The Possibility of Japan's Contributions to International Peacebuilding in the Age of Partnership Peace Operations

Hideaki Shinoda

Japan's international peace cooperation is at crossroads. After the enactment of the 1992 Peacekeeping Bill, Japan sought to remain engaged with international peace operations. Since the withdrawal of the Self-Defense Force from South Sudan in 2017, it has become uncertain how Japan can be more actively re-engaged with international peace operations.

This chapter argues that Japan needs to develop its new strategy to enhance its engagement in international peace operations especially through channels of technologies, capacity development and partnerships, due to the gaps between what it can do and the reality of international peace operations. At the end, the chapter presents the activities of Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC), as an example of the areas which Japan should cultivate more strongly.
Japan’s Engagement in International Peace Operations

Discussing Japan in the context of peace operations has its paradoxes. Japan aspires to be a peaceful country. It aims to be so in the international scene. But its pacifism is not very actively expressed in international society. It used to be said that the traditional conception of peace for the Japanese is narrow-minded ‘one-country-pacifism’, which means that Japan is preoccupied with peace at home, but not about peace elsewhere.

In the domestic society of Japan, the discussion on peace is traditionally understood in terms of Article 9 of the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’, which renounces ‘war as a sovereign right of the nation’ and prohibits Japan from possessing military components for warlike purposes. Many in Japan do not believe that the Constitution does not prohibit any aspects of Japan’s involvements in international peace operations. But those who are not interested in international affairs tend to regard Japan’s participation in international peace operations as a matter of constitutional debates. Discussions of how to engage in peace operations in any form necessarily involved the issue of the Self-Defense Force (SDF). The leftists understand international peace operations as the matter of SDFs and its status under the Constitution. The leftists regard SDFs as unconstitutional or at best exclusively defensive and only operative at home. They believe that SDFs should not or cannot be sent abroad. The leftists argue that the issue of peace operations would be a pretext for the militarists to extend the activities of SDFs and eventually revitalize pre-war Japanese politics.

It is true that the Gulf War of 1991 changed the atmosphere of the public opinion in Japan. Despite its financial contributions of US$13 billion to the multilateral forces that ousted the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Japan felt that it was not recognized by many countries as a contributor due to its abstention from dispatching any personnel. Until that time Japan’s participation in international peace operation was not a policy agenda, as even those who wanted to advance the international status of Japan did not feel a strong need for Japan to take an active role in peace operations. However, the experience at the time of the Gulf War of 1991 inevitably urged Japan to be more proactively international.

The Diet of Japan passed a new law entitled the ‘Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations’ (PKO
Bill) in June 1992. As the leftists organized mass campaign against the enactment and the public opinion was actually divided, the government took very cautious measures in the PKO Bill. As a result, the Bill was given the so-called 5 principles of participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions: (1) there must be an agreement on a ceasefire between parties, (2) they consent to UN peacekeeping as well as Japan’s participation, (3) the operation maintains impartiality, (4) Japan retains the right of withdrawal, and (5) the use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary cases. Now, one can observe some characteristics in the Japanese commitment to peace operations.¹

Continuous Avoidance of Enforcement and Avoidance of Military Measures: Japan dispatches the SDF purely as engineering or logistics units. Japan might even avoid security concerns in general. This means that Japan can never get involved with Chapter VII operations. There is a debate about the cost-effectiveness of the SDF having a role in both engineering and transportation. In any case, the SDF has not been committed to peace operations as a military force per se. Regardless of the implications of the amendment to the PKO Bill, Japan has not yet prepared its own strategy of active use of the SDF in peace operations. It seems that the nature of Japan’s avoidance of direct military measures in peace operations will continue in the foreseeable future.

Concentration on Social-humanitarian Areas in the Wider Context of Peace Operations: This might be the reverse side of the same coin. But the first point is rooted in the ‘Peace Constitution’ and has actual legal constraints. The emphasis upon social-humanitarian areas is more concerned with the issue of Japan’s positive identity in international society. Japanese high-ranking officials, especially those seconded by the government, tend to be in social-humanitarian fields. In contrast, only those Japanese who are career UN officials have senior posts in political and security affairs.

High Respect for Non-interference: Japan has no means of resorting to enforcement actions. It wants to respect and maintain the principle of non-interference. Once a peace operation appears, the Japanese believe that it is preferable to get out sooner than later. ‘Let us not overstay in a foreign country’.
Asian Regionalism: Japan’s interest lies in Asia. Despite Japan’s sending the SDF to United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) shortly after the enactment of the PKO Bill, it was an open secret among government officials that they did not want to send SDF personnel to Africa, where they would be subjected to harsher living conditions but given little media coverage and public attention. Later, the SDF went to South Sudan, as there was no peacekeeping operation in Asia. They came back from South Sudan with mixed feelings.

Less-value-oriented Approach: Japanese policy-makers seldom mention concepts as abstract as international justice, freedom, universal human rights, and the like. Japan does not have the capacity to impose specific values upon others; it does not even espouse a set of values that it wishes to impose upon others. The Government of Japan has been trying to promote human security as the value which Japan promotes for the world. But it does not seem that the government has succeeded in persuading public opinion that human security is the main pillar of Japanese foreign policy.

Since the enactment of this so-called 1992 PKO Bill, Japan has participated in eight peace operations and three humanitarian emergency relief operations. The SDF took part in the missions in Cambodia [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-93, 600 troops for engineering and eight ceasefire observers], Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1993-95, 48 troops for transportation), the Golan Heights [United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 1996-2015, 43 troops as a logistics unit], East Timor [United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor), 2002-2004, 680 troops for engineering], Haiti (around 300 troops, 2010-2013), South Sudan (around 350 troops, 2011-2016), in addition to some other small dispatches for monitoring, humanitarian aid, etc. Japan sent 75 civilian policemen to Cambodia under UNTAC and three to East Timor under United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999. Japan had small numbers of headquarter personnel in UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNDOF (the Golan Heights), UNTAET and UNMISET (Timor-Leste), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
It is true that the PKO Bill is not the only exclusive channel for Japan to launch activities related to international peace operations, although other channels are still regarded as temporary measures. The Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in September 2001 and the SDF began to supply fuel in addition to transportation support to the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) ships. In 2004, the Diet passed the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq to send the SDF to Iraq for humanitarian activities. In 2009, the Anti-Piracy Measures Law came into effect to dispatch the Maritime SDF with Japan Coast Guard law enforcement officers to the coast of Somalia.

In December 2001, the Diet lifted the ban on Japanese participation in some ‘core (basic)’ UN peacekeeping missions. The amendment of the PKO Bill eased restrictions on the use of weapons to protect ammunition and vehicles. The SDF came to be able to participate in the so-called primary ‘Peacekeeping Force (PKF)’ roles such as monitoring of the disarming of combatants; stationing of personnel in and patrolling of buffer zones; collection and disposal of abandoned weapons; inspections of transfer of weapons and assistance in exchanges of Prisoners of War (POWs). The Diet members found the amendment necessary for Japan’s participation in the mission in East Timor.

In response to the turmoil in South Sudan, the new measure was introduced in 2015 to enable SDF personnel to use weapons to protect personnel of UNMISS and civilians around SDF personnel in addition to the case of self-defense. This measure stirred the public sentiment since the measure was introduced together with some other controversial broader security policy measures including re-interpretation of the right of collective self-defense. There was also a debate about the manner the government assessed and presented the situation in South Sudan. The Minister for Defense, Masami Inaba, had to resign during the ‘missing daily reports’ controversy. The opposition parties claimed that the government intentionally hid the daily reports written by the troops in South Sudan in order not to disclose the fact they reported the incidents of ‘battles’ in South Sudan. The PKO Bill does not allow the SDF to be dispatched to the area where ‘battles’ are occurring.
The Gaps between Japan and Contemporary Peace Operations

These characteristics of Japan’s involvements in international peace operations contradict the actual nature of contemporary international peace operations. There is no concrete prospect of dispatching a SDF battalion to any of UN peacekeeping operation. The experience in South Sudan is almost like a trauma for many Japanese circles. It is more pessimistic to look at the prospect of dispatching police officers to UN peacekeeping missions. Japan sent 75 policemen to Cambodia for the UNTAC operation in 1992-93. One superintendent was killed there amidst a very difficult situation of dilemmas between the UN command and the instructions from Tokyo. The Japanese policemen were sent to Timor-Leste for a very short period of time. But these are the only occasions when Japan dispatched police officers to UN peacekeeping operations.

The rapidly changing environment of UN peacekeeping operations continue to widen the gap between the harsh reality of international peace operations and the Japanese manner of engagement.

First, Japan still seeks to identify the room for continuous avoidance of enforcement. But it is more often the case that UN peace operations are given the Chapter VII mandates to resort to enforcement measures especially concerning the protection of civilians. The Japanese SDF still does not use force for the protection of civilians. This means that they are not able to contribute to Chapter VII mandated peace operations. Following the message of the ‘Cruz Report,’ UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasizes in the context of his ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ (A4P) that the UN does not allow for any caveat provided by the capitals of member states.\(^2\)

Second, the attitude of concentration on social-humanitarian areas in the wider context of peace operations has the validity for UN Funds and Programmes. However, peace operations are not determined by social-humanitarian activities. It is nowadays normal that peace operations have integrated structures. The titles of Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) go to Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) when there is a peacekeeping mission. This however, means that, development and humanitarian aids are integrated by
political directions. The so-called Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO report) emphasized the ‘primacy of politics’. This message has been continuously reiterated by many circles in the UN. The engagement in social and humanitarian activities does not substitute a lack of contributions to political and military components of international peace operations.

Third, high respect for non-interference needs sensitive nuances. Non-interference is certainly a valid principle. It is, rather a matter that every nation is supposed to comply with. It is however, problematic to excessively over-emphasize the principle. Even if the concept of Responsibly to Protect (R2P) is still controversial, the manner UN approaches interventions has become different for the last two decades. It is rather important to take principled attitudes when it comes to UN peacekeeping operations, as explained by the Capstone Doctrine. The principle of non-intervention is modified in accordance with the reality of multidimensional peace operations. Even if it is understood to be advisory, international peace operations are expected to contribute to the capacity development of the national government with intensive consultation with civil society stakeholders in local communities. Contributions to capacity development are not limited to socio-economic fields. Security Sector Reforms (SSRs) are major areas of interventions. People no longer regard such interventions through peace operations as problematic.

Fourth, the validity of Asian regionalism is significantly questionable. There is little prospect of new UN peacekeeping operation in Asia in the near future. Since the end of the Cold War, despite the rapid growth of UN peacekeeping operations, there were only two instances of peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Timor-Leste. The former, UNTAC, was a short operation between 1992 and 1993, even though gigantic. The Paris Peace Agreement that terminated the typical Cold War style war in Cambodia was a direct product of the termination of the Cold War. The Cambodian type of peacekeeping in this sense was not repeated. The case of Timor-Leste was an example of decolonization, which was different from patterns of other cases of armed conflicts in the contemporary world. The involvement of a regional power, Australia, would not be repeated in other areas in Asia, as Timor-Leste is in the end, an area very close to Oceania. China as a superpower in the 21st century is so influential especially in
Asia that no operation can be easily created in Asia without the approval of the veto superpower in the Security Council.

It is also the case that most international peace operations are in Africa. Peacekeeping missions outside of Africa are all tiny. Beyond the sphere of UN peacekeeping operations, one can observe that African regional and sub-regional organizations like African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are significantly active in providing peace operation implementers. Even non-African regional organizations as much as the European Union (EU), are heavily involved with peace operations in Africa.

Fifth, UN peace operations no longer take less value-oriented approaches. They have absorbed value-oriented aspects in the last twenty years in terms of the rule of law, human rights, women empowerment, child protection and protection of civilians, etc. The so-called ‘liberal peacebuilding theory’ is stimulating academic debates due to the UN’s apparent commitment to liberal values. There is no consensus about the universal validity of liberal peacebuilding and the appropriate range of its applications. But there is no room for doubts about the established value contents of UN peace operations. It is a fundamental limitation of Japan that it is not usually committed to a value-driven approach except such a quite comprehensive concept as human security. It is true that human security is not against the UN. But peace operations are formed and maintained in line with the principles of the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law. While Japan respects all these values, it is not fully ready to pursue them strongly.

Given these gaps between Japan’s traditional tendencies and contemporary international peace operations, it is not easy to optimistically expect that Japan’s engagement in peace operations will dramatically increase. A more sensible observation would tell that the withdrawal of SDF from South Sudan was an evidence of Japan’s difficulty in maintaining its presence in international peace operations.

This chapter does not necessarily intend to predict the future. Japan might take extra efforts to adjust its engagement in international peace operations. But at this moment any realistic observations would not clearly support such an optimistic view. If so, what can one expect from Japan for international peace operations in a realistic manner?
Areas for Cultivation

The above observation does not necessarily mean that Japan is irrelevant to international peace operations. The status as the third largest financial contributor keeps Japan in the circles of international peace operations. Japan has not lost its interest in contributing to international peace operations, while it is struggling to find the way to do so.

There are three key words that this paper highlights to cultivate areas where Japan might be able to proceed to advance its own interest in contributing to international peace operations: technology, capacity development and partnership.

The Government of Japan has been trying to increase its contributions through logistical support. It should be highly welcomed. No peace operation is conducted without logistical support. The more international peace operations enhance their logistical capacities, the more they become operationally solid. It is a good thing that any country including Japan seeks to contribute to the enhancement of logistical capacities of international peace operations.

If Japan takes this agenda seriously, however, it needs to show comparative advantage of its contributions. Japan needs to show how it can make comparatively advantageous contributions. Very concrete areas like emergency medical aid or rescue operations should be carefully studied and pursued.

Such comparative advantages should come through technological contributions. Given the recent growing interest among peace operations experts in cutting-edge technologies like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 3Ds, etc., Japan needs to show its possibilities to contribute to peace operations by providing technological support which proves comparative advantages. This does not mean that Japan is fully ready to provide such high technologies to international peace operations. There must be a policy decision on the side of the Government of Japan to increase its contributions in this direction. For instance, a simple provision of UAVs is not very much impressive. Combinations of machines and personnel with high-level capabilities to analyze information must be pursued. Japan should be interested in such combinations of material and analytical capabilities.
Capacity development is what international peace operations always want to achieve. Intensive contributions by Japan in the areas of capacity development should be highly welcome anywhere in the world. From this perspective, it should be noted that Japan’s assistance in peacekeeping training centres in various countries in Africa had significant advantages.

Partnership is also a critical concept in contemporary international peace operations. Most international peace operations have institutional partnerships between UN and regional or sub-regional organizations, as acknowledged by HIPPO Report, Secretary-General (SG) Reports, etc. It is a matter of course that partnership is not exclusively limited to the relationship between UN and regional organizations. There is a wide range of areas of partnerships in terms of governments, non-governmental organizations, etc.

Japan’s partnership with other Asian neighbours should have critical meanings. Partnership with immediate East Asian neighbours has significant diplomatic implications for Japan. Partnership with large Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in South Asia has strategic or tactical mutual benefits.

Given that Japan has its own distinctive limitations, it is crucial to develop partnerships with the host country, international organizations, regional neighbours, collaborating countries, civil society actors, etc. In forming various kinds of partnerships, creativity as well as analytical insights into reality are highly required.

Partnership is a key concept to understand the current state of international peace operations. Ad hoc arrangements of partnership between the UN and various regional or sub-regional organizations are inevitable consequences of complex circumstances of international norms and security in the 21st century. The manner of partnership between various international and regional or sub-regional organizations is organized in different regions. They reflect each region’s distinctive normative and security situation. Partnership peace operations is a symbolic phenomenon in our complex contemporary world. A milestone SG Report in 2015 asserted that the UN had “entered an era of ‘partnership peacekeeping’, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm—and an essential component of each organization”.

Partnership was dramatically established in the form of a hybrid mission over Darfur, Sudan, called UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) in 2007. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was formed in 2003, followed by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) established in 2004. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in 2007 followed by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) established in 2009, which transformed itself into the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) in 2015 after the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in 2013. More recently, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) were established to follow previous peace operations, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) led by the ECOWAS and the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) led by the AU, respectively. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) embodies the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) that consists of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member countries. The UNMISS has an institutional linkage with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) by accommodating its Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) and the Regional Protection Force which consists of IGAD member state forces.

It is noteworthy that the EU has been active in advancing partnership agendas in Africa. For instance, the EU is providing its own, smaller security and defence policy presences to Mali and the Central African Republic with either a training or advisory mandate. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also been conducting some assistance missions to the AU including support of strategic air- and sea-lift to AMISOM and capacity-building support to the AU. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has 20 years of commitments to peace operations since its extended engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina that started in 1995.

‘Partnership’ is now a concept to illustrate one major characteristic of contemporary peace operations. In the narrow sense ‘partnership’ points to
new peace operations in Africa where UN cooperates with AU, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, etc. as well as EU and NATO. Its implications go beyond a technical range of some peacekeeping operations. ‘Partnership’ also indicates a global trend of contemporary peace operations, in which multiple layers of international security of collective security, collective defence, and regional arrangements through UN and other international organizations, regional/sub-regional organizations and bilateral engagements are creating complex webs of ad hoc measures. This could also be described as a reflection of the impact of the so-called Global War on Terror.

Partnership peace operations illustrate the internationally shared common normative frameworks as well as the critical state of international security where regional discrepancies in types of peace operations constitute one major issue. It is worth exploring this phenomenon of partnership peace operations from the perspectives of organizational policies, country-specific political concerns, and international security. As there is no universal model of partnership, national or local circumstances in the context of regional politics and security ought to be carefully analyzed to explain the foundation of each peace operation. The impact of the War on Terror, in particular, has significant influence over the way partnership peace operations are formed.

**Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding**

In the context stated above, the activities of the HPC should deserve some mention. HPC has been running the ‘Program for Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding’ for more than 11 years since its inception in 2007. While HPC runs the programme commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), it has been continuously faced with a fundamental question as regards the nature of the programme; what is ‘human resource development’?

Most fundamentally, the mandate of ‘human resource development’ requires some demanding tasks. There are numerous institutions for ‘training’. Those who have specific organizations or specific destinations for specific jobs should be given very specific training. The concept of ‘human resource development’ may contain elements of training. HPC
actually organizes training sessions as a major part of the programme. But training is, in essence, an opportunity for skill development. By contrast, ‘human resource development’ goes beyond such skill-oriented opportunities. HPC intends to provide an environment for ‘human resource development’ rather than for development of skills, believing that the former is more comprehensive than the latter. The former is about humans, while the latter is about skills. For instance, HPC has been mandated to provide various kinds of career development support to young professional participants of the programme including mentoring, information dissemination, etc., while running its own support system. This is a fundamental characteristic of the programme.

Human resource development, in essence, requires individualistic approaches. Each individual has his or her own career development plans, expertise, experiences, knowledge, preferences, personal circumstances, etc. HPC does not assume any particular professional or organizational background when it selects participants of the programme. This policy keeps not only its own distinctive dynamics, but also its own special subtlety, for the sake of coherence of the programme. HPC should always think of the way it can help him or her to develop each one’s career by considering individual factors not only through the channel of career development support, but also the coursework as well as overseas attachment. This is a demanding task, though this constitutes the very essential gist of the programme.

Furthermore, HPC is engaged in human resource development for ‘peacebuilding’. The numerous training centres in many parts of the world more or less focus on peacekeeping operations. Organizational staff training or capacity building programmes provide job training occasions, but usually do not deal with peacebuilding as a whole. HPC needs to cover such a broad range of topics in the category of ‘peacebuilding’. The importance of each agenda of peacebuilding would vary in accordance with circumstances of each distinctive case of peacebuilding and it also changes in accordance with the development of theories and practices of peacebuilding. Since peacebuilding is an ongoing policy issue area, critical and dynamic in many parts of the world, it is a huge challenge to conduct training sessions based on updated peacebuilding theories and practices.
Through these challenging tasks of the programme, HPC aims to achieve several important goals. It pursues to organize the programme for the goal of ‘human resource development’. There is a clear limit for HPC in helping those who develop their own careers in professional fields. Unlike the case of skill-oriented trainings, it is difficult to set a clearly identifiable target of ‘human resource development’, which requires a wide range of approaches to enhance the development of ‘humans’ instead of technical skills or capacities. However, HPC tries to cultivate the way it can provide more opportunities for them to more smoothly and effectively develop the possibilities of their lives. HPC never forgets the fact that it is promoting ‘peacebuilding’ and no other policy goal. It respects the identity of those who associate themselves with ‘peacebuilding’, while the definition of ‘peacebuilding’ ought to remain broad. HPC always wishes to help those who are determined to devote their possibilities to the cause of ‘peacebuilding’, and, thus, it shall not conduct career development support purely for personal reasons.

In order to achieve these goals, HPC adopts its own guidelines in organizing the programme. First, it aims to respect ‘networks’ in the field of peacebuilding. It aims to create a community of those who practice peacebuilding. For those who devote themselves to peacebuilding, it is still often difficult to identify a professional community where they can gather. HPC needs to promote and facilitate such a community to emerge in Japan, Asia and globally. ‘Network’ is the key to develop comprehensive ‘human resources’ through the channels of facilitators, mentors, senior colleagues, friends, supporters, etc. It constitutes the philosophical foundation to organize practical training and, of course, career development support.

HPC respects ‘problem-solving’ approaches. ‘human resource development’ for ‘peacebuilding’ is, by definition, an open-ended task, not only in time, but also in contents. It is simply wrong to present an open-ended task as something systematically describable in advance. No matter how much one talks about ‘coordination’ or ‘integration’ or some other mantras, an organizational chart hardly explains the way peacebuilding is conducted. No matter how often jargons and acronyms like ‘DDR’ or ‘SSR’ or ‘CIMIC’ are used, technical knowledge alone does not provide the solid basis for peacebuilding. No matter how much
one refers to the examples of projects, programmes and policies, peacebuilding can barely be translated into an accumulation of separate small pieces. The key is to develop the ability to cope with the open-ended tasks. HPC recognizes the need for peacebuilding, since it is the manner by which humanity confronts the contemporary world’s problems in achieving peace. As there are problems, there are solvers as peacebuilders, not vice versa.

HPC rather believes that peacebuilding is always contextual and locally oriented. Peacebuilding is never like an empty box to be filled by a set of international jargons with an estimated budget. Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone cannot be the same as peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. This is, first of all, a matter of promotion of local ownership in the strategy of peacebuilding, and more than that. HPC analyzes tools in accordance with the analysis of contexts. HPC makes efforts in presenting peacebuilding as concretely as possible so that the participants can remind themselves of the fact that peacebuilding is a matter of people who desperately aspire to obtain peace, not of those academics or officials who write papers, deliver speeches and receive salaries.

Notes


