Introduction

To even the most casual observer, the course of the world history in the post-Cold War period has been dramatically shaped, on the one hand, by how violent actions, or threats thereof, by a handful of individuals with extreme worldviews have terrorized unarmed civilians. It is also shaped, on the other hand, by how governments across the world have responded to such actions or threats. Public discourses on all major issues—ranging from private rights to governance, from social harmony to public security, and from democracy to development, therefore, tend to pivot around the actions of and reactions to terrorism.

One key element in the discourse is whether democracies observe terrorist incidents more frequently than do non-democracies. A generation
of research that goes beyond the simplistic dichotomy of democracy and authoritarianism to delve deep into the gradients of democracy finds a global trend where partial, factionalized democracies (transitioning) have persistently been more likely to experience domestic terrorism than have been the purer forms of democratic and authoritarian regimes.¹

It is, however, difficult to decipher the categories and intensities of terrorist attacks from a global relationship between partial democracies and terrorism.² Some attacks, for example, are domestic while others are transnational, some are mass-casualty while others are more symbolic in nature, and some are done by stronger terrorist organizations while enthusiastic individuals do others. Understanding variations of terrorists is important not only for academic observers, it is critically important for governments to think about how to combat them. Given an attack, how do governments know what kind of attack was it? What decision choices do governments have while responding to a threat or an event of terrorism? What determines the success of a counterterrorism effort?

The current chapter responds to these questions for three South Asian transitional democracies—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—that have also been targets of medium to large-scale terrorist attacks in the recent past. The chapter is organized as follows: first, in the next section, organizational aspects of terrorist mobilization have been studied to characterize terrorist attacks or events. Any terrorist attack can be attributed as expressions either of three broad organizational strategies: it can be done by a hierarchic (or centralized organization, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State), a heterarchic (or network-based organization, such as the beginning phase of Hezbollah), or an anarchic (or leaderless entrepreneurial move by lone wolf terrorists seeking recognition from a larger organization) initiative. Second, four different strategic models of counterterrorism have been identified from the literature: war, criminal justice, reconciliation, and defensive models. It has been claimed that given an attack, the choice of a counterterrorist strategy is a function of the belief of the government about the kind of terrorism it has faced. Third, counterterrorism initiatives of three transitioning South Asian democracies have been studied. Counterterrorism initiatives in these countries seem to suffer from inter-agency coordination problem. Finally, in the concluding section, some solutions to such coordination problem have been discussed.
Types of Terrorist Organizations

The source of authority of some organizations is centralized while for others it is more horizontally decentralized, and still for others, the structure of organization is yet to form as if it is an anarchy. Large-scale terrorism is organized along one or more of these organizational patterns. This section investigates the development of Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda, the two largest terrorist outfits in recent times, to see how terrorists tend to organize themselves, how their choices of locations of authority can be strategic, and how such choices have implications for counterterrorist initiatives of governments.

Generally hierarchy indicates a vertical chain of command, control and responsibility. In hierarchical organizations, including terrorist outfits, “data and intelligence flow up and down from organizational channels that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not necessarily move horizontally through the organization.” Subordinates are delegated authorities due to specialization of functions, such as support, operations, and intelligence that are directly streamlined under one chain of command of the central executive leadership. Cell leaders may have knowledge about other cells but only the senior leaders, with effective veto powers, have sufficient control over the overall layout of the organization at large, its objectives and goals. Examples of hierarchical terrorist outfits are the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy that are primarily revolutionary in character and were inspired by grand revolutionary theory or ideology. Nationalistic organizations, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republic Army, the Basque separatist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) group, and Hamas fall into this category as well. Whether ideological or nationalist, these outfits care for the greater organizational success measured in terms of pre-set political, economic and organizational objectives.

Heterarchies are more decentralized networks that have a mixture of hierarchy and network styles of organization. In such decentralized networks, subunits enjoy substantial autonomy, but once the decision authority is assumed, each subunit may carry out the decisions hierarchically. The subunits may show tendencies of authoritarian leadership by embedding command-cadres within a single node of the
organization. The overall outfit may look like an acephalous (headless) being at times and polycephalous (hydra-headed) at other times.\textsuperscript{8} Terrorists often adopt a network-styled organization where groups are loosely connected with each other but are able to concertedly make acts of terror towards achieving a single set of objectives or goals. Individuals in these networks share the responsibilities (or power) of managing operations, information, resources and security arrangements to execute the more centralized ideological command.\textsuperscript{9} Hezbollah established in 1982, for example, adopted the mixture of hierarchy and network.\textsuperscript{10}

Decentralization, in the post-2001 era, emerged as a strategy for many terrorist outfits facing pressures from international law enforcements and government crackdowns.\textsuperscript{11} Following 11 September 2001, for example, al-Qaeda turned its centralized organization into a network-based one to cope with the global war on terror, which targeted its funding, leadership, training, and communications. The global war on terror initiatives led by the United States (US) ultimately allowed the al-Qaeda to evolve into a self-organized, locally based networks that were able to operate under a shared vision\textsuperscript{12} and the centralized leadership of Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{13} This shift in organizational style helped al-Qaeda reinforce their positions within the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{14} Another example of heterarchy is the IS, which began its journey as Jamat-Wal Tawhid Wal Jihad or JTJ (1999-2004), an insurgent movement that was more of a personal initiative of Abu-Musab Az-Zarqwai, a close follower of Osama bin-Laden of al-Qaeda. Over time, the Zarqwai network rebranded itself as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, 2004-2006), Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, 2006-2011), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or Levant (ISIS/ISIL, 2011-2014) and finally Islamic State (2014 onward) under the leadership of Abu Bakar al-Bagdadi. Organizationally, IS started as a loosely formed network, but become more consolidated over time and showed a strong tendency towards hierarchy with strong command and control structure. Though organizationally it relied upon a decentralized network, it assumed a complete proto-statehood with clear chain of command and authority including governance activities in its controlled territory in Iraq and Syria in the late-2014.\textsuperscript{15}

Besides hierarchy and decentralized network, the literature on terrorism also emphasizes on the emergence of a third form of terrorist activity: ‘leaderless resistance’ or ‘leaderless Jihad’. Anarchic in nature, these are
‘lone wolf’ operations in which “an individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engage in acts of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader, or network of support.” These operate without central command or central guideline except general strategies and goals. Inspirational leaders may encourage an attack but they “do not provide funding, direct orders, or any other form of tangible support.” Leadership control level in leaderless activities is low or absent compared to the medium level network-based organizations or the hierarchical organizations with the highest level of control in central leadership.

Al-Qaeda’s leadership formally opened up its leaderless frontiers through the fatwa of Osama bin Laden in 1998 where he said, to “Kill an American and their allies—civilians or military—is an individual duty of every Muslims who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.” In the post-bin Laden (May 2011) period, leaderless Jihad refers to the “independent and local groups that have branded themselves with the al-Qaeda names and are attempting to emulate bin Laden and his followers in conceiving and executing terrorist operations from the bottom up.” The homegrown terrorists in the US or Europe are this type of leaderless Jihad. Similarly, the chief of IS, Abu Bakar al-Bagdadi invited all fellow Muslims to carry out attacks against crusaders. For example, the leaderless frontiers of IS has been recognized when in December of 2015, in San Bernardino of the US, a Pakistani born couple conducted a terror attack on a Christmas party killing 14 and injuring 22 persons. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US found that the couple showed allegiance to the leadership of IS.

The above review suggests that terrorist organizations fall into three general categories of organizational types: hierarchy or those organizations that operate on the bases of centralized command and control, heterarchy or those that are mostly composed of decentralized cells of network but have common source of organizational identity, strategic instructions and sources of resources, and anarchy or those acts of terrorism that are referred to in the literature as ‘leaderless jihad’ that shows uninvited allegiance to some overarching ideology of a terrorist group but without any central command or central guideline thereof.

The current chapter argues that terrorist leadership strategically employs organizational styles to maximize its success. Terrorist
organizations, especially the large-scale ones, survive by strategically mixing both hierarchy and anarchy within a network. Hierarchy within a network is more likely to help terrorist organizations like IS than hierarchy or network alone. Under extreme duress due to strong counterterrorism initiatives, a group may invest in promoting anarchic style, leaderless Jihad that seeks endorsement ex-post a terrorist event. Leaderless style may be natural to newer groups who acting as if ‘terror’ entrepreneurs bid to attract attention of a larger group that might endorse their activities and co-opts into its network. The incidents of killings of bloggers, publishers and foreign nationals in Bangladesh in 2015, for instance, highlight this process. Perpetrators claimed to have done the killing as a strategy to attract the attention of IS, which did not operate directly in the country at the time.  

The second part of the argument in this chapter is that understanding and analyzing the types and strategies of terrorist organizations are necessary for the government to formulate or choose appropriate counterterrorism strategies and responses. It is, however, a hard task for an outside observer to conclude if an outfit has decided to operate through hierarchy, heterarchy or anarchy. Even national or international intelligence may know about terroristic choices only ex-post. In the next section, a theoretical argument is developed to show the possibilities that a government has to counterterrorism given a terrorist incident. Implications of the theoretical argument will be discussed for South Asian democracies, especially Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

**Choices for Governments**

There are four existing models of countering terrorism: Defensive, Criminal Justice, Reconciliatory, and War models. From the defensive point of view, terrorism is physical and psychological threats that people are forced to grapple with. In democracies, terrorism is a political problem, and application of raw force is not the first option for governments. Liberal values and norms are relied upon as safeguards against threats. Governments plan to protect civilians from potential harm by empowering security agencies, fire fighters and hospitals to better manage the trauma, the ex-post infliction of the harm. The second model
of counterterrorism takes a criminal justice perspective where terrorism is a form of crime and the state employs its security apparatuses to arrest and punish criminals under existing legal framework. The reconciliatory perspective, the basis of the third model, considers extremism as a behaviour that is rooted in the broader social system. Governments taking this perspective to adopt reconciliatory approaches with a view to transform identified root causes of extremism to more moderate views in the long run. Finally, war model takes the criminal justice approach further by brushing aside legalism to consider counterterrorism as a form of war where governments used military rules of engagement while retaliating any act of terrorism.  

Considering the four counterterrorism models against the three types of terrorism presented in the previous section, we have twelve situations of terrorism and counterterrorism as depicted in Figure 8.1. From the public policy perspective, not all of these situations are favourable for governments. A simple cost-benefit analysis should show that some of these situations are more cost effective for governments than others. In the matrix below (Figure 8.1), the darker the shade the more appropriate is the coupling of terrorism and counterterrorism. Waging a full-fledged war, for example, against lone wolves, anarchic terrorists is like crushing a butterfly on a wheel while anything but war would doom to failure against a hierarchically linked terrorist. War may be effective against heterarchies,

\[ \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Counterterrorism Models} & \text{Terrorist type} \\
\hline
\text{War} & \text{Anarchy} & \text{Heterarchy} & \text{Heterarchy} \\
\text{Reconciliation} & & & \\
\text{Criminal Justice} & & & \\
\text{Defence} & & & \\
\hline
\end{array} \]
for which, however, reconciliation and criminal justice would be more sound approaches of counterterrorism.

**Terrorism and counterterrorism in South Asia**

The situations presented above are theoretical, but may provide a lens to examine various counterterrorism initiatives taken by governments. This chapter focuses on three South Asian countries—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. Although a thorough cross-country comparative analysis is beyond the scope of the current chapter, these countries should provide a nice comparative setup, particularly because of their shared socio-political and economic history that is preserved in their institutions and worldviews as well as the interlocking trajectories of future as evident in their public policies.

**India**

India is faced with diverse forms of terrorism including religious, ethnic, ideological, and insurgent ones. According to an estimate, as many as 47,236 terrorist incidents occurring between 1988 and 2009 killing overall about 42,287 people including 14,511 civilians, 5,846 security force personnel, and 21,949 terrorists. These incidents were carried out by, the estimate also counted, about 177 active extremist organizations in India, 40 of which work in all parts of the country.

Relating the terrorist types discussed above, a substantial number of terrorist events that the Indian governments face, therefore, fall into the category of hierarchy and heterarchy. In response to these organized terrorisms, India relies upon a five-prong institutional measure to counter domestic terrorism: state-run police and intelligence agencies, the national intelligence community, physical security agencies, paramilitary forces, and the Army. These institutions create a framework that capacitates the Indian central government to adopt the criminal justice and the war models of counterterrorism discussed in the previous section.

The state-run police agencies work under India's Federal Constitution and are primarily responsible for maintaining law and order within their
respective jurisdictions. The national intelligence community consists of internal (Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs) as well as external (Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat) intelligence agencies. Intelligence Bureau (IB) collects terrorism-related information within India, while Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) does it outside. For example, the Kolkata Police arrested Mohammad Idris, a leader of Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) who was involved in the Holy Artisan attack in Dhaka on 1 July 2016, from a hideout in Kolkata in March 2017. Earlier, IB and Delhi Police failed to catch Idris, involvement of Kolkata police made the operation a success. In another example, The Special Task Force (STF) of Kolkata Police arrested three persons who were suspected to have links with al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).

The physical security is provided by agencies such as Central Industrial Security Force that are responsible to secure airports, nuclear installations, space establishments, seaports, power plants, sensitive government buildings and heritage monuments; the National Security Guards (NSG) that intervenes in terrorist situations such as hijacking and hostage-taking; and the Special Protection Group that provides security of the national leaders including the Prime Minister and former prime ministers. For example, NSG helped Mumbai police to defuse a threat of chemical attack on Indian Prime Minister. Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force are the paramilitary forces of India that assist the police in counterterrorism operations when called upon to do so. Various wings of CRPF have been used in counterterrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

The Indian military, usually the last resort of the Indian counterterrorism initiatives, plays a significant role especially in curbing insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Most notable operations are: Operation All Out, 2017; Operation Sarp Vinash, 2003; and Operation Calm Down to tackle social unrest following the death of Burhan Wani in 2016.

Besides hard military operations waging wars against terrorists, the Indian Army also adopted a reconciliatory model by undertaking a number of civic action programmes in 2013—known as the Operation
Goodwill—to win the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the people in Jammu and Kashmir and North Eastern States. These programmes focused on fulfilling the needs of the peoples and to alleviate their problems, development of remote and inaccessible areas where civil administration is barely existent, assuaging the feeling of alienation and moulding public opinion towards peace and development, and fan the desire for firmer integration with the nation.  

Pakistan

Following the al-Qaeda-led incidents on 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC, Pakistan became the centre of the global ‘war on terror’. A number of regional factors including, but by no means limited to, US invasions in Afghanistan pushed a number of terrorist outfits to concentrate in Pakistan intensifying its level of terrorist violence dramatically much higher than that in India and Bangladesh. There have been numerous terrorist groups in Pakistan operating for decades with closer ties and link with major international terrorist groups including Taliban and al-Qaeda. These groups may be divided into four categories: (1) domestic sectarian groups like Sunni-Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkare-Jhangavi, who have primarily targeted and attacked Shia sects, (2) the Pakistani Taliban represented by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), (3) the anti-Indian militant Jihadi groups, and the Afghan Taliban, represented by Haqqani network in North Waziristan, and (4) the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar. Since 2000 to September 2018, these groups caused nearly 63,554 fatalities in Pakistan, among them approximately half were civilian and security personnel while the other half were member of terrorist groups. The social, economic and human costs due to terrorism were not ignorable. According to a recent report, in the last two decades, terrorism cost the country more than US$126.79 billion.

Given the above scenario, it is expected that Pakistan would take the war model of counterterrorism more seriously than India and Bangladesh. Military plays the central role in the country particularly because they have the vital strategic partner of the US-led invasion in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the Pakistan military conducted around 10 heavy-handed operations to control and eradicate terrorist organizations in tribal areas. Table 8.1
lists some of the notable operations since 2001. In these operations thousands of soldiers participated with full-fledged military might, even sometimes with air force support. Besides these heavy-handed operations, the military utilized swift raids in urban areas and mobilized tribal leaders into awakening movements to de-popularize and eradicate terrorist groups from their respective areas.

The results of these operations were mixed. In some cases, heavy-handed operations ended up with a truce or peace accord to cease war between military and terrorist outfits due to deteriorating security situation and high casualties. For example, the Pakistan Government of Pervez Musharraf signed peace deals called Shakai Agreement between military
and local militants on 24 April 2004 in Wana. Moreover, another six-point peace accord was signed in 2005 between the military and the local militants led by Baitullah Mehsud.\(^4^6\) In other cases, operations were counterproductive as they escalated violence creating a large number of internally displaced persons, psychological trauma, fear and grief, withdrawal of children from education, even sometimes emergency relief and rehabilitation were not allowed.

Besides the heavy-handed military campaigns, successive governments in Pakistan also adopted a number of non-military policies, legislative actions and peace accords.\(^4^7\) They actively amended already existing legal frameworks, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 as well as introduced new legislation to make the anti-terrorism regime more adaptive to new contexts.\(^4^8\) In March 2013, the Parliament created the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) with functions to gather intelligence and coordinate relevant stakeholders to assess threats, formulate strategies, and establish links with the international counterterrorism initiatives. NACTA is headed by the Prime Minister and is participated by Director Generals of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Military Intelligence (MI), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the National Co-ordinator, and the Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan.\(^4^9\) As a result of these military and non-military initiatives, terrorism-induced violence started to improve after operations Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I-IV, and the comprehensive counterterrorism measures were taken under the framework of the National Action Plan (NAP).\(^5^0\)

**Bangladesh**

In the last two decades, activities of two terrorist networks with hierarchical features prominently featured in the international media: Jamaat-ul-Mujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad (HUJI). They carried out attacks on leftist cultural and political organizations, secular political parties, cinema halls, shrines, courts and religious sect Ahmadia claiming them anti-Islamic. Between 1999 and 2005, about 30 terrorist incidents across the country can be listed from published documents. The most remarkable attack was carried out on 17 August 2005 when Jamaat-ul-Mujahidin (JMB) simultaneously blasted 459 bombs in 63
districts of the country.\textsuperscript{51} From 2006 onward, the frequency of terrorist incidents substantially reduced.\textsuperscript{52}

A new series of attacks began in 2013, this time the targets were atheist bloggers associated with \textit{Shahbagh Gonajagoran Mancha}. Ansar al-Islam, a local affiliate group of a larger, regional network called AQIS claimed responsibility of these attacks. Another series of attacks targeted members of Shia, Christian and Hindu minorities, members of government security forces, and foreign nationals living in the country. IS claimed responsibilities for these attacks. Islamic terrorism reached a new height in Bangladesh with the attack on Holey Artisan Bakery, in Dhaka’s diplomatic zone located in Gulshan, on 1 July 2016 that killed 22 people the majority of whom were foreign nationals. After the Holey Artisan attack, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina vowed to bring all terrorists to justice and condemned those who killed in the name of Islam.\textsuperscript{53}

Bangladesh has conceptualized counterterrorism through a mixture of war and criminal justice models. The Government of Bangladesh jump-started its “fighting against terror” in 2004 by creating an army-led joint force named Rapid Action Battalion (RAB).\textsuperscript{54} Primarily worked as an intelligence wing of Bangladesh Police, RAB rapidly grew as a major force in the government’s combat against JMB.\textsuperscript{55} It captured the JMB kingpin in 2006 and arrested many of its key members in very short time, systematically weakening the outfit.\textsuperscript{56}

The Anti-Terrorism Act formulated in 2009 made “provisions for the prevention of certain terrorist activities, effective punishment thereof and the matters ancillary thereto”.\textsuperscript{57} The act categorically defined offences to be considered as terrorism, individuals and organizations to be labelled as terrorists, and punishment for terrorist incidents. One of the major foci of the act was proscription and enlistment of individuals and organizations\textsuperscript{58} and implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution particularly for the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing, enhance cooperation at inter-state level and allows courts to accept videos, still photographs and audio clips, chats and conversation used on the social media for prosecution.\textsuperscript{59} The act also created provisions for forming Anti-Terrorism Special Tribunals for speedy trial of cases related with terrorist violence. It empowered Bangladesh Bank to monitor financial transactions
of suspected individuals and organizations, and included clear provision for confiscation of property used in terrorist activities. It provides capital punishment and maximum jail term for 20 years and stiff financial penalties based on the gravity of crimes.  

To further aggrandize its counterterrorism initiative, the government formed in early-2016 yet another unit under Bangladesh Police, the Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTCU) with 600 personnel and a special intelligence section. Apparently working independently of RAB, the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Bomb Disposal Unit of CTTCU, soon after establishment, conducted a series of quick operations killing at least 30 alleged terrorists.

In line with the UN resolutions and in a bid to bring counterterrorism within the country’s existing criminal justice system, the government, through a statutory regulatory order issued in early-2018, established two special tribunals in the country’s two major cities, Dhaka and Chattogram, to streamline the sudden growth of anti-terrorism cases. According to the Police Headquarters (PHQ), a total of 908 militancy cases were lodged under Anti-Terrorism Act across the country between 1999 and September 2017, only about 12 per cent of which were returned a verdict, about 68 per cent were under trial and about 32 per cent were to be investigated. A total of 564 militant suspects managed to secure bail during the time.

Multiple Agencies and Problem of Coordination

As has been noted above, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have taken an institutional route to combat terrorism. Governments in these countries have not only relied upon existing military and criminal justice system, they have also created new agencies and enacted new legislation dedicated to counterterrorism. More institutions mean multiple accesses to channels of decision-making and newer levels of delegated authorities, and therefore, more prone to gridlock and slower implementation of public policies, especially in democracies. Institutional approach to policy implementation, although slow, would be robust in the long run only if these multiple authorities and their decision-choices are aggregated under a coordinated framework. In the transitional democracies of South Asia, however, agencies and authorities seem to operate with parallel authority
without much ado about horizontal accountability. An apparent boon to this approach is the ability to make decisions swifter, but “at the expense of a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, of hazardous implementation, and of concentrating responsibility for the outcomes on the [chief executive]”.

In India, for example, the committees, task forces, subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and multi-agency centres that had been created to harmonize intelligence sharing and coordinated operations often failed and slowed, especially because of bureaucratic autonomy of various agencies and competition among them over resources. The weakness of security system of India become clear from the way various agencies responded to the 2008 Mumbai attack by the Pakistan based group Lashkar-e-Taiba targeted luxury Taj Hotel, main railway station and a Jewish Cultural Centre in Mumbai killing 164, wounding nearly 308 people and keeping hostages for four days. Intelligence suggestions of such terrorist attacks were already there, but key bureaucratic actors including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police primarily ignored the information. Others, such as Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation, and when Mumbai police tried to take preventive measures, they lacked manpower and necessary equipment to sustain the operation. After the Mumbai attack, in response to such a failure, the central government proposed a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) designed after the NCTC of USA, but it faced serious oppositions from states and political parties who fear losing considerable autonomy and democratic rights.

In a similar example, Bangladesh’s two agencies, RAB and CTTCU had inconsistent positions regarding capture of the ‘real’ kingpin of the newly reorganized Islamic terrorist outfit, Neo Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB). On 08 October 2016, following a raid in a building in Ahsulia, Savar, RAB claimed that the man who fell from the fourth floor of the building and died was Sarwar Jahan, the chief of Neo-JMB. On 26 October, however, CTTCU contradicted RAB by claiming that Sarwar was just an operative, not a chief of the Neo-JMB. While this example alone is not sufficient to claim that there is a clear lack of inter-agency coordination, however, it reveals that there are rooms for improvement. As for Pakistan, President Musharraf’s peace deals Shakai Agreement, as mentioned above in our discussion of counterterrorism in Pakistan, between military and local
militants in April 2004 in Wana and six-point accord signed in 2005 between Military and local militants led by Baitullah Mehsud are further examples of weak institutional approach to counterterrorism.71

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with a set of taxonomical questions: given a terrorist attack, how do governments know what type of attack it was? What decision choices do governments have while responding to a threat or an event of terrorism? How have three major South Asian countries—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—approached counterterrorism? How do we understand some of the challenges these countries have faced? This chapter responded to these questions, first by studying the organizational aspects of major international terrorist mobilizations to characterize terrorist attacks or events as expressions either of three broad organizational strategies—hierarchic, heterarchic, or anarchic (or leaderless move by lone wolfs).

Second, it identified four broad models of counterterrorism—war, criminal justice, reconciliation, and defensive models, which then have been used to study the evolution of counterterrorism initiatives in the three South Asian countries. It has been claimed that given an attack, the choice of a counterterrorist strategy is a function of the belief of the government about the kind of terrorism it faced.

Overall all three countries have created multiple institutions and agencies to react to terrorism as if it is a war or a magnified frenzy of criminal hunt without solving the problem of inter-agency coordination that has plagued the financially and humanly expensive initiatives. Legal frameworks have been created to centralize authority but altogether ignoring the more political, defensive model of counterterrorism that would have respected liberal values and norms. A defensive approach would have naturally slowed down the process but would have created more sustainable, human and implementable counterterrorism approach. Goal 16 of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) encourages such a defensive approach of counterterrorism. It wants to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.72
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Notes


2 Erica Chenoweth, 2013, op. cit.

3 A strategy is a plan of action that a rational individual or organization formulates to accomplish a specific set of goals. This is a standard definition of the idea of strategy offered in the rational choice literature particularly in game theory. See, for example, Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirovitz, *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.


9 Seth G. Jones, 2014, op. cit.

10 Chris Dishman, 2005, op. cit., p. 239.


12 The major objectives of al-Qaeda included establishing Islamic Caliphate, expelling westerns from the hub of Islam, especially from Muslim countries,
destroying Israel, fighting against false-Muslim rulers and non-Muslim infidels, and reducing American cultural and military influence in Middle East.


For example, the White Aryan Nation (WAR) is referred to as a ‘leaderless resistance’. It violently attacked against immigrants in California after ‘Proportion 187’, which would bar illegal immigrant from receiving government services in California; Chris Dishman, 2005, op. cit.

Ibid.


Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury and Jahidul Islam, op. cit.


However, as a follow-up, the Islamic State, in its periodic English language online magazine *Dabiq* (Issue 12), claimed to appoint its local coordinator in Bangladesh. Such claims are difficult to substantiate. See, Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury and Jahidul Islam, op. cit.


Ibid.


In 2009, the distribution of these organizations was as follows: there were 36 in Assam as well as the same number in Jammu and Kashmir, 39 in Manipur, 4 in Meghalaya, 3 in Nagaland, 12 in Punjab, 30 in Tripura, 2 in Mizoram, 5 in Arunachal Pradesh, and 9 in the rest of the India. Among the all-India organizations, there were 7 in North Eastern India, 17 in North India, 8 in Kashmir area, 4 in Central India, and 4 in South India. See P. W. Puroshotham, P. W. Puroshatham and M. Veera Prasad, 2009, op. cit.


Ibid.


41 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an umbrella organization of as many as 40 militant groups, based in Pakistan’s tribal areas, see, Naeem Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security”, Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2014, available at https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552/document, accessed on 10 November 2018. Anti-Indian militant Jihad groups, which are commonly known as the ‘Kashmiri groups’, such as the Deobandi outfits of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; the Ahl-e-Hadith groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and Jama’at-e-Islami-linked organizations of Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr. See, Naeem Ahmed, 2014, op. cit.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Reports on incidents by leftist radicals like Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), Biplobi Communist Party and Gono Mukti Fouj (GMF) were found during this time, but their magnitude and impact were insignificant.


Currently RAB has 14 battalions under its command.


The JMB kingpin was captured in 2006 and was prosecuted in 2007.


The schedule 2 of the Act proscribed the following organizations: Shahadat-e-Al Hikma party Bangladesh (09-02-2003), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) (23-02-2005), Jamatul Mujahedin (23-02-2005), Harkatul Jehad Al Islami (17-10-2005), Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh (22-10-2009). See, Anti Terrorism Act, 2009”, Ibid.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, its successor resolutions, 1373 and the UN Security Council resolutions related to the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing.

accessed on 24 October 2018. Regarding terrorist financing, Bangladesh became a member of the regional taskforce Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Bangladesh Bank and the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, jointly led the government’s efforts to implement the international anti-money laundering (AML) or countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards and international sanctions regimes. See, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017”, U.S Department of State, available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/, accessed on 10 December 2018.


65 Ibid., p. 62.

66 Besides fragmented authority, other factors responsible for coordination failure include political patronage, corruption and poor quality of training. See Kaplan and Bajoria 2008, op. cit.


