CBMs and India-Pakistan Relations

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1. Introduction
Whenever the term CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) gains currency within the circles of policy formulators or decision makers, it at once draws attention to the existence of a tension loaded situation requiring injection of CBMs for reducing the high level of tensions and increasing chances for cooperation. Thus the primary purpose of the CBMs is twofold - to lower tension by eliminating the secrecy, especially in the military affairs, and to push the possibility of war to the realms of extreme remoteness and create conditions conducive to peaceful negotiations. Indeed this makes CBM a useful tool for adversaries that are contemplating improvisation in relationships. The term CBM covers a very large canvas ranging from a simple unwritten understanding between two adversaries to a treaty. It can be defined as a bilateral or multilateral measure that builds confidence, arrests the undesirable drift towards open hostilities, reduces tensions and encourages the adversaries to make contact for negotiations without taxing too much the operative policy pursuits.
The term CBM is a product of the tensions and the rigidity of the Cold War era. During the Cold War period, efforts were directed towards finding ways and means to reduce tension between the major blocs and to minimise the dangers of war. The inflexible and uncompromising postures of the major actors of the Cold War were generating apprehensions rather consistently and an acute need was felt to soften their bellicose attitudes and inject flexibility before the outbreak of another major war. Besides, it was also realised that a major stride towards the desired arms control measure could only be made if the incumbent level of tension was reduced to manageable limits. Thus one began to witness the gradual injection of CBMs. The decade of the 70s was not only accompanied by detente but also demonstrated an impressive growth of CBMs. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 gave birth to first generation of CBMs, which primarily focused on transparency and openness with regard to military affairs. The underlying logic was that greater transparency might reduce mutual suspicions and fears of surprise attack.

The second generation of CBMs grew in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was highlighted in Stockholm Accord of 1986. The Stockholm Accord emphasised not just upon the transparency but also stressed more heavily on 'access
measures'. The access measures implied observation and inspection of certain military activities. The third generation of CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures) were codified in Vienna Document of 1990, which included information exchange provision, improving on site inspection, communication links, encouraging contact among forces, consultation and cooperation regarding unusual and unscheduled military activities, conflict prevention centre and number of constraint measures. The application of the CBMs paid the anticipated dividends in European context. The purpose of this paper is to concentrate upon the application of the CBMs to India-Pakistan situation. The paper is divided into four sections. Initially it traces the evolution of CBMs within the context of Indo-Pak relations and then evaluates the operational nature of the existing CBMs. Section four discusses the factors that have helped in successful implementation of the CBMs in Europe but have proved quite futile in the context of South Asia. And the concluding section focuses on the relevance of the CBMs and finally makes some suggestions for the future.

2. Evolution

Despite the existence of deep-seated distrust between India and Pakistan, the post-1971 war era seems to be relatively calm. While both countries fought three major wars prior to the
signing of the Simla agreement in 1972 and experienced countless border clashes including major encounters like Siachin in 1984 and Kargil in 1999, the post Simla period is marked by the absence of a major war and the advent of many CBMs. However, it needs to be stressed here that towards the end of the 1980s the Kashmiri freedom fighters intensified their struggle of self-determination.

Since the hurried departure of the British from South Asia and partition of the Indian subcontinent, various types of agreements have been signed by India and Pakistan. Many of these agreements were aimed at generating confidence, reducing tensions, resolving the involved issues and regulating normal state-to-state relations. Some of these agreements were bilaterally negotiated and some were product of multilateral efforts. Among the bilaterally negotiated agreements, perhaps the most notables are the Liaquat-Nehru Pact (1950), the Simla Accord (1972), the establishment of the Joint Commission (1983), and the Lahore Declaration (1999). The most important agreements that were the product of multilateral efforts include the Indus Water Treaty (1960), the Tashkent Declaration (1966), and the Rann of Kutch Award (1968). With the exception of the Joint Commission and the Lahore Declaration, all of them were the product of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments.
Both India and Pakistan have also advanced many constructive proposals with a view to maintaining peace in the area. Many such proposals were never translated into agreement for a variety of reasons. A series of bilateral negotiations took place over issues like the ‘No War Pact’ (put forward by both India and Pakistan at different times) or ‘Joint Defence’ (suggested by Pakistan) in 1949-50, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1968, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980-82, and 2001 but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. But both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations have so far failed to secure some kind of an acceptable formula in order to resolve the main conflict over Kashmir. Despite the existence of a reasonable record of bilaterally as well as multilaterally negotiated agreements the Kashmir dispute continues to defy all efforts. And hence the desired normalisation continues to remains somewhat an illusive commodity.

Following the end of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, many CBMs were adopted with a pronounced emphasis upon military CBMs. (1) However, this does not mean that CBMs covering non-military areas were totally ignored. The CBMs adopted by India-Pakistan can be grouped into six categories; Communication, transparency and notifications, consultations, goodwill, constraints and border security measures. The existing CBMs
are listed below;

2.1. Communication Measures

i. A direct communication link (DCL), known as 'hotline' between DGMOs (Directors General of Military Operations), was established in 1971. Following 1990 crisis it was decided to use this line on weekly basis.

ii. DCLs are also in place between sector commanders.


iv. Communication between the naval vessels and aircraft of the two navies when in each other's vicinity (May 1993)

v. Hotline between the Prime Ministers established in 1997 after Male (SAARC) summit.

vi. People to people contacts; Track-II diplomacy, NGOs, and dialogues between various non-governmental groups like Neemrana Initiative or India-Pakistan Forum started in 1991.

2.2. Transparency and Notification Measures

i. Inviting observers to watch military exercises (as it was done at the time of Zerb-e-Momin in 1989 and 1990 Indian exercise and the US observers).

ii. Publication of Annual Defence Report- India publishes it
almost regularly.

iii. Public negotiations for arms procurement by both India and Pakistan

iv. Advance notification regarding military exercise or major troop movements (1991).

v. Joint declaration on prohibition of chemical weapons (1992). Despite the declaration, it was revealed in 1997 that India had a very large chemical weapons programme.

vi. Advance notification of ballistic missile tests (1999) - a product of Lahore meeting.

2.3. Consultation Measures

i. India-Pakistan Joint Commission (1982).


2.4. Goodwill Measures

i. Various military goodwill measures (1993).

ii. Participation of senior military and civilian officials in various seminars in each other’s country (1993).

iii. Inviting Guest Speakers at each other’s national defence colleges.

iv. Participation and visits of various sports teams.

v. Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular
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Personnel (1992). Both sides have frequently violated this code.

2.5. Constraint Measures

i. Non-attack on Nuclear Facilities (1988). This understanding was reached in 1985 but the actual agreement was signed in December 1988 and was ratified in 1991. Detailed information about the nuclear installations is exchanged each year in January.

ii. Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations (1991). This agreement was ratified in August 1992. According to this agreement, no armed fixed wing aircraft is allowed to fly within 10 nautical miles of the international border.

2.6. Border Security Measures

i. Troops Withdrawal from International Border (1999). This gesture was initiated and undertaken only by the Pakistanis. So far the Indians have not responded to this significant concession.


The earliest CBMs whose structure resembled the European CBMs were the Hotline Agreement of 1971, which established direct linkages between the two DGMOs (Directors
General of Military Operations). The agreement was largely the product of pressures generated by the 1971 Indo-Pak War. Since then many CBMs have been introduced with more emphasis put on military affairs. In addition, a number of dialogues at the non-official levels were encouraged.

3. Evaluation

It is generally believed that the CBMs in the context of India-Pakistan relations have not contributed the way they have in Europe. The introduction of CBMs in Europe during the Cold War did manage to substantively contribute in reducing the tension between the East and West. Many factors account for CBMs success in Europe. To ascertain the factors that influenced and continued to influence the operational CBMs between India and Pakistan to pay much less dividends than what was expected at the time of their introduction, one has to answer two related questions. What is expected from the CBMs and what have the existing CBMs delivered? Why the CBMs were much more successful in Europe but did not pay similar dividends in South Asia?

It is expected that the CBMs would create transparency, make available the requisite information, would accelerate the inter-state contacts, increase economic and trading activities, reduce tension and enhance mutual confidence. Let us have a
look at the evolving transparency in South Asian context. Etymologically transparency means to be able to see through. In the context of International relations, transparency means that the chances of misinterpretation, whether deliberate or inadvertent, are reduced to minimum because of openness of the developments. ‘Transparency implies the systematic release of information covering almost all aspects of military activities’. (2) While transparency is considered as an essential ingredient of CBMs, the existing level of transparency between India and Pakistan especially with regard to military affairs is indeed far from satisfactory. Take the case of defence budgets. Neither country clearly spells out all the details in their respective budgets. The practice of hidden allocations seems more attractive than open rationalisation. (3) Inviting military observers from other countries to military exercises is indeed a useful devise in promoting transparency. But even this practice has not yet demonstrated the desired level of transparency. CBMs without desired level of transparency cannot yield positive dividends comparable to European experiences. More transparency measures need to be introduced especially regarding the military activities.

As far as communication measures are concerned, again the record is not very impressive. Hotline contacts are meant to either secure the correct picture of the event or to defuse the loaded situation as quickly as required. In the East-West context
the Hotline paid the expected dividends. DGMOs Hotline has paid no more than cosmetic dividends. (4) Even during the 1987 Brasstack crisis the Indians 'resisted giving information to the Pakistani side out of fear that the information might somehow be used to its disadvantage'. (5) In many ways the hotline was used as a source of disinformation. Even the Hotline established between the Prime ministers work for a short while only and that too during a non-crisis period. When a crisis appeared, the Hotline was sent to cold storage. The only useful communication measure has been the Track II contacts, which have indeed paid some dividends, although these are confined to improvised comprehensions of each other's limitations and perceptions.

Regarding the consultation measures suffice it to stress that they have proved to be somewhat a non-starter. Initially the establishment of Joint Commission generated a lot of enthusiasm but its working with long intervals and procedural cobwebs has not really produced anything tangible. In many ways the Joint Commission remained a playground for semantic games. As far as the Foreign Secretary level talks are concerned, they have also become victims of procedural mechanism and diplomatic wrangling. Indian strategy to concentrate on all issues except the core Kashmir dispute has not only effectively undermined almost all consultative mechanism but has also helped erode the goodwill, however
limited it was. During the period from Simla agreement to 1994, the officials of both India and Pakistan met for forty five times but the Kashmir dispute was subjected to serious considerations only once and that too ended in what is generally known as 'agree to disagree', coupled with evasive procedural wrangling. (6)

Following the invitation to the Pakistani President by the Indian Prime Minister in May 2001, it was hoped that the consultation measure would get the much-needed impetus. The optimists augured positively orientated outcome. At the least they were expecting that some mechanism or procedure for regular consultative measure would be agreed upon and subsequently instituted. Despite the realisation of changed imperatives that influence the relations of nations in a post cold war period, coupled with almost regular application of international pressures to make strides towards normalisation of relationship, the two countries once again disappointed the regional as well as extra-regional peace lovers. The optimism generated by General Musharraf's repeatedly expressed willingness to talk to the Indians anywhere, anytime and at any level, along with Vajpayee's assertion to be bold and innovative, rapidly degenerated into usual accusations and counter-accusations after their inability to produce an agreed document at the Agra Summit in July 2001.
The picture is even bleaker as far as the constraint measures are concerned. The agreement on non-striking each other's nuclear installations is an important agreement but even this one is not honestly pursued. The agreement stipulates that the list of the installations would be exchanged each year in January. Admittedly the lists are exchanged each year but lot of apprehensions are also regularly expressed regarding the accuracy of these lists. One often hears that many installations are not mentioned in their respective lists. One needs not to go into the justifications often put out afterward as one can always justify non-exclusion in one form or the other. The important point about such situations is that instead of improving confidence, the exchange of list has become an occasion to generate more suspicions.

The Indians have blatantly violated the other constraint measure dealing with the air and space violations in August 1999. On August 10, 1999 the Indian air force jets shot down an unarmed Pakistani navy plane *Atlantique* killing all the 16 naval personnel aboard. While the Indian sources justified the shooting down of Pakistan navy's plane on the grounds that *Atlantique* violated Indian airspace, several non-regional sources stressed that the plane might have been flying too close to the border but the Indian air force chased the aircraft inside Pakistani territory and shot it down and then raced back to Indian air space. (7)
Perhaps that's why many diplomats referred to it as Indian overreaction. (8)

In the wake of Kargil clashes in which the Indians lost two aircraft and a helicopter, the urge in India to even up score with Pakistan is quite understandable. But in the context of existing CBMs on 'Prevention of Airspace Violation' (1991), even if one assumes that the *Atlantique* might have strayed into Indian airspace, the logical course of action should have been either to chase the aircraft out of its airspace with warnings or to force it to land. Since neither was done which in turn merely reflects the sanctity attached to this CBM by the Indians.

As regards the border security confidence building measures are concerned, Pakistan, after the advent of Musharraf regime, had not just offered but actually withdrew its troops from the international border. India. Of course, did nothing in this regard. As a matter of fact, Pakistan has always been even willing to accept international observers. It still hosts UNMOG (United Nations Military Observers Group) to monitor the LOC. Pakistan's acceptance of international observers and even allowing the international journalists to visit border areas as well as LOC reflects its openness, whereas India's strong objections to do so amply reveal its intentions. In addition, Pakistan had ordered its forces to observe maximum restraint and later also
withdrew some of its troops from the LOC. The recent offensive Indian moves along the LOC have forced the Pakistanis to undertake counter moves. Indeed it was somewhat surprising for the members of international coalition against terrorism to witness this untimely Indian move especially in the light of the fact that India was also supposed to be a member of the same coalition. While many expressed disappointment over the latest demonstration of Indian reckless behaviour, some saw it as a regular Indian move to exploit the opportunity in order to pressurise Pakistan. Since Pakistan was experiencing the full impact of war against terrorism in Afghanistan and was continuously confronting internal reactions and demonstrations that were organised by sympathetic elements within Pakistani the collective spirit of the coalition.

4. Factors Causing Success or Failure

An overall examination reveals that not much respect has been paid to most of the existing CBMs. The question that now needs to be examined is why the CBMs were more successful in Europe and not in South Asia? Many factors account for their success in Europe and non-applicability of the same factors resulted in the failure of the CBMs. These factors are cultural and religious affinities, innovative political pursuits, strong stable government, awareness of peace in society, presence of nuclear weapons, mediators, effective multilateral institutions, etc.
Cultural and religious affinities: In Europe shared historical experiences coupled with centuries old religious and cultural similarities provided a strong foundation for the success of the CBMs. Most ruling families in European states enjoyed close family ties. Even after the advent of nation state system the religious and cultural links were maintained. In South Asia not only the historical experiences were viewed as ‘their rule versus ours’ but also even the religious harmony was never able to attain a satisfactory level. In fact the emergence of nationalism that was influenced by a religion was viewed as a sinister development, and attempts were directed to demonising the promoters. Even after the attainment of independence, many leaders in India took some kind of seductive pleasure in describing Pakistan as an Islamic fundamentalist state though they were fully aware of the fact that it was not such a state but a modern Muslim state. Unable to prevent the Muslim League from attaining its main objective, many such leaders went to the extent of expressing the view in the early post-partition days that Pakistan would soon return to the fold of mother India.

Later Pakistan’s efforts to consolidate its independence in order to remove its sense of insecurity were viewed as its effort to attain parity with India. Despite repeated assertions by the Pakistani leadership that Pakistan was fully cognizant of the tyranny of geography in the region and was never engaged in
parity-pursuit, the Pakistan factor was perhaps the most important factor in India's policy formulations until it was able to defeat Pakistan in the 1971 war. Many Pakistanis hoped that Pakistan obsession would cease with the emergence of a preponderant India after 1971 but unfortunately this did not happen and Pakistan continued and still continues to be the focal point.

In recent years religious extremists have emerged in both countries. One of the major legacies of the Afghanistan crisis is Pakistan's inheritance of religious extremist groups, which were trained by the Americans to fight their war against the Soviets. With the Soviet withdrawal, the Americans quickly washed their hands off and many of those trained warriors did not go back to their respective places of origin and opted to stay on in the region. Compared to Pakistan where religious extremism was thrust upon it, the emergence of extremist Hindu fanatics in India is the product of internal developments. There is no doubt that the ideology of militant Hinduism is on the rise partly due to weakness of forces claiming to represent secularism and partly due to the grand design of Brahminic Hinduism to use religion as an effective force to redo the social order. It has been gradually taking shape with the help of slogans like 'India is for the Hindus'. Ironically the forces that were opposing the creation of Pakistan and continuously criticised religious nationalism are also supporting religious Hindu nationalism. The political evolution of
the BJP on road to power clearly paints it as a political front of the RSS. (9) The religious fanatics in both countries have been opposing the institutionalisation of the CBMs— an important setback to the proper implementation of the CBMs in South Asia.

Innovative political pursuit: One of the pre-requisites of successful implementation of the CBMs is the recognition of the inviolability of the borders, the territorial integrity of the state and non-intervention in the internal affairs. CBMs have been extremely effective in situations where borders are recognised; restraints in interfering in internal affairs is strictly adhered to, and the territorial integrity of the states is not endangered. In Europe these principles were given recognition in both the Helsinki Final Act and the Stockholm Document. While in South Asia most of these principles are codified in documents like Tashkent Declaration or Simla Agreement, respect for these principles have been rather weak and feeble. Both India and Pakistan rarely missed an opportunity to exploit the other's difficult situation.

Following the beginning of the American aerial strikes against Afghanistan, the Indian aggressive moves along the LOC is a good example of Indian exploitation of the opportunity. Admittedly the two countries have refrained from going into a major war since 1972 but they have not ceased to interfere in
other's internal turmoil primarily because of the unresolved Kashmir dispute. Until and unless the ongoing Kashmir dispute is resolved the stability in border situation is likely to remain illusive. It is somewhat unrealistic to dismiss the Kashmir dispute as something peripheral. While the Indians need to openly admit that this ongoing dispute has been and continues to be the main factor in Indo-Pak relations, the Pakistanis should also be forthcoming in expressing their willingness to discuss all issues that are advanced by the Indians as very important in their order of priorities.

**Stable governments:** Europe was fortunate to have strong stable governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which enabled them to take decisive actions with regard to the adoption and proper implementation of the CBMs. In South Asia for a very long time both India and Pakistan have experienced unstable minority governments. The decade of the 1990s is full of such experiences. The concept of cooperation at the cost of domestic unpopularity for such governments is extremely difficult to sell. Invariably weak governments tend to blame the other, often to divert attention from domestic problems. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 is an interesting example in this regard. Inability to take firm and decisive action and inept handling of the highjacking has influenced the Indian leadership to put the entire blame on Pakistan. (10) In this connection, India even tried
somewhat un成功fully to convince the Americans that Pakistan was responsible for the highjacking but the American President publicly stressed that they saw no evidence linking Pakistan with the highjacking. (11)

**Mutual images and awareness of peace dividends:** Successful CBMs require widespread acceptance within the society. This implies that the people in general should not only be aware of the peace dividends but they should also express their desire to attain them. In Europe the people expressed their desire in many ways, such as the peace movements, etc. In addition, the adverse images were more linked with the leaders of East-West divide and rarely with regard to the people themselves. People in both countries hardly know about the peace dividends in South Asia. They are more aware of other being the enemy. In this connection media could play a constructive role but so far it has only been damaging the path to CBMs. The most attractive view of India among the Pakistani elite and decision-makers is that of a hegemon and a bully. The Indian view of Pakistan is that of theocratic and militaristic state. Indeed an objective view would probably disagree with both of them.

**Presence of nuclear weapons:** In Europe the presence of nuclear weapons did help in negotiating the CBMs. Most Europeans thought that the next war would be a nuclear and the
most likely theatre would be Europe. Cognizant of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, the Europeans abhorred the thought of war. In India and Pakistan, a vast majority of the people are not even aware of the dangerous potentialities of nuclear weapons. It has been merely presented to them as the ultimate weapon, which will deter the enemy. While the Indian quest to acquire nuclear weapons was in congruence with its desire to attain a great power status, Pakistanis viewed it as a necessary acquisition for its defence. South Asia has become nuclear primarily because of Indian policy pursuits.

Mediator or Role of the third party: During the Cold War the Europeans facilitated the negotiations process between the Americans and the Soviets. In fact the European role in encouraging the confidence building process was extremely important. In South Asia India is somewhat allergic to the role of a third party despite the fact that many agreements were the product of third party mediation like the Indus Water Treaty, the Tashkent Declaration and the Rann of Kutch Award. Unlike India, Pakistan has always been ready to accept the role of the third party. It is somewhat intriguing that while India would not accept the role of a third party to help resolve the Kashmir dispute, it does accept when it feels that it would eventually be able to get more out of the situation. Even the introduction of the CBMs in South Asia, especially those in the 1990s, was suggested by the Americans. Even though the Indians have
accepted to explore the path of the CBMs they still look at it with suspicions. (12)

Regional institutions: In Europe NATO, WP, EU provided important forums for states to engage in conflict resolution processes and in many ways facilitated the advent of CBMs. Later the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) played an extremely useful role in strengthening the CBMs. In South Asia there exists a regional organization called SAARC but it has not been able to play an effective role, which is partly because of the nature of its Charter and partly because of Indian attitudes and obduracy. (13) The SAARC Summit has been frequently postponed because one member does not feel to sit with a particular member at some given point in time. The last postponement of the Summit was on the grounds that a military regime had taken over in Pakistan and as such India did not like at that time to deal with the new leadership of Pakistan. Interestingly, while India, at the time, was seeking closer ties with a military dictator on its eastern border, the military regimes on its western border were totally unwelcome. The irony of the situation is that the very same Indian leadership later decided to invite the same Pakistan military leader for a Summit meeting. All this reflects the inherent weakness of the regional organisation. While the Charter says that all decisions have to be
taken unanimously, the postponement of Summit is often caused by one member's request.

The Kashmir dispute: The most important impediment is the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Many Pakistanis view Kashmir as part of the unfinished agenda of partition and a symbol of Indian highhandedness and clever manoeuvring. They feel being outwitted and cheated by India. India took over princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh on the grounds of overwhelming non-Muslim population and their geographical position, whereas in the case of Kashmir India employed the principle of ruler's right to accede. The ruler of Junagadh opted to join Pakistan and the Nizam of Hyderabad wanted an independent status yet India invaded those states and occupied them by force. By employing delaying tactics India bought sufficient time to complicate the dispute and systematically projected various arguments for justifying its occupation of Kashmir. India dislikes to be reminded of its application of different principles to different states and asserts that these are integral parts of India. Many Indian writers also consider the retention of Kashmir extremely important for India's secular polity.

Level of respect to agreements: According maximum respect to agreed principles and agreements does not seem to be very common in South Asia. Different interpretations of agreements often tend to strengthen further non-compliance and
non-adherence. It is often stressed in some quarters that honouring the spirit of agreement is not as sacrosanct in South Asia as it is in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. (14) South Asia not only lacks the cordial spirit deemed so essential for proper implementation of agreements and understanding but also the respect to be extended to the prerequisites for CBMs as codified in Europe’s CBMs documents. Perhaps that’s what has led to the advent of what has come to be known as ‘sense of ownership for the existing CBMs’.

5. Relevance and Suggestions

While South Asia is known to be the poorest, the most illiterate, the most malnourished and the most deprived region of the world, it continues to make much more investments in defence sector than in education or health of the people. (15) It is over 55 years when both India and Pakistan attained independence, yet one finds large sections of their populations living well below the poverty line. One of the basic purposes of the state is to provide maximum economic opportunities to its citizens, coupled with adequate security. Development is meant to provide wider choices of opportunities eventually leading to a better life. However this does not mean that the security of the individual as well as the state is to be ignored. The efforts that have gone into securing and guarding the independence of the
state need to be appreciated as well. What is indeed required is a balance between development and security even in those states that are involved in conflict situations. Indeed the conflictual cobweb does provide convincing arguments and justifications for increased allocations to the security sector.

While the history of Indo-Pak hostilities predates independence, this does not mean that the people of India and Pakistan are doomed to perpetual misery and depressingly low standards of living. Leaders in both countries must realise the dictates of the 21st century and make concerted efforts to move away from hostilities and encourage cooperation. Any device or mechanism that helps, even remotely, in lowering tensions and facilitating cooperation would have adequate relevance to South Asia. Admittedly the CBMs have not been as successful as they have been in Europe or the Middle East or Latin America or South East Asia, their utility cannot be altogether written off. Given the existing level of tensions between India and Pakistan, the CBMs are even more relevant today than in the past. What needs to be done is to make sincere efforts for proper implementation of the existing CBMs. The current level of tension between India and Pakistan does not augur well for the future. The decision makers should not only recognise their inability to extract maximum benefits from the incumbent CBMs but should also strive for enhanced level of observance as well as consider
adopting new CBMs.

Given the less than expected performances of the CBMs in South Asia, what recipe can be pursued in order to make them work? At the outset it needs to be recognised that a CBM is not a device to resolve conflict, it is just a piece in the process - an important piece that needs to be promoted. With the nuclearisation of South Asia, it is somewhat imperative for both India and Pakistan to demonstrate their rational qualities. Both sides should not only encourage a balanced approaches to history writing and positive pursuits by the media, the political leaders should also demonstrate their determination to resolve the outstanding issues impeding the progress on peace-path. Efforts should be directed towards the introduction of CBMs that are easy to agree on and implement without having to compromise too much. Since both countries react to military issues, perhaps it would be a good idea to concentrate on non-military measures such as environmental protection, health, education, energy, culture and sports, etc. But these efforts should also be accompanied by concerted attempts to resolve the core Kashmir dispute and remove the impediments blocking the desired trading and economic interactions.

Track II should be more encouraged. Consciousness among the people should also be encouraged that the policy of
confrontation is detrimental to the interests of both the countries. Textbooks may need to be revised in order to remove the 'enemy images'. Evil and negative projection of the other is unlikely to facilitate cooperation and proper implementation of the CBMs. In this connection, the media can play an important role. Trade and economic activities within the region need to be improved. CBMs may be institutionalised within the framework of SAARC. Finally strong political will need to be developed in order to reduce tensions and enhance inter-state cooperation. Such pursuits would indeed resuscitate the effectiveness of CBMs as well. The following suggested CBMs could not only further improve the atmosphere enabling the two governments to address the contentious issues with patience and perseverance but could also minimise the dangers of war and even of dreaded nuclear exchanges.

**Military CBMs:** 1) More transparency in Defence budgets; 2) Publication of annual calendar of exercises; 3) Increasing the number of observers including international observers for military exercises; 4) Allowing participation from across the border in Defence College courses; 5) Exchanges of military instructors at various levels; 6) Registration of weapons purchases and sales agreements with SAARC; 7) To promote joint security studies; 8) No War Proposal in some acceptable form; 9) An agreement in principle for reduction of forces without going into the details
initially; 10) Proposal for collaborative arrangement for nuclear waste disposal; 11) Withdrawal of troops from border areas and creating a ten miles (on both sides) troop free security zone; and 12) Proposal to freeze defence budgets for at least two years initially.

**Nuclear risk reduction measures:** 1) Agreement to formalise their respective unilateral nuclear test moratoriums; 2) Not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems; 3) Not to operationally deploy nuclear capable ballistic missiles and to keep them on de-alert; 4) Reaffirm the existing CBMs agreed upon at the time of Lahore Declaration in Feb.1999 including the initiation of bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrine, providing advance notifications in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, immediately informing the other side of accidental and unauthorised use of nuclear weapon, reviewing the implementation of the existing CBMs periodically etc; 5) To observe a moratorium on acquisition, deployment or development of anti-ballistic systems; 6) Further encourage transparency measures to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation or accident; and 7) Agreement on the non-use of force including both conventional and nuclear forces. (16)
Economic CBMs: 1) Encouraging Chambers of Trade and Commerce contacts-exchange of visits; 2) Promoting SAPTA and SAFTA; 3) Joint Ventures – initially may be in a third country; 4) Joint Commission on Agriculture; 5) Promoting increased trade - mutually agreed increase in the trading items; and 6) Collaborative schemes tackling two countries’ energy problems.

Cultural and Social CBMs: 1) Joint archaeological excavation and monument preservation; 2) Visa relaxation - country visa should be introduced instead of continuing with city visa - drop conditions like police reporting etc; 3) Visits/tours to historical and religious places need to be encouraged and facilitated; 4) A cultural agreement needs to be finalised; 5) Flow of books, journals and newspapers needs to be encouraged - start with allowing selected papers and journals (Sport etc.); 6) Contact between medical and scientific institutes; 7) UGC (University Grants Commission) of the two countries must plan joint project - exchange of students and teachers initially for a short period but later it could be extended; 8) People to people contact, track II diplomacy, and NGOs work must be encouraged; 9) Joint research projects regarding minimising the adverse effects of religious intolerance; 10) Energising SAARC - revamping it by improvising its Charter- establishing SAARC Chairs, etc; 11) Establishing contact between Professional
Associations; 12) Joint research on energy problems; and 13) Collaborative research on environmental problems.

*Political CBMs:* 1) Inviting election observers from across the border; 2) Encouraging contact between political parties and parliamentarians; 3) Holding Speakers' conferences; 4) Curbing propaganda and adhering to commitments in the agreements; 5) Adherence to non-interference in each others' internal affairs; 6) Creating institutional linkages - like Judiciary, etc; and 7) Institutionalising the CBMs within the framework of SAARC.

The above mentioned list is by no means an exhaustive one. Many more can be added. While one can think of many CBMs it needs to be kept in mind that progress in core areas as well as regarding the outstanding disputes is absolutely imperative. It needs to be recognised that no progress on the ongoing Kashmir dispute takes a heavy toll on the progress in other areas. Perhaps it is essential to concentrate on resolving the ongoing Kashmir dispute first. However, it needs to be mentioned here that since the Indian leadership is somewhat sensitive about the assertion that the Kashmir dispute is central to improved Indo-Pak relations, it might be a good idea to simultaneously subject India's top priority issue to concerted efforts.

**NOTES**

1) See Richard E. Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe" in Michael Krepon,


7) Many Canadian and American sources clearly stressed that the plane was shot inside Pakistan territory. For details see, *The News*, Internet edition, August 13, 1999.


80-90.

16) See *Dawn*, October 19, 2001. Also see the Text of Memorandum of Understanding that was signed at the time of Prime Minister Vajpayee's Lahore visit, *The News*, February 22, 1999.