1. Introduction

The long standing principal focus of civil-military relationship has been a point of public debate with the avenues of cooperation continuing to be evaluated in the current era in terms of governance, democracy and security issues making both these classes in society interdependent and even to some extent symbiotic in nature. With the end of the Second World War and the finalization of the Charter of the United Nations, having put an end to the traditional role of the military, as an instrument of a state’s policy for territorial expansion or in the technical sense of aggressive war, its utility as a domestic force was greatly enhanced especially after the disintegration of the USSR which led to the emergence of new democracies in the late 1980s principally in Eastern Europe but later spreading to other parts of the world. The military is now seen as the single most effective pressure group capable of playing a positive role in the countries’ attempts to reach a higher level in the ladder of social and political progress. Again the introduction of liberal, western style economic-political institutions in peripheral states had upset the stability of the latter’s traditional socio-political structure - the military appeared to be the only group capable of enforcing and preserving political stability and order in the newly developed countries.

Interestingly, the 21st century is witnessing new changes globally as countries have been struggling to build market economies and democratic institutions. An important issue for democratization is the reform of the armed forces and changing civil-military relations. No one can seriously assess the level of democratization in a society without taking into consideration civil-military relation and in particular the issue of civilian control over the military. Internal and international actors have experienced the transformation of this relationship, which has brought up intriguing new insights in how developing and developed nations are striving to change the civil-military equation. In his classical work *The Soldier and the State,* Huntington identified two main forces that shape military institutions of any society "a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces", ideologies and institutions dominant within the society. On the other hand, Huntington conceived civil-military relation as the principal institutional component of security policy. This work should be the starting point in finding a satisfactory definition and modern elaboration of democratic civil-military relation. Of course, Huntington’s study was written in 1957 and is based on the American experience, but his conclusions remain a valuable contribution to the field of security policy. However, his explanatory model needs further refinement and must be tested in the actual situation prevailing today in Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East and even in Bangladesh.

The main non-traditional threats triggered by globalization that affect state actors include international

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terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, money laundering, cyber terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy, human trafficking and organized crime. Thus, the pattern and dynamics of civil-military relations in the coming years of the new millennium will be tested more comprehensively than ever before as non linear threats have to be addressed by the two dominant partners in society. Terrorism itself is as old as recorded history and does not constitute a novel threat but some characteristics of globalization such as open borders, free trade and the end of bipolarity have influenced the way in which terrorists now act and behave. Before 1989, terrorism was a way to fight for 'national' identity as in the liberation movements of the 1960s of which the struggles in Northern Ireland provides a ready example. The targets for the terrorists then were largely the population of the great powers. In modern times, new political complexities emerged, which provided the opportunity for one state to label a person as a terrorist while another was calling him a hero or freedom fighter introducing certain value judgments in the debates on terrorism. Terrorism in a more interdependent world has two main innovative characteristics: deregulation and privatization. It can be stated that globalization of terrorism is a consequence of its deregulation and adaptation to the effects of a globalized world. Transnational terrorists benefit from the modern communication systems and transportation, global sources of funding and they are more knowledgeable in the use and procurement of weapons.

The characteristic of these relationships is observed to have transformed remarkably in the last decade as the search for societal security is balanced under the asymmetrical threat scenario and a new pattern of civil-military relationship is developing. Broadly speaking, these relations are structured or balanced differently depending on the type of society under review. In the case of western societies, there has developed a
The civil-military structure is as old as its 36 years of existence. At every stage of its history beginning from the time of the Liberation War in 1971 and continuing to the present emergency period, the military has responded to all calls including national crisis while acting alongside and cooperating with its civilian counterparts. The military’s support to democracy and the return to a civilian form of government with the steady economic growth rate in the last three decades is a significant departure from the expert literature on civil-military relations which may stand as unique examples in the developing world. The Bangladesh Army exhibits the characteristics of professionalism, expertise, institutional self-awareness and organized and hierarchic structure. These properties distinguish the military from other professions and their emphasis serves as the best basis for a supportive role to the civilian mechanism. The opportunities provided by this corporate relationship can make both these partners set inventive methods in serving democracy and national security.

In place of the predictable Cold War international structure, the contemporary world is full of dangerous uncertainty and political ambiguity in which concepts of security and the classical military means to attain it, while necessary under some limited circumstances, are no longer sufficient. As a consequence, it is important to revisit and

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3 Allan Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1979, p.122.
address some of the imperatives of the civil-military relationship, which will reflect modern strategic realities. These realities direct attention to at least two current and future requirements. First, it is necessary to prepare adequately for long-term commitments. Second, it is important to appreciate the fact that the armed forces can and will play a positive but limited role in support of civilian rule in promoting defence, democracy, development; and more effectively controlling global terrorism, illegal drug trafficking and new threats challenges. At this backdrop, the main stay of the paper will look into the typologies of the civil-military relationship, Bangladesh as a case study and a future model and the nature of the international security system that is likely to shape the new world order in its purposes, policies, strategies and priorities.

2. Civil Military Relationship-Historical Typology

The military institution generally realizes its corporate goals within four categories in defining the civil-military relationship. In the first category, military exercises its legitimate and constitutional influence to attain goals. A second category could be sanction in absence of meeting their organizational demand mostly out of dissatisfaction. The third is displacing civilian regime that has failed to perform duties towards them and lastly taking over the government. This particular activity has a problem to do with its heavy reliance on the degree of military intervention. This makes it difficult to draw a distinction between the behavioral and structural similarities of the military institution and regimes in different countries, whereas intervention has been pushed to different levels but the role of the military in the society and politics

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remains similar. Huntington, on the other hand, based his typology of civil-military relations on the political objectives of the action taken by the military regime. His understanding reflects again on such categories, where, he distinguishes those cases resembling to a palace coup, the second, near to a reform coup, and the third, revolutionary one. A problem with his typology is that his attention is not only subjective but also elusive. It fails to consider that a military intervention may start as one type of a coup but the military could be forced to undergo certain radical changes.

In an attempt to overcome the limitations of Huntington’s model, Janowitz takes a significant step forward by differentiating civil-military relations in western states to those in the peripheral ones or even newly emerged ones. He classifies civil-military relations in western states into three categories aristocratic, democratic and totalitarian. With respect to the latter cases, he classifies civil-military relations into five categories authoritarian-personal, authoritarian-mass, democratic-competitive, civil-military coalition, and military oligarchy. A problem with his typology is that it does not take into account the degree of autonomy which civilian leaders can have from the military. By failing to clarify this, he makes the distinction of the role of the military in a democratic and in an authoritarian system of government quite difficult. Lucham offers a better model as his theories rely on three factors, he emphasizes on the strength or weakness of civilian institutions, the strength or weakness of the military establishment and the coercive, political and organizational

resources at its disposal and the nature of the relation between the military establishment and its sociopolitical environment. By examining these three variables, Luchams' typology classifies civil-military relations based on the roles that the military institution plays in a country's political life. He argues that military exercises its objective, constabulary, apparatus and subjective control to establish a guardian state in presence of a political vacuum.

The assumption made by Lucham's idea completely ignores the role of the international community and the surrounding environment covering political, economic and


9 The category Objective Control, describes a situation in which military and civil power are balanced. This often occurs in Western European and North American states. Constabulary Control describes the situation in which the political power of the civil institution exceeds that of the military. Sweden and postwar Japan are examples. In the case of Apparat Control, a ruling party apparatus has emerged and balances the power of the military with the assistance of such tools as ideology, purges, and secret police surveillance. USSR, the East European Countries, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia were examples. In the case of a Nation in Arms, the civilian institutions are more powerful than the military ones, as in Israel, whereas in a Revolutionary Nation in Arms, the military's strategic and political functions are shaped by political imperatives. The case of Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba during their evolutionary war fit this category. Subjective Control describes a situation in which there is a near-identification of civilian and military power groups. Such is the case of the 19th century caudillos and landowners of Latin American countries. In the Garison State the political power of the military exceeds that of the civil institutions, such as in the case of Britain and Germany during the First World War. In the Guardian State, the military is relatively free to define its own relations with its environment, whereas in the Post-Colonial Guardian State, the military and other political institutions were the remnants of the colonial era. The Praetorian State describes situations in which sections of the military assist civilian groups, which have common interests. As for the case of political Vacuum, both the civilian and the military institutions are weak. Ibid., pp. 22-35.
military issues. Taking more cognitive views from Lucham, but accepting Huntington’s definition of “praetorian societies”, Nordlinger, Clapham and Philip, tried to formulate supplementary typologies of civil-military relations. After a careful examination of the three models of civilian control, traditional, liberal and penetration models, Nordlinger views that there is no single model of civilian control which can be both widely applicable and effective. The military regime can be moderators, the guardians and the rulers. The first tend to exercise veto power on a variety of governmental decisions without assuming political authority. The second, after overthrowing the civilian government tend to assume political power for a limited time, with the ultimate aim to deny returning political power to civilians. The ruler class intends to control the government, but also being quite ambitious desire to transform the society to their choice or preference.

10 According to Huntington, “in a Praetorian system there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions or professional political leaders are recognized and accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict.” Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven: 1968, p. 196. Whereas Huntington argues that praetorianism is an element, which characterizes all peripheral countries, Lucham argues that the peripheral countries are divided into guardian and praetorian types. Thus, he differs from Huntington’s definition. Lucham, op. cit., p. 31.

11 The Traditional Model of civilian control is based on the premise that there is an absence of civilian military differences. The Liberal Model entails the maximum depoliticization of the military. Civilians are responsible for political decision-making and the military accepts a subordinate position. The Penetration Model assumes the penetration of the armed forces with political ideas and political personnel. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, Prentice Hall, Englewood, New Jersey, 1977, pp. 10-19.

12 Ibid, pp. 21-32.
Clapham and Philip argue that they are not interested in how the military regime can gain political power but in the ways they use it. Thus, the clear distinction of four military regimes namely Veto, Moderator, Factional and Breakthrough types emerge.\(^{13}\) As determinants for their classifications they use the unity of the military command structure, the level of differentiation of the military from civil society, the level of perceived threat from civil society as well as the level of autonomous political organization.\(^{14}\) Interestingly, in their finding they are also concerned with the results of military regimes. The above comparison does not in any sense present strict set of categories, mostly due to regional, social, infrastructural, political and more precisely method of democracy practice conditioned by the need of the society. These typologies have not been built-up out of direct study of civil-military conditions in each country, but rather from extrapolations of their historical records which heavily rely on socio-structural factors. It is more than responsible to assume that the historical compulsions, environmental necessities, socio-economic demands, cultural norms, transnational crime, religious beliefs, political conditions and democracy adopted elsewhere versus internal requirement in a state will go long way to validate what will be the basis of the new era civil-

\(^{13}\) The Veto Regime corresponds to Huntington’s category; the case of Chile and Argentina constitute an example. The Moderator Regime corresponds to Huntington’s guardian type; Turkey, Brazil (1945-64) and West African states fit this category. The Factional Regime is an outcome of a personal coup by a disgruntled officer. The case of Idi Amin in Uganda and Batista in Cuba are two examples. As for the Breakthrough Regime it is the classic example of a radical reforming military regime. Such cases are that of Libya (1969), Egypt (1952) and Ethiopia (1974). Christopher Clapham and George Philip (eds.), *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 8-10.

\(^{14}\) *Ibid*, pp. 6-8.
military relation in a global environment given an added dynamics of asymmetric nature of warfare. Even when cultural and ideological factors are included, they are very broadly discussed. Since the elements, which characterize civil-military relations in each country emerge out of conditions unique to the country and its institutions, the countries are not and should not be treated as mere examples of an ideal type. Instead, one has to pay particular attention to their individual characteristics, while at the same time keeping these typologies in perspective.

3. Civil-Military Relations - Bangladesh Case Study

Bangladesh is an emerging democracy with strong development potential and a homogeneous population of about 141 million in a territory of 144 thousand square kilometers. Bangladesh development index has shown sustained and consistent growth of near 6.7% enhanced through provision for micro credit facilities to the poor, export of manpower, women empowerment, communal harmony, a per capita income of US $582\textsuperscript{15}, booming ready made garment (RMG) export sector and improved and increased literacy rate. Despite all these achievements, the country has been beleaguered by allegations of corruption being amongst the top few designated as the most corrupt nations in the world and questions on governance, confrontational and dynastic politics often creep-up in discussions about the future prospects for the country. This has naturally had a detrimental effect on the country preventing the attainment of double digit growth, transparent democratic atmosphere, economic development and social stability mostly in the last two decades.

\textsuperscript{15} Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2006.
The War of Liberation of Bangladesh was essentially a part of democratic struggle, where the civil and military personnel unitedly fought for the sovereignty and legitimacy of the new state. Bangladesh, ironically for a large part of its existence as an independent state had faced perils and numerous problems to establish norms of democracy. Right from its inception major changes in the constitution, one party rule, emergency, mutiny, student policies, trade unionism, political godfathering, single source of political inspiration and martial law affected the country. Being part of the society and well organized, the Army has been a concomitant partner both in societal security role and meeting peoples' aspiration in Bangladesh. The deteriorating political situation and one party dynastic rule saw military intervention, even for short durations in the politics of Bangladesh. Out of the five state leaders of any real significance in Bangladesh, at least two came from military background and ran the country towards democratic reforms. In the context of Bangladesh, the traditional role of the Army in state and politics cannot be overlooked. Historical experience of Bangladesh is that when democratic process failed army came forward to exercise restraints either to invigorate or infuse democracy. The military aided crackdown on criminals and terrorists has enjoyed widespread public support, whenever applied notwithstanding some highhandedness reportedly committed by them. These episodes of military involvement occurred always when lawlessness and mis-governance crossed the limits of public endurance and the military was asked to take the initiative to restore law and order and combat corruption. But it is unlikely that the army of Bangladesh will again seize power, for that has also been a very bitter experience not only for the people but for the Army as well. Besides, the army of Bangladesh is not at all interested in seizing the power totally, nor is it ready to govern the state, knowing that people of
Bangladesh, however much disappointed with the failure of the democratic process and the political parties have got an almost instinctive antipathy towards military rule.\textsuperscript{16}

A closer look will suggest the civil-military relationship has long been an important factor in the political, economic and social sectors of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Military's indulgence in politics and reform had a number of outings beginning with counter insurgency phase to national disaster, engaging to avert national crises to successfully ensuring national election. The Bangladesh case study constantly reflects Armed Forces involvement in every five years beginning in 1970s. The occasions vary from supporting famine in 1974, coup in 1975, illegal arms recovery in 1975, relapse of another coup in 1981, referendum in 1976, national disaster management in 1988, cyclone in 1991, operation against outlawed group in 1996, election in 1996, disaster duties in 1997, poverty alleviation program and vulnerable group feeding in 1982-2005, holding election in 2001, conducting anti-corruption drive in 2002 and supporting interim government in 2007 after the proclamation of emergency.\textsuperscript{17}

While the response to national disaster management, consequent management or election duties could be termed as logical, the failure of the political leadership to steer the country towards development and stability had largely been the rationale behind military involvement in the civil-military relationship in Bangladesh. After the emergence of Bangladesh, the political leadership of the major parties failed disarmally on repeated occasions to formulate policies for the benefit of the country with disastrous consequences in all

\textsuperscript{16} Matiur Rahman, 'Impact of Terrorism on Development and Democratic Process: Bangladesh Perspective', RCSS Paper, Colombo, p.15.

\textsuperscript{17} Bangladesh Perspective Research Foundation Survey, June 2007.
sectors of governance and the economy. In contrast, the military’s disciplined thinking, governing experience within its own ranks, decisive decision-making processes and visionary planning has made it a consistently reliable force in Bangladesh especially in times of severe strain and pressure. Therefore, a better working relationship between the civil and the military authorities will be to the benefit of the country as a whole increasing efficiency and responsiveness while also safeguarding national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The economic progress between 1980 and 1990 was one of the most prosperous periods for the nation with huge infrastructure projects being undertaken and the economic policies pursued during the reformed democratic regimes of Ziaur Rahman and Ershad. It is interesting to note as well that between 1980-1990 and 1990-2006, the economic loss due to non governance, strike, port closure, arson, non-cooperation movement was US$6.7 billion in the first phase of democracy of Zia-Ershad regimes corresponding to Khaleda-Hasina democratic regimes that amounted to US$19.6 billion\(^\text{18}\). The lesson derived is while military input in government affairs is conducive to the growth of the economy without a balance of good leadership and civilian engagement in decision-making other areas of governance will naturally deteriorate.

Bangladesh public opinion has overwhelmingly supported the armed forces as a savior from the almost anarchic governance caused by the absence of institutional democracy that had been significantly eroded during the mid 1990s to 2006 due to the widespread practice of corruption amongst the ruling elite. The wide acceptance and trust of the Armed Forces is due to the past recognition by the public and this acknowledgement should be sufficient to steer the country

\(^{18}\text{Ibid.}\)
towards a return to democratic governance by the end of 2008. The general public also believes in the concept of "Public Good" as a sovereign requirement, which is based on practical needs and interests. In this respect, the Bangladesh law enforcement agency is seen as an effective responder to national crisis and has, therefore, become all the more important in the minds of the people for internal and external security as well as to maintain the overall unity of the country. The people also recognize the army as a symbol of a nation's unity on which Adam Smith wrote the following words in the 'the Wealth of Nations'. "The first duty of the sovereign that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies can be performed only by means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this military force in time of peace and of employing it in time of war is very different in the states of society, in the different periods of improvement."

Bangladesh on its part spends 1.1% of GDP on defence but also contributes a total of 6.7% of gross GNP on the economic development of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, peace support operations, education, viable economic projects, skilled labor earning from Kuwait, high way development projects, industrial sectors and power generation. Over the last 18 years, 72,984 members of armed forces took part in 37 missions in 26 countries under the United Nations peace support operation. Average earning from this sector rose from US$26 million to US$87 million per year. In the education sector, the military educates 67465 people annually at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. A total of 72% of civilian students receive direct benefit from 54 colleges and universities providing a direct return of US$22 million per

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year to government exchequer. The Medicare facility provided to civilians over the last 10 years in 19 military hospitals counted 22% of treatment out of a total 35,12,225 patients, thus earning US$286 million with average of US$28 million per year. The total income generated from industrial sectors, Army welfare trusts projects, Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory, ports anti-smuggling operations drug and fishery protection, is around US$56 million per year, notwithstanding the fact that savings from port and power sectors will touch US$1.7 billion and improve further in subsequent years, if the current pace is maintained. Moreover, the rural agro-based economy of Bangladesh is shared by armed forces in the chain offering a direct and indirect benefit to 40 million of the population, as mostly are from “Peasants in Uniform Class”, sharing 6% of agricultural growth. In support of such people oriented projects, Indian economist Amit Bhaduri has written on the importance of this remittance provided by the army personnel in the agricultural economy. The military expenditure in the developed countries like the USA and the UK also played a crucial role maintaining the demand level during consumption and stagnation phases of economy. Socialist economists like Paul Baran and Paul Suiji have also spoken on this positive impact of the defence expenditure. The synchronization of military expenditure and reduction in unemployment rate by the rich countries during the period between the two world wars is a fine illustration of their theory.20

Bangladesh as a case in comparison to few more countries in Asia and Europe reflects an understanding of a new model of civil-military relations that supplements country’s political life as well as its level of democratization. The composite model in its essence may be able to cope with newer security
threats in perspective that may need closer cooperation in
dealing with non linear security threat, terrorism, money
laundering, natural disaster, election, asymmetric nature of
threat, transnational crime, piracy, democratic education,
human right training, legal assistance in dealing with
corruption, supervising electoral voting system, human
trafficking, proliferation of illegal weapons etc. are many areas
take into accounts the lessons for future study:

- The Bangladesh case is of a traditional, moderate and
  liberal civil-military relational model.

- In all phases of Bangladesh history, the military either
  handed over power or allowed democracy to ultimately
  flourish.

- At least on two occasions, once in 1990 and again in 1996
  the military returned power to the civilian government.

- Bangladesh has come under close scrutiny with regards to
civil military relation in globalization period.

- A portion of civil society and the intellectual class has
  been critical of military role in Bangladesh.

- In crisis situation civil society, media, intellectuals,
extpatriate community, judiciary, law enforcing agency
and military bureaucracy have protected the corporate
interests of Bangladesh.

- There is a gradual improvement of democratic values and
intellectual development in the military hierarchy and
more cohesive interaction between civil society and the
military bureaucracy.

- If appropriate policy is envisioned military establishment
could be made less dependent on national exchequer.

- There is a paramount need to establish culture of clean
politics and accountability with appropriate respect and
responsibilities for all stakeholders in society to avoid
dominance of certain groups and vested interests.
4. Model for Determining Civil-Military Relations

The political strength of the modern state is based on its ability to develop institutional means of incorporation rather than repressing individual freedom. Civil society facilitates this incorporation of individual freedom into the institutions of the political community through an institutional framework and political supervision. Although security and new sets of asymmetrical threats will encompass greater cohesion and interaction, between civil military relations, the basic tenets of representative democracy should remain as an answerable tool to people who have elected them both directly or from the premises of popular sovereignty.

The last three decades have also witnessed that the civil-military relations undergone significant changes globally from the theories of Huntington to Clapham. The emergence of new states after the post Cold War phase have seen greater role of military institutions to respond to economic challenges, security threats and mitigating governance issue in absence of absolute democratic environment. Thus, a difference is obvious in the western world, where the democracy sustained for longer period as it has completed democratic cycles than the developing countries, which have relatively shorter term of democratic practice. However, with specific reference to South America, Asia, Middle East or even Africa influence of military has not necessarily denuded the development politics but at places contributed to improve democracy.

In the developing world the new emerging democracies have given military some weight of supervision but the broad consensus on the need for political supervision of the military as a critical element in the preservation of a liberal, pluralistic system should be the call of the day, where both the groups should work as partners to support the principle of political
supervision. Following guideline may help to evolve a new model formula in civil military relation. These are essentially:

a. The existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces. This will provide an important prerequisite of the functioning of the rule of law, reduce the risks of uncertain jurisdictional claims and tension among separate parts of the political authority as well as between the political and military establishments.

b. The significant role of parliament in legislating on defence and security matters influencing the formulation of national strategy, contributing transparency to decisions concerning defence and security policy.

c. The hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through an organ of ministry of defence, that is responsible for directing and supervising its activity. In most of the liberal democracies the central organization of defence is headed by an elected retired military politician, who is assisted by a number of qualified civilians.

d. The presence of a well trained and experienced professional military corps within the ministry of defence and parliamentary affairs on security that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It acknowledges the principle of jointness of national objective, principle of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces.

e. The existence of a developed civil society, with a long-standing practice and tradition of democratic institutions and values that is able to resolve societal conflicts in an effective and efficient manner, and, as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role and mission of the military.

f. The presence of a strong non-governmental component within the defence community, independent academics,
media experts and advisers to political parties capable of participating in public debate on defence and security policy, presenting alternative views and programs.

5. Conclusion

The leading actor in shaping security policy is still the state, but other actors, such as individuals, interest and pressure groups or international organizations are increasingly becoming relevant too. Civil-military relations in an institutional framework is understood as a complex mechanism to exercise democratic oversight over the army through civilian control by elected politicians with the aid of competent civil servants able to deal with security issues. But the process of transforming security policy and civil-military relations is a dynamic process in an ever-changing world. Some factors facilitated by globalization have a great influence on the process. However, the transition and matching the transformations with the available resources is a great task for local policy-makers. The main factors that have influenced the shaping of a democratic security policy and democratic civil-military relations will now become more challenging in the face of globalization, technological change, transnational and internal threats, public opinion and budgetary constraints.

The changes in the security environment more visibly after 9/11 has influenced developed and developing countries shape their security needs and imperatives. The nation-state and its traditional security policies are under scrutiny by the increasing interdependence among states, and by the process of fragmentation. The process of increasing interdependence has introduced new kinds of threats to 'national' security.
The classic symptom of civil-military relation has gone through a transformational change in recent times where pure functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperatives arising from the social forces have largely reduced at the backdrop of increased threat to the society from organized crime and terrorism threats. The unconventional threats triggered by globalization that affect state actors include international terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, money laundering, cyber terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy, human trafficking and criminology will put further impetus to civil-military relations in the coming years of the new millennium comprehensively than ever before as non-symmetric and micro level threats have to be addressed by the two dominant partners in society.

The issues of open borders, free trade and the end of bipolarity will advent new political complexity and politicians alone may not be able to adapt to the condition unless expertise is consulted among the essential components of the society. Unfortunately, opaqueness, not transparency, was the paradigm in the early 1950s. As yet another legacy of the Vietnam War, the politicizing of military of the late 20th and early 21st centuries became ever more deeply engaged in “perception management”. The New Millennium Model of many newly emerged state with democratic practices should be studied more closely guided through an even handed approach to exercise and secure to breed of democratization.

The belief that military can be democratic and can support democracy through a corporative role in the developing countries, in the new environment can help to continuously develop the democratic cycle and the institution through engagement process and could be a bench mark of civil-
military relation. The tendency to utilize respective expertise and hide from its responsibility for the judicious employment of the armed forces under the bedclothes of a policy of non-involvement may further erode economic development, which should go parallel to the democratization process. Mutual understanding between the military and society calls for increased linkages at all levels and an understanding that the military is unique institution with standards that may not always comport with those of the society it defends. There is always a balance to be struck between civil rights and liberties within the military and military effectiveness. Even within the military, there is a difference in the degree to which particular forces can or should be expected to mirror society. Ideologues at either end of the spectrum only make it harder of advance sensible policies. Whatever other purposes are served by the military, it must remain a credible force to fight traditional, economic, transnational and non-traditional threats. Thus, the political strength of the modern state must concentrate on the institutional development and new model of civil-military relationship to offer better and peaceful environment to its citizens.
Discussant
Civil-Military Relationship: Bangladesh Perspective
Major General Shakil Ahmed

From historical perspective, Bangladesh has been a nation without a state prior to 1971. Therefore, the institutions and structures that sustain a viable civil military relationship were never forged. The only armies Bengal saw since the early 15th century were foreign sent to subjugate and oppress, thus leading to deep-seated suspicion in the minds of the Bengali elite of the man on the horse-back.

The post-1971 Bangladesh Army was by no means a professional military force as defined by Huntington and they were fired by a revolutionary zeal to play a decisive part in the political processes of the new state.

He pointed out that the period between 1975-1991 saw a military or quasi-military political structure, gaining and experiencing power, resulted in weakening the institution of parliament by making it merely a rubber-stamp for the decisions taken by the ruling coterie.

The re-establishment of democracy in 1991 does not follow strengthening of the institutions rather these are politicized and made subservient to party interest.

He made a point that the army was subject to subjective control by political leadership, during the period 1991-2006 and even the military was subjected to the flagrant interference by the political leadership.

The Armies participation in the UN peacekeeping operations provided an invaluable opportunity to accumulate experiences, which also make the Army more professional contributing to the reluctance of the army to interfere in the affairs of the state.
Discussant

Civil-Military Relationship: Bangladesh Perspective

Professor Imtiaz Ahmed

- The author creatively sought to relate the 'military' with the 'civil' when the two would reproduce themselves without animosity, suspicion and discrimination; and secondly, the author also reflected on the current situation hoping that when the political crisis would end we will be graduated to a more mature level of civil-military relationship.

- He pointed out that only one school of thought was discussed in the paper so far the typologies for civil-military relations are concerned, therefore exposing the paper to criticism and euro-centricism and modernist or western variants.

- He questioned the conformist categorization of the civil and military and the failure to capture the phenomenon of terrorism beyond reason or religio-centered or faith-centered terrorism for it has infected both the 'civil' and the military'. He suggested considering the rising power of non-state civil and non-state military since this has transformed the age-old discourse of CMR.

- Prof. Ahmed also suggested eleven points for a democratic civil-military structure' for Bangladesh:
  - To make the country free of corruption after punishing the high and mighty corrupts.
  - Freedom of expression to the full in the media as well as in all kinds of academia and research intuitions.
  - Political party with internal democracy and without the financially corrupt politicians.
o Political supervision of the military;
o Minimizing the ugly face of the dual economy where the bulk of the majority would be able to buy the essentials at an affordable cost.
o Putting an end to discrimination against women and members of minority communities.
o Putting an end to the distorted and non-South Asian cum non-Bengal understanding of Islam.
o Having an effective non-partisan civil society.
o Putting an end to familycrafty and narrow regionalism in all public entities, including NGOs and public trusts.
o Making an all-out effort to end the energy crisis.
o Establishing a ‘public security council’.