Chapter 2

The State and Human Security Discourses in Bangladesh and Pakistan

The chapter maps the relationship of human security in the context of political and military regimes, the roles of classes/factions and various sectors of human security such as economic, socio-political and environmental. In the process of laying out the political economy of human security, it discusses the tensions between the security of citizens and the security of the state. The discussion in this chapter contributes to a general understanding of the concept of human security and provides the context for the analysis of gendered security in the next chapter.

An attempt has been made here to contextualise the concept of human security in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Specifically, this chapter provides the background to political developments in Pakistan and Bangladesh in post-1971 by comparing the evolution of military and political regimes in the two countries in terms of political economy theories. It examines the human security versus state security debate in three specific contexts of Pakistan and Bangladesh, namely: livelihood/economic security, political security and environmental security. It looks at human security issues and the role of civil society in the two countries and the obstacles to human security.

Post-colonial developing states are still in the process of state formation. While the institutionalisation of the nation-state in the West followed the rather organic pattern of alignment of techno-economic progress with the development of socio-political institutions, this has not been the case in post-colonial states. The colonisation of South Asia by the British interrupted organic political and economic development processes, especially at the local level. Post-colonial states imposed the straightjacket of a unitary modern nation-state on people and communities who essentially associated themselves with multiple and diverse identities and politico-economic structures. Instead of harmonisation, the imposition
of the post-colonial state led to disjuncture in socio-political institutions and in peoples’ lives.

Dominant groups and classes are believed to have taken over in post-colonial states and tailored state policies to suit their vested interests. The interests of these classes become the “national interest” while the state is assigned the task of the fulfilment of national interest. Hamza Alavi in his seminal work on “State and Class under Peripheral Imperialism” broadens this view.\(^1\) He calls post-colonial states “peripheral capitalist states.”\(^2\) Instead of the dominance of the “whole” bourgeoisie as spelled out in Marxist theory, there is more than one dominant class in peripheral capitalist states: “not only the indigenous bourgeoisie, but also the metropolitan bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie.” He thinks that peripheral capitalist states can potentially offer some opportunity for other classes to accrue limited benefits.\(^3\) However, there are other views on the subject. One of them is Kalecki’s conceptualisation of the role of the “intermediate classes” as a significant factor in the distributional politics of developing countries. Others such as K.N. Raj and Mushtaq Khan have elaborated on the issue. “Intermediate classes” mainly refer to the professional/salariat class and the petty bourgeoisie. The role of “intermediate classes” is crucial in factional politics (we will elaborate on it in the section on “Political Security”).\(^4\)

2.1 THE PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH CONTEXTS

The process of policy making is crucial to understanding the role played by various groups and classes — the residual claimants. The military and civilian bureaucracy has been the driving force in the policy making of both united Pakistan till 1971 and then of post-civil war Pakistan and Bangladesh.\(^5\) Politicians, industrialists, professional and the “intermediate classes” also play an important role. However, the military and the civil bureaucracy have been the dominant players. In

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2 While the main objective of modern nation-state is to ensure the necessary pre-requisites of capitalist social order.
3 Hamza Alavi, Ibid.
united Pakistan, no political leader of significant stature was able to influence the decision making process after the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan soon after the formation of the Pakistani state. Bureaucracy called the shots in 1950s and promoted a centrist developmental agenda of industrialisation. The Military formally took over in 1958 and its rule continued till the civil war of 1971. A centrist developmental agenda pushed policies into achieving high economic growth without paying sufficient attention to distributional issues. Pakistan achieved phenomenal economic and industrial growth in the 1950s and 1960s; however, if did so by alienating Bengalis in East Pakistan as well as the Baloch and Pathans in the Western wing. Other than the geographical differentiation, both post-civil war Pakistan and the newly-formed Bangladesh state experienced a period of strong civilian rule in the 1970s led by politicians: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman respectively. Both shared a desire to establish socialist democracies and ended up as civilian authoritarian leaders who could not endure any opposition to their rule. Bhutto and Mujib were successful in curbing the powers of military and bureaucracy in their respective countries by carrying out purges and restricting powers in the early 1970s. Mujib met a violent end in 1975 and the Bhutto regime was dismantled by the military in 1977 while Bhutto himself was hanged in 1979. Bangladesh went through a process of tumultuous changes due to multiple coups d'éstat starting in 1975.

According to Emajuddin Ahamed, between 1958 and 1971, the Bengali civilian and defence elite played an important role in articulating Bengali demands; they played an equally important role during the war of liberation, which also removed the distance between civilian leadership and the armed forces. Therefore, it was to be expected that they would want to ensure “the power balance in their favour so that they could achieve their objectives with their primacy in the political system.”

Further, the Awami League government’s decreased spending on the military, the creation of a parallel organisation (the Rakkhi Bahini) to the armed forces equipped with sophisticated weapons made the military conscious of its’ corporate interest. Some prominent left-

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7 Somewhat similar developments took place in Pakistan under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who created a special force called the Federal Security Force (FSF) that was loyal to him alone and armed it with sophisticated weapons and used it against internal dissent as well as to off-set the role of the more entrenched secret agencies and the military itself.

8 Ibid.
leaning military officers, such as Major Zia uddin and Col. Taher, who had fought actively in the Liberation War, were disappointed and disillusioned with the lack of change independence brought. Emajuddin Ahamed quotes Colonel Zia uddin, who openly expressed his belief in better conditions for the ordinary people in a newspaper article, “Independence has become an agony for the people. Stand on the street and you see purposeless, spiritless, lifeless faces going through life mechanically. Generally, after a liberation war, the ‘new spirit’ carries through and the country builds itself out of nothing. In Bangladesh, the story is simply the other way round. The whole of Bangladesh is either begging or singing songs or shouting without awareness.” Such sentiments among many within the armed forces and the Awami League led to the slogan “revolution betrayed.” Thus it was that divisions appeared within the armed forces as well as Awami League and some of the left-leaning officers (who also felt sidelined) tried to change the government to achieve the ideals of the Liberation War they had fought for so hard. However, this change turned out to be another excuse for the military to cement its role in politics.

General Ziaur Rahman, who took over the reigns of government in 1975, was initially considered a “front man” for a left-leaning sepoyjanata; however, he ultimately proved to be a defendant of the status quo and tried to ensure the military’s institutional interests and class hierarchies. General Zia’s policies demonstrated this: he appointed retired and serving military officials to key civilian administrative positions in different social sectors; and he increased the size and role of the military. However, groups within the military were unhappy when General Zia tried to perpetuate his rule through a process of civilianisation by trying to forge alliances beyond the cantonment. This was done through the creation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and other middle-class oriented institutions that appeared to his disenchanted colleagues as parallel organisations. Many critics termed term General Zia’s democracy to be “martial democracy.”

General Ershad’s government replaced Ziaur Rahman’s government in 1982 after the interregnum of the Sattar government (1981-2). It focused on three issues: (1) consolidation of power; (2) increasing the

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9 Emajuddin Ahamed, ibid.
11 Ibid., p.119.
hold and influence of the military in decision making (the main reason for taking over from Sattar); and (3) further strengthening the Islamisation drive initiated by the government of General Ziaur Rahman. The Ershad government tried to undo Bangladesh’s secular status by declaring Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh.

The attempts of military dictators in Bangladesh to play upon the Muslim identity of the Bangladeshis are explained by Talukder Maniruzzaman in the following manner: “The insertion of Islamic provisions of symbolic value in the constitution only indicates the anxiety of the present government [then Ershad government] to develop a ‘multi-symbol congruence’ in the Bangladesh nation differentiating it from India just as language differentiates it from Pakistan.” (2003, page 229). Thus, while Islam was made into an issue in Bangladesh polity due to the differences and identity politics with India (especially by the BNP), it could not play the retrogressive role that has been assigned to it by rulers in Pakistan.

The Ershad regime in Bangladesh (1982-1990) further institutionalised military interference in civilian affairs. The military’s presence was everywhere evident in civilian institutions. Despite the fact that Bangladesh does not have a military-legitimising issue such as the Kashmir conflict, its’ military establishment played a preponderant role for two decades after its formation. Bangladeshi military drew its legitimacy from being a “national liberation army” as well as from what we have discussed previously: its link during the War of Liberation with politicians and the subsequent civilian government. Ziring gives a vivid account of the army’s involvement in civilian affairs during the Ershad regime:

Army officers filled many of the highest positions in the public corporations, in the government secretariat, and even on the Board of Directors of the nationalised banks. The Foreign Service also had to make way for military appointees. Twenty-five per cent of the posts were allocated to the armed forces. Overall, the country’s civilian institutions were ‘militarised’ even beyond the plan to civilianise the armed forces.

This description would hold equally true for any military government in Pakistan. When General Zia ul Haq seized power through a military coup,

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he filled civilian institutions with serving as well as retired military men. In addition, the Islamisation drive of General Zia ul Haq in Pakistan was far more zealous and ruthless than the attempts in Bangladesh. In Pakistan, this drive began with the last days of the Bhutto regime, and under Zia it succeeded in legislating anti-women and anti-minorities legislation in the garb of Islamisation (discussed in the section on “Political Security” and the chapter entitled, “Situation analysis of women in Bangladesh and Pakistan”). War in Afghanistan and the American proxy Cold War policies encouraged the rise of religious fundamentalism and strengthened Zia ul Haq’s military regime both politically and economically.

Interestingly, civilian rule made a comeback in both Pakistan and Bangladesh almost at the same time. In Pakistan, the two political parties led civilian rule started in 1988 and in Bangladesh in 1991. Even more interesting is the fact that political parties in both countries are legacies of populist left-leaning parties (i.e. Pakistan People’s Party and Awami League) and conservative right-wing politics (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad/variants of Pakistan Muslim League and Bangladesh National Party). The political story begins to differ in the late 1990s. In Pakistan, civilian rule ended in yet another military government in 1999, bolstered by the USA due to its’ War on Terror, while democracy continued to rule in Bangladesh well into the middle of the first decade of 21st century. Furthermore, compared to Pakistan, the Bangladesh army’s influence has waned since the 1990s. According to Imtiaz Ahmed, the army’s active involvement in the UN Peace keeping duties contributed to its relative disengagement from politics.14 On the other hand, Pakistan, acting as a ‘frontline state’ in the Global War of Terror, has witnessed greater involvement of the military in all civilian institutions under a sham democracy.

Aside from the fact that the AL and PPP are considered progressive political parties and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and BNP (with patronage from General Zia ul Haq and General Ziaur Rahman respectively) are believed to represent conservative politics, there are two other major similarities between them: On the economic front, civilian governments have followed centrist policies and IFI (international financial institutes) diktat in both countries, and on both sides local government system was discouraged and crippled, by civilian regimes. Beyond these points, the comparison between civilian rule in the two countries ends.

In Bangladesh, both political parties agreed to have parliamentary form of government and cooperated against the Ershad regime. In Pakistan, the two leading parties did not cooperate against the ouster of the military regime as the PML was revived and strengthened by the Zia regime. During the 1990s there were frequent changes of government on charges of corruption so that both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif became prime ministers twice in a decade. In contrast, Bangladesh has witnessed slightly more stability in terms of BNP and AL having longer tenure and an attempt at military coup was aborted. Although, there appears to be a ‘ping-pong’ game in Bangladesh between Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, the roots of democracy are stronger compared to Pakistan where a military dictator took over power in 1999, when civilian regimes attempted to have the upper hand over the army chief and his appointment.

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have oscillated between the prime ministerial and presidential forms of government. The latter represents military rule and the former civilian rule. Compared to 15 years of presidential rule in Bangladesh over a 35-year span, Pakistan has had 18 years of presidential rule while the clock continues to tick away. Meanwhile, leaders of the prominent political parties are in exile with few chances of return in the foreseeable future. While the military rule in Bangladesh has resulted from more organic factors within the relationship of the armed forces and political parties as well as a limited degree of regional political considerations, recent sustained military rule in Pakistan is comparatively more connected to US politics in the region and Pakistan's frontline status. The relationship between the military elite and the political elite is also coloured by different historical contexts though the overall institutional interests of the military predominate in the equations.

2.2 STATE SECURITY VERSUS HUMAN SECURITY
States are set to achieve “national interest” mainly by focusing on territorial security and economic growth. People or citizens are generally not the main reference point of statist notions of security. Quite often people, and particularly marginalised groups’ rights and freedoms are compromised in order to achieve state security. Usually, the dominant social classes control powerful state institutions such as the military and bureaucracy in both Pakistan and Bangladesh and impose their definition of national interest on the rest of population.
The agenda on national security is geared to achieve their socio-economic and political objectives. However, the two are dissolved in such a way that questioning mainstream notions of national security is considered tantamount to being a traitor. The suppression of internal dissent and weakening of political institutions are the side effects of such policies.

In Pakistan’s case, policy makers and opinion leaders have invoked “national interest” repeatedly to justify all major decisions. Pakistanis have heard national military and civilian leaders publicly justify their self-serving policy decisions as being in the supreme national interest. Ayub Khan transformed Pakistan into the most loyal ally of the United States for the sake of “national interests” in the 1960s. He fought the 1965 war with India for a similar reason, patronised heavy industrialisation and exacerbated the economic inequalities between haves and haves not. Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan alienated a majority of East Pakistan’s population through socio-political and economic discrimination and finally Yahya Khan unleashed violence on the Bengali separatist movement and committed heinous crimes against citizens in the then East Pakistan. Pakistan was dismembered into half because of the drumming of ill-conceived and Machiavellian national interest-oriented policies of its policy makers. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto repressed political opponents, trade unionists, progressive student bodies and internal insurgencies in Balochistan and the NWFP through both overt and covert use of violence in 1970s. He nationalised industry and banks ostensibly for the sake of poor people but in reality for state patronage. Subsequent evidence indicates that nationalisation contributed negatively to people’s development. He purged the army and the bureaucracy to strengthen his own regime. Zia ul Haq dismembered the socio-political and institutional fabric of Pakistani society to promote state-sponsored Islamisation process in the 1980s. Of course, in the Zia ul Haq era, Islam and national interests were two sides of the same coin and the coin was used to validate his illegal rule over Pakistan. The return to democracy during the 1990s decade was marked by intense political bickering and the corruption scandals of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif justified Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 on the pretext of Pakistan’s national interest. The present military government leadership is quite fond of (mis)using the national interest banter. The decision of Musharraf government to extend support to US military operations in Afghanistan is again justified on the grounds of national interest.
These horizontal concepts of national security and economic growth get concentrated vertically along the dominant groups/classes in the state and society. Dominant groups spell out the agenda of national interest and it would be naive to expect that they would do so without being influenced by vested interests. Investment in territorial security further empowers the military bureaucracy, emphasis on the suppression of internal dissent strengthens the civilian bureaucracy, and economic growth caters to the interests of the dominant feudal-industrialist and professional classes.\textsuperscript{15}

However, emphasis on territorial security does not play second fiddle to anything, not even to the objective of economic development. Quite obviously, the goals of defence expenditure and economic development are inherently contradictory. In Pakistan's case, military expenditure and interest payments\textsuperscript{16} accounted for 60\% of total expenditure in 1990-91 and went up to 71.5\% in 1997-8.\textsuperscript{17} For the years 2000-2001, it again came down to 61.25\%.\textsuperscript{18} It is detrimental to economic development because it buys virtually nothing by way of productive goods and services. According to Shahrukh Khan, Pakistan spent $9.2 billion as the total budgeted cumulative military expenditure over the last decade. Most of this expenditure is spent on military personnel; hence "the weapon systems are likely to be off budget."\textsuperscript{19} A Freedom House Report claims that Pakistan spent $6 billion over the last decade on weapon systems.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{15} We are making a broad generalisation just to point towards the contours of policy making process. It will be a gross oversimplification to assume the process of determining national security/national interest as a static process. The nature of these groups and classes change and so does their share in the pie.

\textsuperscript{16} Pakistan currently has $38 billion of foreign debt. Pakistani citizens do not know why various governments borrowed so much money and are still borrowing it. One obvious reason is that various governments have not been able to live within their means and have borrowed to bridge the gap between expenditure and revenue. Another oft-quoted reason is the endemic corruption that military and civilian bureaucracy and politicians have indulged themselves in. Other strong reason is that a substantial amount of this borrowed money was spent on to pay for hidden defence expenditure such as purchasing weapon systems and funding of Pakistan's nuclear programme. No one knows the details, as the government has not shared Pakistan's debt history. When the same question was out to the Chairman of Debt Committee in a pre-budget seminar in 2001, the Chairman refused to entertain the question.


\textsuperscript{19} Khan, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{20} Shiraz Paracha, "Pakistan's defense deals during the last 10 years," London: The Freedom House. The report was circulated over email in late 1999.
There has been an annual real increase in military expenditure of 5.2% in Pakistan from 1957-1996. This is more than the annual GNP increase. Pakistan has frozen its military expenditure at Rs. 131 billion during the last few years compared to India’s significant increase in the defence budget. However, Pakistan’s defence expenditure and interest payments are large enough to plunge the country into deep economic and human development crisis.

More than economic development, defence expenditure is highly detrimental to human development and security. Pakistan spends $6066 per soldier and $36 per student. Pakistan’s military expenditure was 393 times more as percentage of education and health spending in 1985 and 129 times more as percentage of education and health spending in 1990-91. For the year 2001-2002, the military expenditure is Rs 131 billion while the education and health spending are Rs 6502 and 2162 million respectively. Thus, the combined expenditure on education and health amount to roughly 0.66 percent of the military budget.

There are certain parallels in Pakistan and Bangladesh’s socio-political, economic and bureaucratic structures. Pakistan ranks 135th and Bangladesh 146th on Human Development Index of 174 countries. Both countries are characterised a pointed lack of emphasis on human development. If we take the broader view of human security, the picture is not hopeful either.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, within the thematic focus of human security, we will discuss the following sub-themes:

1. Livelihoods Security.
2. Political Security.

The linkages between these sub-themes are evident.

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
2.2.1 Livelihoods Security

Livelihoods security of people is an intrinsic part of human security. Any discourse on economic security for people cannot but emphasise on making people secure from poverty, unemployment, and economic exploitation, and from underscoring the lack of opportunities to utilise their potential. We are going to examine some of those indicators of economic security of people now.

Poverty has increased considerably in Pakistan in the last decade as has been verified by various sources including the government itself. In 1991, the estimated number of poor was 34 percent; now it has reached 40 percent of the population. The total number of people living in poverty is 60 million, out of whom 27 million live in extreme poverty. About 40 percent of the country’s population is without safe drinking water and nearly 84 percent of the rural population is without sanitation facilities. Infant mortality rate has been high at 88 children per 1000 births and life expectancy is 63 years.

The situation is not very different in Bangladesh. Before 1971, Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, had minimal industrial development compared to West Pakistan. Bangladesh started on a weak footing. 40%-50% of its population still lives below the poverty line. According to Imtiaz Ahmed, “The middle class is disintegrating. There is a massive gap between the haves and have-nots. Six percent population controls 60 percent of resources. The rich are getting even richer and the poor poorer. NGO interventions and growth in the garments are the two anti-poverty antidotes.”27 Though, these are not surprising assertions, yet they problematise economic security in Bangladesh. Feudalism ended in Bangladesh due to the colonial policies of the 19th and 20th century. In the absence of feudal trappings, the professional classes and petty bourgeoisie achieved better social mobility. Given the fact that political struggle by East Pakistan was mainly launched by the “intermediate classes” and the rank and file of both mainstream political parties are filled with people from the middle class, it is even more surprising that the gap between the rich and poor is widening rather than getting narrower. This reflects the serious issues of economic security existing in Bangladesh.

Unemployment has risen in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The strings attached to the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) loans by the international financial institutions have had a detrimental impact

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on the poor and the marginalised. SAF loans emphasised a decrease in the budget deficit by cutting government expenditure and increasing its revenue. Since the government was not able to cut defence expenditure due to its national security agenda and the class interests of the military, or loan payments due to its commitments to international financial institutions, the proverbial axe fell on social sector development expenditure.

In the case of Pakistan, in 1990-91, a quarter of the government expenditure was spent on development; this fell to 15.8% in 1999-2000. In 2000s, it rose slightly to 17.3%. Shahrukh Khan has analysed the impact of IFIs policies on the poor and the working class in Pakistan. Public sector employment decreased from 35.3% to 28.7%. There was a major cut in subsidies from 4.1% in 1990-91 to 2.3% in 1999-2000, while almost half of these subsidies were provided for wheat and sugarcane. This has had a negative impact on consumption patterns and the nutritional needs of the poor. Indirect taxes were twice more than direct taxes in government’s revenue estimates for 2001-2002. Indirect taxes have hurt the poor much more than direct taxes. The prices of petroleum and utility charges have increased manifold in the decade of 1990s and even more since 2000. Imposition of General Sales Tax as part of IFIs conditionalities led to a high inflation rate in 1990s and has again had a negative impact on the poor. Real income in all income groups declined in this period. The lowest income group rewarded the highest decrease and the highest income group the lowest. This situation cannot but further increase the inequality between the lowest and highest income groups. Despite the ambitious Social Action Programme initiated by international donor agencies and the government to increase spending in the social sector and mitigate the effects of the structural adjustment programme, the indicators for social sector development has not improved. Unemployment and poverty increased considerably in the 1990s. The percentage of people living below the poverty line is estimated to have increased from 25% in mid-1980s to 39% by end 1990s in Pakistan. Unemployment, under-employment and “disguised unemployment” are some of the factors contributing to the high ratio of poverty. In rural areas, 13.3% of underemployment was recorded and 6.3% of this was registered in

28 While labour is being pushed out of the formal sector to the informal sector and home-based work, is being contracted out because of the push of the globalisation process.

urban areas, a phenomenon linked to the decline in the manufacturing sector due to conditions imposed by IFIs and loose disciplinary action of banks. By mid 1990s, close to 4 thousand manufacturing units were closed.

In Bangladesh, fiscal tightening through structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s and 1990s led to improved macroeconomic indicators and stability such as in inflation rates but the reforms left an adverse impact on poverty and employment ratios. Between 1995 and 2000, unemployment grew at the rate of 3% annually in Bangladesh. Despite the fact that Bangladesh performed better in readymade garments compared to Pakistan, the phase of de-industrialisation that resulted directly from the structural adjustment policies adversely impacted on employment figures and poverty reduction in both countries. In addition, these policies have had significantly negative impacts on women in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In Bangladesh, Dhaka has a special status as the socio-political and economic engine of the country's growth. Therefore, rural to urban migration and urban poverty is a particularly alarming problem. Urban slums are swelling with the rural landless migrating towards the cities due to growing fragmentation of rural landholdings connected with population increase. Although there have been improvements in fertility rates and school enrolments, income poverty is estimated to be 44% in Bangladesh, while some studies assert that 50% of the population (63 million) is below the poverty line and half of them live in extreme poverty. Although there was a modest decline in poverty indicators during the 1990s, the increasing population growth continues to add to the number of people living below the poverty line. Furthermore, and as Toufique and Turton assert, "there is no change in the gender dimensions of poverty. Female headed households are still more likely to live in poverty and females within households are still more likely to be less well-educated, more likely to be malnourished

and more likely to fall ill. They also add that 80% of the poor live in rural areas and further that poverty is geographically stratified, as the poorest districts are located in northern Bangladesh.

Examining the case of the shrimp industry in South-Western Bangladesh, Meghna Guhathakurta has pointed out its impact upon gender relations as well as class relations. She provides details of the displacement that shrimp farming causes and the loss of livelihoods of the poor women who depended on working for the richer households for sustenance. On the other hand, slightly well-to-do households who had leased their land for shrimp farming felt they were better off with the cash. Change and transformation in the patterns of land use indicate that shrimp farming led to salinity of agricultural land and left households more insecure as shrimp yields can vary depending upon weather conditions and viruses. Guhathakurta notes, "... some poor women claimed that previously they received help from those agricultural households who always had some grains in stock, especially during the lean season. Now since everyone had to buy from the market, they too were not in a position to help them. Second, women in middle-income households also felt the same way. Previously they could consume their own produce or sell them in the market. They retained a certain amount of control over their produced. But now, even assuming that they had enough cash in hand, the market dictated their consumption pattern." There have been violent conflicts in the area resulting from local resistance to the spread of shrimp farming, usually viewed as a lucrative business. Guhathakurta concludes that the delinking of a subsistence economy and integration with the global economy has implications for the dual ideologies of capitalism and patriarchy and their manifestation in changing class and gender relations.

In rural areas, big land holdings, diminishing land productivity, low crop prices, absence of agricultural credit, and lack of diffusion of sources of employment and repressive local power structure, floods, natural disasters, and high population growth push the land-poor labour force to cities. The rural poor depend on Common Property Resources (CPRs) for their livelihoods. Arid and semi-arid tropical regions usually constitute CPRs and are high risk and low-productivity

35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
areas. In the absence of entitlement to land or other high productive environmental resources, poor rural communities depend on CPRs for their daily sustenance. CPRs are ecologically fragile and have been affected by serious management collapse. Productive employment (as compared to nominal employment) and building the stock of assets of the poor in urban and rural areas are needed for livelihood security.38

There are minimal safety nets for the poor and marginalised. The hungry, malnourished, unemployed, sick, shelter-less, land-less and destitutes have little access to state protection. A number of people have committed self-immolation in Pakistan in recent years and almost all of them publicly claimed to have undertaken this extreme form of protest due to poverty. In Bangladesh, NGOs with national coverage, such as BRAC and the Grameen Bank, have played a leading role in mitigating the impact of poverty and structural adjustment programmes.39

2.2.2 Political Security

Civil and political liberties are closely linked to issues of economic growth, food security, provision of livelihoods and conservation of the environmental resource-base. Protection of the rights of citizens cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger development process. It is intrinsic to it. However, it is important to highlight the issue of socio-political security, particularly in the context of the vulnerable groups of society.

Equality of all citizens enshrined in the constitution or the ratification of international protocols does not necessarily translate into the protection of civil and political rights. Citizens have to deal with the local power structures and state power structures on a day-to-day basis. Feudal structures dominate the de facto space and district administrations control the formal legalistic relationship with citizens. The establishment of two-party system in both Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1990s indicates a sharing of power between the centre-left and centre-right political forces and social groups. However, citizen's social-political rights have not been safeguarded on a number of counts: Imtiaz Ahmed discusses in detail the politics of agitation that he calls "hartalotics." He interprets the politics of hartals (strikes) as a manifestation of the absence of democratisation of political culture. However, another academic analysis views growth of factional politics in Bangladesh as

38 Khan and Khan, Ibid.

an effort to accrue economic benefits through flexing the organisational power of the middle classes. Factional politics has been rampant in Bangladesh. They have been organised to accrue economic benefits through using the threat of street power. The initial phase of Bangladeshi politics was rampant with factionalism in the military and in political parties. Even now, intra-party conflicts are high. According to Kukreja:

Factionalism beleaguered the administration too. In 1972 there was bitter infighting between the “Mujibnagar” and “non-Mujibnagar” administrators ... members of the civil bureaucracy were caught in the factional schism of AL (Awami League). The overall result was that the bureaucracy became less efficient ... and it remained far from neutral — ideologically and politically.\textsuperscript{40}

Rounaq Jahan (2002, 58-59), writing on the political development of Bangladesh, also points out the that, due to differences that manifest themselves in the form of boycotts, demonstrations, street agitation and violence, the two main political parties have “not allowed parliament to develop as the major instrument of public accountability of the government.” She also points out these factors as threats to Bangladesh’s fragile democracy by emphasising that, “There is continuing difficulty in establishing rule of law. Competitive politics is degenerating into violent confrontation between the two dominant parties. All major parties patronise armed gangs to intimidate the political opposition and to mobilise support. Decision-making is personal rather than institutional, and this inhibits growth of institutions.” She concludes that “Though democratic elections have been restored since 1991, democratic governance is still fragile. Nevertheless, there have been some positive developments. Citizens have consistently demonstrated their support for democracy by rising against the military regime and by turning out in large numbers to vote for elections.” Jahan ends by emphasising the need to institutionalise democracy\textsuperscript{41}

Mushtaq Khan points to an interesting fact: Bangladesh is one of rare countries where an amazingly homogenous population lives. About 98% of people share the same religion, language and geography. Yet factions are organised on nuanced differences over “Bengali nationalism” versus “Bangladeshi nationalism” in an obvious attempt by various political entrepreneurs to get access to resources by organising themselves along factional lines. According to Mushtaq Khan, such factional rent-seeking is detrimental to economic growth and poverty


\textsuperscript{41} Jahan, 2002.
alleviation. Unless the state has the ability to impose “discipline” on capitalist and “intermediate classes,” countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan cannot transform themselves from low productivity to high productivity states. Factional politics is also prevalent in Pakistan where the ruling political party, and the civilian and military bureaucracy split into or supports factional politics along party, regional and ethnic lines.42

Imtiaz Ahmed discusses the under-representation of people in political bodies due to large national constituencies (close to three hundred thousand voters per constituency) and the absence of a decentralised political structure in Bangladesh.43 In Pakistan, the military government of Pervez Musharraf introduced the devolution of power plan in 2001 to provide essential services to people at their “doorsteps.” The devolved political structure is still going through its teething problems and its efficacy and long-term sustainability is not beyond doubt.

In the case of Bangladesh, personality politics still dominate. Mujibur Rahman is of course, a cult figure. But even after him, political parties and factions are organised around personalities. It has led to under-development of internal accountability in political parties and hinders their growth as effective institutions of society. Political activity is mediated through “patron-client relationships.”44 Pakistan represents a similar situation where the two major political parties lack internal democracy and revolve around the personalities of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

Basic human rights remain elusive for many. For example, a number of hari families in rural Sindh in Pakistan work as bonded labour, a fact well documented by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other watch groups. The Hudood Ordinance can make women and men of all religious denominations languish in jail if accused of certain crimes. Hudood Ordinances were passed during the Zia regime in early 1980s to curb behaviours considered outside the limits of Islam and include theft, alcohol consumption, and adultery. Its


43 Imtiaz Ahmed, Ibid.

44 Hossain, op.cit.
wording is such that it does not differentiate between adultery and rape, making women vulnerable to charges of adultery if they are raped. Women cannot approach the state’s law enforcement agencies because they need to provide four male witnesses who have witnessed the actual act of rape. Since, it is often impossible to provide witnesses; they can be booked for adultery under the Hudood Ordinances. Legislation of Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Witnesses) suggests that one man, as a witness, is equal to two women in economic matters.

Pakistan went through a phase of Islamisation in the 1980s during the Zia ul Haq regime. In Bangladesh, President Ershad attempted to introduce changes in the constitution with Islamic underpinnings during the same decade. Although the two generals’ covert agendas were somewhat similar in terms of seeking legitimacy for their rule, in the Pakistan context General Zia succeeded with the support of conservative religious political parties and backing of the USA while in Bangladesh, sans external and significant internal support, General Ershad was relatively unsuccessful. Women, bore the brunt of the Islamisation agenda in differing degrees in both countries. However, the two governments were not too serious in the implementation of Islam and according to Naila Kabeer, this attitude gave space to women’s groups to emerge, consolidate and campaign for women rights. It is obvious that military government’s Islamisation rhetoric centred on passing discriminatory legislation against women in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.45

Often Christians in Pakistan are booked under the Blasphemy Laws passed in 1980s. More recently, this law has been applied by different religious sectarian organisations against one another. Anyone who is proven to have committed blasphemy or questioned that the prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) was the last prophet can be sentenced to death under 295C of Pakistan Penal Code. The present military government tried to introduce a procedural change in the Blasphemy law in 2000 so that the likelihood of false registration of cases decreases but backed off from its decision after protests from religious parties. No one has been hanged to death in Pakistan till now. However, a few accused have been lynched to death after their acquittal. This law is hanging like a sword on minorities. Police and judiciary, particularly the lower judiciary, often do not fulfil their role in protecting people’s rights and upholding justice.

45 Naila Kabeer, op.cit.
The issue of social-political security cannot be addressed effectively without transforming existing unjust and exploitative power structures; discriminatory laws such as the Hudood Ordinance and Blasphemy Laws clearly target vulnerable citizen groups. There are other laws under the Army Act, which contradict the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. These laws can surely be changed if there is enough political will.

While the press is free both in Pakistan and Bangladesh, journalists are harassed, jailed, and beaten up both by the state and other powerful lobbies. The electronic media has largely been in the government's control. Although the liberalisation of the media due to international pressures has led to the creation of private TV channels and FM radio stations, private channels and radio stations mostly cater to the upper classes. Nevertheless, their existence bode well for the political maturity of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

2.2.3 Environmental Security
All our resources are ultimately derived from nature. The environmental resource-base is often taken for granted and that itself is the big threat to the environment. Economic growth models and GDP ratios do not include the cost of environmental degradation. The social cost of environmental degradation is much higher than the private cost. It costs almost nothing for industries to emit pollutants in the air, while it drains societal resources if we take into account air quality, health cost, climate change costs and the likes. The property rights regime does not take into account the capital of environmental resource base or costs of degradation. The property rights regime accepts polluters' rights and gives no legal or economic protection to polluters and this is extensively documented in the environmental economics literature. This phenomenon is referred to as market failure or government (taxation) failure. Environmental goods are not priced, sold or protected.

The environment is generally regarded as a “luxury good.” The argument goes like this: if one has enough to eat, only then can one think of something as fancy as clean air etc. This argument is applied both at the micro-level of households and macro-level of nation-states. However, reality suggests something quite the contrary. The lack of environmental security is closely linked to poverty. Developing countries are sometimes called “biomass-based subsistence economies.” The rural poor depend on their local environments for their livelihoods.
whether it is for fuel, grazing or fertilizers. Soil erosion, deforestation and unavailability of water are causes of poverty. The urban poor are most vulnerable to unclean drinking water, lack of sanitation and sewage disposal, air pollution, hazardous work environment and bad health. High population growth, poverty and environmental degradation mutually reinforce each other.

There is no legal cover for historical users of environmental resources in Pakistan. The decision making system is located far away from rural communities. Local communities are disenfranchised in decision-making and implementing processes. Local notables, in collaboration with the state machinery, exploit local environmental resources (for example forests in the Haraza district of the North-West Frontier Province) that are detrimental to the environmental resource base and the sustainability of livelihoods of local people. Industries excrete their waste to main rivers in Pakistan and invade the food chain. There is no effective mechanism to stop this from happening, though government and environmental NGOs are trying to introduce self-monitoring to implement the “polluter-pay” principle. The four-year drought that ended in 2004 has undermined people’s physical, livelihood and social well being tremendously. Balochistan and Thar regions were affected by drought. The rural poor in these areas lost their livestock. Livestock was the only livelihood most of them had. Water shortages have affected both urban and rural areas all over the country.

Environmental issues have also assumed an alarming state in Bangladesh. The connection between resources and politics has emerged in relations between Bangladesh and India as, “most of the watersheds of the major rivers of the country are outside its territory. India has adopted innumerable development schemes on those rivers ... the sudden release of water causes intensive flow of water into the rivers of Bangladesh which cause river bank erosion along upstream of the rivers in the country.” 46 Similarly, Bangladesh is vulnerable to sea-level rise as more than half the country lies less than five meters above sea level 47 and therefore, the country faces the danger of losing cropped and forested land. Such trends are also connected to loss of resource rights.

47 J.M. Broadus, “Possible impact of and adjustment to sea level rise: the cases of Bangladesh and Egypt,” 1993 quoted in Abrar et.al., 1995, p. 25.
In South Asia, there has been a ‘reduction in resource rights in at least three of the South Asian countries studied Bangladesh, India and Nepal. This erosion has occurred gradually.’ 48 If Bangladesh were to be hit by a tsunami-like situation, it would be a disaster of a very large proportion since the entire country is not very high above sea level. Similarly, air pollution is a major issue in Dhaka. 49 The government has recently tried to solve the problem by encouraging the use of CNG driven vehicles in Dhaka.

Bangladesh has a high population density and natural disasters such as floods affect a majority of the people living close to water in rural areas. This often prompts migration, resulting in the creation of environmental refugees. 50 Since Dhaka is one of the main cities, there is a massive impact on its ecology and environment due to the high migration rate from rural areas to Dhaka. In addition, the loss of livelihood has prompted ‘illegal’ migration to neighbouring India and the southern Pakistani port city of Karachi, in addition to the trafficking of women, also connected with rising poverty and erosion of livelihoods. The issue of trafficking and the rise in sex work for increasingly young girls’ results directly from depleting livelihood sources in Bangladesh. Discussed in greater detail in the chapter entitled, “Situation Analysis of Women in Bangladesh and Pakistan,” the nexus between environmental degradation, economic policies and poverty is fairly well-established. As women are comparatively more vulnerable in situations of poverty whether in terms of malnutrition or vulnerability to violence whether at the workplace or the home, the connections between economic policies and environmental degradation need to account for women’s greater insecurity.

2.3 HUMAN SECURITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Mustapha Kamal Pasha has attempted to contextualise civil society along the matrixes of post-coloniality and the expansion of capitalism in Pakistan. Civil society, as we know it today, contrasts to the concept used by European and American political philosophers in the 18th and

50 For details of the definition and types of environmental refugees, see Abrar, Haq and Rahman, op.cit.
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19th centuries. For them, the advent of the modern state was synonymous with the "civil state." Now, we know of civil society that it connects micro-realities at the household level with the state. It is a grey area and some of its shades are also part of the state: political parties are part of civil society, however when elected, they form the government. Similarly academia in Pakistan and Bangladesh is largely controlled by the state. The Ministry of Education controls public universities. Yet, academia is also part of civil society. There are other shades of civil society that are more independent of state: ethnic nationalist groups, women and human rights groups, sections of NGOs and the independent media. However, civil society does not exist in isolation from the state. In fact, it is the arena that exists between the individual and formal state institutions to articulate the rights and aspirations of different groups. The over-growth of the coercive arm of the state undermines and stifles space for civil society while democratic regimes provide more space to civil society.

The English language press is progressive in terms of accommodating criticism of national security perspective and is accommodative of people's right to development and freedoms. In the case of Pakistan, the print media came of age in the post-Zia era. When press censorship was lifted in the late 1980s, the print media never looked back. Nawaz Sharif's government tried to browbeat the management of a major newspaper chain The Jang Group and an English language weekly, the Friday Times, in late 1990s but it failed to do so. The new military government did not even attempt to place censorship on printed media when General Musharraf took over in 1999. Most of the critical debates on human security and human development take place in the pages of the English language press in Pakistan. Its major problems are a limited circulation capacity and lack of qualified journalists. The press is also free in Bangladesh; however, as elsewhere, business tycoons own the press.

There was considerable propaganda about the Pakistani position on Kashmir in the Urdu language press, so that different Pakistani governments have become hostages to their own propaganda. The Indian media is not much different from Pakistan. The Governments of India and Pakistan cannot risk reaching a solution on the Kashmir

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51 Despite the fact that there is a congruity of views between the state's politics on national security and media as pointed out earlier.
dispute, as that would be considered “unpatriotic” by public opinion in their respective countries. They have indulged in self-fulfilling prophecies over the media. Often they have to live with the jingoistic Frankenstein monster that they themselves have created.

Till recently, there was little talk on human security/human development issues in Pakistan’s state-controlled electronic media. In Bangladesh civil society has been in the forefront of saving democracy by emerging as a ‘referee’ between the two major political parties (Jahan, 2002, 58). The civil society discourse on human security has challenged mainstream notions of national security and linked it to human development. Lack of focus on human security is intrinsically linked to poor health, education, shelter, and the employment conditions of people.

Bangladesh and Pakistan have a long tradition of civil society structures such as charities, lobby groups, professional bodies, media and other networks. However, recently, civil society has been equated with NGOs, which in the Bangladesh context have concentrated on micro-finance and in the Pakistan context on service delivery in the social sectors. NGOs in both countries have been accused of acting on foreign agendas due to international donor funding. As such, in Pakistan they are equated with being anti-Pakistani and considered to be flush with foreign money working for imperial agendas. In Bangladesh many critics assert that, “they resemble the public sector — centrally controlled, bureaucratic in nature, weak on accountability and disconnected at the local level.”52 Further, Jahan asserts that they have become more aligned with political parties, limiting their position as a neutral third force articulating a position different from the major political parties.53 Despite such criticism, NGOs have played an important awareness-raising role in Pakistan, especially around human rights issues, and mobilised millions in Bangladesh in the areas of income generation, health, education and other services.

In the Pakistani development paradigm, two distinct approaches surfaced. One, a pure developmentalist approach, focused itself on the “service delivery” aspect of development. About 10,000 non-governmental organisations were formed, mostly in rural areas to build schools,

52 Toufique, Kazi Ali and Cate, Turton. 2002. op.cit.
53 Jahan, op.cit., p.58.
hospitals, roads, and water supply schemes, and provide micro-credit and other facilities with the active involvement of the community. They were politically conceived development interventions focused on the rural poor. However, they were rather apolitical in terms of their functions. They did not talk about people’s rights, their socio-political liberties, and the socio-economic injustices between various tiers of society and classes. A much smaller group of non-governmental organisations appeared in mostly urban centres that focused on advocacy and/or developmental activities. Women’s rights, the rights of minorities, labour rights, bonded & child labour, human rights, governance issues and decentralisation of government were some of the issues tackled by these awareness-development public interest organisations. It broadened the concept of human development and linked it with human security. Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation, Christian Study Centre, Sunji Development Foundation, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research (PILER), Women Action Forum (WAF), Pattan Development Foundation and the Network for Consumer Protection (The Network) are the names of some of these rights oriented development organisations based in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. Some of these large organisations have advocacy and development out-reach programmes in rural communities as well.

NGOs have made a meaningful difference in the lives of people in Bangladesh. BRAC, Grameen Bank and Proshika have made real inroads in the development of society. Recent rise of Bangladeshi garments industry is attributed to skill development of female labour by NGOs such as Grameen. Even in the mid-1990s, these national NGOs had given 3.5 million loans and disbursed over a billion US dollars. The non-governmental sector in some ways replaced the governmental sector in Bangladesh in 1990s. This was due to the government's inability and inefficiency in dealing with the growing problems of governance. Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in Pakistan have extended their network through the length and breath of country to provide social services to people but NGOs in Pakistan do not have similar outreach like the NGOs of Bangladesh. Inevitably, one can assume that the government in Pakistan has a larger presence in social service delivery in Pakistan compared to Bangladesh.

54 Abu Abdullah, op.cit.
2.4 OBSTACLES TO HUMAN SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT

In the case of Pakistan, religious extremism, authoritarian control of military bureaucracy and slow pace of normalisation of relations with India due to the Kashmir conflict have proved to be obstacles in advancing human security/human development in Pakistan.

Indo-Pakistan military and political antagonisms have besieged the development agenda of Pakistan since its creation. Nothing has undermined people’s development and rights so comprehensively as has the lingering dispute over Kashmir. In the first half of 1960s, Pakistan was on the path of sound economic growth (not human development). There was a significant increase in per capita income and 5.5% annual growth in GNP. Large-scale manufacturing was the hallmark of economic progress with 17% growth. All economic sectors grew at a much greater speed than the targets given in the second five-year plan of 1960-65.55 However, all of these indicators of economic growth started to begin to slide in the aftermath of 1965 war. And Pakistan’s economy could never stand on its feet again. Why did this happen?

In the absence of Indo-Pak antagonism, Pakistan would have little or no rationale to keep six hundred thousand troops, a nuclear programme and one quarter of its annual expenditure engaged in defence. There would also be little or no rationale to give military training to students in madrasahs (mosque schools) by right-wing religious parties. Kashmir conflict has not only ripped apart Pakistan’s economic development in 1960s, sapped a lion’s share of Pakistan’s annual budget for over five decades, but also directly contributed to underdevelopment, allocation of negligible resources for the social sector. It has strengthened the military and civilian bureaucracy’s hold over Pakistan’s decision-making processes, contributed to denial of politic-civil liberties of people and curbing of the rights of the poor, women and marginalised.

The Indo-Pak conflict has allowed a strong hawkish constituency to flourish in both countries. It has led to a mindset among policy makers and opinion makers in Pakistan that is fuelled by mutual animosity. The military, intelligence agencies, and hawkish security opinion-makers have achieved a tremendous ascendance over policy-making process. The Indo-Pak dispute has directly contributed to the over-development of the coercive powers of the Pakistani state at the cost of the underdevelopment of civil society and people’s politic-economic rights.

There are other adverse spin-off effects of the Kashmir dispute. It has led to an entrenched hostility between the two countries. Pakistan encourages groups in Pakistan to fight with India forces. They mostly target the Indian security forces. However, they also target unsympathetic Kashmiri civilians. As result of the military uprising, Indian forces have killed, injured and maimed tens of thousands of Kashmiris and raped Kashmiri women. The human security of Kashmiri population is being massively violated both by separatist militants and Indian security forces. The situation reminds one of Pakistani security agencies military action in the East Pakistan in 1970 when Bengali were killed or injured and women were raped by security agencies.

Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies kill innocent civilians in bomb blasts on a regular basis. A former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Moinuddin Haider, said in a TV interview that there are on average 100 bomb blasts in Pakistan every year. If divided over the 365 days in a year, on an average, there is a bomb blast every third or fourth day in Pakistan. These bombs are placed in crowded places. Nothing can be more illustrative of how doctrines of national security actually undermine human security than these bomb blasts which have become a common feature in Pakistan.

The staggering defence expenditure is a major strain on Pakistan's resources. However, it fell as a percentage of GNP from 5.1% to 4.5% in the 1985-2001 period. It remained stagnant for Bangladesh at 1.3% of GNP. On the other hand, defence expenditure as a percentage of central government's expenditure increased for Bangladesh in the decade of 1980s and 1990s. It rose from 9.4% to 11.2%. These figures corroborate the analysis made by Naila Kabeer that army's direct and indirect influence grew in the Ziaur Rahman and Ershad's regime in Bangladesh in 1980s. Defence expenditures consistently drain resources and take them away from human development. Whereas government's expenditure on health and education combined is close to 3% of GNP, a major portion of the government's budget is spent on defence. Debt servicing and defence used to constitute two/thirds of government expenditure in the late 1990s in Pakistan. Expenditure priorities have changed somewhat in 2000s but only marginally. Unless the government in Pakistan resolves its differences with India and minimises tensions

with Afghanistan, it will be difficult to cut back on the defence expenditure despite Pakistan being a nuclear power.

Other factors that are major hurdles to advancing human security/human development in Pakistan are the very composition of the post-colonial state. Big land-owners still dominate the political scene of Pakistan. Even when they are not in power, they have enough representation and contacts with the civilian and military bureaucracy not to threaten their interests. Three attempts at land reforms (1959, 1971, and 1977) were not properly implemented due to the influence of big landowners. In Sindh, big land-owners still use bonded labour in their land. Successive governments have not been able to do much about bonded labour. No government has been able to impose a substantial agricultural tax either.

Public officials who have been involved in policy formulation have been involved in predatory rent-seeking practices. The impersonal structure of the bureaucracy is imposed on a society where personal relations still mean a lot. Police, judiciary, and delivery of social services are not accessible to citizens. The state machinery is highly prone to the politics of patronage. Rich and well-connected people get things done. Due to weak institutional structure, public officials misuse their official powers for massive private gains. Stories of politicians, bureaucrats and military officials indulging in corruption are all too common. Their actions deprive common people of their rights to health, education, shelter, safe-drinking water and the potential to lead a good life. Resources and opportunities are taken away from the poor and monopolised by wealthy land-owners, industrialists, professionals, bureaucrats, military people and sensational journalists.

The way to reverse this trend would have been institutionalisation of democracy to enable people to participate in decision-making processes and in turn in resource-redistribution. Unfortunately, the record of democracy is dismal. Whenever, democracy comes back after being derailed for years, the political culture is too weak and shallow to sustain it. Moreover, rich land-owners, industrialists, professionals and traders win elections whenever there is democracy in the country. They use political power to serve their personal or group interests at the cost of collective development. Lack of democracy has also deprived people of their fundamental political liberties. The poor, women, agricultural and un-unionised industrial labour and minorities have been hit the hardest. The present government’s attempt to devolve power to the
grassroots level is a welcome change. However, it needs to be seen how effective it will prove to franchise people. According to a study conducted by SDPI, landowners have dominated local body elections in rural Pakistan. If this trend persists in other areas as well, it will not bode well for the empowerment of people at the grassroots level.\(^57\)

The Pakistan's establishment continuous expenditure on defence and army, the habit of living beyond means and borrowing heavily and giving the lowest possible priority to health, education and social development and lack of political will to ensure socio-economic justice between various classes and absence of structural reforms such as land reforms and civil service reforms are the major obstacles to human development and human security.

In the case of Bangladesh, high population density, environmental constraints and factional politics are some of the issues that are impediments to human security. However, its success in the garments industry\(^58\) ensures livelihood security for the poor, mainly the female labour force. Developmental and advocacy interventions of large NGOs such as Grameen, BRAC and Proshika have also contributed positively to improving living conditions of people. Also, its political culture seems to be stabilising after a tumultuous start in 1970s. Its civilian governments have successfully completed their tenure and end of each government's tenure is followed by a caretaker government headed by a retired Chief Justice. It helps to stabilise the political transition. It is being practiced since 1996 and is part of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Decentralisation has been somewhat successfully implemented in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.

### 2.5 CONCLUSION

National security is considered synonymous with territorial security. Large-scale industrialisation and increase in per capita income are seen as the panacea of economic development. However, lack of social homogeneity and equitable distribution of resources trigger massive problems of internal security. Post-colonial states have used their

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monopoly over the means of coercion to suppress dissent to pursue the mega-agenda of state formation.

Human security is people's security to get opportunities to obtain education, healthcare, shelter, employment, food, clean environment and socio-political rights and freedoms. Freedoms include freedom of political participation in policy-making processes, freedom from oppression, freedom from persecution, freedom of speech and association, and, above all, freedom to live a healthy life both materially and mentally.

As such, human security is not a priority area for policy makers anywhere in the world and certainly not in the post-colonial states of South Asia. Pakistan is a national security state. Everything else, even economic development, is secondary to the national security agenda of the state. The military and civilian bureaucracies dominate the decision making processes with the congruence of the land-owning and industrialist class. The professional classes, small traders, and urban bourgeoisie are also able to safeguard their interests in the decision making process. Voices of the poor and marginalised groups are not heard.

In order to ensure human security and human development, a meaningful political process needs to be institutionalised where the common people are given an opportunity to influence the policy making process. This can happen if awareness on human security issues is disseminated to a majority of people in Pakistan. The international community can do so by supporting peace groups to launch alternative electronic and print media, and encourage dialogue among various opinion-makers in South Asia, particularly politicians and students.

Peace groups in South Asia need to pressurise governments to resolve internal conflicts as well as inter-country disputes, including Kashmir. There is no short cut to peace in South Asia and no end to militarism, extremism, huge national armies, conventional and nuclear weapons unless Indo-Pak disputes are resolved through peaceful means. Bangladesh is not involved in protracted international conflicts like Pakistan, yet the principle of peaceful resolution of issues applies equally. Lack of Bangladesh's preoccupation with military disputes explains its relatively better socio-economic development. Progressive movements need to be strengthened. These movements need to be coordinated and mobilised for human security and people's rights. Unless that happens, the constituency for human security and peace will remain limited to a tiny urban-educated minority. Similarly, progressive movements need to be supported in Bangladesh.
The theoretical section of this chapter discusses the influence of dominant groups and classes in the process of policy formulation. Human security/human development is not presented to people on a silver platter. It is one thing to state that people have inalienable rights to security and development and it is quite another thing to ensure such rights and freedoms. The only way by which common people, the poor, and marginalised groups' voices can seek human security is, if the process of political participation is made consistent, widespread and meaningful. Democracy is not only a way of political participation; if effectively run, it is, also a way to include people's voices in policy formulation and resource redistribution.

The lack of meaningful decentralisation, the existence of factional politics, the normalisation of violence and corruption in everyday life, the denial of rights and freedoms to the common people, especially women and minorities, are issues that concern the human security debates in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. On the economic front, both countries have gone through extensive Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s although the people bore the brunt of poverty and unemployment. Women were particularly affected by SAP policies. There is a need to form a joint platform to study, research and campaign against SAP policies that undermine human security. Politically, both countries need to strengthen democratic institutions at the government and civil society levels that uphold principles rather than institutional or class interests. Democracies are not only about elections and votes; they are also about social justice and the inclusion of marginalised voices.

Within the broad framework of historical differences in political development that has resulted in different courses for armies, bureaucracies, political parties and civil society institutions in the two countries we need to place the context of women. Although the course of military dictatorship on the surface appears similar in the two countries, the institutional and class interests involved are quite different. In addition, the regional political considerations of the two countries are also quite different in that the US needed to bolster the military in Pakistan but not so in Bangladesh. This fact, and the support to neo-conservative ideologies received in Pakistan due to the Afghan War has set women back much more in Pakistan than in Bangladesh. The civil bureaucracies in the two countries have been subservient to the military (subjected to the inclusion of military
officers whether retired or serving) and have suffered political interference during civilian rule. The bureaucracies, with legacies and attitudes imbibed from the British colonial administrators, have not administered their respective countries with a pro-people approach. Attempts at changing the bureaucracies to play a developmental pro-people, pro-poor role have all but failed. Ordinary women, whose access to the public sphere is very limited, are therefore, not able to access the elitist bureaucratic set-up, which is impregnable to the common person in any case. That women head three out of the four major political parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh goes to their credit even though they emerged as political leaders initially due to their relationship with assassinated male political leaders (Mujibur Rahman, Ziaur Rahman and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto). However, the mere presence of women political leaders at the top does not ensure that systems will become women-friendly and systemic discrimination and violence would end. The lack of democracy within political parties, and the dedication to male political legacies do not provide the space needed to bring in meaningful changes. Civil society institutions have played an important role in highlighting women’s issues in several contexts — sometimes to women’s detriment but often to their advantage. However, there are caveats: being reflective of the larger character and nature of the state and society on the one hand, and constrained by economic and political paradigms of which they become an unquestioning part, on the other, their emancipatory role is far more restricted than may appear on the surface. It is against these backgrounds and contexts that we need to situate the issue of gendered security in the two countries.