Chapter 4

The Causes and the Instrumentalities

In the realist notions of security, political violence in the context of the Third World has been largely viewed as an outcome of the nation-state building process. Therefore, conflicts and instability in developing societies can be interpreted as signs of an ongoing process of development.\(^1\) The propensity to violence is inherent in the process of development itself. South Asia is fragmented by too many ethnic, religious and linguistic differences. Due to the extended period of colonial rule, political, economic and social structures are weak, divisive and often inflexible. Being post-colonial states, South Asian countries are still trying to adjust to new political institutions and socio-economic structures. In a situation of scarce resources the state becomes the principal means of access to and control of resources. In such societies, politicised social groups arrive at the view that their everyday struggles for livelihood have to be fought not only in the market and within civil society but also in the arena of the control of the state. The state and its resources have thus become objects of political attention. The dynamics of development, therefore, acquires a pervasive character of instability, disequilibrium and conflict. This scenario often results in the use of force and violence as one of the available modes of political action in the pursuit of promoting socio-economic and political change or for reducing instability, establishing order, and suppressing conflict.

By the 1970s a large number of conflicts in South Asia had manifested in violence; the conflicts that were to follow in the eighties were even bloodier. Though the underlying causes of all conflicts, starting right from the post-independence period, were a complex intermingling of political, economic, social and cultural factors, all conflicts did not end

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in violence. In fact, some secessionist movements, like the Dravidian movement in India, which made a demand for a sovereign state, did not transform itself into a violent movement. It died down by the sixties. The Sindhi nationalist movement in Pakistan, with separatist aspirations, has also shown incapacity to use violence on an organised scale, notwithstanding an upsurge in 1983.

The underlying causes of violence in South Asia are predominantly linked to development reasons where right over land and access to education and jobs are some of the important issues. The uneven development patterns in South Asia have resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases and relatively faster development in others. Both conditions have offered grounds for the growth of violent movements. The strongest impetus towards violence, however, is provided by a sense of relative deprivation, rather than deprivation itself. On the basis of the theoretical framework outlined earlier and the manifestations of violence in the context of South Asia, this chapter will seek the explanations for violence and analyse the instrumentalities that support it. Since the state is pivotal in the developmental process in post-colonial societies, it is only with an understanding of the nature and the role of the state and the relationship between state and class, that one will be able to understand the roots and causes of violent conflicts. We begin by analysing the linkages between state and development.

4.1 STATE AND DEVELOPMENT

The nationalist elites of the South Asian states who inherited power at the time of independence enjoyed enormous prestige and a certain sense of purpose and were committed to economic growth and social transformation. Flush from the nationalist struggles, the ruling elites looked upon institution-building as a part of the developmental process that would enable the society to govern itself effectively, provide for mass participation in the political process to ensure legitimacy of the system, and create political stability to achieve economic growth and social justice.

The optimism of the ruling elites was erroneously based on an assumption that rapid economic development, diffused through all levels of society, would inevitably reduce the potential for violent conflict. The processes of economic development, urbanization, social mobilisation and politicisation were expected to breakdown and erode proximate

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identities and fissiparous tendencies. The first decade or so of post-colonial history seemed to bear out this theory. Beginning in the late 1960s, rising ethnic and class tensions in most South Asian states cast doubts on this optimistic scenario. This virtually brought to centre stage the reality that development and conflict was interlinked. The nature of development itself, both in terms of institution-building and economic progress, had sowed the seeds of discontent and conflict.3

The paradox of the nation-state building enterprise is that it is rooted in the European tradition, and unlike the largely homogeneous nation-states of Europe, the heterogeneous post-colonial state-nations of South Asia in the process of the management of a national identity impart to their states, a hegemonic role over their multi-ethnic societies.4 Certain continuities with the pre-colonial state structure can also be discerned. The historical context and developmental processes of South Asian states have also evolved in such a manner as to lead to divergent types of regimes.

The hegemonic role of the state is due not only to the imperatives of nation-building but also because it has taken upon itself, for historical reasons, a role as a provider for its citizens. Consequently, there has been increasing state penetration into civic society as well as centralisation of initiatives and resources on the one hand, and the rising expectation of the people from the state on the other. Although the state has relative autonomy in relation to society, in several respects it embodies and reflects the values of the dominant social classes.

In the case of India, the concern with law and order in the immediacy of partition and the desire to build a strong, welfare oriented state, has laid the foundations for the centralisation of the powers of the state. However, the dilemma of building a nation-state in a complex plural society was circumvented by creating a secular, "non-ethnic state."5 The political arrangement envisaged in the Indian Union constituted several provincial states organised on the principle of quasi-federalism. Subsequently, the re-organisation of states in 1956 on the basis of language accommodated the ethno-linguistic aspirations of a number of groups. There were two factors that contributed to the strengthening of democracy in post-independence India. The first was Jawaharlal Nehru's

4 Ibid., p. 32.
vision and influence. Under him elected institutions enjoyed pre-eminence over non-elected institutions. Secondly, the Congress party played the role of an intermediary between state and society. However, all this was to be undermined later. Since the 1970s, two seemingly contradictory processes appeared to be at work in India. One was the sharp tendency towards centralisation in the running of the state and in the management of power. The other was a gradual decline in the authority of those in positions of power and a loosening grip on the national situation by the leadership. Consequently, there was both an increase in the repressive character of the state and the vulnerability of the state apparatus.

This process has largely to do with the de-institutionalisation of the Congress party and state structures done under Indira Gandhi. The autonomy and professionalism of the state institutions—independence, professional standards, and procedural norms of the parliament, courts, police, civil service and federal system—were eroded. Erosion of the state's capacity to mediate effectively between contending interests and manage conflict was also due to increased political mobilisation of highly fragmented social forces that threatened governability. Indira Gandhi's response to the crisis of governability was by centralising power in her own person and secretariat. Indira Gandhi became increasingly intolerant of opposition and those opposition groups who felt that they had lost decisively developed a tendency to take political issues outside the political process itself for settlement, which eventually led to assorted militancies in various regions.

In Pakistan, the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, soon after independence, weakened the Muslim League profoundly and was to leave a lasting impression on the development of political institutions. For almost nine years after independence the state was to pass through political uncertainty, even finding it hard to put a legitimate government in place. Soon, the military assumed pre-eminence in the power structure,

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dominating and controlling the political system. This shift towards authoritarian structures was theoretically justified by it in the context of a developing state.

Developmental theorists in the sixties acclaimed military regimes as agents of modernisation in the developing world. Since democracy rests on the mobilisation of masses, it was considered to be detrimental to both political stability and economic growth. On the other hand, it was perceived that the military institution with its hierarchical structure, established chains of command and rigid discipline seemed well-equipped to provide political stability and ensure efficient economic management.

There are some theoretical explanations for the nature of the Pakistani state as it emerged. According to Hamza Alavi, the post-colonial state is relatively overdeveloped in relation to society, owing to its origins in the colonial system. Post-colonial society, along with the bourgeoisie and the landowners, are also less developed than the state. Consequently, the state has to mediate the competing and conflicting interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landowning class. The state is, therefore, not simply an instrument of any particular class. Rather it is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the three dominant classes. Alavi’s analysis of the Pakistani state as an overdeveloped state argues that a predominantly Punjabi military bureaucratic oligarchy dominates Pakistan. This oligarchy is linked to the powerful landowning class and the bourgeoisie. Alavi’s reference is to a colonial inheritance where the post-colonial state also reflects the character of the colonial state. The state is above society. Some scholars have questioned the use of the term overdeveloped by Alavi. Their contention is that the overdeveloped character of the state in Pakistan is significant only in its coercive aspect. The state has no capacity of consensus building. Therefore, the state is not overdeveloped as Alavi theorised but “underdeveloped” where only the coercive aspects have been overdeveloped. An overdeveloped military and civil bureaucracy cannot be considered as the overdevelopment of the state itself. Aspects that generate consent and provide the state its legitimacy are inadequately developed.

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The Pakistani state has also been described as a “Praetorian state”—a society without effective institutions and one in which corruption is rampant among those who are entrusted with guarding it.\(^{11}\) There is one explanation, which de-emphasises the role of the military and gives more importance to the bureaucracy in the process of state formation. According to this argument, the Pakistani state is a “bureaucratic polity” which has sought economic development and modernization through its “involutioned paternalism.” That is a belief that the masses cannot represent themselves and so they must be represented. And due to a detestation of non-bureaucratic institutions, the argument goes the masses must be represented by the bureaucracy.\(^ {12}\)

The composition of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has been changing over the years. Initially, Urdu-speaking Muslims or Muhajirs, were over-represented in the Civil Services of Pakistan. Their influence declined with the assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, when the hold over the state went to the Punjabi bureaucrats. With the rise to power of Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, a Punjabi-Pakhtun Military Bureaucratic oligarchy was on the ascendancy. After Gen. Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977, the predominantly Punjabi army eclipsed the bureaucracy. Even now substantial representation of Muhajirs still remains in the bureaucracy. In terms of the class composition of the military and bureaucracy, there have also been substantial changes. Since the late sixties, there are more recruits to the officer core from the middle classes in the urban and rural areas as against the land-owning background of the earlier officer corps.\(^ {13}\)

The multi-ethnic character of Sri Lanka became a central issue in defining the state structures as it moved towards independence. Initially, the Sinhalese political elite stood for some composite Sinhalese-Tamil nation. However, the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a dominant political force, particularly since the elections of 1956, led to the formation of a government with a hegemonic Sinhala Buddhist ideology, and resulted the erosion of safeguards for the minorities. The Sri Lankan state is a highly centralised state because there is no devolution of power to the local bodies. Consequently, it is the majority

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\(^{11}\) See some of the contributions in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, The Political Economy of A Praetorian State, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.


Sinhala community that enjoys state power in Sri Lanka. After 1956, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism became the dominant ideology of the ruling class. The governments that have come to power have been populists in order to sustain their support base in society and build up a system of patronage and reward. Such an approach has inevitably undermined the autonomy of the state.¹⁴

Majority domination on one hand and the increasing authoritarian character of the state on the other has played a significant role in promoting the divide between the Sinhala and Tamils.¹⁵ Right from the introduction of the Citizenship Act of 1948 disenfranchising one million Tamils to the passing of the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, to the passage of the 1972 republican constitution granting Buddhism the foremost place the state has been perpetuating the divide between the Tamils and the Sinhalas. This divide between the Sinhala and Tamils and also within the Sinhalas was furthered by some strong measures undertaken by the J.R Jayewardene regime since 1977. His adoption of tough measures like the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 and the Sixth Amendment (4th August 1983) only invited defiance from the Tamil youth. Preponing of Presidential elections in 1982 and the referendum of 1983 for the extension of the United National Party (UNP) regime resulted in the increasing erosion of the competitive party system and ensured the continuance of the UNP till 1989.¹⁶ It was after Jayewardene’s regime that the modes of protest and dissent have increasingly been extra-constitutional, with the worst manifestation of this development being in the ethnic realm.

Unlike the rest of South Asia, Nepal was bypassed by the changes that were wrought by British colonialism in the subcontinent. The Shah Kings, creation of the modern nation-state of Nepal, preserved the traditional order. The Nepali state under them has remained an extractive state that regards the mass of the population as revenue—producing subjects rather than citizens with rights. The state is a patronial state, and belongs to the rulers and they used the revenues of the state for their own private purposes.¹⁷ Deeply abhorrent of

democracy, they found ways and means of retaining ultimate power under the facade of democratic participation and electoral accountability. King Mahendra introduced the Panchayat system in 1962 on the pretext that multi-party parliamentary democracy was an alien system unsuited to Nepal and he duly banned party political activity.

The Nepali state under the kings and Ranas did not deliver when it came to development and Nepal has remained one of the most impoverished states of the world. The Panchayat system did bring about some changes in education, health and development that set in motion powerful forces of social change. Over the decades there were considerable improvements in levels of literacy and in some indicators of health. But the development was not evenly spread and there were gaps between the rural and urban areas. Also standards of living in the villages have been falling. There is also widespread corruption and economic stagnation. This resulted in a decline in the legitimacy of the regime.

The Panchayat system was dismantled in 1990 in the wake of a people's movement for democracy that was spearheaded by the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front comprising of seven communist parties. It was replaced by a bicameral parliament. A new democratic constitution was enacted and the monarch accepted a purely constitutional role. But, unfortunately, the democratic experiment did not prove to be stable. Between 1991 and 1999 some eight coalition governments took power. In the meantime, the state of the economy worsened and politicians had little time for programmes or policies. A perception emerged that their only concern was political power. Economically, most people were hard pressed because of rising prices and a lack of employment. Regional disparities have grown further in a country, which privileges only the elites of the Kathmandu valley. Both the Nepali Congress and the mainstream Marxist parties do not have anything to offer to the people. Their governments are seeped in corruption. They lack competence and statesmanship. In these circumstances, some of the parties in the extreme left resorted to extra-parliamentary methods. The Maoist insurgency since 1996 is an extreme expression of this dissatisfaction with the political dispensation.

4.1.1 Political Economy of Development

Most states in the post-colonial world emphasized planning for development in their initial years. With the dawn of decolonisation the
state’s role in development came to pervade the theory and practice of development economics. Development was to be overseen by the centralising state, which had two primary tasks—one was to ensure economic growth and the other was to level the multitude of diversities rooted in developing societies. By planning for development and monitoring the production and distribution of economic resources in society, the centralised state was expected to expedite the processes of national integration.

The capacity of the state to engage in redistributive reforms is intricately dependent on the support of at least a fraction of the dominant social classes or those elements in it relatively autonomous from the dominant social classes. The ideological leanings of those exercising power within the state apparatus bear upon development policies adopted by the ruling coalitions. An analysis of the state-class relationship in the different phases of the post-independence history of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal will help us in understanding their relative capacities in addressing and redressing the longstanding problems of economic disparities and social injustices. The absence of significant restructuring of prevailing relationships of dominance and privilege in civil society have since the late sixties served to intensify competition and conflict in expanding political arenas and has increased the transactional costs of governance, forcing greater reliance on the state’s coercive apparatus, irrespective of its formally democratic or authoritarian facade.

Although the countries of South Asia have had diverse regime patterns, they basically have followed the same economic system, which is to say that of a mixed economy. A mixed economy may be described as an eclectic system, based on a mechanism of interaction between the private (market) and public (state) sectors. The system of a mixed economy was adopted in stages since independence through planning. The choice of a mixed economy emerged from the underdeveloped nature of South Asian societies. Thus the entire planning process was geared to overcome underdevelopment in the region. This strategy of economic development has come under attack from Left critics as vacillating between capitalism and socialism and reflecting lack of a coherent plan, purpose and direction. Economic planning became

concentrated in the hands of the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital, which resulted in retarded social and economic development.

The post-colonial Indian state has enjoyed relative autonomy from the dominant social classes. The state was not the instrument of any particular class but was balanced between, what Pranab Bardhan calls, the dominant proprietary classes—the industrial capitalist class, the rich farmers and professionals, both civilian and military, including white collar workers. The proprietary classes are not homogeneous and none is more powerful than the other class. This is partly due to the retarded growth of capitalism in India. The industrial capitalist class has not yet become strong enough to undermine the economic interest of the rich farmers; neither has it succeeded in taming the professional classes to make it pursue its goals.

This heterogeneity and class balance while determining resource distribution has ensured the stability of the Indian state and helped preserve a liberal democratic tradition. The interest of the proprietary classes in the maintenance of a democratic process could be attributed to the need for a system which could provide the best medium for bargaining in the coalition. However, this democratic tradition has coexisted with authoritarian strains due to the institutional structures inherited from the colonial period.

The earlier Congress leadership, especially Nehru, avoided conflict with the dominant social classes and made measured and subtle uses of state coercion. Nehru succeeded in the abolition of Zamindari or the feudal landlord classes. Abolition of intermediary landholdings reduced tenancy from 60 to 25 per cent and increased the proportion of owner cultivators from 40 to 75 per cent. About 20 million tenants became owners and about 14 million acres were acquired and distributed. This transformed agrarian relations by shifting the locus of power from feudal landlords to medium and rich farmers—a class which was diverse socially, ranging from high caste Rajputs to low-caste Hindus. However,

22 Rudolph and Rudolph, op. cit., p. 315.
proposals initiated in 1959 to lower ceilings on landholdings—to redistribute surplus land to tenants and landless labourers failed terribly due to faulty legislation. Implementation couldn’t take place except in Kerala and West Bengal, which were states ruled by Marxist governments.23

Instead of initiating redistributive programmes for the rural poor, the fourth five-year plan went for a technological package aimed at inducing the medium and rich farmers to enhance production. Increased use of fertilizers and high-yielding varieties of seeds were supposed to usher in a Green Revolution. Since land reforms in the early 1950s had barely altered the agrarian power structure, the technological innovations in Indian agriculture produced regionally disparate results. Parts of north-western India with better irrigation facilities, Punjab and Haryana in particular, saw rapid growth in agricultural output. Rural India was simply bypassed by the Green Revolution of the late 1960s. India as a whole was able to shore up its food grain production, but in the process accentuated existing inequalities in the distribution of rural power and resources, and created greater disparities in the development of the different regional economies.

Although industrialisation strengthened the national economy, it did so at the expense of intensifying regional inequalities. Industry dominated in the Northern and Western regions and bypassed the Eastern and the North-eastern states.24 The contemporary articulation of regional identities in India is a product of inequalities created and perpetuated by the operation of capitalism in the last five decades. Capitalist development has intensified both class and regional inequalities and intensified anger against “a modernist elite.”25 The present sense of alienation on the part of a large segment of India’s diverse population is linked to a large number of factors, but more pertinently to democracy and distribution. The centralised state apparatus has thwarted many of the substantive political goals of democracy. The inability of India’s

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23 Even after thirty-six years of independence, less than 0.6 per cent of total cultivated area had actually been distributed among the landless. See, Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India, op. cit., p. 59.

24 For an argument that the north-eastern states (provinces) served as sub-colonies for the Indian state, see, Gough and Sharma (eds.), op. cit., pp. 8-9.

25 “The nation-state as it emerged through the Nehruvian design of the fifties can survive only if it allows its dominant imagination to admit amendments, and strive to achieve greater equity between classes and regions, and try to surmount and heal the great cleavage of dispossession by the processes of the cognitively arrogant, socially uncaring, brutal form of modernity.” Quoted from, Sudipto Kaviraj, “Crisis of the Nation-State in India”, in John Dunn (ed.), Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State?, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, p. 128.
democratic system to bring about redistributive reforms and an even pattern of regional economic development has resulted in what one may call in V.S. Naipaul's term "a million mutinies."

Since the neo-liberal reforms of the early 1990s, successive Indian governments have steadily reduced subsidies for agriculture, public health, education and poverty eradication programmes, increasing the vulnerability of a large section of the population. The cut in agricultural subsidies in an effort to introduce market forces to agriculture has seen a spate of suicides by farmers in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan and Kerala. According to official government figures, 1,00,248 farmers committed suicide between 1993 and 2003. The defeat of the BJP-led NDA government shows that any reform agenda that is overly concentrated in urban areas and dependent only market forces ran the risk of marginalising India's poor masses. Growth has to go hand-in-hand with welfare. According to the Human Development Report, India has slid down in many measures of development, such as rates of infant and maternal mortality and of school enrolment. Despite India's faster economic growth, even countries like Bangladesh are progressing quicker in health and nutrition indicators. This is one illustration of the lopsided nature of economic growth in India. Faster growth has largely benefited the privileged. Jean Dreze points out "the elitist orientation of public policy in India has intensified during the recent period of 'economic reform.' Today, India's international credit rating and the 'sentiment' of the stock market receive far more attention in economic policymaking than the lives of its poor." It has to be noted that when India was moving towards a free market, the Naxalite movement, which was more or less dormant, revived in some of the poorest and most populous states. And since then the movement has only gathered even more momentum, suggesting that mobilisation to their cause has not been very difficult.

Similar outcomes, but largely due to different processes, were also the bane of Pakistan. Pakistan's economy has been conditioned by the socio-economic structure inherited at the time of partition. After independence, Pakistan has had almost no industrial infrastructure.

27 The figures were given by the Agriculture minister, Sharad Pawar in the Rajya Sabha on 18 May 2006. See, "1 Lakh Farmers ended Life, Debt Major Factor: Pawar", Indian Express, 19 May 2006.
28 Quoted from Jean Dreze, "Don't Forget India's Poor", Time Asia, 6 December 2004. URL: http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13873,501041206-832318,00.html
Its economy was basically a feudal-dominated agrarian economy. The leadership of the Muslim League party, which headed the Pakistan movement, was dominated by a feudalistic aristocracy and a group of professionals and rich merchants.\(^{29}\) Over a period of time, the trading classes, were able to gain control of industries with the support and patronage of the bureaucracy.

Since Pakistan did not have an industrial capitalist class at the time of independence, the state has followed a deliberate policy of creating one even at the cost of creating inequalities of income and wealth in the commercial and industrial sectors. This policy was followed because of a perception that such a class was essential for the economic development of the country.\(^{30}\) This resulted in the expansion of the private sector but concentrated wealth in some families or groups of merchant capitalists belonging to certain ethnic communities. A study of distribution of industrial assets in 1959 show that there were twenty-four industrial houses owning 45.9 per cent of private industrial assets and 31.9 per cent of sales in the corporate sector.\(^{31}\) The planning process not only helped the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie in the urban areas but also strengthened the feudal landlords in the countryside. The trading class, which developed into an industrial bourgeoisie, was unable to challenge the landlords. On the other hand, the feudal classes controlled state power either directly or through their links with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. This led to the co-existence of semi-feudal and capitalist relations—which gave rise to an uneven pattern of development.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{29}\) Jamil Rashid and Hasan Gardezi, “Independent Pakistan: Its Political Economy”, in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), op. cit., pp. 4-5. According to Hamza Alavi; the trading classes were not significantly represented amongst the class of people who were behind the Pakistan movement. He calls the class which was behind the Pakistan movement as the salariat class. This class emerges in colonised societies, comes from urban educated classes who qualify for employment in the colonial state along with the professionals who emerged in the context of the colonial transformation of Indian society. These were the lawyers, journalist, urban intellectuals, etc. See, Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology”, in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988, pp. 65-7.


\(^{31}\) Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 67-68; also see, Rashid Amjad, “Industrial Concentration and Economic Power”, in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), op. cit., pp. 230-31. However, the position of the monopoly industrial houses was drastically affected by the separation of East Pakistan and the nationalisation of some industries and the banking and insurance sectors by the Bhutto regime.

In the agricultural sector, serious land reforms did not take place till the mid-1960s. Land reforms have had only a nominal effect on land distribution. As early as 1952-53 Punjab’s bigger landlords subverted an attempt by the more progressive wing of the Muslim League to initiate redistributive reforms by refusing to bring their produce to the market and by precipitating a man-made famine in that province. This pattern continued during the late fifties and the sixties when Gen. Ayub Khan’s military regime attempted to bring about land reforms favouring medium-range landlords. Special care however, was taken not to unduly ruffle the bigger landlords. Gen. Ayub’s land reforms announced in 1959 fixed the ceiling on land ownership at 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. But as in the Indian case of land reforms of the early fifties, the ceilings were on individual rather than family holdings. This allowed most of the larger landlords concentrated in the Punjab and Sindh where the agrarian structure is far more skewed than in Pakistan's other provinces, to retain land well in excess of the ceilings. Land reform measures under Gen. Ayub Khan in 1959, it is believed, had impacted only about 1.6 percent of the cultivated land.

Much radical rhetoric adorned Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's land reform of 1972. As in 1959, the drafters of the legislation were more concerned about winning popular legitimacy than delivering substantial benefits to the poor. Again, the ceilings were on individual rather than on family ownership. An individual landowner could hold up to 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of unirrigated land. These reforms had no impact on the power of the larger landlords. Only a mere one per cent of the landless tenants and small peasant holders benefited directly from the reforms. Thirty per cent of all farm area is still owned by this landlord class. Landholding sizes are more than 150 acres and this class constitutes less than one percent of total landowners. Since these landed elites dominate major political parties they are a major stumbling block in building democratic institutions. Only proper land reforms can shift the power base of the feudal landlords and increase their hold over the state apparatus.

33 Hamza Alavi, “Class and State”, in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), op. cit., p. 60.
The economic programmes initiated by the ruling elites also increased disparities between economic classes as well as among regional and ethnic groups. In Pakistan, the disproportionate representation of Punjabis in the military and civil bureaucracy and concentration of enormous powers in their hands resulted in the structural domination of the economies of East Pakistan, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. The Punjab and Sindh provinces, which had relatively more developed infrastructures, attracted a larger proportion of industrial investment than the other provinces. In Sindh, however, the growth of income was noticeable mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad. Thus the economic disparities widened not only between East and West Pakistan but also between the other provinces. During the 1960s the factor which accelerated the growth of regional income disparities within West Pakistan was the differential impact of agricultural growth associated with the so-called Green Revolution. Partly because the yield increase associated with the adoption of high yield varieties of food grains required irrigation, and partly because Punjab and Sindh had a relatively larger proportion of their area under irrigation, they experienced much faster growth in their incomes, compared to Baluchistan and NWFP. Regional disparities worsened and sharpened the polarised nature of development and growth. They also intensified large disparities in income and wealth of the different strata of the population.

The economy had expanded rapidly between 1959-60 and 1964-65, but slowed down and declined sharply in 1969-70. The economy during the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime was marked by a rapidly growing debt-servicing burden together with a slowdown in GDP growth and government revenues. Gen. Zia was able to bail the country out of this situation due to the generous financial support it received from the west and the acceleration in the inflow of remittances from the Gulf. These foreign capital inflows eased budgetary and balance of payments

pressures. When the cushion of foreign loans and debt relief was withdrawn at the end of the Afghan war, the underlying structural constraints to GDP growth began to manifest themselves: debt servicing pressures resulting from the low saving rates, high borrowings and balance of payments deficits related with low export growth and poor infrastructure, combined to pull down GDP growth and put the country into a protracted economic recession in the 1990s.

Since 1988, the management of Pakistan's economy has been in accordance with the IMF/World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) indicating the limitations in autonomy in economic policy making. The nature of this programme has been controversial and the consequences for Pakistan very severe indeed. Most of the objectives of the SAP were never met. One of the primary objectives was to reduce the fiscal deficit to about 4 per cent of GDP. After its inability to achieve this target by direct and indirect taxation, the government resorted to a reduction in public expenditure in development areas. Development expenditure fell from 9.3 per cent of GDP in 1981 to only 3.5 per cent in 1996-97. The consequence of this and other reforms carried out as part of SAP was a decline in the growth rate, a rise in the rate of inflation, an increase in unemployment, decline in real wages and increase in income inequality and poverty. There was a sharp decline in the growth rate of the GDP from 6.3 per cent in the 1980s to 4.2 per cent in the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan was spending less than one per cent on health and less than 2.5 per cent on education. The cut in the public expenditure in social development had a severe impact on labour and the poor. Poverty, which had declined in the 1970s and 1980s, increased after Pakistan followed the IMF/World Bank-sponsored SAP. The seeds of social conflict sown with the breeding of the religious militant groups began to erupt and feed off the poverty and unemployment associated with the economic recession of the 1990s.

Extended periods of military rule in Pakistan have also distorted its political economy. Due to its convoluted origins Pakistan has been devoting a disproportionate share of its resources to security since its

40 Zaidi, op. cit., p. 7.
42 Zaidi, op. cit., p. 322.
creation. The defence budget, coupled with the costs of administration, expenditure on para-military forces as well as interest payments on military debt accumulated over the years, has greatly limited Pakistan's policy options in regards to its development programmes. Given the centralised nature of the state structure, Pakistan's political economy has been portrayed as defence-oriented than development-oriented, i.e., a large part of resources go to non-productive expenditure. So it is the entrenched interests of the non-elected institutions, the military in particular, within the state structure, which has grown and instead of development what has occurred is a political economy of defence.\(^4\) Pakistan's political economy has seriously frustrated the state's development agenda, particularly with its scarce economic resources. The Pakistani military has been able to translate its dominance over the state structure to become deeply entrenched in the political economy. This dominance over the state structure has provided opportunities for legal and extra-legal privileges. The military-bureaucratic oligarchy has been able to use government jobs as ladders to making private fortunes. The military owns some of the richest foundations and some of the best health and educational facilities in the country.\(^4\)

Sri Lanka had a self-sufficient peasant economy before it was colonised. This was destroyed with the introduction of a plantation economy, organised on modern commercial lines, by the colonial rulers.\(^4\)\(^5\) Even after independence, the indigenous rulers continued with this classical export economy. The ruling elite was economically and socially a product of British colonialism and came from the land-owning propertied classes who had commercial interests in the plantation sector. The continuation of, more or less, the colonial economy suited the interests of the ruling class, but it became dependent on the export of certain primary agricultural products only.

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\(^4\) The economic system, which evolved under colonial rule, has also been termed as a dual economy. The modern sector, which centred on the plantation economy depended on foreign entrepreneurship, immigrant labour and foreign capital. It was technologically advanced but at the same time highly land and labour intensive. On the other hand, the traditional sector centred around subsistence agriculture, handicrafts, petty trade and small scale commodity production for domestic consumption. There were no linkages between these two sectors and therefore the traditional sector was underdeveloped. See, Donald R. Snodgrass, *Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition*, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966, pp. 4-15.
A favourable balance of payments position immediately after independence allowed the Sri Lankan state to introduce social welfare measures like subsidies on food, education and health. Successive governments financed these measures with the help of foreign capital and loans. Although these measures improved the quality of life in Sri Lanka, they were not in tune with hard economic realities. The excessive emphasis on welfare was at the cost of development. There was an imbalance between expenditure on 'human investment' and investment in capital goods to increase production and employment.46

The continuation of the plantation economy and the prevalence of immigrant labour adversely affected employment opportunities for Sri Lankan peasants. As a result, the peasants or their descendants were rendered landless due to the gradual development of capitalism in the countryside and demographic and economic pressures on the land. The increasing pressure of population created an adverse man-land ratio and the number of people dependent on the same acre of land grew because of acute fragmentation of land. Within a generation or two, a class of landless and semi-landless people grew in the rural areas. In the 1960s, 30 per cent of the peasantry was landless and worked as sharecroppers.47

In 1958, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) government passed a minimal land reforms act—the Paddy Lands Act. This was meant to guarantee certain tenurial safeguards to the tenants and enacted a provision for reduced rents. But it was never implemented properly due to severe opposition from the members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), who considered some of its provisions as inimical to their interests. The act was passed only after making favourable changes, which diluted some of its substantive content.48 In the absence of any meaningful agrarian reforms, the governments failed to resolve problems of indebtedness, landlessness and the poverty of the peasantry. At the same time, external borrowings were being used to finance import of consumer goods and for building costly public works. By the next

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The causes and the instrumentalities of the conflict in Sri Lanka can be understood in the context of the economic and social transformations of the post-colonial period. During the 1970s, Sri Lanka was experiencing a serious economic crisis, characterized by a rapid population growth, high unemployment, and a high literacy rate. The transition from a closed economy to a more liberal free-market economy since 1977 is considered one of the reasons for the intensification of the conflict. This economic liberalization facilitated the mobilization of funds and weapons by both the LTTE and the government, contributing to the violence and sustainability of the conflict.

Despite diverse regime patterns, certain general trends can be discerned in the state system of South Asia. With increasing modernization, the historical legacies of peripheral capitalism and uneven development have been compounded by increasing centralization of power and scarce resources. Initially, there was an expansion of state-sponsored and state-initiated activities for development, equity, and justice by the post-colonial leadership. Besides, a strong center was needed to cope with issues of identity and territoriality. Military regimes, by their very nature, do not provide much scope for decentralization, which has been the bane of Pakistan in varying periods. However, even in non-military governments like India and Sri Lanka, a centralising tendency has been strong, weakening the center by eroding intermediate institutions which often act as a cushion for dissent and protest.

The state's role in the development process has been significant. The capitalist class was extended ample help with finance and infrastructure. While India possessed a relatively strong indigenous bourgeoisie, Pakistan did not have a bourgeoisie of its own. It had to be fostered by the state. In Sri Lanka, most of the central political elites belonged to a class of rich commercial plantation owners. But none of the South Asian states and the bourgeoisie except for India in the early years were able to move towards rapid industrialization. This was largely due to the relative autonomy of the state from the dominant classes. The position of the other dominant classes on such transformation had to be taken into account.

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Soon after independence, except for Pakistan, where big landowners constituted a powerful political factor, in India and Sri Lanka elites adopted the social democratic ideology, and the traditional landlord system was abolished. Under the so-called Green Revolution strategy adopted by India and Pakistan, agricultural modernisation promoted by the state encouraged commercial farming. And at a later stage, a broad section of medium range capitalist farmers, not only survived but also were encouraged by the state to consolidate and expand through the so-called Green Revolution strategy. Concessions had to be made to these landowning classes since they exercised considerable political clout at the local level and therefore were important for electoral purposes as well as for the general maintenance of control. Thus modernisation was sought in alliance with the rural property owning classes. Substantial benefits accrued from industrialisation, based on the import substitution strategy and agriculture modernisation of the propertied classes.

On the other hand, the impact of modernisation and development on the poor was much more complicated. Initially, the part of the poor peasantry released from agricultural activity was absorbed by the nascent industrial sector. Some from the disadvantaged sections from both the rural and the urban areas could experience upward mobility due to the benefits of state-sponsored education. The impressive achievements in higher education during the 1960s produced a large number of college and University degree holders, mostly in the field of humanities. For them employment opportunities grew only slightly, and so unemployed young men were to be found in large numbers during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These recently arrived members of the intelligentsia, often of peasant and lower middle class origins, were not willing to return to their humble surroundings. By that time the disruption of the subsistence economy had proceeded in some depth and the restoration of the old order was well nigh impossible. The state was therefore compelled to continue expanding its instrumentalist role as the main solver of the societal crisis, but it failed to meet the increasing volume of demands due to a weak economic base. Unemployment therefore rose sharply.

The current crisis in Pakistan is linked to the radicalisation of the youth and the spawning of a large number of radical groups is due to the state’s incapacity to create a balance between human capital and physical capital. With the Pakistan economy in immense difficulties, development priorities have been completely distorted. Pakistan’s schooling system is in shambles and there is evidence that school
enrolment is failing. Over the years, the decline in the social sector spending on public education has allowed the institution of the Madrassa (religious schools) to fill the gap and also gain legitimacy within society. In the 1980s, the institution of the Madrassa got intertwined with politics. Gen Zia promoted the Madrassas as a way to garner the support of the religious parties for his rule and recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Gen. Zia’s Islamist policies opened the floodgates for funding to come in for the Madrassas. Most of the Madrassas were opened in areas where the public sector had a weak presence.

The Madrassa is a traditional institution of learning. The curriculum offered here is rudimentary and pertains mostly to religious instruction. Not enough is done to fulfil the needs of a modern state and a modernising society. But it provides free education along with boarding and lodging, inducement enough for the poor who get not only free education but also are not burdened with financial liabilities. The Madrassas gradually grew in number and spread across Pakistan. They became notable socio-political institutions with roots in local communities and ties to vested political interests. The figures on how many Madrassas may be operating in Pakistan varies considerably. While some western sources come up with abnormally high figures, official figures are moderately low. There has been a debate on the number of Madrassas that may be operating in Pakistan. A World Bank report had questioned the high figures cited by western sources. At the time of independence, there were about 136 Madrassas in Pakistan but they may have grown to around 30,000 according to one source. Some have suggested a high figure of 40,000 to 50,000 Madrassas in

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50 For an incisive account of Pakistan’s schooling system, see Paul Blustein, “In Pakistan’s Squalor, Cradles of Terrorism”, Washington Post, 14 March 2002, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23886-2002Mar13.html. There is high levels of corruption in the disbursement of welfare funds. One example of this is in the existence of what is known in Pakistan as “Ghost schools”. These are schools which exist on paper and receive regular funding from the government but are non-functional. Pakistan may have had 30,000 of these “Ghost schools”. See editorial “Ghost Schools Galore”, Dawn, 18 April 2006. URL: http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/18/ed.htm


Pakistan. Official figures cited by the International Crisis Group in 2002, suggested that there might be 1.7 million students studying in around 10,000 Madrassas. Government of Pakistan figures on number of Madrassas in 1998 was 2801 and in 2002 as only 9,880. Subsequently, according to the Ministry of Education’s 2003 directory, the figure was placed at 10,430, while Madrassa unions had placed the figure at 13,000.

Despite the uncertainty about the exact number of Madrassas in Pakistan, what is not in doubt is the way they have entrenched themselves in civil society and the important role they have been playing. Tariq Rahman writes, “... the Madrassas perform the role of the welfare state in the country. As a result, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases.” The Madrassas receive their funding from larger religio-political parties or outside donors, and instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda of their donors. Some of these Madrassas also preach an extremist ideology of Jihad. Many Madrassas provide military training to their students. The problem is not with the Madrassas as such; the real problem is the training camps established by some of the Jihadist groups under the cover of the Madrassas. Students who come out of these seminaries have few skills that will enable them to follow traditional careers in scholarship and religious services, or allow them to join the mainstream economy. Many join the ranks of extremist Islamist parties and sectarian organisations. Some find employment in the armed forces. Those who find employment in traditional religious offices, such as preacher or imam, impart their sectarian and extremist biases in carrying out their religious duties. The Madrassas also produce a large amount of religious literature. These books, journals, magazines and pamphlets all propagate sectarian hatred and violence.

57. Quoted from Rahman, op. cit., p. 92.
The level of unemployment in Pakistan since 1998 has been increasing. In 1998, it was 5.9 per cent, whereas in 2003, it stood at 8.3 per cent.\textsuperscript{60} In other words, approximately 13 million people may have been unemployed in 2003, which is further likely to have increased. It will not be presumptuous to guess from what schooling system most of the unemployed come from. The students graduating out of the Madrassas due to their lack of a modern liberal education find it very difficult to compete in society and find meaningful jobs. After having been misled with a wrong interpretation of Jihad, such boys are mobilized to fulfill spiritual obligations by joining militants in Kashmir and other places. On one side Jihad has become a means for some to make wealth and on the other side for the poor it means gainful employment, however risky this may be.

Unemployment, especially among young educated men, was also an acute problem in Sri Lanka in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969, there were 14,000 university graduates and 112,000 young adults with general certificates of education, ordinary level qualifications without employment.\textsuperscript{61} Sri Lanka has one of the highest literacy levels in South Asia. But the Sri Lankan economy is faced with a jobless growth scenario. The incapacity of the states to maintain congruence between social capital formation and physical capital formation was to result in a crisis of the state in the 1980s—when the volatile population of educated but unemployed youths were readily available for political mobilisation. This is an issue that we will be focussing on in a subsequent section.

4.1.3 Land Colonisation, Demographic Transitions and State Incapacities

While we have discussed the inadequacies of the land reform programme, land remains one of the central issues in conflict formation. Access to land and fear of loss of one's land can result in a violent response. The reason why land colonisation evokes strong reaction is because of the feeling that the 'other' is developing at one's expense and thus colonisation is associated with underdevelopment or lack of development. Perception of being colonised by the state gets aggravated if the state is an ethnically centralised state. This then leads to defining one's status in the state system and how much stake one has in it. Alienation from the state


then can lead to a redefinition or reassertion of a separate identity and demands for separation. The processes of colonisation can operate in various ways.

In Sri Lanka, Tamils had been critical of the Sinhala leadership for pursuing a policy of land colonisation. A large number of Sinhalese peasants have been resettled in Tamil area, through state-sponsored colonisation schemes. Tamils believe that this is a deliberate policy to undermine the contiguity of the Tamil majority districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticalao, and Trincomalee where they form the largest ethnic group. These measures were instrumental in altering the demographic composition of the districts of Amparai, Batticalao, Mannar, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. Though the Sinhalese constituted only 20.6 per cent of the population of Trincomalee in 1946, over the years, their number have been gradually increasing. By 1971 it was 28.8 per cent and in 1981 it was 33 per cent. In Amparai district, in only a decade’s time from 1971 to 1981, the increase in the Sinhalese population has been as high as 78 per cent.\(^\text{62}\) These policies, Tamils believe and fear, have been progressively making them minorities in the land which they claim as their homeland.

The problem in the northeastern region of India arose as a result of the colonial pattern of economic development introduced by the British after its annexation of Assam in 1826, which led to an influx of immigrant labour, resulting in significant demographic changes. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 resulted in migrations due to the restructuring of state boundaries. The massive and uncontrolled influx of settlers from East Pakistan at the time of partition and later Bangladesh as well as other parts of India, particularly into Assam and Tripura, upset the socio-economic pattern, marginalised the indigenous people in the region, and increased pressure on land. The disturbance in the demographic equilibrium supplemented by economic exploitation and a strong tribal identity led to militancy in the north-east. Most agitations started peacefully, but were gradually transformed into violent insurgencies.

The migrants who have settled in Assam have monopolised or dominated in virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or for jobs in the modern sectors of the economy and in government service. Land alienation among the poor tribal peasantry and demographic

changes has engendered a feeling among the indigenous people that the ‘outsiders’ had deprived them from availing economic opportunities. The creation of the Assamese into a minority in their own state and their uneven share in the process of uneven national economic development and Assam’s consequently persisting underdevelopment has led to a perception that this was due to the intrusion of outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the central authority.

Therefore, initially the movement that emerged due to these grievances sought to control Assam’s resources and to make sure that the management of those resources remained with the Assamese themselves. The demands also included sharing political and administrative control, revenues generated by the state, employment and other opportunities. State incapacities in responding to the problems of the Assamese resulted in the emergence of the ULFA, eventually leading to the demand for independence.

Since the late 1980s, the problem in Assam has been further compounded by the demand of the Bodos, one of Assam’s largest tribal groups, for a separate state of Bodoland. The grievances of the Bodos are similar to that of other tribals in the region. Bodos complain that they have lost land to non-tribal people, that they are educationally backward, and that their language is not taught in schools to their own children. This language issue, as elsewhere, is linked to the question of jobs. The Bodos did settle for a Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) according to an accord signed in February 1993, which provides for limited autonomy. This Accord remained largely unimplemented and the Bodos kept raising the separate statehood demand. However, an Accord signed in February 2003 which granted an autonomous council to the Bodos called the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), is likely is to bring some semblance of peace.

The accession of Manipur and Tripura to the Indian union was a smooth affair. However, the partition of the subcontinent totally changed the demography of both regions. Millions of Bengali Hindus migrated from East Pakistan to Tripura and Manipur, reducing the indigenous tribes to minorities. Migration allowed Bengali Hindus socio-economic dominance. As the Meiteis were steadily relegated socially and numerically in their own state, a resistance movement was forged involving educated and resentful Meitei youths. In Tripura, the influx of Bengalis from East Pakistan has been on such a large scale as to turn Tripura, once a tribal majority territory, into one in which the
tribal population had been reduced to a minority of 29 per cent. The eruption of violence of frightful intensity in 1980 was due to the resulting sense of political and economic deprivation, and the realisation by the tribals, as the years passed, that no redress could be secured for their deep-seated grievances by lawful means. An appraisal of the insurgency in Tripura brings into focus the fact that insurgency and the demand to secede from India was not born out of any ideological conviction, but merely out of an expression tribals discontent with the changing demographic profile in favour of non-tribals. At the root of the discontent was the loss of tribal land.

The recent upsurge in violence in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan has also to be seen from this issue of the importance of land and how the Baluchis feel that they will lose their land to outsiders and become minorities in their own province if the Pakistan state carries out proposals for setting up mega-projects in the province. The recent controversy over the setting up of the Gwadar port—a prestigious Pakistani mega-project is in fact considered a conspiracy by the Baluchi nationalists to turn them into minorities. This feeling was articulated by Ataullah Mengal—one of the Sardars and a former Chief Minister of the province. Balochistan's population is only five million. One needs to create only one mega-city like Karachi with a population of around 15 million to turn the local population into a minority. Therefore, Baluchis would like to accept the mega-projects only with some conditions. One is that the immigrants should not get the right to vote. If they do, they will soon start sending their own representatives to the provincial and national assemblies.

From the entire above instances one can see a similar pattern in that the question of right over land has generated considerable amount of violence, whether it is in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Assamese Hindus in Assam or the tribals in Northeast India. While the conflict is against the state, settlers have also become targets of violence. The primary reason behind this is that where the state shows incapacity to intervene on behalf of the indigenous people, the only way to get back one's land is by physical eviction of the settlers. Where settlement is supported by the state, such violent action can be justified much more easily. The LTTE in Sri Lanka is known to have been

64 “Mega-Projects are a Conspiracy to turn the Balochis into a Minority in their Homeland”, Herald, vol. 35, no. 8, August 2004, pp. 50-53.
attacking peasants in colonised lands. The AASU and the AGP have occasionally used violent tactics to expel foreigners. The pattern of extensive mass violence witnessed in 1983 during the movement to detect and deport Bengali Muslim nationals of Bangladesh origin was due to attempts to foil the February 1983 election, which was being conducted without revising the rolls. This resulted in an unprecedented round of violence and destruction.

The states and central governments' policies in regard to addressing one of the primary concerns of the people in the region regarding illegal immigrants have also been motivating factors. The issue of repatriation of illegal migrants is a difficult one. So much migration has taken place within the region from colonial times that repatriation is probably not a viable solution anymore.

4.1.4 Lack of State Penetration

State incapacities in regard to land colonisation has become a major issue, giving rise to alienation and anger. But also the lack of state penetration of marginalised regions or sections of people has become a problem. In some of the peripheral areas state penetration is weak—physically as well as institutionally. Physically, the outlying regions of the state have not been integrated strongly within the state apparatus. Institutionally, the idea of the state has not captured the allegiance of the people inhabiting these areas. The people residing in these areas retain a certain independence and tactical mobility when it comes to their incorporation within the modern state.

In the context of South Asia, it is because of its colonial inheritance that institutional structures have not penetrated the outlying tribal dominated northeastern areas in India and the northwestern areas of Baluchistan in Pakistan. All these regions have a high potential for violence. In all these regions state penetration is weak—both physically as well as institutionally. Institutionally, people from these regions identify weakness with the idea of the state and as such resist being incorporated within the post-colonial state. Physically, their geographical location in the peripheries or the outlying regions of the state's geographical boundaries creates the gulf between the centre and periphery. Lack of state penetration also leads to lack of development. These peripheral societies lag behind in their development achievements in comparison to the core societies. This gulf or the notion of distance and the lack of development is not helpful in attracting the allegiance of resistant
groups to the central state apparatus. A perception of being out of the effective reach of the coercive apparatus of the state emboldens some groups to resort to violence. The Baluch guerrillas could take on the might of the Pakistani army because of the above reasons.

The same is the case with the numerous insurgencies carried out by the tribal people in the north-eastern region of India. The primary reason for the alienation of the northeast is its isolation from mainstream India. This isolation is not only geographical, but is also due to historical and administrative reasons. The tribals have resisted alien encroachment on their cultural, social and political identities for centuries. Under colonialism, the British maintained a policy of status quo and isolation for the tribals of the northeast, virtually insulating them from the plainsmen and the national movement for freedom. After independence, by continuing with some of the policies of the British, the Indian state has also not been able to integrate the northeast into the Indian mainstream.

Geographically, the long distances have also meant very little social contact between the peoples of the northeast and the rest of the country. Thus, when in 1947 the insulated hill tribals became part of independent India without being self-consciously involved in the independence struggle, a section of the tribal elites questioned their integration into independent India. It is in this context that the question of independence and secession of the Nagas—and later the Mizos—emerged. A separate ethnic identity from the dominant non-Mongoloid races in India and historical allusions to a separate political existence led them to demand self-determination. Their main argument was that tribal peoples were simply not Indians at all. Although their political integration with India is more or less complete, their emotional integration and identification with pan-Indian nationalism has remained weak and incomplete. The social processes in the region, therefore, tend not to be integrative and centripetal, resulting in fellow Indians being regarded as "foreigners" in most of the northeast.

To a certain extent, even though the Tamil areas in Sri Lanka, Kashmir and the Punjab in India cannot be charged with the lack of state penetration, the fact that they come from outlying regions or border states enhances their capacity for violence. These regions are peripheral only to the extent that the policing functions of the states are weak in these regions and the state lack control over the borders through which men and material are moved for training and augmenting

coercive resources. Thus, insurgent movements from these regions retain a tactical mobility in their confrontation with the state.

Some regions in the heartland of India lack state penetration—both physically and institutionally. One such region is in Central India where the borders of the five states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra meet. The authority of the state does not extend to these areas. The rural oligarchy in this region is engaged in a feudal mode of appropriation of surplus value and perpetuates exploitative production relations. The state machinery in some of these areas, particularly Bihar, comprises of a non-official apparatus of landlords and their private armies. Whatever maybe the reflection of class forces in the state, in these peripheral societies the landlords are the ruling classes. They are not independent of the state but are only an extension of the state.

To maintain existing patterns of agrarian relations, the rural oligarchy is opposed to rural class struggle and is willing to use force towards that end. Resentment by the poor peasants, let alone revolt, brings in severe retribution not only against individuals but against members of an entire caste, at times even against entire villages. The violence unleashed by landlords through their private armies has allowed the space for the mobilisation of peasants, low castes and the landless harijans by the Naxalites. The Naxalites are descendants of the parent Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), founded in 1969 with the aim of organising the peasantry and seizing power through armed struggle. The Naxalite movement, which was an ideological movement, now finds space to mobilise on the basis of social oppression.

The Naxalites main demands centres on tribal autonomy and land reform. The peasants and tribals have suffered loss of land, loss of access to forest resources. Landlords have made use of the judiciary in staying the land ceiling laws, thus enabling them to defeat its purpose through benami transfers. In their pursuit of a more equitable land

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67 Landlords have formed private armies mostly along caste lines and a few under individual leadership. Some of these are the Brahmarishi Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Satyendra Sena and the like. See, “Behind the Killings in Bihar: A Report on Patna, Gaya, and Singhbum”, People’s Union for Democratic Rights, pp. 29, 45-47.

redistribution, the People's War Group (PWG), in Andhra Pradesh has taken over land and distributed it among landless labourers of its choice through the judgements of its 'people's courts'. These land-grab campaigns have threatened the power structure in rural areas and hence landlords have become increasingly repressive.

Except for the Kathmandu valley, in Nepal there is little state presence across its vast hinterland. In many villages, there is no institutional state presence like a development office or a police post. In most places it is minimal, consisting of a schoolmaster and a health post. Further, after the Maoist insurgency gradually expanded to more and more districts, government representatives, in fact, abandoned villages and fled to more secure shelters. The government also withdrew the police from rural areas to guard the towns. This trend towards an absence of the state has led to a crisis of authority. The state can neither extract resources from the society nor deliver services. Its legal and administrative capacity to rule has been weakened. It cannot maintain law and order or even police its own territory effectively. This inability of the state to extend effective political authority, maintain order and extract resources has led to the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. In such a situation, Maoists have filled in the space vacated by the state.

4.2 THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS

The globalisation process has resulted in a growing political and socio-economic disorder in many developing societies. This disorder is enhanced by the inability of states to satisfy people's basic needs at a time of growing political uncertainty and economic hardships. Under the processes of globalisation the state as an institution is losing salience and finds its role diminished as other actors are taking over. Neo-liberal dictates from multilateral donor institutions have supplanted the economic roles of the state—by encouraging collapse as in ex-communist countries, via privatisation or the vending-off of


70 Huntington has given primacy to political and institutional factors and emphasised disequilibrium within the political sector as the primary cause for unrest and disorder. He argues that if a country's institutional procedures for political participation are inadequate in comparison to the people's expectations for participation, this could lead to unrest and anti-regime activity. As a result of mobilization, new social forces enter the political arena, but the political structure does not provide channels for their participation in politics, thereby leading to civil strife. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 274-75.
state-controlled assets. Instability precipitated by the globalisation process has simultaneously led to extreme forms of vulnerability while magnifying popular perceptions of relative deprivation. Not only is the absolute divide between the haves and have-nots been growing\textsuperscript{71}—but also due to the widespread information and communication revolution, this deprivation is felt much more acutely than in the past. Thus, the globalisation process has contributed to stimulating mounting popular expectations and perceptions of relative deprivation.

This sense of relative deprivation is much more acute in those societies undergoing a crisis situation. This crisis situation can be understood in the political, economic and social realm. At the political level, legitimacy of political institutions and governing structures has been eroded. Then there are the problems of managing plural societies. With the reassertion of traditional values and identities, there is a loss of faith in the ability of the states to satisfy people's needs at the grassroots level. Socially, there is no amicability and there is rise of intolerance for other social groups. Economically, the system is not able to deliver. Most South Asian countries are faced with this kind of a crisis situation.

The petty bourgeoisie and the underclass are affected the most by the crisis situation generated both by modernisation and the globalisation process. These groups have a perception that there is a mismatch between what they are capable of and what they are able to get. The feeling of relative deprivation may be conditioned by an increase in expectations or a decline in the rewards. Violence is likely when aspirations and capabilities are changing and when the gap between them is increasing.\textsuperscript{72} This is precisely what takes place during the

\textsuperscript{71} On the increasing concentration of wealth and welfare in the hands of the wealthy, see the \textit{Human Development Report 1999}, UNDP, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. The total wealth of the world has been increasing in the last few years. But not all countries and people are benefiting from the global increase in wealth. Some countries are experiencing a net decrease in their GDPs, while some an increase in the number of people living in extreme poverty. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening. This is producing dangerous fissures in some societies. The poor are becoming resentful — a trend especially pronounced in the developing world. In this environment, large number of people, especially amongst the unemployed youth is being attracted to extremist political movements. See Michael T. Klare, \textit{"Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms"}, \textit{Current History}, vol. 95, no. 604, November 1996, pp. 355-56.

\textsuperscript{72} When people perceive a discrepancy between their value expectations or what they believe they are entitled to and value capabilities or what they are able to get and keep, then this leads to alienation, deprivation and disillusionment. If members of a collectivity experience this relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for political violence increases. See, Ted Robert Gurr, \textit{Why Men Rebel}, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 24-30.
process of socio-economic modernisation and now under the forces of globalisation. Socio-economic modernisation also has effects on the forms of violence and instability. The social classes affected most by it hold the system responsible. The desire to correct this imbalance has manifested itself in violence against the state but such violence has increasingly transcended state boundaries.

The process from which such a feeling arises is largely, though not necessarily, linked to educational policies. Education has been an important channel for social mobility in modernising societies. However, the state's incapacity to create a balance between human capital and physical capital, i.e., education and employment, has resulted in a feeling of relative deprivation amongst the petty-bourgeoisie. The crisis situation has radicalised this social class, which is willing to use violence in its mobilisation strategies against the state in which it does not have much stake.

In all the above cases of violent movements, it was the emergence of an educated, lower middle class youth, in some instances also from the working class and peasant families, that pushed all the movements towards violence. In the South Asian context, except for the Naxalite movement in India, the onset of violence in all other movements has coincided with the rise of the petty-bourgeoisie. One may illustrate phenomenon by looking at the social bases of some of the movements.

4.2.1 Social Bases of the Violent Movements

The petty-bourgeoisie class is identifiable in large parts of South Asia. The rise of the JVP in the late 1960s was largely due to the educational policies of the period. In the context of Sri Lanka, it was not only the cultural values associated with education but also the failure of agricultural activity to generate livelihood that compelled the younger generation of the peasantry to get educated. There was widespread hope that education would provide employment and consequently better livelihood and social mobility. The youth who completed their education before 1971 expected to step into clerical or administrative posts because education had traditionally been a stepping-stone to white-collar office employment. But when the number of educated youth soared dramatically in the 1960s, education ceased to provide a

route to secure and remunerative white-collar office employment. As a result, the educated rural youth were often compelled to return to their agricultural fields. The heightened aspirations and expectations engendered among youth by enhanced educational opportunities and crushing of these aspirations under rising unemployment produced a sense of alienation, deprivation and disillusionment. For the employed too, the kind of jobs held by them fell far short of their aspirations and reasonable expectations. This, in turn, heightened the potential for political violence.

The re-emergence of the JVP around 1986 was largely due to post-1977 economic policies. The economic policies adopted by the UNP since it took office in 1977 have had a tremendous impact on the socio-economic development of the country. These market-oriented policies were successful to some extent with regard to growth and employment generation till the early years of 1980s. At a macro-level, however, they contributed to the worsening of conditions of inequality in terms of income distribution and regional development. Withdrawal of food subsidies and reduction in resource allocation on education has resulted in growing incidence of malnutrition and worsening levels of educational attainment among vulnerable sections of the society.

Education, which was generally free till 1977, was opened up to the private sector. A decline in state funding reduced educational opportunities for the poor and lower middle classes. While the schools in the metropolitan areas managed to raise resources those in remote rural areas were largely neglected. Consequently, those from the poor and lower middle classes dependent on education, traditionally the primary avenue of social advancement, suffered.

The contraction in the state sector also had a severe impact on employment opportunities. Educated youth from rural areas depended primarily on the state for various kinds of white-collar employment, which declined after 1977. Further, employment in private sector firms

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77 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
was restricted due to the lack of fluency in spoken English amongst job seekers.\(^{78}\) While a student from a private school in Colombo with a GCE (A) level qualification could get a plush executive post in a private firm, the same was not available to the rural educated youth even with a University degree. The jobs that were mostly available were in the service sector, which had expanded after 1977 while the production sectors had declined. These included working as bus conductors, lottery ticket sellers, tourist guides, housemaids and the like.\(^{79}\) Thus, the new economic regime placed serious limitations on opportunities for social upward mobility for educated rural youth.

The post-1977 economic changes did not alter the sense of deprivation and alienation, which prevailed among the rural youth before 1971, but only compounded it further. There is no doubt that even in the late 1980s, alienation arising out of lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and the nature of employment, was fairly widespread. This was brought out in the *Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth*, instituted on 19 October 1989 to enquire into youth unrest in the country. According to the Report:

> There are some indications that the unrest of the Eighties also involved youth with relatively high educational attainment... If the profile of the insurgent is indeed identical or similar [to those who participated in the 1971 insurrection], then the findings will constitute a telling indictment of our social and economic system and, in particular, its failure to respond to the needs and aspirations of young men from predominantly rural areas, with access to at least secondary level education.\(^{80}\)

Some of the figures presented in the Report are revealing. The rate of unemployment for GCE (O) level qualifiers was 37.5 per cent, GCE (A) level 44.1 per cent and 23.2 per cent for university degree holders.\(^{81}\) A vast majority of the 55.4 per cent unemployed belonged to the age group of 20 to 29.\(^{82}\) Region wise, the percentage of unemployment was higher in 1981 as compared to 1971 in the seven districts of the Sinhala heartland. This is reflected in Table 4.1.

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79 These were the underclass of the suburban areas that joined the JVP. The emergence of a lumpen social class after 1977 provided the JVP with its urban support and contributed significantly to its violent nature. See, Victor Ivan, “The Political Legacy of Wijeweera”, *The Island*, 4 February 1990.


81 Ibid., pp. 30, 98.

82 Ibid., p. 109.
Table 4.1: District-Wise Percentage Unemployment in Sri Lanka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalutara</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matale</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matara</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambantota</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurunegalle</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The two districts of Matara and Hambantota, in particular, experienced a significant rise in unemployment. The levels of violence in these two districts were also very high due to JVP activity.

The support base of the JVP is essentially based among the petty bourgeoisie, including the youth and unemployed, and some sections of the low castes. Evidently, it had a limited social base for it to carry the people with it. During the second attempt to hold power in 1987-89 period, the JVP’s support base was largely the same but it also seemed to enjoy the support of some professional classes.83

The Tamils in Sri Lanka have had better access to employment in the state sector due to historical reasons. Moreover, they also dominated in enrolment in higher education, particularly in technical and science subjects. Over the years this was eroded by certain discriminatory policies adopted by the Sri Lankan state. The “Sinhala only” legislation of 1956 had a serious economic impact on the Tamils, as it made knowledge of Sinhala a necessary qualification for various jobs. The Tamils as such had to learn Sinhala within three years, failing which they were faced with the prospect of losing their jobs. This policy had the potential to shut out the Tamils from government employment.84

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Further, in 1970, the state introduced a standardisation system of selection for admission to higher education according to which Tamils had to secure more marks than their Sinhalese counterparts in order to be admitted to higher seats of learning. In 1978, this system was scrapped but then introduced again with some modifications. The standardization method introduced in 1970 gradually saw the decline of Tamil applicants in University admissions. Due to this policy, they had the feeling that they were being systematically squeezed out of higher education. Between 1970 and 1975, there was a drastic drop in the number of Tamils entering the University. Table 4.2 illustrates this situation.

Table 4.2: Relative Figures of University Admissions among Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka Between 1970 and 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total intake</th>
<th>Tamils</th>
<th>Sinhalese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1177</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was a rise in unemployment and a lack of commensurate employment amongst the Tamils as well. The major part of this unemployed group was the offspring of the Tamil lower-middle class, who unlike the higher strata of Tamilian society, did not have alternative means of securing suitable employment. Most of these unemployed and underemployed were channelled into the militant movement, which had started emerging by the early seventies.

The shifts in Tamil demands from regional autonomy to a federal system in the mid-1950s to a separate state in the 1970s have been accompanied by the rise of the petty-bourgeois amongst the Tamil

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85 For details see Sunil Bastian, “University Admission and the National Question”, in Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka, Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1984, pp. 166-78.
leadership and a change in the form of the political struggle. The new leadership was less westernised than the earlier leadership and had a regional base in the northern and eastern provinces. The Tamil insurgents are mainly from non-propertied, lower middle class background in the age group of 18 to 35. In lot of respects they are a mirror image of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie which had spearheaded the JVP movement in the south. The earlier leadership had been from the Tamil bourgeoisie.

In India, this feeling of relative deprivation has permeated several militant movements. In the case of the Sikhs in India, the sense of relative deprivation was not only felt by the youth but also by the rich farmers. The demand for more autonomy by the Akali Dal, representing the farmer's interest, was linked to this feeling: Its members had hoped that more autonomy would correct the imbalance in the Sikh farmer's capability to generate more wealth. The peculiar social division of capital in Punjab was instrumental in the feeling of insecurity amongst the Sikhs. In Punjab, Sikhs are concentrated more in the villages and rural settlements while Hindus predominate in towns and cities. Punjab was never considered good for setting up heavy industry. However, it had a sampling of agro-industry although most of these and the service sectors were owned and controlled by the Hindus. The Green Revolution was to result in the rise of a rich class of prosperous modern farmers. By 1978 it had peaked. But when the Sikh farmer wanted to invest their surplus capital in the other sectors of the economy, they found avenues for reinvestment blocked as the Hindus controlled industry and the service sector.

The Sikhs also realised that they did not have any control over agricultural pricing and industrialisation policies, as these were determined by the central government at New Delhi. The excessive prosperity of the big landowners and capitalist landlords not only

encouraged but also necessitated greater political power, so that Sikh farmers could decide and direct economic policies and free the industrial sector from the Hindus. One of the peculiar economic demands in the Anandpur Sahib resolution was that all key industries should be brought under the public sector. This was in contradiction to the principles of state autonomy, but ostensibly these demands reflected the interest of the landowning upper crust of Sikh society. While amongst the rich farmers it was the feeling of not being able to generate more wealth from surplus capital that had resulted in their feeling of relative deprivation, the Akali agitation had separatist overtones and emerged due to this feeling of the relative deprivation of the rich Sikh farmers. However, their moderate movement for more autonomy was hijacked by the rise of the petty-bourgeoisie. In fact, Bhindranwale was opposed to the upper class Sikh landed classes organised in the Akali Dal. His support base was the educated unemployed, subordinate non-agricultural castes, rural , jats, and youth from small peasant families, most of them with only a few years of schooling. The other point of view is that the Sikh militant movement attracted the attention of the illiterate and semi-literate, rural, landless and marginalised strata of Sikh youth.

Even in the case of the Kashmiris, although political grievances and Islamic revivalism predominate, economic factors have also constituted an important dimension of the problem. There has been a dramatic improvement in the standard of living in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between 1977 and 1984. During 1977-78, 33.4 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line. By 1983-84 this figure had declined to a mere 16.3 per cent. There were only four states—Manipur, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Haryana in that order—which had better poverty figures for the same period. The per capita income in the state in 1971-72 was Rs. 588. By 1986-87 it had gone up to Rs. 3344 which was overall the sixth highest in the country after Delhi, Goa, Punjab, Haryana, and Maharashtra during the same period.  

90 Sikhs were aspiring for more power than is possible within Indian federalism. See Zoya Hasan, "Introduction: State and Identity in Modern India", in Zoya Hasan and others (eds.), The State, Political Processes, and Identity: Reflections on Modern India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989, pp. 22-23.  
92 Shinder Purewal, Sikh Ethnonationalism and the Political Economy of Punjab, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 121.  
93 Statistical Outline of India, 1989-90, Bombay, Tata Services Limited, July 1989, p. 27.  
94 Ibid., p.16.
While the average standards of living have gone up in J&K, it has not benefited Muslims in real terms. Free education up to the level of the Universities introduced by Sheikh Abdullah resulted in a large number of poor students who could aspire for social mobility. The pressures of educated unemployed youth were to soon strain the system. The number of unemployed matriculates rose from 6,875 in 1971 to 14,374 by 1981 and to 26,559 by 1986. The number of unemployed graduates rose from 1,228 in 1971 to 6,368 in 1981, while that of postgraduates increased from 409 in 1971 to 1,177 in 1981 to 2,866 in 1985. The number of unemployed engineering graduates increased from 166 in 1961 to 443 in 1988. It has been observed that the higher the educational qualification, the higher the growth and incidence of unemployment in that category.

The main sources of employment for educated Kashmiri Muslims were the government services and public corporations. In the state government their representation in the non-gazetted and clerical services was fairly high but when it came to the gazetted posts representation of Hindus was far ahead of Muslims. In 1987, Hindus held 51 per cent gazetted posts in comparison to only 42 per cent amongst Muslims. However, in central government jobs, Hindus monopolized almost 83 per cent of the gazetted posts while Muslims held only 7 per cent. And in the clerical non-gazetted central government jobs, Hindus held as high as 79 per cent in comparison to only 13 per cent amongst Muslims. From 1986-87 to 1989 there was an increase of 200 per cent in the number of unemployed educated youth from 100,000 to 300,000. Under these circumstances it was not difficult to mobilise the educated and underemployed youth. The processes of modernisation also produced a sizeable intelligentsia who could mobilise them. For most of the first phase, the young men who joined armed groups after 1988 were from the urban lower middle class, and were people driven by Kashmiri nationalist sentiment. Later Kashmiri recruits consisted of poor rural youth with little ideological conviction.

96 All figures are from Mishri and Bhat, ibid.
98 Ibid.
There are serious structural constraints in the J&K economy. The economy does not have the productive capacity to absorb investments and generate employment due to the lack of industrialisation on account of Art. 370. This has created a large pool of unemployed youth available for militancy. In 1998, unemployment in J&K was estimated at 700,000, out of which nearly 200,000 were educated.\textsuperscript{100} 50 per cent of the labour force was underemployed.\textsuperscript{101} Many of the militants in J&K joined the ranks of militants because of a lack of opportunity for leading a constructive life. Many of the youth who opted out of militancy are toying with the idea of going back to it because of lack of jobs and opportunities in J&K.

In Pakistan, this crisis is the most severe and has increasingly consumed more and more social groups. In the case of the Muhajirs, over a period of time they have been marginalised. During the 1960-80 period, Muhajirs experienced a slow relative decline in their economic and political status. There was a perception of their eroding representation among the national elites—the civil bureaucracy, the military and the business elite.\textsuperscript{102} With the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi, to power, state policies after 1971 hurt the interest of the Muhajirs. In 1972, the Sindhi language was restored as the official language of the Sindh province. Muhajirs protested as they felt their interests in the provincial government were threatened. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had also introduced in 1971 a regional quota system for recruitment to the federal bureaucracy. The quota allocated 50 per cent to Punjabis, 11.5 per cent to the NWFP, 11.4 per cent to rural Sindh, 7.6 per cent to urban Sindh, and 3.5 per cent to Baluchistan while 10 per cent was to be filled on the basis of merit at the national level.\textsuperscript{103} This quota system was designed to increase the representation of the Sindhis in the federal bureaucracy as the higher percentage intake from rural Sindh envisaged an increase in Sindhi recruitment.

Further, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policy of nationalisation carried out from 1972-76 still shrunk the prospects of employment in the private

\textsuperscript{100} Reshaping the Agenda in Kashmir, International Centre for Peace Initiatives, Mumbai, 2002, p. 38.


\textsuperscript{102} By the early 1970s, a large number of the initial bureaucrats had retired. Presumably a large proportion of them were Muhajirs. After twenty-five years of Pakistan’s independence, the Muhajirs were feeling squeezed not only at the top but also at the bottom of state sector employment.

sector as public sector recruitment was regulated by the quota system. Gen. Zia further curtailed prospects for employment in the state sector by introducing in 1982 a quota of 10 per cent in the federal secretariat for retired military personnel. Put together Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Gen. Zia’s policy eroded the Muhajir domination of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy and public sector business elite, while increasing the representation of Punjabis and Sindhis.

Though there has not been an absolute decline in the Muhajirs share of jobs and admissions, their share has dropped relative to that of the Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis. It is the middle and lower middle class Muhajir youth who have really felt the constraints of the quota system. The Muhajir underclass (mostly Biharis from Bangladesh) faced severe competition for scarce jobs with the large influx of Pathan immigrants to the city of Karachi in the 1980s. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the MQM’s leadership and support comes largely from the lower middle class and working class segments of the Muhajir population. The social base of the MQM is primarily among the lower middle class petty-bourgeoisie. It comprised of a young urban-based middle class group, led by predominantly lower middle class University graduates.

When one studies the profile of the activists of the sectarian groups, they are found to be in their twenties. “Almost all of them belong to the urban lower middle-class—petty traders, junior government officials and unemployed youth.” They do not necessarily come from religious backgrounds. When it comes to the background of the members of the Jihadi groups, most of them come from impoverished peasant families. Those who join the Madrassas end up being literate or semi-literate, but Madrassa education is not enough to make them take advantage of the economic opportunities in society. Militancy is thus one of their escape routes.

Though the social base of the Baluch leaders was primarily within the traditional tribes, the formation of the Baluch Students Organisation in 1967 signified the emergence of an educated middle class, though it is very small in size. This class also did not find any share in the power.

104 Ibid., pp. 122-25.
structure. Their representation in the army and bureaucracy is abysmal. Further, the jobs situation in Baluchistan has only worsened.

One of the popular arguments offered for the rise of the Maoists in Nepal is grinding poverty. But there are strong political reasons as well. The Nepalese political system closed political avenues to the leadership of the Maoists. The Nepalese political system does not allow space for the circulation of elites. On the economic front the structural adjustment programmes since the 1990s reduced subsidies for farm inputs and cut jobs in the public sector—which affected the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie. In Nepal also, education led to increase in popular consciousness. Primary school enrolment, which was only 20 per cent in 1965, increased dramatically to 82 per cent in 1987. At the secondary school level it increased from 5 per cent to 26 per cent during the same period. In 1990 there were 24,000 schools, but by 2000 this had up to 37,000. In actual figures, in 1965 secondary school enrolment was only 21,000, which had gone up to an astounding figure of one million in 2000. The failure of the Nepali state under the Panchayat system as well as after democracy was restored in 1990 in generating new kinds of employment for the educated masses was bound to lead to radicalisation. The Structural Adjustment Programme carried out under the supervision of the multilateral lending agencies had a negative impact on the peasantry and the youth because of the reduction in subsidies for farm inputs and the cut in jobs in the public sector. Further, recruitment into the British Gurkha troops was discontinued and employment opportunities in the Indian army also declined. On one side, the offsprings of the peasantry and on the other the literate and conscious youth became easy recruits for the Maoists. The expectations of the youth had been raised, earlier by the leftists.

The Maoists also took advantage of the alienation of the ethnic populations in districts like Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot. The Maoists support base lies in the Western region. This region is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped and is also inhabited by tribal and backward

social groups who have felt exploited and discriminated against at the hands of the upper castes. The Western districts are the worst affected in terms of child literacy, child labour, landless households and per capita food production. A large section of these people work as migratory labourers in India and the economy of the region is sustained by the remittances sent. The support base of the Maoists has expanded to other areas in the Central and Eastern regions of Nepal and the movement now has a diversified social support base. While landless peasants, workers and poor farmers have been the mainstay of the movement, the Maoists have identified lower middle class people like the school and college teachers, doctors, engineers, white collar employees, small traders and artisans also as their supporters. 112

The Maoists also cashed in on the general sense of discontent after the 1990 movement for the restoration of democracy. While the political parties vied for power, there was no improvement in the social economic conditions of the people. Governance remained in shambles. The gap between the rich and the poor grew. The Nepalese youth from the hills were steeped in poverty but much more politically aware and saw no salvation in the crop of the squabbling mainstream politicians, whether from the Congress or the numerous Left parties and were the more likely to be swayed by the Maoist rhetoric. The Nepalese youth like elsewhere were more able to compare and contrast their own lives with those of people elsewhere. This had naturally led to their developing a sense of relative deprivation.

4.3 MOBILISING IDEOLOGIES

That the South Asian states have been going through a societal and economic crisis is fairly apparent from the above analysis. Most South Asian states have failed to meet the challenges of promoting economic growth, erecting institutions for political participation and ensuring security of the people. This crisis situation has contributed to the phenomena of terrorism in two ways. First, this crisis situation has made the petty-bourgeoisie and the underclass in these societies the most vulnerable groups. Second, it is out of these conditions that a large number of radical movements have emerged. The driving principle of these movements is the belief that only through violent revolution can societies be sufficiently changed to accommodate the interest of the

disadvantaged. In such cases, religious, cultural and ethnic factors have encouraged popular mobilisations for the use of organised violence for empowering disenfranchised groups. Consequently, citizens and groups who no longer feel part of the state due to lack of political participation and marginalisation from society's legitimate economic activities are prone to violence. Where states are unable to provide a secure environment for their citizens or meet basic human needs, there is an emergence of such movements and the search for a different ideology to organise social and political life.

In most developing states, the economic base is underdeveloped and the superstructure is overdeveloped. This imbalance can be corrected by capturing the superstructure. The students and youth perceived that the only way their living conditions could be changed was by capturing the state apparatus. But the manifestations of this perception have been varied and have depended on the nature of mobilisation. Thus, while on the one hand the JVP tries to capture state power, on the other the petty-bourgeoisie within the minority ethnic groups think in terms of secession and a new state. This is not to say that a majority of an entire ethnic group would not be supportive of an independence movement given the opportunity. The difference is in the methods adopted. The petty-bourgeoisie would introduce and be capable of sustaining the violence. Increasingly, it is evident that this petty-bourgeoisie class can sustain a high level of violence. As a social group, this class has weak material and social ties unlike the bourgeoisie, the middle class or the peasantry. And due to the age group, it is also not strongly attached to family ties.

Is this a reflection of the transformation in the nature of the class character of the agency that was to be the spearhead of the social revolution? Marx assigned the working class a historical role in the revolutionary transformation of a society under a specific set of objective and subjective factors. This role has been usurped by the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie in certain historical stages. In the sixties, worldwide, the petty bourgeoisie assumed a revolutionary role believing that the working class had abdicated its role. Therefore, the University emerged as the seedbed for revolutionary ferment in the post-1968 period. Thinkers like Herbert Marcuse and Frantz Fanon had come up with intellectual constructions to project the youth and unemployed as the driving force of the revolution. Marcuse expressed his lack of faith in the working class, particularly in advanced industrial societies in
which he felt the labouring class had lost the revolutionary potential. He rejected the organised working class in favour of the "outcasts and outsiders"—the students and intellectuals. Fanon considered the peasants as the sole revolutionary class, which could spontaneously resort to violent action. The lumpen proletariat would be the ally of the peasantry and operate from urban areas. Fanon developed his thesis in the context of colonialism in Africa. He argued that the colonial system rests on violence and therefore; any anti-colonial movement had to be based on violence—on "an armed and open struggle." He argued that "violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them." In spite of these ideas prevalent in the sixties, the question arises as to why is it that students and youth as social groups, resorted to violence? Students as a group are essentially of mixed class origin. But does the group have any other characteristic that make it prone to violence? According to certain constructs on political violence, it is the peasantry with small landholdings that is more prone to violent action and radical change than those with large owes. In the case of students, it is not the ties with land, but to other professional and occupational groups that moderates a student's social and ideological perspective.

There is not much evidence to suggest that Marcuse and Fanon have had an impact on the leadership of the various movements of South Asia. But by assigning itself a role in the revolution, it had already made an intellectual construct quite similar to what Marcuse and Fanon were talking about in the advanced industrial societies and Africa. And as a social group, a large number of youth may have been more prone to violence as they mostly came from peasant families. The students and youth perceived that the only way their living conditions could be changed was by capturing the state apparatus or seceding from the state.

It is important in such times of crisis to have a secular ideology; otherwise the social class that is the most affected by this crisis turns

114 Ibid., p. 27.
115 See, Eric Wolf, op. cit., and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 353-60.
to a reactionary ideology. The emergence of Islamic extremism in the region has little to do with an all-pervasive ideology but is more a mobilising strategy. The ruling elites have failed to deliver the goods to the people. The growing gap between the rich and the poor, unemployment, massive corruption and widespread disillusionment with the mainstream political parties and their leaders, all have become issues of serious concern. Thus, it may be argued that the revival of political Islam is not a matter of faith but is related more to social, political and economic matters. In an atmosphere of ideological and developmental failure, radical Islamic groups have emerged. And in a growing upward trend due to the inability of the ruling elites of some Muslim countries to cope with their economic and social problems, frustrated intellectuals and young students have come to sympathise more and more with the anti-government slogans of the radical Islamic groups. Radical Islam has appeared as the mouthpiece for the oppressed and despised. Its appeal has mainly been to the underclass and the sub-proletariat.

Islamic extremists are convinced that the state, classes and the bureaucratic elite of Muslim societies are incapable of bringing about any radical change in their economic and political systems. Those who run the chain of Madrassas in Pakistan have contempt for the state and a sense of self-righteousness because they have been able to provide the functions that the state was essentially supposed to have done. This quote would substantiate that view: “The state is bathed in corruption. The teachers at the government schools are unqualified. They get their jobs through political connections. We, not the government, are educating the common people. And we are putting all our efforts into training those who will spread Islam.” The LeT runs hundreds of schools and provide free education. It also runs many hospitals across Pakistan and is involved in charity work. It behaves like a parallel state, which can provide public services to the masses. It projects itself as an alternative to the failed welfare state. But to capture state power one needs an ideology for purposes of mobilisation and strategy. Hassan Abbas writes: “The Kashmir insurgency in 1989 came at an appropriate time to provide an active battleground for the LeT soldiers. Contrary to the

general assumption, freedom for Kashmir is not the ultimate goal of this conglomerate. Their ideal is to provide an alternate model for governance and development in Pakistan, and for that MDI's Muridke Headquarters (near Lahore), occupying two hundred acres of land, was built up as a model city.” Thus, a large number of young, educated and unemployed youth are mobilised in the name of Islam to take up arms against the ruling elites. The intellectuals and westernised elites of Pakistan are seen as their main enemies. Is this about Islam or is this a class conflict, in which the petty-bourgeoisie is being used by the Islamists? There are definite signs of it but in the murky social landscape of Pakistan it will be difficult to decipher. There are, however, some scholars in Pakistan, who may have similar thoughts on this issue. For instance, Tariq Rahman has this to say:

..., though difficult to demonstrate, Islamic militancy—whether by radicalised Madrassa students or members of Islamist or Jihadi groups in Pakistan—has an element of class conflict. It is at least in some part, a reaction of the have-nots against the have-haves. This is a dangerous trend for the country because the Madrassa students are taught to be intolerant of religious minorities and are hawkish about Kashmir. Since they are also from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.121

In the case of the Sikh militant movement, the rich Sikh farmers “invoked the ideology of Sikhism to build a common bond with the marginal and landless peasantry.” The sense of deprivation and grievances of the youth, unemployed and underemployed, were a common phenomenon in India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka as these countries were trying to adjust to new economic structures and social institutions. This condition has been effectively mobilised by the leadership of the various separatist, secessionist, anti-systemic or revolutionary insurgencies and reactionary movements against state power by means of ideological formulations that range from the extreme left to the extreme right.

4.4 INSTRUMENTALITIES FACILITATING VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Despite the causes, justifications and motivations for violence, the levels of violence and widespread terrorism prevalent in South Asia are

120 Quoted from Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 212.
121 Quoted from Rahman, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
122 Purewal, op. cit., p. ix.
not possible without the aid of certain instrumentalities. The two major instrumentalities for sustaining violence and terrorism are adequate financial resources and easy access to weapons. There are many factors that have created an enabling environment for access to both resources and weapons in South Asia. As stated earlier, these have come about due to socio-economic, geo-political and strategic reasons. The conditions for the emergence of such a situation were sowed during the Cold War years. In the theatre for the last Cold War, the conflict between the superpowers in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, these instrumentalities blossomed and continued to have an impact on the region long after the Cold War was over.

4.4.1 Resources from the Illicit Drug Trade

To understand how financial resources are generated to support insurgent groups and terrorism, it is also important to understand the dynamics of the underground economy in the region. The golden crescent region comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran has been a major producer of opium. Afghanistan once produced the most opium in the world. The conflict following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 facilitated the increase in opium production. It also provided a source of funding for the anti-Soviet war effort, and allowed traffickers to exploit the support extended to the Mujahideen by Iran and Pakistan, by using those countries as transit routes.\(^{123}\) The Mujahideens involved in the drug trade were clandestinely aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan in procuring arms. Profits from the drug trade were ploughed back into buying more weapons.

Drug production almost doubled between 1986-88\(^{124}\) when Mujahideen leaders like, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, turned to the systematic cultivation and refining of drugs in league with Pakistani cartels.\(^{125}\) After the Taliban come to power, poppy cultivation increased. In 1997 alone, the opium gum production in Afghanistan was around 1,265 metric tonnes.\(^{126}\) According to US government figures, opium production in


1996 was around 1,230 metric tonnes, which increased to 1,265 metric tonnes in 1997. According to the UNDCP report of February 1999, the production of raw opium in Afghanistan in 1998 had gone up to 2,200 metric tonnes, making Afghanistan the single largest producer of opium, it having overtaken Myanmar by this time.\textsuperscript{127} It again doubled from 2,200 metric tonnes in 1998 to 4,500 metric tonnes in 1999. However, UNDCP reports suggest that for the year 2000, opium production declined to 3,275 metric tonnes.

Even though the Taliban condemned illicit drug production and drug trafficking, there were no serious efforts made either to curb cultivation or to control trafficking of drugs. They claimed to have taken steps to curb illicit drug cultivation and trafficking since 1997 and carried out raids on production units and made them well-publicised events. But probably the crackdown was part of an effort to appease the west.\textsuperscript{128} Indirectly, they encouraged poppy cultivation and it remained an important source of revenue for the cash strapped Taliban government, which levied a ten per cent tax on agriculture produce as the Islamic tax called \textit{ushr}. But on the other hand they defended themselves by pointing out that in a war ravaged country it alternate means of income were not generated, it would be difficult to ban poppy cultivation altogether. Following the removal of the Taliban regime, the areas under poppy cultivation have gone up. In 2003, it increased to 200,000 acres. Production of opium had gone up to 4000 tons and it was believed that it was generating $2.3 billion in revenues.\textsuperscript{129}

Pakistan itself had become a major opium producer during the 1980s, producing around 800 metric tonnes a year or 70 per cent of the world’s supply of heroin until 1989. But, amazingly, that figure has gone down drastically. It was only after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that US pressure began to mount on Islamabad to curtail the production of opium in Pakistan. Over the following decade (1989-99), some $100 million of western aid to combat narcotics was made available to Pakistan. Poppy cultivation was drastically reduced from a high of 800 tonnes to 24 tonnes in 1997 and to two tonnes by 1999.\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{128} Intikhab Amir, “Wooing the West?” \textit{The Herald}, vol.20, No. 3, March 1999, pp. 60a-60b.


In the early 1990s, UN Drug Agency sources estimated that more than $30 billion worth of heroin produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan was entering European and American markets. It was estimated in 1992 that illicit drug export earnings for Pakistan was about US$1.5 billion annually, which was about 20 per cent of the total export earnings. Other studies have estimated that the revenue generated by the export of Heroin in Pakistan between 1988 and 1993 was between $800 million and $1.8 billion. The UN International Drug Control Programme estimated in February 1994 that the Pakistani heroin industry had an annual turnover of $2.5 billion. According to a report published in a Pakistani newsmagazine, drug smuggling provided revenue worth $8 to $10 billion to drug-dealers in Pakistan. It was believed that fifty per cent of the total Pakistani economy was being heavily subsidised by drug money.

Though drug cultivation and production has gone down in Pakistan and the opium cultivation in Afghanistan is largely in the hands of the Afghan farmers, Pakistani narcotics barons control the drug trade in the region. The dealers and the transport Mafia who had consolidated their operations during the Afghan war, in fact received a major boost with the arrival of the Taliban and the subsequent increase in Afghan heroin production. The same dealers, truck drivers, Madrassa and government contacts and the arms, fuel, and food supply chain that provided the Taliban with its supplies also funnelled drugs—just as the arms pipeline for the Mujahideen had in the 1980s. The tribal heroin cartels in Pakistan control more than half of the cultivation and marketing of opium in Afghanistan, and the refining into heroin of much of the opium produced in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan had become a major transport route for Taliban heroin exports. The drug barons comprised of industrialists, politicians, businessmen and also military men.

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134 "The Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan", op. cit., p. 5.
137 For a good exposition of these linkages see Ahmed Rashid, op. cit.
Drug money came to play an important role in Pakistani society and economy. During the 1980s its involvement in covert operations and corruption became intertwined to produce the situation prevailing today.\textsuperscript{138} The nexus of the drug trade with the Pakistan army was reinforced in the 1980s due to mutual needs. The easy money due to drugs was used to pursue its strategic interests in Afghanistan and India. The drug mafia needed the support of the Army for the safe passage of drugs. The heroin pipeline in the 1980s could not have operated without the knowledge, if not the connivance of officials at the highest level of the army, the government and the CIA. Obviously, these developments took place under the benign neglect of the US whose larger task was to defeat the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{139}

It is suspected that vehicles of the army-controlled National Logistics Cell and those used to supply arms to Mujahideen groups were used as drug carriers. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Bureau (PNCB) and other agencies do not have the authority to check these vehicles and so they were the safest means for drug transportation.\textsuperscript{140} The fact that during 1986 alone, nearly 16 Army officials were arrested for drug trafficking even though most of them managed to escape detention suggests the deep involvement of the army.\textsuperscript{140} In one instance, a Pakistani Air Force officer, Squadron Leader Farooq, was arrested by the U.S. Drug Enforcing Agency in the US in April 1997, for carrying two kilogram of heroin with him in a Pakistan Air Force flight that was to collect spare parts for F-16 fighter planes. The value of the seized heroin was estimated to be $2 million (Rs 8 crore). In 1983, the ISI Chief Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman had to remove the entire ISI staff in Quetta because of their involvement in the drugs trade and sale of CIA supplied weapons that were meant for the Mujahideen.\textsuperscript{141} It was not until 1992, when Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua became Pakistan’s army chief that the

\textsuperscript{138} Drug money has become so powerful that it has left no institution untouched. Drug money is used to bribe the police and other drug enforcement agencies not to conduct raids or to make arrests, is paid to the government prosecutors not to prosecute and. is used to finance political parties and politicians to buy protection and induce disinterest in controlling drug trafficking. Drug lords are believed to have funded candidates to high offices during the first governments of Benazir Bhutto in 1988-90 and Nawaz Sharif in 1990-93. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) founded by Pakistani national Agha Hassan Abedi, which collapsed in 1991 was believed to be heavily involved in laundering money and was used by arms dealers, drug traffickers and terrorists. See Jonathan Beaty and S.C Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI, New York: Random House, 1993.


\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{141} See Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p. 120.
military made some effort to root out the narcotics Mafia that had developed in the Pakistani armed force. Nevertheless, drug money had by then penetrated Pakistan's economy, politics and society and there was no evidence that any concerted measures had been taken to root out the problem. In 1993, a CIA report published in a Pakistani newspaper detailed the close links between politicians, drug traffickers and the intelligence agencies and their linkage to terrorism in J&K and Punjab.142

The power of drug money has left no institution untouched. Drug lords funded candidates to high offices during the first governments of Benazir Bhutto in 1988-90 and Nawaz Sharif in 1990-93. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), founded by Pakistani national Agha Hassan Abedi, which collapsed in 1991, was heavily involved in laundering money and was used by arms dealers, drug traffickers and terrorists.143 As a result of all these developments the illegal underground economy in the region grew into a multi-billion dollar business, creating a vibrant black economy in the entire region.144 It has been estimated that by 1988 illicit drugs accounted for more foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan than its legal exports.145

The illicit drug trade that was used to finance the Mujahideen in the Afghan civil war has become an integral part of the Pakistani black economy. This lucrative trade has penetrated the institutions of the state in Pakistan and also financed all kinds of terrorists groups.146

4.4.2 The Easy Availability of Weapons

The second most important instrumentality that is impacting on the growing lethality of terrorism relates to the widespread easy availability of light weapons.147 With the end of the Cold War, there has been a

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142 "Sowing the Wind", Friday Times, 3 September 1993.
143 Beaty and Gwynne, op. cit.,
147 Light weapons refer to a category of weapons that are man-portable and capable of inflicting severe casualties and destruction. They include lightweight sophisticated assault rifles and a variety of explosive devices. They are low-tech, inexpensive, sturdy and easy-to-use weapons that do not require any complex organisational, logistical or training capacities to maintain and operate.
dissemination of armaments from munitions stocks left over from old Cold War conflicts. The increased weapons availability has allowed terrorists to operate on a far more sophisticated and destructive level. One of the most significant factors accounting for the higher number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the 1990s is the fact that lethal conventional weapons and other supporting technologies have become increasingly sought after, available and affordable. The extent and type of weaponry currently available to terrorists is truly enormous. It includes assault rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, shoulder launched Surface to Air missiles and a variety of explosives.

The South Asian region has had a long history of diffusion of small arms. Before partition, India had a thriving cottage industry in illegal small arms production located in areas such as the North West Frontier Province, Punjab and Bihar. Some circulation in small arms is associated with the several wars fought in the region, including World War II, the India-China War (1962) and the India-Pakistan Wars (1948, 1965 and 1971). Insurgent groups are known to have had some access to small arms from the late forties. Baluch and Naga groups, obviously in the possession of some amount of small arms, launched insurgencies in the late forties and early fifties, while Mizo insurgents and the Naxalites followed suit in the late sixties. But the weapons that were in circulation at that time were qualitatively different in terms of their sophistication and firepower capabilities to the weapons that have become available since the Afghan war. The earlier arsenal consisted mostly of bolt-action rifles, 0.303s, 12 bores and later, Sten guns. But since the Afghan war, the increased access of insurgent groups to more sophisticated assault rifles has been noticeable. Notwithstanding the existence of an underground black market for light weapons and the illegal manufacture of such weapons in some parts of the region, the Afghan war was the primary reason for the widespread diffusion of light weapons in the region.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 indirectly resulted in massive transfers of sophisticated light weapons to the

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South Asian region. The US covert operation response must have cost nearly $8 billion,\textsuperscript{149} while the Soviet Union spent nearly $20 billion on this war. From World War II weapons and \textit{Jezails}, rebels in Afghanistan graduated in less than five years to rapid-fire assault weapons, high-powered rifles, RPGs, communication sets, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons. Christopher Smith’s study estimates that by 1987, 65,000 tons of weapons were being transferred each year to Afghanistan via Pakistan.\textsuperscript{150} The increased use of Soviet air power led to the induction, in late 1986, of the (FIM-92) Stingers, and other anti-aircraft weapons. According to some estimates, 900 Stinger missiles were supplied to the \textit{Mujahideen}.\textsuperscript{151}

Throughout the conflict, seepage was part of the pipeline. While the CIA co-ordinated the supply of weapons, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) of Pakistan managed their distribution. Once the weapons reached Pakistan, they were transported by truck from Karachi to depots at Ojhri (near Rawalpindi), Peshawar or Quetta and then, transported by mule, truck or human loads by contractors. The several transfers, haphazard storage, and the sheer size of weapons flow allowed for ample theft and corruption. By the time the weapons reached the \textit{Mujahideen} commanders, they were loaded and off-loaded at least fifteen times over a distance of several thousand kilometres. Arms were siphoned off at every connection and by all the players—the ISI, Afghan party leaders and field commanders. Varying estimates regarding the extent of arms leakage range from twenty per cent to as high as sixty per cent.\textsuperscript{152} Even

\textsuperscript{149} Christopher Smith, “The International Trade in Small Arms”, \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review}, vol. 7, No. 9, September 1995, p. 427.

\textsuperscript{150} Chris Smith, \textit{The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India}, London: Brassey’s, 1993, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{151} A total of 340 were fired which shot down 269 aircraft. See, \textit{Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence}, 1990-91, Surrey: \textit{Jane’s Information Group}, 1990, pp. 54-55. The whereabouts of the remaining 560 Stinger missiles is unknown, and all efforts to recover them have failed so far. The US is believed to have had an outlay of $55 million to recover the Stingers by offering as much as $100,000 per Stinger—ten times the price at which they were provided. See, Nina Planck, “Dealers in Death”, \textit{Time}, 19 October 1998, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{152} Some estimates suggest that only thirty per cent of the supplies sent through the pipeline reached the front-line. Christopher Smith, op. cit.; and also M. Yardley, “Afghanistan: A First Hand View”, \textit{International Defence Review}, vol. 20, No. 3, March 1987, p. 276. Weinbaum estimated that at least twenty to thirty per cent may have been skimmed off with the ISI claiming a fair share. Marvin G. Weinbaum, \textit{Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction}, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 31. Another estimate suggests forty per cent of weapons meant for Afghan \textit{Mujahideen} may have leaked to Pakistan. See, Mahnaz Isaphahani, “Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity”, \textit{Adelphi Papers No. 246}, 1990, p. 27. Pakistani Foreign Office personnel reportedly put this figure as high as sixty per cent. A former
after the Soviet withdrawal, the supply of weapons into Afghanistan by regional actors such as Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia, to their respective proxies continued.\textsuperscript{153}

Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Southern Asia became awash with light weapons. Many of these weapons found their way to conflict zones and terrorists operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and other countries as well. It was around this time that the substantial increase in the availability of light weapons the region became noticeable. Most militant and insurgent groups graduated to sophisticated assault rifles and were reported to have an assortment of light weapons in their arsenals.

The indirect fallout of being a conduit in America’s proxy war led to high levels of diffusion of light weapons not only in Pakistan but in the region as a whole.\textsuperscript{154} Between 1977 and 1987, a large proportion of weapons meant for Afghan guerrillas filtered into the illegal arms market. Almost every variant of light weapons supplied through the pipeline to the Afghan rebels could be found in the arms black market. A steady flow of Afghan refugees contributed to the large illegal arms market and a burgeoning heroin trade injected both weapons and syndicate organisations into the social life of the major urban centres of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{155}

However, the Afghan war was not the only reason for the diffusion of small arms and light weapons in Pakistan. Indigenous production in small cottage industries has gone on for years in places like Darra Adam Khel in NWFP. According to a study, the number of people involved in the illegal arms industry could be around 50,000.\textsuperscript{156} Claims

\textsuperscript{153} The Arabs continued to provide monetary aid and the other regional actors poured weapons from the international arms black market or from existing pilfered stocks. Pakistan, in August 1990, had supplied 40,000 rockets and 700 truckloads of ammunition to its favourite warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. See, Rubin, op. cit., p. 115.

\textsuperscript{154} For details see, Tara Kartha, Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and India’s Security, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999; and Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India, op. cit.


by local manufacturers suggest that Darra has the capacity to manufacture one hundred light weapons per day.\textsuperscript{157} The cost of a local AK-47 in the early 1990s was around $65 and one with a foreign made barrel $114 (at the exchange rate of Pakistani Rs. 30.80).\textsuperscript{158} The NWFP market trade turnover could be worth nearly $1 billion. Almost any type of light weapon is on sale. Upon payment, weapons can be delivered made to anywhere in Pakistan and possibly further.

The residue of small arms from the Afghan war and their production in the informal sector in locations based in NWFP has weaponised Pakistani society. Some estimates of the number of small arms in circulation in Pakistan are available from studies and news reports. In Punjab it is about 800,000, in Sindh 500,000, in Baluchistan about 250,000\textsuperscript{159} and in the NWFP more than 500,000.\textsuperscript{160} There are probably more than 2 million small arms circulating in Pakistan today and another 3 million in clandestine stockpiles, part of which possibly goes to arm most militant groups.

The sustenance of a varied number of insurgencies and the emergence of new ones in the northeast region in India indicates that the region historically has had access to fair quantities of weaponry. Access to weaponry in this part of the country dates back to World War II when the Indian Army and the Japanese forces fought a series of battles during the mid-1940s. After the disengagement of forces, the leftover weaponry fell into the hands of the tribals in the region. These weapons facilitated the Naga insurgency against the Indian state. The 1962 India-China war and the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, which were fought along the borders of this region, again led to a limited amount of diffusion of light weapons into the region. During the 1960s and 1970s, and also subsequently, weapons were mainly infiltrated from China and East Pakistan. The Naga and Mizo insurgents in the 1960s and 1970s received arms and training from China. However, it was believed that China had stopped arming the northeast insurgents after 1979.

The most well-armed insurgent group in the northeast is the NSCN (I-M). It has been reported that, in 1993 alone, they had such sophisticated weapons as the AK-47 and the AK-56, G-3 and M-16 rifles, rocket launchers, radio sets and mines bought from arms bazaars in Myanmar.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{160} Ahmed Rashid, “Drug Bazaars”, \textit{Herald}, vol. 21, No. 4, April 1990, p. 68.
Thailand and Bangladesh. Earlier, the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) was the main source of supply for the NSCN (I-M). However, over a period of time an extremely well organised system of smuggling weapons into the region has emerged. The NSCN (I-M) is said to have a so-called “Atlee Command” to procure weapons from abroad. The NSCN (I-M) serves as a nodal agency for the inflow of weapons into the region as it has access to the clandestine arms market of south-east Asia, and as it controls the routes through which such arms are smuggled into the northeast.

Sri Lanka has high levels of light weapons diffusion. The country has been wracked by two violent insurgencies. Because of the insurgencies, there has been a high level of diffusion at the societal level. But the enormous strength and the capacity of the LTTE to keep itself supplied with weapons is a feature of the protracted conflict. The amount, source, and transaction of weapons acquired by the LTTE are very difficult to assess. The LTTE possesses almost every kind of sophisticated weapons including assault rifles, grenade launchers, anti-tanks weapons, mines and a huge quantity of explosives. The LTTE is also reported to have acquired radar-guided or heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles to supplement its arsenal. One method through which they get weapons is through surprise attacks on the Sri Lankan Army. They have been able to snatch a huge quantity of weapons from their arsenal in this way. In fact, nearly 30 per cent of the weapons come from this source.

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162 Atlee Command is the name given to the Foreign Ministry of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland in exile.