Chapter 1

Contextualising Human Security in an Environment of Burgeoning Insecurity

1.1 SITUATING NEPAL: AN OVERVIEW
Despite being relatively free of violence and of any serious crime until recently, Nepal, as a matter of fact, has always been a human security-deficit country. Considering the burgeoning conflict at present and its impact on the people, the situation in Nepal today is the worst it has been in its history. Nepal is increasingly becoming difficult to govern because of the violence caused by the Maoist insurgency. The rapidly increasing political unrest has raised doubts about the relevance of traditional monarchical system. Perennial political instability has ruined the national economy. The sources of the sustenance of the state are foreign aid and remittances sent home by Nepalis working abroad. Societal cleavages, as a consequence, are now openly articulated even as the state is withdrawing its core responsibility of providing security, and ensuring the welfare of the people. The weakening of the state both in its institutional and functional dimensions and its inability to guarantee the rights of the people have not only eroded the regime's legitimacy but also made it vulnerable. At the same time, their fundamental rights to development and physical security are being severely jeopardised.

The simmering domestic conflict started as a contest between pluralism and absolutism. The conflict has led people to question the 'stateness' of Nepal but has also drifted the country towards anarchy. The fundamental clash of values underscores the rivalries between the state and the Maoist insurgents. The Maoists have resorted to violent armed conflict determined not so much by their political aspirations as by the imperative of a regime of violence instituted by their lust for political power. The objective of violence being the suppression of the freedom of the other, both state and counter-state forces have to the
extent of inhuman treatment of the citizens. Never before in the history of the country did the people of Nepal suffer incessantly as it is doing now because of the violence and terrorism caused by the state or non-state forces. Children, in particular, have never felt so insecure. School-going children are kidnapped from the streets regularly. Students are cordoned and taken to unidentified destinations from school compounds and forced to join the guerrilla bands. Children are being killed in the crossfire and by explosions, or made porters or to carry ammunition and foodstuffs, or used as informers, militia men and as human shields, or denied educational opportunities, or tortured and disabled. Women and girls are vulnerable to roving Maoist guerrillas and security forces. The government blockades food supplies to food deficit but Maoist-infested areas intending to deny the food to the Maoist, in the process, leaving the inhabitants of the areas starving. Food, therefore, is being used as a weapon of war. The state also denies the constitutional rights of citizens of Tarai origins under the suspicion that they are aliens and relegating them to the status of stateless persons. In other words, if human security is defined and acknowledged comprehensively as comprising the two normative elements of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" in the context of an underdeveloped country like Nepal, the situation of human security in Nepal is at its gravest at the moment.

Grounded on the reality of the situation confronting Nepal, at present there is no need to indulge in splitting unnecessarily on what is and what is not human security. And what can be human security and what cannot be human security asking what human security is. To make human security relational and relative we need, however, to understand the perception of the people defining their own situations and the role of the state in response to the situation. Narratives of the life of people who hardly expect to eat rice, who usually survive on wild roots and other forest products, who are barely clothed and whose children have never been treated by a medical practitioner and have never known what schooling is, can be seen an aberration and generalising the context, but their needs, hopes, fears and expectations of the future can also be keys to understanding human security. The situation of a mother who can be raped and killed if she insists on asking for the whereabouts of her son arrested by the security forces without warrant needs no conceptualisation as well as operationalisation of human security. Contrarily, the laws and regulations enforced by a government
fencing district headquarters with barricades and intensifying security
measures in the Capital city and notifying high level government officials
to confine their movements within the perimeter of the Ring Road are
indications of insecurity about the rulers’ safety rather than provisions
made for human security. Orders issued to security personnel to shoot
at sight any suspicious persons by the Valley Military Command reflect
the paranoia the state has been gripped with. This description of the
two different situations experienced by the people of Nepal indicates
correspondingly diverse material conditions of life they are leading. But
the people living a First World life in a Fourth World country like Nepal
appears to be no less insecure than ordinary Nepali people enduring a
primitive and unstable existence.

In the first two cases of people living in destitution and facing
injustice, both their “want and fear” involve fundamental basic needs
that their material conditions do not provide them. These needs are
relevant and related to human security if security is defined simply as
freedom or protection from danger and worry about survival. Societal
security based on the notion of social justice in the domestic realm of
the state is conspicuously absent; whereas in the latter case, despite
the abundance of material conditions supporting them, the people
behind the state policy are exposed to vulnerabilities and a sense of
insecurity. The first situation concerns social deprivation leading to
insecurity. The second, however, arises with organised violence and the
prospects of bodily harm to people irrespective of their material conditions.
Both these perspectives are concerned with individual safety and
security. However, the difference is that whereas the first is concerned
with the social community at the receptive end, the second is concerned
with the political community governing the state.

Although protecting people during violent conflicts is integral to
human security, the eruption of violence has increased the number of
dead and heightened the concern for ‘national security,’ as understood
by the political community, by ironically defying the need of human
security. With the erection of barricade, as in the medieval walled city-
state of Kathmandu, the behaviour of a government driven by the
fortification mentality has left the common citizenry exposed to the
excesses of both the Maoists and security forces who oppress them in
the name of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Kidnapping, disappearance
and torture have become truths that neither the Maoists nor the
security forces would like to acknowledge. In the latter case, the army
Nepali State, Society and Human Security

has defied the Supreme Court’s order to respect human rights regarding *habeas corpus* cases. In another instance, the Army Head Quarters has even rebuffed the apex court order declaring that details on the deliberation of a military court cannot be furnished to a non-military body “since there is no constitutional or legal obligation” to do so in cases relating to the armed forces (Luitel, 2004:1). The police have followed suit. Laws exist but legal recourse to justice is absent when people in uniform become law unto themselves.

Denial of institutional space but intrusion in the private sphere and militarisation of the social sphere has further curbed the constitutional rights of the people. Individual security is being jeopardised, as violation of human rights has become the norms of state apparatuses. Presumably, the state, that is to say, the leadership and the government as its representative make the political choice for the people, therefore, they are not only relevant but also essential features in understanding the context of human security. It is not necessary to identify any qualifying ingredients of human security. It is not a question of what criteria should be met, what laws should be regulated, and how the priorities are to be fixed to achieve human security. It is but to be humane and to uphold the human instinct to preserve, protect and promote the welfare of the people to achieve human security. Hence the leadership of the state who determines the policy and priorities for the state either under autocracy or democracy and its attitude and operational code are fundamentals in understanding the state of human security in a country like Nepal. Conscious of establishing order through a strong inclination towards preserving the sovereignty of the state and protecting it from external temptation and internal machination, the leadership becomes parsimonious and indulges in visionary shifts in decision-making by absorbing new ideas and incorporating them into the state mechanism fearing a loosening of their grip on political power. The insolvency of this characteristic demonstrated by the political leaderships has threatened the institutional base of the state, generating domestic insecurity articulated through violent conflict.

Politically, the democratic experiments in Nepal have been ended by the bloodless Royal coups against democratic governments both in December 1960 and October 2002, and again in February 2005 when a nominated government came to power with the resurgence of conservative monarchical forces at the helm of political power. The ruptures caused by the personal rule of monarchy which decided to step in between the
forces of regression and reform have led the country towards disaster. The political leaderships have lost credibility in national politics as they have failed to address the national agenda of responsible governance relative to the people due largely to their insatiable lust for power, prestige and privileges. Their greed and grievance have become a normal function of the institutionalised system of patronage centring on loyalty towards the monarchy without any accountability to the people even though they supposedly represent the people through political parties and electoral politics. Their efforts to thwart oppositional forces demanding the democratisation of polity had inadvertently fostered instability against their attempts to preserve the stability of the regime. The political and power equations of the leaderships have hardly any semblance of relationships to politics at the grassroot level—that is to say—the needs, the demands and aspirations of the people. The template of the political equation rests on the sharing of the spoils of state power at the cost of the political process that the leaderships have struggled to establish.

Political violence of the magnitude caused by the Maoist insurgency has been unprecedented in Nepali history and has been responded to feebly by a state that has vacillated between indifference and repression. The ineffectiveness of repression has, however, highlighted the prospect of the breakdown of the civilian order. As a result, the growing political violence has brought the security forces to the central stage of Nepali politics along with the imposition of national emergency and the adoption of anti-terrorist laws. Such an option taken by the state in defence of 'national security,' preceded by the Public Security Act 1961, the State Treason Act 1962, and Peace and Security Act 1989, therefore, has thoroughly repelled constitutional safeguards against the violation of human rights by undermining the principles of the citizens’ state.

The counter-state violence mounted by the Maoists has again led the state to be overconscious of security and has made it an omnipotent institution of domination and control despite its fragility. Violence in the domestic realm has reinforced the conceptual rationality of the modern state, which is substantially being associated with effective domination and control. The role of the state is seen to be one that consists of regulating the socio-political order through penetration and control within the territory under its jurisdiction through force. The preservation of the regime's security interests remains the most
fundamental, definitional and inescapable characteristics of the state. Through acts and ordinances the state has reasserted its rights of dominance and hegemony and in the process has pointed a gun at the society. Hegemony is the euphemism for the modern state. The state is reified as the most sacred institution and presented as the source of all power. And nationalism and patriotism are excuses made to embellish the state-building process with a central authority capable of enforcing its will over the territory it controls.

State-centrism therefore is invoked in prioritising security. As fallout of 9/11, ‘terrorism’ has become one of the most lucrative excuses for the state in strengthening the security apparatuses for combating every facet of opposition while invoking threats to national security. Obviously, the Nepali state uses ‘terrorism’ as a construct to justify its unlawful acts, including suspension of civil liberties and the rights of the people to legal recourse, to carry out acts of violence in the name of ‘counter-terrorism,’ to prohibit freedom of assembly and expression, to resort to arbitrary arrests, torture, detentions and disappearances. Although this denial of the fundamental rights of the people has caused insecurity in the social sphere and yet it has been interpreted as a state imperative essential in the pursuit of national security. Security has always been a sanctified concept defined by the state comprising war, violence and conflict. In the context of the burgeoning conflict in Nepal, the state has become a repository of violence that is trying to triumph “by the hands of executioners,” (Sorel, 1941:121). Although there is a rationale for state security achieved militarily in case of external aggression, the military repression of political dissent internally, however, exposes the twin failures of the state in the realm of governance and consent.

The growing political violence in Nepal has brought the armed forces into primacy in the defence of national interests. The country is being militarised and security expenditure is superseding any other means of survival. Resource transfer from the social to the security sector has had a tangible effect on the country’s development activities notwithstanding the justification given by the state for militarisation as “investing for peace.” The intensification of violence has not only resulted in indiscriminate killings, it has also led to a mass exodus with increasing number of internally displaced people as well as external migration by people in search of safety and survival. The use of force by the state in defence of its interests, but against its own citizens and the
continuing skirmishes with counter-state forces has led to a dispossession of the people living within its bounded territory. The people have become easy prey for both state and anti-state forces. Their vulnerabilities exposed and coping strategies weakened the life the people living in conflict zones have been severely compromised, as there is no way out of a randomly escalating violence. The seams of the bounded territory have apparently burst at the margins because of the domestic conflict and the militaristic approach to security has become inadequate in protecting the 'national interests' as the use of force domestically has become a threat multiplier by victimising people and by stealing their rights to development and survival. The militarisation of the national sphere by the state has increased the insecurity of the people as they are denied both the chances of pursuing normal economic activities and social opportunities.

The ineffectuality of the state-centric concept of security based on a historically false assumption of the state as the protector, preserver and guarantor of the fate of the people has therefore become obvious. The leaderships' disposition towards securing the state from its own people is a case of structural violence and repression expanding the threats and vulnerabilities of the citizens whom the state is liable to protect. Defending 'national interests' does not however mean that the power of the state is being abused. The state is legitimised by the consent and support of the people but without it the territorial jurisdiction of the state is contested as well as challenged by forces of fragmentation, thereby increasing tensions and disputes. Despite the widely accepted view that the viability of the state as a political institution rests on popular legitimacy and the endorsement of the people living within its boundaries, the national security elite, opting to defining security in relation to the stability, integrity and the identity of the state, had defied every discourse on restructuring the state, any attempt at renegotiating institutional reforms through power sharing and has considered broadening representation as threatening to state cohesion and tantamount to destabilising the existing order and unbecoming of a citizen. They demand unflinching loyalty to the state and resort to the rhetoric of nationalism and patriotism, thereby making the state an object to be preserved with even at the expense of the blood and sweat of the people.

Desecuritising the state therefore is not in the nationalist agenda of strategic elites whose careers are built in chasing an elusive concept of
security through imposition of values, rules and regulations, and by setting up a tradition of political culture unique to Nepali nationalism. The nationalist discourses in Nepal have long been construed on the basis of high-caste hill Hinduism and cultural exclusism—a janus-faced phenomenon leading to homogenising the national ethos with hegemonic agendas of controlling and dominating the state. The feverish search for purity by Hindu nationalists has germinated seeds of social segregation and led to the enactment and implementation of various laws to preserve the invented national ethos by the ruling class leading to a disjunction between official nationalism and societal demands for reinventing the state while critically influencing both the pattern of state-society relations and affecting the context of the new lexicon called human security in Nepal. There is therefore a need to oppose the self-perception and positionality of nationalist elites and their rhetoric of unity with a dialectic of social diversity.

1.2 STRATEGIC ELITES AND SECURITY PRACTICES
Contextualising human security in Nepal requires understanding the meaning of security and reconsidering the security practices of the Nepali state which is peculiarly imbued in an institutionalised logic derived from the concept of the monarchy in a Hindu state. The principal element of the Hindu Kingdom is the ruler, not the people, who is at the core of the system of nationalism and national unity. The monarchy has played a role in the formation of the concept of an 'unified' and an unitary territorial state as well as the religious and cultural values and the evolution of hill Hindu culture. The Hindu monarchy, in its ideational mode, therefore, reflects the identity of the state. This religious root behind the formation of the Nepali state has led to the concept of national security threat revolves around the safety and security of the institution of monarchy associated Hindu religious identity has been used to propose a state ideology supported by the armed forces. The Monarchy as a force for stability and national integrity and for upholding the Hindu religious identity can only be preserved if the army is pampered with the distribution of land to their satisfaction, a view that the Rana Prime Minister Jang Bahadur is attributed to have established (Regmi, 1975:105). Accordingly, the economic security of the army is the primacy of national politics “on whom the welfare of the state rested in a special way” (Stiller, 1968:65).
The territorial integrity of the state, the regime security and the infusion of religious ideology thus are intricately linked with the unflinching loyalty of the armed forces to the monarchical system. The military elites comprising the Gorkhali warrior clan are closely identified with the monarchy. They are essential for the ‘national unification’ campaigns that have become the national ideology. The politics of ‘unification’ is guided by the military value of conquest and rule. The Gorkhali military elites, therefore, have been part of the politics of unification and governance of the conquered territory. They are thus essentially a political army. The government comprises members of the leading families of Gorkhas whose consent and “concurrence was essential in any major decision because of the tremendous importance that the Gorkhas placed on the military” (Stiller, 1975:275). The formation of the army with loyalists and people of proven merits and familiarity confining recruitment to select ethnic groups was carefully pursued to evolve a strategic elite compact essentialising the view of the first Shah King Prithvi Narayan Shah that the “Soldiers are the very marrow of the king” (Stiller, 1968:66-67), in other word, the state. The army became a family affair during the century old Rana oligarchy between 1846 and 1951. Rana oligarchy was in fact a militocracy. Taking a cue from this martial tradition, King Mahendra, the 10th in the dynastic succession of the Shah Kings of Nepal, followed the instruction of his ancestor after the Royal coup in 1960 by carefully nurturing his role in the army as its supreme Commander-in-Chief. In 1965, the king renamed the Nepal Army as the Royal Nepal Army and glamourised its role as the ‘Royal Army’ (Sharma et al, 1992). There is thus a close tie between the King and the army.

King Mahendra’s personal interest in the welfare and training of the officers and men of the army, and the bestowal by him of special favour on them in the form of royal grants of land and other concessions, have in recent years created bonds of a personal nature between the king and the army. The Royal Nepal Army thus regards the king as the sole personification of the state, with the result that to the army it appears there is no such thing as loyalty to the state and the people as distinct from loyalty to the king as a person (Shaha, 1982:109).

Such a perception of the monarchy is nowhere reflected more poignantly than in the keynote speech of the incumbent Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa to graduate officer cadets at the 11th convocation of the
According to him, "The Crown is the symbol of our identity and the kingship is the progenitor and guardian of the Royal Nepal Army along with the unalterable symbol of Nepali nationalism and national unity. The faith, devotion and the trust of the people towards the Crown have remained the essence of Nepali nationalism since time immemorial. All Nepalis should therefore be united to work towards preserving the symbol of our identity along with the fundamentals of our national interests" (COAS, 2004). The motto of the army has been “Rajbhakti, Hamro Shakti,” i.e. “the loyalty to the king is the power of the army.” The Monarchy as integral to the integrity of the state has thus become an ‘acquired value’, which should be the primacy of national security.

The army, in particular, the majority of the officer corps, act almost as an extension of the Royal family as a consequence of the matrimonial ties established between the Shahs and the Ranas and their offspring’s marriage relations to other high caste Hindu people of the traditional Bhardari (courtier) elite. Top-ranking military posts were the preserve of the Rana family during their de facto rule of the country for 104 years between 1846 and 1951 and their offsprings have continued to enjoy privileged positions although the supreme command of the army is reasserted by the monarchy after the fall of the Rana regime in February 1951. Since then promotion over the rank of the Lieutenant-Colonel is made by the King himself. The people in the officer corps of the Royal Nepal Army are drawn largely from the same caste and families that constitute the traditional ruling class of Nepal. Some non-Hindu but high-ranking military officers are either offsprings of surrogate mothers (Dhai Ama) or susaree (servants in the inner sanctum of the Royal households) of queen, prince and princesses or the kings or close confidents. The military elite who reflect the views and vision of the monarchy are professionally conservative by their association and entitlement. Their training abroad have not helped in professionalising the armed forces; rather, it has entrenched vested interests through the elite-building process by creatively manoeuvring ‘national interests’ for the needs of the army, thereby increasing their influence on the national decision-making process. The familial and informal relationship between the king and the military top brass remains integral to national security decision-making instead of the formal constitutional process and is presently consigned to the National Defence Council which is constitutionally presided over by the prime minister.
As Shaha, has observed, military and security officials were accorded special importance among the elites during King Mahendra’s reign. This was exemplified by the case of his own dismissal from the finance and foreign ministerial portfolios through the manipulation of security officials (Shaha, 1982:126-127). Much later, the cases of the forced resignation of Home Minister Joshi in 2000, Prime Minister Koirala in 2001 under a democratic political dispensation, and even King Gyanendra’s appointment of Prime Minister Chand in 2003 are fresh testimonies to the continuing influence of the military, albeit informally, in the politics of Nepal. As a matter of fact, under the direct rule of the king after 4 October 2002, the army has become a state within a state, impairing efforts to revive the parliamentarian road towards governance. Thanks to the Maoist insurgency that has exposed in the role of military power and its hidden hand in the political equation and impact on the organisation of the Nepali state. The question under democracy has arguably been who controls the means to state violence, how complete such control is, and to what end has the army been deployed? Whose security has the military to contend with and what values are it obliged to constitutionally? The mobilisation of the military only after the army barrack and armed personnel had been attacked in the national emergency shows whose security is paramount in Nepal. Till the Maoists were killing commoners and police, the unrest was simply defined as a ‘law and order’ problem. It was only when the army was attacked; they suddenly became a threat to ‘national security’ and national integrity.

Similarly, the trappings of the status and authority of the state is a fixation that has lured educated people towards the bureaucracy as a path to power. Merrill Goodall observed sometime ago the Nepali bureaucracy comprised of two categories of people: the prestige group and the performance group. The first group consists solely of the members of two high caste groups—the Brahmins and Chhetris. The second group comprises a mixed ethnicity of Newar, Gurung, and Tharu, along with people of Brahmin and Chhetri origin (Goodall, 1975:894-95). He has also identified the prominence of three administrative entities of which the most visible is the formally constituted civil service, followed by the foreign aid community, and predominated by the Palace Secretariat. The national bureaucracy is therefore risk-averse and decision making is deferred to the top to avoid bureaucrats from committing mistakes. This snag in the bureaucracy was observed by Bista (1991:110) who noted “To keep an administrative position for as long as possible, the
best strategy is to act as little as possible, so that the danger of dismissal is diminished. A general rule for working in such a bureaucracy is: The lower you are the more active you are, because you have high aspirations and are working hard to realise them. The higher you are, the greater you are at risk and the less you do.” As the sovereign power of the country resides in the monarchy, Goodall declares that the “inspiration of the public service might start from this source” (Goodall, 1975:892). Three decades after he had made this observation, the situation in the national bureaucracy has not changed because, as noted, the “system has yet to pursue representativeness as a value and the openness of the structure to novel and experimental policy inputs...” (Goodall, 1975: 895). Being elitist, public access to bureaucratic services is difficult, as the bureaucracy has refused to be an agent for change and is instead upholding a tradition of rent seeking (Panday, 1989). Civil service response to public welfare issues therefore is selective and the relationship between the state and general public has been strained by the politicisation of a bureaucracy that caters to the interests of political masters and not citizens.

The Nepali bureaucracy is composed mostly of the same caste group of people whose proximity to the power centre, i.e., the king, as a measuring rod of prestige and influence, has become another determining factor in the composition of inner sanctum of the national security elites. Personal connections therefore remain the most important factor in guiding the agenda of the state, in establishing perspectives on national security and in the formation of the national security elite. To recall Shaha, again, “As elite politics operates almost exclusively on a personal level, the overriding importance of proximity to the king combined with the informal character of Nepali government and politics has made the personal attendants of the king formidable members of the political elite irrespective of their ranks and positions” (Shaha, 1982:116). The recruitment process of Nepali elites is based on sycophancy and nepotism and continues to reflect ascriptive values that make them thrive only under state patronage.

Although political parties have reinvented themselves and have made themselves central to the national polity after 1990, the umbilical cord of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy patronised by the monarchy, however, has not been snapped. They replicate, to a large extent, what the monarchical panchayat system had practiced prior to 1990. Being representatives of the people, political parties have a crucial role in
determining national policies as executives in government and the legislature in parliament. They form the core of the national security elite while in government and as a supervisory agency in parliament. The political parties could have become a critical input as well as a decisive factor in integrating popular aspirations with state decision making and in promoting people-oriented policies. But political parties have not tried to maintain an unambiguous control of state power. Rather, they have been tempted to compromise with the monarchy and have refrained from intervening positively in the pre-existing structure of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy to substantially adjust their roles and functions to changing political situation. Instead, political parties and politicians have been thoroughly manipulated by the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which needed them in a complementary role to cater to their role of controlling and dominating notwithstanding electoral politics. Politicians become more state-conscious than people-conscious after being elected to power and it has become difficult for them to rein in the security forces and modify the public administration to make them more responsible to the people’s aspirations.

The composition of the National Defence Council (NDC) Secretariat by the elected government in 2002 clearly exemplifies that security policy is the area where intervention of civil society and public oversight agencies was least desired. Article 118 of the Constitution has stipulated the formation of the National Defence Council comprising the Prime Minister as the Chairman followed by the Defence Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff as members. Article 118(2) says: His Majesty shall operate and use the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the NDC (Constitution, 1990:103). Though the NDC is under the civilian leadership of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Army Staff, who, in turn, is one of the three crucial members of the NDC has direct access to the king as the latter is the supreme commander of the armed forces. The composition of the NDC secretariat with the members of security and intelligence agencies is also suggestive of the military dimension of security for which the agency has been made responsible for strengthening the security sector. The challenges emanating from political movements against the traditional authority of the centre and for broadening the base of state power with representation and distributive justice have thus been diluted because of the concentration of power at the centre and lack of accountability.
As the centralisation of power has remained the ultimate objective of the ruling class, they have focused exclusively on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state against both internal and external pressures. Although there is no official espousal of the national security doctrine except from understanding security in the reactive mode, national security elites have embedded views nourished by the *Dibya Upadesh* of Prithvi Narayan Shah that has defined Nepal as a ‘gourd between two rocks’, understandably locating its situational complexities since it is sandwiched between India and China; a situation that requires a realistic appraisal of the defensive strategy of the country (Kumar, 2000:162). The survival of Nepal as a physical entity is a primary concern of security policy. The threat perception till date has been more or less defined by this delicate geostrategic situation and in the past by the temptation of the British East India Company to open up a trade route to Tibet through Nepal (A similar proposal has been mooted by India recently in its negotiations with Nepal in early 2004. King Gyanendra has reportedly conceded to the Indian proposal while conferring with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his Jakarta sojourn in April 2005).

Indian economic and security sensitivities always overlap with the Nepali situation as is demonstrated not only by the movements of men and materials but also by the contraband goods, Maoist rebels and international terrorists across the open border. The threat has therefore actually emanated from an apprehension of the greed and sensitivities of its southern neighbour and its hegemonic policy essentialising preventive diplomacy through a cultivation of good relations with both the powers flanking Nepal. As *Dibya Upadesh* had put it: “Maintain a treaty of friendship with the emperor of China. Keep also a treaty of friendship with the emperor of the southern sea” (Stiller, 1968:47fn). Nepal has followed this mantra as closely as possible. Perhaps the Ranas were brilliant disciples who had learnt much from the contents of the *Dibya Upadesh* and about British intentions through their direct interactions with the British Company government in India after their ascension to power through violence in 1846 and had devised their security policy accordingly.

The Ranas had thus adopted a policy to keep Nepal isolated and underdeveloped because of a fear of absorption by the Company government. Despite their cultivation of the British power to sustain their regime domestically, the Ranas were not free from the possibility
of threat from the same power in the event of pursuing an independent path. Their sole concern therefore was to avoid being absorbed by the British and to maintain their control internally. They had thus to undermine the economic potentials of the state even though they were “interested in exploitation of the country’s resources to sustain a centralised state and administration and ensure personal enrichment,” as Regmi observed (1988:26). Further explaining the economic policy of the Ranas, Regmi (1988:25) wrote that they were afraid that the economic development of the country would be an incentive to the British to annex Nepal and could lead to the disappearance of the Hindu kingdom from the map of the subcontinent. Regime security and personal safety therefore were the predominant concerns of the rulers in the past and continue to be the primary preoccupations of the rulers at present. Territorial integrity and personal rulership thus has had overwhelming impact on determining the security policy of the Nepali state rather than public welfare and prosperity.

The phenomenon of being a weak state and the perception of the threat of being absorbed by a geographical colossus had led the security elites of Nepal to a foreign policy based on manipulating the tensions between the strong as the strategy of the weak created by South Asian geopolitics (Rose, 1971; Khatri, 1987; Kumar, 2000). Every country prepares itself militarily to face external aggression, as the dominant security paradigm remains traditional in the sense that it is state-centric; the case of Nepal, however, is different. It is territorially, demographically, economically and militarily a pigmy in comparison to the giants that China and India are. Therefore, Nepal’s security policy has never been dependent on military prowess but on diplomacy. Diplomacy has been used as the mainspring of security policy for territorial integrity and legitimisation of domestic politics, even though co-opting, cajoling and coercion have been the major means of maintaining regime stability in the context of domestic security.

The global security compact that has emerged in post-World War II international politics culminating in the process of decolonisation was useful to countries like Nepal as it honoured the sanctity of territorial integrity of existing political units and delegitimised the use of force against them despite the creation of new states in the South Asian region. Through this security compact, as agreed upon with the formation of the United Nations and with conventions adopted by the Security Council, the territorial integrity of even fragile and weak
states like Nepal has become acknowledged through international recognition. The overbearing influence of the Westphalian state system in international politics has helped rulers of Nepal to ensure territorial integrity. Not only was the Nepali state guaranteed territorial sovereignty and independence theoretically but it also was materially rewarded to maintain stability through foreign aid that was primarily spent on expanding the state's administrative reach and police control (Mihaly, 1965; Mishra and Sharma, 1983).

Much later, the monarchical state in Nepal initiated a two-prong strategy to preserve the sanctity of the regime domestically from growing domestic political dissent and to ensure territorial integrity from anticipated external intervention/aggression through the Royal proclamation of Nepal as a Zone of Peace in 1975. Although apparently a non-provocative defensive strategy advocated for seeking security assurance from external forces, the rationale behind the concept was related to the domestic situation, interpreted by many as an anti-democratic measure of the panchayat regime for maintaining internal repression and political control without foreign interference. Challenges to the political survival of Nepal have always been from within. Till April 1990 and again after October 2002, the problem of democratisation itself has become a critical challenge to the monarchical order. Thus there was a budding perception of internal-external nexus of threat inculcated by the strategic elites. Domestic challenges to political survival have posed grave threats to the regime. Therefore the conception of security has been conditioned heavily by considerations of domestic democratic opposition leading to the extent of influencing Nepal-India relations. In the process, India has been identified both a political-ideological and a military-security threat to Nepal's autocratic political dispensations. Although there is a growing sense of disquiet in the strategic elite circle about India's dualistic role, they would like to see India play a positive role in resolving the currently-intensifying Maoist insurgency.

The galling situation in Nepal today is India that had helped modernise the Nepali armed forces in the 1950s and is presently training a majority of the officer corps in its military academies, supplying uniforms, arms and military hardware, and is in effect becoming the largest weapons supplier to the Royal Nepal Army. Uniform-wise, there is presently no distinction between the Royal Nepal Army and the Indian Army. They are identical except for the insignia of Khukuri on the shoulder lapels
of the former. Nevertheless, distrust between the two countries persists. The relationship between Nepal and India has thus significantly been limited to damage control measures. The traditional Nepali strategic elites have not forgotten the scar of 1989 caused by the Indian economic blockade and the way the popular support to Jana Andolan in Nepal had cost it the *Panchayat* regime. But as the political regime distanced itself from society and functioned only with the objective of controlling and suppressing societal demands, again with the infusion of the foreign aid, it collapsed under the weight of an exclusive and excessive centralisation of power on the king whose decision becomes the ultimate force in determining the domestic political trajectory.

1.3 THE STATE AND SOCIETY: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES
Dramatic change in domestic politics in 1990 and the switch from monarchical absolutism to democratic pluralism, thus, raised a hosts of issues hitherto suppressed under the *panchayat* regime. The impact of economic collapse could be felt after the formation of the Interim Democratic Government in April 1990, which suggests that the vested interests comprising the political elites of the past regime had conspired to “put Nepal’s economy in its prolonged stage of stagnation” to be ultimately entangled in a spider’s web of smuggling, black marketing, commission brokerage and corruption (MoF, 1990:34). Ironically, the assessment paper of the Ministry of Finance amounts to a real indictment of the past 30 years of misgovernance and bankruptcy of a *panchayat* system supposedly introduced for creating an ‘exploitationless society’ by the king.

The absence of a strong economic base for consolidation of democratic order, though recognised, however, has not led to policy choices made to remove impediments to economic development. Politics has been entangled with the process of globalisation and depending on market forces has made the state less effective in being able to sustain the need of the poor by tying the state to the demands of a global centre rather than the domestic periphery. The linkage of the national decision-making centre to the regional and global metropolis has immersed Nepal into the receiving end of globalisation process and has led to the peripheralisation of the rural economy of the country. Market-friendly liberalisation policies have upset the local economy making indigenous production uncompetitive. The agricultural subsidy has been more or less withdrawn by the government, leaving poor peasants to fend for
themselves, whereas tax exemption, tax subsidies and soft loans provided to politically influential industrialists and trading houses have turned into bad debts that continue to be maintained. The impact, as noted by Panday (1999) has been ‘failed development,’ with increasing number of people being marginalised, and distorted development, with expansion of some lucrative service sectors but severe constriction on the agriculture sector on which the survival of a majority of the people depends. The total estimated unemployment figure has increased to 17.4 per cent (Economic Survey, 2002/03:99) with a measurable impact on human deprivations in the absence of work for livelihood, health and education for capacity building. Thus, the HDC (2002:95) concludes: “The decade of reform [in the 1990s] has seen an increase in the level of income inequality both in rural and urban areas. The poverty situation has also worsened due both to rising inequalities and declining growth in agriculture and industry.”

Another critical issue that came to the fore after the November 1990 proclamation of the democratic constitution was the religious identity of the state in the midst of a multiethnic and multicultural society. The declaration of Nepal as a ‘Hindu, monarchical’ state by the constitution was a cause for the controversy and gave impetus to the human rights movements in the country and against social, religious and economic discrimination. State sponsored religious practices have pitted the state against the rest of society making this one of the major sources of tension. Secularist ideology has been deeply entrenched in Nepali society as a consequence of religious and cultural diversities. Intermittent expressions of ethnicity as a political mode of dissent however had been controlled since the formation of the state in Nepal. The 1990 constitution further aggravated the situation when the ethnic demand for making Nepal a secular state was met half-way by the declaration that while it was a ‘multiethnic and multilingual’ state it was a Hindu one.

Moreover, King Gyanendra recently added much insult to injury in January 2004 by crowning himself as ‘Hindu Emperor of the World’ in a ceremony inspired and stage-managed by the India-based and much-hated World Hindu Council. His enthronement was endorsed by the fascist Hindu sectarian group that had also felicitated the ‘butcher of Gujarat’ Narendra Modi. The king’s myopic decision to enshrine himself as the ‘emperor of the 900 million Hindus’ living around the world has been seen as a ploy to legitimise his regime amongst the Hindus of the world as he is loosing the lustre of legitimacy at home
amidst his own citizens. Anointing himself with the help of the high
priest of Hindu extremism, the king has perhaps sought to ensure the
safety of his regime from the poisonous weeds of multifaceted oppositions
to his rule with the grace of a "big brother" who is also seriously concerned
about the fate of Hindutva in Nepal.

However, the governments formed under democracy were so
inordinate and inefficacious that they did not address ethnic grievances
and minority rights because of their unscrupulous attitude to the
people (Bhattachan, 2003). The democratic dispensation of the country
was not prepared to evolve a singular identity of the people through
broadening the base of participation and representation. Rather, the
strategy of majority versus minority continued to be used to politicise
the minorities. This led to sensitising the feelings of the people and had
socio-economic and political repercussions in domestic politics. Successive
governments postponed taking a decision on the issue by undertaking
various measures such as setting up Commissions to study the problem
but this was really an escape strategy and one of many delaying tactics.
In the absence of any vision for the progressive transformation of the
state, governments were very cautious even in adopting the
Decentralisation Act in 1999 as well as in establishing National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC) offices in 2000 with even meagre
resources, although the decision for creating the NHRC, had been made
in 1995. Despite their dismal functioning throughout their existence,
multiparty governments have some positive records such as ending the
Kamaiya (bonded labour) system and the passage of significant bills
regarding Dalits and women’s property rights.

The governments also adopted a policy to implement a programme
of distributing nominal stipends to senior citizens who are above 75
years of age and widows who are more than 60 years old. Medical facilities
for the poor and destitute were stipulated. Disability allowances and
scholarships for girls from poor families, Dalits, and other oppressed
groups were introduced. But in the absence of local governments these
programmes could not be satisfactorily implemented. Since 1999, the
democratic government under the Nepali Congress Party adopted some
populist and pro-people programmes such as Garibsangha Bisheshowar
(Bisheshowar among the poor a la Jawahar rojghar yojana of India), the
gender-sensitive Jagriti (awareness programme) for women’s income
enhancement, a rehabilitation project under the Ganesh Man Singh
Peace Foundation, Garibi Nibaran Kosh (Poverty Alleviation Fund),
28 Nepali State, Society and Human Security

and the National Food Security Reserve in 2000/01 budget with the help of massive government endowments. The government also initiated the Remote Area Development Programme in 1992 covering some 22 remote districts and the Special Area Development Programme with 25 districts as target area since 1998 as ‘basket fund’ and later as the Integrated Security and Development Fund (ISDF) in Maoist hit areas. Unfortunately, these programmes remain operational largely on paper and for the most part the cronies and cadres of the political party in power have filled the posts of officers of those programmes for their own-aggrandisement.

Both under autocracy and democracy, the state purse was used maximally for the purpose of elites capturing the political leadership of the country to retain their supremacy in the affairs of the state rather than to put themselves in the service of the citizenry they claim to represent. As a study has suggested, “Democracy is not about the people; it is about access to state power,” and this attitude has made democracy an elusive system of ‘recycled elites’ (HDC, 1999:47). The politics of opportunism has created a system where even legislatures were bought and sold for a price and hangers-on enriched. The crony syndrome that overwhelmingly influences the government decision-making process renders the question of governance ineffective by ignoring the need for institutionalisation of the democratic process. Politicians and political leaders have been rather indulgent in promoting cronyism and their delinquency and readiness to promote their own interests have led them to consolidate their power under the cover of constitutional legality. Meanwhile law-abiding citizens are becoming alienated from the government as they see very little sense in the plenty of laws, rules and regulations passed for governance but no rule of law for governing the state. Political change therefore has become meaningless without any substantial attitudinal changes in the dimension of power of the state and the behaviour of the leadership in the absence of any move towards democratisation of political structure and articulation of a democratic political culture (Kumar, 2000).

Multiparty democracy, as practised by Nepal’s political leaders, however, has created functionaries in rural areas who are really party stalwarts and appendages to the central authority. But the political leaders and power elites and decision-makers and rulers are all created in urban centres whose monologues were to be transmitted to the rural people in the guise of dialogues by the party ideologues. Party politics,
have ineffect divided the people of Nepal into two distinct groups: the 'Jai Nepal' and the 'Lal Salam' groups. A majority of them have become the 'salaried' class and form a new group of political professionals and consultants to political power elites whose increasing dependency on the state as the biggest employer have led to a clientele relationship between the state and themselves. These salaried but auxiliary political entrepreneurs have become protectors of the interests of the state. People belonging outside party political nets have consequently become not only political non-entities but also some thing of a social and economic liability to the partisan interests of the politician in command of the state apparatuses.

Thus 'man as a political animal' conscious enough of the attributes of power politics in Nepal has switched loyalty frequently from one group to another by aligning himself to the party in power with every alteration of the national power equation. Putting a finger on the state pie remains the objective rather than the pursuit of ideology: the former Panchas of the discredited Panchayat regime filled the party hierarchies of both mainstream political parties—the Nepali Congress as well as the CPN (UML)—while their experiences of regime control and maintenance worked to entrench the status quo. This has debarred the state from functioning as the instrument which delivers the people's basic needs, and the programmes politicians initiate rebound only to their personal benefits. The absence of accountability of the power elites therefore has caused disappointment among social groups who had anticipated that the state would be more forthcoming in addressing the problems they had articulated. The popular outcry is the result of the continuing social exclusion that the democratic state has practised while doling out inadequate measures to broaden the bases of participation and development. The hopes generated by the demise of the panchayat regime for participatory politics were soon belied as the urge for greater participation of the people itself generated the sense of insecurities in the state structure and the fear of fragmentation in the regime's control lead the state to constitutionally reassert the status quo.

Although the constitution promises equality to all before the law, it remains state sensitive while staying ethnically insensitive in restricting the 'freedoms' to assembly and association of the people when deemed necessary in case such 'freedoms' may "undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal, or which may
jeopardise the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes or communities....” (Constitution, 1990:9-11). Accordingly, Article 113(3) of the constitution restricts the registration of any ethnic political associations, particularly that of the non-Hindu Mongoloid groups, in the shape of political parties from functioning, although the Tarai-Hindu based Nepal Sadbhavana Party and the India-inspired Shiv Sena parties have been allowed to field candidates in national elections. This glaring discrimination in the practice of national law has undermined the provisions guaranteeing the civil and cultural liberties of the ethnic communities. The continuation of a sectarian policy by the state and its imposition of ‘one language, one culture, one religion and one dress’ in a multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious and multicultural society has resulted in the suppression of human rights, thereby instilling a sense of insecurity in non-Hindu ethno-religious groups of the country. Political change in Nepal in 1990 and the practices of different governments under democracy has been found to be seriously inadequate in addressing societal challenges through inclusion and formation of a mutual bonding between the state and society.

Misgovernance under democracy and the lack of social sensitivity has, thus, led to further alienation of the people. The Maoists, who had initially placed demands concerning people’s livelihood and public welfare, were virtually ignored and repressed by the state, but this policy ultimately rebounded causing violence which appears to be unending. The reasons for the beginning of ‘social disorder’ have been identified even by the government as the ‘persistent poverty and inequalities’ in the absence of decentralisation and inadequate resource allocations to needy areas (NPC, 2003:35). Conventional wisdom relates conflict to poverty and the latter is usually described as a potent factor in generating conflict and violence. Although subalternity and marginalisation remain crucial factor in explaining the causes of conflict in poor and underdeveloped countries, bad leadership as the chief factor in the eruption of violent conflict has been ignored in the case of Nepal (Kumar, 2004:8). The leaderships’ intransigencies and insensitivities to legitimate issues confronting the state and their impersonal attitudes towards societal demands led to the death of more than 13,000 people because of violent conflict, climaxing in the complete reversal of democracy after the 1st February 2005 Royal coup.

The re-emergence of conservative forces at the helms of state affairs has led to militarisation and escalating violence and the increasing
insecurities of people, thereby eroding the prospect of human development. Militarism is both a means of violence and control of territory, which confers power as an attribute of authority to the person who has traditionally claimed sovereignty upon him 'by virtue of the State authority as exercised by us' (Constitution, 1990:2). The military virtue is accorded highest priority in safeguarding national interests, as is evident by the expansion of the army and spiralling arms procurement. In the absence of any perceptible threat to the state's territorial integrity from external machinations, it can be concluded that the role of the expanded army would be to intensify internal policing for repelling domestic opposition in order to maintain dominance and control and preserve the traditional structure of the state, but not better governance. The desire to make Nepal a strong state by articulating a policy of dependent militarisation and by monopolising the power of the state through the monarchy has undermined constitutional order wherein the principles of human rights will be downgraded through the use of different methods of political control.

1.4 STATE AND HUMAN SECURITY

The situation described above indicates that affirmative change in the political matrix of the state cannot be expected given the present setup. The Nepali state has reverted to its original form of the monarchical state rather than advanced towards democratisation, decentralisation and development. The failure to proceed to representative governance and the way this has impacted on the nature of the state and leadership has affected the context and approach to human security in Nepal in a negative way. When participation is denied, human rights naturally become the first targets of a despotic regime. And where basic human rights are absent, to think and talk about human security will be tantamount to daydreaming. Human security as a concept is inextricably linked with human rights practices. These rights include not only the rights of individual freedom and freedom from want and fear but also the right to development commensurate with the life-sustaining activities. The growing 'threats of development reverse to the threats of violence inflicted' (CHS, 2003:2) have generated widespread insecurities among people. This general sense of insecurity should, therefore, be posited with the critical dialogue with the notion of security.
In the case of Nepal, security as a term cannot be described interchangeably with defence, which is primarily underpinned by its military connotation. Militarily, Nepal has, fortunately, not had to defend its territorial integrity and national independence ever since the war with the British East India Company took place in 1816. Over a period of nearly two centuries Nepal has been at peace. Because as the status quo sits rather than expansionist powers surround Nepal, military defence of its territorial integrity has not been warranted. The perception of insecurity germinating in Nepal among the people is neither caused by the threats of external aggression nor by the threats of ethnic violence, separatism and secessionism. Rather the threats and insecurities are caused by lapses in the government and its inability to protect its citizenry from violent domestic conflicts and from deepening anarchy. Expanding domestic insecurities are not consequences of threats to state security. Neither are the predicaments of people caused by distant but cataclysmic external factors. Rather, it was the persistent social anomalies and internal dissensions coupled with the inability of the state to uphold its normative obligations to the citizens that has caused the feeling of insecurity of the people. Threats to their livelihood have now expanded to threats of physical violence. Against such a background three questions can be raised in relation to an understanding of human security in Nepal.

1. Can human security be achieved through the given political structure where state apparatuses are fundamentally based on centralised control?

2. Would the political leadership be ready to devolve power and its exclusive identity and sacrifice its privileges for fostering human security by undertaking humanitarian policy measures through social inclusion?

3. What condition should be evolved to sensitise the concept of human security in Nepal?

I have approached the discourse on human security in Nepal by addressing these root questions and not statistics. Theses questions are crucially tied in evolving a perspective on human security or whether the institutional means for organising the state and the functional process of the Nepali state is capable of and inclined to accommodating the changing dimensions of state-society relations relative to societal demands. Is the leadership prepared to reassess the policies it has been
pursuing and gear up the state towards protecting the interests of the people by making their representation essential to state security and by providing them the basic needs and individual freedom they seek to pursue their lives without fear of discrimination, persecution and hunger for survival? Removing the persistent fear of insecurity among the people from want in particular could be construed as a first step towards attaining human security in a situation where questions of survival and safety are being increasingly undermined both by violence and repression as well as by hunger and diseases. The fragility of human rights and insensitivity displayed in the name of ‘national security’ and the increases in the ‘kill ratio’ in making the statistical profile commensurate with the projection of success stories defending national security militarily is resulting in a dangerous bloodbath causing irreversible human miseries. My contention, however, is that the meaning of security cannot be discovered within the framework of the hegemony that the leadership and the state are burdened with. In other words, it would be futile to expect the leadership to remain unchallenged and the state stable in securing its rights to dominate without preserving the rights of citizenry.

I therefore conclude that the Nepali state even under democratic dispensation has failed to institutionalise the process of governance by imparting a feeling of ownership of the state by the citizenry. Rather, the democratic experience has distinctly segregated the people into majority and minority by unpropitiously establishing the rule of majority through an electoral process and by creating a permanent gulf between the electorate and the elected. A perspective on human security, thus, is developed in this study on the basis of the concept of state failure caused primarily by leadership inefficacy and unaccountability. Persistent political instability has affected all spheres of the activities of the state. Thus, in terms of human security, state failure has a meaning relating to a situation in which the Nepali state can be linked to conditions of poverty, illiteracy, income and social inequalities, and unrestrained violence. The fundamental reason behind this assertion is the inability of the Nepali state to change the course and direction of history despite changes in the leadership and the political system along with the opportunities conducive for democratising the state. The political structure of the state has seen the power relationships between the state and society embedded in an authoritarian rulership that has, therefore, been identified as a major
impediment in democratising the state, and against increasing the prospect of human security.

The failure of the leadership is reflected in the burgeoning violent insurgency that has led the state towards crisis and resulted in the multiple insecurities of the citizenry. State failure is caused by (i) sustained military conflicts between insurgents and governments aimed at displacing the regime, (ii) sustained policies of the protagonists resulting in the deaths of a substantial number of people or declamations of political groups and; (iii) an adverse and disruptive regime transfer with a major abrupt shift in the pattern of governance leading towards authoritarian rule (King and Zeng, 2001:625). In the political lexicon, state failure does not mean the loss of sovereignty. It can be described as grossly undermining state authority by anti-state forces, thereby internally weakening the juridical authority of the state, leaving it without the ability impose rule of law (King and Zeng, 2001:623). Similarly, state failure or the condition of being a failed state is defined as a state “that do not carry out state functions—to maintain order, to prevent police and military forces to harassing civilians, to protect peaceful economic activities, to provide education and health care and improve infrastructure” (Williams Jr., 2004:47-48). Distinguishing between failed and collapsed states, Williams suggests “collapse states are those in which governments [are] under siege or in which civil war [has] erupted” (Williams Jr., 2004:48). The state of Nepal is not any different from what these definitions definitely imply. The Maoist insurgency has started with the objective of establishing a republican system in Nepal with the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a multiparty democratic regime that has intensified the armed conflict with devastating impact on both the lives and properties of people. Yet there is no stopping the killings as both antagonists are determined to deal with each other violently. Efforts at negotiating conflict have failed because of inadequate commitment to prior agreements and the absence of trust along with the poor performance of governments in every conceivable arena (Kumar, 2003:12-13).

Such a nebulous situation has led to the destruction of democratic authority, giving way to the assertion of executive power by the king and who rules the country in accordance with his whim. The monarchy, supported by the military power of the state, and the Maoists, with their armed guerrillas, have created a situation that has made the people victims and their rights, their welfare and survival have been
thoroughly undermined as the contending forces have made them the prime target of their struggle for power. The growing insecurity of the people can be further underscored by enumerating some trends. First, the Nepali state has become utterly incapable of sustaining itself through civilian measures and has resulted to militarisation as a strategy of coping against internal violence. Second, the process of militarisation has further heightened the level of social tensions making the situation intensely violent and leading to an appalling domestic situation where the judicial system has been undermined. Third, the leadership void has led the state towards anarchy as the legitimacy of the monarchical regime is being sharply contested by popular forces.

It should, however, be noted in the context of Nepal that numerous sources of internal instabilities and insecurities surfaced with the restoration of parliamentary democracy after the success of the *Jana Andolan* in 1990. Through the opening of the floodgate of demands, ethno-politics has become a major paradigm for reclaiming social space. Gender is another complex but sensitive issue not to be ignored by the state. Unlike in the *Panchayat* system when the army was under the direct control of the monarchy, civil-military relations under democracy entered a grey zone, although the armed forces were constitutionally answerable to an elected government. As the political feuds between different political parties sharpened and led to perennial political instability, internal insecurities increased, along with violent insurgencies. Amidst the disorganised and dubious measures that the political leaderships resorted to for their political survival, the military, as the traditionally developed organ of the state, imposed itself on the government through the intervention of the monarchy in national politics. The defused and weakened political authority of the elected leadership and the uncertainty of political equations caused by intraparty wrangling made them align themselves more closely with the monarchy rather than with their own parties and the electorate. The concern with their own political and personal security and their desire to hold on to power has primarily created a nexus between the parliamentary leadership and the traditional institutions of monarchy with the armed forces behind it to ultimately destroy democracy while in search of ‘paternal dependency’ (Bista, 1991:111) to preserve their privileged positions. Both under autocratic and democratic dispensations, the Nepali state has undermined the essence of human security by promoting a culture of violence and social suffering.
The leadership phenomenon is hence posited as a basis for interrogating human security in the case of Nepal. It is contended here that the national historical experience and the nature of the state and leadership should be a starting point to discuss, deliberate on and examine the contexts of human security in Nepal. Leadership that frames the policy of the state should therefore be the focal point in examining the state of human security rather. Policy decisions of the leadership have institutional and functional levels. At the institutional level, policymaking is done to deal with a situation and execute decisions by operationalising a policy. The functional level comprises the means through which the policy is implemented to meet the challenges posed by a situation *per se*. The impact of the institutional and functional roles of the state is thus the primary concern through which the lives of the people are crucially linked. The impact of policy on people critically reflects on their collective experiences of suffering and highlights the situation of human security. As the late Mahabub ul Haq has said: “Human security is a concept emerging not from the learned writings of scholars but from the daily concerns of the people.... [It is] a people’s concept and people’s concern, human security is reflected in the shrivelled faces of innocent children, in the anguished existence of the homeless, in the constant fear of the jobless, in the silent despair of those without hope” (Haq, 1996:116-17). Haq’s observation is more relevant to the situation in Nepal than any claims made by academics and writers on security issues. But security as a term has itself been a contested concept; perhaps the concept of human security, as Alagappa has noted, is a synthesis of all the defined categories of security (Alagappa, 1998:694-5). Human security is a policy that does not pose threat to others as state security, involving threat or use of force, reproduces insecurity.

In the case of a Nepal that has yet to face any serious threats of external aggression and attack of its territorial integrity and independence, violent internal conflict is the *situation* more relevant to human security and affects people’s lives in various ways. Human security is therefore not a distinct phenomenon that can be conceived separately by ignoring the situation faced by the state. The state is the referent even in the case of human security as this can only be envisioned within the framework of the state as the facilitator and not without it. Hence security, be it human or national, is a relative and relational concept. It is argued here that an understanding of human
security need not involve a debate in reaching a consensus definition among the scholarly community and policymakers. Neither should the practice of human security wait for a Security Council definition as was the case in defining ‘aggression.’ As human security is a post-Cold War phenomenon, it cannot be judged, defined, analysed and evaluated with a Cold War mindset. If the matrix of the Cold War as a struggle for power and order were to be actually replicated in the Nepali context, the power rivalries across the cis-Himalayan regions would be seen to have a restraining impact on the ambitions of both China and India, thereby ensuring the territorial integrity of Nepal as a state.

The realist paradigm of security that has long been under careful scrutiny has found that the security practices of states are inadequate in conceptualising security except in a case where the state itself is the easiest referent to security and where there are multiple causes of insecurities. A distinct phenomenon in this case is the controversial deterrent value of nuclear security at the highest level. This flawed realist precept is comfortably grounded in defining security relations between states and not within a state. Human security, however, is an in-house phenomenon that can be located within the state; it can be situated in the context of nature, type and policy of the state and is broadly within the ambit of state-society relationships. Accordingly, human security is connected with a liberal search of a normative definition of security and with values inextricably linked to human destiny. The ultimate value is freedom—freedom from threats to individual survival and the right to equality in the pursuit of opportunities for individual fulfilment. The denial of these freedoms to the citizens of the state degrades the quality of life of the people, thereby threatening their circumstance of their lives causing increasing insecurities as has been the case in Nepal.

Although there is hardly any reference to the question of human security both in public and policy domains in Nepal which are constantly marred by struggles between autocratic and democratic forces, the issues of human security have been poised in assertions about human rights and democracy, in the articulation of ethnic and gender disparities, religious and social discrimination, environmental degradation and population displacement, and in documentary the migratory flows of people, poverty and destitution. The issues of child labour, girl trafficking, the Badi and Deuki systems practised particularly in western Nepal ritualising prostitution, and domestic violence causing dowry deaths in
the Nepal Tarai have become common denominators of human insecurity widely debated in the public circles along with poverty and destitution. Poverty remains a phenomenon contributory to the state of underdevelopment and is the key agenda of politics. Underneath this phenomenon, societal anomalies and grievances are articulated publicly as issues related to low politics. Discourses on these societal issues, however, are normally treated as rights and development agendas, and not viewed as focused debates on issues at the heart of human security.

Discourses on the assault on democracy by the monarchy and Maoist extremists have now become common and have distressful implications on a process of governance overwhelmed by the military influence in decision-making. Growing risks and vulnerabilities in the social spheres caused by economic downturns are a constant feature of public concern. Shrinking means of livelihood and growing unemployment have had multiple effects and created social disruption and have displaced people internally and externally. The media in Nepal has covered all issues concerning social anomalies in relations to human security and has sensitised public concern (e.g. Parajuli and Onta, 2003; Onta and Parajuli, 2003; Sharma, 1999). Although both academic and media outputs under democracy have sensitised people-oriented and governance issues, no efforts have been made on scrutinising broader contexts. However, advocacy groups, like some NGOs, have been continuously engaged in promoting the causes of disadvantaged groups by spotlighting the issues. BASE and INSEC, and even CIVICT are in the forefront of raising human rights issues acutely related to human security in addition to some human rights organisations functioning in Nepal. Dalit, ethnic and gender issues have led to social movements. In the past, human security issues were usually blurred in the discourses of human rights as the struggles for human rights under autocratic regimes had put the premium basically on political security as a determination for human security, something which remains at the root of the conflict between democracy and dictatorship in Nepal.

One understandable reason for the absence of any critical debate on human security is perhaps because social security has never been seen as the responsibility of the state and has been seen as related to the family. To put it crudely, the concern for social security in old age has been the classic reason for the preference of male child in the family and the basic cause of gender discrimination in Nepal as in the whole
of South Asia. The son performs Hindu family traditions, which are ensconced with the belief in rituals that extend from the life and death of a person, and make people desirous of having sons. The bond between the living and the dead is a never-ending cycle and only a son is seen as the link in the chain of relationships (Bista, 1991:61). It is ironic to note that the preference for a male child subsists inherently among married women in Nepal because of their traditionally dependent relationships in the family, social system and cultural practice. As the economic activities of a majority of women are confined to households, they feel that their old age security is dependent on male members, especially sons. Even though the pivotal contribution of women in rural economy is being recognised increasingly, no endurable safety nets are as yet available for them.

Presently, social security for over 96.4 per cent of the 11 million active work forces involved in informal sectors, including agriculture, is not a concern of the government. The demands for social security for workers/labourers raised by the Nepal Trade Union Congress (NTUC) in accordance with Article 26(6) of the Constitution of Nepal 1990, has been rebuffed by the government. Although the “Directive Principles and the Policies of the State” has clearly stipulated that the “The state shall pursue a policy of increasing participation of labour forces, the chief socio-economic force of the country, in the management of enterprises by gradually securing employment opportunities to it, ensuring the right to work, and thus protecting its rights and interests” (Constitution, 1990:18, emphasis added), there is no legal recourse to the problem. With the swing towards privatisation and the economic crunch facing the country, people are increasingly being laid-off from their jobs; complicating labour relations even further (Manandhar, 2001).

The “Directive Principles and Policies of the State” is inclusive in comprising various components of human security in “establishing a just system in all aspects of national life, including social, economic and political life [and] at the same time protecting lives, property and liberty of the people (Article 25) and eliminating all types of economic and social inequalities (Article 25(3)); in establishing a decentralised government protecting and promoting human rights (Article 25(4)); in providing education, health, housing and employment services to the people (Article 26); in encouraging cordial social relations by helping in the promotion of language, literature, scripts, arts and culture of the diverse ethnic-linguistic people; in encouraging gender equality by
making ‘special provision’ for female education, health and employment along with social security for orphans, helpless women, the aged, disabled and in preserving the interests of backward communities by making ‘special provision’ with regard to their education, health and employment” (Constitution, 1990:16-19). But all these commitments were made non-enforceable by law in any court (Article 24, Constitution, 1990:16). And where worries from both ‘want’ and ‘fear’ have increased, the state has abandoned its responsibility to even protect its citizens. Instead, the state has become a cruel manifestation of a repressive regime using widespread torture and resorting to ill treatment of the people (“Statement of UN System in Nepal,” Himalayan Times 26 June 2004).

The NTUC in its concept paper has, therefore, asserted, “Till date the programme of the Nepali state has empowered the ruling class than the people. The state has never been sensitive to the social and economic problems faced by over 50 per cent of the people living below the poverty line. A majority of these people are engaged in unorganised sectors for their livelihood. The government and political parties have yet to rise above their petty interests to impart a sense of belongingness among the people by assuring their social security” (NTUC, 1997:1-2). The NTUC has been actively pursuing the policy of labour rights movements as integral to their livelihood and social security (NTUC, 1998). The Nepal Trade Union Federation, on the other hand, notes that one Nepali among 10 dies of work-related accidents, diseases or occupational hazards every day. Yet provisions for health security in industrial establishments are yet to be adopted and implemented.

Provisions for social security exist in the formal sector for less than 0.4 million people (3.6 per cent) of the total labour forces and the question of adequacy and coverage remains. The government has failed to provide health insurance policies for some 200,000-service personnel. Even in the informal sector the different rules, regulations and measures taken have not ensured social security. For a majority of the work force social security coverage is still a scanty. Of the total work force, the proportion of rural population engaged in agriculture, as large as 6 million, is mostly self-employed. Some 24.4 per cent are landless agriculture workers. Women engaged in agriculture sector come to 47 per cent, accounting for 62 per cent of the total working population in agriculture. However, the agriculture sector, which employs 80 per cent
of the total labour force and contributes to almost 40 per cent of the national GDP, is still beyond the safety net of the state.

Thus the state is yet to address the manifold increases in the vulnerability of people. Degradation of the quality of life of the people has continued amidst the spurts of violence and political vicissitudes. The question of human security, therefore, has become an intractable challenge in the country not because of mounting external threats and global anarchy but because of continuing internal instability and domestic anarchy caused by the leaderships’ rivalries for power and the state purse. Human security is integral to the domestic socio-political and economic situation and not dependent on external designs. Domestic anarchy is caused more by national leadership factors than any other normative reason. Anarchy is promoted by bad leaders who thrive by manipulating antagonists who are attempting to perpetuate themselves in power. Their preference for power has cost the state both democracy and development. Violence, repression and insecurity have further damaged social cohesion by weakening the state’s ability to respond to the peoples’ needs and by deliberate policy preference for defence than development.

There can be no real security for the state if the people themselves are not secure. This is easily demonstrated in the case of Nepal. State-centric security measures have not prevented Nepal from falling into an insecurity trap and increasingly violent challenges to political regimes along with damages and destructions of the economic base and of people’s lives. Internal turmoil is therefore much more relevant than external threats to security because domestic threats arising from the state of underdevelopment and the dehumanising experiences of the people have threatened both political stability and the well-being of the people. Continuation of domestic violence caused by insurgency can further spill over political borders providing alibi for external powers to intervene under the guise of humanitarian assistance. This situation could not only make the state more insecure but it could also lead to loss of sovereignty and independence for which the state had taken up arms to enhance security, although that had not helped to alleviate security concerns. The need of rethinking security from a utilitarian concept, thus, arises both from developmental and humanitarian perspectives because human development can be a normative base for enhancing the scope for human security in Nepal.
1.5 RATIONALISING THE MEANING OF HUMAN SECURITY FOR NEPAL

Some sustained attempts have been made to understand the human situation in Nepal in recent years to understand the state of poverty and human development. The Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) published by the National Planning Commission in 1996 (CBS, 1996) was followed by the Human Development Report 1998 (NSAC, 1998) and the Nepal Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP, 2002) by agencies assessing human security-related issues from development perspectives. NLSS monitored the prevalent human condition, evaluating the impact of the policies and programmes of the government on the life of the people. The studies suggest creating an enabling environment for capacity building of the people and ‘means of conserving, creating and recreating appropriate political, economic and cultural institutions’ (e.g. NSAC, 1998:246). The last survey focused on issues of poverty reduction and governance, establishing the interrelations between the two. It has identified weak governance as the root cause for thwarted development, persistent disparities in the freedoms and choices given to the people and notable absence of their participation in the decision-making processes that shape their lives (UNDP, 2002:iii).

On the other hand, the documents published by the government also can be used as basic indicators of the development scenario in Nepal. The recently published Sustainable Development Agenda for Nepal mentions the development challenges for lifting the lives of the majority of the people from absolute poverty, and for ensuring the secure, peaceful lives of honour and dignity for all the people of Nepal (NPC/MoPE, 2003). Together, these publications have been of immense value in understanding the national situation regarding entitlement, rights and development. The ‘guns versus bread and butter’ discourses have been unfolding in Nepal against a background of spreading violence Impinging on the very essence of human security.

To begin with, ‘human security,’ as the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 says, “is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity.” The current situation in Nepal fits the definition provided by the UNDP Report:

For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises from worries about daily life.... Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a
victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? (UNDP, 1994:22).

This is a utilitarian concept closely related to a situation of underdevelopment in which poverty, unemployment and social exclusion are causes of the miseries of the people. On the other hand, it has contextualised human life with the nature of the state. Both economic sustainability and political freedom are imperatives for human security. This definition based on a development perspective assumed the prerequisite of two elements to attain human security. From this perspective, human security means 'first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities' (UNDP, 1994:23). The report is explicit in its assumptions: "In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced" (UNDP, 1994:22). The underlying elements of human security, according to the report, are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security, which are integrative concepts chained together by the need of freedom from want and fear (UNDP, 1994:24-33).

In addition, a critical ingredient to human security is security sector reform through democratic control. Since "unchecked and unaccountable security institutions often prey on the most vulnerable members of society hampering daily struggles for survival and other basic freedoms" (UNDP, 2002:87). Affordability is also a related question involving the security sector in countries like Nepal where the swelling of security expenditures in the name of counter-insurgency mobilisation is eating up funds sanctioned from social sectors further pushing development issues into the backburner. This has put questions of human development and human security at odds with 'national security.' If the latter concept is defined only in military term, the question of human security is now under siege as the glamour of possessing state-of-the-art weapons for modernising the security sector is eating at the vitals of state while causing increasing pauperisation of people. As the Nepali state is empirically weighing security through the number of men under arms, questions like 'whose security' followed by 'security for whom,' 'security of which values,' 'security from what threats' and
‘security by what means’ (Bajpai, 2000:9) have become relevant in locating human security. These questions constitute dialectic between human and state security, particularly in a situation when threats emanating from internal insecurities are jeopardising both.

Therefore the first question that human security faces is with regard to its conceptualisation. Can human security be conceptualised in the absence of the state or without the security of the state being ensured? Secondly, should human security be considered as the opposite of national security? Thirdly, does human security exist in contradiction to national security? And finally, is human security conceived as a result of the tension caused by the contradiction in state-society relations? The arrow flees both ways, as nation/state is a reality. Human security can only be conceptualised within the framework of this reality. The state is both a means and the end to human security. It cannot be otherwise as the insecurity of the Nepali state is a cause of the tortuous and incomplete state-building process that has been constricting democratic space. The state can be made to reverse this role after an intensive struggle but the state will very much be there while facilitating the democratic space. The priority of the state in any stage of its development first would be consolidation of its power so that it is unassailable by any forces—both internal and external. Hence, it is argued that the notion of human security can only be conceptualised by infusing it with the notion of social justice, unfettered human rights and respect for human dignity and by firmly linking these ideas with the democratic process, governance, and accountability. This way the human element of security can be introduced into the paradigm of state security by making the state more responsible to society and by registering the threats emanating from systemic decay rather than external machination.

The locus for the inquiry should be ‘whose security’ and a question related: how has the leadership of the state responded? Already, it has been noted that one of the institutional and functional roles of the state is protecting and providing security to the people. Hence the primary object of security is the people whose freedoms and rights should be the core of security. The crux of the state is obligation is to preserve people’s rights and freedom in any situation. Thus, according to the Commission on Human Security, “human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that builds on people’s strengths
and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity" (CHS, 2003:4). This, in other words, means that human security is not a negation of state security. It not only complements state security but also enforces the imperative of the state considering its role as critical to the pursuit, provider and protection of human security. The failure of the state in these realms and sometimes in it becoming a source of threat to its own people—as in the case of Nepal—does violence to the complimentary continuum between the state and society and make them antagonistic.

This becomes a greater cause of concern when the state involves itself in internal violence by undertaking repressive military measures against anti-state forces designating them as terrorists, thus, fundamentally abusing the human rights of the innocent (CHS, 2003:23). The continuous expansion of budgetary allocations to security forces (e.g. MoF, 2004), and emphasis on a 'gun first' policy and the maintenance of an autocratic regime has had crippling effects on people's livelihood as well as security concerns. As the security perception of the Nepali state is being increasingly equated with the threats to regime safety, the consequence has been the constraining of its ability to safeguard human security and the deliberate undermining of the rights and needs of the people with military forays. Although the need to increase the combat capability of the security forces to counter anti-state violence cannot be disputed, the burgeoning manpower recruitment and military procurement at the expense of social sector investment is not conducive to any attempt at providing dignified and peaceful life to the people of Nepal. As the NSAC 1998 asserts 'there are more “small” people than big, and there are many more poor than rich’ people in Nepal. 'The rich, however, may also be underdeveloped in human terms.... Without denying or diluting the significance of other institutions, [it should be] affirmed that the principal role for the promotion of human development has to be played by the state. Human development is a constitutionally mandated duty of the state (NSAC, 1998:245 and 247, emphasis original).

In this context, Mahbub ul Haq's contribution in making the state more responsive to its citizens can be seen in the development of the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human Governance Index (HGI) which can be used to determine how a particular state has fared in response to the needs of its people. Through these measures he not only advanced the thesis that development should be people-centric but
also created a chasm in the conceptualisation of security, suggesting that the term security has been interpreted and used too narrowly and inappropriately 'for too long' when it has been restricted to the notion of territorial integrity 'from external aggression.... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolised protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (UNDP, 1994:22). This focus on the small and voiceless people marginalised for long has indeed had a convulsive effect on the reconceptualisation of security.

This assertion made by the UNDP report has evidently lead to production of critical security studies linking human development and human security to sustain state security. Similarly, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of the Canadian government has produced reports demonstrating that although 'security between states remains a necessary condition for security of people, national security is insufficient to guarantee people's security' (DFAIT, 1999). In a comprehensive review of the UNDP and DFAIT reports, Bajpai has delineated the distinction between the two perspectives on human security suggesting that whereas the former has primarily stressed individual security, the latter has conceded the primacy of the individual without losing sight of the importance of state security. The values inherent in both reports are 'personal safety, well being and individual freedoms' but the threats perceived by them are different in the degrees of emphasis given on indirect versus direct violence (Bajpai, 2000).

UNDP has naturally emphasised the indirect threats and violence related to the livelihood and welfare of the people. Conversely, DFAIT has drawn attention towards national, societal as well as international and global threats. Human development, democratisation and participation are the means suggested by the UNDP report to attain human security. DFAIT, on the other hand, has stressed good governance, political development, and collective use of force and imposition of sanctions when necessary to achieve human security. Despite the systemic divergence assumed by these two reports—one has been produced by an international organisation and another by a state—they have understandably put considerably less stress on the use of force to attain human security. Not so, of course, in the case of UNDP, whose focus in achieving human security is through development. This is antithetical to a state's
obession with the use of force as a means to security. The Canadian position is also intricately linked with the emphasis on protecting civilians in times of war and in prevention and resolution of violent conflicts (Preston and Hubert, 2000:351; DFAIT, 2003) complementing the principles of the UN Charter.

Conceived in this perspective, it can be argued that human security requires 'both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charges of their own lives' (CHS, 2003:IV). A further reading of the literature suggests 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' are complementary; neither can be achieved without the existence of the other (Sabur, 2003:44). These are crucial values linked to the conception of human security. Bajpai has therefore tried to resolve the complexities involving these values and has tied them to human security by suggesting a construction of a 'human security audit' with pivotal emphasis on bodily safety, well-being, and personal freedom for the 'meaningful life choices' of an individual (Bajpai, 2000:38). In his view, "Human security relates to the protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence. The promotion of human development and good governance, and when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security" (Bajpai, 2000:48). While defining human security, Bajpai has blended both the UNDP and DFAIT definitions, co-joining the relationships between 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' as imperatives of human security.

These concepts can lead to an understanding of situation in relations to human security in Nepal. The Figure 1.1 is an attempt to situate Nepal through contextualising human security.

The Nepali state today is hamstrung by a violent conflict threatening both bodily safety and the well-being of the people. Terrorism and social crimes are on the rise. The country is presided over by a government formed after the Royal coup on 1st February 2005 that lacks legitimacy. The king and his nominees in the government have collectively turned the country into an “animal farm.” Continuing political instability as a result of the struggle for democracy and the reestablishment of parliamentary and constitutional order, on the one hand is coupled with the imposition of anti-terrorist laws and counter-mobilisation of state forces to contain anti-state forces. On the other hand, anti-terrorist laws have been used with impunity and have given immunity to the security forces. Security sensitivities of state have led to the
downgrading of development concerns. Such a state posture has destroyed any prospect for development as well as residual human rights of the people, making them insecure and miserable. The reality is that governance is sorely lacking now and that society is verging on anarchy. The state and its leadership, which is primarily responsible for ensuring people’s welfare, security and representation, is deficient in all these scores. Indeed, the leadership of the state has become a dominant reason for the sufferings and exclusion of the people from the political mainstream.

Although the prevailing scholarship has contributed immeasurably to an understanding of human security and the means through which it can be attained, it has not given adequate attention to the state of human security in countries where political leadership features absolutism. Nepal has 236 years of history, but just over a decade it was under multiparty democracy. A prerequisite to human security remains democracy in which the rule of law becomes the instrument of
governance. But democracy in itself is not enough to attain human security, unless the leadership is committed to abide by the laws of the land and becomes answerable to the people. The concept of human security can be made tenable only when the leadership is committed to equitable distribution of national wealth as the fruit of development. A modicum of human security can be achieved with changes in leadership attitudes and behaviour and by reforming the nature of politics and addressing the situation of deprivation and social exclusion existing in Nepal.

A perspective on human security can be built within the framework of governance wherein the leadership coordinates both internal and external resource inputs to ensure the healthy development of its citizenry in a manner congenial to the interests of state and society. The need therefore is to articulate the prospect for human security by highlighting the issues against the background of dehumanisation that the country has faced constantly. Human security in Nepal can be reconceived only by making state services accessible to the people according to their needs and for their advancement. Their fundamental rights should be honoured and the rule of law must prevail. The leadership must be made accountable and answerable to the people. The leadership should react to social grievances and formulate preventive policies to contain disputes and disruptions by inculcating the feelings of people. Such a situation can only be obtained with change in leadership attitudes, which, however, remains a distant dream. A leadership unchanged will be detrimental to the prospect of good governance. And bad governance coupled with bad leadership will ultimately lead to disaster for human security in Nepal.

References

COAS, “Speech of the Chief of Army Staff at the Graduate Officer Cadets’ Convocation Ceremony of the 11th Command and Staff Course,” 14 May 2004.


Contextualising Human Security in an Environment


Sharma, Kedar, Bigr eko Bato (The Damaged Road), Lalitpur: Centre for Investigative Journalism/Himal Association, 1999.


