CHAPTER 2

Traditional Security of Bangladesh

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2.1 INTRODUCTION

National security, which denotes both people’s security and state’s security, is dependent upon elements of national power. A study of national security presupposes a study of various elements of national power. Military power is one element of composite national power. As the maintenance and protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence are the core values of traditional security, this aspect of security domain decides that the key source of insecurity faced by nations is posed by the military power of other nations. Traditional security discourse identifies security as safeguarding nations from attack and subversion from the external sources. But subversion can emanate from within the state as well.

This chapter assumes that addressing security challenges involves a composite approach. Security challenges are multiple, and therefore they cannot be dealt with piecemeal. The boundary between Traditional Security (TS) and Non-Traditional Security (NTS) at certain point becomes blurred as both impinge upon each other. A composite picture of national security calls for a study of both external and internal sources of insecurities, and state and non-state actors. It further assumes that from the cost-benefit perspective, diplomatically negotiated settlements of contentious issues vis-à-vis external powers is preferable to military operation as such military operation will be so costly that it will outweigh the gains.
What are the sources of challenge to national security of Bangladesh? Does Bangladesh perceive security challenges stemming from both its internal and external settings? As this chapter is primarily concerned with hardware-oriented securities, then, who has the wider traditional national security responsibilities? Can Bangladesh ensure that its forces have enough military personnel and armament to accomplish the military mission that its overall strategy calls for? Does Bangladesh have a written defence policy? What defence policy is it currently pursuing? What defence policy should it follow for a "credible" defence? What are the components of a "credible" defence? Does "credible" defence have solely to do with military preparedness? In "credible" defence, where does diplomacy figure out? Conversely, what should be Bangladesh's first line of defence? What is the state of civil-military relations in Bangladesh? In this respect what role can the Parliament and "civil society" play? These are some issues and questions raised and addressed in this chapter.

2.1.1 Objectives, Scope and Limitation
The chapter will primarily deal with "hard power", exploring the elements of military power and defence planning of Bangladesh with a focus on "credible defence". It will, among other things, address the security challenges to the sovereign state of Bangladesh, and will study the defence expenditure and military balance in comparative perspective vis-à-vis India and Myanmar as Bangladesh's planners perceive sources of insecurities from these two states. Although this chapter's main focus will be to explore the sources of insecurities emanating from the external front, it will also very briefly discuss sources of insecurities stemming from the internal setting of Bangladesh. But it will not probe deep into this aspect as successive chapter(s) of this annual review will address the multifaceted issues entailing NTS more exhaustively. The other issues which will be discussed in this chapter are Bangladesh's defence co-operation with other states, the civil-military relations, the role of civil society and parliament, and the role of military in aid of civil power.
2.1.2 Methodology
A qualitative methodology will be applied to this chapter. Data and information will largely be culled from published works, newspaper reports and analysis. Furthermore, websites will be used for research materials. The collected information and data will be critically examined and used as objectively as possible.

2.1.3 Framework for Analysis
An interfacing framework that propagates a synergic approach between TS and NTS has been chosen as a framework for analysis. As we shall be mainly dealing with hard power, we adopt the Traditional Security Model (TSM) whose defining features are the following:

a. The core unit of the TSM is the sovereign state;

b. The most vital threat one nation faces is the existence of other nations;

c. Military security is the primary objective of the statecraft, and hence the major issue of national security.

What follows from the TSM is that military preparedness is the primary option for nation’s security. But the effectiveness of this hinges on the relative military power between nations. The military preparedness is one element of national power, and military preparedness is also contingent upon other elements of national power (e.g. national resources, level of industrial development, economic robustness, democratic leadership, and negotiation skills). Approaches that will be followed are applied and narrative interfacing TS and NTS.

2.1.4 Organisation
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses sources of insecurities emanating from external and internal settings. Section 3 reviews traditional security institutions focusing on army, navy, and air force etc. by making a comparative study of defence expenditure and military balance between Bangladesh and India, and Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh’s defence planning and its related issues and Bangladesh’s defence co-operation with other states are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 deals with
civil-military relations, while Section 7 provides conclusion and recommendations.

2.2 SOURCES OF CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Situated in South Asia bordering India, Myanmar, and the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is located in a strategically important position. Seen from land boundary standpoint, it is encircled by India on almost three sides — West, North, and East. But Bangladesh has the access to the Bay of Bengal. It may exercise this advantage in its favour to overcome its geographical encirclement vis-à-vis India. This very fact of encirclement gives rise to security challenges emanating from the external front. Conventionally, fear of war, attack from external sources, subversive activities carried out from beyond nation’s border by both state and non-state actors have been identified as the key sources of insecurity. But as mentioned, subversion can also be carried out from within the state.

A 2008 report on the state of democracy in South Asia¹ identifies three distinct clusters of sources of insecurity. These are: (a) those direct at the person, i.e., theft/robbery, physical attack/harassment and kidnapping/extortion; (b) those directed at the community, i.e., riots/mob violence where the entire community is at risk; and (c) those directed at the state and nation, i.e., action by militants/insurgents, police/army/security forces action, attack by another country and global terrorism. Such clusters of sources of insecurity are also applicable in the case of Bangladesh. Here, first, an attempt will be made to delve into the external sources of challenge to national security of Bangladesh followed by a discussion about the internal sources of challenge to Bangladesh’s national security.

2.2.1 External Sources

Bangladesh’s national security interests have been affected by numerous external and internal factors. The external insecurities are arising from global transformation, regional settings, and the disputes with immediate and distant neighbours. The regional sources of insecurities are emanating from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in neighbouring countries, cross-border disputes, illegal small arms trade, transnational
crimes, drug and human trafficking, un-demarcated maritime border, resource sharing issues, trans-border health issues, global warming and environmental issues. Since the chapter is dealing traditional security issues, the following section discusses hard power concerns for Bangladesh.

Since Bangladesh’s borders exist, the potential external insecurities are largely related to its geographic neighbours India and Myanmar—surrounding three sides. For the last decade or so, in terms of the various measures of hard power—military strength, neighbouring countries have been pursuing active WMD proliferation that includes substantial development of joint research, development and production of military equipments with other defence partners and developing missile defence system. For instance, India has been improving its conventional capabilities in the areas of air and sea power, albeit haltingly. The development of India’s missile defence system is based on two sources: one is external, and the other is internal. Externally, it develops its missile defence system with the help of its strategic partners like Russia, the United States, and Israel. Internally, it does develop its missile defence by developing an indigenous technology. In terms of hard power, Bangladesh’s military is not well-equipped to face security challenges from its neighbours. On the other hand, Bangladesh has bilateral disputes with both of her neighbours. Bangladesh-India relations are marked by several contentious issues: (i) the sharing of water resources, (ii) implementation of the 1974 Border Agreement, (iii) Indian support for insurgency, (iv) non-demarcation of maritime boundaries, (v) trade imbalance, and (vi) illegal cross-border activities, etc. Bangladesh-Myanmar relations are marked by a set of contentious issues such as land and maritime border disputes, arms trafficking, acts of insurgency and the outstanding Rohiyanga problem. In the shadow of isolation, Myanmar has also been modernising her military capabilities continuously. It is alleged in the international arena that Myanmar is acquiring chemical weapons to strengthen its hard power capability. Therefore, given the low level of mutual trust, spill-over effects of the ethnic and religious conflicts and the magnitude of disputes, it can be concluded that the weapons proliferation among the immediate and distant neighbours present considerable challenge for national security of Bangladesh.
Securing the borders is among the primary national security issues in both traditional and non-traditional perspectives. Traditionally, protection of international border is the basic means to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country. As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh is bordered by India and Myanmar on three sides. There are disputes, illegal activities, and violation of guidelines in border areas. For instance, Bangladesh-India border is marked by incomplete demarcation, problem of enclaves, and areas of adverse possession. A number of controversial issues give rise to disturbances in border areas of India and Bangladesh. Sometimes, the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) encroach into Bangladesh that causes violation of border guidelines, as well as violation of human rights in many border areas of India and Bangladesh. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s border management system is not well-equipped and technologically insufficient. Border security forces of Bangladesh are not fully capable of dealing with potential challenges at the border. Again, much of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border remains un-demarcated, disputed and un-protected. The difficult hilly terrain, lack of outposts, and absence of effective check make the entire border very porous. Consequently, the contentious bilateral issues and unprotected border may generate skirmishes with forces of neighbouring countries, engendering challenges to national security of Bangladesh.

Maritime security is a vital part of Bangladesh’s national security. Bangladesh faces a number of challenges from its maritime security front. These challenges can be classified into two categories: traditional and non-traditional. Traditionally, the vulnerability of the sea frontier to naval developments in and around the region and Bangladesh’s unresolved maritime boundary issues with two of its immediate neighbours, India and Myanmar, figure out prominently. Particularly, the unresolved maritime boundary issues pose a threat to maritime security of Bangladesh. The scope and dimension of this threat can become more complex and serious unless and until a satisfactory political solution can be found. Given the fact that Bangladesh and India are at conflict with each other over demarcation of maritime boundary, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the two countries may give rise to conflicts over the sharing of resources, in particular fisheries, oil,
and gas. Also, because of the unresolved maritime boundary, Bangladesh is constrained in its claim to an extended continental self of 350 nautical miles, and over few new born Islands in its maritime zones. Under such circumstances, the possibility of a confrontation with India and Myanmar may arise while undertaking routine activities like patrolling, surveillance, combating pollution, chasing the pirates and poachers, etc.⁵

The threat of maritime piracy has also been a constant source of concern for national security of Bangladesh. The Bay of Bengal is the hot-spot of maritime piracy attacks on small craft, including fishing boats, and merchant vessels. In South Asia, most of the piracy incidents take place in the waters of India and Bangladesh. In 2003, Bangladesh has seen 58 incidents within its water territories but the number has rapidly come down to five in the first eight months of the year 2007.⁶ Earlier in 2004, 17 attacks were recorded in the waters of Bangladesh. The Singapore flagged vessel *MV Britoil 4* was also attacked and crew members were killed in Chittagong in June 1998.⁷ Furthermore, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 33 incidents of actual and attempted piracy attack in 2006. These incidents made the waters of Bangladesh most dangerous in the world. In 2007, the global trend of piracy showed a rise of 10%⁸ compared to the previous year, but it declined greatly in Bangladesh. The Burmese and Indian pirates are alleged to be active in the waters of Bangladesh. Thus, the threat of maritime piracy is a vital source of national insecurity in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Navy and its Coast Guard should always remain very alert and capable so that it can curb smuggling and piracy to ensure the security of maritime zone.

### 2.2.2 Internal Sources

Alongside the external sources of insecurity i.e. safeguarding against the external insecurities, the internal insecurity components within the country are important in safeguarding national security. The internal security encompasses the maintenance of security within the country from the consequence of intolerance and political violence, extremism and militant activities, energy shortage, unemployment, food shortage, natural disasters, economic security, technology, environment security, information, and cyber security,
Extremism and terrorism have been identified as the most immediate security threat for nations and regions. The emerging nature of terrorist threats challenges the traditional security perceptions and calculations everywhere. These cause serious threat to national security of Bangladesh. There is convincing evidence that the government has been taking active drive against extremist organisations. Owing to the continuous vigilance of law and order forces, the extremist groups are not able to make any fresh attack. According to a recent study on threat prediction 2008-2015 for Bangladesh, the risks of terrorism remain very high as a source of national security threat. Many proscribed militant groups are still believed to be regrouping changing their names and operation techniques. Thus militancy is being reproduced, albeit in a slow pace. This becomes a threat to public order and results in the growth of tension in the society. On the other hand, the extremist activities by the leftist groups in south-western and northern districts of Bangladesh are also generating threats to law and order and potential threat to the sovereignty of the country. The cross-border nexus of the ultra-leftist groups of Bangladesh with Maoist and Naxalites groups of India and Nepal engenders potential challenges for national security of Bangladesh.

Proliferation of small arms and drugs are also sources of threat to national security. Illicit trade, transfer and use of small arms have become a growing concern for security of state and society in Bangladesh. It is causing national security threat in two ways: the tempo of use is escalating at a startling pace and Bangladesh being a soft state and a soft society, the impact is easily understood. Another important challenge is the use of Bangladesh-India border regions by different insurgent groups and outlaws. Taking advantages of porous border, some Indian North-Eastern insurgents groups and Myanmar origin Rohingya Solidarity Group, etc. are reportedly allegedly conducting arms training in the jungles of Cox's Bazar, Ramu, and Ukhia. As Bangladesh is a part of Mongoloid ethnic belt, it will be alarming if the pan-Mongoloid Movement takes roots in this region involving ethnic groups of China, India, Myanmar, and South East Asia.
In summary, Bangladesh has been facing multi-dimensional external and internal national security challenges emanating from global forces, regional countries as well as internal disorder and instability. The Bangladesh government needs to map out a comprehensive security policy to address these external and internal sources of challenge to national security.

2.3 COMPARISON OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY BALANCE: BANGLADESH-INDIA, BANGLADESH-MYANMAR

As of the traditional security paradigm, the national security goal is to defend the nation from external hostility and contain internal instabilities. Under such threats, military strength becomes the primary focus of national power. But, as part of the new national security equation, non-traditional issues like economic insecurities, environmental issues, proliferation of acts of terrorism, health hazards, lack of natural resources, demographic changes, etc. continue to be in forefront of national security paradigm. According to TSM model, the main challenges of national security of Bangladesh may come from the changing regional security environment. The complex bilateral relationships, the strategic and military modernisation of neighbouring countries would strongly feature in Bangladesh’s security calculation. Particularly, causes of security anxiety arise from two immediate neighbour of Bangladesh, i.e. India’s military and geo-political ambitions in the region and the military modernisation of Myanmar under the military rule. India is increasingly modernising military hardware, software and overall capabilities. According to the *Military Balance* (2007), India is one of the top 10 nations of high military spending countries. It is also the third largest military in the world with 3.772m military personnel ranking ahead of North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, France and the United Kingdom. So, it may open the Pandora’s Box for other neighbours to seek options for military strength. Figure 2.1 compares the defence spending of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. It shows that in 2005, Bangladesh spent 841m US$ whereas India spent 21,726m US$ as defence expenditure. Again, Myanmar’s military spending was 6,944m US$ for the same year. Thus, Bangladesh’s military spending was 3.87% of total Indian
spending and 12.11% of Myanmar’s. It raises fundamental question that how a credible defence is possible with such a comparatively limited spending. Whether this military budget is capable of enhancing military power? Whether Bangladesh has a strong economic base capable of sustaining military growth? We need a credible defence system. But it substantially depends on other sources of national power including economic power.

Increasing trend of military expenditure is an important part of traditional national security. Table 2.1 and 2.2 show detail trends of military expenditure and balance of armed forces between Bangladesh and India and Bangladesh and Myanmar for the years 2003 to 2005. Bangladesh, India and Myanmar spent respectively 1.4%, 2.9% and 9.6% of GDP as military expenditure for the year 2004. Again, Bangladesh increased 30.39% of military budget from 2003 to 2005 whereas India increased 40.10% of its military spending. In terms of the size of Indian economy and total amount of military spending, 40.10% increase significances rapid militarisation in
India. Spending 9.6% of GDP by Myanmar also hint at its priority for military modernisation. Where Bangladesh stands in terms of military spending? Figure 2.2 also highlights the number and trends of armed forces for Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. As mentioned above, the number of total Indian military personnel is 3.772m whereas the number is 0.19m for Bangladesh. Again, the total number of Myanmar's military personnel is 0.482m. So, the number of military personnel between India and Bangladesh and Bangladesh and Myanmar is highly asymmetrical.

The Table 2.3 shows that the comparative picture of arms and the military forces between India and Bangladesh and between Bangladesh and Myanmar is something for Bangladesh to reckon with. As of the 2006 figure, Indian ground forces are equipped with modern arms and equipment including Self-Propelled Artillery, Active AIFV/Light Tanks, MBRLs, etc., whereas Bangladesh fares very poorly as far as the quantity and upgradation level are concerned. With more than 852 combat aircraft, India has the second largest air force in Asia. Its navy has emerged as a potent

![Graph showing comparative number in armed forces: Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar]  


Figure 2.2: Comparative Number in Armed Forces: Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, 2003-2005 (in US$m)
### Table 2.1: Comparative Defence Expenditure: Bangladesh and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>15508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>19821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>21726</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure</th>
<th>Number in Armed Forces (000s)</th>
<th>Estimated Reservists (000s)</th>
<th>Paramilitary (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$m</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bangladesh | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| India      | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.7 |


### Table 2.2: Comparative Defence Expenditure: Bangladesh and Myanmar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>6260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>5889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>6944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure</th>
<th>Number in Armed Forces (000s)</th>
<th>Estimated Reservists (000s)</th>
<th>Paramilitary (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$m</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bangladesh | 127 | 375 |
| Myanmar    | 0   | 0   |

force with aircraft carriers, combat aircrafts, submarines, and other combat vessels. India is also acquiring new warning and control system, fighter bomber aircraft, surface-to-air missile system, etc. In addition, India has recently tested ICBM which has the capability of reaching Beijing. On the other hand, Myanmar has been pursuing modern arms and equipment at the level of ground, air and navy. Bangladesh is poorly equipped compared to arms and equipment of neighbouring countries. Its military budget deserves rethinking, arms and armaments need upgradation. In terms of quantity and quality of military hardware and software, Bangladesh’s position remains untenable.

Table 2.3: Comparative Number in Weapons: Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active AIFV/Lt. Tanks</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total APCs</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBRLs</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM Launchers</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light SAM Launchers</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Guns</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/ Ground Attack</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce/FGA Recce</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/MPA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Helicopters</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light SAM Launchers</td>
<td>some</td>
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(Table 2.3 contd.)
(Table 2.3 contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Surface Combatants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer-Guided Missile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate-Guided Missile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Frigate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrol Craft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo and Coastal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshore, Riverine</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/SSK</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Vessels</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Ships</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marines (1,000s)</strong></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Air</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aircraft</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGA</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/MPA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW Helicopters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR Helicopters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Helicopters</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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2.4 DEFENCE PLANNING

2.4.1 Do We Have Any Defence Policy?

As discussed, insecurities that Bangladesh faces emanate from both internal and external fronts. It is the government's duty to defend the people and territorial independence of the country from
those insecurities. How do we do that? How do we defend our people and country? What defensive guidance have we received from our political leaders? What is the defence policy of Bangladesh? Does Bangladesh have a defence policy? We know Bangladesh has a foreign policy, import policy, drug policy, education policy, health policy etc. But what about its defence policy?

In the seventies and eighties, people of all spheres of live were very shy, reluctant and little apprehensive to debate or discuss about the defence of the country as well as the Armed Forces. The discourse on national security and national defence of Bangladesh was limited to military and diplomatic circles and few intellectuals in the academia. Broad based public debate on the subject was absent. But after the end of military regime and with the beginning of democratic rule from 1991, with the growing openness of our society as well as military leaders, the topic of defence has no more remained the exclusive domain of the Armed Forces. In the recent times in the wake of political and labour strife, international and home-grown terrorism, global warming etc. there has been a surge of public debate on the subject. This has led to increased awareness and ushered in hope that we, as a nation-government and people together, would address the issue of national security, more precisely, national defence seriously and objectively from now on.

In the backdrop of such positive environment we observe that a reasonable amount of interest about our defence and the Armed Forces has grown amongst a cross-section of the intellectuals involving politicians, journalists, notable authors, retired senior civil and military officers. Their work in this field was in the form of published interviews and articles and holding of roundtable talks and seminars. The summary of the views and opinions expressed by the security experts, intellectuals, think tanks and the educated people of the country is that we need a defence policy as a part of overall national security policy. And for supporting this defence policy we need well-structured Armed Forces with solid higher Defence Organisation. And to make it happen efficiently, we need an apex body comprising of security experts, think tanks, intellectuals, politicians and military leaders who will be tasked to oversee the overall security including defence of the country. One may call it National Security Council or give any name acceptable to majority.
2.4.2 Defining Defence Policy

National defence is the concern of every citizen. Defence policy is dynamic in nature and shaped by the interplay of many factors and variables. It is essential that the national defence policy is supported by the people so as to enable building a dependable defence posture that will be responsive to emerging threats and respected by other states, especially the neighbours. According to Major General Mansur Ahmed, “the defence policy must, therefore, necessarily be based on well-defined national security objectives and approach supported by a realistic military strategy, valid operational doctrine, responsive equipment and a sound organisation.”

Foreign and defence policies of a country are interlinked and interrelated. Defence policy is gradually and normally built-up taking into consideration the foreign policy of the country. Defence and foreign policies of a country give expression to its aspirations as a member of the international community. Study of these policies is necessary to understand the core values guiding a nation and the course it has charted for itself. A historical study of these reveals the ups and downs of a nations’ fortune, the nature and quality of the responses, and gives an indication of future policies and intentions. Defence policy is an important public policy encompassing a multitude of activities aimed at achieving military strength and use of that strength in support of national interests. While a lot of discussions have taken place on foreign policy of Bangladesh, not much has been written or talked about the Defence Policy of Bangladesh.

Defence policy is a public policy. The term public policy denotes a flow of decisions; a set of orientations or principles; an overall plan or framework; and a series of actions designed to achieve the objectives of the programme as a whole. “It indicates the pattern of government activity on some topic or matter which has a purpose or goal.” It has also been defined as “anything that a government chooses to do or not to do.” More precisely, it provides a series of related decisions on a subject which are explicit or implicit, plans and the stable set of attitudes or guiding principles of a government. According to Major General Syeed Ahmed, “defence policy means the defined ends of any states’ defence and military efforts. Defence
policy consists of both strategic and organisational decisions. It has two parts: the content and the process more specifically, the strategy and the structure.

2.4.3 Contents and Purpose of Defence Policy

States may use their armed forces as deterrence as well as in an offensive and defensive manner against other states as part of what they call their defence policy. It concerns the provision, deployment and use of military resources to facilitate not only the protection but also the pursuit of perceived national interests of the state. In other words, defence involves the protection of a country's forces threatening from within and outside the territory of the defending state. Therefore, defence policy is made at the interface of domestic and international policies, and at the interface of peace and war.

A defence policy is dynamic in nature because it is dependant on the security environment which changes rapidly. Therefore, a defence Policy is generally valued for a time or a given international situation whereas a military strategy is more specific and addresses a particular problem. Now let us look at the relationship between defence policy and strategy. National strategy has been defined as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, technological and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to further national ideals, interests, priorities and policies. Military strategy is the military component of the national strategy and has been defined as the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of a national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. As we have seen, military strategy basically deals with a specific situation and aims at achieving military objectives with basically military means through military operations. Defence policy of a country provides policy guidance, legislative support, resources and long term capability enhancement programmed for dealing with threats to national security. It provides the political rationale for these measures and puts these in national strategic perspective. A country could have one defence policy but it may have a few separate military strategies for dealing with different dimensions of threat. A defence policy is generally valid and
addresses a particular problem. To give an example, Bangladesh may have one defence policy but separate strategies for dealing with overland threat and military strategies for dealing the insurgency and terrorism problem. Many may argue against a written defence policy. Some may speak in favour of it. Bangladesh is neither a superpower nor a regional power. She does not have any nuclear weapon capability. She is not trying to achieve it either. Bangladesh is a least developed country and should not hide anything from her neighbours, friends and likely adversaries for the sake of her own interest. Her defence preparedness, postures and future plan should be clear and transparent to her own people and people outside. So defence policy of Bangladesh should be published as a public document, which is to be based on the calculations of threat perceptions, but the chapters on Operation Plans are not to be published mainly due to reasons of its classified military value and the equations of foreign relations with some countries.

In a broad sense defence policy gives out a country’s line of action on how it plans to secure itself against external or internal threats. In a more narrow sense it deals with specific objectives that must be achieved by the Armed Forces to ensure that foreign policy and in some cases, the domestic policy have the necessary support from the military. Defence policy is an amalgam of foreign policy, fiscal policy and industrial policy. Its contents range from routine decision about acquisition of spare parts and ammunition stocks to major decisions about the development and deployment of costly weapon systems in pursuit of national interests in foreign relations. According to Major General Mansur Ahmed, “defence policy serves several purposes. First of all, it is a guideline for the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces for further military planning. Second, it is a moot point for the opinion makers and general public in the country which can be debated and refined. Third, it is also aimed at the potential threats and it conveys the seriousness with which the security questions will be dealt with. Last, it informs the world in general as to how the government want the foreign relations and defence questions and what is its policy priorities? It should be clear that to serve these purposes the defence policy or at least major parts of it should be open to public.”21
2.4.4 The Current State of Bangladesh’s Defence Policy

Although no written defence policy exists, it does not mean Bangladesh is without a defence policy/guideline. Defence is an important sector in Bangladesh and a substantial budget allocation is made to this sector every year. The yearly budget allocation for defence is an important public document and many counties use this to explain the proposed allocations and their rationale. In Britain, the yearly defence white paper, for example, explains the international security environment and threats to national security. It details various measures and deployments. No such document is available to general public in Bangladesh but the main features of the defence policy can be inferred from past actions.

Bangladesh National Defence College (NDC) Handout on National Security Strategy for Bangladesh spells out three objectives for the Defence Services of Bangladesh.22 These are: preserve the territorial integrity of Bangladesh including air space and resources within the EEZ, support government’s national security and foreign policy objectives particularly in contributing to and promoting regional and international peace and security under the auspices of the UN and provide aid or assistance as required by the government in the event of natural disaster, major civil disturbances or any other national contingency. Linked to it are the vital national interests of Bangladesh which could be: territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bangladesh, a functional democracy, economic prosperity for the people, intrinsic value system of Islam for the vast majority of the people and the value system of other religions as they apply, thereby embracing the concept of religious tolerance.

There are specific directions about defence in the Articles 61, 62 and 63 of our Constitution. Besides, the outline of our defence policy can be construed from the study of actions, statements, attitudes, explicit and implicit plans and programmes of the government. We may arrange them in the framework of a defence policy. Since 1975, Bangladesh has pursued a consistent pattern of activities in the field of defence. These are evident from the planned allocations to the defence sector, policies on its mission and organisation, established roles, the recruitment and training policies, procurement policies, logistics and administrative policies including other policy directives that have given our military the capability to maintain a
defensive posture by which we can resist any attack from potential aggressors and can ensure security of our country’s resources. These are the basic and important elements of the defence policy of Bangladesh. Absence of a published document does not suggest absence of policy though a written policy document is helpful and will act as a general guideline and clear misconception if any in the minds of general public.

According to Major General Mansur Ahmed, "Defence policy of Bangladesh is the outcome of four major factors. First, our view is that as a developing nation our security interests will be well-served by friendly relations with all countries of the world in general and in particular with the countries of the region and with the Islamic world. Second, as a developing country there is need for enormous movements in economic and social sectors to reduce our non-military vulnerabilities. The defence budget should, therefore, remain small and should not try to catch up with neighbouring countries. Third, the War of Liberation has given tremendous self-confidence to the people in their ability to deal with external aggression. This does and should be allowed [sic] to play an important role by further promoting the idea of citizen soldier. Last, the force structure, training systems and operational doctrines reflect our history of many years." In the wider international arena we have been an active member of the non-aligned movement and a substantial contributor to international peacekeeping operations. If all the above can be summarised, then the main features of our non-published and existing defence policy may be as follows:

a. Main responsibility of our armed forces is to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the country at any cost.

b. Deterrence is what Bangladesh hopes to achieve by combination of diplomacy and a standing Armed Force. The task of territorial defence of the country has been given to the services who would take on the initial onslaught and the people would take up arms in their own defence as they had done in the War of Liberation.

c. Our military preparation is defensive and non-provocative in nature.
d. Another principal job of armed forces is to defeat all kinds of subversion from external and internal sources including insurgencies.

e. We have all volunteer armed forces with participation from all regions and sections of population. Recruitment is done on the basis of merit and quotas to districts to ensure participation by people of all regions.

f. Bangladesh believes in collective security measures and continues participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

g. Bangladesh believes and strives for peaceful settlement of international dispute.

h. Our Armed Forces are employed in peacetime crisis management and development works to bring them nearer to people.

i. We strive for limited self-sufficiency in defence production.

j. Our defence budgets indicate how modest our defence effort is. It is lowest in this region. Without getting onto the policies of terminology, we can call our effort as non-provocative and defensive.

k. In defence management, like any democratic society, military is subordinated to the political authority but the internal and operational autonomy of the armed services is maintained.

2.4.5 Credible Defence: A Proposal for Bangladesh Defence Policy

By carefully studying and analysing the unpublished or may be unwritten present state of Bangladesh defence policy as discussed in preceding paragraphs we can come to a conclusion that Bangladesh pursues a national defence policy which is defensive in nature. But how much defensive is our defence policy? What is the depth of our defence? Politicians in power, military leaders and diplomats frequently describe our defence policy as defensive one as and when they encounter questions on the same. But how long can we defend our country in case of an external aggression? Do we have the capability to defend our country for one week/two weeks or for a month? If we critically analyse the present structure, organisation
and capabilities of our armed forces (Army, Navy, Air force, Paramilitary forces, Auxiliary forces and 2nd line defence forces), it clearly reveals that all our security forces are purely of defensive nature. They lack offensive capability; even we have doubts whether our armed forces have any limited offensive capability. The strength of our present armed forces indicates that we may be ready neither for passive defence nor for active defence. In case of an external aggression or attack how long we can continue to fight being in defensive position? Do we have sufficient logistic build-up for a prolonged war? If we continue to remain defensive always during an external aggression and continue to fight back being in defensive position without any aggressive posture then sooner or later we have to embrace a humiliating defeat. This argument will definitely get support from military leaders, and others who have basic knowledge on military tactics.

What are the options open for us? Considering the socio-economic conditions of the country our options are very limited. We have to maintain a defensive posture all through. But here we can argue in favour of a credible defence. Some may raise the question on the very meaning of ‘credible defence’. What is it? Military tactics deals with mobile defence, static defence, and area defence but it hardly addresses the issue of credible defence. At present many nations and their leaders have been arguing in favour of credible defence. The meaning of credible defence has to be well understood by politicians, academicians, military leaders and general people. Some country may consider attainment of nuclear capability as the main pillar of credible defence. Some may feel confident that possession of few Submarines, Aircraft carriers and F-16/Mig-29 aircrafts will constitute their credible defence capabilities. But it may not be the same in the case of Bangladesh. For Bangladesh, major components of credible defence may be as follows:

a. Credible defence will ensure peace, security and stability of the country.

b. Components of credible defence forces must be able to defend the country from an external aggression for a specific period.

c. Credible defence forces will possess limited offensive capability which to be respected by all neighbours and likely adversaries will be hesitant and think twice to attack.
d. Foreign powers and adversaries will find it difficult to dictate terms and conditions so that Bangladesh is not marginalised by external powers in the field of security, economy and trade.

e. Adopting the concept of people’s army or citizen’s army or nation-in-arms, thus forcing enemy/adversaries to raise their defence expenditure.

f. It should be based on partnership and alliance with other like-minded foreign powers.

g. Above all, it should be built within the overall political framework of the country and the world around.

We need to have a credible defence policy with credible defence force. We have to have the strength and capability to defend our motherland for a specific period. Argument is that we expect in good faith, international community will come forward to solve the problem within that specific period. And to fight for that specific period we must have required logistic build-up. At the same time our armed forces to be restructured in such a way so that they can attain limited offensive capability to off balance the attacker in their weaker moment. The issue of cost—military and non-military inflicted on the aggressor will naturally feature in our calculus of credible defence.

So what should be our national defence policy? Our national defence should provide the guarantee for maintaining Bangladesh’s security and unity, and for realising the goal of building a peaceful and moderately prosperous society in all-round way. We need to build a credible defence force for ensuring all round security and defence of our country. The main tasks of Bangladesh’s national defence are “to safeguard Bangladesh’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, to resist aggression, to guard against armed subversion and to maintain social stability and order.” The most important point is that it must be well prepared for military struggle with the capability of containing the aggressor for a definite period. Other features of defence policy should be as follows:

a. Bangladesh will not engage in any arms race and military expansion. She will only restructure and reorganise her armed forces to convert it into a credible defence force
which may demand little increase of present strength and semi mechanisation and little modernisation of armaments. Bangladesh will build her defence forces as a credible one just for enhancing active defence capability.

b. Bangladesh will never go for Nuclear Weapons capability but must look for adopting required defensive measures against Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare.

c. Along with national security Bangladesh defence policy should also ensure the interests of national development. This includes guarding against and resisting aggression and taking precautions against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism, extremism and any form of insurgency.

d. We should pursue a policy of coordinated development of national defence and economy. It will help to restructure and reorganise our armed forces as an integral part of its social and economic development.

e. We should foster a security environment conducive to our peaceful development.

f. Bangladesh maintains military co-operation with other countries on the basis of principles of peaceful co-existence and takes part in international security cooperation, strengthens strategic coordination and consultation with neighbouring countries. We continue to participate in UN Peace keeping operations in the similar fashion.

g. We should try to maintain the deterrence value of our armed forces through continuous mechanisation and modernisation. We will endeavour to achieve the ability to provide right mix of air, land and naval capability to deter threats. Modernisation has many dimensions but we will modernise only to catch up with the major technological changes and to cope up with surrounding developments. We should gradually moves towards semi-mechanisation to full mechanisation in phases. For achieving these an adequate budget allocation should be maintained.

h. We should be in favour of creation of a modest defence industry mainly to meet the basic needs from domestic resources.
i. Our war fighting strategy to be based on a combination of conventional and unconventional (guerilla) war with the integration of reserves, paramilitary and auxiliary forces.

j. We will strive for the capability to face the challenges of information age.

k. We should also consider actively about friendship, partnership alliance in our struggle for survival.

l. Military and non-military cost to the aggressor will have to be raised to an unacceptable level as a part of holistic deterrence strategy.

All the above policy guidelines are suggested in addition to the existing ones that are being pursued, practiced and followed.

2.4.6 Security Sector Reforms

Defence policy that has been suggested will definitely demand adequate reforms in the security sector to make it workable and operational. Without bringing fruitful reforms in present security sectors we can not make a credible defence policy. First of all, we need an apex body that will be overall in charge of national security both traditional and non-traditional. The formal policy formulation has to be directed by a higher defence organisation, like National Security Council or Cabinet Committee on Defence and Parliamentary Committee on Defence.

A survey of higher defence organisations of different countries will show organisation at two levels. The upper level body is headed by the chief executive of the country and includes ministers of foreign affairs, defence, finance and professional military advisers. It is supported by full time staffs from military as well as other departments that integrate defence, foreign and domestic policies to develop strategic options. One example of this is the National Security Council of the USA. The lower level usually is a committee of the Chiefs of Staff of services and headed by one of the Chiefs or an appointed Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, supported by professional staffs.

Like USA and other democratic countries we also need such a body whose first and foremost task will be to prepare a draft on national defence policy for approval by the parliament. We also
need to have reform in our Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Armed Forces Division (AFD). To convert our armed forces into a credible defence force we have to carefully study the present organisations and capabilities of defence services directly responsible for national defence. Where we talk about blending conventional warfare with un-conventional one we need to reassess the present capabilities of our paramilitary, auxiliary and 2nd line defence forces. We must also think how to defend our people against NBC warfare, cyber-warfare, information-warfare and psychological warfare etc.

2.4.7 Ministry of Defence (MOD) vs. Armed Forces Division (AFD)

Like most other countries Bangladesh has also a MOD, as it started with the parliamentary system, which practically controlled the services headquarters almost on all matters. An exception, in Bangladesh case, is the appointment of a Cabinet Minister as the Defence Minister was never appointed.27 It has been the practice so far that when it is the presidential system it is the President and when it is the parliamentary system it is the Prime Minister, who would concurrently hold the portfolio of Defence.

At present in Bangladesh as the executive powers are vested in the Prime Minister, as such it is the Prime Minister who is the de facto Supreme Commander of the defence services although theoretically or ceremonially, according to the Constitution, President has been shown as the Supreme Commander. However, the Cabinet level Defence Minister in the democracies like India, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, UK or USA, takes care of both the operational professional matters and the civilian aspects of the military like accounts, lands and cantonments, macro budget processing, legal matters and construction. In India, there is an exception where the Chain of Command is a little different from other countries. In most of other countries operational matters are separately handled by professional military officers like the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or Chairman Joint Chiefs of Committee and other aspects are handled by a civilian bureaucrat. Both of them are directly responsible to the Defence Minister. In context of Bangladesh, since a separate Defence Minister was never appointed, the Heads of the Government probably felt comfortable to handle
the military matters directly with the professionals. Consequently, the level of communication between the civil and military remained very limited.

In Bangladesh, immediately after the War of Liberation we saw formation of a combined defence services headquarters headed by Gen M A G Osmany. In 1975 we have seen formation of the office of the Chief of the Defence Staffs for a brief period. Chiefs of Staff Committee was also formed once located in MOD during President Zia’s tenure in 1979 when MOD was one compact organisation. Subsequently Supreme Command Headquarters was created which can be called the precursor to the present day reorganised Armed Forces Division (AFD). BNP’s 1990-91 Government inducted AFD in the Prime Minister's office. Subsequent Governments are continuing with the reorganised system. Lt General Aminul Karim says, “According to the Rules of Business, AFD deals with Defence Policy, mobilisation of the defence and paramilitary/auxiliary services and plan and coordinate all joint services training, operation, administration and logistics. MOD is also entrusted with Defence of Bangladesh, along with construction, Military Lands and Cantonments, Cipher documents, Meteorology, Survey, budget, legal and statutory matters of the armed forces.”

Now to bring harmony in overall defence planning of the country we need a full-time and separate Cabinet Minister as Defence Minister. Along side we need to upgrade the office of AFD into office of Chief of Defence Staffs or Chairman Joint Chiefs of Committee or Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff of the rank of 4 star General/Air Marshal/Admiral. For better co-ordination and co-operation in defence field it is suggested to have both MOD and Joint Chief of Defence Staffs Office or whatever appropriate name it is given be under the same roof. Both the offices to take policy guidelines from national security council which to be headed by either Prime Minister or President where Defence Minister, Defence Secretary, and Joint Chiefs of Staff may be members.

2.4.8 Parliamentary Standing Committee

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence should continue to hold the MOD, AFD, Services HQs and inter-services organisations accountable for any policy decisions, may be, on
procurement, legal matters, promotion policy, and construction etc. It may even, like the Indian or American system, carry out inquiry into any irregularities, weaknesses, or lapses found in the system. However, it may be noted that National Security Committee and the Parliamentary Standing Committee would not run counter to each other; rather they should complement each other. Efforts should be made to strengthen both the committees in order to institutionalise democracy and for better transparency and better management of the armed forces affairs. Our past experience about activities of Parliamentary Standing Committee is not encouraging. We are yet to know whether they could produce anything credible other than demoting senior military officers who were promoted by previous government(s).

2.4.9 Strengthening and Restructuring Existing Defence Forces

For a credible defence of the country we need a credible defence force. Capabilities, structure and strength of present defence forces need careful scrutiny for converting it into a credible one. Bangladesh Army has successfully secured the territorial integrity of one-tenth of Bangladesh i.e. Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) by perseveringly fighting, for decades together, the insurgents who were given logistics and sanctuary support from outside. Bangladesh Army supported the foreign policy objectives of the government by participating in the multinational UN forces that was created to liberate Kuwait. Since late 1980s, Bangladesh Armed Forces have been actively involved in the UN peace support missions in different countries of the world. Bangladesh Armed Forces are actively involved in the reconstruction of Kuwait. Till date, over 76,000 troops have participated in various overseas missions and have contributed few billions dollars to the economy of Bangladesh. Nowadays, Bangladesh is known to the whole world for two things: one is the micro-credit programme of the Grameen Bank and the other is Bangladesh's active involvement in the UN peace support operations around the world. Today, Bangladesh is the highest troops contributing country in the world in UN peace support operations.

Since 1990, Bangladesh Armed Forces have been actively involved in restoring democracy in the country by assisting the
Traditional Security of Bangladesh

government and the Election Commission in holding peaceful, free and fair elections. Bangladesh Armed Forces are widely known to the world for its efficient management of the post disaster rehabilitation programme. Some of the landmarks could be 1987, 1988, 1991, 1998 and 2007 disaster relief operations. In 1991 and 2007, Bangladesh Armed Forces in collaboration of US Armed Forces took active part in rehabilitation of the cyclone and tidal surge affected people in southern part of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Armed Forces are called upon to undertake varied tasks depending upon the crisis or situation. In recent past the most important event was Armed Forces involvement on 11 January 2007 which got popularity as 1/11 event. On that very day emergency was declared by the President to bring normalcy in the country where armed forces took very positive role to save the country from an imminent civil war. The demand of the nation in the security arena is multidimensional. Bangladesh Armed Forces have always lived up to the expectations of the nation. Better organisation especially at the political decision making level and a clear-cut hierarchy both at the political and operational level would pay even richer dividends to the nation.

Highly motivated and well trained Bangladesh Armed Forces if move towards semi mechanisation and modernisation through careful planning will be able to defend their motherland from any sort of aggression, both external and internal at any cost. Only thing is that strength and capabilities of these defence forces have to be increased by providing some limited offensive capabilities. A sub-committee of proposed National Security Council may look into the matter of reorganising and restructuring the present armed forces in phases. In 2007, Bangladesh Army has established Army Training and Doctrine (ARTDOC) Division with the responsibility of conducting training need for Bangladesh army to meet the challenges of 21st century and to conduct research on training and operational concepts. This is a good step. But we suggest that Bangladesh Navy and Air force are also to be integrated with this division for joint services training for enhancing defensive capability and for formulating joint operations concept. Gradually this division may be converted into a tri-service organisation. To generate limited offensive capability of Bangladesh army one may consider
of raising one or two more Para Commando units. To have proper control and credible defence along Myanmar border one may think of raising an additional fighting division. Along with defence this division may also be given additional responsibility of counter insurgency operations and containing and controlling arms smuggling through the difficult jungle terrain. We need to have more air defence capability to defend various Key Point Installations (KPI) like the Jamuna bridge, Harding bridge etc. to ensure safe line of communications and rear area security in case of any out break of war. Like land force, Air force should also attain limited offensive capability. Few attack helicopters in the inventory of Bangladesh air force will definitely help ground forces to conduct limited offensive operations. Our Navy should also attain limited blue water capability and should be able to defend our EEZ without any hindrance. We do not have submarine and aircraft carriers but why we should not think defence against those. A sub-committee under National Security Council can be tasked for suggesting judicious changes in the armed forces considering the over all socio-economic condition within a reasonable time frame.

Initially there was the idea that there would be no standing army for Bangladesh. Instead some kind of national militia would be created. However, a standing army was created and the government followed the pattern of the Pakistan Army so far as the organisation, structure, training and method of recruitment were concerned. Till today for any sort of external and internal crisis armed forces is being utilised extensively by government. Even the water and electricity distribution system which has never been the domain of the armed forces, government has put them for security and proper management. For ensuring food security as well as safer transportation of fertiliser armed forces are used regularly. Besides, armed forces are also involved in various nation building activities. Construction of Cox’s Bazaar-Teknaf Highway can be cited as an example.

If we depend so much on our armed forces in almost every difficult aspect of our national concerns, then why not equip and reorganise them accordingly. Why not make Bangladesh’s armed forces a prestigious one at home and abroad by increasing its credible defence capability little more? Some will say we do not
need viable and credible armed forces because we will never fight a
war. We need to remind ourselves that owing to the presence of
highly motivated, well trained and professional armed forces we
could avoid a war with Myanmar on the Rohingya issue a decade
ago. If we did not have well-trained armed forces then by now CHT
would have been a separate country. It would not have remained
part of Bangladesh. Bangladesh armed forces are also earning
huge amount of good-will and foreign currency through participation
in various peacekeeping and other operations abroad. A disaster­
prone country like Bangladesh also needs semi-mechanised and
little mobile armed forces to save the lives of destitute people
during and after a disaster. All the above arguments do speak of a
credible defence force for Bangladesh. Now political, social and
military leaders along with intellectuals should support and act
concertedly in favour of restructuring and reorganising the armed
forces.

2.4.10 Unconventional Warfare and Strengthening Second
Line Defence Forces

Bangladesh Armed Forces have attained a reasonable amount of
proficiency in unconventional warfare by fighting against insurgents
in CHT for more than two decades. In fighting against insurgents
in CHT paramilitary, auxiliary and second line defence forces
worked shoulder to shoulder with armed forces. The people, second
line defence forces and armed forces together can form a formidable
and credible defence for the country. This was proved during the
War of Liberation in 1971. People of all spheres of live fought
together with armed forces by following the famous announcement
of Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman:
“turn every house into a fortress” (Ohore Ghore Durgo Gore Tulo).
This famous announcement clearly points towards the preparedness of
the nation as a whole to defeat the aggressors through protracted
fighting method and tactics. Since we can not spend much money
for defence forces, therefore, our fighting strategy should be based
on combination of conventional and unconventional (guerrilla)
warfare with the integration of general people and second line
defence forces.
Our War of Liberation has a great impact on our military concept and culture. Victory in that asymmetric conflict has given us so much of confidence that we would like to replicate the same strategy in future conflicts. It is not for emotional reason; it seems to be the most rational thing since our basic strength lies in our people. What do we see in Iraq and Afghanistan after the so-called US-led coalition victory? US-led Allied Forces captured Iraq and Afghanistan but could they bring normalcy there? Are they fully in control of local administration? Answers are no. Even a mighty army is getting a beating there every day from the unconventional forces. Americans in Iraq in the so-called Green Zone is not remaining green or safe. Being in the green zone they are getting bloodied every day. They are on the run. In the name of Al-Qaeda, guerrillas, with some local support, are making lives of the US-led allied forces miserable. Similarly, in Bangladesh with the support of the general people, armed forces and second line defence forces together can play havoc against any aggressor. Therefore, we need to give more emphasis on unconventional warfare concept and training. Simultaneously, we also need to upgrade for the same purpose the defensive fighting capabilities of all paramilitary, auxiliary and second line defence forces of our country.

2.4.11 Defence against NBC and Electronic Warfare (EW)

Our big neighbours such as India, China and Pakistan have nuclear weapons in their baskets in addition to their biological and chemical warfare capabilities. It is being argued that all our big neighbours have attained nuclear weapon capability as deterrence and they will use this weapon only as a last resort if attacked by an opponent with the same. But who can give guarantee in case of any outbreak of war that they will not use their nuclear capability against one another? Even in a very odd situation if someone uses the same against us then we do not have any defensive preparation against it. We can not think of attaining nuclear weapon capability. In case of use of any nuclear weapon in close proximity of Bangladesh border our innocent civilian people will suffer from dangerous after effect of it. If someone uses it against us directly we will be caught unaware and will be destroyed in totality as we do not have any
defence against it. In addition, we also do not have any defensive capability against biological and chemical warfare.

We have seen in the last Gulf war how Iraqi air defence system was impaired by the effective use of US EW gazettes and higher information technology. Therefore, it is important for our own survival that we attain proficiency in countering aggressor’s EW capability by developing our own ECCM (Electronic Counter Measures) capability. We have entered the information age and the information age warfare is drastically different from the industrial age warfare. As a country, due to lack of vision of our leaders, we failed to keep pace with other countries in adopting new technology. Traditionally, military is more slow in this regards. However, recently, we have understood the importance of information technology and military is also not far behind. Preparation of an electronic voter list with photographs along with national identity cards testifies to that. To have credible defence against NBC warfare, EW and information warfare we have to support and equip our armed forces accordingly.

2.4.12 Counter Intelligence

Reportedly, a good number of foreign intelligence organisations including CIA of USA, MI-16 of UK, RAW of India, ISI of Pakistan, MOSUD of Israel and many more are operating inside Bangladesh and causing great insecurity for us. Many a time it has been reported in media by quoting several sources and we have also good reasons to believe that some foreign intelligence organisations are acting in favour of and fuelling labour unrest in garment and other industrial sectors. Some believe that explosives and weapons are supplied by foreign intelligence agencies to terrorists in Bangladesh. Even concern has been raised that some foreign intelligence organisations are providing money to some political parties including their student wings to create unrest and disturbance for their own interest. In Bangladesh, there is an impression that our counter intelligence operations are not equipped and effective to deal with those hostile activities of different foreign intelligence organisations. We need to develop our counter intelligence capabilities along with national security information system to meet the current challenges. The wider
security challenges posed by foreign intelligence agencies need to be taken little more seriously.

2.4.13 Defence Forces in Primary Role

The primary role of defence forces is to protect the country and its people by defending country’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty from any sort of external aggression and internal subversion. To perform the sacred duty they should be always ready to take on both external and internal enemies of the country. By touching the Holy Quran or Geeta or Bible, personnel of defence forces have taken the oath to perform this sacred duty and for performing this noble task they should be fully trained and equipped. But in reality what we see? Defence forces are being pulled out from their day to day training affairs and operational activities to perform jobs like safe distribution of drinking water, ensuring secured electricity supply and speedy and safe transportation of fertiliser which should have been otherwise the normal duties of the relevant departments of the government. Even defence forces were engaged in traffic control role on the road to the utter surprise of everybody. Helping distressed people during and after any natural calamity and disaster is the secondary role of defence forces and they are performing this role very judiciously and spontaneously which is being appreciated by every one. Defence forces are also effectively engaged in containing and controlling the terrorist and insurgent groups. But dragging them out all the times from the barracks and from their primary role to contain and control political unrest by the government in power is not being viewed positively by the general people, and hence this cannot be considered as a widely acceptable role.

It has been seen in the past, due to lack of proper democratic practices and good governance defence forces were tempted to declare Martial Law and under the rule of emergency they got themselves involved in running the civil administration of the country. By getting involved in these affairs, defence forces are remaining away from their basic job of obtaining training and getting prepared for the defence of the country all the time. Throughout the 2007, defence forces remained fully away from their original task. They hardly had undergone any collective
training since September 2006 to date. They are remaining busy in maintaining the law and order of the country under the rule of emergency. Majority of defence personnel are busy in preparing the voter list which is otherwise the job of somebody else. It has been almost two years since defence forces have not undergone any collective training in the field. For example, a Brigade Major or a Commanding Officer of a Regiment or a Brigade Commander is now busy in policing job. May be after two years they will be promoted to next higher ranks without undergoing any collective training, thereby having no practical knowledge and field experiences of previous ranks. In fact, they will lack practical knowledge of leading a group of troops in the field in case of real emergency, which is a serious lapse in defence preparation. By engaging our defence forces away from their primary role we are harming and weakening our over all defence preparedness. We have to come out of it and engage our defence forces in their primary role.

2.4.14 Consensus on Core National Security Issues

Dysfunctional politics, lack of good governance and confrontation and conflict amongst political leaders and parties are major drawbacks in reaching a consensus regarding the issue of national security and in particular national defence. We have seen our political leaders failed to reach consensus regarding any national issue. Major political parties remain in opposite poles about their views on and attitude towards important issues. Our top ranking political leaders are reluctant to talk to each other. Even after pressure and compulsion if they sit for any negotiation the end result is discouraging. On the contrary, politicians of our big neighbour India were found talking in the same voice regarding any issue on national security/defence even though they have major ideological differences. It has been reported that some of our politicians got themselves involved into corrupt practices in defence procurement. We need unity amongst our political leaders and parties for formulation of a higher national security and defence organisation, like National Security Council, and for preparing a credible defence policy. Transparency should also be ensured in regards of any defence purchase deal.
2.5 BANGLADESH’S DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER STATES

States establish defence co-operation to strengthen military ties among themselves and to enhance defence capabilities. At times, the “situational variable” dictates the nature and extent of such defence co-operation. A solid defence co-operation is expected to grow on the basis of mutual needs and convergence of national interests. Not that Bangladesh has defence co-operation with many states. Below an attempt is made to give a brief picture of defence co-operation that Bangladesh has with some countries.

2.5.1 Bangladesh-China Defence Co-operation

Following Bangladesh’s Independence on 16 December 1971, it began developing some defence co-operation with the Soviet Union—the superpower which strongly supported the Bangladesh’s War of Liberation of 1971. Following the political change in August 1975 that overthrew the Sheikh Mujib Government, the Soviet Union refused to supply spare parts for military equipment to Bangladesh in 1976. Bangladesh had to find out an alternative source of supply. It needs mentioning here that during that period both at the global and subcontinental levels the Cold War was at its height. In 1971, India, following the dismemberment of Pakistan, emerged as a regional hegemony which China found hard to accept. The changed political scenario in Bangladesh following the overthrow of Mujib in 1975 suited China’s perception of its role in South Asia.

It was during the Ziaur Rahman’s regime (1975-1981) that the foundation of close ties between Bangladesh and China was laid and co-operation took off in the political, economic, military, and cultural fronts. Several factors motivated Bangladesh and China to establish defence co-operation. As mentioned, following the political change in 1975, the Soviet Union refused to supply military spare parts to Bangladesh. So China stepped in to fill in the vacuum. The inflow of Chinese military support during the Ziaur Rahman’s period took place in two forms: weapons and military advisers. And among weapons received from China there were second hand, refurbished as well as new items.

Defence co-operation further upgraded during the Ershad regime of 1982-90. A number of high level military visits took place both
ways. The prominent visitors from the Bangladesh Armed Forces were the Chief of Army Staff in 1988 and the Chief of Naval Staff in 1984 and 1987. The Chief of Air Staff, A.V.M. Mumtazuddin visited China in September 1989. Army Chief, Lieutenant General Noor Uddin paid a visit to China in April 1991 at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart. From China, the Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) visited Bangladesh in 1987 and 1989. The other high ranking visitors from the Chinese side included the Deputy Chief of General Staff in 1979 and 1982, the Commander of PLA (Air Force) in 1984 and 1990, the Commander of PLA (Navy) in 1983 and 1989. Chinese Defence Minister General Qin Jiwei paid a visit to Bangladesh in February 1990. Thus the highest number of high ranking military level visits from both sides took place during the Ershad regime.35 Supply of weapons and service also continued during the Ershad regime. For example, Bangladesh received Hainan class FAC from China. In subsequent years, defence co-operation between Bangladesh and China continued to develop.

It has been learnt from a reliable source that a defence protocol has been signed between Bangladesh and China in 2004. According to the protocol, China agreed to supply 20 million worth of US$ weapons to Bangladesh. Since then, the Bangladesh Army has received military hardware like KW-II (surface-to-air missile), RAT (Anti-Tank Missile), and Tank upgradation facilities. Under the protocol China has supplied to the Bangladesh Navy surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles (C802 type), and to Bangladesh Air Force, radar. To some, the 2004 protocol help to “institutionalise and rationalise” the existing defence co-operation in “training, maintenance and in some areas of production.”36 In summary, defence co-operation between Bangladesh and China has become multidimensional, which will continue to grow as military ties between them serve their mutual national interest.

2.5.2 Bangladesh-US Defence Co-operation37

Some claim that the US has always denied the defence supplies to Bangladesh.38 Since late 1970s, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) military personnel received professional training assistance from the United States through International Military Education
Training Programme (IMET).\textsuperscript{39} Visits of high ranking military officials and combined military exercises, conferences, seminars, such as Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistic Seminars (PASOLS) and Pacific Army Management Seminar (PAMS) are also held under the programme.\textsuperscript{40} Since 1988, several joint military exercises and nation building works have been undertaken by the US and Bangladesh Armed forces. The US Department of Defence responded to the 1991 cyclone with over US$28 million worth assistance in kind including medical supplies, other relief commodities and repair of the Chittagong Airport by Corps of Engineer Personnel. In addition, the US President dispatched a joint task force of 4600 marines and 2965 sailors, along with seven ships including the helicopter carrier \textit{USS Tarawa}, 28 helicopters and ten landing crafts. The relief mission engaged in air and amphibious transport, communications, medical and engineering assessments and assistance.\textsuperscript{41} The relief efforts of US troops are credited with having saved as many as 200,000 lives.\textsuperscript{42}

The US troop platoons have visited Bangladesh on several occasions in the past to conduct joint military exercises. There have been three such exercises involving the armies of the two countries in the last ten years. Since 1982, a liaison team comprising the Pacific Command of the US and the Bangladesh military has been in operation to coordinate their actions in the Indian Ocean Zone, including in times of disasters, breach of peace and/or hostility in the region. More than 300 military personnel from Bangladesh have received training in the US since 1979. The US military assistance to Bangladesh too has been steady since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{43}

Bangladesh and the US have carried out joint exercises as a symbol of their collaboration. “Operation Seabat” an exercise between US Navy and Bangladesh Navy and Air Force was held in August 1995 in the Bay of Bengal.\textsuperscript{44} According to Commander Brian Prindle of US Navy, this exercise focused on co-operation between US and Bangladesh naval forces in fields of surveillance, search and rescue operation during natural calamities, a legacy of the 1991 post cyclonic disaster rescue “Operation Sea Angel”. It was also aimed at forging co-operation between US Navy and Bangladesh Air Force in search and rescue technique. The joint exercise is a part of the series underway since 1992. The exercises
are held twice annually since 1992. In 1995, the Bangladesh Air Force made its largest purchase from the US—12T-37 Jet trainers.45

Military relations between the two countries further developed by the visit of the Chief of the US Armed Forces General Dennis Joe Reimol, in April 1998, who headed a 97-member goodwill delegation. Reimol met the Prime Minister, President and senior defence officials.46 Lieutenant General James M. Lee, Commander of the US land force in the Western Pacific, during his five days visit to Bangladesh in early 1984 held extensive discussions with the then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Lt, General H.M. Ershad, the Chief of the Bangladesh Navy and Air Force, the Chief of General Staff and the Defence Secretary to the Bangladesh Government. The US Government was interested in obtaining landing facilities for the Seventh Fleet Planes in emergency situations. Chittagong, the only Bangladesh port open to the sea was considered unfit for berthing for big warships. The Seventh Fleet could not therefore be keen on obtaining berthing facilities for its warships, which rank among the largest and most sophisticated in the world. But emergency landing facilities including refuelling amenities in the Bay of Bengal could be of tremendous advantage for its planes. Three senior officers of the Asia-Pacific command made an extensive tour not only of Chittagong but also of St. Martine and Manpura Islands, in the same year while the US was looking for emergency landing facilities for the Seventh Fleet at Chittagong, it wanted to establish naval bases in the two Islands.47 Because of strong opposition from domestic level Bangladesh government could no allow USA to establish naval bases in Bangladesh Islands.

In 1998 the US diplomat, Bill Richardson, during his visit to Bangladesh proposed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) agreement to Bangladesh Government. This was a controversial issue. SOFA would facilitate unhindered entry of the US troops into Bangladesh, in times of emergency, without having to comply with even visa and passport formalities. Equipment and supply would also have been allowed to be brought in without being subject to customs formalities.

Section of the media, intelligentsia and left-leaning politicians argued that the proposed agreement contained unequal provisions
would work against Bangladesh's sovereignty and dignity.\textsuperscript{48} Responding to such criticism, the US authorities clarified on 18 June 1998 that SOFA was not conceived as a military pact and that it would not facilitate the establishment of a U.S. military base in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{49}

Some sections of Bangladesh continue to argue that Bangladesh needs a "security umbrella" of a major power to defend its interests in the nuclearised South Asia. Strategic affairs experts who subscribe to this theory say that consequent to India's nuclear tests, it would be prudent for Bangladesh to enter into a military co-operation agreement with a major nuclear power "even if it means that the islands in the Bay of Bengal would have to be made a base for that power." "Several intellectuals likewise argued in favour of Bangladesh taking shelter under the security umbrella of a major power like the US "to counter any Indian design."\textsuperscript{50}

2.5.3 Bangladesh-India Defence Co-operation
Defence co-operation with geographically proximate countries offers a range of mutual benefits. Such defence co-operation helps to generate trust and confidence and enhances political and economic ties. Bangladesh and India have developed relationships based on the legacy of historical and cultural linkages. Bangladesh-India defence co-operation dates back to the Bangladesh War of Liberation of 1971 when India fought directly in favour of the independence of Bangladesh and gave military assistance, armed training and shelter for the people of Bangladesh.

Today, most of the emerging national security threats are transnational. Like traditional security threats, transnational threats such as international organised crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, etc. are considered as national security threats and their causes and effects are often not easily ascertained.\textsuperscript{51} The transnational nature of domestic threats has led countries to build strong defence co-operation with immediate neighbours. Seen from this perspective, Bangladesh-India defence co-operation demands qualitative improvements. Currently, defence co-operation between Bangladesh and India encompasses exchanging visits of defence personnel, availing of training courses in each others' training
institutions and participating in peace keeping exercises by the military of both countries. It may be mentioned here that Bangladesh’s Army Chief, Lieutenant General Mustafizur Rahman visited India in 2000. Furthermore, India participated in August-September 2002 to the Bangladesh Army and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) hosted multinational peace support operation exercise named Shanti Doot-1 in Bangladesh under the framework of Global Peace Operations Initiative Programme.

At least three compulsions can be discussed to expand defence co-operation with India. The first is the geopolitical reality. Bangladesh is geographically proximate to India. As such, defence co-operation with India may contribute to enhance political and economic ties between the two countries. The second is the overlapping trends of transnational threats to national security of both countries. In recent years, Bangladesh and India have been suffering from the organised crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, small arms proliferation, maritime piracy, etc. To address these transnational challenges, military co-operation between Bangladesh and India is necessary. Meaningful co-operation between security and intelligence agencies of both countries can play a vital role in this regard. The third is the India’s global emergence as an important player in global politics. Bangladesh can take political and strategic leverage by strengthening defence co-operation with India. The rise of ‘Chindia’ connectivity is an example of breaking the decades-long dispute between China and India. However, a lasting defence co-operation between India and Bangladesh depends on their attitudes and temporal and spatial factors. Finally, taking into consideration of domestic, transnational and strategic compulsions, Bangladesh may examine to forge and reinvigorate defence partnership with India to enhance its national security. Therefore, Bangladesh can explore the possibilities of conducting joint military exercises with India. These joint military exercises may be conducted between Army to Army, Navy to Navy and Air Force to Air Force of Bangladesh and India.

Now Bangladesh has been facing the realities of the 21st century. Hence the question is: Is Bangladesh in a position to have defence alliance or to sign a defence treaty/pact with any superpower or regional power? Many regional powers may be interested in cultivating cordial relations with Bangladesh owing to her strategic
geographical location and the mineral resources that she possesses. It is a known fact that in international politics there is neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends. What is permanent is the country’s national interest. If other nations do find interest in Bangladesh they will definitely be encouraged to have friendly relations with her. As mentioned, there was a strong opposition in the media and in some quarters a decade ago when the US wanted to have a military agreement with Bangladesh by signing SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) or SOMA (Status of Military Agreement). Many quarters including the leftist political parties opposed the move vehemently and the government in power was hesitant to go for it for its own political interest. It is a known fact that US has few military bases abroad. Within Asia, US have military bases in Japan, Indonesia and South Korea. Even US have bases in some Middle East countries and have signed SOFA/SOMA with them. Now the questions are: Whether these countries have lost their territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty? Have the socio-economic conditions of these countries declined because of SOFA/SOMA? Answers that appears are “no”. In this context, if one raises the question: Have their credible defensive capabilities increased? Then the answer appears to be “yes”. Not only in defence sector have they developed, they have also developed in economic and other sectors. If it is so, then why should not Bangladesh consider positively prospects of defence pact/alliance with some powers which may assist it against odds and adversaries?

Small states do have difficulty in having military alliance with someone bypassing their big neighbours. Few years ago, Nepal wanted to buy weapons from China bypassing India and reaction of India and consequences are all known to us. Small state in some cases cannot afford to renounce the possibility of making alliance with other large states. Enemy’s enemy is a friend: such wisdom remained the basis of military alliances and the balance of power game throughout the history of warfare. Bangladesh’s War of Liberation was fought in alliance with India and the former USSR.52 Bangladesh should definitely exploit all the available opportunities and in that the possibility of alliance remains open. Our policymakers need to think with whom to make alliance.
Pakistan has been receiving US military assistance and at the same time having defence relations with China. Why should not Bangladesh have one for its own survival and safety?

It is important to mention here that in 2007 under the title Malabar-2007, from September 4-9 a massive multilateral naval drill involving India, the US, Japan, Australia, and Singapore took place in the Bay of Bengal. This is the first time a joint exercise on this scale involving 25 vessels had been conducted off India’s eastern seaboard and very close to Bangladesh waters. The operational area of Malabar-2007 was planned to stretch from Vizag on the eastern seaboard to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands that guard the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, considered the world’s busiest waterway. Significantly, although such a massive multilateral naval drill took place in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh was not a party to this naval exercise event. It needs underscoring here that Bangladesh should have been included in such a naval exercise. Bangladesh’s inclusion in this naval exercise would have been a great opportunity for it to foster defence co-operation with these countries. It seems Bangladesh has missed a great opportunity. In future if any kind of naval drill takes place in the Bay of Bengal, the Bangladesh government should take necessary initiatives to participate in that naval exercise for its own national interest.

2.6 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

It is well-known that the direct involvement of the military in politics occurred in 41 A.D. when the Roman emperor Caligula was assassinated by his praetorian guards who then took control of the government. "Civil-military relations is one aspect of national security." The key focus of civil-military relations is the relations of the officer corps to the state. "Here the conflict between functional and societal pressure comes to a head. The officer corps is the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society. The state is the active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including military security." Machiavelli summed up as Peter Lyon put it: "almost the whole art of government" in The Prince, in the following manner: "The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be
good laws where the state is not well armed it follows that where
they are well armed they have good laws.”57 Then Lyon states,
“Civil society presupposes respect for civilities; but ... entailments
are much more onerous and therefore rather rarely accomplished.
The classic question *quis custodiet ipsos cutodes?*-who shall keep
watch over the guardian?—remains pertinent.”58 To Huntington,
“nations which develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations
have a great advantage in national security; on the other hand,
nations that failed squander their resources and run uncalculated
risks.”59

The questions are: Who shall play this role of maintaining a
balanced pattern of civil-military relations? And who shall keep
watching over “the guardian”? Can a country’s “Civil Society” and
Parliament play this balancing and watching role? If so how?
Before addressing directly these questions, one needs to put the
subject in a wider perspective so that one can understand what
civil-military relations are all about, and what is the picture of this
in Bangladesh’s context?

General Moeen U Ahmed opines: “Any democratic government
needs to value the professional expertise and opinions of military
hierarchy for policy decisions on defense and national security.
Civil bureaucrats and different bodies of the government should
work in close coordination with the military for implementation of
decisions on the issues like national security for ensuring rule of
law.”60 The central importance in civil-military relations is the
relationship between the military elites and the political leaders.61
The aspect of civil-military relations to which attention is often
given is the tradition of political control over the military power.
According to this principle, “The military does what the civil
authority determines, and only that; it does not do otherwise.”62
This classical theory of civil-military relations is thus rooted in the
primacy of the principle of civilian control over the organisation of
the armed forces. The concept of supremacy of civilian body is
based on the ideals of the regular functioning of political
institutions and the organisation of the armed forces is designed
as a neutral body mainly to handle defence and security.63

We argue here that problems arise when there is an absence of
regular functioning of political institutions and when those
political actors/leaders who are given the responsibilities to make political institutions functional cannot keep it functional any longer because they fail to go by the democratic rules of the game. This in turn gives rise to undemocratic governance and a crisis of governance in a given state, making politics of the day dysfunctional. Under such a situation relations between political leaders/elites and military elite get strained, as under that condition the military’s role to remain politically neutral is compromised by its direct involvement in politics.

By definition military involvement in politics is evidence of a failure of “professionalism”. Such perceptions provided the conceptual underpinnings for the “liberal model” of civil-military interaction, and the normative context for much of the early literature on military involvement in politics. In essence, the liberal model upholds that military neutrality in politics is good; military involvement is bad. S. E. Finer argued that military involvement in politics cannot be understood solely by reference to the military; rather, military involvement is inversely related to the level of a country’s political culture. The military steps in when other institutions of the government are relatively weak or when they fail. Huntington also argues that military intervention in politics (“political disorder”) is the consequence of a failure of a country’s political institutions to cope with rising demands for expanding political participation caused by rapid social change. Military involvement in state power is an important political event. The intervening regime is called, according to Finer, “men on horseback”, and in order to attain public approval for their intervention, they often adopted civilian titles and transformed themselves, as Nordlinger, said into “soldiers in mufti.” Evidence is abundant to support the contention that a primary motive for continuation of military rule, regardless of the original motive to seize power, is to maintain the corporate interests of the military. Morris Janowitz has identified five types of civil-military relations: (i) authoritarian-personal control; (ii) authoritarian-mass party; (iii) democratic-competitive and semi-competitive system; (iv) civil-military coalition, and (v) military oligarchy. Rizvi’s work on Pakistan, and Baxter’s and Rahman’s work on Bangladesh show that Pakistan and Bangladesh maintain “a strong attachment to the ethos of the liberal model of military involvement in politics.”
But the practice in these two countries as far as the military interference in politics is concerned are opposite of what the “liberal model” advocates: Political neutrality of military is good, and its involvement in politics is bad. Pakistan is a glaring example of military oligarchy under General Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul Huq.


Hossain maintains that since Bangladesh has been ruled differently either civil and military or civil/military or military/civil mixed at various stages of turbulent political history, different trends have also emerged in civil/military relations. The pattern of civil/military relation in Bangladesh during the War of Liberation shows that there existed a pro-military ideology within the society. The military fought hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder with the common people and won independence. They had substantial influence on the government, although they were under political control. After independence, however, when the Awami League headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, formed the government, civilian control was firmly imposed on the armed forces. “Under Mujib’s dominating civil authority, the military virtually lost its influence and therefore became alienated from the Awami League government. The army not only suffered from status deprivation, they became highly politicised and in consequence different groups emerged on different ideological or personal lines finally leading to several coups. All these groups became contenders for state power and each group fought against the other.” Then through a people’s revolution, as it came to be called, the military under the command of General Ziaur Rahman established a dominant position in government and politics in Bangladesh. His successor General Hossein Mohammad Ershad followed his predecessor’s suit.

Some would argue that post 1990 civil-military relations in Bangladesh had a positive trend. Military elites in Bangladesh are primarily interested in professional and academic pursuits. But
military involvement in Bangladesh's politics in 2007 has given rise to public debate as to the real motive of military.

Civilian control of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence has been gradually making the military more accountable and transparent. Veena Kukreja has shown that if the level of the institutionalisation of civilian political procedures, the level of military institutionalisation, the domestic socio-economic and international environment supporting level of social mobility and economic mobility are high, then there would be integrated boundaries displaying civilian control and if these are low then there would be fragmented boundaries displaying tenuous civilian control. In Bangladesh, these levels cannot as yet be graded high but it is definitely "picking up" notwithstanding the irritants and vibrations at times.

Bangladesh Constitution has devoted separate chapter (Chapter IV under part IV (the Executive) that deals with the Defence Services. President of the Republic is shown as the Supreme Commander of the defence services although the Prime Minister exercised de facto powers, as is the practice in any parliamentary system of government.

2.6.1 The Role of "Civil Society"
The term “civil society” is academically overloaded. It means different things to different people. A satisfactory definition is hard to come by. Civil society normally refers to an intermediate and non-commercial associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relations to state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect and advance their interests or values. Towards 1998 in a brochure entitled “UNDP and Civil Society Organisation: Building Alliances for Development” defines Civil Society Organisation in the following way: “Civil society embraces the broad range of human activity outside the market and the state although it ultimately influences and is influenced by both .... Simply put, CSOs express the interests and aspirations of people. They are citizen organised, united by common needs, interests, values or traditions and mobilised into many kinds of activity.” Civil society lies in between the state and the private sphere. It does not include parochial relations of kin or other
inward-looking groups, such as groups getting together for entertainment or religious worship. It also excludes commercial and economic activities. “Civil society is distinct from society in general, in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests and to make demands on the state. Society then refers to everything that is not the state, whereas civil society is only concerned with public ends.”

Since civil society involves citizens, here civil society can mobilise public opinion against uncongenial military interference in the civilian rule. It can create fresh public opinion regarding the political role of military. Doubtless, military has its corporate interest to represent. But this representation should not be bypassing the civilian norms and rules. Civil society can organise various seminars, conferences, meetings, roundtable conferences in which it can discuss threadbare when, how, where and what for the political neutrality of military should be maintained. It can, by forming citizens’ opinions, act as a regulatory body to monitor under what circumstances the role of political neutrality has been compromised and what for. It can mobilise citizens’ opinion about military excess, by propagating a balancing pattern of relationship between civil-military relations. As it is a part of national security, therefore military cannot be put in total isolation about the affairs of the state. But in which state of affairs military role will augur well should be decided by both civilian political leaders and military elites so that military cannot feel estrange and suffer from self-estrangement, giving rise to an unbalanced pattern of relations. It is here that civil society can act as go-between between civilian and military elites. True, unless there is a healthy balanced relationship between the civilian and military elites, it may give rise to political instability. It is here civil society can act an early warning signal mechanism so that before relations get sour, they can be brought back to the correct perspective. Civil society can also engage in forming public opinion regarding whether the military will be given some decision-making role in war diplomacy. Although to wage a war against an external power is a civilian matter, military should be consulted as the war game and war strategy is not a civilian matter, rather a military affair. As civil society normally refers to an “intermediate associational realm”, it
can play a mediating role in settling contentious dispute which stands as a barrier against balanced civil-military relations.

2.6.2 The Role of Parliament

The Parliament is the highest legislative body in which public voice must be heard, respected and taken into consideration to decide important matters of the state. It has a crucial role to play in the field of civil-military relations in that it can play a legitimate role in any public procurement policy. It is the right effective state organ to make both civil and military elites to remain transparent and accountable to it about their policies, decisions, strategies, and their overall function. It is through it, public should know whether correct procedural process has been followed or not about public policy on defence and defence procurement. It is the Parliament which can play an authoritative role to decide both the extent and nature of civilian and military matters so that their matters and decision do not suffer from lack of legitimacy. Thus, it can play a legitimate balancing role between civilian and military matters so that a balanced patterned of relationship develop between civil-military. Perhaps there is no other organ of a state which has such an authoritative role of making the government accountable and transparent. When and if Parliament works independently of the executive with a sovereign power, it is possible to strike an equipoise between civil and military relations if the major actors remain deeply committed to go by the democratic rules of the game. But when Parliament is just a rubber stamp, then the nation cannot cultivate a balanced relation between civil and military. Rather it runs the risk, to borrow the ideas of Huntington, of “uncalculated” damage in the nation’s security matter. It needs mentioning here that a balanced civil-military relationship is conducive to good governance in the absence of which democracy cannot function properly. And, without good governance and democracy, nation’s security cannot be enhanced. The absence of good governance is anarchy; and out of anarchy grows bad governance. Bad governance is not able to bring about a balanced civil-military relationship.

As one Bangladeshi military General puts it, “National security today is the domain of both civil and military men. It is achieved through a well-articulated policy determined at the highest level of
the government i.e. cabinet, parliament, AFD, MOD, and Ministries of Foreign and Home Affairs etc. The policy should be a blend of political vision, strategic aspirations, regional and international environment, economic and military capabilities. While political masters determine the policy, the military leaders need to provide the military viewpoints, given that in a workable democracy if not vibrant, Bangladesh should develop a healthy civil-military relations and viable politico-military structure for ensuring national security. 78

There is a Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence, which sits occasionally to discuss defence related matters. This committee discusses some of the relevant and burning issues that affect the defence services but it need to go deeper into the details of defence services as visualised in the Constitution. Mansoor Mamoon says: "The parliamentary standing committees seem to have no effective say over the functions of different ministries. These committees appear helpless as the ministers concerned very often ignore them." 79 Here the role of Parliament should be underlined. Its role should be tailored to make ministries concerned fully accountable and transparent to it. To make it happens all lawmakers of the Parliament should abide by the democratic rules of the game. This is through such agreement among the major actors about the democratic rules of the game institutionalisation of the basic pillars of democracy is possible. This in turn will make the Parliament effective. Given the fact that in 2007 judiciary has been separated from the executive, it is likely that henceforth the Parliament will be able to function independently of the executive.

2.6.3 Military in Aid of Civil Power

After Bangladesh's independence in 1971, the military 'aid to the civil power' has occurred at regular intervals. Both civilian governments and military regimes that came to power have extensively employed armed forces in maintaining public order and ensuring the country's internal security as well as providing necessary administrative and logistic aid to the civil administration. Although the active employment of troops in aid to the civil power is the last resort of civil government, many regimes have frequently exploited this option of using the military forces for domestic peacekeeping even for extended periods. This has overly contributed to the process of politicisation of the armed forces of Bangladesh. 81
Moreover, the frequent uses of armed forces have generated public criticism and have tarnished its image as the defenders of the nation, thereby undermining the military morale. However, aid to the civil power is a function of the Government of Bangladesh for the prevention or suppression of disorder which should not be confused with martial law.

The Government instructions on military assistance to the civilian affairs have been clearly spelt out. According to the Government instructions, military assistance in aid of civil power falls into three categories. The first use of military is to assist local authorities and police to prevent likely disturbances. If the civil authorities have reasons to think that a disturbance is likely to occur, which will be beyond the power of the police to control, they may requisition military assistance both as preventive and precautionary measures. It has been said in the instructions that in civil disturbances the presence of troops has a “steadying effect, and their early appearance frequently results in the arrest of a dangerous movement before it has had time to develop.”82 The early arrival of military support tends to boost up the morale of the police and civil administration. Even following the outbreak of disturbance, the arrival of troops at the spot often results in the improvement of the law and order situation. This makes easier for the civil authorities to establish control over the situation without actually having to employ troops. The military’s second aid to civil power involves in the situation of the actual dispersal of unlawful activities. The civil authority may call upon troops for the actual dispersal of unlawful assemblies. The active measures include patrolling and the use of military in cordons or in quartering localities. The military’s third aid to the civil power involves in the maintenance of essential services during national calamities/strikes. Troops may be employed in the maintenance of essential services during national calamities or emergencies like fires, earthquakes, floods or famines and also during strikes or industrial disputes.

According to the Government instructions, there are a set of principles and instructions for seeking military assistance in aid of the civil power. First, troops should not be employed in aid of the civil power for periods of over 10 days without the sanction of the Government. Second, it is only in exceptional circumstances that troops should be employed in labour disputes for purposes other
than the prevention or suppression of disorder arising out of such disputes. Beyond these, if the deployment of troops is required, then it can be done only with the consent of the Government as a general rule. Third, except in cases of extreme urgency, the power to request the military authorities to send regular troops from one station to another is vested to the Government. Fourth, when there are no troops in the affected area, the local authorities should telegraph to the Government for troops, indicating the nature of the disturbance and the kind and number of troops likely to be required. In cases of extreme urgency the authority should send telegraph to the military authorities directly, concurrently sending the same telegraph to the Government. In few cases, the control measures for the suppression of disturbances should remain in the hands of the civil authority as long as possible i.e. until Martial Law is proclaimed. The active employment of troops in aid of the civil power is the last resort of a civilised government and when employed in that contingency, troops make use of the lethal weapons with which they are armed at the discretion of the officer on the spot. They will not be deployed like police methods or be armed with police weapons. Troops when patrolling an area should be accompanied by a police representative or magistrate so that they may thereby be empowered to arrest and take other actions as may be necessary.

Bangladesh has been suffering from repeated political crises, labour disputes, and natural disasters, etc. The frequent natural calamities are causing the death of thousand lives, displacing millions of citizens from one place to another within the country. The Bangladesh military is routinely called upon to face challenges like natural calamities. In 2007, the military aid to the civil power came into effect in two forms in Bangladesh. First, in January 2007 under the state of emergency, following the Government’s instructions, nearly sixty thousands troops were deployed throughout the country to assist local authorities and police to restore and maintain law and order and to prevent the outbreak of likely disturbances. In fact, armed forces were called upon in the situation of actual dispersal of unlawful activities in the country. Since January 2007 when the reformed Caretaker Government came into power, the armed forces have been playing an important role in maintaining law and order and combating various crimes in
The military forces have led a concerted effort against criminals, criminal syndicates, and terrorists in the country.

In addition, one sees that in aid of civil power, the armed forces have been called upon to prepare electronic voter list to facilitate free, fair and credible elections in the country. Up to now, the voter list preparation work has been accomplished smoothly. This initiative has been appreciated by citizens, communities and other stakeholders. The Government has deployed troops in aid of civil administration following the Cyclone Sidr and the two preceding floods in 2007. On 15 November 2007, the Sidr cyclone hit the coast of south-west Bangladesh with winds of up to 240 km an hour. The Sidr directly affected about 8.9 million people and caused extensive damages to houses, water and sanitation infrastructures, harvests, food stocks and livelihoods, killing livestock and destroying fishing resources and other income generating assets. The Cyclone Sidr and the two preceding floods resulted in at least 4,400 deaths disrupting the lives of millions of people in some of the poorest and most vulnerable areas of the country. As of the instructions of in ‘aid to civil power’, Government has installed naval ships, aircraft, and helicopters to reinforce the rescue and relief operation in the most affected areas. The armed forces have been heavily engaged in post-cyclone rehabilitation activities and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure in the affected areas.

Bangladesh has witnessed severe political crises, giving rise to the declining of law and order situation. It has also experienced devastating disasters in which armed forces have repeatedly been called upon in aid of civil administration to control the situation. From the human security point of view, natural disaster is an important issue which affect national security. Thus, military assistance to protect national resources and citizens from the catastrophe serves the objective of national security. However, the success of all military assistance in aid of the civil power depends upon the co-operation between the civil and military authorities. Successful co-operation can only be achieved when there is mutual confidence, trust and understanding between the armed forces and civil administration. According to the Government instructions, in all stages of disturbances, military and civil officers must co-operate with one another as closely as possible. Fundamental and human rights should not be violated by the armed forces while conducting
operations. In this regard, members of armed forces should have scope for training about human rights and humanitarian law. Furthermore, armed forces should not be called upon frequently for minor jobs like traffic control, fertiliser and/or water distributions, etc.

2.7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bangladesh faces security challenges both from internal and external sources. A comprehensive security strategy is needed to meet these challenges. External vulnerabilities of Bangladesh can be addressed by application of diplomacy, and hence diplomacy should be Bangladesh's first line of defence, while the military means or application of force should be the last resort. Viewed thus, Bangladesh also needs taking precautionary military measures to address any security challenges emanating from the external source. To do so, it needs modernising its weapons system so that its weapons can match the superior quality weapons of its opponents. Outdated weapons are military liability. If necessary, at the tactical level, it should take measures which may appear a little offensive. An exceedingly defensive policy may expose Bangladesh's vulnerabilities in such a negative way which powers, inimical to it, may deem as its weaknesses. This Bangladesh should try to avoid, otherwise, external powers will feel tempted to exploit this weakness of Bangladesh to their advantages.

A credible defence policy, among other things, depends on its military capabilities and political willingness to apply that when necessary. However, Bangladesh cannot adopt any policy which becomes too costly and hence outweighs its gains. But it must allocate adequate necessary resources so that it can improve its technological know-how. This is how Bangladesh can upgrade its own weapon system. But it has certain limitation which Bangladesh cannot easily overcome. Bangladesh cannot, for example, allocate huge public money to the defence sector at the cost of other sectors. Given the fact that Bangladesh cannot militarily face the domineering neighbours, it has to train the whole nation in-arms as its credible defence so that it can raise the cost of aggressor so high in which the aggressor's losses outweigh the gains. This is how Bangladesh can enhance the capacity to inflict damage on the aggressor.

Given that civil-military relations occupy an important place in national security, these relations ought to grow evenly so that
civil-military relations remain harmonious, and both can supplement and complement to each other. In this respect, the role of Parliament and civil society is paramount. It is through Parliament and civil society that the acts, policies, and strategies of civil and military can be made accountable and transparent. It is through these organs the military’s rightful place in the realm of politics should be defined. The military, on the alibi of preserving its corporate interest, should not determine its own rules of the game. Should it happen, then it will destroy the established rules and norms of civilian control of military. For democracy’s survival and sustenance such a civilian control of military is essential. If such a harmony can be achieved by agreeing to go by the democratic rules of the games, then prospects for good governance will appear bright. This will make civil-military relations robust. And such robustness of civil-military relations is the need of the hour. So is the National Council on Defence. And, this should comprise both state and non-state actors so that they can have their own voices in dealing with issues of national importance.

At this stage, we would like to put forward some critical issues which merit immediate attention. These issues are as follows:

a. Formation of a national apex body for national defence planning and co-ordination,

b. Bringing reforms in the security sector,

c. Exploring options for alliance and substantive defence co-operation, and

d. Establishing a think tank for defence studies.

2.7.1 Formation of a National Apex Body for Defence Planning and Co-ordination

The country should have a national apex body for national defence planning and co-ordination. The government should take necessary initiatives to form such a national apex body for national security. The name of such an apex body could be National Council on Defence or a name which should be decided on the basis of consensus. The primary function of such a National Council will be to determine the national defence policy. In the absence of such a National Council, a concrete defence policy will be hard to formulate, and hence it will seem inconceivable to talk about a credible defence.
Therefore, the government should take initiatives to determine the nature and extent of the tasks that National Council should undertake. Initiatives on the part of civil society and research community will be to give the government support and feedback, thus working concertedly with the government to accomplish the job of formation of a National Council on Defence Planning and Co-ordination.

2.7.2 Reforms in the Security Sector

Bringing necessary reforms in the security sector of Bangladesh has become quite urgent. The government should take urgent initiatives to appoint a full-time Defence Minister. A credible defence urgently calls for such reforms. In this respect, civil-military mindset should be one and uniform so that they can speak in a single voice about appointing a full-time Defence Minister. Such a meeting of the minds between the two will help government to undertake reform measures in the security sector. Also, keeping in mind the flow of information technology, the government should take initiatives in line with the ground realities for modernising, upgrading, and gradual mechanising of the hardware capacity of the Bangladesh armed forces so that they can perform their job as the situation demands. It should seriously think about how to make the citizen-army a part of credible defence. In this regard, the government will task the National Council on Defence to prepare a detailed plan about what reforms should be brought about and how to inject these reforms, spelling out the concrete roadmap of how to accomplish these reforms. Initiatives on the part of civil society and research community will be to vigorously advocate such reforms in line with the government's initiatives so that the government can have the full backing from both civil society and research community to go ahead with such a vital national project.

2.7.3 Exploring Options for Alliance and Substantive Defence Co-operation

Bangladesh has been facing the realities and challenges of the 21st century. In the text it has been mentioned that a number of countries in the world have signed SOFA and SOMA military agreement/arrangement with the USA. These have not compromised those
countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such arrangements seem to have given those countries a security shield. In the changed context of international system, some South Asian countries have made military deals with the US that serve their mutual security interests. It is time that Bangladesh takes fresh initiatives and approach to think about SOFA and SOMA arrangements with US, China, India and other countries with terms and conditions that are acceptable to one another. This will give Bangladesh a security shield against a potential aggressor. The Ministries of Foreign and Defence affairs should work concertedly and jointly to explore such options for concrete alliance and defence co-operation with the USA, China, India and other countries. Such an agreement/arrangement will make Bangladesh's defence policy creditable. Hence, civil society and research community should take initiatives to support the government initiatives positively by popularising the idea of such defence arrangements with the USA, China, India and other countries so that the government's efforts do not go in vain.

2.7.4 Establishing a Think Tank for Defence Studies

The government needs to take initiatives to establish a separate think tank for defence studies. As mentioned in the text, in 2007 the Bangladesh army has established its Army Training and Doctrine (ARTDOC) Division. But this Division seems to urgently need expansion. If it remains an exclusive body of the army, it will not serve wider purpose. All other branches of the military should be included within it so that eventually it can become an effective tri-service organisation including the Second-Line Defence. The ARTDOC Division and BIJISS can work jointly with each other, sharing each other's expertise for the mutual benefit. Such a joint collaboration will be helpful to establish institutional links between the two. The government's particular job in this regard will be to take initiatives so that the ARTDOC can actually evolve as a tri-service organisation, thus serving defence needs of the combined armed forces. National Council on Defence should be tasked to look into the matter so that the pace of accomplishment of such a tri-service organisation becomes faster. Civil society and research community, through their advocacy in favour of such a tri-service organisation, can boost up the government's initiatives.
ENDNOTES


12 See for details, Abdur Rob Khan, op.cit.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.
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18 Maj Gen Syeed Ahmed, op.cit.
19 Ibid.
20 Maj Gen AM Mansur Ahmed, op.cit.
21 Ibid.
23 Maj Gen AM Mansur Ahmed, op.cit.
24 Maj Gen Syeed Ahmed, op.cit.
26 Ibid.
28 Maj Gen AM Mansur Ahmed, op.cit.
29 Maj Gen Md Aminul Karim, op.cit.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid, p.269.
33 For details, see ibid, pp.279-280.
37 Information, facts, and text of this part are based on the article of Md. Harun-ur-Rashid, “U.S.-Bangladesh Defense Relations”, in *Asian Affairs* (Dhaka), Vol.24, No.2, (April-June), 2002, pp.45-59. In the consecutive footnotes the main sources, that the author has used, have been mentioned.
122 Whither National Security Bangladesh 2007


44 Ehsanul Haque, op.cit., p.244.

45 Dilara Chowdhury, op.cit., p.118.


49 Ibid.


52 Syeed Ahmed, op.cit.


54 Ibid.


56 Ibid, p.3.


58 Ibid, p.xiii.

59 Samuel P Huntington, op.cit., p.3.


61 Golam Hossain, op.cit., p.4.

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63 Golam Hossain, op.cit., p.4.
68 Kennedy and David J. Louscher, op.cit. p.3.
70 Kennedy and David J. Louscher, op.cit. p.2.
71 Golam Hossain, op.cit., p.203.
77 Anne Mette Kajaer, op.cit, p.159.
78 Quoted in Mohd Aminual Karim, op.cit.
79 Ibid. p.9.
80 This part is heavily drawn from the Government Instruction regarding the “Aid to the Civil Power,” the Ministry of Defence, the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n.d.).
82 Government Instructions regarding the “Aid to the Civil Power,” op.cit.
83 The Chief Adviser of Bangladesh Caretaker Government, Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed told the BBC on 9 May 2007 that the armed forces were working in aid of interim civil administration and played an important role in maintaining law and order and combating crime since January 2007. See, The Daily Star and The New age, 10 May 2007. Also available at:www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6639019.stm (accessed 16 July 2008).
84 See, sections 11 and 12, Appendix I and II of the Government Instruction regarding ‘Aid to the Civil Power’, op.cit.