Why *Chandabaji* (Extortionism): Social, Economic and Political Interpretation

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**Introduction**

This paper especially deals with four key concepts: namely economic liberalisation, entrepreneurship, youth force and *chandabaji*. While liberalisation and entrepreneurship are two closely related policy dimensions, youth force represents a distinct section of the society and *chandabaji* is a venomous evil that evolved due to malpractice and pragmatic individualism, posing serious threat to sound development of entrepreneurial growth. The youth force has become a dominant actor in carrying out the process of *chandabaji* though it is prevalent in all spheres of the populace to some extent.

In this paper, an attempt has been made to arrive at working definitions of the key concepts followed by a probe into their inter-relations. Greater emphasis has been given to the question as to why *chandabaji* in general occurs and how the youth force of Bangladesh gets involved in this shameful pursuit.

**Economic Liberalisation**

The aftermath of the Second World War was characterised by emergence of post-colonial independent states, encountering a bi-polar international economic and political order. Consequently, the newly independent states opted for a mixed economy with an aim to avail enthusiastic economic and policy support from both the capitalist and the socialist bloc.¹ Post-colonial adjustment in these countries was predominantly followed by nationalisation, and a liberalised free-market approach. Together with nationalisation, a state also sponsored the growth of private entrepreneurship turning traders into manufacturing entrepreneurs owning heavy industries at substantial concession offered by the government.

Conforming to this prevalent pattern of non-aligned mixed
economy strategy. Bangladesh started socialism with nationalism and democracy. Nevertheless, until the change of political power in 1975, the economic and fiscal policy was more public than private. Through acquisition of abandoned enterprises of formerly Pakistani ownership, the public sector comprised around 86% of the total national entrepreneurial investment up to 1975. From then onward a major policy shift was evident through increased privatisation and prescribed liberalisation policies dictated by international development agencies, chiefly from the capitalist bloc. From the prescribed hand outs of the literature of international development agencies it seems that the economic reform policy, pushed through with conflicting policy pronouncements but unidirectional policy actions, is variously described as economic liberalisation, globalisation of the economy or economic reform policy. Reform policy includes diverse sectors including industrial reform—extending to the privatisation public enterprises—trade liberalisation, financial sector reform and fiscal stabilisation. For today any policy action initiated by the government in market plus democracy model is promptly defined as part of the policy of economic liberalisation: liberalisation with steps to liberate both the polity and the economy of the country.  

Bangladesh has been implementing stabilisation and structural adjustment reform since 1987 within the prescribed framework and assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. The prescribed package itself went through transformation to make it more extensive and comprehensive in the 1980s and the 1990s, learning from experiences of earlier implementation in other developing countries. Bangladesh kept pace with this evolution. Presently, the whole range of reform measures are followed in totality, from the initial macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment to those having political and administrative consequences better.

Package of structural adjustment programme, known as the ‘Washington Consensus (WC)’, prescribes adjustment reforms to expand the role of market, to make it flexible and efficient. However, it has to be preceded by stabilisation reforms to reduce the balance of payments, fiscal gaps and to harness the inflation rate in order to create conducive environment to move the economy forward. Simultaneously, institutional and administrative reform should accompany to complete the package. More specifically, the WC prescription includes:

1. macro-economic stabilisation by implementing necessary measures: reduction in fiscal and trade deficits
(through circumstantial required steps including tight control of public spending, tariff reduction and taxation reforms, cutting down inflation, maintenance of foreign exchange reserves at appropriate levels, and introduction of interest and exchange rate reforms):

2. no intervention in price mechanisms (market deregulation especially financial and labor markets, withdrawal of food and agricultural subsidies);

3. foreign trade and investment liberalisation and creation of cordial environment for foreign direct investment;

4. public ownership reform and privatisation;

5. measures to promote environmental sustainability;

6. appropriate emphasis on social sectors (education, health, training, women development) aimed at improving human skill;

7. institutional, administrative and legal reforms consistent with the liberalised economy; and

8. the establishment of a social ‘safety net’ for the vulnerable people.

The key measures adopted to promote private investment are the privatisation programme, tariff and related policy reform, exchange rate reform and institutional and legal reforms. A large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have already been privatised. In the private-sector, participation has turned all encompassing excluding only a few sectors like the railways and defense industries. Set up in early 1993, the Privatisation Board is advancing towards denationalisation of the remaining SOEs in sectors like steel and engineering, sugar and food, fish culture, jute, textile and so forth in stages. The state-owned shares in various public enterprises are being transferred to the private sector through the mechanism of stock market. Several private banks have been and are being established. In oil and gas exploration, private investment is being encouraged through incentives under a national petroleum policy that came in effect since 1993.

Persistent tariff reform reduced the rate of unweighted nominal protection which includes custom duty, development surcharge, license fee, retained advance income tax and sales tax, less domestic excise or value added tax (VAT) not refunded. Only a few items are imposed
custom duty above 100%. Rates charged on most import items range from 7.5% to 30%.

Export enjoys an incentive of duty drawbacks equal to custom duties and VAT paid on imported materials to manufactures export goods. 100% export-oriented enterprises, even those outside the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) enjoys duty-free import of machineries. Taka has been made fully convertible on all international current transactions.

The institutional and legal reforms are designed to transform the nature of state intervention from regulatory to catalytic, to encourage the private sector. Thus, government has withdrawn the compulsory seeking of permission to set up new industries or to undertake balancing, modernisation and rehabilitation except in a few reserve sectors. The Board of Investment (BOI) plays an accommodating role to the private sector. The process continues to remove legal, policy and regulatory constrains on private investment.

Foreign investors, in addition to all the facilities offered to domestic private investors, enjoy the facility of repatriation of profits without the permission of Bangladesh Bank, Central Bank of Bangladesh. Total foreign ownership is also allowed. Ready convertibility of Taka is also an important element of attraction to foreign investors.

**Entrepreneurship: What It Needs**

Entrepreneurship bears a connotation, which is related more to private than the public sector economic activities. Setting up of a new business venture warrants the courage to risk financial resources in a prospective and feasible productive venture/enterprise, the ability to face free competition and the creative innovation to avail a pioneering competitive advantage. Harvard Business School defines entrepreneurship as 'the attempt to create value recognition of business opportunity, the management of risk taking appropriate to the opportunity and through the communicative and management skills to mobilise human financial and material resources necessarily to bring a project to fruition.' However, entrepreneurship as a goal-oriented venture involves the fusion of capital technology and human talent.

For entrepreneurship to flourish, a number of conditions must be in place, such as ample financial sources, efficient structures, strong educational and training facilities, equal opportunity, uniform commercial law and limited regulations, low taxes, and tax incentives, free trade,
public-private partnership, support from large corporations, research, enterprise zones, encouragement and support from society. Economic growth and diversification, technological development, job creation, profits, a broader tax base, image enhancement, improvement of the standard of living and new investment of opportunities can jointly be achieved only when the said conditions are fulfilled through state initiatives.

Experience supports the fact that state-initiative and policy incentives enhance the entrepreneurial competence of the private sector. Conversely, governments imposing obstacle towards free growth of small business has suffered in terms of private sector entrepreneurial development. Through implementation of appropriate policies and support programme, the government might play a decisive role in this developmental arena. Economies pursuing market-oriented reforms must ensure the existence of right elements to sustain growth and progress. Although, the policy-mix is sure to differ across nations, three key points may be considered pervasive or universal:

1. market-oriented policy environment with sound, legal and regulatory structures;
2. entrepreneurial training; and
3. government support and assistance including ready access to risk capital.

All of these three elements equally are vital. Even if appropriate technical assistance and special lending programme are in effect, the ultimate entrepreneurial growth may suffer severe set-back due to regulatory constraints and bureaucratic overkill.

The government may foster sound development of entrepreneurial drive through appropriate policy formulation in four basic areas: (i) private property rights, (ii) legal system, and (iii) efficient state administration and (iv) infrastructure. Sound government policies can effect private sector growth through shaping the economic environment. The dominant policy areas of economic environment are: market-based prices, market-based interest rates, sound money and balanced government budgets, open trade and open investment. Government policies may influence the private sector decisions to commence operation or to expand into newer markets through: administrative procedures (license, permits, certificates); cost and availability of capital, tax rates, labor laws, wage/price controls, excess to information, protection from competition.
Chandabaji: A Theoretical Framework

A comprehensive and clear-cut definition of chandabaji is yet to be formulated. It is not impossible to study chandabaji without such a definition. There are reasons why indifference is common towards rigid conceptualisation. It is criticised by sociologists who rightly insist on distinguishing substantive theory from conceptual analysis. Secondly, conclusions on conceptual issues are improbable because it tends to justify the definition through incorporating it into an impressive theory. Nevertheless, productive research and impressive theories are impossible without conceptual issues and problems.

Methodical exploration of a theory needs definition of at least some of its constituent terms; but test findings even using similar units of comparison will differ if each definition's empirical applicability is negligible. that is, if independent observers disagree when applying the definition to identify a phenomenon. This can be highlighted in the context of chandabaji. How far would independent observers agree in judging a particular activity of monitory extortion/transaction as chandabaji? Simple definition may produce agreement and yet be objectionable for theoretical reasons. However, it is important to note that empirically applicable definition does not always need a theory. On the other hand, when empirical applicability is negligible, no theory can justify the definition.

Conceptual issues and problems dominate all social and behavioural sciences. The usefulness of definition depends on whether it can answer questions relating to those issues and problems. There are at least five questions relating to chandabaji:

1. Is chandabaji an illegal act, a crime?
2. Does it have a particular type of end and, if so, what is it?
3. How does chandabaji differ from hijacking, pick-pocketing, or snatching/looting?
4. Does it have a distinctive strategy of applying coercion, if so, what is it?
5. Does chandabaji represent any socio-econo-politico-cultural legacy?

The questions above would be examined in search of a plausible definition of chandabaji. However, questions far beyond
definitional ones are important in the present context. The quest for a theory of chandabaji would be furthered by describing chandabaji of a particular notion so as to recognise the logical and empirical association.

Implicit coercion for contribution to political or other partisan fund is not illegal as such. It signifies a partisan beneficiary system and the nature and morality of the reciprocating benefit may transcend the boundary of legality. Very often, political contributions are offered with the hope of attaining undue privileges subsequently. It is, however, true that in some instances contribution to collective fund may pursue ideological satisfaction in which case it remains within the cover of legality.

Yielding to chandabaji for elicit game is a crime on the part of the contributor be it of political or of any other form. On the receiving side also such chandabaji is nothing less than a deliberate crime. The criminality is obvious when money is extorted from a criminal as a price of ignoring his or her crimes. Here the crime is mutual. On the other hand, coercive extortion from helpless citizenry is a crime only for the chandabaj, and not for the victim.

In most of the cases chandabaji is aimed at satisfying lust for consumption or personal greed but there are instances where the proceeds of chandabaji is employed for organisational activities in politics and social service or cultural movement and so forth.

Chandabaji may by imposed by anti-socials as well as socially acceptable groups or individuals. In both the cases the extortionist is not unknown to the yielder. Even if it is a roving band or individual, a particular identity is employed to affect the coercion. On the other hand, hi-jacking or looting or similar acts are committed by anonymous individuals or groups. On the side of the victim there is no consent, whereas chandabaji is committed through compulsion with the victim being a reluctant consent giver.

In case of organised racketeering there exists a regular hierarchical system of protection money to anti-socials as well as to dishonest state-agents/representatives. Here the coercion is implicit and not pronounced at every transaction, possessing a kind of automatic process of extortion. On the contrary, in case of isolated criminals or illicit earners individual efforts as strategy is applied by the chandabaji. When compulsive contribution is extorted towards a collective fund either of political or socio-cultural nature, the implicit threat is the consequent antagonism. Above all, where victim is a criminal or
dishonest earner the inherent weakness is exploited by the chandabaji to compel the victim to contribute only to avoid extra risk of exposure.

As for historical legacy, the termination of British colonial rule in 1947 gave birth to the Eastern province of Pakistan that today constitutes sovereign state of Bangladesh. Experiences show that colonial policies were obviously not helpful for the growth of entrepreneurial class. After the emergence of Pakistan, economic planning was basically formulated by foreign advisers accommodating donor demands. This, however, resulted in bureaucratic obstacle and control of market forces which were criticised by conservatives in economic policy arena. As for entrepreneurial growth, the Pakistan government resorted to far-reaching public interventions and controls in the 1950s and the 1960s. It promoted private capitalism through public patronage, which transformed only a small group of traders into industrialists. Discriminating favouritism was pronounced in the process.

At the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 socialism was accepted as one of the fundamental constitutional principle. The entrepreneurial enterprises inherited from East Pakistan, were mostly abandoned by the Pakistani owners and were subsequently nationalised. Private entrepreneurial option was limited within the ceiling of 1.5 million. It was soon raised to 30 million in 1974 which evoked substantial emphasis on private entrepreneurial development. After the power-shifting of 1975, privatisation was accelerated and in the late 1980s, the government started denationalisation on a major scale. But the valuation of enterprises were not transparent rather these were in questions.

The lack of transparency and the questionable nature of privatisation was chiefly a result of governmental failure and absence of legal enforceability. The transfer of power through non-constitutional/extra-constitutional fashion has induced a sense of lawlessness and degraded civil society. Corruption in the economic field has become rampant.

Chandabaji has overwhelmed every aspect of economic transaction due to the oligarchic military dominance in Bangladesh. Historically, the elementary phase of chandabaji started with coercive contribution towards political fund collection. During absolutist military administration in two episodes since 1975 chandabaji as a phenomenon infiltrated into social spheres entangling a vast youth force into this extortionism under the shadow of the ruling party. The advantage was
availed by anti-socials who operated outside any formal institution. As an inevitable consequence of illegitimate rule, the institutional extortionism also became widespread and arrogant denying in totality any aspect of public answerability.

Moreover, from the colonial rule until to date, inequitable distribution of resources and gains coupled with partisan and dishonest state institutions have accumulated a sense of deprivation among those with any power to practice extortionism (*chandabaji*). Discrimination at institutional premises, institutional extortionism and dishonest leniency on the part of the law enforcing agencies have resulted in the involvement of the unemployed youth force into the indulgence of extortionism.

Having dealt with all the five questions, it is necessary to formulate a working definition of *chandabaji*. Literally, *chandabaji* means coercive extortion of benefit, be it in cash or kind but predominantly monetary in nature. Such extortion may assume various forms both in terms of means and ends.

As for the means, *chandabaji* is the extortion as a price of leniencies towards legal enforcement or as the price of protection from implicit or explicit threat to inflict injury and finally as a price of undue privileges which is generally known as bribery. Seen in this perspective, *chandabaji* may also be a state-induced coercion or corruption in addition to individual or organised extortion by private forces. Instances of *chandabaji* may include immunity-money paid to the law-enforcing agencies, coercive extortion by political individuals or parties, collecting tolls from property-owners by local hooligans and bribes to influential authorities with a view to appropriate illicit gains.

As for the ends, the proceeds of *chandabaji* may be obtained in various ways. Bureaucratic extortion and immunity-money paid to the law-enforcing agencies are appropriated through a deliberate network of gain-sharing through organised rackets. Besides, extortion by private individuals or groups generally appropriated towards personal consumption. A small portion of such extorted proceeds may be utilised for common collective fund of political or social organisations. In the aforesaid sense, *chandabaji* would exclude so called speed money to avail a legitimate right. It also excludes hijacking, snatching, or hold-ups.

In the discussions above, attempt has been made to formulate workable definition of economic liberalisation, entrepreneurship and *chandabaji*. It is in this light an analysis is conducted to find conceptual linkages between these three aspects.
Liberalisation versus Entrepreneurship

It is abundantly clear from the formulation of working definitions of economic liberalisation *vis-à-vis* entrepreneurial development that both aim at encouraging greater participation of the private sector in national economic development. While liberalisation generally implies a non-interventionist approach and the removal of obstacles towards private sector growth, entrepreneurial development, on the other hand, may demand concerted intervention by the government. Some aspects of liberalisation may come into conflict with domestic entrepreneurial development. Moreover, enforceability of legal rights and privileges is related to good governance, which is primarily interventionist in nature. So as far as economic liberalisation is concerned it must be confined within those enhancing policies that nurtures domestic/national entrepreneurship and facilitates foreign investment in conformity with local growth of entrepreneurship.

While economic liberalisation is substantially related to entrepreneurial development, some components of the standard package of liberalisation may come into conflict with entrepreneurial growth. Particularly in case of an economy like that of Bangladesh where excessive foreign aid-dependency has made it compulsive for the government to rigidly implement policy prescriptions by international agencies like IMF and WB, the liberalisation package, though apparently meant to foster entrepreneurship, ends up eventually in being adverse to nationalistic entrepreneurial development. For example, indiscriminate import liberalisation may hinder proper development of local entrepreneurial ventures.

Entrepreneurship versus Chandabaji

While posing the question of extortionism/chandabaji by the youth force against entrepreneurial development, it must be admitted that on the part of the entrepreneur this *chandabaji* of the youth force is at its worst only an unavoidable expense and it constitutes a much smaller outlay compared to the extortion by the various institutions. Questionable acquisition of entrepreneurial resources either as a bank defaulter or a favoured buyer of public enterprise at irrational concessions makes extortion unavoidable for the entrepreneur. Efficient law and order may minimise the impact of youth *chandabaji* which is detrimental to small entrepreneurial growth but must be proceeded by administrative reforms and corruption-free equitable law-enforcement. On the other hand,
governmental institutions through special lending schemes can provide better access to the youth to risk capital and to venture into entrepreneurial enterprises themselves rather than being an obstacle to entrepreneurial growth.

It is imperative to probe into the nature of influence that chandabaji exerts on entrepreneurial development. When chandabaji is exertion as price of immunity for breaking laws, it may prove conducive to foster growth of private entrepreneurship. That by definition tends to maximise profit by all means regardless of its legality. On the contrary, when chandabaji is exertion by threat of inflicting injury to a bona fide entrepreneur, it becomes detrimental. Moreover, when state policy is inequitable and infested with vested interest and corrupted partiality while offering entrepreneur incentives it generates popular sense of deprivation and indignation that induces chandabaji by the policy-enforcing agencies themselves as well as by individuals and groups suffering from the sense of discrimination and deprivation. In such cases lack of moral strength on behalf of the entrepreneurs themselves make them vulnerable towards organised and isolated chandabaji.

Youth Force

Youth happens to be the prime time in the life of an individual for flourishing all kinds of intellectual faculty and functional competence. Most of the stalwarts in various branches of epistemology with immemorable contribution had been able to reach the zenith of their individual achievement within their young age (15 to 30 years).

Therefore, the youth force is one of the most potential means for a brighter future of a nation in terms of political, economic, social and cultural development. The youth force of Bangladesh could exult on the glorious and vanguard role in the struggle for complete freedom of the oppressed majority of this region since British colonial time and specifically during the struggle for independence from imperial colonialism in 1947. When Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan the youth force has been instrumental in many emancipating movements such as the language movement during 1948 to 1952, struggle for autonomy during Jukiafront elections, youth and students movement during 1962, six-point movement during 1966, eleven point movement and mass-uprising during 1969, the liberation struggle in 1971, students' and peoples' uprising in 1990.
Attempts to utilise the youth force through participatory policy planning has become a global trend but the emphasis was provoked due to that increasing concern regarding the fall of moral positivity and achievement motivation in the youth force as a reaction to deteriorating human condition. The youth force instead of standing upright to face the odds rather seek refuge into drugs and controversial life-style.

Specifically in case of Bangladesh lack of employment opportunity, immoral state administration and third world inferiority complex have led to self-destructive pessimism and petrified inaction.

**Liberalisation versus Youth Force**

Liberalisation in a developing economy has two aspects: the first deals with the problem of developing the national private sector to widen capital participation and to groom up a nationalist class of entrepreneurs; the second aspect of liberalisation is closely linked with the concept of globalisation and dismantling of trade barriers across national frontiers. This may have different consequence in a developing economy compared to the developed ones.

The aid dependent, IMF prescribed, compulsive liberalisation package practiced by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) bears little impact on the youth force in any constructive sense. Rather the state-sponsored transformation of trade capitalist into industrial entrepreneurs and the corrupt practice of licenses in fostering local entrepreneurship in other fields have mostly left the youth force out. The natural predicament of this discriminating practice has created a sense of grievance among the youth force making them aggressively disposed towards both the government and the private entrepreneur. The feeling is widespread among the youths that the nationalist popular interest is being sacrificed for partisan gains and is resulting in emergence of compradors, selling out mass interest for oligarchic beneficiaries.

On the other hand, sweeping liberalisation dictated by international agencies with deliberate vested interest has thrown the national economy wide open to the aggressive global competition that frequently comes into conflict with the primary necessity in a developing economy to protect the national entrepreneurs from unequal competition. All these inequitable implication of the liberalisation, privatisation and entrepreneurship has induced growing sense of resentment among the youth.
Moreover, in the process of being merged into the main stream of struggle for eco-political emancipation, the youth force has become vulnerable to willful manipulation by partisan politics. Extortion being a regular form of fund collection by the political parties needs only a small deviation by the youths to turn into self-seeking extortionists (chandabajis) posing increasing menace and retarding obstruction to the development of private entrepreneurship. Therefore, it is evident that chandabaji is a legacy from partisan political abuse, compradors, administrative corruption, defying of national interest, absence of effective youth policy, lack of adequate employment and structural deficiencies for youth entrepreneurs. As a result, it has drawn a vast portion of the youth force into the heinous avengeful act of chandabaji of coercive extortion committed specifically against private entrepreneurship.

Culturally, we inherit a legacy of adoring the just-doing Robinhood like labelers who snatch from the rich to provide the poor. This romantic myth has, to some extent, glorified the role of a chandabaj as a protester against anti-mass and anti-national economic malpractice. Along with that, global consumer market, anti-hero dominant TV films and the demanding habit of drug abuse have induced the youth to the role of extortionist (chandabaji).

Why Chandabaji?

A comprehensive answer to this question should encompass the social, political and economic aspects of the problem. These three aspects happen to be closely interrelated and complexly entangled. An attempt to answer this question should not concentrate on any single specific aspect. Rather it should accommodate the whole gamut of interrelation of these three aspects.

To elaborate the social, economic and political context of chandabaji, it is imperative to outline the state structure of Bangladesh. While explaining the state structure in the contexts of Weberian concept, neo-Marxist values and neo-classical concept of market economy, it is evident that Bangladesh is three-tier state-structure with 'elitism at the top, corruption in the middle and ignorance at the bottom'. Such a state is prone to have widespread anti-social activities in its daily affairs of which chandabaji comprises only a specific component. Through the above-mentioned approach of socio-econo-political analysis, some of the causes behind instances of chandabaji happen to be:
1. **Patron-client relation in power structure**

Certain sections of political leadership in Bangladesh indulge into the role of 'God-father' providing protection to pseudo-political miscreants including *chandabaji*.

2. **Overall entitlement failure**

Entitlement refers to the individual's moral right to food and subsistence through the legal means including production, trade and free gifts. Failing this entitlement provokes resentment often leading the victim to resort to *chandabaji*.

3. **Pragmatic individualism**

Pragmatic and opportunistic tendency on question of self-interest maximisation is a stereotype of national behaviour pattern in Bangladesh. More specifically, an anthropologist sketches a Bengali as 'an individualist in the sense that he behaves automatically to maximise opportunity through social relations, learns to find his own way in life, and does not depend much on either institutions or ideologies'. However, excessively self-seeking individualism tends to be indifferent towards collective interest. Thus collective revenues is abated through bribery within the bureaucracy and individual *chandabaji* backed by political or administrative malpractice.

4. **Lack of public morality**

'Political instability, potential for making windfall profits instead of building up solid enterprises, and lack of political will to deal with corruption among the new urban elite' are some important reasons that have declined public morality since the independence of Bangladesh. No doubt, the beneficiaries of corruption have an inherent moral weakness turning them vulnerable to threat and coercion. As a consequence, they easily fall victim to *chandabaji*.

5. **Emergence of two societies in a homogenous community**

Persistent misappropriation and illicit gains have led to the emergence of two extreme economic strata with a wide gap between them. This causes a sense of grievance at the bottom and a concomitant sense of guilt and weak morale at the top. This frequently provokes *chandabaji*. 
6. **Distorted political culture influenced by personal cult**

Personal cult breeds autocracy or oligarchy generating partiality, favouritism, and nepotism. Undue privileges within such a personal cult demands extortion as a price.

7. **Poor governance**

Failure to distinguish public from private, failure to have a predictable framework of law in government behaviour, excessive regulations and interventions, excessively narrow-based and non-transparent decision-making are causes of poor governance. All these structural/governmental incompetence encourage chandabaji.

8. **Rise of managerial hegemony**

Weakness in the application of representative political power creates scope for managerial hegemony or bureaucratic dominance that provokes institutional chandabaji.

9. **Lack of strict demarcated line between state power and civil power**

Lack of concrete definition of the scope of state intervention and the extent of civil rights lead to confusion regarding rights and duties of the civil society. Such a confusion creates ground for undue coercion and extortion.

10. **Personalisation of political power**

As an atomic component of personal cult at the top, local political structure also becomes personalised resulting in extra-legal advantages and coercion which is closely related to chandabaji.

11. **Unjust incentive system of economy**

When power, access and immunity from the law are not handled on an equitable basis, it tends to accentuate inequalities and injustices. In such a situation chandabaji becomes prevalent both across the institutional hierarchy and among the victim of discrimination.

12. **Maldistribution of development benefits**

When the state distorts the economic incentive systems, depriving the productive sector to the gain of the comparatively unproductive beneficiaries, the result is abuse of dynamism in the economy and persistent poverty and aid-dependence.
vast majority suffering from such maldistribution resort to 
\textit{chandabaji} as a means of vengeance.

13. \textit{Party-backed trade unionism and the growth of 'union-hijacking'}

Political intervention and maneuvering in the field of trade unionism have made it more of an interaction between political parties and trade unions rather than between the union and the entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{20} This sort of political intervention removes productivity from the focus and gives birth to undue influence, coercion and extortion.\textsuperscript{21}

However, for \textit{chandabaji} the causes mentioned above are, no doubt, the outcome of the gradual formation of two distinct strata in its social domain, negatively excessive dependability on foreign aid in the economic sphere and the lack of faith and reliance in the political arena that have conjointly turned the state into a confined pedimental diagram. The only way out of this predicament is to eradicate fuzziness in its governance process and governmentality so that the mass populace can regain faith on the state.

\textbf{Summary and Conclusion}

In the discourse of Political Science, the 'stateness' is an accumulative phenomenon fundamentally containing reflection, choice and calculation through which a state expresses its governmentality according to the 'market plus democracy' model. In case of Bangladesh, the apparent observation is that the governmentality, through continuous abuse of power, access and immunity within its legal structure, is exemplifying inequality and injustice. This eventually obstructs Bangladesh from becoming a minimum democratic polity. As a result, the politically conscious mass who consider and expect politics to be 'formation and implementation of public policy over domestic production and international trade' are persistently being led to question the governmentality of the government.

It may be contended that the stateness of Bangladesh had been unduly hampered through the extra-constitutional transfer of power in 1975. The subsequent authoritarian regimes lacked the required moral and public support. Infested by rampant corruption, the military and quasi-military regimes and their benefactors have misappropriated public fund and excessive aid-dependence compelled them to prescribe economic and legal measures that benefitted the donors at the expense of sound entrepreneurial development. Moreover, institutional corruption
has led various forms of *chandabaji* by political parties as well as by institutional law enforcing agencies.

A comprador-like state entity and the favoured few plunderers of public benefits are the causes of the apparently unproductive youth force. Lack of education, employment opportunities and optimism have turned a vast section of the youths into socially detrimental *chandabajs*. Proper emphasis on reviving the constructive spirit of the youth force through methodical structural adjustment and effective incentives, and prudent socio-economic policies would help the youth turn into active partners in national progress and entrepreneurial growth.

If market forces and democracy are given a fair chance to flourish, the overwhelming frustration of the youth may be redressed. If that could be achieved, the youth force, instead of posing obstruction, would rather enhance the entrepreneurial development and a sustainable economic growth in a country like Bangladesh.
End Notes


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


