Chapter 2

Violence, Terrorism and Human Security: Exploring the Linkages

Violence has been endemic in human history. The use of physical threats and force has been widespread not only in social relations but also between states. Nevertheless, the complexity of understanding the phenomena of violence and the numerous forms it takes has not led to any normative understanding or definitive moral clarity. However, with the growing scale and incidences of terrorism worldwide a moral clarity seems to be developing as ordinary human beings are often hapless victims of such political action. Both transnational terrorism and cases of internal political violence are increasingly being perceived as security issues by states.

Since the end of the Cold War, terrorism has increasingly figured as one of the important threats to national (state) security. This increased focus has led to many academic and popular writings on the theme of “Terrorism as a Challenge to National Security.” Even though many scholars have focussed on internal political violence while analysing Third World security, terrorism as a specific form of violence that most developing societies, and quite often the developed world as well, is confronted with does not constitute the core of mainstream security discourse. While indiscriminate violence affects people directly, the focus has been in fact on the implications of such violence to the state structure or the regimes in power. This concern emanates from the undue focus on nation-building and state-formation in early stages of decolonisation. In reality, however, violence in whatever forms it is manifested and whomsoever it is directed against, affects the safety and security of people. It is one of those human concerns that can glue rise to fear, anxiety and insecurity—much more than any other human condition. Unfortunately, it has not merited the intellectual attention that it deserves to build a body of knowledge around the fact that people are the main sufferers from the increasing incidences of terrorism and violence.
It is possible to further this debate—on the linkages between violence, terrorism and human security—within the new thinking that is emerging to give security a more holistic perspective and to build a people-centric security discourse. In the post-Cold War context, the debate on the nature and meaning of security is being enlarged to broaden the concept and meaning of security as well as to deepen the agenda of security. The traditional concept of security, based on the realist school, emphasised the primacy of the state, its sovereignty and its capacity to deter external threats. In a complex and interdependent world and with the transmutations in the nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the state-centric military security framework is under challenge by conceptions that are more people-centred. The individual has been made the central or primary variable in the current debate on human security. Before examining the changing connotations of security since the end of the Cold War, let us understand the Third World security predicament.

2.1 THE THIRD WORLD SECURITY PREDICAMENT

In the conventional realist approach to international relations, the concept of security is defined as the security of the state vis-à-vis external threats, that is, in relation to the aggressive behaviour of other states. This had a narrow focus as it emphasized security of territory from external aggression, or protection of national interests in foreign policy. This was partly due to the practice of viewing the state as the only unit of analysis. And thus security was perceived as the capacity of the state to protect its citizens against external threats and the preservation of the "minimum core values of the state" like territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. Within this framework the stress was solely on the role of the state and its ability to maintain an independent identity and functional integrity. During the Cold War period, the concept of security referred mainly to national security and was largely defined in military terms.

In the context of the Third World such a definition of security was problematic. In the process of decolonisation, and the entry of a large number of developing states having different socio-economic and

political formations into the global system, the connotation of security became very different for different states. Having undergone colonial domination and exploitation, and in view of the problems of state-formation and socio-economic development, the concerns regarding security for these states varied greatly. Decolonisation in the wake of the Second World War, led to the emergence of a large number of states in the global system. These states were not homogeneous political units like their European counterparts. They were also faced with the problems of nation-building and state-formation. The structural transformation of these societies was conflict-ridden. These conflicts concern the long-term processes of nation-building and state-formation. For most of these Third World states, therefore, the main threat to security emanated from within the state rather than from outside it. This is in the nature of socio-political tensions and domestic institutional instability. The fundamental problems confronted by such states were internal subversion and the possibility of territorial dismemberment. These problems threatened the capability of the state to survive as a cohesive political entity. This security predicament arose largely from the fact that the process of forging loyalty to the state was still at an early stage. Most developing societies fragmented along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines and the regime in power usually lacked the support of some significant component of the population.

These states were not nation-states like European ones, where a state was invariably based on a single nationality. Most post-colonial states were multi-ethnic in character, and consisted of several nations. Rather than being nation-states, they were state-nations, that is to say, a single state forged for a multiplicity of nations. Their national boundaries were often drawn by a departing colonial power without any regard to the ethno-linguistic or cultural composition of the population. The state had to take the initiative in nation-building. Deriving from the European nation-building experience, the elites in these developing societies at times felt that the nation and state should be congruent. This resulted in the attempt to bring about cultural homogenisation. This process of nation-building was a major factor in fomenting conflicts based on ethnicity.

3 Theory of nationalism proposed by Ernest Gellner states that industrialization has the inbuilt logic of bringing nation and state into congruence. See, Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983.

Due to the extended period of colonial rule, political, economic and social structures of such states had become weak and divisive. The pressure to complete the state-making enterprise within a very short timeframe exacerbated this vulnerability. In contrast to the industrialisation of advanced Western states, development in the Third World states was expected to take place even before the unity of the nation had been attained. The European states took several centuries for the completion of the state-making enterprise whereas the Third World states were expected to replicate the same process within a short time frame. Demands for political participation, social welfare, as well as a more equitable distribution of economic resources by the general populace have further complicated the process of state-making, leading to conflicts. The pattern of economic development in these states has intensified both class and regional inequalities. As a result, many states have failed to create a political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force.

Lack of unconditional legitimacy of the existence and security interests of the regime has resulted in violent contestations. Domestic political fragmentation in the nature of ethnic conflicts in society renders states insecure and unstable as the authority of the state is contested internally by forceful means. The degree of violence, as stated earlier, can probably be explained because of the pressure of nation-state building within a drastically curtailed timeframe. The major difference between Europe and the Third World involves the amount of time available to complete this process of building national states. Third world states were expected to duplicate and complete the same process within an artificial time-frame imposed by their own people and the international community in a ridiculously short duration encompassing a few decades at the most.

During the Cold War years, the involvement of superpowers in internal domestic conflicts heightened the levels of violence and resulted in instability and insecurity in large parts of the developing world. Further, support for the concept of self-determination and human rights provided some legitimacy to the violent struggles of secessionist groups. The degree

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of violence was also due to the fact, wherever accommodation of the interests of deprived groups was marginal, there was an intensification of conflicts and an increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands. Some of these conflicts have taken the shape of insurgencies, where the final goals are either secession or the capture of state power by means of armed struggle. But violence has its own logic and dynamic. Use of violence may not always result in a desired outcome and hence the increasing resort to terrorist tactics. Unfortunately, in the case of a large number of groups, armed struggle has degenerated into terrorism.

Violent ethno-national movements and the pervasiveness of violence have eroded the sovereignty of the state as they signify a loss of control by the state over its traditional monopoly over violence and territory. The violent struggles of secessionist groups have also gained legitimacy from international support for the concept of self-determination. While states were invariably censured for human rights violation, the terrorist acts of secessionist groups were mostly overlooked or received mild opprobrium. The legitimacy of the state is also undermined when its political institutions are unable to provide minimum order and when the state fails to provide security to its citizens. Under these circumstances, citizens may no longer perceive the government as a manager of conflicts. Such a situation can result in chaos and turmoil. And, hence states consider such a situation as their primary threat or ultimate security concern.

One cannot understand the reasons for violence, specifically in developing states, without understanding the nature of states and the nature of conflicts that confront them. Conflicts in developing states can be understood best by examining the development process as a whole.

2.1.1 Perspectives on and Nature of Post-Colonial Conflicts
Conflict is pervasive and occurs inevitably in all social systems. The development process results in dislocations and disorder leading to

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7 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing legitimacy accorded to ethno-nationalism by the international community. Developments in Europe, the prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European community, and the separation of Slovakia from the Czech Republic have strengthened the legitimacy accorded to the right of ethnic groups to self-determination. For a detailed exposition of this point see Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 165-84.

various kinds of conflicts. Most of these conflicts occur over the distribution of scarce resources. Inequality remains the ultimate source of conflicts. There are various perspectives on conflicts—including the functional and the dialectical ones. Both these perspectives on conflict point to the significance of violence. According to the functional perspective, conflicts arise when the deprived members of a system withheld legitimacy from the system. Conflicts are a struggle over values, entailing behaviour that is initiated with the intent of inflicting harm, damage or injury on the other party. However, functional theorists focus on less severe and violent conflicts and their consequences for promoting integration within and between the conflicting parties and for increasing overall system adaptability and flexibility.

The dialectical theory of conflict has emerged out of a concern to end capitalism and change society. The dynamics of change has been explained by Marx’s concept of dialectics—the inherent contradictions in social relations generate their transformation. These contradictions make conflict inevitable. The economic organization of society and consequent class formations resulting from ownership and non-ownership of property lead to class conflicts. Dialectical conflict or class conflict leads to violent conflicts and cause redistribution of resources leading to a new pattern of inequality, which, in turn, results in a new wave of conflict and resource distribution.

This conception of conflict is not only narrow but also teleological, as it essentially arose from Marx’s desire to not only interpret the social world but also to change it. However, conflicts are rarely bipolarised across an entire society, as the process of class formation has not taken the course that Marx had predicted. Also, class conflict was supposed to have been more acute in capitalist societies in which major classes were much more clearly differentiated. On the contrary, in transitional developing societies as well as the Third World, polarisation has taken place across a whole range of primordial identities, resulting in multiple levels of conflict. They are confronted by ethnic, religious, linguistic, communal, sectarian, tribal, caste as well as class conflicts.

Though Marxism visualised the need for conflicts to change the world, it saw violence in instrumental terms. However, after the Second World War the Communist world had largely bifurcated with regard to the theoretical need for violence to achieve goals. While the Soviet contention was that there are many roads to socialism, the Chinese still

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felt the necessity for violence. Thus, immediately after the Second World War, Communists in most new states in Asia, who were influenced by Maoism enunciated the doctrine of wars of liberation and sought to gain power through armed insurrections. Phenomenal changes have taken place since the end of the Cold War. The Marxist-Leninist ideology has been debunked by the Soviet Union. China no longer adheres to the Maoist ideology and has adopted liberalism in the economic sphere. Neither of the two countries promotes revolutionary struggles in any part of the world. However, it is interesting to note that the Maoist ideology has inspired a number of movements in South Asia and still sustains two sizable movements in India and Nepal.

While class-consciousness and in many instances violent class conflict do exist in the Third World, it is the multi-ethnic character of these developing states that has probably resulted in the numerous ethnic conflicts. The process of nation-building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power or influence. The relationship between the core community or the dominant ethnic group and the peripheral communities in a state is quite often characterised by exploitation. This is in some senses structural. The core community acquires an advantage over the outlying communities in the period of state-building or during the early periods of modernisation, and then uses political and economic power to maintain and enhance its superior position. Despite the formal withdrawal of the colonial power, forms of oppression, which could be described as colonial, continued in some countries. In this relationship between the centre and the periphery, ethnic conflict is an outcome of a real or a perceived sense of internal colonialism. Rajni Kothari brings out the operation of the concept of internal colonialism powerfully in the following passage:

Emphasis on economic development through the historicist model of industrial growth and urbanization produces an elite (economic, bureaucratic, and technocratic) that is intimately tied to the metropolitan areas of the world and treats the vast rural hinterlands in its own country as colonies that provide cheap food, raw materials and surplus labour (and markets for inferior industrial products). It, no doubt, produces impressive increases in the national GNPs (and hence also in the aggregate per capita incomes) without

10 Development theorists had noted that the problem of insurgency is closely related to the transitional societies, and that the highly complex industrial societies have relative immunity to them. See Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, New Delhi: Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1972, p. 136.

really benefiting anyone except a small fragment of the large humanity huddled in the 'countryside'.

Ethnicity as a category in conflicts not only exists at the level of consciousness, but is also a reflection in consciousness of very real, concrete and material circumstances. Some view ethnic conflict as inherent in the capitalist model of development as it is competitive. The capitalist form of development is uneven and accentuates exploitation as some ethnic groups benefit disproportionately while others lose disproportionately.

The way ethnic conflict or ethnic movements relate to development is highly complex. One of the outcomes of the development process has been an expression of ethnic violence. In all ethnic conflicts there is an economic factor, albeit of varying importance since there is no uniform economic cause. The range of economic factors that may influence ethnic relations can also be diverse—struggle for scarce resources, regional imbalances, infrastructural investments with a great impact on the local economic systems, labour market conflicts, distributional conflicts, etc. Conflict over natural resources can be exemplified in the way in which jungle tribes use forest wealth on the one hand and urban middle class populations want to exploit it on the other. For the former the forest represents a way of life, for the latter it means building materials or paper for the newspaper industry. Thus, growth and modernisation can go against what is known as ethno-development—a development process appropriate for a particular ethnic group. In most cases, modernisation and development have only resulted in the intensification of conflicts and an increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands.

In analysing conflicts what is important for us is to understand the genesis, escalation, de-escalation, outcome and consequences of conflicts. There will be subjective factors and many approaches in understanding conflicts. There will be debates over whether inequality is the


14 This development strategy is suggested by Rodolfo Stavenhagen. As opposed to the conventional notion of development, which is state-centric, ethnodevelopment follows principles that bring out the potential of different ethnic groups rather than bringing them into conflict. See Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, Essex: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1990, pp. 190-2.
underlying basis for conflict. Some argue that absolute deprivation is a major factor while others regard relative deprivation as more important. Post-9/11, the leadership in the West has built a discourse on terrorism arising out of an ideology fomenting ancient hatreds revolving around religious and cultural differences. Such a discourse makes the appreciation of the political and economic bases of terrorism much more difficult. We will probably never have a grand theory to explain conflicts and violence but as long as partial theories help us in understanding the phenomena, they will prove useful in policy formulations.

2.2 THE CHANGING CONNOTATIONS OF SECURITY

The end of the Cold War transformed the global security environment. The collapse of the East-West ideological confrontation ushered in a new world order. With the end of the Cold War, a new international consensus emerged. Democracy, good government, free markets, privatisation, liberalisation, the rule of law, respect for human rights constitute elements of this consensus. But the post-Cold War security environment was also fraught with a lot of uncertainty. The relative stability and predictability of the Cold War disappeared and many regional and global alignments lost significance. Old security and military ties based on superpower rivalry underwent serious examination and transformation, as regional and other issues like human development gained greater salience. Conceptions about the nature of threats were transformed. National security concerns now extended beyond military threats to a state's territorial integrity to political and economic stability, ideological or religious and ethnic conflicts, environmental problems, heightened violence and crimes confronting civil society, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and transnational issues such as terrorism, diffusion of light weapons, drugs and refugees. It was an era of precarious peace. According to the neo-realists, far from peace breaking out in the post-Cold War period what was being noticed was the outbreak of nationalist and genocidal violence, which had been the hallmark of international politics since the 17th century.15

With the end of the Cold war, traditional security threats to the state declined. A large number of these states were much more secure externally. But security challenges were much more complex. First, in a globalising world the state itself was losing some of its salience. The

global order since the end of the Cold War has enhanced the vulnerabilities of the state. It is increasingly under threat by interlinked global forces. Global economic forces and the growing assertiveness of individuals, groups, clans, tribes and other such actors are eroding its power and authority. A large number of them were faced with violent intra-state conflicts, which were less amenable to resolution due to the support structures created by a globalising world. The state's capacity to satisfy increasingly strident demands from a wide range of newly assertive internal constituencies is diminishing. This in turn is leading citizens around the world to shift their primary political loyalty from the state to more familiar and accessible communities—usually groups organised along ethnic, religious, tribal, caste and linguistic lines. This has been referred to as the “relocation of authority” by James Rosenau and the “diffusion of authority” by Susan Strange.16 According to them, a growing number of sub-state actors are coming to play a significant role in the fate of peoples and the world at large. The diffusion of authority is producing a degree of incoherence and disorder within states that is highly disorienting to ordinary citizens and often increases their tendency to seek protection or reassurance through close association with their ethnic, tribal and religious kinfolk.17 This creates a new order, which is based on a variety of actors and authorities, of diverse loyalties and rivalries.18 Many of the new claimants to power are organised around issues of identity—whether of ethnic, religious, tribal or linguistic nature—and as such generally seek to promote the interests of their identity group at the expense of other groups.

Secondly, global market forces are eating away at the economic power of the state. From the early 1980s, the rapid spread of free markets led to the partial retreat of the state from welfare and social support in many parts of the world. Multilateral financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often made the opening of markets a condition for aid to third world countries. This process was termed as structural adjustment. The IMF and the World Bank along with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) work together to promote corporate expansion into and dominance of international markets.


18 Ibid.
The WTO rules on trade disputes between member countries in an effort to reduce trade barriers or eliminate barriers to corporate profits. The IMF and the World Bank provide loan packages to many Third World countries, accompanied by requirements that nations receiving loans lower their trade barriers and fulfil other requirements, such as the privatisation of state industries and mandatory cuts in government workforces. The economic agenda of the IMF and the World Bank has synchronised neo-liberal interests to integrate and deregulate markets around the world. In the last several years, the IMF and the World Bank have been insisting on “good governance” as a prerequisite for loans. Neo-liberals blame poor governance and bad economic policies or mismanagement for the failure of economic development. Neo-liberalism is an ideology that argues that markets can do everything better than government. A large number of the Third World state’s developmental functions are also being performed by NGOs through whom donor funds are increasingly being channelled. The Structural adjustment programmes, however, have raised the cost of food and other basic consumer goods, reduced government spending on social, health and educational services and diminished the role of the public sector at the expense of the private sector. Recipient states complain that these demands are an impingement on state sovereignty.

2.2.1 Globalisation and Security

There have been two views regarding the impact of globalisation on security. On the positive side it has been argued that the intensification of global connectedness associated with economic globalisation and interdependence will lead to cooperation and increased multilateralism, facilitate dialogue between states, and provide significant gains for global security. On the other hand, a gloomier prognosis presumes increased tension and conflict, since economic globalisation may be associated with rapid social change, increased economic inequality and societal disarray, while the globalisation of ideas presents significant challenges to cultural identity. Images of a new world disorder have also been conjured up on this basis. Globalisation has been a mixed blessing in the developing world. It isn’t developing in an even-handed manner and globalisation is also not benign in its consequences. To many living in the non-Western world it looks uncomfortably like Westernisation or even Americanisation, since the US is now the sole superpower with a dominant economic, cultural and military position
in the global order.\textsuperscript{19} It has had widely differing impacts, uplifting some parts and leaving others in economic stagnation and deprivation. According to Anthony Giddens, the emerging global order is not, "driven by collective human will. Instead, it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion, carried along by a mixture of influences."\textsuperscript{20} There is little consensus on whether globalisation has made matters better or worse. Many see globalisation as a deeply divisive and contested process as has been suggested by David Held and Anthony McGrew when they say:

... as the rise of the anti-globalisation protests demonstrates, it should not be read as prefiguring the emergence of a harmonious world society or as a universal process of global integration in which there is a growing convergence of cultures and civilisations. Not only does the awareness of growing interconnectedness create new animosities and conflicts, it can fuel reactionary politics and deep-seated xenophobia. Since a significant section of the world's population is either untouched directly by globalisation or remains largely excluded from its benefits, it is arguably a deeply divisive and, consequently, vigorously contested process.\textsuperscript{21}

The spread of the global media makes it possible for the most deprived and the oppressed to compare their fate with that of others who are well-off. Due to the rapid expansion of communications many more people are becoming aware of their own marginalisation—which has been also termed as the "knowledgeable poor."\textsuperscript{22} The economic divide may result in "anti-elite insurgencies."\textsuperscript{23} Some seek revenge and self-esteem in terrorism. Transnational terrorism is made possible by a vast array of communication tools.

How do security and globalisation relate to each other? That security is being reshaped by the impact of globalisation can be judged by examining four interrelated sets of arguments. They are as follows: the detachment of security from territoriality; the enmeshment of security in global networks; the creation by globalisation of a new security agenda, and the diminished capacity of the state to provide security to its citizens.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
Security has normally been defined as the protection of vital interests within a sovereign space. It is thus territory that ties down security. This has been the traditional referent point of security. Globalisation has undermined this territorial dimension. By doing so it poses a frontal challenge to the existing frameworks for understanding security. Territorial defence was challenged by the advent of nuclear weapons. International regimes, common markets, political communities, etc have also undermined territoriality. Instances of this de-emphasis of territoriality are manifold. They include new military agendas in which military forces are now less exercised by the requirement for the defence of national territory. Armed forces are increasingly assigned tasks that have nothing to do with national defence in the traditional sense. They have also become instruments in humanitarian intervention, in the prevention of genocide, and the protection of human rights.\(^\text{24}\)

But this argument should not be stretched to its limits. Despite the revolution in military affairs and talk of the prospects of war being reduced to the virtual sphere, wars are a distinct possibility and the role of force has not become irrelevant in international relations. As the post 9/11 world order reminds us, territoriality remains a powerful form of defence within the international system, and nowhere is this more evident than amongst its weakest members. It is on this basis that analysts of the Third World security question emphasizes the tendency within Western security literature to come up with a new agenda with an explicit shift in focus from the State to the individual. For example, Mohammad Ayoob has strongly argued that within the South, strong territorially organised states are the only available bulwark against the penetrating forces from the North.\(^\text{25}\)

The second set of arguments claim that security is increasingly structured into global networks. The emergence of a global economic system and communications has created a vast network of linkages all across the world.\(^\text{26}\) Globalising networks have reduced the capacity of the state to act autonomously. These networks are the outcome of the globalisation of production and exchange, and of systems of global


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communications, etc. The ideas of a national industrial base that was central to Cold War concepts of national security have come to be challenged. The production of military hardware is now part of the global system of production as well as exchange. This development is imperative given the escalating costs of military technology, a degree of privatisation and the relative internationalisation of the defence industry. The encroachment of the market into defence production points to the inability of the state to control this process.27

The third manifestation of globalisation is in the setting of new security agendas and the creation of new security problems. These pertain to issues of identity. Globalisation is part of a complex of forces leading to the emergence of non-state-centric paradigms and the introduction of societal dimensions of security. These are manifestations of assaults on the state from above and below—from globalisation without and from fragmentation within. Globalisation generates feelings of threat and encourages local resistance to homogenisation, which produces the exacerbation of a feeling of insecurity together with a fear of losing one's own identity.28 Anthony Giddens contends that, "Globalisation is the reason for the revival of local cultural identities in different parts of the world...Local nationalisms spring up as a response to globalising tendencies, as the hold of older nation-states weakens."29

The rise of radical Islamic opposition has also been viewed as a reaction to globalisation. World system theorists have argued that, "Islamic social movements have increasingly become the most militant expression of anti-imperialist nationalism. By becoming the voice and assuming the leadership of anti-imperialist nationalist movements,... Islamic movements have largely displaced secular nationalist and leftist movements as the primary mobilising force of resistance against real and imagined Western politico-economic and cultural domination."30 Benjamin Barber uses the term "Jihad" to denote the forces of tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism in opposition to the forces of integrative modernisation and aggressive economic and cultural globalisation represented by "McWorld." According to him, the term "Jihad" suggests

27 Ian Clark, op.cit., p. 116.
28 Ian Clark, op.cit., p. 117.
29 Quoted from Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 13.
dogmatic and violent particularism in an effort to preserve cultural and religious distinctiveness in the face of homogenisation due to the processes of globalisation.\textsuperscript{31} Islamic terrorism is also fuelled by a resistance to unjust economic globalisation and to a western culture deemed threatening to local religions and cultures.\textsuperscript{32}

Fourthly, the relationship between globalisation and security can be examined in the framework of the "retreat of the state"\textsuperscript{33} from the provision of security. In parallel with the retreat of the state from a range of social and welfare services, and the withdrawal of the state from what was once deemed to be its core industries, such as energy and transport, analysts also discern the privatisation of security. The dramatic growth in private security is less accountable and controllable than in the case of state military forces. The changing nature of warfare also suggests that the traditional role of the state in warfare is also undergoing transformation with the privatisation of warfare and contracting out tasks that states might be reluctant to carry out. The ongoing privatisation of security and the role of mercenaries in warfare challenge the traditional notions of the State. The monopoly of the state on legitimate violence is being shared. The capabilities of such private security companies—such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Executive Outcomes and Sandline—are comparable to the military capabilities of a large number of Third World countries. What this phenomenon suggests is both a security leakage to other bodies, and a degree of devolution of the security function to private companies. It is in some senses comparable to the deregulation that is taking place in the economic sphere. This trend also challenges the state's monopoly over legitimate violence.

The state's inability to perform its traditional security functions as a result of the impact of globalisation has resulted in a legitimacy crisis for the states. Security is becoming dis-embedded from specific national compacts, which has hitherto been the case. The state provides less security and consequently is constrained to make fewer demands on its citizens. It also places limits on the state's legitimisation of violence. Globalisation as a factor in changing security is also setting new agendas and creating new security discourses.


\textsuperscript{32} Stanley Hoffman, "Clash of Globalisation", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 81, no. 4, July-August 2002.

2.2.2 Broadening the Security Agenda

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar world order have led to a paradigmatic shift in the conceptions of security and has invigorated the debate on alternate approaches to security. A comprehensive approach to security is more in tune with the conception that challenges to security are also non-military in nature. The scope of security has been broadened to encompass political, social, cultural, economic and environmental concerns. All these have been amenable to "securitisation." This requires a shift from the military conception of security and a more cooperative approach to addressing the relevant issues. The widening of the concept of security has privileged the well-being of the citizens also in the emerging security discourse.

An international consensus is being sought which can emphasise individual security over state security in which democracy, good government, free markets, privatisation, liberalisation, the rule of law, and respect for human rights became primary. Internal political cohesion and stability, economic growth and rational and restrained external policies are now recognised as the primary requirements for the progress of nations. Some analysts have begun to distinguish between negative and positive security. Unlike the narrow military or "negative" conception of security, positive security denotes a more inclusive view that addresses issues of well-being, of cultural and political identity, freedom from structural or indirect as well as from direct violence, and reasonable access to material needs, including food, employment, and protection from the effects of environmental degradation. Similar ideas have been identified in concepts of co-operative security, common security, comprehensive security, and so on.

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34 This concept links security to discursive practices within states. It can be seen as a "speech act" whereby elites securitise or desecuritise issues or fields. According to Ole Waever, the agenda of redefining security is a process of bringing into the field of security also areas which could have remained outside. Ole Waever, "Securitisation and Desecuritisation", in Ronnie D. Lipshutz, On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-57.


36 The distinction between negative and positive security derives from John Galtung's distinction between negative and positive peace, the first denoting the absence of war, and the second denoting the positive aspects of peace, specifically the absence of structural violence.

The onset of the globalisation process has left no choice except for the acceptance of these ideas for interdependence among all countries in the world to harmonise their aspirations and approaches. The globalisation process also presents security challenges that are increasingly transnational in character. These challenges cannot be easily confronted and tackled without regional and international cooperation. The security agenda of an interdependent world is also bound to shift to a more cooperative framework. This change acknowledges that many contemporary security threats, whether the breakdown of the global financial system, poverty, global warming, human rights protection, the proliferation of light weapons, drug abuse, forced migration, AIDS and so forth are largely beyond the control of individual states and therefore require international and not national responses. These profound changes have eroded the traditional distinction between a state's internal and external policy and have advanced a conception of security which is much broader than that envisaged by the state-centric conception. The international communities move towards “a responsibility to protect” attitude resulting in humanitarian interventions across continents also suggest a shift away from the sanctity of the state as the central focus in security concerns.38

All these processes have been undermining the legitimacy and the security of the state. But, state security is also being accorded limited importance in a context where individuals, social groups and their social institutions do not enjoy security. And thus, issues concerning security embrace a more diverse agenda than that which dominated the discourse in the Cold War context. For the developing world, apart from the state, society and individuals often neglected in studies in most security analysis, has become important as well. While the problem of nation-building still constitutes an important element in the security of developing states, the notion of security encompasses a wider connotation now. Even after decolonisation the inability of the ruling elite to address issues of development like food, health, housing, education, energy, environment, etc, left much to be desired in the understanding of the security discourse. However, much of the refocusing in the discourse came along with the end of the Cold War.39


The narrow concept of national security has now given way to an all-encompassing concept of human security. It has changed from a stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security. While it has been clearly recognised that non-military dimensions also threaten states and individuals and there has been a broadening of security studies to focus on economy, environment, health and the like, there is also scepticism that expanding security studies in this manner would make it lose its focus and "destroy its intellectual coherence." Security analysts in mainstream International Relations theory are mainly concerned with the state and the system of states. Security is about political-military threats in the short-term. Defining security more broadly to involve long-term environmental issues such as climactic change dilutes the essence of the concept. According to Ayoob, these types of vulnerabilities become integral components of the definition of security only if and when they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival.

2.3 THE IDEA OF HUMAN SECURITY

Since the end of the Cold War, with the changing nature of conflicts and intensifying globalisation, the security of states had become complex while the "security of people" in general has declined. There has been a rise in violent crime, terrorism, drug-trade, disease, environmental degradation and there has been an unregulated spread of small arms and light weapons. A growing number of armed conflicts are being fought within states. All these have impacted on the individual, making him insecure. Traditional concepts of security have been seen to have failed in its primary objective of protecting the individual. In such circumstances the idea of human security has emerged as a global political concern.

The ideas that underpin the concept of human security are not new. Within the United Nations, the debates on sustainable development in the 1980s increasingly situated people at the centre-stage of development


by referring to meeting basic human needs and reducing poverty. The debates on sustainable human development are now spilling over into the debates on global security. The values that have been espoused deal with human beings and their environment. Sustainable development is viewed as having the objectives of "improving and sustaining human security and reducing perceived and actual threats to physical and psychological well-being from all manner of agents and forces that could degrade people's lives, values, and property." In this way, development and the notions of human security are getting inter-linked even though a clear conceptual understanding of human security has yet to emerge. The Human Development Report of 1993 emphasize that the concept security must include the security of people, not only of nations and that the "concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security." Thus, sustainable human development is being viewed as a process of improving and sustaining human security.

An important step in the evolution of the idea of human security was taken in 1994 when the UNDP conflated development and security by including it in the Human Development Report. It called for "a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security" and attempted to list threats to human security under seven categories: (i) Economic, (ii) Food, (iii) Health, (iv) Environmental (v) Personal, (vi) Community, (vii) Political. It noted that while the superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle, the developing world was more sensitive to fragile national identities. The legitimate concerns of ordinary people in their daily lives have been completely forgotten. For most people, security means the protection from the threat of hunger, unemployment, disease, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. Thus, a sense of human security implies that people are free from worries, not merely from the dread of cataclysmic world events but primarily about daily life concerns. In this way, the concept of security has to be more people-centred.

Mahbub-ul Haq, who worked for a long time for UNDP, can be credited with advancing the concept of human security. Haq, who was

instrumental in the formulation of the Human Development Index, has premised that human development as the bedrock for security. He has argued that the imperative of securing people from economic deprivation, disease, hunger, social conflict, and environmental degradation should constitute the notion of security. The concept should focus on human rights and human development. Individual and human collectivities rather than the state should be made the referents of security. In the traditional state-centred security conception, the referent object of security is the state and it is assumed that if the state is secure so will be the people who live within it. But even after the end of the Cold War, the militaristic notions of security still continue. Patterns of development in the Third World suggest that the individual has become much more vulnerable due to the forces of globalisation, neo-liberal agenda, and the growing incidences of violence and terrorism in everyday life. The eagerness to shift the focus of security to a development agenda has to do with the UNDP’s hope that the post-Cold War peace dividend could be directed towards the development agenda.

Despite the debate that has continued for more than a decade now, the concept of human security still lacks a universally accepted definition or for that matter even a precise definition. Criticisms of the concept of human security have come from its expansiveness, and from its inability to keep the development agenda distinct from conceptions of security. As Roland Paris has pointed out, “Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being”.45 Given this ambiguity and the potentially unlimited number of threats to security, the conceptions may be grouped under a narrow and a broad head. The broad range focuses more on development-oriented threats such as health, poverty and the environment. The narrow range is limited to violent threats such as landmines, small arms, intra-state conflicts etc.

The UNDP agenda had a very broad approach to human security. The broad range focus was more on development-oriented threats such as health, poverty and the environment. According to UNDP, poverty constitutes a major source of threat to the survival of individuals and hence of societies; security cannot be ensured without effectively challenging the problem of poverty and underdevelopment. If security

could be defined at a minimum as freedom from threats to one’s survival, then it cannot remain limited to issues of political independence, national defence and territorial integrity. Securing human beings means much more than just protecting them from armed violence. Thus, for the UNDP, security needed to be defined in much broader terms than protection only from threats to physical well-being.

The narrow range is more limited to violent threats such as landmines, small arms, intra-state conflicts etc. The Canadian formulation promoted by former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy focuses on the security of people by addressing the threats faced by people due to the growing incidences of violent conflicts. Civilians face a greater degree of threat when thrust into violent conflicts. The erosion of state control—more specifically in failed states—is also threatening human beings. Challenges are also being thrown up by the expansion of organised crime, drug trafficking and the growth of private security forces. The Canadian approach focuses on human costs of violent conflict. Canada was one of the countries that took an early lead in this regard. The initiatives on land-mines and the setting up of the International Criminal Court encouraged a people-centred approach to security. The Canadian formulation gives more importance to “freedom from fear” but not “freedom from want”, which comes under the purview of development. The approach makes a distinction between the concept of human security and human development and argues that they are not the same. One can narrow down the objectives of the Canadian formulation as to two: i) the protection of civilians in armed conflict and ii) the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts. It believes that the foundations of international peace and security are constructed on the foundation of people who are secure.

The Canadian approach focuses on the “freedom from fear” while the UNDP report stresses human development and “freedom from want.” The Canadian criticism of the UNDP formulation is that it largely ignores the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict and because of its broad-based approach is seen to be unwieldy as a policy instrument. There are mechanisms to take care of the non-violent threats to human security as articulated in the UNDP report. UNDP’s greater emphasis on economic development contrasts with

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Canada's accent on political development. However, it might be difficult to make sharp distinctions between the political and the economic as conflict threatens the whole spectrum of human development indicators, as does the unstructured violence from terrorism, drugs or crime. The two aspects of human security, "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" are equally important in ensuring the security of the individual and people. "Freedom from fear" would be meaningless if "freedom from want" is not ensured. More importantly, persistence of underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and large-scale human deprivation is certain to generate socio-political turmoil leading to violent intra-state conflict and violence. On the other hand "freedom from want" is impossible to achieve or sustain without achieving "freedom from fear." Thus, the link between violence and development is important. This is stressed in the Canadian report Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World:

The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived. While the safety of people is obviously at grave risk in situations of armed conflict, a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety. There are also human security dimensions to a broad range of challenges, such as gross violations of human rights, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational organised crime, gender-based violence, infectious diseases and natural disasters. The widespread social unrest and violence that often accompanies economic crises demonstrates that there are clear economic underpinnings to human security. The litmus test for determining if it is useful to frame an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk.

As a matter of fact, for a large number of poor people, poverty and insecurity are linked in a vicious circle. Thus, protecting people as well as promoting human development becomes an important requirement to promote human security. Inequalities, which are often the root causes of violent conflict, therefore need to be addressed.

At the most elemental level, the right to life constitutes the basic values underlying human security. The preservation of human life and the well being of citizens distinguishes the cherished goal of human security. Hence, any form of violence directed against citizens is a threat to human security. Freedom from anxiety and fear of physical

abuse is a central aspect of human security, and therefore, the state must concern itself with protecting the individual and groups not only from war but also from other forms of violence and terrorism. The UNDP report privileges the individual over the state, whilst the Canadian approach gives importance to the state even while according primacy to human security. The controversial part is that it suggests the use of coercive measures in support of ensuring human security. It argues that states are not necessarily guarantors of human security and there are limits to sovereignty and also need for humanitarian intervention. But such drastic measures can only be justified in severe cases such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and massive and systematic violation of human rights and humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{49} However, it suggests that the UN Security Council is the appropriate body that should decide about humanitarian intervention.

The role of the UN in promoting the goals of human security is likely to be controversial. The difficult question is whether the promotion of a concept of human security challenges the traditional understanding of national security. Is it a threat to national sovereignties? Any kind of external intervention challenges traditional notions of state sovereignty. “Pressing international organisations into the service of individually focused human security could therefore constitute an incremental step toward circumventing or marginalising states and legitimising supranational governance.”\textsuperscript{50} Many would agree so. There is a need for greater clarity in this regard. However, the Canadian formulation does not seem to see fundamental contradictions between the two concepts. In this regard Lloyd Axworthy has this to say: “Although often portrayed as conflicting, national and human security are really two sides of the same coin—bottom-up and top-down approaches to promoting the individual. The challenge is how to bring the two theories together, how to find the meeting place between global rights and national interests, emphasising the need for international cooperation and governance.”\textsuperscript{51}

2.4 DEFINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

The existing literature on political violence is beset with a great deal of conceptual confusion. This is largely due to a lack of consensus on the

\textsuperscript{49} Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{50} Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, op.cit., p. 260.

definition of terms such as revolution, insurgency, insurrection, guerrilla warfare, popular warfare, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, protracted struggle, armed struggle, internal war, rebellion, liberation war, low-intensity conflict, terrorism and many more which have evolved in the course of understanding conflicts. This array of terms has become analogous not only in common discourse but in academic literature as well. They have been used interchangeably and indiscriminately and often defined in contradictory ways. This only adds confusion to a subject as complex as political violence. In view of this conceptual confusion about political violence, an attempt is being made here to define some of the terms.

Political violence, in contradistinction to other forms of violence in general, is not random. Two criteria that help to locate political violence or distinguish it from other forms of violence is that it is a group phenomenon and that it must be carried out with the intent of having an impact on the political system. It is the use of force for the resolution of conflicts in society that mainly originate from socio-political, economic, ethnic, and cultural causes and that find expression in various forms of collective action. The expression of political violence need not always be found in overt physical armed violence. Violence may be inbuilt into the structure—characterised as structural violence—violence that is implicit in the structures of domination and inequality in a society. This violence is exerted by situations, institutions, and social, political and economic structures. The prevailing juridical order, and socio-political and economic institutions legitimise these structures.52

H.L. Nieburg has provided one of the most comprehensive definitions of political violence. According to him, political violence is “acts of disruption, destruction, injury, whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.”53 Ted Robert Gurr provides a more precise definition when he notes that political violence is “the use or threat of violence by any

52 The reduction of structural violence should also be addressed as a very important part of development. For this view see, Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation, London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 157.

party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order."\textsuperscript{54}

Political violence emerges within a certain socio-political and economic context. Though political violence is disorderly it may have reordering purpose, i.e., to overthrow a tyrannical regime, to redefine and realise justice and equity, to achieve independence or territorial autonomy, or to impose religious and doctrinal beliefs.\textsuperscript{55} Under certain circumstances it can become self-legitimising, specifically when it is an expression of the natural desire for freedom and liberty when directed against autocracies. But in democratic societies, political violence suggests institutional weaknesses, or normative insufficiencies, injustices or inequities. In this context David Apter states that "political violence, although a fluctuating phenomenon within democracy, has at every step accompanied its evolution, and with... the whole improving results. Which is why we have argued that in some respects democracy is violence-driven."\textsuperscript{56}

Terrorism, as a specific form of political violence, is used by both state and non-state actors to pursue political and socio-economic goals. There are many definitions of and disagreements over what constitutes terrorism. The result is that the term terrorism has been used to refer to a variety of phenomena, some of them contradictory such as guerrilla warfare or wars of national liberation. At the heart of the definitional and conceptual disagreements are two factors: (i) the lack of agreement over what constitutes terrorist activities and related phenomena such as guerrilla movements or violent protest movements, (ii) the difficulty of making a distinction between activities related to legitimate acts of national self-determination struggle and "illegal" acts of violence against governments. What may constitute genuine struggles for nation self-determination may be labelled terrorism by those that may not approve of the activities of the group. Terrorism thus becomes a purely subjective matter. The fact that terrorism defies precise definition is due to its value-laden nature.

However, what is often labelled terrorism is manifested in activities—such as bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortions, hijacking, arson and the like. All such acts in the final analysis are to


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 26.
be considered terrorist even if they are carried out by freedom fighters. Given the way terrorism has been making victims of innocent human beings, the defining characteristic of terrorism has become the act of violence itself, not the motivations or justifications behind it. It is debatable whether terrorism should be defined by “the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.” It would also be a grave misconception to equate terrorism with simple crime, because terrorism unlike crime is a political problem. “The distinction between political terror and crime is that the former makes an open bid for public support.” While terrorism is often the work of an extremist faction of a discriminated minority whose objective is to redress grievances, ensure equality, and provide civil liberties or equal opportunity to the rest of society, it is not always due to deprivation or discrimination.

Terrorism involves violence or threats of violence by individuals or a group of people designed to instil fear in a targeted population and produce a pervasive atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety. This serves as a double-edged weapon to erode the ruling regime’s legitimacy and credibility and drive the masses away from supporting them. Terrorism’s objective may or may not be to destroy the opposing side but to break its will and force it to capitulate. It can psychologically weaken the incumbent regime by undermining its effectiveness through widespread fear and insecurity. As the regime is rendered more incapable of providing law and order, as well as physical security, it gradually loses legitimacy in the eyes of the people because of widespread insecurity and demoralisation. The fear and insecurity is a result of violent incidents or deliberate activities aimed at undermining the regime’s efficiency and effectiveness. The bombings by the LTTE in Sri Lanka are examples of attempts to psychologically demoralise the incumbent regime.

A misconceived notion about terrorism is that it constitutes use of violence per se, but it actually uses violence for effect. It is important to

58 Quoted from Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Islam, the USA and the Global War Against Terror, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005, p. 229.
59 Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Los Angeles: Crescent Publications (not dated), p. 1. In creating an atmosphere of terror, the media plays an important role because of its tendency to give a disproportionate amount of attention to spectacular acts of violence. Also see, Gerard Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 30.
note that it is not only the terrorists but the state as well which uses violence to instil fear. Thus, terrorism is only a means to an end. According to Paul Wilkinson, terrorism-related violence has the following characteristics: (i) it is inherently discriminatory in its effects; (ii) it is arbitrary and unpredictable both in the minds of its victims and audience and in its effects upon individuals and society; (iii) it implicitly denies recognition of all rules and conventions of war, i.e. it does not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and recognizes no humanitarian constraints, and (iv) it rejects all moral constraints.

Some analysts use terrorism and insurgency as co-terminus terms, as sabotage and terrorism are also a part of insurgent tactics. However, those who would like to use violence for a just cause or for a reordering purpose would not agree with this contention as terrorism can alienate potential support for insurgents and hinder real revolution. Che Guevara believed acts of sabotage to be very important. “It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution.” He argued that terrorism has a role to play in revolutionary war but should be applied only against representatives of the repressive state apparatus and not against civilians or ordinary people. It is a valuable tactic but over-dependence on it may lead to severe reprisals.

The basic difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that even if guerrillas fight with small numbers and inadequate weapons, they do so according to the conventions of war, taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the rights of non-combatants. Terrorists place no limits on the means employed and frequently resort to widespread assassinations, terrorising the civilian population and even killing innocent people. Generally, terrorism has a political motive but unlike guerrillas and insurgents who have strong ideological affiliations,

61 A definition which takes into account state terrorism is provided by Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 59.
terrorists are not committed to any formal ideology and are mostly driven by political motives and linked by common experiences and aspirations or a commonly perceived enemy. Terrorism is about power, the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of a political aim. It is fundamentally and inherently political.

Terrorism may have political goals but invariably innocent people end up as victims of terrorist violence. It has the unpredictable potential to cause grievous bodily harm or death. Though, there is still no clear commonly accepted definition of terrorism, whatever may be the cause of terrorism, the strategy of killing innocent civilians for political demands has become unacceptable. Or for that matter, collateral damage resulting in loss of lives and physical destruction due to terrorist action has also become unacceptable.

2.4.1 Manifestations of Political Violence

Political violence can manifest itself in various forms like civil war, guerrilla warfare, insurrection, revolution, and terrorism and also state violence. The form of violence in regard to terrorism is much easier to comprehend but other forms of violence can take complex forms. Some of the historically identifiable forms are riots—communal, ethnic and sectarian. The other forms are caste violence, peasant and tribal uprisings. Most of these riots or uprisings have involved violence, homicide, arson and destruction of property. Stanley Tambiah views these as forms of collective violence where collectivities of people, or crowds, engage in violent acts such as arson, destruction of property, and physical injury to human beings that are directed against a designated enemy, whether it be a social group or category or the state or political administration. There are many other emerging forms of violence defying nomenclature. But for the purposes of this study only those instances of violence will be considered which are a group phenomena.

Fred R. Von Der Mehden creates a typology of five basic types of political violence. These are: (i) Primordial (such as religious or racial); (ii) Separatist or secessionist; (ii) Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary; (iv) Coup

66 Neil Livingstone, op. cit., p. 41.
67 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 13-16.
oriented, and (v) Political issues or personality oriented.\textsuperscript{69} These categories may not be totally comprehensive and do in fact overlap. Primordial violence encompasses acts of violence related to cultural—primarily racial, ethnic or religious—conflict. Often, it is difficult to separate the political element in these events from personal or group antagonisms. Separatist conflict is a particular form of primordial violence related to efforts by groups to achieve independence or autonomy. Such events are usually tied to religious and ethnic divisions. They differ from events associated with what is called primordial violence, however, in that they are aimed at removing the aggrieved group from the sphere of influence of the group that dominates the central government. Primordial violence refers to situations in which a group attempts to improve its situation by changing or altering conditions or even taking control of the central government, whereas the term secessionist violence refers to a situation in which a primordial fission runs so deep that efforts are directed at seceding from the socio-political context rather than at altering it. Revolutionary violence takes place during the effort to overthrow a regime and to establish a state melded upon a significantly different economic and political model. Coup violence is attendant to efforts by organised groups to overthrow the regime in power without intending to establish fundamentally different economic and political systems. Most coups and coup attempts result in comparatively low levels of violence as either the military moves in quickly to take power or the effort is nipped in the bud. The last category is primarily oriented towards a particular issue or set of issues, individuals or groups. Some of the violence may be student violence, strikes for government reforms, land reforms, etc.\textsuperscript{70}

In systemic terms, political violence can be categorised into anti-systemic and extra-systemic. The objective of anti-systemic violence is a revolutionary transformation in the social and political order. Extra-systemic violence is unleashed by secessionist insurgencies by ethnic, religious or ethno-religious minorities, who affirm their right of self-determination and question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

2.4.2 Explaining Political Violence: Some Theoretical Propositions
Most analyses of political violence explain the causes of violence as a product of repression and unresponsive governments. The reality,


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp. 7-17.
however, is that political violence is attendant even in those states, which are not repressive. And therefore, instead of making a normative treatment of violence it will be instructive to seek explanations in the socio-political and material bases of society.

Various theories have tried to explain the causes of political violence. Samuel Huntington has given primacy to political and institutional factors and emphasised disequilibrium within the political sector as the primary cause for violence. He argues that if a country's institutional procedures for political participation are inadequate in comparison to the people's expectations for participation, this could lead to unrest and anti-regime activity. As a result of mobilisation, new social forces enter the political arena, but the political structure does not provide channels for their participation in politics, thereby leading to civil strife.  

Violence and instability are “in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions,” and the primary problem of politics becomes “the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”  

That is, violence and instability are the consequences of political institutions developing more slowly than the rate at which new socio-economic groups are being politically mobilised.

The role of the regime and the nature of state in fostering violence have been crucial factors in the expression of political violence. Centralisation of administration, especially where it threatens regional and cultural autonomy, can intensify the discontent of an aggrieved group and deepen conflict. Further, when ends are moderate (for greater autonomy) and means non-violent, the regime may not deal with the problem. This often leads to the exacerbation of the crisis and in such cases the movement may turn violent. In the process of state-building, sometimes, rapid social change leads to dislocation and demands the repudiation of the old and the forging of new institutions and relationships. When a ruling class resists fundamental reforms (which means reduction, if not liquidation of its power and privileges), a

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72 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

73 Invariably, there is a pattern to the use of political violence. On a continuous scale, the intensity of violence moves from a conflict with no violence or force, to stages in which minor or major violence is used by at least one party. This in turn leads to retaliatory violence and escalation in the levels of violence.
confrontation between the new political forces and those who wish to retain the status quo becomes inevitable and violent.\textsuperscript{74}

Amongst other theories of violence, the relative deprivation and resource mobilisation approaches are the most influential. Ted Gurr is the most influential within the relative deprivation school of thought. According to him, when people perceive a discrepancy between their value expectations or what they believe they are entitled to and value capabilities or what they are able to get and keep, the result may be alienation, deprivation and disillusionment. If members of a collectivity experience this relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for political violence increases.\textsuperscript{75} The feeling of relative deprivation may be conditioned by an increase in expectations or a decline in the rewards. Violence is likely when aspirations and capabilities change and when the gap between them increase. This is precisely what takes place during the process of socio-economic modernisation. Socio-economic modernisation also has effects on the forms of political violence and instability. In traditional societies such violence is likely to involve a limited number of actors with limited goals. As modernisation proceeds, however, more groups are socially mobilised and become participants in politics. As a result, the forms of violence and instability diversify and become broader in scope. This opposition to the government turning violent would depend on “the scope and intensity of the disposition among members of collectivity to take violent action against others.”\textsuperscript{76} The attacks against the political regime may take the form of guerrilla wars, coup d’état, rebellion and riots.\textsuperscript{77}

Political violence is in the greatest magnitude if both a regime and those who oppose it exercise approximately the same degrees of political control and command similar high levels of institutional support in society. Applying Gurr’s notion of similar degrees of political control and levels of institutional support in society to separatist struggles, one can assert that in a situation where a separatist movement is well-equipped militarily, enjoys some amount of popular support and can also employ political clout regionally and internationally, it will be able to mount and sustain a separatist challenge against the state more


\textsuperscript{75} See, Gurr, op. cit., pp. 24-30.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., pp. 3-4.
forcefully. The modern state is normally well-equipped to crush internal challenges but rather ineffective in controlling external sources of support to such movements.

The theory of relative deprivation, however, provides only a partial explanation. It does not explain why in similar socio-economic and political conditions, some groups resort to violence while others do not. Relative deprivation may, in fact, exist and yet the situation may not turn explosive. Sometimes groups which are economically worse off do not revolt. To make up for this gap in the understanding of political violence it may be supplemented by the resource mobilisation theory. The resource mobilisation school is based on theories of collective action and emphasises organisations and mobilisation. According to this school of thought conflict and violence are a product of a leader's capability to manipulate resources of power, to organise, and to recruit members by providing incentives or coercion that motivates participation.78

Charles Tilly has argued that if a conflict arises between a regime and its opponents, whether the conflict becomes violent or not depends on who fares better in terms of comparison over available options/abilities. The outcome between the government and contenders of power and the probability of a popular protest occurring will depend on how the resources available to the latter compares to that of the incumbents. The ability of groups to achieve power will be determined by the extent to which they are in control of: (a) normative resources by which Tilly means, commitment of members to the group itself and its ideals; (b) coercive resources or ways of inflicting punishment on opponents, and (c) utilitarian resources which basically mean rewards.79

If the group is to be effective in collective action against its contenders, acquiring these resources is necessary. This collective action lead to violence when members of one group mobilise to attack its opponent's resources, which will further lead to violence—groups which have lost their resources, responds to reclaim them.80 According to Tilly, only mobilised sections of the population can be involved in violence. Thus, according to the resource mobilisation school, conflict and violence is more a consequence of organised activity unlike the view of the relative deprivation school, where it arises from feelings of anomie. Even though Gurr's approach is psychological—the various patterns of relative deprivation may provide a partial explanation, but it is the mobilisation of resources that determines the likelihood of violence.

79 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
80 Ibid., pp. 216-19.
deprivation is determined by the magnitude of frustration and anger within a given populace—he also recognises that for frustration to be transformed into rebellion and generate violence in society, it has to be politicised. The basic premise of his theory is that political action is motivated by people's deep-seated grievances, in combination with the capability of group leaders to articulate these grievances. If grievances regarding differential treatment and a sense of group identity are strong, then it can be organised and articulated by group leaders.81

Disappointingly, there is no single theory able explain collective violence. The most influential ones have been discussed here, but they also have limitations in their explanatory capacities. The relative deprivation theory can be criticised for its inability to account for the violence by generally those not deprived relative to other groups. The resource mobilisation approach can be criticised for its weakness in explaining relatively spontaneous violence with its emphasis on the organisation of discontent. But in the absence of a coherent theory of collective violence, these two approaches do help in providing explanations for violent political action, particularly when they are directed against the state, the administration or against power holders.

2.5 VIOLENCE, TERRORISM AND HUMAN SECURITY
As has already been pointed out, the concept of human security still lacks a precise definition. Roland Paris's observation that, "Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being,..."82 can serve as a good starting point to clarify the focus of this study. In studying violence, the two-referent points that Paris mentions become very important. Students of violence have always had problems in understanding the phenomena of violence, as invariably socio-psychological explanations come into the picture.83 Even the relative deprivation theory that is used so often to understand political conflicts is a socio-psychological approach to understanding violence.

82 Roland Paris, op. cit.
Whether the psychological well-being of individuals can become a factor in ensuring human security is a debate that a political study of this nature will have difficulties in addressing.

To bring coherence to the understanding of human security, it will be most appropriate to make the physical security of the individual the referent point. Both the UNDP report and the Canadian formulation have stressed physical or personal security. According to the Canadian formulation, personal security refers to an individual’s freedom from crime and violence. A conception of human security narrowed down to “freedom from fear” i.e. a definition of human security that focuses on violent threats and assaults to the physical integrity of persons, would be more in place. This would provide for analytical coherence as well as a practical agenda. Instead of broadening the understanding of human security by focussing on “freedom from want”, issues that have been already brought into analytical focus by the development agenda, what is probably more important is to understand the role of force and organised violence in everyday life and politics. In this regard Keith Krause states that, “The question of controlling the institutions of organised violence and evacuating force from political, economic and social life has been central to our modern understanding of politics....”84 There is a need to move to a new framework of security focussed on the nexus of violence and security. While not necessarily shifting the focus from the threats that states pose each other, this new framework should also focus on the threats that organised violence poses to not only states and regimes but also to citizens and society.85

On one hand, violence in the context of Third World states can no longer be justified on the basis of the violent creation of nation-states in Europe five hundred years back and on the other with the growth and spread of terrorism, the vulnerabilities of individuals and citizens needs to be taken into account in any security analysis. This study, therefore, focuses on violence with the objective of understanding how violence in all its facets affects human security.

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For analytical purposes, a kind of typology similar to Kanti Bajpai’s has been drawn up to answer the four basic questions—security for whom, security of what values, security from what threats and security by what means. But the typology here does not include human security in all its aspects and only refers to those issues that concern violence. This is illustrated in Table 2.1. One can add to this list one

Table 2.1: A Typology of Human Security Pertaining to Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY FOR WHOM (REFERENT OBJECTS)</th>
<th>NATIONAL SECURITY</th>
<th>HUMAN SECURITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Territorial integrity and national independence</td>
<td>Individual safety and well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sovereignty</td>
<td>Freedom from fear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from violence from external sources</td>
<td>Guarantee of fundamental human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from violence from external sources</td>
<td>Protection from violence from internal sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY FROM WHAT THREATS (SOURCES)</td>
<td>Violence and coercion by other states</td>
<td>Violent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal conflict and state failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational organised crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious and ethnic discord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic conflict and migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State repression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militarisation of social and political life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-mines and small arms proliferation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Warlordism and banditry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private armies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUSES OF VIOLENCE</td>
<td>External Aggression</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic maldevelopment or underdevelopment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Breakdown of states, societies and governance or political underdevelopment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Violence, Terrorism and Human Security in South Asia

(Table 2.1 Contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL SECURITY</th>
<th>HUMAN SECURITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(SECURITY BY WHAT MEANS)</td>
<td>Development. New human development paradigm with an accent on equity, sustainability and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTRUMENTALITIES/RESPONSE</td>
<td>Persuasion and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral use of force to compel or deter states</td>
<td>Coercion including the use of sanctions and force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional and nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Peace-building, Peace-keeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances and balances of power</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great power and UN intervention</td>
<td>Promotion of norms/institutions. Human rights, humanitarian and refugee laws. Anti-personnel land-mines, small arms, conflict prevention, transnational organised crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invigoration of global institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more question regarding the causes for violence, which has great significance if the agenda of human security is the removal of insecurity due to violence. Chapter 4 analyses in depth the causes of violence and the instrumentalities that support violence in South Asia.

The listing of threats to human security by the UNDP and also the Canadian formulation is fairly long. It is a mixed bag, which has tried to captures any and every form of violence against the individual. Some of them are direct threats and some indirect. While terrorism, ethnic and religious violence, genocide, land-mines and small arms, and private armies have a direct bearing on the physical safety and security of the human being, others like drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, state failure and militarisation of social and political space are indirect threats. Warlordism is not relevant in the context of South Asia.

It is too ambitious an agenda to include all forms of violence in the conception of human security. The Canadian report envisions promoting human security by providing protection from crime. The UNDP report also speaks of freedom from crime. But whether crime as a threat to human security can be addressed in a meaningful manner is a debatable point. One way of looking at the issue is that incidences of criminal violence will not reduce in any significant manner as long as there is inequitable distribution of wealth. The other way of looking at it would be that causes for criminal violence can also be psychological and therefore does not provide us a political framework to understand this phenomenon. Criminal violence like armed robberies and hired
killings, which are threats to the physical safety and security of individuals, cannot be addressed specifically (or politically) and therefore would not fall within the scope of this study. However, criminal violence can be linked to terrorism and the illegal economy.

The approach in this study is to focus on the causes of violence and the instrumentalities through which they are carried out. The central focus of human security, therefore, should be the nexus between violence, development and governance. Human security is concerned primarily with intra-state violence because it is this that poses the greatest threat to people everywhere. The root causes of violence, invariably, are located within the realms of development and governance. Minimal conditions of physical security are a necessary condition for development, while sustainable and equitable development is necessary if human security is to be guaranteed in the long-term. This study would also attempt structural explanations within the realm of development and governance. A greater understanding of the causes of violence will be helpful in the long-term to resolve conflicts, reduce incidences of violence and promote human security. This will be useful to evolve a set of policy measures to address the issue of human security by reducing the incidences of violence, if not to completely negate them. The objectives of security should be to ameliorate the risks of violence and therefore it is important to understand how violence and terrorism impact on people's insecurity. In the next section, the linkages between violence and development are briefly highlighted before the direct and indirect threats to human security are analysed.

2.5.1 The Mutuality of Violence and Development

The uprooting nature of the development process results in the emergence of conflicts in developing societies. Violent conflict can also be highly disruptive for development prospects. The costs in human potential, social and productive capital and physical infrastructure can be very high, and a tremendous amount of development effort can be lost. This obviously has very serious destabilising effects. Peace and political stability are thus preconditions for development. Violence can be a major factor in distracting a state from its developmental agenda.

It has been estimated in general that civil war causes GDP per capita to decline by 2.2% per year. This is the cumulative result of the loss of production from the destruction of transport networks, capital stocks, physical capital, infrastructure and natural resources. Instability
resultant from violence motivates highly skilled workers to emigrate.\textsuperscript{87} While these are more tangible, the other costs are not. These involve the culture of violence that develops from the breakdown of government, the dislocation of civil society, the violation of human rights and the growth of corruption. Vigilante and paramilitary groups proliferate, either with the tacit support of the government or beyond its control. Military expenditure increases at the expense of government spending on social services and economic development, in turn leading to further hardship and insecurity and crowding out spending on social expenditure to finance law and order enforcement scheme.\textsuperscript{88}

Violence is, therefore, dysfunctional in the development processes of civil society. But if it is against the structural inequalities inherent in the existing socio-political and economic framework, in which a certain group has continued to be disadvantaged, then should it be viewed as mobilisation efforts on the part of such groups for distributive justice and thereby seen as functional in the developmental process? Our normative concerns do not allow us to accept that even in democratic states, ethnic and social groups should resort to violence to extract concessions from the ruling classes. However, the reality seems to be that ruling classes do in fact succumb to such pressures, even while suppressing violent conflicts.

If developmental prospects improve will there be a decline in the degree of political violence? The inability to create a bottom line on developmental needs suggests that even if developmental prospects improve political violence will not necessarily subside. But what one can be sure of is that if developmental growth produces negative consequences, it is virtually certain that political violence will endure and probably escalate. However, the process of development and state-formation need not necessarily and permanently be of a violent nature. The relationship between violence and development can be characterised as curvilinear; violence will decrease only when a certain level of development has been reached. It is not yet clear, however, what this level is or whether economic (in the form of more equity) and political development (in the form of more democracy) is sufficient in themselves to prevent conflict and violence.\textsuperscript{89} A much better sensitivity to people's


\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

need—social, cultural and economic—on the part of the ruling classes may probably ensure lesser levels of violence. But it will be no guarantee against violence as long as violence can be justified ideologically.

2.5.2 Direct and Indirect Threats to Human Security

Arguably, violence and terrorism have undermined human security. In the post-Cold War period most societies are being confronted with a greater degree of violence as a growing number of armed conflicts are being fought within states. Civil societies have become involved in a growing number of conflicts, mostly fought along ethnic, religious or tribal lines. Civilians are in the epicentre of contemporary conflicts, which at times resemble wars due to the extensive firepower being used in them. The increasing availability of small arms and light weapons has made such conflicts difficult to resolve, resulting in the deaths of a large number of non-combatants. The regulative power of the states is in decline and state failure or lack of state control has contributed to the escalation of such conflicts and violence. In many such situations the state has become incapable of providing security to its own citizens. Further, challenges to state control have also emanated from expansion of organised crime and drug trafficking and the growth of private security forces. The creation of private security systems within some states in the form of sectarian militias has undermined governance.90

While the individual is central to our concern due to his/her insecurity arising from the threat of violence, at decline of the role of the state or state incapacities creates grounds for that violence to take place. These structures do not seem to directly affect the security of individuals, but they do so by creating the enabling circumstances that make conflicts endure and violence pervasive. In this section, we analyse one of the direct instrumentalities for violence—the diffusion of light weapons and also the indirect threats that impact on the state but have implications for human security.

Direct Threats: Implications of Light Weapons Diffusion for Security

Some consider small arms, the primary threat to human security. It takes a heavy toll on human life and also undermines development.91


The nature of conflicts around the world is changing, and with it the type of arms used therein. The weapons of mass destruction that still dominate strategic thinking and international diplomacy remain far away from the scene of actual combat. Instead, it is the flow of small arms and light weapons that is most relevant to the incidence of internal conflicts and the outcome of recent wars. The portable nature of these weapons and their tremendous firepower has contributed to the intensity and duration of ethnic and other intra-state conflicts. The growing availability of light weapons in low-intensity conflicts has played an increasingly important role in destabilising states and endangering civil society in large parts of the developing world.

Over seventy-five per cent of all warfare since 1945 has been internal i.e. not between existing states, but over the emergence of new states. The end of the Cold War has only heightened this trend. Every year since 1991, there have been at least ten internal conflicts around the world, each of which caused ten thousand deaths or more. In 1999, there were twenty-five major-armed conflicts raging in the world. The level of destruction caused by these weapons in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Chechnya, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia is quite self-evident.

The impact of the diffusion of light weapons on state and society has been eloquently expressed in the preamble of the proposed Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Weapons and Illicit Arms Trafficking:

Although they do not in themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, the wide availability, accumulation and illicit flows of such weapons tends to escalate conflicts; undermine peace agreements; intensify violence and the impacts of crime in society; impede economic and social development; and impede the development of social stability, democracy and good governance.

The anxieties regarding the diffusion of light weapons are well-founded, as they appear to be the common factor in all states in the grip of turmoil, instability and even civil war. The easy availability and

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94 The Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking was proposed in a Conference on “Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa” by the Institute of Security Studies held at Pretoria, South Africa during May 3-6, 1998. URL: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR7.4/regional.html
accumulation of light weapons has become an important factor in armed conflicts, societal violence, organised crime, drug trafficking, and in sustaining terrorist and subversive groups, thus directly and indirectly creating insecure conditions for human existence.

There is a tendency to treat many civil wars as purely internal conflicts. There is no doubt that in almost all cases there is a strong element of internal dissent, discord, alienation, and these conflicts have their roots in political, economic, social and administrative factors. However, this does not imply that the increased availability of light weapons causes these intra-state conflicts in the developing world. The causes lie in complex social and historical distortions, mismanagement, the failure of state-building processes and discriminating distribution of developmental gains, or in some cases, the acute absence of such benefits. Evidence, however, suggests that an abundance of arms in society tends to increase the propensity to violence and accelerate conflict so that political dissent can take a violent turn. Afghanistan again is an example of a country where the increased availability of light weapons prolonged the conflict and made it resistant to resolution.

The risk of explosive violence is greatest where the diffusion of light weapons coincides with the fragmentation of societies along ethnic, religious, tribal, caste and linguistic lines. As competition and antagonism between social groups' increases, the diffusion of light weapons increases the possibility that deeply held resentments and differences may end up in violent confrontations. While the conflict in these societies may have deep and complex roots, it is the abundance of light weapons at every level of society that increases the likelihood of armed violence and bloodshed.

The changed nature of conflicts has resulted in an increase in the number of civilian deaths and has also destabilised states. Unlike wars, which have indirect consequences for civil society, the diffusion of light weapons has had a direct impact on civil society. Violence, civil strife and instability cause insecurity as much for the people as for the states. There are certain spill-over effects of light weapons diffusion like abundance of light weapons in private hands in post-conflict scenarios, displacement of populations and creation of refugee populations, increase in lawlessness and criminal activity, and retarded economic development.

Light weapons are a major cause of human insecurity in large parts of the world. During the Cold War, scholars and policy makers were seized with problems related to weapons of mass destruction and the
proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. Light weapons have not affected Western countries in the way they have impacted the developing world, where they have been exacerbating armed conflicts, and insurgencies, and have heightened violence, consequently, taking a heavy toll on human life. While advocacy networks in the West have begun to address the issue of the spread of light weapons,95 much as they have the landmines issue, light weapons have not received the serious attention they deserve in the dominant security discourse.

There are exceptions. Countries such as Canada, Japan and Norway have taken up the issue of light weapons.96 In Norway, the Norwegian Red Cross (NorCross) and the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) have joined the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRI) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in launching a joint initiative, called The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) in December 1997.97 The Japanese government initiated a resolution (50/70 B of December 12, 1995), requesting the UN Secretary General to establish a panel of government experts on Small Arms. The panel consisted of sixteen governmental experts, equitably representing all the regions of the world. This panel, instituted in May 1996 submitted its report, consisting of twenty-four concrete measures for the reduction and prevention of the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons to the UN General Assembly in 1997. A follow-up group of governmental experts on small arms was instituted in May 1998 that submitted its report with twenty-seven recommendations for further action. The report was endorsed by the resolution of the General Assembly in December 1999.

After years of neglect, then, the UN and other multilateral efforts by UN member states have helped put light weapons on the international


96 See, for example, the website of the Canadian government’s Foreign Ministry, URL: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreign/disarm/smab12.html.

97 See, Jan Egeland and Ole-Petter Sunde, "Small Arms are Big Problems but Norway is on the Case", at URL: http://www.peacemagazine.org/9803/norway.htm.
agenda. These initiatives have been complemented by the work of nongovernmental organisations to highlight the human rights dangers posed by unregulated and unrestricted light weapons flows. In July 2001, the UN convened an international conference on the “Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.” This conference, attracting high-level representatives from over 150 countries, culminated in an effort initiated by the UN in 1995. Under the provisions of UNGA Resolution 54/54V dated December 15, 1999, the conference was tasked to develop and strengthen international efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons by creating a Global Programme of Action on SALW.

The aim of the conference was to agree to a UN Programme of Action (PoA) containing a number of recommendations to governments involved. It unanimously adopted a PoA, which contains a number of measures to be implemented at the national, regional and global levels. It commits countries to: (i) adopt effective regulations to control SALW production, export, import and transfer; (ii) identify and prosecute those engaged in the illegal manufacture and trade in small arms; (iii) ensure that manufacturers adequately mark all small arms for identification and tracing; (iv) ensure comprehensive, accurate record-keeping on SALW manufacture, holding and transfer; (v) take appropriate measures against violations of any UN Security Council arms embargo, and (vi) ensure that confiscated, seized or collected small arms are destroyed. The PoA also outlines a follow-up process to the conference, including a review conference, to be held no later than 2006, and meetings of states on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the PoA.

Indirect Threats: Threats to State Structures

Since the early 1990s, due to events in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia and Afghanistan, new concepts like ‘state collapse’ and ‘state failure’ are being used to explain severe political crisis in some states. These concepts do not refer to only political instability or anarchy but go beyond them to explain a deeper kind of political crisis. At a generic level, the concepts refer to instances where the institutions of the central state have been so weakened that they are no longer able to maintain authority or political order within the territorial boundaries of the state. Such cases of state collapse usually occur in circumstances of widespread and violent civil conflict, and are often accompanied by
severe humanitarian crises. These conditions may precede or follow the institutional collapse of the state. Sometimes they are instrumental in causing it.

The impact of state collapse within a country is tremendous. If the state collapses, it will also lose physical control over its territory, forfeit the authority to make collective decisions for the national population, and no longer have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and violence. State collapse, apart from the loss of control over political space, is also marked by the loss of economic space. The informal economy takes over, overshadowing the formal economy in its transactions and escaping the control of the state. At the same time, parts of the national territory are lost to neighbouring economies. It ties in to the neighbouring region's economy and trade. There is also erosion in the legitimacy of the state where it fails to provide security to its citizens who may no longer perceive the central government as a manager of conflicts. All this will also result in the erosion of the sovereignty of the state.

The phenomenon of state collapse has to be situated in the nature of the international system today and in the perspective of ongoing changes in the character of the state due to the onslaught of global forces. Its power and authority have been eroded, resulting in a degree of incoherence and disorder within states. There is likelihood that with the decline in the power of the state and its inability to protect minorities and other disadvantaged groups against more powerful groups, some constituencies will attempt to arm themselves in their own defence. This is occasioned by the easy availability of arms leading to the increasing participation of sub-state groups in conflict and the transformation of conflicts into armed conflicts. This is where light weapons become a factor in state collapse. It catalyzes civil conflict, which precedes the institutional collapse of the state. And as evidence suggests, since the end of the Cold War the growing availability of light weapons have been playing an increasingly important role in destabilising states. They have contributed overwhelmingly to the intensity and duration of intra-state conflicts and have led to the virtual disintegration of states like Yugoslavia and state collapse as in Somalia and Afghanistan.  

The diffusion of light weapons in the context of the end of the Cold War has transformed some of the quasi-states into failed states. This is

especially true in the case of states that had witnessed high levels of superpower military involvement, including arms transfers, during the Cold War. At the height of the Cold War, superpowers often attempted to shore up client governments in internally fragmented states in order to maintain a semblance of stability in countries that were their allies. One major instrument of this support was the transfer of large quantities of relatively sophisticated arms to friendly countries. Such arms transfers frequently led to countervailing transfers of weaponry by the rival superpower to forces opposed to the central authorities. During the 1980s, Afghanistan epitomised these action-reaction phenomena.

Superpower policies of pouring arms into fragmented polities have become a major source of instability in the post-Cold War period. As Mohammad Ayoob points out:

Today the prevalence of modern weapons, Somalia's most significant legacy of superpower involvement during the cold war, has undermined the very foundation for order in Somalia's society—the authority of clan elders. The presence of large quantities of sophisticated weaponry, ranging from AK-47s to Stinger Missiles, combined with the withdrawal of superpower support to weak regimes—support that prevented the central authorities from being overwhelmed by domestic rivals who, in turn were divided among themselves—has created near total anarchy in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia. In these places, central authority is completely collapsed, turning these quasi-states into failed states.99

As we have seen, failed states are a combination of juridically sovereign but empirically non-functioning central authority. Thus, what can be surmised about the way in which state collapse comes about is that the diffusion of light weapons is not the only cause but one of the factors along with interlinked global and domestic ones that bring about state collapse. In such a context, the diffusion of light weapons serves to promote the process of state breakdown by fuelling conflicts and accelerating the trend towards insurgency and guerrilla warfare.

**Indirect Threats: Transnational Security Threats**

A clear dichotomy between internal and external security in security analysis is incomplete not only due to their closely inter-linked characters but also because of the enhanced nature of transnational threats which

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have been accentuated due to the globalisation process. Transnational threats are no longer peripheral security concerns; rather, they challenge the vital interests of the states. The sources of these threats blur the erstwhile clear lines dividing the domestic sphere from the international one and to that extent are relatively impervious to traditional state-centric techniques for providing security.

Many contemporary threats resulting from factors such as the diffusion of light weapons, drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism are transnational in character. The movement of drug money, weapons and so on across state borders cannot any longer be easily connected to the foreign policies or behaviour patterns of other states. Threats from transnational actors are situated, in a complex dynamic and global web created by modern communication, transportation and information technologies, which have enhanced the ability of non-state actors to operate beyond governmental controls. This, in turn, threatens the core values of state security, as well the state's duty to preserve the well-being, freedom and property of its citizens.\(^\text{100}\) It does so by enhancing the ability of non-state actors to operate beyond the limits of governmental control and by undermining the ability of governments to protect their societies from the negative consequences of such transnational activity.

With globalisation, terrorist activities and illicit trafficking in narcotics have increased, creating a web that serves transnational actors trading in small arms and light weapons. In addition, advances in both communications and transportation have tremendously enhanced the means and the speed with which weapons can be transferred. New transnational financial and commercial institutions provide a convenient cover for a huge, sophisticated black market in arms and illegal goods, making concealment easier for governments, as well as non-governmental groups. In other words, the global economy enables transnational actors to evade national restrictions and regulations. Given the fluid and mobile nature of global investment and distribution networks, it has become easy to launder drug money and distribute arms and drugs.

**Indirect Threats: Drug-trafficking**

The illicit drug trade has played an important role in destabilising states and societies across continents throughout history. During the

Cold War years adequate attention was not given to the dimensions of the problem. It was fairly well known, though, that the illicit drug trade played an important role in many conflicts in Central America, Southwest and Southeast Asia. It was used, and is still being used, for the purposes of secret wars or subversion.  

The illicit drug trade still sustains a large number of local conflicts in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Central America, Myanmar, the Southern Republics of Russia and Sri Lanka. Due to the massive difference in the production and market price of narcotics, the high rates of profit from drug trafficking provide an easy source of funds for cash-strapped forces. It is an extremely lucrative business enterprise with profits higher than that of the entire oil industry and second only to the arms trade. Estimates of the annual turnover of the illicit drug industry vary from $300 to $500 billion. This is approximately eight per cent of total international trade. Annual profits generated from the narcotics industry are believed to be as high as $200 to $300 billion. That is the reason why the illicit drug trade is such an attraction. The impact of the illicit drug trade on the common man may be judged from the estimates by the United Nations that between 3.3 and 4.1 per cent of world’s six billion people are regular users of drugs.  

The character of the illicit drug trade has undergone a substantial change from the Cold War era. It has acquired a highly sophisticated and complex organisational structure and appropriate operational mechanisms. The highly efficient, fast and flexible organisational structure, the superiority of its supply networks over the traditional bureaucratic organisation of enforcement agencies explains their failure in dealing with the illicit drug trade. The growing trade liberalisation and opening of markets have allowed the drug industry  

to spread its activities worldwide, open new trafficking routes and production zones, and infiltrate the legal economy. A UN Conference on Organized crime, held in Rome in November 1991, concluded that an estimated US$750 billion worth of drug money is laundered every year. The profits from the illicit drug trade have been strengthening the economic and political power of international drug syndicates.

Transnational organised crime associated with the illicit drug trade is, thus, a serious social, political and security issue for the international community. The illicit drug trade has clearly emerged as a powerful and dangerous threat to human security. It has the potential to inflict staggering economic and social costs and to undermine the political stability of countries. Combating the illicit production and distribution of narcotics has traditionally been the concern of law enforcement agencies. It can no longer be treated merely as a law and order issue. Corruption and violence resulting from the illicit drug trade is weakening governance particularly in developing countries, because individuals and elites become habituated to working outside the regulatory environment and rule of law, thus, weakening the state’s capacity. Drug trafficking also has an indirect impact on security as drug proceeds are used to finance insurgencies and terrorism. Drug money has increasingly become an easy source of self-financing for insurgent movements.

2.6 THE STATE AND HUMAN SECURITY
Violence plays a predominant part in the insecurity of individuals and the state. Further, an understanding of the security of individuals cannot be completely devoid of the understanding of the nature and character of the state and stages of development. State security is not opposed to human security. The state can be both a source of security and a threat. For critical security theorists therefore attention should be focussed on the individual rather than the state. Ken Booth has argued that the individual should be made the security referent and security can be assured through human emancipation defined in terms of “freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.” But the question remains


whether security can be understood in the same way for the Third World states as it is for developed states. Not only is the concept of "emancipatory security" abstract, it also does not reflect the realities of the Third World. The end of bipolarity has not in any sense altered the fundamental sources of Third World insecurity. Several elements of the Third World's security predicament have survived the end of the Cold War and bipolarity. The causes of Third World insecurity continue to lie in weak state-society cohesion, problems of national integration, economic underdevelopment and the lack of legitimacy of regimes.\textsuperscript{109} It is the weak state that is a problem for the security of the individuals in the Third World states and not states \textit{per se}. A strong state with a high degree of socio-political cohesion is a necessary prerequisite for individual as well as national security. But current changes in statehood undermine the conditions for creating and sustaining strong statehood, consequently jeopardising security for individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{110}

If one takes the Westphalian state into consideration and break it into its basic components like territory, people, sovereignty, and government—the security of the state would mean the security of all the components individually and collectively, including the security of the individual. Therefore, inherent in the concept of state security is human security. While it is true that the state is a means and not an end, states still constitute the primary nexus when it comes to the security of the individuals and groups. Even when the primary concern is the security of human beings, states have a significant place in the analysis. The broad post-Cold War security agenda, including threats of economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, environmental degradation, terrorism, crime and disease, is an agenda that brings the state back in as the single macro-institution in deciding how such threats will take place and what their consequences will be for individuals and groups. Just as a modern vibrant market economy requires the state to invest in people and provide the infrastructure—physical and institutional—for the market to function, similarly citizen's security can only be ensured by the state. The assumption that free markets will bring about economic convergence is


misleading. The role of the state in economic development is pivotal. European economic supremacy was not forged by free markets but by strong states. Most of Europe's leading powers did not rely on private initiative alone to promote their development. They used state power to create a trading system that would raise national income, permitting governments to enhance their own power through additional taxes.

The growth of terrorism has also put the state centre-stage in fighting terrorism. The attack against civilians by a military power can only be countered by a state's military power. A situation where states are unable to counter terrorism can widen and intensify terrorist activities. The dilemma is that dealing with terrorism may also require a curtailment of civil rights because of the need for roadblocks, identity cards, luggage searches, etc. In conflict situations, state responses to control violence and deal with terrorism invariably results in compromising civil liberties. The challenge to states, therefore, is to use these measures within the rule of law.

The creation of stronger states will be a necessary condition for both individual and national security. While they will not solve all problems, they will substantially enhance individual security. A strong state's objectives of national security are to pursue a long-term national development agenda without the fear of being interrupted by conflict, violence and disorder from within or outside. It should be the objective of the government to preserve and extend the progress made in securing the state against external threat of war while finding ways to safeguard people against internal threats of repression and gross deprivation of basic human needs. While the universal concern for human security should not be used as a cover to undermine the political integrity of nation-states, particularly those belonging to the developing world, national security should not be used as an argument to perpetuate gross violation of human security and against intervention. In various instances humanitarian interventions have taken place primarily in pursuit of some strategic interests or hidden political agenda of some powers. Certain clear rules and criteria for such humanitarian intervention must be agreed upon.

The processes of globalisation are transforming the state. But it would still remain a key referent in the security debate. It would be


112 Ibid.
premature to downplay the role of the state or assume its obsolescence. The question that needs to be addressed is not whether security should be reconceptualised around individuals or societies as alternatives to the state, but how the practice of states can be reconfigured to take into account the new discourse on human security. Despite globalisation, states are not withering away but are being transformed as they struggle to deal with the new security agendas that confront them.

In this new discourse on security, the state still has a primary role to play, because the human security agenda cannot be furthered without state security. Given the fact that the state has to play an important role in its developmental functions and in providing security, state security and human security are to be seen as mutually supportive. The state must concern itself with protecting the individual and groups not only from war (external security) but also from other forms of violence and terrorism. Human security becomes an integrative concept that includes security of individuals, communities as well as territories and states. Thus, human security only complements state security. State security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human security. States have the fundamental responsibility of providing security. Yet they often fail to fulfil their obligations. At times the state (and the regime) itself becomes a threat to security. Violent conflicts suggest that states cannot be secure if people's security is at stake. But people's security cannot be ensured in the absence of strong, democratic and responsible states. This has been made amply clear by the collapsed states of the international system.