Chapter 5

Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict, and Human Security: The Sindh Case

The name “Sindh” derives from the Indo-Aryans whose legends claimed that the Indus River flowed from the mouth of a lion or Sinh-ka-bab. In Sanskrit, the province is called Sindhu, meaning “ocean”. Sindh, a former province of British India, is now one of the four provinces of Pakistan. Located in South Asia’s southwestern corner and bordering the Iranian plateau in the west, Sind is Pakistan’s third largest province. The prominent geographical feature in Sind is the course of the lower Indus. The province stretches about 579 kilometres from north to south and 442 kilometres (extreme) or 281 kilometres (average) from east to west. It has an area of 140,915 square kilometres, of 5.43 million hectares are cultivatable. It is bounded by the Thar Desert to the east, the Kirthar Mountains to the west, and the Arabian Sea in the south. In the centre are the fertile plains of the Indus. The central riverine belt—360 miles long and about 20,000 square miles in area—constitutes the Indus Valley. Ecologically, it is arid, subtropical, and has low and erratic monsoon rains. Owing to the deficiency of rain, hot weather in Sind is the norm. Lying between two monsoons, it escapes the influence of both.

According to the 2006 census, Sindh’s population is approximately 40 to 45 million, under half of whom are urban dwellers, chiefly living in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Mirpurkhas, and Larkana. Officially a bilingual province, larger sections of its population speak Sindhi and Urdu. Other languages spoken are Saraiki, Balochi, Brahui, Punjabi, Pashto, Rajasthani, and Gujarati. Urdu-speaking Mohajirs dominate Sindh’s urban areas, while Sindhis mainly live in the rural areas of the province. More than 75% of Sindh’s rural people practise animal husbandry. Because of its ethnic composition, Sindh has become a highly polarised province. It is estimated that Balochi Sindhis make up
30%, Urdu-speaking Sindhis 25% and natives 45% of the total population of Sindh.

Among the major tribes of Sindh are Jats and Rajputs, while Balochi and Urdu-speaking Sindhis are settlers. Balochis as well as the natives speak Sindhi. Sindhi-speakers make up 55% and Urdu-speakers 25%, while 20% of the total population of Sindh speaks Gujarati, Bengali, Balochi, Saraiki, Thari, Kutchi, and Persian. Although predominately a Muslim province, Sindh is also home to the vast majority of Pakistan’s Hindus, numbering approximately 1.8 million. Few smaller groups of Christians, Parsis or Zoroastrians, Ahmadis and a tiny Jewish community (of around 200) also live in the province.

Sindh is the richest province of Pakistan in terms of natural resources such as gas, petrol, and coal. The salt of the delta is a key mineral product of commercial importance. Agriculture, the mainstay of its economy, is almost entirely dependent upon irrigation from the Indus. The Provincial Assembly of Sindh is unicameral and consists of 168 seats of which 5% are reserved for non-Muslims and 17% for women.

Because of its coastal access, Sindh is considered to be the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. It has a highly diversified economy ranging from heavy industry and finance centred in and around Karachi to agriculture concentrated along the Indus. Pakistan’s rapidly growing information technology (IT) sector is also located in Karachi. Its manufacturing sector includes machine products, cement, plastic, etc. Sindh contributes substantially to Pakistan’s economy. Its share in the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is about 30% (Ahmed, 1998: 235). Karachi is still the country’s financial hub.

Since Pakistan’s inception, the Sindh province has become a victim of overcentralised politics practised by the state apparatus of which the Pakistani military is the key component. As F. Ahmed has noted, the people of Sindh have been deprived of even a marginal share in Pakistan’s economic progress (Ahmed, 1998: 235) despite its 30% contribution to the nation’s GDP. As mentioned above, almost the entire economy of Sindh is dependent upon irrigation from the Indus, nonetheless, the Sindh province has been greatly discriminated against in that the quantum of water from the Indus, which it rightfully deserved/deserves, is diverted elsewhere. Human security threat here stems from the construction of the Kalabagh dam (details will follow). This remains a festering sore between the dominant Punjabi ethnic
group and the Sindhis. Hence, it will be useful to dig into the economic roots of Sindhis’ discontentment.

The connection among ethnicity, ethnic conflict(s) and human security vis-à-vis Sindh calls for elucidation of the state’s role in provincial politics since it has often denied provincial autonomy to Sindh. This is a clear violation of federal principles. To ignore constitutional provisions in managing affairs has become a routine practice for the ruling authorities of Pakistan. Such actions and policies have given rise to provincial grievances that have led to conflicts centred on ethnic lines in Pakistan. This is, however, not to assert that no other South Asian federal states witnessed such mismanagement. India, for example, has also been guilty of such practice carried out in the name of state building. A key difference between India and Pakistan is that while the the former could cultivate a secular polity the latter could not. This again does not necessarily imply that had Pakistan developed a secular polity it would not have experienced conflicts on ethnic lines.

What matters most, however, is the federal state’s inadequate application of its federal principles in managing the affairs of Sindh province. It is evident by now that Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s secular ideology has not been able to gain strong foothold in Pakistan. True, the Pakistani military is the key policy maker of Pakistan. It has ruled the country for most of its life, overcentralising the state apparatuses. State building in Pakistan has become synonymous with military rule. The Pakistani military is of course mainly made up of Punjabis. The attempt to “Punjabinise” other ethnic groups has sowed the seeds of ethnic conflicts in the Pakistani polity where ethnicity has become a means of political and ethnic mobilisation. The rise of Sindh ethnonalism needs to be situated in such actions of the Pakistani state.

For many a high-ranking citizens of Pakistan, for example, Pakistan’s former Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was truly a secularist and against theocracy (Munir, 1980: xv). For them, Jinnah’s 11th August 1947 speech to the Constituent Assembly demonstrated his secular bent of mind. This position, however, is contested by the quarter that argues that the other group misconceived the hidden-meaning of Jinnah’s speech. For them, theocracy is the appropriate ideology for Pakistan (Jan, 2004).

It was none other than Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Khan Liaquat Ali Khan, who introduced in the Constituent Assembly a resolution that
came to be known as the Objectives Resolution. This was contrary to what Jinnah's idea of a state was. The resolution generated a fear psychosis among non-Muslims who believed that it would make them "Zimmis" (hostage) (Munir, 1980: xv) of Pakistan, a thing that Jinnah never wanted. Liaquat Ali, despite objections from non-Muslims, passed the resolution. Some people, without furnishing evidence, claim that Jinnah was "primarily a Muslim nationalist", and "never a nationalist Muslim" (Shah, 2003: 2). Whether such a construction of Jinnah is helpful, it can be argued that Jinnah's (note Jinnah himself a Gujarati-speaking Mohajir) declaration of Urdu as Pakistan's state language favoured the Mohajir community. It will be seen that Sindhis became hostage to Mohajirs when the ethnic conflict began surfacing in which the role of Pakistani military was significant. And, of course, throughout Pakistan's history, it is the military that has remained the key state apparatus.

In Pakistan the military hold the "political veto", even when the country had the "trappings of a democratic regime". Capitalist modernity itself developed in Pakistan in symbiotic relationship with precapitalist formulations based on language, religion, caste, kinship and locality. As Hamza Alavi aptly observes:

The history of the Pakistan movement does not have the depth and character to provide the substance of national memories. It has manifestly proved to be incapable of providing over-arching national bonds for it is tied too closely with the fortunes of a fragmented and discredited political party. This fact is compounded by the even more significant and paradoxical fact that the Pakistan movement was at its weakest in the Muslim majority of India that today make-up Pakistan (Alavi, 1991:153).

Increasingly secular Pakistani scholars have continued to argue that religion never acted as a strong cementing force in Pakistan's nation-building process. When Pakistan was founded in 1947, it became a truism that Islam would remain the loadstar of Pakistan's nation-building. That such a belief is premised upon a flawed assumption is clear when Pakistan's bureaucratic-military apparatus begin to feel that "many other loyalties" (Misra, 1998: 965) would fragment Pakistan. A Pakistani scholar, Iftikher H. Malik, argues that "ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism were viewed as threats to the whole country and rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality" (Malik, 1997: 168 as cited in Misra, 1998: 965).

In other words, Pakistan has had a very uneasy time, and was not able to resolve the identity issue (religious component vs ethnic
component) that has kept bedevilling the process of nation-building in Pakistan following its emergence on 14 August 1947. The unresolved controversy about the correct interpretation of Jinnah's famous 11th August speech is a case in point.

In course of time, the Pakistani state, its army, and the policies adopted by Jinnah were responsible for a specific ethnic community's (that is, the Mohajirs') domination over others. As stated earlier, the Pakistani state's attempt to "Punjabinise" other ethnic groups also sowed the seeds of ethnic conflicts in the Pakistani polity where ethnicity became a means of political and ethnic mobilisation. Behind a specific community's domination lay the policy of overcentralisation pursued by Pakistani ruling elites. In pursing such overcentralisation policy the "relational needs" of other ethnic communities were ignored. This is in clear violation of federal principles. Secessionist tendencies in Pakistan, among other things, can be contextualised in such violation of federal principles of the federal state of Pakistan.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic society, dominated by an overwhelmingly ethnic group—the Punjabis. Like many other countries of the world, Pakistan has been beset with ethnicity or ethnic conflicts in all its provinces (Punjab, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Baluchistan, and Sindh). Some of these problems are inter-ethnic and some are state-group in nature. However, conflicts on ethnic lines are one source of the problems that one witnesses in Pakistan. As an informed conflict watcher of Pakistan, Husain Haqqani, put it:

"The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is based on ... ethnic and provincial differences. Although the majority of Pakistan's ethnically disparate population has traditionally identified with secular politicians, that majority has not always determined the direction of Pakistan's policies, even when its opinion is expressed in a free and fair election. Highly centralised and unrepresentative governance has created grievances among different ethnic groups, and the state has yet to create any institutional mechanisms for dealing with such discontent. The constitutional provisions relating to provincial autonomy, which could placate each province by allowing self-government, have often been bypassed in practice. Intraprovincial differences, such as those between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns in Baluchistan, between the Punjabis and Saraiki in Punjab, between the Pashtuns and Hindko speakers in the North West Frontier Province, and between the Sindhis and Mohajirs in Sindh, have also festered without political resolution (Haqqani, 2004/5: 88).

This work is concerned here with ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the province of Sindh, where there are inter-ethnic problems concerning
Sindhis and Punjabi-Pathans, Punjabi-Pathans and the Mohajir community. Malik is among the few Pakistani academics who subscribes to the idea that ethnic factors do, indeed, constitute a critical threat to the Pakistani nation. He identifies five such factors. These are territoriality, provincialisation, cultural configuration, linguistic foundation, and historicity. To him these make a case for conflicts between ethnic identity and the nation state (Malik, 1997).

This study focuses on the conflict between Sindhis and Mohajirs in Sindh. The Pakistani state has played a dual role vis-à-vis the Mohajir community. So, the conflict under review has to be seen at two levels—Sindhis vs Mohajirs, and Mohajirs vs the state. However, there is also another level—Sindhis vs the state—which is relevant to understand the conflict dynamics between Sindhis and Mohajirs. Let us first get introduced to the Mohajirs and present the conflict from their perspective.

5.1 THE MOHAJIRS AND THE CONFLICT

"Mohajir" is an Urdu word, meaning “refugee”. Mohajirs are Urdu-speaking Muslims who came from India at the time of and after the Partition of 1947 and settled in various parts of Pakistan. The so-called "Mohajir community" is in reality an assortment of various Indian-origin groups. However, they are not a single ethnic community and comprise various ethnic and racial groups having roots in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, etc. (Ahmar, 1996). Do the Muhajirs then constitute an ethnic group? The answer to the question is “no”, in the ordinary sense, but is for all practical purposes “yes”. They speak the same language and have all migrated from India. Over time, Muhajirs developed a sense of community and a common group identity. They identify themselves as members of one single ethnic group and the rest of their compatriots recognise them as such (Ahmar, 1996). The Pakistani state has also categorised them as such. This categorisation is not unlike the one done in the United States regarding the Hispanics and African Americans.

Two major factors served as underlying causes of the ethnic conflict in Sindh between Sindhis and Mohajirs. One is that the bulk of the Mohajir community settled in Sindh, particularly in its major urban centres like Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur, resulting in significant demographic transformations to the immediate and far-reaching
disadvantage of the Sindhi “sons of the soil”. The other factor is rooted in the power structure of the newlyborn Pakistani state. The death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah so soon after Partition, the weakness of the political party system, the “India factor”, and the already dominant position of the Punjabi elite fundamentally affected the nature of the new state of Pakistan and also impacted on the priority of nation building tasks. In the absence of strong representative institutions, the bureaucracy—both civil and military—became very powerful in Pakistan right from the early days of its independent existence and played a decisive role in matters of state and nation-building, and national security. As a result, state building in Pakistan was characterised by a tendency of centralisation and nation-building by the neglect of ethnic and regional issues as well as the question of majority-minority with regard to sharing power and resources (Samina Ahmed in Brown and Ganguly, 1997).

Most Mohajirs came from northern and western India. They had played a pivotal role in the creation of Pakistan and had better educational background than other Pakistanis. The political segment of these Mohajirs became members of the ruling coterie and became entrenched in the all-powerful bureaucracy alongside the Punjabis. The share of Mohajirs in Pakistan bureaucracy was way too lopsided compared to the numerical strength of the community. They also occupied plum jobs in administration and other government sectors. The Mohajir community, thus, enjoyed immense power, status and privileges in Pakistan’s power structure and society. They were amongst the staunchest supporters of the two-nation theory and Pakistani or territorial nationhood, even showing abhorrence for ethnic or sub-national identity (ethnic nationalism) and aspirations. This brought the Mohajir community first into competition and then into conflict with Sindhis, particularly in urban Sindh. The people of Sindh soon began to feel oppressed and exploited in their own land by the Pakistani state as well as the Mohajir community.

However, with the passage of time, the Mohajir community developed a strong sense of alienation and deprivation due to certain policy measures adopted by the Sindh government and interestingly the Federal government too, which they felt threatened their human security—ethnic identity, economic security, societal security, killings, rape, arson, kidnapping, torture, due process of law, etc. There are two

5.2 SINDHI ALIENATION AND MOHAJIR ETHNICITY IN SINDH

Sindhi ethnonationalists maybe identified as those who want to establish a Sindhi collective identity. The trajectory of their self-determination can be traced back to 1947. Following partition in 1947, most Hindus fled the new state of Pakistan. Mohajirs replaced the Hindus, possessing many advantages over their Sindh co-nationalists. For example, 70% of them were literate. By contrast, only 10% of the indigenous inhabitants of the province were literate. Added to these advantages, Pakistan state policies favoured the interests of Mohajirs. As Kennedy noted:

Early policies of the new state also favoured the interests of the Muhajirs. Perhaps most significant was the decision by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, himself a Gujarati-speaking Muhajir, to make Urdu, the mother language of the majority of the relatively small Muhajir community, above that of the much more widely spoken Punjabi, Bengali, or Sindhi languages. Also beneficial to Muhajir interests was the so-called One Unit scheme of 1955-69, which centralised the administrative system of West Pakistan by merging its four provinces. The rationale for this policy was to counterbalance the size differential of East Pakistan and thus enable the drafting of Pakistan’s first constitution in 1956. However, one Unit emasculated the powers of the Sindh provincial government, which was dominated prior to 1955 by the majority Sindhis. Furthermore, Ayub Khan (1958-69) adopted economic policies that focused economic development activities in Karachi, the site of largest concentration of Muhajirs (Kennedy, 1991: 942).

Owing to state policies favourable to the Mohajirs, their community "became disproportionately overrepresented in Pakistan’s elite groups" while Sindhis became "woefully underrepresented in the elite groups" (Kennedy, 1991: 942-943).

The founder of Sindhi nationalism, Ghulam Mustapha Syed, has argued that Sindhis became victims of "Punjabi-Muhajir imperialism" and that the interests of the Sindhis are ill served by a strong central government (Kennedy, 1991: 943). The key focus of the Sindhi ethnonalist movement prior to the 1971 war remained confined to the dissolution of the concept of a unified West Pakistan province and the restoration of Sindhi as the official language at the provincial level.

The “Jayee Sindh” movement of Syed opposed the separation of Karachi from Sindh in 1948, the federal government’s attempts to put all West Pakistan provinces under one unit in the mid-1950s, and the
downgrading of the Sindhi language as a medium of instruction by the government of Ayub Khan. The settlement of the Mohajirs in urban Sindh was perceived by the Sindhis to have been a sign of the pro-Mohajir bias of the federal government in the initial years of Pakistan and was viewed as a challenge to Sindhi nationalism and pride. It was also perceived to constitute political, economic, social and demographic threats to Sindhis. Sindhis, therefore, were bitter over the actions of the Pakistan federal government as well as the Mohajir community as a whole.

Among the steps taken by the Federal Government as well as the provincial government of Sindh that alienated the Mohajir community and threatened their perceived political, economic and cultural interests include:

1. The shifting of the national capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi by President Ayub Khan in 1958 alienated Mohajirs since they believed that it would erode their political and economic power.

2. In 1964, a series of attacks on Mohajirs allegedly led by Gohar Ayub Khan for their support for Miss Fatima Jinnah in presidential elections, in which many Mohajirs died and were injured, further alienated them.

3. The passage of the Language Bill in Sindh Assembly in 1972 declaring Sindhi to be a provincial language along with Urdu triggered anti-bill riots in urban Sindh causing deaths and destruction of property.

4. In 1972, Z.A. Bhutto's policies of nationalisation of banks, insurance companies and other big businesses resulted in the loss of jobs for many Mohajirs.

5. Urban-rural quota in jobs and educational institutions introduced in Sindh by Prime Minister Bhutto aroused Mohajir fears about losing their jobs and socio-economic status.

6. The military ruler General Zia ul-Haq extended the quota system in 1984 for another ten years, further aggravating Mohajir fears.

7. Ethnic riots in Karachi in April 1985 between Mohajir and Pathan communities claimed many lives and caused destruction of properties on both sides.
8. By the 1980s, even at the societal level and in day-to-day life, Mohajirs began to perceive an indifferent and even hostile environment even in their own backyards.

9. This fear may be explained by the fact that more and more Punjabis and Pathans had settled in Sindh in the 1980s. They had become their competitors in the job market and business sphere. Pathans had by then taken over the entire transport sector, hitherto the preserve of the Mohajirs. There was also an influx of Afghan refugees and arms, promoting what came to be known as a “Kalashnikov culture”.

10. Owing to these developments, by the mid-1980s, the Mohajir community began to feel alienated and steadily grew bitter and bitter over the erosion of their power, status and influence. They now felt the need for political mobilisation and began to demand their rights.

11. A political party for Mohajirs, called the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), was formed in March 1984 under the leadership of Altaf Hussain. The All-Pakistan Mohajir Student Organisation (APMSO), formed in June 1978, actually helped float the party.

Proud of their language and culture, Sindhis had always nurtured Sindhi nationalist emotions. Actually, language became the core of the Sindhi nationalist movement that had been led by G.M. Syed since the creation of Pakistan. This is evident from a popular song such as \textit{Sindh ahay amar, Sindh rahndi sada} (“Sindh is immortal, Sindh shall live forever”).

A good number of writers injected a cultural genocidal dimension into the Sindh problem (Ahmed, 1985). The Pakistan state’s policy to impose cultural unity on the Sindhis was perceived as an act of cultural strangulation by them. This is evident from their assertion that the Pakistani state policy had made their language and culture “peripheral, not only in Pakistan but even in Sindh itself” (Rahman, 1988: 118). Their insecurity will be evident from the following sample quotations:

\begin{quote}
What we get in Urdu is borrowed thoughts, borrowed sentiments, plagiarised and jejune literature, commonplace and maudlin compilation, nostalgic poetry, sociological wailing and seductive pornography .... In Urdu literature real sociological Pakistan does not exist (Quoted in Das, 2001: 114).
\end{quote}
The Sindhi language now became for the Sindhis, especially for its middle class intelligentsia, a symbol of cultural identity. ‘What is Sindhi culture, except driving donkeys and camels? (nas, 2001: 114).

All government records and registers—even at the municipality level—which were thus far kept in Sindhi now came to be printed in Urdu. Even Sindhi signs in official buildings and bus and railway stations were replaced by Urdu. A Mohajir-oriented history of Pakistan was imposed on the Sindhis (Das, 2001: 114).

Hence, Sindhis rejected the imposition of Urdu on them. To them, the Urdu which was a language of Chawk, Aminabad, Chandnichowk, the battlefield and the mullahs had a problematical and uncertain future in Pakistan. According to them, the people of Pakistan and democracy would always suffer at its enforcement and currency (Das, 2001: 115).

The modernisation programme in Pakistan rested on the shoulders of a centralised and overcrowded state. Under General Zia-ul Huq, Islam was used to buttress state control. But in a multiethnic state with strong regional imbalances, the centralisation policy carried with it the danger of marginalising sections of population who were perceived by the ruling power as unsuitable for the nation-building process. Instead of appreciating the grievances of Sindhi nationalists, the Pakistan government responded to the assertion of Sindhi identity negatively, an attitude that is evident when General Tikka Khan, the erstwhile Governor of East Pakistan, had declared:

We failed in East Bengal because it was too far away; there were too many people there, and it was helped by India. If “Sindhu Desh” raises its head, we can easily crush it because it is near at hand, not very populous, and not likely to be helped by any foreign power. We will then offer the Sindhi Pir and Zamindars, who are fattening now, as a sacrifice (quarbani) in celebration of our victory, Jashne-e-fateh (Malkani, 1984: 133).

Here is a classic example of what Anderson calls “official nationalism”, a situation where national identity is not “spontaneously generated from below”, but imposed from the top to subvert subnational movements that appear to wield considerable popular support. When the need was to recognise Pakistan as an ethnically diverse unit, the “central elite” of the country opted for a “viceregal system” that failed to integrate “the existing social structures ... into the political and economic mainstream.” The ethnic imbroglio in Sindh was a fall-out of this process. As a Sindhi analyst puts it:

Problems of national unity in Pakistan stem from the very philosophy of the country—as prophesied by those who wield power. The philosophy and
ideology of the state negates the reality, i.e. the existence of nations that together formed Pakistan. The policies and practices based on philosophy and ideology of the creation of Pakistan have obviously damaged the problems of national unity (Khan, 1989: 30).

5.3 CONFLICT PHASE

The Punjabi ruling elite adopted the state policy of perceiving Pakistan as one nation, one culture, and one language, denying thereby the space for provincial identities. This policy led to a conflict between state elites and ethnic elites. The state viewed ethnic elites as “traitors” disloyal to Islam and Pakistan. If one looks at the politics of Pakistan, the policy of one-nation, one-culture, and one-economy, formed in the first parliamentary era (1947-58), were strongly implemented in military-bureaucratic rule. Urdu was imposed as a medium of education and the use of other regional languages was banned.

Successive regimes (1972-77) followed similar policies, monopolised power, and pursued contradictory cultural policies (declaring Sindhi as the only official language of the province) emphasising development policies in the provinces. Instead of creating integration, it began to exploit differences between Punjabis versus Pushtuns in NWFP; Sindhis versus Moharjirs in Sindh and Balochis versus Pushtuns in Balochistan.

During 1971-77, the government of Bhutto, separatist unrest was mainly confined to Baluchistan and parts of NWFP. The 1970 local elections resulted in victories for the pro-autonomy NAP in both NWFP and Baluchistan. In 1972, NAP leaders became chief ministers in both provinces for the first time. In 1972, Bhutto dismissed both assemblies and sent troops to Baluchistan, officially to control tribal unrest. Military interventions increased and federal officials accused the provincial government of supporting secessionist dissidents. The military’s counter-insurgency battle continued until 1975. Violence seems to have been mostly concentrated in Baluchistan rather than the NWFP (Aleman and Treisman, 2002: 22-23).

In Sindh, which had remained relatively calm between 1972 and 79, nationalist conflict increased with the return of the military. In autumn 1983, a “full-scale rural uprising” developed, mostly in a few rural areas in the province’s interior. The movement began with a series of unauthorised demonstrations, but later developed into a large-scale uprising that threatened the economic prosperity of Punjab. This
compelled the President of Pakistan to send army divisions to crush the uprising (Rakisits, 1988). According to one observer:

As Sindh dissent spread, the military launched anti-insurgency operations in the Sindhi countryside; hundreds were killed and thousands were arrested and tried by summary military courts, run by military administrators. When force alone did not contain Sindhi dissent or weaken the PPP’s base the military adopted discriminatory policies aimed at excluding the politically suspect Sindhis from the state apparatus (Quoted in Alemán and Treisman, 2002: 23).

The state elite during the Zia-ul-Huq regime (1977-88) attempted to restructure Pakistani society into an Islamic state. During this phase the elite comprised Punjabis, Pushtuns, and Mohajirs, while Sindhis and Balochis were underrepresented. This situation led to a large-scale rebellion in Sindh first in 1983 and then in 1986. Zia’s regime led to the further ethnicisation of Pakistan.

The formation of MQM apparently ended the Mohajir community’s support for a centralised political structure for Pakistan and for civic nationalism. Instead, they started advocating ethnic nationalism and demanded to be recognised as the fifth nationality of Pakistan. Some hardline Mohajir leaders and activists even started calling for a separate province for the community, created by separating Karachi and Hyderabad from the rest of Sindh.

Also, MQM’s formation implied that Mohajirs were ready to engage in violence for their perceived rights. The MQM looked desperate at this stage as is evident from its actions. It acted in connivance with the Zia regime to weaken the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) launched under the aegis of the PPP, the party General Zia had toppled from power in 1977 and whose leader (Bhutto) he had hanged in 1979. Secondly, the MQM became associated with militancy, crimes and lawlessness in urban Sindh, clashing not only with Sindhis, Punjabis and Pathans but also with federal security forces. Altaf Hussain’s MQM grew so intolerant of dissent from within and opposition from outside that it earned the reputation of having employed fascist methods in dealing with its opponents. In the eyes of the Pakistani military establishment MQM had become “a state within a state” (Ahmar, 1996: 1034).

The advent of the military government in 1977 reduced the influence of Sindhi politicians and administrators in federal decision-making. Making matters worse, grants to Sindh were reduced quite
sharply in the early 1980s—from 18.8% of total provincial current revenues in 1979-81 to 11.5% in 1981-3, a substantial drop of the share compared to that of other provinces. Sindh’s share in deficit grants dropped to just 5% in 1981-3, compared to the population share of 23% (Alemán and Treisman, 2002).

These events were followed by rural violence in 1983. Local leaders of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), who had been in power until 1979, led the rebellion in many districts. Demand for a separate Sindhi nation-state was voiced throughout the 1983 rebellion (Noman, 1990:195). As noted, the government responded with military force. But it also attempted financial appeasement, deciding to significantly increase development funds allocated to the province’s interior, where Bhutto’s support was strongest (Rakisits, 1988: 87). Total grants jumped to 44% of current revenues in 1985-7. Sindh’s share of deficit grants rose from 5 to 20% of the total in 1985-7 and its share of development grants jumped from 28 to 48% of the total in 1983-5. This may have helped stabilise the situation in the late 1980s (Alemán and Treisman, 2002).

Towards early 1986, G. M. Syed had to admit his alienation from Sindhi politics. “Jeaye Sindh Mahaz” was engaged in an ideological struggle instead of power politics. “Chances [of success] of the Mahaz struggle are remote as 90 per cent of the Sindhis are with the PPP”, he declared at that point (Interview with G. M. Syed, Pakistan Times, 5 June 1996 quoted in Das, 2001: 147).

The Jiye Sindh Tehrik, led by Syed, has now split into four factions. These are: (i) the Jiye Sindh Tehrik, led by Gul Muhammad Jakhrani and Bashir Khan Qureshi, whose members are loyal to Syed, believes in armed struggle, and is especially active in campuses in the interior of Sindh; (ii) the Jiye Sindh Mahaz under Syed Ghulam Shah and Abdul Wahid Aresar, which mainly consists of moderate socialists and demands independence for Sindh, but does not approve of strife with the Muhajirs; (iii) the Jiye Sindh Taraqqi Pasand led by Qadir Magsi, which is the most strident critic of Syed and enjoys considerable grassroots support and views the Muhajirs as the chief foe of Sindhis; and (iv) the Hamida Khuro group, which perhaps wields the least influence amongst Sindhi nationalists (Newsline, February 1992: 42 in Das, 2001: 148).

Some Sindh affairs watchers attribute the dysfunctional stage of Sindh ethnondenationalism to Syed's “personalised and enigmatic
approach", and in his unwillingness to “prepare a blueprint for an alternative socio-economic structure”. This situation has limited the Jiye Sindh movement to landed and educated elites. Qadir Magsi, the leader of Jiye Sindh Taraqqi Pasand, admitted that they originated from the “intellectual activity inspired in part by Syed”. Magsi, however, laments that:

Syed has been involved with the politics of Sindhu Desh for 22 years, but Sindhis—the educated middle class, lower middle classes, and the toiling masses—have gained nothing except destruction and death. The Sindhi feudals and wederas, meanwhile, have continued to mortgage the rights of Sindh and barter their conscience for privileges and ayasbi ... His [Syed's] reliance on palace conspiracies has totally distanced his politics from grassroots (Newsline, February 1992: 31 quoted in Das, 2001: 148).

Rasul Bux Palejo, a leftist Sindhi nationalist, and other like-minded leftists have identified a set of “structural” variables that have led to the erosion of the Sindhi movement. It has been asserted that the absence of a strong Sindhi Muslim middle class and the bickering between wederas (absentee landlords) and haris (landless nomadic farm workers) have enabled the federal government to play off one group of Sindhis against another (Harrison, 1987).

In early October 1998 a two-day nationalist conference of Sindhis, Pashtoons, Balochs and Saraikis was held. It resolved to launch “the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement” whose goal was to work for a truly federal polity, restoring to all ethnic groups/nationalities the fundamental rights that the Punjabi ruling elites solely enjoyed (The Telegraph, 5 October 1998 in Das, 2001: 152). In what came to be called the “Islamabad Declaration”, the Conference condemned the Punjabi leadership as “... myopic rulers, [who] have constantly used force and applied instruments like martial laws and doctrine of necessity and slogans of Pakistan nation, brotherhood and Muslim ummah to swindle, rob and deny the people of the federating units of their political, economic, cultural and human rights” (The Telegraph, 5 October 1998 quoted in Das, 2001: 170).

In the same spirit a Sindhi intellectual has complained that:

Since the inception of Pakistan, vested interests and classes have tried their utmost to damage unity of the people. Whenever there is trouble, tension or some unhappy incident in Karachi or Hyderabad, politicians from other provinces rush in, and, instead of helping solve problems, incite one group against other, thus adding fuel to fire and enjoy[ing] in troubled waters (Tonyo, 1991, 30-31)
Tensions between Sindhis and the Mohajir community intensified from the second half of the 1980s, as exemplified by two rounds of aggravated violence. It is alleged that some gunmen of Jayee Sindh leaders Qadir Magsi and Janu Arain attacked a group of unarmed Mohajirs in Hyderabad, killing more than 250 of them, in September 1988. One Pakistani influential weekly has noted that:

Each violent incident in Hyderabad or the interior of Sindh only speeds up the process of migration. Family after family belonging to Sindh’s Urdu speaking community has moved from Larkana, Dadu, Thetta, Badin and other areas and a substantial Sindhi-speaking population has left Latifabad and part of Hyderabad in search of safer abodes (The Herald, May 1989: 28 quoted in Das, 2001: 136).

Less than two years, that is to say, in May 1990, Sindhi police in Hyderabad swooped on a demonstration of Mohajir women and children, killing over 60 of them. In retaliation in Karachi, Mohajir gunmen killed more than 40 Sindhis. Inter-communal tensions ran so high that many people from both sides became IDPs, as they left homes for safer places.

The MQM did very well electorally in the national elections of October 1990. It also emerged as a powerful force, joining Nawaz Sharif’s coalition at the provincial and federal levels. However, the MQM became so powerful and militant that the federal government decided to check its spread in urban Sindh. It decided on a two-prong policy—split the MQM and use the army to crush its fighting capability. The MQM was eventually split when the moderate faction of the organisation that came to be known as MQM (Haqqiqi) was promoted by the government. The army got this opportunity following an incident in which two army officers were maltreated in Karachi by some Altaf Hussain loyalists in 1991. The army launched “Operation Cleanup” in May 1992, first against dacoits and anti-social elements in rural Sindh, and then against the MQM in urban Sindh. Later, paramilitary and police forces joined the army. An urban guerrilla war erupted and continued until 1996. Casualties on both sides ran into thousands. The Army was accused of carrying out genocide against the Mohajir community. Shehjad Amjad, Editor of the News’ political economy page, in an article entitled “Pakistan, Pakistanis, and Pakistaniat” in the 28th December 1997 issue of the paper had this to say:

Pakistan is a nation-state that is structurally alive and psychologically nonexistent. Its innumerable crises are rooted in the heart of the state – a
state of non-being. It is geographical entity that is vulnerable to an alternative conception of a redrawn map (Quoted in Jan, 2004: 41).

After the end of “Operation Cleanup” and the self-exile of MQM leader Altaf Hussain in London, the Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic conflict seemed to have petered out. Violence must have exhausted both sides and it must have dawned on them that violence would not bear them fruits; it was better to join the political process. It was perhaps also time for reflection on the need for cooperation, progress and peaceful integration.

5.4 THE KALABAGH DAM AND HUMAN SECURITY

The construction of the Kalabagh dam has given rise to human security problems in the areas affected by it. Critics call it yet another imposition of the Centre’s will on the province and a perfect undertaker without the consent of the people of the area concerned. Certainly, overlooking the concerned people’s “relational needs” has aggravated the human security aspect of the situation. As Khan has pointed out, there are five areas where the Kalabagh dam has been problematic. They include the following: (i) water crisis, (ii) food, (iii) energy, (iv) environmental consequences, and (v) the technical and financial viability of the dam. An analysis of the problem makes it clear that this is a project that the Centre has adopted at the expense of the Sindhi people. We shall now discuss it issue-by-issue.

### 5.4.1 Water Crisis

The Sindh-Punjab water dispute can be traced back to the second half of the 19th century when the British began rewarding soldiers, who had fought against the insurgent indigenous Indians in 1857, with land in Punjab. By 1875 the colonial government had started constructing canals to irrigate lands granted to their ex-servicemen. In 1893, Lord Curzon constituted the Indus River Commission that concluded that Punjab “cannot divert water without the consent of Sindh, Bahwalpur, Balochistan and Bikaner.” In 1934, Punjab began demanding construction of the Bakhara dam on the Sutlej river. Sindh opposed this move intensely. To avert any crisis between the key actors, the British

1 Information and data of this section have been mainly drawn upon from Shaheen Rafi Khan’s article on “The Kalabagh Controversy”. Available: http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-14.htm accessed on 28/2/2007.
proposed negotiations between Punjab and Sindh. Accordingly, the 1945 Sindh-Punjab Water Agreement was signed. According to the Agreement, 75% of the Indus waters were allocated to Sindh, and the remaining 25% to Punjab, while 94% of the waters of the Indus tributaries were allocated to Punjab and the remaining 6% to Sindh. In 1948, Punjab unilaterally decided to take more water from the Indus system, considering the partition of India as the basis of a fresh commencement of water management.

After partition, there was a standing agreement about maintaining the status quo on the water issue up to 31 March 1948 by both Sindh and Punjab. On 1 April 1948, East Punjab [of India] diverted the waters of eastern rivers, resulting in escalation of Pakistan-India tension. By contrast, Sindh’s application for maintaining the status quo was withdrawn by the central government on Sindh. In 1951, the World Bank intervened. Talks began in 1952 to reach a negotiated solution. Initially, all provinces were represented in the talks. M. S. Qureshi negotiated for Sindh. However, he and other representatives of Pakistan’s other provinces were later dropped from the negotiation process, and an all-Punjabi seven-member team became the sole negotiators. All these “negotiations”, “decisions” and “treaties” were conducted or signed by a team of Punjabis, without the consent of the people of Sindh.

Many attempts were made to impose some kind of pact or agreement on Sindh enabling Punjab to legalise the greater share of water it had been taking or aiming to take from the Indus and its tributaries. In 1991, they succeeded in imposing an accord on Sindh. According to this accord, 117 MAF (million acre-feet) of water were apportioned among the provinces. Because water availability is a concern of all parties, controversy ensued. The question that keeps coming up is whether there is adequate surface flow to justify the Kalabagh project? WAPDA, which cites two sources to make its case, has added to the confusion. It has presented two average flow figures. One is for 123 MAF and the other is for 143 MAF. Its first calculation is based on a 64-year period (1922-96) which includes both wet and dry cycles. The second one is based on a much shorter and wet cycle period of 22 years (1977-94). This second method of calculation has been used to manipulate figures in order to justify the construction of the Kalabagh dam. It has been reported that since the total requirement (inclusive of the additional allocation of 12 MAF under the 1991 Water Accord) is 143 MAF, there is a clear short fall of 20 MAF. This means
that the Kalabagh may remain dry every four out of five years, creating a huge water crisis.

5.4.2 Food and Energy

Food security and energy requirements have been put forward to justify the building of large dams. The same arguments also hold true in the case of the Kalabagh dam.

Food: It is been argued that additional water from the Kalabagh can enhance crop production in three ways: by irrigating new land, by enhancing cropping intensity on existing land, and by enhancing yields. Claims have been made that the first option has proved to be tenuous after close study of facts. It has been claimed that the Kalabagh dam will irrigate almost an additional million hectares of barren land, and bring Pakistan closer to wheat self-sufficiency. But evidence, furnished by the National Commission on Agriculture in 1987 and the National Conservation Strategy of 1991, suggests that the truth is contrary to the claims being made. After reviewing all three enhancing factors, Khan, for example, concludes: “Kalabagh is bound to add to the problem, not only in its immediate environs but also where new irrigation infrastructure is to be situated. Furthermore, the incremental land degradation is likely to be most pronounced in Sind, reflecting the north-south land gradient. While this may appear somewhat fanciful, the secular evidence supports this contention.” Tables 5.1-5.5 [not the original numbers] support Khan’s case. Tables are reproduced below.

Table 5.1: Land with Water-Table Depth of Under 0-5 Feet (By Province over Time) (Million hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compendium of Environmental Statistics of Pakistan, 1994-95.
It needs to be noted here that water-logging is higher in Sindh in comparative terms. It continues to increase over time against a declining trend in Punjab. Also, the numbers for salinity show its highest incidence in Sindh. Table 5.2 demonstrates these features. Despite the fact that the information presented is dated and recent comparable data is not available that can help us to study the trend, the old numbers show that almost 30% of the area within the canal commands in Sindh are afflicted by salinity, as compared to 20% for Punjab.

Table 5.2: Extent of Salt Affected Land (1000 hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Total Indus Basin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total CCA</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>7,891</td>
<td>5,351</td>
<td>13,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within CCA Salt Affected Area</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>3,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside CCA Salt Affected</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>2,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,551</td>
<td>5,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CCA= Canal Command Area.
Source: Soil Survey of Pakistan (1977-78).

Food security, as Khan asserts, is likely to become a demand-driven problem rather than a supply-constrained one, engendered by a growing population and rising per capita incomes. Table 5.3 that makes projections gives outcomes calculated on the basis of demographic and economic variables.

Energy: Following the controversy over private power, the Pakistani government has resorted to publicise the Kalabagh as an alternative source of cheap and clean energy. Khan notes that the claims for cheap hydel energy are becoming untenable on two counts. First, the cost estimated has changed with respect to both capital and recurring outlays. “Up-front capital costs need to factor in social displacement and environmental degradation. While this would result in cost escalation, it is only one aspect of the problem; the willingness or ability to finance such costs is another”—so claims Khan. He concludes that “if Kalabagh were to represent a discrete and substantive addition to the energy grid this could, theoretically, mean lower unit costs. But the secular trends demonstrate something to the contrary.”
Table 5.3: Projected Demand-Supply Balances of Major Agricultural Commodities (Million tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Years</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>-25.3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton (million bales)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits &amp; Vegetables</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
S = Supply, D = Demand, G = Gap

Source: In-house projections, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 1997.

5.4.3 Environmental Consequences

The social displacement aspects and environmental ramifications of constructing the Kalabagh dam on the Indus River ecosystem have

Table 5.4: Flood Damages in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monetary Losses (Billion Rs. in 1955 prices)</th>
<th>Lives Lost (Nos.)</th>
<th>Villages Affected (Nos.)</th>
<th>Area Flooded (Sq. miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>11,609</td>
<td>29,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>9,719</td>
<td>16,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8,628</td>
<td>13,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>64.84</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>18,390</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>9,199</td>
<td>11,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>7,545</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>56.00</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>13,208</td>
<td>15,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>6,852</td>
<td>6,518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

caused grave concern about human security of people living around the area. About 100,000 people live in coastal villages in the northern side of the Indus Delta. For them the mangroves are a vital source of livelihood. Big dams such as the Kalabagh would impact adversely on such a vital source of livelihood. Hence, the human security of the people living in these areas would be affected.

Furthermore, the conventional argument that large dams save a country from floods has proved to be less tenable in the case of the Kalabagh as it has not worked as a perfect flood prevention tool. It has been found that despite the existence of the dam, there has been neither reduction in the incidence and intensity of floods nor in the associated losses in lives, crops, livestock and infrastructure. Table 5.4 below demonstrates this fact.

5.4.4 Technical and Financial Viability of the Dam

Analysts have been quite critical about the technical and financial viability of the Kalabagh dam, and have thrown a challenge against those who have lobbied for it. They have questioned the advantages of the Kalabagh dam from the angles of reservoir operating strategy, underwater dikes, flushing bypasses, etc. They have concluded that the construction of the civil engineering works for the alternative project would have been one-seventh of what it would cost for constructing the Kalabagh. Table 5.5 below shows this aspect.

Table 5.5: The Kalabagh Dam Comparison—Net Present Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>With Kalabagh (US $ million)</th>
<th>Tarbela Action Plan (US $ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.V. Construction cost of Kalabagh</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.V. Construction cost of project</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.V. Construction cost of thermal plant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.V. Incremental thermal operating cost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total P.V. Cost</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>