Introduction
I am happy to share with you a European or rather the specific German experience with Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 by 35 Heads of State. More than any other country, the divided Germany in the centre of a divided Europe, surrounded by nine neighbours, had a vital interest in the Helsinki Process and – as the historic developments of only 14 years later have proven - Germany only profited from such process.

Of course no one wants to compare the situation in South Asia of today to the Europe of the 1970s. But I am firmly convinced that the basic principles of the Helsinki process are universal: peace, stability and economic development can only be achieved through close regional co-operation, based on democracy and human rights. The basis for regional co-operation or at least peaceful coexistence is confidence and trust in each other. And therefore the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), which
have been developed over the years in the framework of the CSCE/OSCE, may serve as a model for other parts of the world and different security environments. The predicted "Clash of Civilizations" is no natural law in a world where tolerance reigns. German theologian Hans Kung is right when he detects the elements of Kant's categorical imperative in the written testimonies of all world religions. For us it was always clear: Who if not the Europeans with their history should propagate the basic principals of a new culture of global coexistence based on equality, tolerance and human rights. There is no alternative to this: we all share only this one world. Europe's unification can become a model for peaceful global coexistence, where wars have virtually become impossible. We all carry the responsibility for a new world order; acts of terrorism only confirm this behalf.

I know that this conviction is widely shared in Asia. The interest in the CSCE/OSCE experience is growing. The evident proof to this is the recent accession of Thailand and South Korea as partners of co-operation to the OSCE. Furthermore, activities in the region itself prove that the conviction is gaining ground to do things together: co-operation increases security and mutual trust, and peaceful dialogue gets a chance. The efforts to revitalise SAARC and the steps undertaken by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are steps into the right direction. What if an "Organization for Security and Co-operation in Asia" (OSCA) looms at the
political horizon? Is the Conference for Interaction and CBMs in Asia not a similar model? Doesn't the Shanghai Co-operation Forum help stabilise its region? With great interest we have taken note of the statements and decisions at the Eighth Meeting of the ARF in Hanoi in July 2001. "There the Ministers recognized promotion of dialogue and co-operation on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, noted with satisfaction that the ARF was the key forum for participating countries to address key political and security issues and agreed that this process be further strengthened and more CBMs be encouraged." This is pure OSCE language and philosophy! ASEAN by the way was founded in Germany and I still remember when my Foreign Minister recommended to his Asian counterparts to follow the European example. Didn't they have a similar number of population, similar economic output, and similar security interests? That is why ASEAN is no longer only an economic organization but has ever since become a strong political voice.

The Europeans began to realise that there was no alternative to dialogue and communication, to encouraging politicians, artists, journalists, representatives of the business world, to exchange diplomats between their foreign offices on a regular basis, and above all to young people who meet, exchange ideas, identify and discuss problems
and in this way slowly but surely to establish a process of co-
operation, that we hoped would result in co-operative
structures in Europe and would build confidence and open
the way for political progress. We hoped it would even be
able, in the long run, to open “even hard-headed communist
systems” . It was successful in Europe because it did not
seek advantages unilaterally but took up the diverse
interests of all concerned.

This is exactly what the 4,500 or so OSCE staff
members have been doing every day in 20 missions, as they
help develop civil societies. Now as then, this policy was
backed by the conviction that co-operation and regular
contacts were factors of equal importance in achieving
detente and stability. The aim in those days was to give
detente some permanence. If it were possible to break down
walls through economic, technical or commercial co-
operation, we thought it should also be possible to remove
the walls that still prevented the respect of human rights
throughout Europe and in our own country. Especially for us
Germans the CSCE marked the transition form a bilateral to
a multilateral policy of detente that had worked so well. It set
itself the task of solving two fundamental problems: drawing
an overall picture of reality and, on this basis, of drafting
rules for co-operation and maintaining these rules - a task to
which the OSCE remains committed today.
You may ask why the OSCE has become an organisation of choice for its participating States when addressing serious crises, conflicts and instability in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia. The potential of the OSCE to contribute to co-operation for peace building stems from its broad membership, its shared values and its decision-making transparency and consensus. As the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, the Organization has a very flexible inventory of instruments and mechanisms aimed at addressing the various stages of the conflict cycle.

The Three Dimensions of Security

The three instruments and mechanisms of traditional security aspects are: the politico-military dimension, the human dimension, including democracy building, and economic and environmental dimension. The dimensions are closely intertwined.

The term human dimension refers to the commitments made by OSCE participating States to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote the principles of democracy and, in this regard, to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as to promote tolerance throughout the OSCE area.
In the human dimension, the OSCE encourages States to provide conditions for development of civil societies by applying to OSCE principles. The practical means involve supporting NGOs in nascent democracies, supervising elections, assisting States in drafting legislation and providing constitutional advice, monitoring respect for human rights and the situation of minorities, and assisting in the general establishment of democratic institutions.

Since 1990 the CSCE has developed institutions and mechanisms to promote respect for the Helsinki commitments. The institutions acting in the human dimension include the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative on the Freedom of the Media.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) in Warsaw supports States in practical ways in implementing their human dimension commitments. It works to:

- Promote democratic elections, particularly by monitoring the election processes;
- Provide practical support in consolidating democratic institutions and human rights and strengthening civil society and the rule of law; and
• Contribute to early warning and conflict prevention, in particular by monitoring the implementation of human dimension commitments.

The OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities tries to detect crises before they break out and responds, for example, at the earliest possible stage, to ethnic tensions that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE region. The HCNM functions as an instrument of preventive diplomacy: he aims to identify - and promote the early resolution of - ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or relations between OSCE participating States. He promotes ethnic dialogue.

The OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media provides early warning and assists governments in the furthering of free, independent and pluralistic media, which are crucial to a free and open society and accountable systems of government. To this end, he is authorised to observe media development in all participating States and advocate and promote full compliance with relevant OSCE principles and commitments.

In the economic dimension, the OSCE Secretariat’s Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities as well as the missions and field activities monitor economic and environmental developments among
participating States, with the aim of detecting any threat of conflict, and facilitating the formulation of economic and environmental policies promoting security in the OSCE. The economic dimension has always been part of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. It reflects the belief that economic liberty and environmental responsibility are at the very heart of security. Thus the OSCE organises conferences and seminars on economic and environmental matters, promotes adherence to shared standards and norms for economic and environmental behaviour and maintains contacts with other relevant international organizations.

Last but not least politico-military dimension: An all-embracing political approach to confidence-building and detente can, of course, not ignore the military situation, armaments potential and troop concentrations. On the contrary, these aspects usually are the heart of the matter. If detente is to be pursued seriously, it must from the very outset include notification of troop movements, disarmament or verification treaties. The main OSCE tools are confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), and arms control. The CSCE focus on defence planning, information exchange, verification and evaluation is on a regular and reliable basis. The aim of these measures is to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency. The current

The slogan ‘peace with fewer weapons’ was often heard during the German reunification process. The armaments spiral reached its climax at the height of the Cold War in 1983, when medium-range missiles were being stationed in Germany as part of the NATO double-track decision. But whenever confrontation is pushed to the extremes, the call for more cooperation becomes louder. It was at this point that we began to consider how the cooperative approach of the CSCE process could get foreign policy moving again. Our bold answer was to propose a European verification regime. We were looking to bring about agreement between East and West that would make the balance of military forces transparent and verifiable. Putting this thought into practice was no easy matter. When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM)s in Europe began in Stockholm, there was a notable exchange between Hans Dietrich Genscher (German Foreign Minister) and Andrei Gromyko (Soviet Foreign Minister). The latter, at his most non-transparent, said: “Mr. Genscher, I know exactly what you hope to gain from this conference. You just want to make a hole in our fence, and I can tell you that you won’t succeed.” The
German Foreign Minister was not in the least put off and replied: “Mr Gromyko, you are wrong. We don’t want to make a hole in your fence. We want the whole fence to disappear.”

The result of the Conference on CSBMs in Stockholm put to shame all the critics of the CSCE process and brought an important element of trust into East-West relations that had not existed hitherto and indeed had not even been conceivable. At the end of the conference on 19 August 1986, the way was clear for the historic process of disarmament to begin. It had been proven that disarmament was possible. For the first time a whole category of arms, namely landbased medium-range nuclear missiles, was banned from the Earth. Eastern and Western Europeans alike could now sleep more easily again.

The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament (CDE) took place in Stockholm (1984-1986), as mandated by the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid. The Stockholm Conference yielded a significant improvement of CBMs, namely the political obligation to abide by the provisions; lowered thresholds and a longer time frame for the prior notification of military activities, obligatory notifications of military activities and invitations of observers; provisions on annual calendars and
constraints and finally compulsory on-site inspection. Though it took eleven years to reach this phase it was considered a leap forward, as it constituted a whole new generation of CSBMs, which to a great extent contributed to the end of the bipolar system in Europe.

The third CSCE Follow-up Meeting from 1986 to early 1989 in Vienna elevated the concept of transparency and trust, coupled with strict control, to a guiding principle. Within this framework the mandate for negotiations on reciprocal arms, equipment and troop reductions by conventional NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was devised. Today the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty constitutes a cornerstone in the arms control acquis.

The politico-military aspects of security in the OSCE are not only an integral part of the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, but have far reaching consequences for European and indeed global security. Therefore this politico-military OSCE acquis deserves a closer look: Confidence (and Security-) Building Measures accompanied the CSCE process from the outset, and the first set, not obligatory yet, were enshrined in the Final Act, when it was stated that they should serve the need "to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a
situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information”.

In November 1990, further negotiations led to the (first) Vienna Document on CSBMs. The scope of mutual information was broadened beyond the area of “dynamic” information on military activities, by providing the obligation for an annual exchange of “static” information on existing forces. Furthermore, the scope of verification was enlarged by providing the obligation to accept evaluation visits of military formations or units. It further provided obligatory invitations to visit airbases.

In 1992, the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) was established to deal with politico-military aspects of security within the OSCE. It is the body where the negotiations about the above-mentioned enhancements and further developments of CSBMs take place on a weekly basis. Apart from this more conceptual task, the FSC is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of CSBMs by all participating States.

Since then the Vienna Document has been further developed and updated three times, improving upon existing measures and introducing new ones. As a logical precondition for confidence, transparency and security, there
is the exchange of information on military forces including personnel strengths, equipment types and numbers, as well as the locations of troops. In addition, the provision of information on annual defence budgets, budget plans and the dissemination of military doctrines and defence policies greatly contributed to making participating States aware of the military situation within their geographical region and throughout the whole area of application.

In order to ensure the provision of appropriate information by others, participating States have included a variety of verification measures which, inter alia, allow participating States to inspect areas or to visit military formations at very short notice with the aim of verifying the information provided. Other measures include visits to airbases or the notification and observation of military activities above a certain threshold of troops or equipment numbers.

In the framework of the Vienna Document the FSC organises seminars of military doctrines and defence policies with the participation of experts from capitals. The last seminar took place in June 2001. These seminars themselves have become a major element of confidence building among OSCE participating States. For the first time, the Vienna Document 1999 included a chapter on regional
measures. Under this, the participating States are encouraged to undertake, including on the basis of separate agreements, in a bilateral, multilateral or regional context measures to increase transparency and confidence.

Taking into account the regional dimension of security, participating States, on a voluntary basis, may therefore complement OSCE-wide confidence-and security-building measures through additional politically or legally binding measures, tailored to specific regional needs. The Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, adopted at the 1994 Budapest Summit, breaks new ground by formulating new norms, particularly regarding the role of armed forces in democratic societies. It formulates norms, particularly regarding the role of armed forces in democratic societies. It formulates norms aimed at intrastate relations - namely concerning the democratic political control and the democratic internal use of armed forces.

The already mentioned CFE Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Code of conduct, as well as the progressive measures for arms control and regional security in South Eastern Europe provided for in Annex 1-B of the Dayton/Paris Agreement - keystones in the European security architecture - are dealt with under the auspices of the OSCE.
The Treaty on Open Skies took effect in January 2002. It only confirmed the usefulness of the Treaty. It symbolizes the spirit of co-operation, military restraint, transparency, confidence-building and crisis prevention in the area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. States Parties to the treaty open their territory for air observation. Air observation can also facilitate crisis management by the responsible organisations, for instance in preparation for peacekeeping missions or through the observation of borders and ceasefire lines. In crisis situations, air observation provides an additional chance to test the will of the parties to the conflict to comply with the agreements by consenting to observation flights, taking part in them and agreeing to inform international bodies about the results.

The Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons negotiated at the FSC is another contribution to the politico-military dimension of security. The OSCE comprises many of the world’s largest small arms suppliers, but also includes a number of regions that have been seriously affected by the spread of small arms. The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons was developed with both these aspects in mind, and as a result it is extremely comprehensive in its scope - perhaps more comprehensive than any similar document agreed to date by an international organization. Because the document was agreed by consensus, 55 states are now committed to standards for manufacture, marking,
export and stockpiling of small arms. They have also agreed to a number of information on all exports to and imports from participating States. This will be the first such exchange in any region. The document also includes a set of measures for use on the ground, as part of the OSCE activities on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We have already begun to look at how these can be implemented, especially in the context of the OSCE contribution in the fight against terrorism.

The OSCE's principal instrument for long-term conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation in its region are the OSCE missions and field activities, which since 1992 have been dispatched to areas of potential or actual conflicts. The missions which in all cases deployed with the approval of the host country ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of developments in its various areas and facilitate political processes designed to prevent or settle conflicts, and to assist with post-conflict rehabilitation. Currently the OSCE has missions and field activities deployed in Southeastern Europe, East-Central Europe, the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Central Asia - and remarkably, no other international organisation is represented there.

OSCE missions and field activities are at the front line of the OSCE work. They give the Organization an active
presence in countries that require assistance and are the vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action. The mandates, composition and operation of mission and other field activities are increasingly varied, underlining the flexibility of this instrument. The respective mandate may, i.a., include the following responsibilities:

- Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;
- Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;
- Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
- Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- Helping to create conditions for negotiations or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

In order to cope with the rapidly growing tasks and responsibilities of the OSCE Secretariat, the Conflict
Prevention Centre has over the last couple of years been substantially enlarged and reorganised. A major achievement in the aim to strengthen the Organisation's operational capabilities was decision by participating States at the 1999 Istanbul Summit to develop a capability within the participating States and the OSCE by setting up Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) that would be at the disposal of the OSCE. This concept enables OSCE bodies and institutions to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating States to provide assistance for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability covers a wide range of civilian expertise. It gives the OSCE the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These teams should also be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with rapid deployment of large-scale or specialised operations.

The component of police and police training has recently gained enormous relevance in the organisation's activities, which may comprise:

- Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
- Police training, which includes i.a. the following tasks:
Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary forces;
Providing new and modern policing skills, such as community policing, and anti-drug, anti-corruption and antiterrorist capacities;
Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the confidence of the entire population;
Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.

A number of recent success stories, often not widely publicized, are due to this concept: The OSCE has played an essential role in the resolution of the potentially disastrous conflict in Southeast Serbia, and also the ongoing OSCE-activities in Macedonia have as well every chance to become another success. Another of OSCE’s success stories undoubtedly is the amazingly smooth development in Latvia and Estonia. Here the respective missions and the High Commissioner on National Minorities have played a decisive role to guarantee minority rights. There is a good chance that these two missions may be closed soon, having accomplished their tasks.

Concluding Remarks

OSCE offers a wide variety of experiences, tools and lessons to other regional organisations. It is ready to learn from them too. It looks beyond its area of responsibility and
co-operates closely with its Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation as well as with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, all being Partners for Co-operation. Its methods and tools cannot be copied mechanically. One of the most important lessons of OSCE is that any peace building effort can be really effective only if it takes into account the specific political, geographical, cultural, historical and other features of a given region. Transparency, openness, predictability and reliability are needed for this policy to succeed. Exchanges of information and experience may help participants to create and to develop their own methods, tools and institutions of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. If the political will is there to do it, it can be done.

We Europeans have not come here to give advice. Nor can the successful European approach of the OSCE process be transferred without further ado. At the same time, there are no grounds for assuming that the principle of peaceful change as advocated by the OSCE is restricted to Europe, and I would therefore like to encourage you to continue on this path.