Definitional Frontiers of Concepts and Their Interconnectivity

This chapter deals with the definitional boundaries of the three key concepts that will be applicable to the current study: security, human security, and ethnicity. In so doing, existing conceptual lacunae will be addressed, conceptualisation of human security attempted, meaning and problems of ethnicity explored, and issues of human security in situations of ethnicity or ethnic conflict brought out. Attempts will be made to establish the link between ethnicity/ethnic conflict and human security, indicating the need to mainstream the latter into security discourse and suggesting measures for prevention, management and resolution of ethnicity-induced insecurities. The chapter begins by discussing the existing security discourse.

2.1 SECURITY DISCOURSE

Security, in the negative perspective, connotes immunity of the state and/or its people from threats, and, in the positive sense, it means fulfilment of their basic needs and socio-political and cultural aspirations. Security is both universal and contextual. It is universal because it is intrinsically reflexive in both the state and the human individual. Security is contextual as the nature and content of threats and people’s welfare vary in temporal and spatial terms. Security is again both perceptual and reality-based. Security has been a contested concept and the discourse of security a difficult terrain.

Academic scholarship, security analyses and policymakers’ views have differed widely on issues such as: security of what/whom? Security of what values? Security by what means? Security against what? Security by whom? In other words, who securitises an issue and/or who interprets security needs? Is it the security of the state or of the people or of both? Is it security of a national territory and independence or of people’s safety and well-being or of both? Is it security by military
means or by non-military means or both? Is it security against military threats or non-military threats or both? Are the threats from within or from beyond national borders? Is it the state that provides security or is there any other body, except the state, who/that can interpret security needs and provide security? Depending on the views on and responses to these fundamental questions, there have evolved various schools of thought concerning what has come to be called 'national security', actually implying state security. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, that witnessed newer sources, types and victims of insecurity, vigorously reinforced debates on security. There have been tendencies to both deepen and widen the concept of security not only in terms of referent objects and levels of analysis but also in terms of the issue areas covered. Some, however, have chosen to hold on to the conventional understanding of security. All these schools can actually be grouped into two broad categories—traditional or conventional security and non-traditional security. Let us turn to traditional security first.

2.1.1 Traditional Security: A Critique

Here traditional security concepts will be revisited with a view to highlighting their inadequacy to address emerging issues and, hence, making the case for a new approach to security.

While security is very old as a perception, feeling, situation or condition, its academic conceptualisation and conscious official application is rather recent in historical terms and can be related to a particular world order, a particular academic tradition, and a certain stage of state formation/nation building and development. The international system we are referring to is the post-World War II ideological bipolarity propped up by two opposing politico-military alliances headed by the United States and the former Soviet Union respectively, encompassing Europe directly and the entire globe by proxy. This is the (in)famous Cold War period that was ushered in soon after the Second World War and that came to a rather abrupt end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This was also the context when both scholars and practitioners in the West, mainly in the United States, coined the concept of security. In the Western context, the state was a developed democracy with social cohesion and elite consensus delivering good governance and internally guaranteeing a stable social, economic and political order.
In such a context, threats were understood only in terms of armed conflicts and the sources of threat were considered possible only from across the state border. The concept of security has thus had military connotations and an external orientation. Securing territory and sovereign independence came to be accepted as the supreme values in the security debate. The state became the referent subject/object of security; it became the interpreter and provider of security to itself; security became threat-based. However, the concept gained currency as national security. This is the conventional or traditional security paradigm.

This paradigm actually has strong roots in the intellectual tradition of political realism that characterises the international system as anarchical in which a state has to use coercive means against another state to achieve political objectives and to acquire and maintain a reasonable degree of military capability to defend itself and survive. Security was actually understood in terms of power. This realist interpretation of security was the dominant or mainstream view during the Cold War and still continues to be seen as important by some. Militarisation of the concept of security actually "left little opportunity to advance either broader conceptions of security ..., or alternative means of achieving security" (Hendrikson, 1999: 16). However, such conceptualisation of security is now increasingly being found to be inadequate in explaining the nature and sources of new threats as also the goals of security. A few words are in order here on the felt lacunae in the existing security paradigm.

Since the 1990s there have been significant changes in the theatre and nature of conflicts. The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a whole range of threats whose source and nature are not traditional. More complex and varied as they are, these threats are seen to have emanated more from internal than external sources, and are perceived to be more non-military than military in nature. As the nature of conflicts/violence has changed, so have the responses to it. This has at times made the notion of territorial security irrelevant, the role of the state inadequate, and the roles of the domestic non-state actors and international community desirable and even essential.

In this new environment and altered conditions, the state-centric, geopolitically premised military-oriented paradigm of security studies seems to be too restrictive and unable to address the questions of security involving non-state actors, security of newer values, security
by non-military means, and security against non-military threats. In view of the limitations of the traditional understanding of security, the need for a broader security concept has now gained currency.

2.1.2 Non-traditional Security: Limits to Alternative Approach
The new world power relations and the changing nature of threats following the end of the Cold War have generated a fresh debate about narrow concepts of security. From historical and analytical perspectives, what then are the values dominating the discourse on security at this point in time? The post-Cold War re-articulations and reformulations of security all over the world are essentially attempts to make the meaning and content of security more inclusive. In a fundamental sense, the schools of thought of both the traditionalists and their challengers embody different theories of state, society and individuals and their interactive relationships (Rais, 2000: 113).

Depending on the views in favour of or against widening and deepening concepts of security or for/against shifting the focus away from state-centric conceptions, the post-Cold War security discourse seems to be taking place at two levels: at the level of traditional versus non-traditional security, and within the trend of non-traditional security itself.

Within the inclusive approach, there are those who conceptualise security in a vertically extended sense and those who do so in a horizontally extended sense. The “deepeners”, for example, (Rothstein, 1999; Walter, 1999: 127-155; Kumar, 1997; Horowitz, 1985; Mueller, 2000: 42-70; Valentino, 2000: 1-59; Walter and Snyder, 1998; Kaufmann, 1996: 136-175; Snow, 1996; Brown, 1993; Licklider, 1993), are willing to vertically expand the level of analysis, as they are willing to consider the security of individuals and groups/communities as well as of the state. The “wideners”, for example, (Ullman, 1983:129-153; Mathews, 1989:162-177; Jones and Miller, 1995; Romm, 1993; Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch, 1998: 381-4000; Buzan, 1998. Dalby, 1992: 95-134), on the other hand, accept the idea of horizontal expansion by recognising political, economic, social and environmental issues (Buzan, 1998: 2-5).

While most scholars and policymakers seem to agree that many security threats and responses to them may well be non-military in nature, there are some realists who tend to persist in their conventional views. These realists, who are also hardcore traditionalists, resist any
horizontal and vertical expansion of the concept of national security. They keep their focus strictly on military threats to the security of states (for example, Walt, 1991: 211-239; Betts, 1997: 7-3; Brown, Cote, Jr, Jones, and Miller, 2000; Baldwin, 1995: 117-141; Dabelko and Simmons, 1997:127-146; Deudney, 1990: 461-476; Dyer, 1996: 22-39; Keller, 1996:11-23; Ullman, 1995; Florini and Simmons, 1998). They reject any extended conception of security on the grounds that overcrowding the concept by too many issues would render it elastic and incoherent and hence be of little analytical or policy relevance. They stress that military threats still abound and argue that military power still has its uses. The inclusivists respond to this critique by disaggregating security into several sectors, for instance, military, political, economic, societal and environmental ones, and setting rigorous criteria of securitisation (Buzan, 1998: 18-35.)

Aside from the changing nature of security threats and the inability of the state to address some of them, the tendency to re-conceptualise security has been reinforced by the post-Cold War process of globalisation of the democratic political values, the market-driven economic philosophy, and trade and commercial practices. The ever-increasing role of some intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) including the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) operating domestically and internationally in meeting challenges facing states, societies and individuals since the early 1990s has also provided a stimulus for re-conceptualising security. Indeed, there has been an alternative or critical security discourse pursued by peace researchers and post-structuralists since the 1970s. The post-modernists, constructivists, feminists and post-Cold War theorists have been adding momentum to this discourse, particularly since the 1990s.

Indeed, although unsuccessful, the Cold War (read US) conceptions of security were virtually challenged by the World Order Models Project, the Worldwatch Institute, and world society and peace studies perspectives (Mendelowitz 1977; Weston, 1984.) There were concerns for ecology and for more humane approaches even in the late 1970s (Mische and Mische, 1977; Pirages, 1978; Barnet, Simon and Schuster, 1980). The notion of competitive security emanating from geopolitical and military formulations was also challenged by ideas about common security and non-offensive defence or non-provocative defence. The
proponents of common security argued for recognition of mutual vulnerability and for adoption of policies promoting mutual cooperation and disarmament. Non-offensive defence, which is in fact complementary to common security, was meant to be effective without threatening any potential adversary (Taylor and Francis, 1985; Buzan, 1987: 265-279; Boserup and Neild 1989).

The non-traditional security terrain owes their existence to contributions made by “critical” theorists, including post-modernists, constructivists and feminists, who have enriched the field of security studies with their own ideas and political views (McSweeney, 1999; Krause and Williams, 1997; Weston, 1984; Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Ashley and Walker, 1999; Walker, 1988, Paggi and Pinzauti, 1985:79-92; Tickner, 1989, Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases, 1989; Mohsin, 2001: 11-43). Some have advocated a conception of ‘cooperative security’ for the post-Cold War era premised on the view that a state could gain more security from cooperation with its adversary than from competition with it (Nolan, 1994).

Within the non-traditional security paradigm, there are those who hold the view that states are only history-specific political formations. As such, they tend to offer a counter-nation-state discourse that discards the metaphysics of domination and control. Ken Booth, for example, gives a radical definition of security as he equates security with ‘emancipation’. He argues that “emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do....Emancipation, not power, or order, produces true security...” He goes on to argue that, “human security is ultimately more important than state security. It thereby helps to dislodge the state as the primary referent: as a result, states become the means and not the ends of security” (Booth, 1991:313-326).

Clearly, rethinking security along these lines entails transforming the state itself. Imtiaz Ahmed, for example, suggests that the very nation-state has to be reconstructed in order to provide security to all (Ahmed, 1997-1998: 167-205). Kaldor asserts that transforming states must be an important part of reformulating security (Kaldor, 1988). Dalby states that, “alternative conceptions of security must focus on reforming the state system....” He contends that, “separating security from state security opens up space for constructive interactions between peoples across boundaries, eroding the possibilities of
constructing security in terms of exclusionist identity" (Dalby, 1992: 115, 119). Some scholars even hold the view that the new meanings and understandings of security rest on the philosophical ideas of liberalism of the late 18th century; only the Cold War politics, bipolar structure of power, military alliances and confrontation between the power blocs had overshadowed liberal principles by giving prominence to state-centric geopolitical thinking of security (Rothschild, 2000: 114).

People, more than the state, have been on the spotlight in non-traditional security discourse. One of the strands in it is human security, about which more discussion will follow shortly.

Although there are views that security must be constantly interrogated to reveal exactly who or what political order is being rendered secure (Dalby, 1992: 124) and that the concept of security needs to be inclusive, clearly there is a need to rein in the expansionist tendency of some critical theorists in defining the concept. In this context, some questions seem to be fundamental and relevant: When does a problem become a security issue? When does an actor/agent become a security referent? Who interprets security needs and who initiates policy responses, prioritises policy options and allocates resources for security needs? What are the criteria for securitisation? And, what after all is the role of the state in such a schema of things?

Although most scholars and analysts tend to remain within the nation-state paradigm, they would like to broaden the levels of analysis by including the security of human individuals and groups and deepen the security concept by incorporating non-military concerns. However, there are limits to alternative approaches to conceptions of security and means of achieving it. Buzan, for example, positions himself somewhere between the two extreme views regarding security. He attempts to transcend the limitations of the idealist approach to peace and the realist focus on power by structuring his analysis in terms of three levels and accepting a wider security agenda by way of disaggregating security into five sectors—political, military, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan, 1991: 431-451). Buzan et. al also bring in the issue of securitisation, defining securitisation as an extreme form of politicisation when “an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedures.” He and his co-authors argue that non-military issues and threats can be legitimate subjects of security if those become sufficiently securitised (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998:
4, 23-24). Securitisation actually involves drawing attention to the immediacy of paying attention to certain threats and vulnerabilities facing the state and/or people, setting the order of policy priorities, and allocating resources in response to those threats.

Now who securitises and how does securitisation take place? Unlike in the realist tradition, it is not only the state that interprets the security needs of people but also non-state actors such as civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and the international community. Buzan et. al. state that before an issue becomes securitised it must be accepted as a plausible threat to the vital interests of society and it must become the subject of public debate and state action (Buzan, 1998: 25). Actually, it could be a matter of public concern and a topic of debate both internally and externally. But who provides security? It should be a matter not only of state action but also of concerned non-state actors with the knowledge and consent of the state. However, if the state itself happens to be the perpetrator of insecurity to its citizens, such consent may need to be coaxed.

What is clear from the above exposition is that given the current focus on the non-state security referents and the non-military nature of the content and sources of security threats, the realist conception of security is too restricting in scope. On the other hand, the indiscriminate efforts of the non-traditionalists at widening and deepening the purview of security have visibly led to conceptual overstretch and also policy dilemmas. As such, securitisation must be effective in identifying threats and judicious in applying policy priorities and security instruments for the goals of security to be realised. What is implied here is that security needs to be viewed in a holistic manner, combining both traditional and non-traditional security in one wholesome concept. We may call this concept 'Comprehensive National Security'. Let us now briefly discuss this concept.

### 2.1.3 Comprehensive National Security

The term 'comprehensive' in relation to the concept of national security is seen to have been used in two senses – inclusion of non-military threats only in respect of the state, and inclusion of both military and non-military threats to non-state security referents. Actually, the Japanese were the first to propound the concept of comprehensive national security, meaning state security, as an element of state
philosophy way back in the 1980s. The idea, in delineating the scope of national security, was to go beyond the pale of inter-state wars and military threats to ideas about territorial integrity and political order and to include threats from non-state actors and even natural disasters (Barnett, 1986, Alagappa, 1988: 50-78). Like the Japanese Government and some Southeast Asian scholars, Kanti Bajpai of India also keeps the concept of comprehensive national security state-centric. He contends that comprehensive security refers to military and non-military threats to the state (Bajpai, 2001).

However, some scholars tend to go beyond the state-centric expansion of the concept of security. Cheema, for example, states that "the notion of comprehensive security implies abilities to defend against external as well as internal threats; prevent disintegration that may have been commenced by internal strife; growth of power and prosperity accompanied by improved quality of life; and abilities to maintain desired level of peace and security". He also states that "a comprehensive definition of national security must take into account external and internal threats as well as threats emanating from economic insecurity and inequalities" (Cheema, 1997:139-140). Upreti is of the view that the challenges to security are internal as well as external and both have to be dealt with equally so as to make individuals, communities and the state fully secure, that both internal and external security may provide strength and vitality to each other and therefore there is a need to adopt a comprehensive approach to national security (Upreti, 2001, 2002: 180-181).

A broad conceptualisation of security, or what has only now come to be widely known as comprehensive security, was offered by Khan and Kabir of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Bangladesh, way back in the mid-1980s. Their definition included threats to both state and its people from internal and external sources and elimination of vulnerabilities by development and other means (Khan and Kabir, 1987: 13-18). Put explicitly, comprehensive security has recently been defined as the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields in both domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means. Three elements in this definition are crucial: the first is to view the content of comprehensive security as an over-arching organising concept. Second, it envisages the process of security management in comprehensive terms at the sub-national, national and
regional levels. And third, the definition incorporates an approach to security through cooperative, not competitive, means.

The concept of comprehensive national security has several other benefits, both academic and real-life ones. Security being dynamic, the concept has the ability to hold all the security dynamics in a single framework, capturing permanent and evolutionary threats to the state and its people and thus weathering the vicissitudes of seasonality in security thinking. Such a security concept also helps overcome the apparent dichotomy between traditional and non-traditional security. General Raghavan aptly states that the concept combines the competing perspectives of the ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ streams of security and that it gives a constructive and interactive security outlook, involving the needs of the state and its people (Raghavan, 2001: 2). Such a comprehensive framework also facilitates devising appropriate national policies in response to security threats and vulnerabilities.

Human security, viewed as a component of non-traditional security, will now be discussed with this comprehensive security framework in mind.

2.2 HUMAN SECURITY

Human security means security of the human individual or simply people’s security. In the long line of neologisms in the sub-field of non-traditional security, human security is among the latest. There is an intensive and extensive discourse going on throughout the world regarding human security. It has been claiming the attention of researchers and policymakers in recent times. Questions arise: why now? What is the nature of the debate about it? What is the role of the state in guaranteeing human security?

The discourse on human security has come to the forefront following the end of the Cold War owing to certain factors. The first factor is the emergence of newer types of threats that affect ordinary people and non-combatants a lot more than they do the state. As a result, the surging concerns for human beings have become a defining value in the current security discourse. The contributions in this regard of critical theorists and peace researchers, since the 1970s, in highlighting the need for addressing people’s needs and concerns, apart from or in juxtaposition to those of the state, are commendable.

Second, in the post-Cold War era wars and conflicts the state itself is being seen as the violator of the safety and welfare of its own citizens.
Third, sometimes a state alone is not capable of confronting some newer threats faced by its own people. Fourth, there is a dire need for re-articulating the responsibilities of the state vis-à-vis its own citizens. Fifth, there is also the need to articulate security as a positive concept and not only as a threat-based, negative one. And sixth, there is the need for refocusing the post-Cold War security debate on ordinary people's needs and concerns. Let us now discuss the nature of the debate on human security.

Conceptualisation of human security and the nature of the debate on it actually depend on the views of a country, organisation, individual scholars and analysts on the state, society, power, the international system, security referents, and the need for ameliorating people's plight. This will take a concrete shape once we raise certain questions such as: what are the values in human security? What are the threats to these values? What are the means/mechanisms for achieving human security values? Who securitisises in matters of human security? And who provides human security? In answering these questions, let us examine some approaches to and views on human security. In what follows the approaches of the UNDP (Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme), Canada, Japan and the Commission on Human Security (CHS) will be discussed.

It was argued in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) that "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly.... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. Human security can be said to have two key meanings. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities." This Report identifies seven specific elements that comprise human security: (1) economic security; (2) food security; (3) health security; (4) environmental security; (5) personal security; (6) community security; and (7) political security. In short, this approach essentially prioritises the security of the human individual from want. Clearly, the HRD approach to human security is too broad and all too integrative and virtually has no definitional boundaries. Such random securitisation and the broad sweep and definitional elasticity do not help make the concept a serviceable tool of analysis or of policy prioritisation.
The government of Canada, more specifically its former Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, offered a less ambiguous and more restrictive concept. He defined human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives." In essence, it means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats (Axworthy, 1997: 183-196; Axworthy, 2001: 19-23). Canada emphasises not only individual security but also state security, and, as a means of ensuring security, suggests promotion of political development and global norms and institutions (Bajpai, 2000). As many as thirteen states, under the leadership of Canada, Norway and Japan, and a good number of international NGOs have formed a coalition called the Human Security Network. This Network is committed to "strengthening human security with a view to creating a more humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear, and with equal opportunities to develop their human potential to the full." This is essentially security from fear and of dignity.

The government of Japan offers another concept of human security that "covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity...and strengthens efforts to confront these threats." According to the Commission on Human Security, "human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people's vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives." The recommendations of the Commission involve policies aimed at both empowerment and protection. The Commission, in essence, synthesises the Canadian and UNDP approaches with a new thrust on empowerment of the people to enable them to make their own choices. While the Commission Report attempts to make linkages between state security and human security, it advocates a new paradigm of security centred on people and not states.

As evident from the burgeoning literature on human security, individual authors have advanced their own views on human security. Hans Van Ginkel and Edward Newman give a very inclusive conceptualisation of human security. They write, "The concept of human security seeks to define the bases of security as a comprehensive and integrated matrix of needs and rights, from which all individual and social values can flourish and be optimised" (Ginkel and Newman, 2000: 60). While this is obviously all-inclusive, they also view human security as an alternative paradigm. They maintain, "As a
conceptual starting point, instead of the instinct of the "national security" paradigm—which seeks security by strengthening military deterrence—human security thinking is an alternative prism through which to view security. The human security model seeks to identify the core elements of human needs upon which intra- and inter-societal security are based and upon which individual and collective aspirations are articulated and realised." The authors relate this development to circumstances that are new and that appear to have a normative message. They add, "This changing context—some have heralded the post-Westphalian, post-hegemonic, post-industrial, and even postmodern world—holds great implications for state power, statecraft, national interest, and the normative implications attached to being a member of the international community."

Clearly, such a conceptualisation is too broad. It is also all too inclusive and, hence, is not analytically very useful nor policy friendly. This all-embracing concept came in for severe criticism and serious reservations from both policy makers and intellectual communities across the world. Del Rosso, for example, writes, "the writings on "the new gospel of security" did not produce a "singular, widely accepted new paradigm", instead, an "additive 'laundry list' approach to security became commonplace" and led to the production of a "raft of dimly remembered and rarely consulted books and articles" (Rosso, 1998: 57). As the critique has put it, "some of the efforts to redefine security have appeared to use the security level at almost everything in the hope that the word alone will create a conceptual framework. But a label alone does not create a framework."

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the concept of human security has several problems (Anthony, 2000: 412-417) and that there is a clear lack of consensus on the definition of the concept. Whether human security means the ultimate ends of all security concerns (Chen, 1995:137-146.) or whether it is just a means to an end (Bajpai, 2001) or whether it is a separate, distinct and parallel concept of security remain points of contention. Another problem lies in delineating the scope, i.e. the possible parameters of human security. Barry Buzan relates this to the issue of securitisation of the problems that cause human insecurity (Buzan, 2000). And last, not least, is the role of the state.

Since the main referent object of human security is the individual, “the relationship between individual security and state security and
establishing a balanced relationship between the two will have a significant impact on allocation of power within the state. This brings about changing dynamics among actors in a number of areas, such as governance, social and economic organisations." The challenge, therefore, is how to balance the pursuit of state security and human security, conceptually and operationally (Jr., 2000: 403-410). Conceptually, human security needs to be accepted as an integral part of comprehensive national security the way state security is. Operationally, human security issues need to be recognised by the state as matters that demand priority policy attention and resource allocation not only for maintaining internal political and social order but also for protecting people’s lives, rights and group/community identity.

Now, let us go back to the questions we raised at the beginning of this sub-section: what are human security values, threats, etc? Bajpai’s views are relevant here. “Human security relates to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence. The promotion of human development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security. States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and other groups in civil society in combination are vital to the prospects of human security”, he writes. He provides a schematic illustration of these values and threats. He identifies personal safety and individual freedom as the human security values. He lists direct threats (violent death or disablement, dehumanisation like use of child soldiers, abuse of women and children, kidnapping, abduction, unlawful detention and farcical trials, and discrimination and domination) from states and non-state actors and indirect threats (deprivation, natural and man-made disasters, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, etc) and sees them as threats to these values, human development, humane governance, sanctions etc which are the means of attaining human security.

However, Bajpai considers the state to be the provider of individual security and indicates that cooperation between the state and national and international organisations and NGOs in matters of securitisation and providing security is often required. Basrur, an advocate of human security, also holds similar views. He states that the attainment of human security is dependent upon the state and that the state remains
the primary provider of security in its numerous manifestations (Basrur, 2001: 199-200). However, Ken Booth, another strong advocate of human security, equates security with emancipation, meaning both political liberty and economic capacity, and questions the very assumption that states do necessarily provide security (Booth, 1991: 313-326). Dalby also questions the central role of the state in security matters when he states, “So long as security discourse remains intimately and uncritically entangled with state politics, the more innovative possibilities for rethinking human community in the aftermath of the Cold War and in the face of the global ecological peril will be unnecessarily limited” (Dalby, 1992).

Hampton provides a different exposition on human security (Hampton, 2002:15-37). He identifies three different conceptions of and approaches to human security: (a) the rights-and rule-of-law-based approach; (b) the ‘safety of peoples’ or the ‘freedom from fear’ approach; and (c) the ‘Sustainable Human Development’ approach. Hampton’s exposition on these is given below.

The key values under the rights-based approach are human rights and the rule of law enjoyed by the citizenry of a state. Of these rights, the issue of minority rights is the most problematic because minority rights may conflict not just with the ‘will of the majority’ but also with the rights of the individual. According to the rights-based approach, the main threat to human security lies in the denial of fundamental human rights and due process of law and the absence of democratic systems of governance. The governance challenge is to create participatory governance structures, develop new social and legal norms, and establish democracy and the rule of law. Other than the state, there is an important role to play here for some domestic and international actors. At the domestic level, civil society organisations and NGOs have a role to play by mobilising public support, documenting human rights abuses, and generating much-needed publicity to pressurise those who are guilty of abusing and violating the rights of others. At the international level, the three instruments for promoting domestic protection of human rights are sanctions against violators, shaming of the perpetrators, and co-optation of international or region-wide courts and commissions that seek to enforce human rights and promote democracy by promulgating legal norms and suggesting reforms of domestic juridical structures and legal systems.
The "safety of peoples" conception of human security has traditionally focused on securing the moral and legal rights of non-combatants in war or situations of violent conflict and on providing humanitarian assistance and emergency relief to those in dire need. However, with the increasing frequency of armed conflict within states in the late 1980s and early 1990s in which non-combatants accounted for about 80% of casualties, the scope considerably widened. Also, awareness grew that a different approach was required to address the needs and interests of victims of these new armed conflicts, including military intervention. The UN and many other actors, national and international, now engage in a big way in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace building.

The 'sustainable human development' conception of human security stems from the UNDP Human Development Report 1994. It stresses non-military threats to human security and the threats to human survival that have arisen from a wide variety of largely human-induced problems, such as unchecked global population growth, migration, disparities in economic opportunities (especially the widening income gap between the world's rich and poor), the rise in pandemic diseases (e.g., AIDS), environmental degradation, and new security problems that affect individuals and groups, such as drug trafficking and terrorism. According to the sustainable development concept of human security, the appropriate instruments to deal with the problems are tools of human development, particularly those that address socio-economic inequalities. Multilateral institutions take up some of the work of states because the global nature of these threats makes it impossible to deal with them at the national level. Also, this approach sees a diminished role for the state, while it reserves a special role for civil society organisations.

Be that as it may, a diminished role for the state is hardly realistic. For all practical purposes, the state remains the main provider of human security. In fact, the primary responsibility of the state is to ensure protection to individuals and groups against threats of physical injury, economic deprivation, violation of fundamental rights, etc. Although the state sometimes does not, or is not able to, render its citizens secure or may itself violate their security, it still commands the loyalty of its citizens whose primary identity lies with the state. It is on the basis of state sovereignty that international relations are built on
and, contrary to its literary meaning, states and not nations are still the building blocs of the *inter-national* system.

However, the human security discourse needs to be credited in that there maybe a role for the international community and the non-state actors both within a state and outside of it not only in the process of securitising problems but also in providing security, side by side with the state, at least in some cases.

Given the scale and nature of human suffering and misery in many parts of the world in the last two decades, international and regional actors and civil society organisations—both national and international—have voiced strong concerns for the affected people's protection, rights and well-being (Lizee, 2002: 509-527). These efforts have in many cases succeeded in changing state behaviour and making a state conform to desired international standards in internal and external affairs. In some extreme cases of violence and natural disasters, the international community has even chosen to intervene, including militarily, according to the merit of the case.

In conclusion, it may be reiterated that human security is based on the sanctity of the individual. The concept of human security is based on foundations of both negative and positive values—threats as well as fulfilment of basic needs and aspirations. Personal safety and dignity, group identity and status, economic well-being, and fundamental rights and freedoms are some of the most important human security values that may be threatened by violent conflicts involving external forces and even the own state, by some policy initiatives/actions of the state itself, by ethnic/religious insurgencies, by inter-ethnic or inter-religious violence, and even by natural disasters. Clearly, threats may be violent or non-violent or both. The instruments or mechanisms used to maintain and advance human security values or to meet the threats to those values are mostly non-military and are drawn from domestic and/or international sources. Military means are sometimes necessary.

The tendency to privilege human security over state security or to juxtapose one against the other is unwarranted, and is not likely to be theoretically useful or practically relevant. Privileging human security should be pursued in the sense of bringing it into the mainstream security discourse and not with a view to relegating state security into oblivion or even dislodging the state as a referent object of security. In fact, the two need not be viewed as separate, independent paradigms but must be seen rather as security approaches that are inter-
dependent and mutually supportive and reinforcing. State security and human security are parts of one organic whole and, as such, should be viewed through the lens of comprehensive notions of security. Concepts such as economic security, environmental security, political security, etc are possibly the other components of comprehensive security, although in the ultimate analysis they all tend to fall into the categories of either state security or human security or even both. In other words, in terms of referent objects, security is state security or human security; and economic security, political security, environmental security, etc are various dimensions/elements of the content of security that may affect either state security or individual security, or both. Such an understanding goes beyond realist restrictions and reins in the critical theorists’ expansionist tendency to conceptualise human security. This human security, originally a normative concern, now demands to be firmly put on the security agenda of a nation-state.

Let us now turn to deal with ethnicity/ethnic conflict as an area of human security.

2.3 ETHNICITY/ETHNIC CONFLICT: AN AREA OF HUMAN SECURITY

The ambit of discussion in this sub-section is not confined to only ethnicity; it also includes ethnic violence/conflicts, for they too are related to human security. Ethnicity, as a situation or development, is a precursor to ethnic conflicts. There may be human security issues even in the pre-conflict era as also in the post-conflict period. While human security is part of security discourse, ethnicity or ethnic conflict is part of political discourse. As such, the focus of discussion here is on showing how ethnicity or ethnic conflicts can create situations or generate issues of human security. The tasks here are to establish linkages between ethnicity/ethnic conflict and human security as well as to identify in this context the human security values and the threats to these values. However, before we delve into the details of ethnicity, it is pertinent here to go over some of the defining features of ‘ethnic group’ or ‘ethnie’, and ‘nation’.

Historically, the word ‘ethnie’ signified ‘gentile’, and derived from the Greek adjective ‘ethnikos’. The adjective is derived from the noun ‘ethnos’, which meant foreign people. The noun ‘ethnic’ ceased to be related to ‘heathen’ in the early 18th century. The use of the term ‘ethnic’ in the modern sense began in the mid-20th century. ‘Ethnic group’ then
began to be referred to also as 'ethnie' or 'ethnic community'. The 'ethnie' or ethnic community is a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity (Posen, 1993: 48-62). Scherrer has given a similar definition (Scherrer, 1999: 57). According to another view, the ethnie is indeed a 'super-family'—extended in space and time to distant relatives over many generations, including the yet unborn (Horowitz, 1985: 55-92).

Another perspective on the subject is as follows: an ethnic group is a group of people who identify with one another, or are so identified by others, on the basis of a boundary that distinguishes them from other groups. This boundary may take any number of forms—racial, cultural, linguistic, economic, religious, and political—and maybe more or less porous. Because of this boundary, members of an ethnic group are often presumed to be culturally or biologically similar, although this is not in fact necessarily the case. However, this is more akin to a minority concept or race rather than an ethnic community. Interestingly, the term 'ethnicity' is sometimes used to refer to a particular ethnic group on the basis of cultural characteristics, social categories, classification of population, a person's identification or affiliation. In the United States, for example, ethnicity is a term that is used somewhat flexibly, but generally refers to a subset of the national culture in which people share one or more characteristics like race, nationality, religion, ancestry, or language. Be that as it may, we will view ethnicity somewhat differently. Before discussing ethnicity, however, some concepts related to ethnic group such as race, nation, and nation-state need some discussion here.

Unlike the term ethnie, 'race' is rooted in the idea of biological classification of homo sapiens to sub-species according to morphological features, such as skin colour or facial characteristics. A 'nation' is a people welded together by common ties of culture, ancestry and territory and enjoying self-government within the same state (Welsh, 1993: 63). Conversely, a nation is an ethnic community that has achieved self-government and is recognised as such. A nation enjoying sovereignty is called nation-state.

Actually, there are four different perspectives on ethnic formation and ethnicity, namely, primordialist, instrumentalist, objectivist, and subjectivist, resulting in widely differing views on ethnic group and ethnicity (Vayrynen, 1999: 128). These perspectives essentially revolve
around anthropological and sociological approaches. However, as mentioned, we see ethnicity as part of political discourse and, as such, a discussion on it will follow.

‘Ethnicity’ connotes an explicit sense of distinctiveness from other groups of people leading to mobilisation of a group for political ends. “As a relational concept, ethnicity draws boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As a political resource, it is a potent rallying cry for politicians....” Ethnicity as a term is used to describe a variety of forms of mobilisation, which ultimately relate to the autonomous existence of specifically ethnic forms of socialisation. Ethnicity is actually politicisation of an ethnic group for certain goals. Therefore, to talk about politicisation of ethnicity is tautological (Scherrer, 1999: 57). Ethnicity is a political development or process caused and triggered by adverse policies and actions, perceived or real, of other ethnic group(s) and the state.

“Ethnic solidarities constitute the structural category which identify with collective deprivation in the arrangement of power and in the sharing of scarce resources”. The nature and extent of deprivation varies from one situation to another and becomes an engine for social mobilisation and conflict generation only when consciousness about deprivation is aroused and politically articulated to appear as an issue for conflict. The factors of community consciousness, size and cohesion; group leadership and the responses of the “dominant” group play an important role in creating ethnic turmoil and its political impact (Shurke and Noble, 1977; Chocicri and North, 1975: 60).

Ethnicity occurs at two levels: at the inter-ethnic one and between an ethnic group (or several ethnic groups) and the state. Ethnicity actually begins with ethnic identification, and not with ethnic identity as such. Ethnic identity can be described as the passive awareness of a condition, while ethnic identification refers to an active consciousness of belonging to a group. Identification implies a perception of separation between groups and is often coupled with a readiness to safeguard collective identity and to defend a group’s real or perceived interests. This is the kind of identification that can lead to various forms of political mobilisation (Ronquist, 1999: 150). Such political mobilisation may take place vis-à-vis another ethnic community or vis-à-vis the state that may also be essentially representing an ethnic community. These two processes may even take place simultaneously.
How does ethnicity produce human insecurity? Here comes the question of human security values and the threats to these values. The security referent here is the people of an ethnic group, and their security values are the protection and enhancement of their ethnic identity, access to economic opportunities, and the right to individual and collective justice. Threats to these values, perceived or real, come from both structural and policy-induced factors emanating from the dominant ethnic group, and also results from majoritarian state policies. The size, power, and attitude of the dominant ethnic community and the size of the ethnic minority, its location, and its role in the creation of the state it lives in are among the structural threats. State policy-induced threats stem from the nature of the state reflected in fundamental state principles and in the extent of devolution of power; from economic development policy that is biased against ethnic minority; from the lack of state policy initiatives aimed at nurturing and promoting ethnic minority identity, meaning their language and culture; and from government-sponsored programmes of rehabilitating a section of the population drawn only from the dominant ethnic group with a view to changing the demographic balance and the land possession scenario in the area of the country known as the traditional homeland of ethnic minority groups. Clearly, these factors constitute threats to the security of the people of minority ethnic groups.

It is pertinent here to inject the notion of collective injustice in relation to an ethnic group, for it is often much more important than other explanations. Personal injustice can be dangerous, but a group's perception of collective injustice can be even more dangerous and profound in its impact. Issues of injustice can override all other considerations in its influence on group action. A sense of collective injustice can mobilise powerful and sometimes violent insurgencies against those seen or perceived to be the cause of mistreatment. Leaders frequently play an important role in promoting an ethnic group's adoption of the "injustice" perception. An effective leader can persuade group members that their current situation is not only unjust but also intolerable and that change, perhaps even violent change, is necessary.

Now, once an ethnic minority group feels threatened and develops a sense of collective injustice, its collective self awakens and gets agitated and politicised in a sort of 'self-defence'. Then its members mobilise and begin articulating their demands and grievances for redress from the state through peaceful and constitutional means. In case of unsatisfactory
response from the state, the aggrieved ethnic group begins to mobilise and sets about choosing the appropriate methods to fulfil its demands. Once it decides to opt for violence as the weapon of redress, the conflict phase begins. As such, ethnicity is a precursor to ethnic conflict. The state itself may resort to violence in an attempt to preempt ethnic violence. In any case, the parties find themselves engaged in an ethnic conflict with all its horrendous consequences.

Before delving into some details of ethnic conflict, a few words about social conflict in general are in order.

A social system is a perennial source of tension-producing elements, and contradictions, some leading up to conflicts (Mukherji, 1986: 50-51.). Social conflict, an outcome of antagonism, connotes incompatibility of interests, objectives and values among two or more groups of human beings. Incompatibility may be latent or explicit but it is only the manifest incompatibility that may lead to conflict (Bernard, 1957: 38; Coser, 1956). Again, relations that are not antagonistic will not produce conflict. Similarly, not all social relations of antagonism will necessarily lead to social conflict. “This is contingent upon to what extent and in what manner a given society is structured, permitting or inhibiting the articulation or expression of antagonisms and their resolution or neutralisation through institutional means.” “If there exist no institutionalised provisions for the expression of such discontents, departures from what is required by the norms of the social system may occur” (Coser, 1967: 31).

Muni states that domestic conflicts can be grouped, on the basis of their stated goals, under two broad but interrelated categories, namely, systemic and ethnic conflicts. The typology of conflict has also been based on the forms it takes and the ultimate outcome, for example, revolution, rebellion, riot, coup d’etat, or guerrilla war, or on the basis of the social categories of the participants and the social institutions primarily affected, such as peasant rebellion, political conflict, or economic conflict. However, such classification does not fall within a single framework and lacks general applicability. This problem is overcome when conflict is explained “in terms of antagonism or tension-producing elements that inhere in social systems” (Mukherji, 1986: 27), as stated earlier.

Thus social conflicts are not subjective state or potentials for action, but overt manifestations of collective behaviour. Indeed, they may be defined as conflicts “in which the parties are an aggregate of individuals,
such as groups, organisations, communities and crowds, rather than single individuals, as in role conflict...social conflict encompasses a broad range of phenomena; class, racial, religious, and communal conflicts; riots, rebellions, revolutions, strikes and civil disorders; marches, demonstrations, protest gatherings, and the like" (Oberschall, 1973: 291). Marxist and liberal theories of social conflict will be discussed in the next chapter.

Of all social conflicts, ethnic conflict may be considered to be the most problematic, for it may come in conflict not just with the will of the majority or the dominant group but also with the rights of the individual. Carlton and Bekker premise that ethnic conflict is different from all other forms of conflict, insofar as it embodies the assertion of difference (Bekker and Carlton, 1996). One scholar's view is, “In the strict sense this [ethnic conflict] should mean violent acts committed between two or more ethnic groups whose motivation lies solely in the perceived differences between themselves, that is, for example, ‘Because “they” over there do not share our ancestors, do not share our habits and so on...we will fight them”’ (Dragadze, 1999: 265). However, as mentioned, ethnic conflict occurs not only between ethnic groups but also between ethnic group(s) and the state.

How is ethnic conflict linked to human security? What are the values that come under threat?

As indicated in the preceding discussion, one of the causes of ethnicity is the sense of deprivation and discrimination regarding sharing politico-administrative power and economic resources, and the denial of cultural distinctiveness perceived by an ethnic community. Actually, all human security values identified under the situation of ethnicity come more acutely and directly under threat due to violence in conflict situations. Ethnic conflict only increases these threats in a much graver sense and does so directly. Indeed, ethnic conflict is the ultimate weapon employed for renegotiating the status quo of an ethnic community. On the other hand, violence is the ultimate weapon for the state too for maintaining the status quo. The cycle of violence and counter-violence generates horrifying levels of human insecurity in the form of death, disablement, dehumanisation, destruction, dispossession and displacement, as both the state and insurgents frequently resort to deliberate and direct assaults on civilian populations and their property (Brown and Ganguly, 1997: 5). As a result, the physical safety of human individuals, their food security, health security, environmental security,
etc are directly jeopardised by ethnic conflict. Vulnerabilities and insecurities of women and children are particularly traumatising. Our empirical case studies will sustainate the preceding conceptualisation.

Ethnic conflicts are inextricably linked to the issue of human rights (Klaff, 1998: 70-88). Jack Donnelly argues “while no country in the world today equates personal security—understood as the effective enjoyment of internationally recognised human rights—with national security, the conflict between the two has been substantially reduced.” He elaborates: “governments that set themselves at war against a significant portion of their population can never be safe because they erode the real strength and security of the nation, namely, the personal security of the citizens. Conversely, if each individual is secured in his or her enjoyment of human rights, the security of the nation has largely been achieved” (Donnelly, 1996: 388).

So a key issue is who securitises the human (in)security issues induced by ethnicity and ethnic conflict and who provides security and by what means? Here the burden of securitisation lies more with domestic civil society organisations and NGOs and the international community, but the onus of providing security is more on the state. Human security is achieved through both national and international means. It is apt here to quote Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, in relation to human rights violations. He said, “The world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violation of human rights are taking place with grave humanitarian consequences” (Annan, 1999: 49). What situations can be more appropriate for the notice of the international community and national civil society than ethnic conflicts where the state is the main perpetrator of violence against a section of its own citizens and, as such, is the main source of insecurity?

Notably, human security issues continue to exist even in the post-conflict phase. Here too the responsibility of providing security lies more with the state than with other securitising agents.

In the light of the preceding exposition, the ethnicity- and ethnic conflict-induced human security values and threats may be identified as:

1. Value: Protection and advancement of ethnic identity
   Threat: Dominant group attitude and the State policy of assimilation;

2. Value: Economic development of ethnic group(s)
   Threat: State policy of deprivation and exploitation;
3. Value: Protection of human rights
   Threat: Threats to life, property, physical well-being, dignity, the
   law, etc by both the state and ethnic groups;

4. Value: Choice of residence, and property right
   Threat: Displacement—internal and transnational

5. Value: Implementation of peace accord, restoration of collective
   justice
   Threat: Non-implementation or partial implementation of by
   dissident groups; denial of right to return home; dispossession;
   not ensuring protection from violence for all, and not ensuring
   collective justice.

What is remarkable in the above-sketched ethnicity/ethnic conflict-
generated human security menu is that security is conceptualised as
something positive-sum insofar as it includes developmental aspects,
fulfilment of basic aspirations of ethnic groups, and not only the
absence of war/conflict but also durable peace and harmony among
various ethnic groups.

The next chapter contextualises the preceding discussion in South
Asia.