Contemporary Peacebuilding Challenges
Bangladesh as a Mitigating Actor

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Introduction
The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved as one of the main tools used by the international community to manage crises that pose significant threat to international peace and security. Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multinational peace operations are called upon to facilitate the political transition through promoting national dialogue and reconciliation, protecting human rights, assisting in the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, supporting mechanisms for holding elections, and restoring the rule of law. As the missions extended from simple interposition to enforcement operations after the Cold War, the concept of peacebuilding arrived. From 1991 onwards, UN multifunctional missions increased in number and are termed peacebuilding operations. However, with the
passage of time, the idea of peacebuilding evolved in relation with the developments in the field level activities of peace operations. The conceptual ambiguity of peacebuilding raises several debates, especially when the term is applied in the UN peacebuilding affairs. Academicians do not fully agree on a single definition of ‘peacebuilding’. The term was first coined by Johan Galtung in the 1970s where he emphasized on peacebuilding as the interface between peacekeeping and peacemaking and a robust third-party response to ongoing violent conflict. Afterwards, significant contributions have been made on peacebuilding at the operational level alongside its academic discussions.

In the contemporary world, the UN peacebuilding operations are becoming more robust and new debates are surfacing regarding how to make a peacebuilding operation more effective. Three debates are encountered at the implementation level. The first one is integration versus segregation, the second one is peacekeeping for the rich versus peacekeeping for the poor, and the third one is related to the application of a standard operating procedure (SOP) for a wide range of conflict management issues. The practice of peacebuilding emerged based on experiences in peace operations. Due to the emerging global order, decision making and mandates for a particular mission must also take into account new realities. The formation of institutions and the implementation process at the field level are raising new questions regarding effective peacebuilding operation.

Since 1988, Bangladesh has been an important contributor in the UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). In addition to field level activities, Bangladesh also contributed to developing and popularizing a universal understanding on global peace. In the 66th meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2011, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina proposed a six-point global peace model, which was appreciated by the international community. Bangladesh can be an important contributor in the process of mitigating contemporary peacebuilding challenges. As a pioneer in the UN peacekeeping operations, the country has acquired a wide array of knowledge on the issues of peacebuilding. The country has developed a good image in the international fora as well as in the conflicting areas due to its commitment and dedication in the global peacekeeping activities.
In this backdrop, the present chapter is an endeavour to understand the contemporary challenges of peacebuilding and how Bangladesh can contribute to make peacebuilding efforts more effective. The chapter is qualitative in nature and examines existing literature on peacebuilding based on varieties of sources, e.g., government and non-government documents, academic journals, books, and newspaper articles. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction. Section two analyzes the evolution of peacebuilding including practical developments and academic debates. Section three deals with the contemporary challenges of peacebuilding at political, institutional and field levels. Section four highlights the potential role of Bangladesh to address the emerging challenges of peacebuilding affairs. Section five concludes the chapter.

**Evolution of Peacebuilding and Academic Debates**

Peacebuilding is one of the most discussed ideas in contemporary peace studies. The concept of peacebuilding, however, entered the mainstream thinking in 1992, when it appeared in the UN document titled *An Agenda for Peace*. The concept accommodated the changing nature of the UN peacekeeping missions as they evolved from their traditional roles and tasks. It has continued to evolve as the definition of what constitutes ‘peace’ changed over time. However, the idea has been developed in an unplanned and ad hoc manner which led to many academic debates, some of which are still ongoing.

**Development of International Peacebuilding**

The idea and functioning of the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding affairs have widened and deepened in connection with the necessity of different UN missions in the field level. The principle of UN peacekeeping operations can be found in chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were deployed in conflicts in parts of recently decolonized Asia, Middle East and Africa. Traditionally, the role of peacekeeping forces has been two-
fold: to work as a buffer between warring parties pending troops withdrawal and negotiations, and to assist in implementing agreements reached by the peacemakers. This period has been termed as the traditional peacekeeping era.

The end of the Cold War has brought a number of changes in the international system. These changes led to the transition from traditional peacekeeping to the peacebuilding activities. Firstly, the number of intra-state conflicts increased compared to the interstate ones. This meant that adjustment was needed on how peace was established in a conflict situation. While the inter-state conflicts were often settled by territorial adjustment and withdrawal of troops, the same was not true in the case of intra-state conflicts. As different confronting parties lived together in a single jurisdiction after the end of a conflict, preserving long-term peace in the society became important. The idea of peace was no longer confined within stopping the violence (negative peace) but also building peaceful relations shaped by social justice (positive peace). Secondly, the end of the Cold War and the demise of superpower confrontation reduced the challenges that the Security Council would be paralyzed by a veto. Thus, the UN had to take more decisive actions and the number of UN peacekeeping operations increased significantly. Thirdly, the concept of human rights became prominent in the international arena and it was deemed that the protection of people is more important than state sovereignty. This led to an increase in multilateral humanitarian intervention. As a result, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations became frequent and the peacekeepers undertook a wide variety of complex tasks to help build sustainable institutions of governance, human rights monitoring, security sector reform (SSR) and DDR of former combatants. The peacekeeping missions started to include more civilian people in missions. These changes were reflected in the Former Secretary-General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, which focused on building a better society after the UN intervention had taken place. The report introduced peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Peacebuilding was seen as the final stage in the cycle of violent conflict in this period.
Over time, various notions of peacebuilding and other related concepts emerged based on the experiences in peace operations. The period between 1989 to 1999 witnessed peacebuilding as a multidimensional peacekeeping. Peacebuilding has been related to the multidimensional UN peace support operations carried out during early to mid-1990s in countries including Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. During this era, the UN peacekeeping missions also performed what has been termed as 'peace enforcement'. Peace enforcement activities included low-level military operations, enforcing ceasefires and rebuilding 'failed states', e.g., operations in former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

In 1995, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a supplement to 'Agenda for Peace'. The lack of success of UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia was reflected in the report. This report did not focus on interstate peacebuilding, rather entirely on armed conflicts within a single sovereign state. The report also discussed the issue of timing and modalities of returning peacebuilding functions to local actors so as to preserve any gains that have been made.

The next major UN document that addressed peacebuilding was the Brahimi Report of 2000. It reviewed the peace operations in the 1990s in order to learn the lessons from the challenges and failures of the operations. The report pointed out that there was a need for complementing peacebuilding with 'action against corruption' and 'effective action against diseases'. The report proposed that the UN take the lead role in the international peacebuilding actions and build its capacity. Another major recommendation made by the report was that there should be a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and human rights experts to strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. The necessity of peacebuilding became significant as the role of peacekeeping missions extended beyond the traditional tasks to post-conflict reconstruction and development which were deemed necessary for lasting peace. Thus, the focus of that period since the 2000s was on peacebuilding as state-building measures.

From 1990 to 2006, the UN authorized 42 peacekeeping operations, majority of which were beyond the traditional practice of peacekeeping. This marks an era that viewed peace more than just ending violence and holding free and fair elections. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
UNAMSIL (1999-2005), suggested reevaluating the international interventions in post-conflict situation. It was observed that peacekeeping missions had huge achievements in terms of stability and ending of violent conflict but less success in terms of helping the national governments address the root causes of conflict. Therefore, a shift from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding became necessary to address the underlying causes of violence and barriers to post-conflict developments. It was also noted that the responsibility to rebuild is just as important as the responsibility to protect. Thus, ensuring that the UN peacekeeping operations can successfully perform peacebuilding activities, became a key focus of the UN.

By the end of 2005, the UN established a Peacebuilding Commission which has 31 members. Of them, seven members are elected from the General Assembly and seven are selected by the Security Council; another seven members by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), five members from the top military contributors and five from the top financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping missions. The commission plays a crucial role in the decision making of contemporary peacebuilding missions. It also devises policies for the field-level activities.

The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report did some rethinking about peacebuilding. It recognized that local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country’s future, including women ‘as victims of conflict and drivers of recovery’. The report also mentioned to protect livelihoods and generate employment.10 Mentioning these issues have been a way of addressing the academic critics who criticized the liberal peace approach of the UN peacekeeping missions and advocated the need of national actors in the decision-making process.

Since 2009, the focus of the peacebuilding process has been to nationally-owned peacebuilding. In this process, the UN has been trying to move away from external stakeholders in ways that recognize the importance of national decision-making, participatory processes, more agile funding, and local context and capacities. The ongoing UN peace operations have been focusing on extending responsive state authority and
building state-society relations. Though the missions are still involved in state-building activities, engaging with the local communities and catering to their need has been given more importance. These efforts are evident in the peace operations in Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. In recent years, the UN is focusing on 'sustaining peace', a concept that is broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.

**Academic Evolution of Peacebuilding**

Parallel to the institutional developments, there have been significant discussions on the concept of peacebuilding in the intellectual arena. Boutros-Ghali's report also sparked a renewed interest in the peacebuilding literature. As such, the number of articles that focused on peace issue increased manyfolds and there has been a significant development in the academic arena regarding the meaning of peacebuilding. The concept of peacebuilding was driven by practice rather than theory. Peacebuilding as a concept means creating a culture of peace through establishing institutions that promote and facilitate non-violent solution to disputes and tensions. The UN states, peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.

State-building and governance are considered as the central points of peacebuilding effort.

In the academic circle, there are three major debates on peacebuilding. Galtung and Fischer emphasized that peacebuilding is the interface between peacekeeping and peacemaking and between a robust third-party
response to ongoing violent conflict and the establishment of conditions to be able to tackle the causes of the dispute. Galtung identified peacebuilding as a process to create self-supporting structures to remove the causes of war and offer alternatives in potential war situations. On the other hand, American sociologist John Paul Lederach proposed that peacebuilding is engaging grassroots, local NGOs, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace process. He defined peacebuilding as “an array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable and peaceful relationships”. Similarly, Reychler opined that the central task of peacebuilding is to create positive peace, a “stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war”. But these definitions raise debates as to which actors and institutions should be involved in the undertaking, what kind of mandate and resources ought to be involved and what time frame for such an operation might be. Based on the evidence from Sierra Leone, Jennifer M Hazen argued that it is highly questionable whether peacekeepers are equipped to handle peacebuilding tasks and what the role of the armed forces in peacebuilding is.

Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke argued that there are three central pillars of peacebuilding, e.g., security, socio-economic opportunities and well-being (welfare and development) and a robust framework of justice and the rule of law. They argued that security and development concerns cannot be separated and the concept of peacebuilding is a heuristic device which makes a sense of and put into practice such a joint approach. But Astri Suhrke pointed out that it is difficult to link a security agenda with peace and development concerns—particularly in a situation where the military intervention drags on resulting in a contradictory situation of ‘waging war while building peace’. Even if combat does not continue to rage, the risk of a post-conflict situation slipping back into violence is omnipresent, leading to call for peace support operations to privilege ‘security promotion’ efforts in particularly SSR and DDR of ex-combatants. In this respect, debate arises regarding how to balance security concerns with development needs and how DDR can be embedded into peacebuilding efforts and aligned more closely with broader development strategies.

A conceptual debate has arisen recently regarding peacebuilding versus state-building because of the considerable degree of conceptual confusion
### Table 2.1 Evolution of the Concept of Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proponents</th>
<th>Focus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johan Galtung (1976)</td>
<td>Structures to remove the causes of war and offer alternatives to potential situations of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
<td>Identify and support structures to strengthen peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen J. Stedman and Donald Rothchild (1996)</td>
<td>Politico-economic, military and cultural security along with confidence building</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Paul Lederach (1997)</td>
<td>Post-accord reconstruction (relationship building)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (2001)</td>
<td>Political factors are key to peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rama Mani (2002)</td>
<td>Social and associative process to build fractured relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolf Schwarz (2005)</td>
<td>Security, welfare and representation as the core of peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Bryden and others (2005)</td>
<td>Security governance, rule of law and transitional justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer M Hazen (2007)</td>
<td>Role of armed forces in peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astri Suhrke (2012)</td>
<td>SSR and DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Hatto (2013)</td>
<td>Integration among different UN actors and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke (2015)</td>
<td>Welfare and development, framework of justice and rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhav Joshi and Peter Wallensteen (2018)</td>
<td>Ensuring post-war security, improvement of governance, economic reconstruction, reconciliation and transitional justice, strengthening the role of civil society</td>
</tr>
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Source: Compiled by the author.
with regard to each of the two concepts individually and their relation with each other. Some authors have suggested to conceive peacebuilding as a subset of state-building activities while others, conversely, have considered state-building to be a part of peacebuilding. But Jörn Grävingholt, Stefan Gänzle and Sebastian Ziaja argued that the two concepts represent different perspectives on a very similar underlying problem, e.g., fragile social peace and the destruction of political order. While peacebuilding is a multi-faceted single-purpose task, state-building can be rather characterized as a multi-purpose and instrumental task. Additionally, building state apparatus is a task of enormous instrumental value for several end goals, e.g., peace, human security and a rule-based framework for socio-economic development and it should not be considered a goal in itself. In contrast, peacebuilding is concerned with bringing about an element of favourable development itself. Thus, peacebuilding can justifiably be regarded as an end goal rather than an instrument. They also argued that while differences between the concepts of peacebuilding and state-building exist, there is a tendency in recent scholarship as well as policy documents to overemphasize some of the resulting dissimilarities.

At the implementation level, three kinds of debates are discussed. First is about integration versus segregation. Peacebuilding operations generally have three pillars, e.g., diplomatic and political pillar, a military pillar (Blue Helmets) and a humanitarian pillar. Therefore, integration among different UN actors and NGOs is important. Cédric de Coning argued that integration continues to present problems, particularly, with regard to institutional peculiarities or bureaucratic rivalries between the agencies deployed in peacebuilding missions. As most UN agencies and the secretariat bodies have a strong tradition of autonomy, they are attached to their prerogatives and mandates, and are opposed to overly strong ‘integration’. Second, developed countries are still wary of deploying their soldiers in missions. This practice creates two kinds of peacekeeping: peacekeeping for the rich versus peacekeeping for the poor. In peacekeeping for the rich, developed countries do not hesitate to deploy well-trained troops with substantial resources. In peacekeeping for the poor, the UN has to be content with deploying troops that have varying degrees of training and are often badly equipped. Third one is related to whether the application of an SOP for a wide range of disparate conflict
settings is the appropriate approach. The mandates developed by the UN authority, sometimes face challenges in the implementation level. Therefore, there are pertaining debates on how to make SOPs compatible with the existing necessities in the field level.

Apart from those debates, there are several criticisms of the concept of peacebuilding as well. The whole idea of peacebuilding is based on the assumption that there is a need to ‘address root causes’ of conflict. However, what constitutes the root causes of conflict is not self-evident or agreed upon. During the post-Cold War era, when peacebuilding and multidimensional UN peacekeeping became popular, the liberal peace hypothesis emerged as the most influential doctrine. The core idea of the hypothesis is that democratic countries do not fight each other and, thus, the promotion of democracy can prevent conflict. The influence of this hypothesis can be seen in UN peace operations. The peacekeeping missions operate by the motto that if the war-torn societies are bestowed with democracy, good governance, civil society, open markets, and human rights, conflict will become less likely. The academic critics of the liberal peace, such as Mac Ginty, Paris and Richmond are highly critical of this concept. They labelled the concept ‘liberal imperialism’ in peacebuilding.

Another criticism is that the evolving role of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations which requires overcoming the UN Charter, prohibition of intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. There are significant efforts within the UN system to ensure that the peacebuilding activities increase local integration, as evident by the recent nationally-owned peacebuilding approach. But Pugh observed that centrally coordinated methods of the peace operations and the promises of increased local engagement are contradictory to each other. He argued that local autonomy is meaningless without the capacity to resist the power of external actors, particularly their financial power. As the UN continues to increase its capacity and intervene in countries for a longer period of time with the support of international financial institutions, the quest for local autonomy will become more rhetorical than real.

Furthermore, much of the ongoing peacebuilding missions solely focus on state-building measures. However, some communities regard their respective states as largely meaningless, as in Kosovo, where the attempt
### Table 2.2 Components of Peacebuilding

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pillars</th>
<th>UN Peacebuilding Priorities[^45]</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Supporting basic safety and security</td>
<td>Removal of landmines (mine action), protection of civilians, DDR, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the provision of basic services</td>
<td>Water and sanitation, health and primary education, support to the safe and sustainable return, and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Supporting economic revitalization</td>
<td>Employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Addressing women’s post-conflict needs</td>
<td>Ensuring women’s participation in politics and elected office, and increasing the level of post-conflict financing devoted to promote women’s empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the restoring of core government functions</td>
<td>Supporting public administration and public finance, at the national and sub-national levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>Supporting political processes</td>
<td>Supporting electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation and developing conflict-management capacity at the national and subnational levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author.
to build one has often been a cause of conflict. This is connected to another major criticism of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions, which is the lack of accountability to the populations affected. Even though, there is an increasing discussion on the local engagement in the peacebuilding process.

Despite these debates and criticisms, peacebuilding continues to be the dominant paradigm in the UN peace missions. Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding, in the immediate aftermath of conflict sets out five recurring priorities of peacebuilding and it also describes the basic tasks undertaken by the UN missions in a conflict situation. The progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict also discusses several priorities. Along similar lines, Vincent Chetail divided UN peacebuilding activities into four pillars—security, development, democratization and human rights. This chapter uses Vincent Chetail’s framework to divide the priorities and tasks of the UN peacebuilding effort. The framework is explained in Table 2.2.

Over the years, the UN peacekeeping missions have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to nationally-owned peacebuilding. This shift has been corresponded by academic debates on the issues of conceptual clarity, the balance between security and development and to what extent the peace missions should focus on state-building. There are also disagreements regarding value promotion in the peacebuilding activities in respective countries. Because every society bears some unique values and imposition of new values may be problematic for the people of the respective society. Therefore, developing a common understanding of peacebuilding affairs remains challenging.

**Contemporary Challenges of Peacebuilding**

The multidimensional nature of peacebuilding concept, both in the context of UN and in the academic world, has been discussed in the previous section. The debates, surrounding peacebuilding, point to the complexity of its implementation and diverging viewpoints as to the notion itself. The academic contributions in the domain immensely helped in shaping the field level practices. Yet, peacebuilding as a practice is beset with multilayered challenges emanating from political, institutional and
implementation issues. Ongoing peacebuilding operations show the magnitude of these challenges and how they make the practical tasks of peacebuilding difficult to address. This section discusses the emerging challenges of the modern peacebuilding operations.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) formed the three components of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA). Since the establishment of the PBC in 2005, challenges were encountered in the institutional framework, operational procedure and implementation mechanisms. As one of its first two agendas, the PBC responded to the Burundian government’s desire to focus on peacebuilding in 2006. During 2007 to 2014, the PBF delivered over US$61 million in Burundi to implement peacebuilding projects. During the transitional period of Burundi, the PBA made a clear difference through several smart and targeted interventions implemented by Security Council-mandated missions. It also helped unblock political stalemates, support critical reforms in security institutions and implement aspects of the council’s mandate that did not otherwise have funding. It also helped raising resources, mediate between the government and international donors and focusing on the political aspects of Burundi’s post-conflict transition.

Despite this visible success, there were flaws in some projects that the PBF funded in Burundi. Only seven out of 18 projects could achieve their goals and were pertinent to Burundi’s peacebuilding process during the first investment worth US$35 million. It was also reported that some of the unsuccessful PBF projects had negative impacts. During the second investment worth US$9.2 million, many of the PBF-funded activities failed to serve the main purpose of peacebuilding activities, but were concentrated on standard development or humanitarian activities. The impact on the intended beneficiaries led to the violent protests in Bujumbura in the spring of 2015. It validated that the PBA’s effectiveness was constrained by the policies and practices of Burundi’s political actors. The PBA failed to show the capacity to prevent parties from returning to war. The reason behind the failure was that this type of heavy-handed intervention required a degree of military, political and financial support. But that is neither allowed because of the question of state sovereignty, nor is it financially feasible in the broader geopolitical climate. The PBA
was established with the potential to assist countries in their post-war transitions, providing crucial peacebuilding resources and targeted political advice to host governments. But with the absence of an inclusive and democratic host government like the case of Burundi, there was little space for PBA to act effectively.

**Political Challenges**

The proponents of peacebuilding emphasize on the political factors as the key to lasting peace. But peace cannot be established in isolation from the complexities of global politics. In a multipolar world, geopolitics continues to bring new dimensions to global and regional political landscape. These have profound implications for UN peace-related operations. For example, competition between the US and China has led to increased tensions in recent years. This has been felt in parts of Asia and Africa. The events in Ukraine demonstrate how the conflict between Russia and the West can also escalate even though the Cold War has been long ended. Beyond great-power politics, traditional conflicts also persist in some regions, for example between Pakistan and India in South Asia. Along with these global geopolitical realities, international progress in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is often stymied by rising non-traditional security threats, e.g., climate change, violent extremism and terrorism. Peacebuilding operations are not free from these complex equations of international politics and emerging threats that are harder to address by dint of military means. Global powers are in constant competition to influence the post-conflict outcome according to their own priorities.

Although the number of overall ongoing violent conflicts declined compared to those in the mid-1990s, today’s conflicts are more severe in nature. These conflicts are more complex, involving intra-state violence, civil wars and ethnic or religious strife. That the belligerents are not always formal armies, rather rebel groups, insurgents, guerrillas, warlords, independent militias and terrorist groups complicate the task of mediation and peacebuilding. In many conflict-affected states, any attempt to prematurely reconstruct a strong central authority is not only difficult but doing so can also trigger increased violence, as one group gets primacy
Conflicts are also becoming stretched due to rivalries between global and regional powers in the form of proxy wars. The colonial legacies also determine troops deployment in some parts of the globe.

On the other hand, as non-state actors become more powerful in global decision making, it creates a 'diplomatic deficit' in the old structures of international relations while also presenting opportunities for alternative channels for mediation. The proliferation of non-state actors has ushered in an age of global partnerships between private and
public bodies on specific issues, including the area of peacebuilding. Although their influence and impact on peacebuilding operations also pose certain risks. Thus, managing the role of non-state actors, especially those of spoilers, from negatively influencing the outcome has also become imperative.

**Institutional Challenges**

The complex institutional framework of the UN Peacebuilding Commission leads to the ambiguity and delay in the decision-making process. It will be useful here to discuss the formation of the commission to clarify the point. The PBC brings together 31 member states that serve for renewable terms of two years as shown in Figure 2.1. European Union (EU), IMF, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and World Bank can participate in all meetings of the PBC. The Commission can also invite additional partners to participate in its deliberations. These partners may include member states who are not members of the PBC, representatives of relevant entities of the UN system, international financial institutions, regional and sub-regional organizations as well as civil society organizations, including youth and women organizations.

The peacebuilding architecture has three pillars: (a) political and diplomatic pillar, (b) military pillar, i.e., the Blue Helmets and (c) humanitarian pillar. Only UN-based organizations contribute permanently in these three pillars—the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the political pillar, peacebuilding soldiers in the military pillar and specialized agencies as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the humanitarian pillar. The inclusion of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional and international organizations is vital for the smooth functioning, credibility, and efficiency of these three pillars of peacebuilding. Nonetheless, it is also noted that there is a lack of integration and coordination of operations due to the strong tradition of autonomy of the UN agencies. Due to this tendency, organizations are more attached to their mandates and prerogatives which sometimes does not go well with the idea of ‘integration’ suggested in the Brahimi Report on 21 August 2000.
Since the field works are short-term in nature, there is limited time for the operation of systemic rotation. As the nature of peacebuilding is context-specific, skilled leadership, intelligent political analysis and robust local knowledge are crucial. Context-specific knowledge building mechanism of peacebuilding bureaucracy faces problems in certain cases. For example, the environmental issues like ozone depletion or climate change are cases where consensual knowledge is created based on generalized scientific evidence of the epistemic communities; new network-based forms of knowledge management can be found in bureaucratic organizations. However, knowledge generation should not be limited to formal structures and resources for policy development rather should include factors like leadership, staff skills, incentives, career development as well as the coordination and interaction with external experts and other actors.

Bureaucracies require standardization of efficiency and rationalized training. The perfect balance between generalization and context-specificity has to be made, which is only possible when the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy is able to tackle the increasing complexities and uncertainties.

Peacebuilding is often conflated with the task of state-building, because of the former’s emphasis on the institutions of democratic governance. This has been reflected in some contemporary debates. According to Roland Paris,

Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering—an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.

Oliver P Richmond discusses ‘peacebuilding consensus’ in which “like-minded liberal states co-exist in a Western-oriented international society and states are characterized by democracy, human rights, free markets, development, a vibrant civil society and multilateralism.” In the process of initiating strategic negotiations with the view to establishing democratic governance, peacebuilding is often viewed as a threat to the power and authority of the local elites. The balance between the concrete objectives of the peacebuilders and the goals of the democratization of the state apparatus is difficult.
Thus, conceptual challenges, complex organizational structure, coordination of multifunction, monitoring of the PBC and the lack of democratic institution and political culture create institutional challenges for modern peacebuilding operations. The bottom line is that each peacebuilding case requires a specific mix of organizations and expertise.

Field Level Challenges

Peacebuilding as a theory is much difficult to implement at the field level because of context-specific challenges. Some of these problems concern field level operations. The first issue is, perhaps, whether or not to expand the mandates of the mission. The question of commitment and prioritization of goals is difficult to balance at times. For example, early withdrawal is risky because there will be limited time for building peace, viz., ensuring reconciliation and restoring much-needed state institutions. However, there are also dangers of long missions because of dwindling returns over time. This line of argument has been made by many experts who note that the role of the global organizations, such as the UN, in peace missions is most crucial where there is a strong need for ‘transitional political arrangements.’ For example, helping to draw up constitutions, build institutions and oversee elections. The following discussion explores some of these challenges frequently encountered at the field level operations of the UN peacebuilding mission.

In the last decade or so, there has been an increasing discussion to ensure local participation in peacebuilding. This implies engaging local actors and empowering indigenous communities. But finding out efficient mechanisms for local participation is harder than it is normally suggested. International peacebuilders experience new challenges in the field while attempting to promote inclusiveness. Yet, failure in exclusion could lead to a potential risk factor for recurrence of conflict. Deterring post-transition authorities from excluding particular social groups is therefore highly crucial. Since the state machinery or an inclusive governance system is almost non-existent in post-conflict situations, fostering inclusive national ownership determines the success of peace operations. There is also a need for facilitating roles for international actors, long-term engagement and approaches that respond to demands and context. Effective
peacebuilding also requires greater participation of civil society and local populations. Mandated peace missions require locally differentiated analysis in line with local perceptions and participation, as well as inclusive processes in designing prioritized peacebuilding programmes. Collecting information from dozens of localities and converting it into coherent plans of action and programmes require greater resources.

The peacebuilders, deployed in the field, encounter varying degrees of communication, coordination and information problems. However, the success of PBC missions is highly contingent upon effective communication and coordination with the UN headquarters and other stakeholders on the grassroots levels. Not all stakeholders may have necessary tools at their disposal, for example, in the areas like confidence building measures and risk reduction. In more challenging and conflict-prone situations, the same logistical resources that special UN missions and peacekeeping operations have, may be not available across all missions. To overcome these challenges, the UN has been experimenting with and promoting the ‘Delivering as One (DaO)’ initiative to encourage various organizations within the system to work more closely in the field.

Efficient peacebuilding is also positively related to the availability of funding. Two types of issues are generally encountered. First, those requiring short-term, but urgent projects that UN development agencies and the multilateral development banks are not always well-equipped to respond, especially considering time constraint. These needs may include DDR, quick impact projects, urgent employment generation projects, political or constitutional processes, training for negotiators and civil society groups operating in a more open political regime and human rights reforms. Second, the long-term institutional development needs for fragile and conflict-affected countries are also required, especially where peacebuilding is concerned. As the World Development Report (WDR) 2011 pointed out, these institutional development challenges require 20 or more years of commitment. Development agencies have not been inclined to commit to such long-term peace-oriented ventures for obvious reasons of time stretch. There is a need for more resources. But questions remain as to who will share the long-term burden. Despite years of discussions for greater attention to conflict prevention and post-war recovery and peacebuilding, member states have been unable to commit.
to the resources for these tasks. However, peacekeeping troops—which require short-term commitment—are more popular among member states willing to contribute. It is hard to calculate how much is spent on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, since a little portion of most agencies’ budget is dedicated to this purpose. But then again, it must be mentioned that in contrast to the requirement of peacebuilding, peacekeeping troops and civilian advisers are not given the necessary resources for priority post-war programmes like urgent job creation, short-term political and security aspects of peace processes and sustained institutional development in fiscal policy, service provision and politically sensitive areas like policing, justice and human rights.

The UN peacebuilding mechanism should re-evaluate its field presence, including the nature and composition of more streamlined presence of the countries, leadership, the selection and training of suitable staff, provision of resources and clear and unified delegation of authority. The operational peacebuilding measures require a thorough understanding of the potential and actual causes of conflict, ways to engage more effectively with local actors, women’s groups, more effective and unitary communication strategies. The PBC’s operations demand clarification of its mandate and role, relationship to the Security Council and proper funding facilities. The PBF could also have additional and more reliable resources for both emergencies and prolonged crises. For the success of the PBC initiative, there is a need to foster more policy harmonization.

Potential for Bangladesh’s Contribution

Bangladesh has been one of the pioneering contributors in the UN peace operations. Its first deployment in the UN peacekeeping operation came in August 1988 by participating in United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). Fifteen army officers from the Bangladesh Army participated in that military observer group. The author was one of the 15 pioneer military officers of Bangladesh who served at the UNIIMOG and received the commendation of the Force Commander. Since then, the numbers of Bangladeshi peacekeepers have seen a steady rise in the UN peacekeeping affairs. One major reason was the end of the Cold War, which enabled the UN to be more decisive. On the other hand,
the second major reason was the increasing number of civil wars and armed conflicts across the globe that has resulted in increased UN peacekeeping missions as well. Hence, there was a strong demand to fill the void of peacekeepers under the blue helmet. Since its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1988, Bangladesh has come a long way in its thirty-year journey as a UN peacekeeping nation. Following the end of the Cold War, liberal democratic forces started to change the global political landscape. Incidentally, around the same period, Bangladesh was going through its own socio-political shift, as the military rule ended and made the way for reinvigorated democratic voyage in the country. Since then, a total of 160,204 members from Bangladesh armed forces and police have participated in the noble task of peacekeeping. In total 145 Bangladeshi uniformed peacekeepers have died while serving under the UN flag. Bangladesh is recognized as a leader in UN peacekeeping operations, as its contribution has been recognized several times in the Security Council.

Despite having an impressive track record in the UN peacekeeping missions, Bangladesh needs to widen its focus to include peacebuilding in its pledge for peace as a responsible member of the global community. At the primary phase of the UN peacekeeping missions, uniformed personnel were in the majority. However, with the shift in the UN’s philosophical understanding regarding what really constitutes ‘peace’, increasingly the requirement for civilian participation has gone up in these missions whereas uniformed personnel started to play a supportive role. This role reversal has made civilians as integral part of the UN peacebuilding architecture. The average share of uniformed personnel is 86.12 per cent and civilian personnel is 13.88 per cent in the peacekeeping operations. Figure 2.2 and Annex 2.1 show the increasing number of civilians in the UN peacekeeping operations in 2018.

Another significant fact is that civilians were more than 50 per cent in four UN peacekeeping operations in 2018, e.g., MINURSO (52.02 per cent), UNMIK (94.87 per cent), UNMOGIP (62.06 per cent) and UNTSO (60.98 per cent).
Figure 2.2 Percentage of Uniformed and Civilian Personnel in UNPKOs as of December 2018

Source: Compiled by the author.
Scope for Contribution

As discussed in the previous sections, peacebuilding has four components, e.g., security, development, human rights and democratization. Bangladesh can contribute in these four components of peacebuilding. At the time of transition from short-term peacekeeping efforts to long-term peacebuilding process, Bangladesh police and military personnel have an opportunity to work at the security component of peacebuilding. The uniformed peacekeepers from Bangladesh have directly contributed in protecting vulnerable communities, clearing some of the most dangerous land mines and unexploded ordnance and also played important role in DDR process in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kosovo and Timor-Leste, etc. Having these experiences, they can certainly contribute to the security component of peacebuilding. Besides, Bangladesh police and armed force have expertise in the field of responsive policing, accountable policing, community policing and electoral assistance. By utilizing this expertise, they can play a potential role in basic safety, security and the rule of law which includes protection of properties and lives, enforcement of law and order, capacity building of local police, reform of the security and training of local police forces, and ensuring the respect for human rights for achieving sustainable peace.

One of the main purposes of democratization component is to restore core government functions and the political process to bring back stability in a post-conflict society. There is a space for public services of Bangladesh to share their expertise in the areas of public finance management, electoral process and public administration. On the other hand, the main purposes of the development component are as follows: to support the provision of basic services like healthcare, job creation, education and economic revitalization. In this respect, some of the well-recognized NGOs, e.g., BRAC, WaterAid Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Wash Alliance are working on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programme and their skilled and trained staff can certainly contribute in the development component of future peacebuilding efforts in any country in trouble. BRAC, a non-governmental organization, which has been declared as the top NGO in 2019 for the fourth consecutive year, has already been playing a pivotal role in some of the most conflict-ridden
countries, such as Afghanistan, Liberia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone by working on areas viz. microfinance, healthcare, youth development, education, women empowerment and poverty alleviation. This international experience to work in different geographical locations and with diversified problems have rendered BRAC with skill sets that can be utilized in UN peacebuilding efforts.

One of the key focuses of the human rights component of peacebuilding is ensuring women’s participation in politics and elected offices, and increasing the level of post-conflict financing devoted to promote women’s empowerment. The main purpose of the human rights component is to address women’s post-conflict needs. According to UN statistics, almost 80 per cent of the civilian staff is male and only 20 per cent is female. Therefore, there is a gap between male and female ratio in terms of participation. Recently, the UN has decided to bring gender parity on the issue. Bangladesh is also trying to increase Bangladeshi women’s participation in the UN peacekeeping affairs. As Table 2.3 shows, till March 2019, a total of 1,185 female members from Bangladesh Police, 289 female members from the Army, 12 female members from the Navy and 65 female members from the Air force have participated in the UN missions.

Moreover, Bangladeshi female officers are reaching new heights of achievement in the UN. In Haiti, an all-female Bangladeshi Formed Police Unit served with the UN mission, known as MINUSTAH, from 2015 until October 2017, until the end of the mission. The contribution of the Bangladeshi women peacekeepers is appreciated in the international forums due to their sincerity, commitment and efficiency when they were working in the field level. By participating in UN peacebuilding effort, Bangladeshi female civilian staff can place themselves as a key driving force to reduce gender-based violence, conflict and confrontation, providing a sense of security, especially for women and children, mentoring female police officer in the local area and thus, empowering women in the host country and promoting social cohesion.

Despite the above mentioned opportunities, participation of Bangladeshi civilians in the UN has been limited in number. As of 31 August 2015, only one Bangladeshi civilian was working at the D-2 level
Table 2.3 Bangladesh Female Peacekeepers Deployed in UN Missions as of March 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Organization</th>
<th>Participated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,551</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Armed Forces Division, Prime Minister’s Office, Bangladesh.

while most were working at P-1 to P-5 levels. In 2015, there were 48 Bangladeshi citizens working as international civilian staff in the UN, whereas the number of uniformed personnel from Bangladesh in the UN peacekeeping operations was 9,432.93 In 2017, 726 civilian staff from Bangladesh were working at the UN, whereas 7,246 uniformed personnel were participating in UNPKOs. Bangladeshi nationals in the UN senior appointments like Peace Support Operations (PSOs), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) are also very low in number.94 There are total 28 occupational groups of civilians for UN affairs. Among them, the majority of Bangladeshi civilians are participating in security sectors.95

Civilians are divided into two categories in PSOs, e.g., substantive component and supportive component. As a substantive component, civilians can contribute in the following areas: political affairs, human rights, legal advice, humanitarian liaison, public information, planning and coordination, child protection, gender, conduct and discipline, rule of law, electoral affairs, civil affairs, SSR and DDR. As a supportive component, civilians can contribute in the following areas: human resources, procurement, financial, logistics, Geographical Information System (GIS), Information and Communications Technology (ICT), transport, Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE), security, engineering and integrated training services.96
Bangladeshi civilians can participate in 26 occupation groups related to PSOs. Bangladeshi civilians, as a supportive component, can contribute in 12 job categories that provide logistics and administrative services in the PSOs. In each of the job categories of supportive component, Bangladeshi civilians can design, install, operate and maintain mission-wide communications including telephone, radio and data systems, proprietary information management systems, internet, intra-mission mail and diplomatic pouch service, etc. Bangladeshi civilians can contribute in 14 job categories that give services to the local recipients as defined in the mandates of respective PSOs. Bangladeshi civilians can contribute in many ways in each of these job categories of substantive components. They can provide policy and technical advice to the senior mission leadership, the host government and partners on strategies for advancing gender equality and women’s rights. There is also scope for providing expert technical advice to inform policy and operational activities of mission components and ensure the delivery of appropriate training for all levels of personnel on gender issues; strengthening partnerships, including with the national machinery for the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality and ensuring documentation and dissemination of good practices and lessons learned, etc.

**Strengths of Bangladesh**

Bangladesh earned independence in 1971 through a bloody war in expense of 30 million lives. This great human tragedy has been the part of the collective memory which has been translated in the incorporation of ‘friendship to all and malice to none’ as the guiding principle of Bangladesh’s foreign relations. Furthermore, the centrality of peace or global peace has been inscribed in the preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh as it says, “...we may prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind”. Besides, in the initial years of independence, Bangladesh was part of a bipolar global structure. To maintain sovereignty, like many other post-colonial states, it was imperative for Bangladesh to uphold multilateralism under the umbrella of
Table 2.4 Number of Police, UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM), Staff Officers and Troops by Nationality as of December 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>UNMEM</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,318</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>7,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5,828</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5,211</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5,861</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5,272</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the UN and maintain neutrality. This philosophical pledge to uphold global peace, stability and non-interference have shaped Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Therefore, following the end of the Cold War and the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh during the early-1990s, it was no surprise that Bangladesh became one of the flag bearers of the UN peacekeeping effort. The principle of neutrality and non-interference as well as humanitarian obligation obtained through the upheavals of history, have been reflected in Bangladesh peacekeeping efforts.

For example, Bangladeshi troops under the UN peace mission arrived in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. They carried out their peacekeeping activities as well as humanitarian and social work beyond the UN mandate. In doing humanitarian services, Bangladeshi troops provided free medical treatment
daily or weekly or on the additional basis to the local people. Treatments were provided to serious patients like those suffering from malaria. They also received Bangladeshi medical drugs and distributed for free among the locals. They used to distribute food among the local people. Besides, Bangladeshi battalions supplied pure drinking water to locals and UN personnel in all their camps. Bangladeshi peacekeepers also extended their support to local orphanages and get children resettled whenever required. They gave free treatment to 58,646 Ivorians between 01 July 2006 and 31 May 2007.

In recognition of the contributions made by Bangladeshi peacekeeping forces, people of Côte d'Ivoire have named a particular street in Danane town as ‘Bangladesh Road’. Similar thing happened in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In recognition and appreciation to the contribution made by the Bangladeshi peacemakers, Sierra Leone has declared Bangla as their 2nd language and Liberia has named their capital’s major street as ‘Bangladesh’.

The adaptation capability of the peacekeepers of Bangladesh is already established and they have proved to be disciplined, efficient and successful by participating in various UN missions around the world. Bangladesh has deployed more than 0.15 million of its peacekeepers in 54 missions spread across 40 different countries, though it made a late entry in 1988 through the UNIIMOG. Bangladesh joined the second generation of UN peacekeeping and has coped with its emergent transformation with its professional demeanour. Bangladesh Army took the pioneering role and subsequently Bangladesh Navy (BN) and Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) as well as Bangladesh Police, reinforced the country’s peacekeeping contribution. These forces have developed an efficient SOPs, established an institutional framework to mobilize for peacekeeping operations and are in a position to train and deploy effective and adequate forces when the UN calls for it. Bangladesh’s consistent participation in the peacekeeping missions over the last three decades originates from her constitutional obligations to maintain peace, freedom and justice across the world. In discharging their solemn duties under the UN flag, a total of 145 Bangladeshi peacekeepers have made the ultimate sacrifice among a total of 3,700 UN peacekeepers killed in peacekeeping duty. Despite being informed about the huge challenges at the missions, Bangladeshi soldiers bear courage and devotion towards their professionalism. The sacrificing
mentality and desire of the contribution in the international fora can make Bangladesh a reliable partner in the international peacebuilding affairs. In addition, Bangladesh can contribute in the areas of institution building. Bangladesh has established the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) to provide training mainly to army, navy and air forces. Bangladeshi peacebuilders can also help the host country build up different types of institutions like electoral office, health institute, disaster emergency centre, disaster relief shelter, maternal and child health centre, voter registration centre and immunization clinic, etc.

Bangladeshis have strong resilience to face different kinds of natural calamities and disasters. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, a panel of experts on CNN suggested that Bangladesh can be a case for best practices for learning about resilience to natural disasters. This is because Bangladeshis have confronted cyclones, tidal surges and floods for so many years. Their accumulated practical knowledge is an immense resource for the international community and practitioners on climate change. It might be useful in the UN peacebuilding effort in post-conflict societies where climate change and natural disasters aggravated the human sufferings.

Challenges for Bangladesh

The role of civilians in the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions has shifted from a secondary support role to the core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and the number of civilians has steadily increased over the years. A considerable number of civilians now constitute the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and most of the civilian contributing countries are from the Global South. The opportunities and areas where the civilians can contribute in the UN peacebuilding affairs were being discussed in the previous section. Unfortunately, there is no government mechanism or organizational structure to incorporate civilians in the UN peacebuilding affairs like that of the military and police.

Most of the civilians are unaware and uninformed about the vast job opportunity in the peacebuilding arena with lucrative UN salary packages. There is Youth Promotion Initiative under the peacebuilding fund which
aims to strengthen the participation of men and women within existing peacebuilding initiatives, supports innovative projects focused on youth employment and participation with peacebuilding outcomes and so on.\textsuperscript{104} There are many initiatives and programmes under the umbrella of the UN peacebuilding office. The circulars about these initiatives as well as the application processes are being constantly updated on the official websites. Regretfully, most of the eligible civilians of Bangladesh do not even know about the process and procedures to apply for the jobs as well.

As of now, there exist no official training facilities for the civilians to prepare them for UN jobs. Collective operational learning about peacebuilding affairs and commitment to increase funding for those training mechanisms are very crucial. Trained civilians will highlight their professionalism and as a result, they will be able to show effective performance in a short period of time. In terms of the peacebuilding arena, there is no such institutional arrangement. Although under the supervision of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), a training institution named ‘Bangladesh Peacebuilding Centre (BPC)’ has been established but it is yet to start the training.

There is a strong representation of Bangladesh in UN peacekeeping and the number of civilians in that arena is also increasing day by day. But in terms of the UN peacebuilding affairs, it is seen that in most of the occupational groups where Bangladeshi civilians can participate are yet to be explored. It is not only from the personal level, but also from the national level, there should be appropriate communications and negotiations. Strong diplomatic initiatives can create opportunities so that the trained and qualified civilians can be deployed in the UN, including peacebuilding missions.

**Conclusion**

Peace missions have become one of the core activities of the UN through which the organization contributes towards peace and stability in many parts of the world. Since its inception, the UN has initiated various peace missions, but their scope has changed over the period of time, due to the changing nature of conflicts and new challenges they pose. There have been subsequent developments within the UN apparatus to confront those
changes. The concept of peacebuilding also developed based on emerging practices. There has been a growing emphasis on the necessity for addressing security while not overlooking the developmental issues. Moreover, peacebuilding, as the practice goes, often involves the activities of state-building or institution building.

It is also highlighted by some experts that the task of peacebuilding is different from those rendered under peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement missions. It is being increasingly felt that the dichotomies of these concepts are becoming blurred and often the UN takes on many of those roles under the umbrella of the single mission. In the recent years, the UN has been trying to address criticisms that missions rely more on external intervention rather than catering to local needs. Therefore, the UN is focusing now on nationally-owned peacebuilding efforts. At the same time, it is working to better coordinate with other agencies at the implementation level. In this context, the peacebuilding activities of the UN can be divided into four pillars: security, development, human rights and democratization, as discussed in the chapter.

The chapter also explored the emerging challenges ongoing peace missions are facing. These can be divided into (a) political challenges, (b) institutional challenges, and (c) field level challenges. But the bottom line is that the global political order is changing and this has an impact in shaping the role of the UN. This changing dynamic also dictates where the UN peace missions will be authorized. Despite the existence of an organizational structure named Peacebuilding Commission under the UN, due to its complex structure, it often faces challenges in coordination and multifunctionality. There is a need for better coordination and efficiency in delivery. At the field level, the involvement of multidimensional peace missions and of multiple agencies demand strong leadership.

Bangladesh has been playing a major role in the UN peace missions for a long time and its role is well recognized by the conflicting zones it served as well as other member states. Some of the post-conflict countries where Bangladesh had sent its mission under the UN, recognized the country’s contribution by declaring Bengali as one of the official languages of the respective country. Despite the country’s enormous contribution, the role of Bangladesh in the peace missions has been mostly limited to the participation of armed forces. As the role of the UN peace missions
evolved over time, the participation of civilians has become important in the current multidimensional peace missions. There is much scope and potential for Bangladeshi civilians to contribute in the UN peacebuilding efforts. Bangladesh has the capacity and experience to contribute in each of the four major components of peacebuilding, e.g., security, development, human rights and democratization, as a substantive and supportive component in different occupational groups as well as in the norm setting and institution building.
### Annex 2.1 Uniformed and Civilian Personnel in UNPKOs as of December 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>International Civilians (as of May 2018)</th>
<th>Local Civilians (as of May 2018)</th>
<th>UN Volunteers</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67.16 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>January 1949</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.75 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>53.53 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60.30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,120</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,147</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>474.41 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURUSO</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52.87 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37.19 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5,833</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2,296</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>11,077</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>385.68 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cont'd. to the next page)
(Cont’d from previous page)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>International Civilians (as of May 2018)</th>
<th>Local Civilians (as of May 2018)</th>
<th>UN Volunteers</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>15,345</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>20,580</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1.11 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>263.86 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>14,275</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1,778</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>19,363</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.12 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12,336</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>16,139</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1.07 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11,177</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>15,046</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>930.21 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUJUSTH</td>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121.46 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>75,033</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>10,371</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>8,393</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>102,910</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>About 6.69 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes


2. Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”, chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security.


Contemporary Peacebuilding Challenges  


19 Jennifer M. Hazen, op. cit.

20 Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke, op. cit.


25 John Paul Lederach, op. cit.


32 Jennifer M. Hazen, op. cit.


34 Astrid Suhrke, op. cit.

Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke, op. cit.


Ronald Hatto, op. cit.


Ronald Hatto, op. cit.

Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke, op. cit.


Michael Pugh, op. cit.


Michael Pugh, op. cit.


Charles T. Call, op. cit.


Jennifer M. Hazen, op. cit.

Contemporary Peacebuilding Challenges 57

54 Ibid.


68 Kirsti Samuels, op. cit.


71 Gisela Hirschman, op. cit.

Jennifer Hazen, op. cit.


Armed Forces Division of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Bangladesh, 12 March 2019.

Ibid.


United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.


United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.


Margarete Barbosa Sobral and Ajay Sethi, op. cit.


"UN Praises Bangladesh Peacekeepers for Immense Contributions", *Bangla Tribune*, 14 March 2019.


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Opportunities for Civilian in the UN Peace Operations” organized by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh and Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) on 22 February 2016, Dhaka.

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.