to reconcile the right to rebel against an authoritarian and repressive regime with the use of terror to achieve freedom. Without clarity about the nature of terrorism, the measures proposed within the UN can address only certain aspects of terrorism.

Right from its inception, the UN has been confronted with the issue. But over a period of time, terrorism has increasingly been perceived as criminal. In 1985, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution unanimously condemning all acts of terrorism as criminal. It condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whoever committed. On 23 December 1994, the UN General Assembly called upon member states to take all necessary and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all acts of terrorism. The resolution unequivocally condemned all methods and practices of terrorism as activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedom and democracy. Terrorism, it stated, threatens the territorial integrity and security of states, destabilises legitimately constituted governments, undermines pluralistic civil society, and impacts adversely on the economic and social development of the state. Another resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 11 December 1995 stressed the need to strengthen international cooperation between states and between international organisations and agencies and the UN “to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”

There are more than twelve major multilateral conventions to deal with the problem of terrorism. Efforts at a comprehensive convention dealing with terrorism have not succeeded. Given the fact that terrorism has only grown at its expense, it is obvious that so far responses have been inadequate. The values upheld by some of the resolutions can be lauded. The UN has recognised that terrorism is not only a threat to state security but also undermines pluralistic civil society and destroys human rights, freedom and democracy. But the conventions have very little effectiveness to ensure these values because the conventions seek to address the problem at a superficial level. The international responses against terrorism have mostly focussed on the criminal aspects of the problem.

It is in regard to the criminal aspects that the UN has made some headway in framing regulations, however, it has done so without much
success. There is an International Convention against the Financial Mechanisms of terrorism. The UN Convention of 1999 calls upon national governments to suppress the financing of terrorism through open, front, covert and sympathetic organisations of terrorist groups operating on their soil. But very few of these conventions have produced the desired results. The impediments in developing a global strategy to suppress the financial mechanism of terrorism still remain. Despite international efforts to regulate the threat of narcotics through the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, it has been a failure. The annual drug consumption of the world’s population is on the rise.

It is in regard to the issue of light weapons diffusion that the UN is again making some progress. Despite the scale and severity of the threat posed by the diffusion of light weapons, there had been few attempts to subject these weapons to any form of arms control or limitation earlier. Given the extent and the nature of illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons that have already taken place, and the diffusion of these arms to actors and entities outside state control and society in general, instituting controls is obviously a Herculean task. On the other hand, the risk to human security is likely to keep increasing. Some progress has at least been made in controlling the spread of light weapons. The UN has started addressing the issue of small arms trade. In 2001, it held a conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects which had some success and where a Programme of Action was adopted by member states. While the Programme of Action deals with the illegal trade, there are other issues that remain at large like illegal production. The UN may also be encouraged to widen the scope of the UN convention on Arms Transfer Register and cover light weapons as well, to monitor their production, movement and use. Joint efforts may be helpful in generating data in a field where authentic accounts are badly needed. The key to control lies in transparency and accountability. Strong norms like end use certification need to be established to ensure that diversion and diffusion are restricted. For the future it will be necessary to evolve identification systems of weapons manufactured so that when illicit arms are recovered, it will be possible to trace the manufacturers and possibly the suppliers. Despite primacy being accorded to the threat of terrorism, the developed world has not shown the keenness to regulate the trade in light weapons. Some of the largest exporters of light
weapons are to be found in the developed world. Many of these states have weak controls on arms brokering, transit trade and lack of common standards on enforcement. There is a need for a comprehensive arms trade treaty to regulate and curtail supplies to areas of violent conflict.

The existing environment of disparity in national laws and the lack of bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, especially on crimes that are politically motivated, have permitted terrorist groups to operate across borders. A typical example of lack of regional cooperation is South Asia where the Convention on Terrorism by SAARC members exists only on paper. A key factor will be missing in the battle against terrorism, until terrorist's state-patrons are held accountable for their aid and encouragement. Bruce Hoffman, a leading expert on terrorism, considers state-sponsored terrorism as a mode of surrogate covert warfare, which poses the greatest threat to international order and stability. The focus of international, multi-national and bilateral measures also needs to be directed at the states that support and sponsor terrorism.

So far the UN has addressed the criminal aspects, ignoring the political and socio-economic aspects. The question then arises: can the international body frame conventions that address the root causes of terrorism? Given the dominant discourse on terrorism in international politics today, it is unlikely that the UN will venture in this direction. Can the UN evolve strategies that do not undermine state sovereignty? The principle of humanitarian intervention has generated more controversy than it has actually saved lives.

6.1.2 Regional Measures

Global measures have to be complemented with regional measures. And like the global measures, the regional measures also can tackle criminal aspects of the problem of terrorism. The regional dimension of the problem will require regional solutions. South Asia as a region is confronted with the twin problems of spillover of weapons and narcotics from the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle regions. Drug trafficking is no longer a social issue; it creates its own dynamics of hidden economies, leads to a spiralling of violence within the region as a whole. The expanded reach of drugs and weapons trafficking networks create vested interests, which become a hindrance to the easy resolution of

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conflicts. This is not only a destabilising factor but also a human security issue. But unfortunately the problem in South Asia is that countries in the region do not have a shared security threat perception. It is imperative to build regional cooperative relationships and promote a coordinated regional perspective on these critical developments, which cut across the sanctity of national borders.

The threats from violence and terrorism transcend the territorial boundaries of South Asian states. The phenomenon of globalisation—porous borders, free-flowing information, enhanced communications, increased travel, and migration and have created grounds for cross-border linkages between terrorist groups. Thus, terrorism in South Asia has acquired a regional character because of the increasing nexus between various terrorist groups in South Asia. Despite differing ideologies and objective goals, groups of various hues have established linkages with each other, at times creating opportunistic alliances. Such alliances help in seeking training, weapons procurement, sharing intelligence, and, in some cases, drug trafficking which is a means of raising much needed resources for terrorist groups. What this shows is that there is a fairly well-coordinated network between various terrorist groups in South Asia. Accessing weapons from the international black market or from like-minded sympathetic groups is not difficult. It needs the right contacts with those groups, which control the transit points in the gunrunning business.

The issue of light weapons diffusion and their implications for human security has not received adequate attention in South Asia. This despite the fact that a growing number of insurgencies, intra-state conflicts and terrorism, and the rising levels of violence have been sustained, if not caused, primarily by the unprecedented spread of light weapons in the hands of non-state actors. The insecurity dilemma arises from the relationship between light weapons diffusion and the propensity for armed conflicts. Not only does it provide the instrumentalities for motivated individuals resort to violence but it also poses difficulties in resolution of conflicts.

Whether the international community brings vigour to its effort or not there are important lessons for all South Asian countries in the increased networking between various terrorists groups in South Asia and the emerging nexus between terrorism and organised crime. Unless terrorism is tackled at a regional level and law enforcement agencies cooperate in countering economic offences, terrorism as well as organised
crime will erode social cohesion and political stability and undermine economic development. The inability of South Asian countries to cooperate suggests that addressing human security concerns will be problematic in South Asia.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a regional organisation has already taken some steps in this direction. The SAARC “Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism” signed on 4 November 1987 can provide the macro framework for developing regional cooperation in this regard. According to the convention, terrorist acts shall not be regarded as political offences. It obligates contracting states to extradite or prosecute terrorists on its soil. At the moment, though it appears to be fairly convincing on paper, its considerable potential is not close to realization. Pakistan has not yet translated it into national law, while the disinclination of constituent organisations to share information wholeheartedly prevents it from being as effective as it might have been. Another agreement signed on 23 November 1990 envisaged the setting up of a SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD), which would collate relevant data on terrorist activities, tactics, strategies, methodologies, and profiles. This is still to be operationalised. Similarly, a Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances has also been signed. This also led to the setting up of a SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) at Colombo. Narcotics officials and other officials concerned with internal security meet once a year. The designated Liaison Officer’s recommendations are to be considered by the SAARC Council of Ministers who will then be expected to implement it in their respective countries. These Conventions can basically serve as the basis for future cooperation. The emphasis on coordination, which seems to have been underlined at all meetings, is beginning but the organisation on the ground has yet to take place. If the convention is framed according to international law and ratified by all member states and if it is adhered to in spirit, it has good prospects.

Some steps have been taken to coordinate strategies to deal with money laundering. The ongoing liberalisation processes undertaken by most countries of the region have further complicated the problem.

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3 The thirteenth technical committee meeting on prevention of drug trafficking and drug abuse took place at Male, Maldives from 27-28 January 1999 where discussions on how to make the SDOMD more effective took place. See, Annual Report 1988, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1998-99, p. 16.
Conversion of black money into white and consequent channelisation of such money to procure weapons creates enormous difficulties for the enforcement agencies. The states of South Asia need to discuss these issues and jointly formulate policies for containment of such illegal activities. The states have a difficult task ahead.

The perspective within SAARC on terrorism is similar to the United Nations. At the 8th SAARC Summit in New Delhi in May 1995, the Delhi Declaration declared:

- The Heads of state or government expressed serious concern on the spread of terrorism in and outside the region and reiterated their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal. They deplored all such acts for their ruinous impact on life, property, socioeconomic development and political as well as on regional and international peace and cooperation.

- The heads of state... once again emphasised that the highest priority should be accorded to the enactment of enabling legislation at the national level to give effect to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. They urged member states, which had not yet done so, to enact expeditiously enabling legislation at the national level to implement the convention and reiterated the need for a constant dialogue and interaction among the concerned agencies of member states, including submission of periodic recommendations to the council of ministers.

- They underlined that cooperation among the SAARC member states was vital if the scourge of terrorism was to be eliminated from the region.

- The heads of state... recognised that drug abuse and drug trafficking with its linkages with organised crime, illicit arms trade and terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the security and stability in the region.

- While noting the efforts made by the member states as well as the regional cooperation underway to combat this pernicious trade, the leaders stressed the urgency of further strengthening the process of cooperation.

- The leaders welcomed the ratification of the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by all member states and entry into force of the convention in September 1993. They urged all member states to take necessary follow-up action for effective implementation of the convention.

The SAARC Conventions on curbing drug trafficking and terrorism in the region are important steps forward in evolving suitable regional mechanisms to tackle the twin problem. An additional protocol to the SAARC Convention on Terrorism 1987 was signed at the Islamabad summit in January 2004 by the foreign ministers of the SAARC countries. The purpose of this protocol was to take further measures to prevent and suppress financing of terrorism, extradition of terrorists
Conclusion

and to promote technical cooperation among member states. This protocol was in consonance with the obligations to the UN Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001.

Despite these conventions, there is no meaningful cooperation at the regional level in combating terrorism. The conventions, however, remain at odds with the ground realities. The declarations of intent are contingent on a qualitative improvement in the political climate in South Asia. Nevertheless, some regional initiatives in the South Asian region have proved beneficial. Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to adopt domestic legislation to give effect to the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and on Narcotics Drugs. Adoption of similar legislation by all the member countries is needed if they are to discharge their obligations, as undertaken in the conventions. Until and unless member countries receive the fullest cooperation in making more effective the regional monitoring mechanisms in respect of drug and terrorist offences there will be no headway. There is a need to facilitate a constant dialogue and interaction among the concerned agencies in the member countries in the task of combating terrorism and drug trafficking in the region.

Unfortunately, the issue of violence and terrorism within SAARC is perceived only in its criminal aspects. SAARC seeks a cooperative framework and enabling national legislations but has not attempted to confront the root causes of terrorism.

6.1.3 Domestic Measures

Tackling the problem of terrorism will require adoption of short-term as well as long-term policy measures. In the short-term, steps should include administrative and security measures. In the long-term, the measures have to be political.

Light weapons have to be perceived as one of the primary security concerns of South Asian states in short-term. A lack of understanding of the dynamics of their uncontrolled spread in the region has been instrumental in the inability of the affected states to devise appropriate policies to address the issue. Devising such policies will not only require systematic and large-scale co-operative efforts at the regional and global levels but also necessitate stringent domestic laws. South Asian states may make progress on this issue within their territories and also be part of the international campaign to regulate the arms trade. National control measures will need to be strengthened. These would
include: (i) improved border surveillance and control, (ii) stricter gun control and legislation and its effective implementation, (iii) strong and effective measures against illegal possession and traffic in small arms and light weapons. National measures will need an increasing degree of harmonisation at the regional as well as global levels. It may not be possible to control the spread of light weapons without a corresponding control over drug-trafficking and money laundering.

National regulations related to possession of arms by the civilians have to be strengthened. Effective implementation of national gun-control acts is a necessary step. Arms licensing has to be made rigorous and difficult. Adequate verification of the needs for self-defence has to be satisfactorily fulfilled before arms licenses are issued. Licenses have to be revoked in case of misuse of weapons. The possession, trafficking and use of explosives have to be dealt with seriously. Introduction of the Explosive Substances (Amendment) Bill with a view to putting highly lethal explosives such as RDX, PETN, HMX and similar other explosives under ‘Special Category Explosive Substances’ and providing for enhancement of the maximum punishment for offences committed with such explosive substances needs to be undertaken.

Some countries like Pakistan need to evolve measures domestically to tackle the diffusion problem. The de-weaponisation programme announced by the military regime in Pakistan has not met with success so far, and is unlikely to succeed without some drastic steps. Although on paper the government has promulgated an anti-weaponisation law on 15 February 2001 prescribing harsh punishments for those who are in possession of illegal weapons or involved in their sale and transaction, no one has yet been punished under its terms. On 5 June 2001, a de-weaponisation drive was launched. The response was not encouraging and the initiative was formally given up by the end of August 2001.

Domestic production in the unorganised sector in places like Darra in Pakistan continues to contribute to the levels of diffusion in the region. So far, measures to provide alternative livelihood to Darra manufacturers has not succeeded. There are some measures that Pakistan can take in this regard. First, if the government so desires it can create hurdles in the manufacturing process by imposing strict

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restrictions on the supply network for raw materials employed by Darra manufacturers. The Pakistani government is in a position to do this as the raw material required by Darra manufacturers is procured from Lahore, Gujranwala and Karachi. Second, the Pakistan government can discourage buyers by not issuing licenses arbitrarily or as political bribes. The third suggestion is a little problematic. The Pakistan government could become a major buyer of Darra-made weapons—by agreeing to purchase a guaranteed amount of weaponry each year on the condition that weapons would not be sold to anyone else. The assumption that if Darra manufacturers were assured of continuous business from a particular source they will agree to stop production and supply arms to other buyers probably may be untenable. The Pakistani government is not in a position to figure out how much weapons are being produced in Darra. Given the existing supply networks it will also not be in a position to ascertain whether weapons are being supplied to other buyers as well. The proliferation of arms making cottage industry and the domestic arms market in India also has to be tackled on an urgent basis.

Gen. Musharraf’s avowed plans for Madrassa reforms have also not made much headway. The reforms were supposed to ensure that Madrassas would not propagate Jihad, provide military training and not preach religious and sectarian hatred and intolerance. The plans for Madrassa reforms, which included the registration of Madrassas, state regulation of curriculum, and monitoring of their funding, is yet to be implemented. New regulations were outlined that would license schools, require them to teach a broad curriculum and not just the tenets of militant Islam, and forbid them to engage in arms training. Three months after Gen. Musharraf announced a crackdown on terrorist groups and on the Madrassas that were breeding them, signs of softening appeared. The reform of the Madrassas had met with resistance and they continue to operate. Given the political pressures, mandatory registration of Madrassas may be a difficult task to achieve, but if the objectives of curbing terrorism are to be met, at least the Madrassas run by militant organisations should be proscribed. According to Husain Haqqani: “If Pakistan is to move beyond the phase of officially tolerated Jihadism, it

5 These three suggestions have been made in the study, Light Weapons Manufacture in the Public and Private Sectors: A View From Pakistan, BASIC, Project on Light Weapons, Working Paper No. 2, February 1996, p. 9.

is not the Madrassas but the training camps and the militias spawned by them that need to be shut down.\footnote{Husain Haqqani, “Jihad and Jihadism”, \textit{Indian Express}, 3 August 2005.} Also, the official textbooks being taught in the schools, which glorify Jihad and violence, will need to be revised.

Drug trafficking and money laundering are two other areas which have to be taken care of in the short-term. Pakistan’s response so far has been sporadic. There has been no concerted action to curb the inflow of terrorist finances. Institutionalised legal constraints on terrorist funding are weak in Pakistan. It does not have effective anti-money laundering legislation. Terrorist funding continues through unofficial channels like the \textit{hawala}.\footnote{Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 132-135.} At present, India is attempting to deal with large scale laundering through Foreign Exchange Management Bill, 1998 and Prevention of Money Laundering Bill, 1998. The Prevention of Money Laundering Bill owes its origin to the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, to which India is a party. It is a part of a worldwide effort to curb narco-terrorism and organised crime.

Counter terrorism strategies have to be redesigned. The police has to play an important role in counter-terrorism as it did in the past the police when it was often in the forefront in tackling terrorism. The use of the army has to decline. Given the increasing complexities, the policing apparatus of the states have to be strengthened. Police departments have to acquire a degree of sophistication, which goes beyond tackling ordinary crime and maintaining law and order. For this, Police training has to be improved and better infrastructure in terms of weapons, transport and communication equipment has to be provided to them. It is a fact that security forces that patrol the borders and sensitive areas are ill-equipped and ill-paid; hence they are often prone to bribery and corruption. Measures to improve the standards of the police forces and to provide them better facilities have to be undertaken seriously. The civil intelligence gathering systems need to be upgraded and made more effective. Better-coordinated intelligence inputs can be very useful to take preventive measures. Above all, counter-terrorism measures have to be strictly followed within the rule of law.

While the short-term measures are essentially designed to counter terrorism, insurgency, curb the diffusion of light weapons, and stop drug trafficking and money-laundering, the long-term measures require
the creation of a conducive environment where political violence and militancy will no longer be felt a necessity. There has to be a better understanding of the political setting and socio-economic underpinnings of the conflicts and the nature of such conflicts. The strategy should be to target the causative and contributory factors to the conflict. A multi-pronged strategy of fulfilling socio-economic needs, deepening of the democratic process, and good governance will pay dividends in the long-term. It is only by addressing the root causes of political violence and terrorism that the goal of human security can be advanced.

6.2 ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND ADVANCING HUMAN SECURITY

If the concept of security is to be embedded in beliefs linking it to freedom from fear and anxiety, then it is imperative to understand the causes of violent conflicts and terrorism. The UN does not do this and neither does SAARC. The policy framework envisaged by the world body and the regional initiatives are more in the nature of administrative and security measures. They address the criminal side and the instrumentalities and trans-national networks that support terrorism but not the political and socio-economic undercurrents that are the root causes of terrorism. Simply treating terrorism as a law and order issue is not enough. Terrorism is a political problem and therefore requires a political response. States and societies have faced considerable difficulties in dealing with internal political violence. Despite having strengthened their nation-state building projects, most South Asian countries have not been able to eliminate the large-scale use of violence. Resistance to this process and articulation of demands keep manifesting in the language of terrorism.

So far terrorism has been viewed only as a threat to state security. The human side of the problem—that ordinary citizens are the worst sufferers from the impact of terrorism—has not merited enough attention. The increasing use of violence and the growth in terrorism has undermined the security of individuals in South Asian countries. While violence is being used for a reordering purpose, the growth in terrorist tactics has often, if not always, made victims of ordinary citizens. Ordinary individuals do not feel secure as they are invariably caught up in the violence between counter-state and state forces. Further, violence also has an overall impact on the state, society and economy, creating an environment which directly and indirectly
impinges on the security of individuals. South Asian states need to focus on the increasing insecurity of their citizens arising from violence and terrorism.

The conceptions articulated in the UNDP report and the Canadian formulations have relevance in making the lives of people more secure and in their struggle for survival and their need for safety and physical security. UNDP clearly has a developmental focus and has largely ignored the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict. But there is a need, as the Canadian formulation envisages human security on the human costs of violent conflict.9 Promoting human development has to be an important strategy in furthering human security. Therefore, human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimise risks for human beings and adopting remedial action where prevention fails. It will also mean taking steps that will create an environment which does not motivate people to violence. By addressing inequalities, which are often, root causes of violent conflict, by strengthening governance structures, and by ensuring human rights states can enhance human security.

This aspect of security, however, has been completely sidelined in the current discourse on terrorism. Counter-terrorism strategies following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States has sought using massive force, hoping to root out terrorism. In the process, it has unleashed wars and in turn this has provoked more violence. The enhanced focus of the world today on terrorism as a primary threat to peace and stability has provided a large number of states the leeway to adopt a hard-line approach to deal with the problem. The “war on terrorism” has the potential to distort priorities. It has created space for a militarised response to development problems. There is a danger that the “war on terrorism” could sideline the struggle against poverty, inequality and other challenges drawing scarce resources away from the causes of insecurity. Citing overarching security imperatives many governments have justified the violation of human rights and civil liberties. This can weaken norms and institutions needed to secure peace.

A large number of frameworks to counter terrorism are a violation of civil liberties and have become sources of oppression. Most of the

laws being framed to counter terrorism vest vast powers in the administration against ethnic groups, minorities, migrants, tourists and others. Internment without trial, arbitrary arrests and deportations has become common practices. Detention of suspected people without charge for long periods is a violation of human rights. There has been a gross abuse of anti-terrorist laws by most states confronted with the problem of terrorism. There has to be a monitoring mechanism to check the abuse of counter-terrorism measures. States have to be denied the dangerous power to terrorise their own people in the name of countering terrorism. They have to be sensitised to frame counter-terrorism measures within the rule of law. Human security is, probably, best expressed in the thought that a state does not oppress its own people and creates adequate conditions within to ensure their safety, security and the means to earn a livelihood.

UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has outlined a global strategy for fighting terrorism during his address to the international summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security held in Madrid on 10 March 2005. Stressing “five Ds” he said: (i) ‘dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic,’ (ii) ‘deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks,’ (iii) ‘deter states from supporting terrorist groups,’ (iv) ‘develop the capacity of states to prevent terrorism,’ and (v) ‘defend human rights.’ Although Kofi Annan urges states to develop capacities to prevent terrorism, the million-dollar question is how to go about the task. Unfortunately, Annan’s prescription does not seem to give any primacy to the causes of violence.

Most of the existing policy measures and the new ones that are being framed against terrorism are technocratic and technical responses that only address the problem at a superficial level. Unless and until the root causes of terrorism, which lie in the crisis situations in large number of developing countries, are addressed, the phenomena of terrorism is only going to grow. In the absence of a political and socio-economic understanding of the roots of terrorism, present approaches are geared towards an ‘anti-terrorist regime.’ This kind of regime only addresses the transnational networks and the instrumentalities that support terrorism and does not address the root causes. There is a need to develop a ‘non-terrorist regime’—a regime that addresses the root causes of the problem and tries to change the environment in which

terrorism is bred. Given the complex nature of the problem, it will be very difficult to evolve such an approach. It has to be very imaginative and may come about with further understanding of the political and socio-economic undercurrents that are at the base of terrorism.

It is unlikely that there will be any decisive military success against terrorism. As long as there are communities with grievances and an unresponsive system there will be an inclination towards violence. The propensity to violence has roots in legitimate grievances, in the failure of governments to address the people's basic survival needs, in extreme inequalities and intolerable injustices. In this era of globalisation, liberalisation and free markets, the vulnerabilities and insecurities of a large section of humanity has to be kept in mind if the international community and also the states of South Asia wish to meaningfully address the concerns emanating from violence and terrorism. Globalisation and liberalisation without a human face is bound to lead to political and social unrest. Structural adjustment programmes have increased the vulnerabilities of the weaker sections of society. It is important to place agrarian reforms and land redistribution and the concerns of the educated unemployed and the deprived sections of society in the human security agenda. Despite the dark side of globalisation, it cannot be wished away. And as Anthony Giddens says:

..., but globalisation has to be managed more effectively and equitably than has happened over the past few decades, and the ideological agenda of economic development shifted... The idea that economic development can come about purely through the stimulus of market competition is false and even dangerous. A country which opens up its economy to free trade without other social and economic reforms is likely to experience economic deterioration rather than growth. The guiding hand of the state is needed, as are institutional reforms promoting education and the emancipation of women, banking reforms and the fostering of a stable investment climate... Many countries on the margins of the world economy will require help from the rich societies. 12

Some suggest that it might be worth considering a Marshal plan to tackle the underlying conditions that give rise to violence and terrorism. The estimated expenditure to uplift the standards of living of large sections of humanity will be far cheaper than current global military expenditures. 13 But self-help is the best course. Priorities need

to be reordered and a greater share of public expenditure should be allocated to social expenditures. The inability to advance human security and to eliminate the fertile grounds upon which terrorism thrives may have severe consequences on humanity.

In this new discourse on security, the state still has a primary role to play, because the human security agenda cannot be furthered without state security. Given the fact that the state in developing countries has to play an important role in its developmental functions and providing security, state security and human security are to be envisaged as mutually supportive. Probably, the ideal situation is where state security can be achieved on the foundations of people who are secure. Thus, if the human security agenda is to be promoted and if the lives of ordinary citizens of the South Asian states are to be more meaningful, it is important that there is an interface between state security and human security. The state must be the means to human security as well. The state remains the ultimate guarantor of the individual’s well-being and security. A weak state, therefore, cannot fulfil this role effectively. But, it is the democratisation of the state, sustainable and equitable development, and instituting stricter legal norms for protecting human rights and distributive justice that will eventually ensure lesser levels of violence. Greater sensitivity to people’s need—social, cultural and economic—by the political classes is imperative. There are other transnational issues like organised crime, etc., that the international community will have to address. The measures being undertaken by the UN and the regional initiatives are making some progress in this direction, despite their limitations.
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