Human Security and Extremism in Pakistan: Synergy and Conflict

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Introduction

Lack of human security breeds extremism while growth of extremism undermines human security. It is a vicious cycle. Broadly speaking, human security is associated with economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Within Pakistani context, another two areas of security - energy security and demographic security are quite important. In Pakistan for the past six decades or so there has been much focus on traditional security paradigm and national security has been largely viewed in terms of military security and territorial security. This has resulted in gross neglect of human security or non-traditional security where the referent is people and not the state itself. The paucity of human security is most obvious in growing horizontal inequalities in the areas of education, health, and incidence of poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment across the country. The looming threats to environmental security manifested in deepening food and energy crises are only making the situation worse.

The paper explores the relationship between human security and growth of extremism in Pakistan. It attempts to analyse the socio-economic roots of radicalization of the youth in three regions of Pakistan – the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Swat Valley of North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP), South Punjab and Balochistan
which have become breeding grounds for extremists and militant organisations. The main argument is that lack of human security has played a key role in providing space to the growth of religious extremism and ethno-nationalist militancy in Pakistan. Ignorance, poverty and deprivation are making Pakistani youth vulnerable to militancy and extremism. It is only a paradigm shift from traditional security to human security - addressing all types of insecurities that threaten a common man that can pull Pakistan out of the growing morass of extremism. The paper is divided in four sections. The first section discusses the concept of human security. The second section explores the relationship between human security and extremism. The third section deals with the linkage between human security indicators and rising extremism in Pakistan especially in FATA/ Swat, South Punjab and Balochistan. The fourth section examines the relevance of human security approach in countering growing extremism in Pakistan.

**Conceptualizing Human Security**

The concept of traditional security underwent a paradigm shift in the post-Cold War period. The UNDP Report (1994), *New Dimensions of Human Security* authored by Dr Mahbub ul Haq transformed the concept of human security by interpreting it as security of the people, not just territory; security of the individuals, not just nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all the people everywhere - in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment. National security is still paramount, but its attainment is more and more linked with human security. As such human security complements and does not replace state security. It connects and integrates the agenda of peace, security and development, seeing these as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. Unless all the agendas are promoted,
none will succeed. State security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human security.\(^2\)

The key values entailed in the UNDP Report (1994) definition were "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". The report identified seven dimensions of human security and the emerging threats posed to them. These included:

- Economic security – poverty, homelessness.
- Food security – hunger.
- Health security - inadequate healthcare, diseases.
- Environmental security - degradation, pollution, natural disasters.
- Personal security - physical violence, crime, traffic accidents.
- Community security - oppression by, disintegration of, discrimination.
- Political security - repression, torture, disappearance, human rights violations.\(^3\)

The agents of insecurity were identified as state, individuals, nature, and societal groups. The report pushed human security on the security agenda of the policy makers, connecting the new thinking in development to new thinking in security.\(^4\) In 2001, Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General stated, "human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law."\(^5\) The report of the Commission on Human Security of 2003 defined human security as the protection of "the vital core" of all human lives. It observed, "Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development.... It empowers people to act on their own behalf".\(^6\)
The growing shift towards human security in the post Cold War period manifested itself in emerging consensus within the UN institutions on new security paradigm. The Millennium Development Goals agreed in 2000 marked an important step in underscoring key areas of human security. The Kyoto Protocol was another landmark development that brought primacy of human security to the forefront. The human security paradigm was reinforced by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s report for the 2005 World Summit- *In larger Freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all* which observed that humanity will not enjoy "development without security" or "enjoy security without development", and "will not enjoy either, without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed."7

**Relationship between Human Security and Extremism**

There are many explanations of the rise of extremism in Pakistan in the last three decades or so. These range from geopolitical to sociological, ideological approaches that trace root causes of radicalization in the country to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan leading to the mobilisation of "Afghan Mujahideen" by the US; Islamization of the Pakistani society during Zia years (1977-88) and in more recent times, a reaction to the US intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan's becoming a key ally of the US in "war against terrorism" and finally a view that Talibans are driven by an obscurantist ideology and are striving to impose their brand of Islam on the rest of the Pakistani population. None of these approaches has given adequate space to important socio-economic factors that underlie the growing radicalization of Pakistani society. The paper brings out human security dimension of growing religious extremism and nationalist militancy in Pakistan.
There is a profound correlation between deteriorating human security indices and rising extremism. Economic deprivation, illiteracy and social marginalization create breeding grounds for intolerance which in turn promotes conflict and violence within our societies. The development economists often attribute the roots of violent conflicts to the economic and political exclusion of the certain population and groups and their socio-economic deprivation. Frances Stewart points out that "horizontal inequalities" cause most violent conflicts across the developing countries. The horizontal inequalities include socio-economic and political dimensions. These inequalities point to lack of attention to human security which promotes obscurantist ideologies. The relationship between conflicts and human security and vice versa was clearly pointed out in MHDC 2005 report *Human Security in South Asia*. It observed, "Conflicts lead to the erosion of human security and development by destroying life, livelihoods and violating rights. On the other hand, lack of human security becomes a root cause for violent social upheavals, increased poverty and insecurity." This is quite evident in various violent conflicts raging South Asian region.

**Pakistan’s Growing Human Security Deficit**

The rising extremism in the Pakistani state especially in economically and socially depressed areas has brought the state of human security in Pakistan in sharp focus. The macro indicators offer a poor level of human development while violence affected areas or those rated as most vulnerable offer an extremely dismal picture. The vulnerabilities are quite glaring in the area of education, health, food and energy security, youth unemployment and endemic poverty especially in the violence prone regions.
**Educational Crisis:** The most alarming is the growing educational crisis. Pakistan is among the most educationally backward countries within the South Asian region. The country still has half of its population illiterate, the highest number of out of school children in the world and suffers from huge gender disparity at all levels of education. According to education census 2006-7, literacy rate in Pakistan is 53 percent with a gender gap of 28 percentage point (male literacy rate is 67 percent whereas female literacy rate is 39 percent).\(^{10}\) There are also urban-rural and inter-provincial gaps in literacy rates. Literacy rate in rural areas is lower than urban areas by about 27 percentage points. Similarly, there is huge inter-provincial disparity. Literacy rate in Punjab is 53.6 percent as compared to 35 percent in the least developed province of Balochistan. It is 54.2 percent for Sindh and 43.4 percent for the NWFP.\(^{11}\) The gross enrolment rate is also quite poor. It has reached 87 percent but net enrolment rate is 68 percent which is far below the regional average of South Asia of 87 percent.\(^{12}\) Against this backdrop, Pakistan is unlikely to achieve the EFA/MDG (Education for All and Millennium Development Goals) in time.

Another important failure in terms of access to education is that public schooling has not kept pace with population growth, posing serious problem of access to education. This implies that Pakistan’s investment in education sector has been quite inadequate. In the fiscal year 2009, Pakistan invested just 2.1 percent of its GDP in education. It was 2.6 percent for 2005-06. Further, the country has three types of education system - public schools, private schools, and religious schools called *madrasas*, each representing and in turn reinforcing social class of its students. As a corollary, *madrasas* have increasingly filled this vacuum by growing rapidly especially in the 1980s and the years that followed. Presently, there are
12,150 madrasas, with an enrolment of 1,549,242 students of which 38 percent are girls. In a recent report, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Babar Awan stated that there are 15,843 registered madrasas in the country while the actual number is much higher if one includes the unregistered madrasas as well. According to an independent source, the total number of madrasa students in the country has reached about one million. Madrasas provide free education, boarding, lodging to the students. Although madrasas are not new phenomenon in Pakistan, it has remained ignored and isolated from the mainstream national education system. The management of madrasas and bringing them into national mainstream in terms of curriculum and contents of education is posing a huge challenge to the Pakistani government at the moment.

**Energy Crisis and Food Insecurity:** Over the last few years, Pakistan is hit hard by twin crises manifested in enormous energy shortage and food deficit which have pushed the country down the scale of human security. Sharp rising international oil prices in 2008 reduced Pakistan’s ability to import enough fuel to sustain its energy needs. This resulted in severe power crisis in different parts of the country, adversely affecting Pakistan’s economy. The manufacturing and services sectors were hit hard, power shortage cost the economy 7 percent of industrial output and 2 percent of GDP in the fiscal year 2009.

Food crisis is also taking its toll in terms of declining security indicators in the country. According to a 2008 World Food Report, 77 million Pakistanis - nearly half the country’s total population were food insecure, while 95 of Pakistan’s 121 districts faced problems such as hunger, malnutrition and related diseases. The food stampede in Karachi in which 14 women and children were killed on 13 September 2009 reflected the severity of growing food insecurity in Pakistan.
The 2009 World Food Report pointed out that overall food supply situation in Pakistan was satisfactory. However, serious insecurity in the FATA and the NWFP triggered a significant displacement, making up to 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) food insecure since August 2008. With the food prices sky rocketing, the malnutrition has assumed a more alarming proportion for Pakistan since 1995. The proportion of undernourished has ballooned from 19 to 24 percent of the total population. Presently, more than 37 million Pakistani are chronically malnourished.

**Poverty and Unemployment:** Pakistan’s economy flourished in the 1980s but slowed down during the 1990s. With the ruthless application of demand management measures the average GDP slumped to 4.6 percent. This resulted in the rise in poverty in the 1990s. The high GDP growth - around 7 percent - from 2003 to 2006 reduced income poverty but situation continues to be far from satisfactory. The percentage of people below national poverty line has increased from 28.6 percent in 1993-96 to 32.6 percent in 1999-2004. The human poverty index has improved over the last decade. It was 42.1 percent in 1995 and 36.2 percent in 2005. However, there is a visible disparity in the incidence of poverty between the urban and the rural Pakistan - roughly twice in the rural areas compared to that of urban Pakistan. Given that two-thirds of Pakistan's population lives in rural areas, the scale of vulnerability is quite obvious. This population is exposed to amongst other risks to illiteracy, unemployment, extremism, violence, and crime. According to Sadia Malik, during the last one decade or so, there has been an evidence of growing polarization between the "haves" and the "have nots". This is despite the fact that there has been reasonable economic growth and subsequent reduction in poverty on an average. "Regional inequality in terms of both income as well as non-
income dimension is particularly striking not only across rural and urban areas but also across provinces and across districts of the same province.  

It is important to take into account the "poverty of opportunity" dimension as coined by Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq in the Report on Human Development in South Asia 1998. The Poverty of Opportunity Index (POPI) takes into account a composite of deprivation at three levels - health, education and income. The POPI in Pakistan exceeds income poverty by 8.5 percentage point. The MHDC report for year 2007 observes that poverty of opportunity affects one out of three Pakistanis.

Furthermore, Pakistan's Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 136 is indicative of unsatisfactory progress in human development. Pakistan is also facing problems in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to health and education that were set in 2000. The lack of economic opportunity has a deep connection with the probability of youth joining militant organizations. Thus, poverty and lack of job prospects may become very strong contributing factors in pushing youth towards militancy. In fact, it is already happening in FATA, South Punjab and Balochistan.

**Youth Buldge:** With mushrooming young population, the human security dimension acquires added importance in Pakistan. Pakistan is in the midst of a population explosion, which makes the problem of youth much acute. Half of the current estimated 180 million population is under 20, and 66 percent are under 30. According to British Council Next Generation Report on Pakistan, the country "risks falling prey to a worsening cycle of poverty, polarisation and conflict, at a time when the population continues to increase rapidly and growing numbers of Pakistanis hunger for a better life." The report states that Pakistani youth population is plagued by
joblessness, lack of education and economic opportunity. The report that took into account the youth’s opinion on the issue of security fears, education, religion and the international community treatment of Pakistan found that three-quarters identified themselves foremost as Muslims first, with just 14 percent describing themselves primarily as citizens of Pakistan. Only 10 percent expressed confidence in national or local government, the courts or the police. Just one third advocated for democracy for the country while another third preferred sharia. Significantly, an overwhelming 92 percent believed that education is an important issue that needs to be addressed immediately. On the causes of prevailing violence in the country, 30 percent cited injustice and 28 percent poor economic conditions. A good number of youth is also very critical of the international community for their interference in the country and for demonising the Pakistani population.²⁶ The report concludes that there is a strong possibility of demographic disaster or dividend depending on how aggressively the government acts. With the current population growth rate of 2.2 percent, Pakistan’s population is projected to exceed 260 million by 2030, and 335 million by 2050. The time for action is running out very fast. The country’s downturn may increase the vulnerability of the youth to join militant outfits.

Human Security Deficit and Growth of Religious Extremism and Nationalist Violence in Pakistan

Currently, Pakistan is experiencing an upsurge in violent religious extremism in FATA and parts of the NWFP especially in the Malakand division, a very explosive situation in South Punjab which is on the verge of eruption and a violent nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. A closer examination of root causes of growing extremism in these areas shows that
dismal state of human security in all its seven dimensions cited above is playing a very critical role in radicalizing the youth in these areas.

**FATA & Malakand Region:** FATA tops the conflict map of Pakistan where religious extremism has taken a violent turn. FATA comprises seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions and has a semi-autonomous status within the Pakistani constitution which severely curtails the writ of the federal authorities and security forces in the area. The Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) is responsible for the "overall administrative and political control of FATA", but is virtually powerless in devising or implementing FATA policy. The civil bureaucracy continues to dominate almost all areas of governance since FATA’s elected representatives lack both the authority and capacity to direct governance.

FATA is perhaps the most backward region in Pakistan with 60 percent of its population living below the poverty line. The human development indicators of FATA are much lower compared to the national or provincial average. Even before the growth of militancy, the region lacked basic infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, electricity, irrigation, schools etc. Per capita public expenditure in the region is quite low compared to the national average. The government of Pakistan invests USD 11 per capita on development efforts in FATA as compared to USD 25 per capita in the rest of the country. Similarly, per capita income is half of the national per capita income. The educational attainment of girls and women in FATA is markedly lower than in other areas. Female literacy rate in FATA is only 3 percent while in the NWFP, it is 17.42 percent. This is much lower than 32 percent at the national level. The male literacy rate is comparatively much higher in FATA with 29.51 percent, but it is again much lower
compared to 51.39 percent in NWFP and 54.81 percent at the national level. Health security is also quite dismal. Population per doctor in FATA is 7,670 as compared to 1,226 at the national level. FATA's maternal mortality rate is more than twice the national average, estimated to be as high as 600 per 100,000 live births. Employment opportunities are also limited and natural resources are under-exploited. The main sectors of employment are agriculture, transport, arms manufacturing and trade, drug trafficking, cross border trade (smuggling) and small businesses. Shinwari views poverty and lack of opportunity as a contributing factor towards growing militancy in FATA. Another FATA analyst observes "ideological recruitment is few and far between. Most of the reasons (for recruitment) are related to economic and political marginalization." The table below shows some selected development indicators of FATA.

### Selected Development Indicators for Pakistan, NWFP and FATA (1998, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy ratio (both sexes, %)</td>
<td>43.92</td>
<td>35.41</td>
<td>17.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male literacy ratio (%)</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>51.39</td>
<td>29.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female literacy ratio (%)</td>
<td>32.02</td>
<td>18.82</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per doctor</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>4,916</td>
<td>7,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per bed in health institutions</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>2,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (per sq km)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lack of economic opportunities and education in FATA has made youth vulnerable to exploitation by the Talibans.
Currently, several extremist groups are operating in and from FATA. In 2007, some 40 Taliban groups formed a loose alliance under the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan, TTP), that was led by South Waziristan-based Baitullah Mehsud until his death on 5 August 2009 in a US drone attack. Hakimullah Mehsud became new leader of the TTP after Baitullah's death but got killed in another drone attack in 2010. TTP is also loosely allied to Punjab-based jihadi outfits, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). As militancy started spreading its tentacles, the army went into FATA in 2004 to conduct counter-insurgency operations. In August 2008, faced with increasing disorder, Pakistan's army stepped up their operations in Bajaur Tribal Agency. In March 2009, army launched Swat operation that was aimed at restoration of the writ of the government in the Malakand division. The military operations are continuing to flush out the militants from the area but they do not offer long term solution unless human security deficit is addressed in a holistic manner.

**Conflict and IDPs in Swat and FATA:** The eruption of conflict in FATA and Swat has severely undermined human security and development in the two regions. The FATA secretariat has estimated the cost of the conflict over USD 2 billion, including a tentative estimate of USD 103 million in damages to infrastructure. More than a million of FATA residents have been displaced by the conflict which is close to one third of the FATA's 3.7 million population. Militancy and conflict have also seriously undermined education in FATA. Large scale displacement has left tens of thousands of children without schools. A large number of boys and girls schools have been destroyed or threatened by the militants. In many tribal districts, female students were barred from attending the schools.
Militant violence and military operations have also adversely affected the prospects of economic development in the tribal agencies. "Violence is now contributing to poverty, with the lack of jobs making FATA’s residents vulnerable to militant recruitment." The Taliban’s rank and file reportedly receive a monthly salary of Rs 15,000 (almost USD 190), much more than any other occupations - including tribal levies who earn a monthly salary of Rs 3,500 (roughly USD 43).

Swat military operation against the militants belonging to Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and Swat Taliban commander Maulana Fazlullah, also led to massive displacement of 2.8 million people from the area. The violent conflict also profoundly affected the education system. Prior to the military operation, the extremist targeted schools across gender divide. The humanitarian crisis resulting from military operation also disrupted learning on a massive scale. The UN estimated that 1.2 million children in the region were deprived of education services. In the first place, educational infrastructure was destroyed, approximately 280 schools - 70 percent of which were girls schools - were targeted in Swat alone. As a corollary, over 560,000 displaced children and young people lost access to education. In the second instance, the education of the host communities children and youth was also disrupted. Almost 4,000 schools were used as shelter for the internally displaced. This meant that education of over 700,000 children and youth was disrupted by the conflict.

The economy of Malakand region has also been severely hit by militancy and the armed conflict, disrupting productivity and depleting incomes. In Swat, for instance, more than 400 hotels and restaurants were shut down after the militants moved into the district in 2007. Further, the Taliban’s landmines and the military use of heavy artillery and airpower caused excessive damage to the region’s crops, fields,
livestock, roads and water-courses that would hamper progress long after the fighting is ended.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{South Punjab:} South Punjab is another region that is experiencing growth of extremism for almost last three decades or so. Four major militant outfits, the \textit{Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan} (SSP), \textit{Lashkar-e-Jhangvi} (LeJ), \textit{Jaish-e-Mohammad} and \textit{Lashkar-e-Tayyaba} have bases in South Punjab. The area has become critical to planning, recruitment and logistical support for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. A lot of the \textit{fidayeen} (suicide bombers) come from the South Punjab and are reputed to be much more brutal in their handling of victims. There has been mushrooming growth of \textit{madrasas} in South Punjab in the 1980s. According to the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Babar Awan, “out of 15,843 \textit{madrasas}, Punjab topped the list with 11,332 \textit{madrasas}.”\textsuperscript{37} And within Punjab, the South Punjab emerged having the largest concentration of \textit{madrasas}. Recent estimates by the Intelligence Bureau for 2008 show that approximately 1,383 \textit{madrasas} were functioning in Bhawalpur division, having 84,000 students. The Rahimyar Khan district has the highest number of \textit{madrasas} (559) followed by Bahawalpur district (481) and Bhawalnagar (310).\textsuperscript{38} The sheer number of the \textit{madrasas} in South Punjab and the strength of the students enrolled there shows criminal lapse on the part of the state to provide access to education to the students belonging to the poor families. The three favourite areas of recruitment in South Punjab for all militant outfits, Cholistan in Bhawalpur, the Rekh in Dera Gazi Khan, and the Kacha area in Rajanpur are economically and socially backward. The first two are desert areas known for their poverty and underdevelopment, while the third one is known for dacoits.\textsuperscript{39}

South Punjab is a region mired in poverty and underdevelopment. There are few job prospects for the youth. The region is home of big landowners who also happen to be
politicians and belong to powerful *pir* (religious) families. But they have done little for the development of their area. The region has been virtually left out in the process of industrialization while the agriculture that happens to be the mainstay of the area is also faltering. As Ayesha Siddiqa argues, "It's in areas like this, amid economic stagnation and hopelessness, that religious extremists find fertile ground to plant and spread their ideology." In a statement, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has equated South Punjab with Swat. The equation is relevant not because of violence but due to the presence of elements that want to take the society and state towards obscurantist Islam through militancy.

Although province of Punjab is considered the most prosperous province of Pakistan, yet within Punjab there are marked differences between the northern and southern districts. Poverty is mostly acute and its incidence is much higher in South Punjab. In some of the districts such as the district of Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh, Dera Gazi Khan and Bhawalpur, the incidence of poverty is very high. In fact, these are the very districts that also happen to be the "fertile recruiting grounds" for the groups that are involved in suicide bombings in Pakistan. Sadia also highlights the correlation between poverty and militancy in southern Punjab, saying that "radicalization and militancy is gaining faster support in south of Punjab where poverty is rampant and illiteracy and unemployment is high leading to relatively greater potential of unemployed and frustrated youth providing support to the militant activities."

The table below brings out glaring difference in the incidence of poverty between the northern and southern districts of Punjab. There is a huge gap of 31 percent between the districts having highest incidence of poverty - Sargodha district (25.66 percent) of North Punjab and Muzaffargarh
district (56.29 percent) of South Punjab. The gravity of disparity is also quite evident in the comparison of two districts with lowest incidence of poverty, i.e., Vehari (South Punjab) with 30.03 percent as against Rawalpindi (North Punjab) with 11.32 percent.

### Incidence of Poverty in Punjab by Districts (2004-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern districts</th>
<th>% of population below poverty line</th>
<th>Northern districts</th>
<th>% of population below poverty line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rahimyar Khan</td>
<td>45.87</td>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>11.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhawalpur</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>14.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajanpur</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>Chakwal</td>
<td>18.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan</td>
<td>51.01</td>
<td>Sialkot</td>
<td>13.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargarh</td>
<td>56.29</td>
<td>Jhelum</td>
<td>12.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>12.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodhran</td>
<td>48.37</td>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>25.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhawalnagar</td>
<td>32.45</td>
<td>Narowal</td>
<td>19.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vihari</td>
<td>30.03</td>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>19.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanewal</td>
<td>38.84</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>11.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layyah</td>
<td>40.86</td>
<td>Sheikhupura</td>
<td>26.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPDC (2007)

A lot of debate is going on whether South Punjab has reached a stage where extremists can turn violent or is it still at a stage where the process of graduating to a violent conflict can be reversed. Senior police officers, independent analysts and militants in custody suggest that southern Punjab could be Pakistan’s next battle ground. Internal police documents also
indicate that the province is at risk. Another report states that poverty stricken, extremely feudal and increasingly illiterate South Punjab could possibly provide shelter to the Taliban and other outfits. It has also potential of becoming a nursery or a major centre for sectarian recruitment. Others argue that it has already reached that point and turned into "factory for suicide bombers." Police sources say that Al-Qaeda has access to a labour pool via banned SSP, among others and it is working with a loose network of militant groups in Punjab. Those who play down the fear of Talibanization of South Punjab feel that an overemphasis would draw excessive US attention to South Punjab; that Punjab-based militants are "home grown" and not connected with war in Afghanistan; they will not spin out of control and that dominance of Sufi version of Islam will not allow a Swat or FATA type Talibanization. While all these points may have some logic in them, the fact remains, if enabling environment is not addressed, the vulnerability of youth to radicalization can not be guaranteed.

**Balochistan Nationalist Insurgency**: Balochistan has always been a conflict prone province of Pakistan and is currently embroiled in a low level nationalist insurgency since 2002. Demands for political autonomy and economic rights have persisted and nationalist resistance has been waged from time to time. The current insurgency that began in 2002 was steered by Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), headed by Balaach Marri, who was killed in 2007. The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in 2006 precipitated the armed struggle under the umbrella of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) led by Nawab's grandson Behramdagh Bugti. Another group, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) led by Attaullah Mengal is also actively engaged in insurgency. The death and disappearances of several Baloch nationalist political workers in recent years have further fuelled the demands for control
over Balochistan’s natural resources and political rights. The growing anger and resentment has given birth to a number of nationalist insurgent groups. A relatively moderate Khan of Kalat, now in self imposed exile has talked of approaching the UN and the International Court of Justice against denial of rights. He has even threatened to reopen the whole issue of the original accession of Kalat by his father to Pakistan. Besides, there has been growth of religious extremism and sectarian terrorism in the province.

Although Balochistan problem is much more complex due to its strategic location and external involvement from time to time, a closer look at the issues involved in Balochistan crisis show that utter failure in providing human security over the past sixty two years has created a deep rooted alienation amongst the Balochi masses which has repeatedly manifested itself in different spells of insurgency. On the other end of the spectrum, the conflict has created conditions of instability that accentuate the socio-economic underdevelopment of the area.

The human security indicators for Balochistan are very depressing. In its latest ‘Balochistan Economic Report 2009’, the World Bank states that economic growth of this province is lagging behind that of the other provinces. Taking into account statistics from 1972-73 to 2005-06, the report shows that Balochistan’s economy expanded by 2.7 times compared to 3.6 times in the NWFP and Sindh and four times in Punjab.\(^45\) The social indicators of the province are even worse. It scores lowest in 10 key indicators for education, literacy, health, water and sanitation for 2006-07. Illiteracy is high in Balochistan - nearly 60 per cent. The province has the lowest literacy rates in Pakistan for both males and females - only 18 percent females are literate compared to 54 percent males and the GPI (Gender Parity Index) at 0.34 is alarmingly low.\(^46\) The primary school net enrolment ratio is 32 percent as compared to 66 percent
nationally. Similarly, NER for secondary is just 11 percent compared to 24 percent nationally. With its large area and a small scattered population, the province has failed to provide sufficient facilities for healthcare as a result of which diseases are rampant and immunization coverage is poor. Besides, water is the single most important constraint to develop rural Balochistan. While some 87 percent of Pakistan’s total available water is found in the river system of the Indus basin, only five percent of Balochistan’s landmass is connected to the Indus basin and the remaining 95 percent rely on non-perennial sources.

The current regime has attached high priority to the socio-economic development of Balochistan. In November 2009, it announced a 'Balochistan package' named ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooqe Balochistan’ (beginning of the rights of Balochistan) to address the grievances and deprivation of the province through constitutional, administrative and economic measures. The package prepared by a parliamentary committee on Balochistan, headed by Senator Mian Raza Rabbani envisaged probes into political murders, recovery of missing persons, release of detained political workers, army pullout from key areas, halt to new cantonments, more local control on resources and dialogue with estranged Baloch leaders. It also included creation of 5,000 jobs for the province, payment of arrears of gas development surcharge (GDS) from 1954 to 1991, amounting to Rs.120 billion, in 12 years, allocation in all poverty alleviation schemes in proportion to percentage of people living below poverty line. The government committed itself to more autonomy now being considered by special parliamentary committee on constitutional reforms. Further, with the change in the National Financial Commission (NFC) award formula which has moved away from the unsatisfactory single criterion of population to multi-criteria which includes poverty/backwardness, revenue collection and generation, and
inverse population density, Balochistan is entitled to more allocation of resources.

The Baloch nationalist leadership is, however, quite sceptical about government's overtures as they have not been taken into confidence. Most of them are dissatisfied with the contents of the package and quite apprehensive about its implementation. Senator Hasil Bizenjo, of the National Party, rejected the package because it has "failed to take a decision to end the army operation, which is the main issue."\(^{50}\) Balochistan National Party (BNP) believes that the issue does not revolve around grants and packages...it is a matter of right to ownership and full control over natural resources of the province. The party leaders have rejected the package and maintained that the situation has not changed yet. "It was the same as in Musharraf's regime. The people of Balochistan are still facing a military operation and extra-judicial killings have not stopped so far... Millions of rupees are due against the government for gas, minerals and fisheries industries but unfortunately, the government has tied these with the NFC Award."\(^{51}\) Although the package can help a lot in reducing the human security deficit in the province, its political dimension needs to be addressed by the federal government.

**Countering Extremism: A Human Security Approach**

The foregoing analysis clearly establishes that in Pakistan the prevailing human security conditions, in its all seven dimensions are far from satisfactory. The education security that did not figure high as such in the broader dimensions of human security is profoundly linked with rise of extremism in the Pakistani society in general and in the conflict prone areas of FATA, South Punjab and Balochistan in particular. The poverty of education is also in turn linked with the lack of economic security that manifests itself quite bluntly in high
incidence of poverty in the extremism prone or conflict hit areas. The lack of health security is also quite visible in the areas that suffer from ignorance and poverty. The food and energy insecurity has only aggravated the situation by increasing the vulnerability of the very populations that are already adversely affected by poverty, illiteracy and inadequate healthcare. The degradation in environment, more alarming in depleting water resources and natural disasters has a telling affect on the overall economic conditions of the country. The last three dimensions of human security are most glaring in case of FATA/Malakand division and Balochistan. The personal security, community security and political security are found at their lowest in both these areas. The issue of disappearances and army presence or operation in Balochistan is radicalizing Balochi nationalism and Balochi youth. The people are caught between the security forces and extremists or militants. All this is further deteriorating the human security conditions in the affected areas.

Pakistan is in dire need to make a strategic shift to comprehensive security approach that puts greater emphasis on improving human security conditions in the country. There is pressing need to increase social sector spending which has traditionally suffered due to primacy of military security. Government has undertaken some poverty reduction programmes so as to ameliorate the socioeconomic conditions of the most vulnerable section of the society. These can be divided into four broad categories: programmes generating income and employment opportunities; social and human development; infrastructure and community development; and social protection schemes. The major programmes include, Zakat programme, Pakistan Baitul Maal (PBM), the Khushhal Pakistan programme (KPP), Khushhali Bank and most recently Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). All these initiatives
are basically targeted interventions which can provide short
term solutions. Pakistan need long term sustainable growth and
poverty reduction prospects are critically contingent on
investment in human development. Within this context,
Education Sector Reforms (ESR) Action Plan and Education
for All (EFA) Plan of Action are most important.

The regions that have fallen to extremism or are most
vulnerable should be given top priority to recover them from
the all pervasive human insecurities. FATA has been hit hard
especially in the wake of 9/11 as it became a safe haven for the
remnant of Al-Qaeda and Taliban that fled into the porous
region due to American war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
The militancy and terrorism in FATA can not be eradicated
through the military means alone. Successive governments
have followed a three “D” policy that implied dialogue,
deterrence and development approach to counter extremism in
FATA, but it has not been implemented faithfully, except the
deterrence component. The Musharraf government announced
a USD 16.5 million developmental package for FATA. Later,
the US also pledged USD 750 million to develop infrastructure
and human resources in the area. US pledged Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones for the uplift of the FATA but there has
been little headway in that direction. The process need to be
accelerated to counter extremist trends driven by poverty and
deprivation. The current military action in FATA must be
followed by an aggressive development programme to bring
about a visible change in socio-economic conditions of the
people. FATA desperately needs more education and more
employment opportunities.

In case of South Punjab, economic development of the
region is very critical to wean away youth from the clutches of
militant outfits. The region requires new ideas in agriculture,
capital investment and new relevant industries. Further, the
government needs to go beyond usual textile and sugar industries that have turned into mafias that are draining the local economy rather than feeding it. Further, investment in social sector development is urgently needed. A larger social infrastructure that provides jobs and an educational system that is responsive to the needs of the population can contribute to fill the gaps.

A human security approach is desperately needed to pull Balochistan out of nationalist violence. The development of Gwadar port, Makran coastline, mining and petroleum sectors and facilitation of cross-border trade in energy and other goods will provide a powerful impetus for stronger linkages of Balochistan’s economy with the rest of the country. The government should focus on activities around Balochistan’s economic assets, such as minerals, gas, fisheries and coastal development, trade with Afghanistan and Iran, livestock and crops. The World Bank in its recent report has recommended to the government to make substantial investment for infrastructure of Gwadar port in the range of USD 1.2 billion for building the required infrastructure to run this port effectively. The government should adopt a proactive approach in improving socio-economic conditions in the province so that the violent nationalist movement is pacified. If it fails to do so, it will be faced with twin conflicts – the nationalist resistance and growing challenge of religious extremism that is taking roots in the Pushtoon dominated areas of the province.

Conclusion

Since its independence, Pakistan has been pursuing a traditional military security approach partly due to its geopolitical conditions and partly due to lack of political will and commitment of its ruling elites in incorporating the
importance of human security in the concept of national security. The accumulated underdevelopment, aggravated by socio-economic inequalities has contributed to the growth of extremism and terrorism in the Pakistani society. To prevent the growing religious militancy and violent conflicts, Pakistan needs to evolve a comprehensive security strategy that initiates the process of de-radicalization by way of addressing the underlying socio-economic conditions that continue to contribute to radicalization of the society, fosters and sustains support for the radical elements.

Pakistan requires a strategic shift from state centric approach to people centric approach with greater emphasis on improving human security conditions, especially in the conflict hit areas of FATA and Balochistan and conflict prone region of South Punjab on priority basis. Exclusive reliance on military action may not be productive in the long run and must be accompanied by social development, equitable economic development and good governance. Pakistan needs to adopt long term sustainable growth strategies. Poverty reduction prospects are critically contingent on investment in human development.

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**Endnotes**


4 Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, "Comprehensive Security is the Answer", in *Non-Traditional and Human Security*, op. cit., p. xvi.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


16 Ashley Pandya & Teresita Schaffer, "Pakistan: Avoiding Economic Disaster", *South Asia Monitor*, No. 135, CSIS, 1 November 2009.

17 Ibid.


20 Ibid., p. 69.

21 Sadia Malik, *op.cit.*, p. 22.


24 "Youth bulge" is defined as the ratio of youth aged 15 to 24 years to the entire adult population aged 15 and over.


27 The Tribal Agencies are Bajaur Agency; Orakzai Agency; Mohmand Agency; Khyber Agency; Kurram Agency; North Waziristan Agency; and South Waziristan Agency". The frontier regions comprise: Tribal Areas, adjoining Peshawar district; Tribal Areas, adjoining Kohat district; Tribal Areas, adjoining Bannu district; and Tribal Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan District.

28 World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, 1 July 2009. Also see, Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, ICG Report, No. 125, 11 December 2006.


32 The Malakand Division includes the districts of Buner, Chitral, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Malakand, Shangla and Swat. Since 1975, it has been administered as a Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) with a separate criminal and civil code from the rest of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).

33 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, op.cit., p. 8.

34 Ibid., p. i.

35 Khalid Kheshgi, “5,000 more levies personnel being recruited to man cleared areas”, Daily Times, 31 July 2009.

36 “Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities”, ICG Briefing, No. 93, 3 June 2009, p.12.

37 "Registered Madrasas fraction of total: Babar", Daily Times, op.cit.

38 Ayesha Siddiqa, op.cit.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.


42 Sadia Malik, op.cit., p. 23.


44 Ibid.


47 \textit{Ibid.}, p.xix.

48 Amin Ahmed, \textit{op.cit}.


52 The BISP was launched in October 2008 which pays about $12 (Rs. 1,000) every month to 3 million families with a monthly income of about $76 (Rs 6,000) or less. The programme was created to offset the impact of recession. The money is channelled through women to ensure that they have access to family finances. The programme was given an initial allocation of Rs. 34 billion (approximately $425 million) for the year that it hopes to expand its scope to 7 million families in the year 2009. Supporters of the programme cite it as evidence of Pakistan’s changing attitude toward social welfare programme, but opponents have declared it ineffective because of corruption, complicated rules, and a lack of transparency. Ashley Pandya & Teresita Schaffer, "Pakistan: Avoiding Economic Disaster", \textit{South Asia Monitor}, No. 135, CSIS, 1 November 2009.

## Annex-I

### Basic Human Development Indicators of Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population (million)</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1996-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (year)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate (%)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP) (USD)</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>2,242</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate - age 15 and above (%)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary enrolment (%) gross</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary enrolment (%) net</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malnourished children (% of children under age 5)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2000-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalent under nourishment on total population (%)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below income poverty line (%)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>2000-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below national poverty line (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population below income poverty line (%)</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>1993-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population below income poverty line (%)</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2004-06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence expenditure as % of GDP</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on education as % of GDP</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2005-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on health as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Development index (HDI)</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human poverty index (HPI)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender related Development Index (GDI)</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data provided in Human Development in South Asia 2008: Technology and Human Development in South Asia, MHDC, OUP, 2009.
Annex-II
Map of FATA