1.1 INTRODUCTION

What makes people insecure? This fundamental question makes us think about the sources of insecurity among humans in various situations and locations. It confronts orthodox accounts of security and gestures at its inadequacy in understanding and assessing the actual nature and scale of threats to human security. The central premises of orthodox accounts of security have constantly come under challenge both at the end of the cold war and in the face of the fast-changing nature of threats and instabilities among humans. The end of the cold war has created three fundamental differences in this regard: it has removed a major driver for ideological hostility from the international system; it has reduced the support of the two super powers for their client states in proxy wars, and it has to a large extent liberated the United Nations so that it can play an effective global security role.¹

What are these central premises? Why have they been questioned? What are the alternative discourses and conceptual underpinnings that are emerging? How relevant are these alternatives to India? What are the crucial forms and manifestations of these non-traditional security threats that are being witnessed and that have increasingly acquired the proportions of local and national threats? These are some of the issues this monograph attempts to deal with.

At the very outset, it should be noted that there are three major constraints in discussing the changing contours of security and in bringing human security discourse upfront while juxtaposing it with the orthodox account of security in India. Firstly, the concepts of security in India like in other nation-states have been predominantly

military ones. The very nature of post-colonial state formation based on pre-1947 strategic and military alliances and diplomatic arrangements conspicuously oriented national security issues more to external parameters and determinants rather than internal dynamics. Citizens insecurity has often been neglected ignored and very often sacrificed by the state in the name of larger military security interests. Human security, on the other hand, focuses on citizens, thereby opening the state up for critical scrutiny. This is despite the fact that both state and human insecurity can lead to failure of states. Look at the States like Sierra Leone and Liberia that collapsed more because of crises generated by complex interactions of political and social forces at the national and sub-national level rather than from external invasions.²

Secondly, the other threats to security, which are now increasingly called “non-traditional,” have tended to be treated in the framework of problems of nation building and socio-political contingencies and development drawbacks even if they tend to breach human security in the wider and deeper sense. Since they do not impinge upon sovereignty directly, they are primarily kept out of the national security agenda and its management. This omission is reflected in various ways. Foremost of them is the exclusiveness with which by now widely discussed “non-traditional” security threats emanating from areas like food, environment and energy are dealt with. For instance, the total isolation of sources of threats like food insecurity from the mainstream debate on national security has undermined the importance of providing food for maintenance of human security vis-à-vis the protection of borders and boundaries for sovereignty. In other words, it was felt that food provisioning could be neglected but not national borders. Millions of people could go hungry but resources had to be devoted to military and other aspects of national security. This gives rise to very fundamental questions. For example, for whose security must national borders be protected? Can the coexistence of internally insecure, sick and discontented people with nationally secured borders be sustained without triggering any major instability within the nation? In other words, at what point of time does internal instability triggered by human insecurities impinge upon national security and change the source of threat from “across the border” to “within the border”?

And finally, the literature available, both academic and others that have dealt with human security issues in the national context both conceptually and empirically, is rather limited. Though the basic tenets of human security concerns have been core issues in development discourse and programmes in India for a long time, most of the literatures related to it have been written in the context of the political economy of development rather than from the non-traditional security framework that is now considered important. There are attempts by various scholars and institutions across the country trying to import and link the emerging international discourse on the changing contours of security with the realities existing within the country. In other words, the conceptual acceptance and empirical applicability of the new trends in security discourse is yet to make any dent in India. This makes any attempt to do so challenging, novel and to a large extent contestable.

Most importantly, like other countries, human security as a “concept” and an “issue” has not entered into Indian competitive politics. At the same time most issues that concern human security in India have one way or the other figured both prominently and marginally in election campaigns and manifestoes of political parties at both national and state level. However, no political parties have put together all these issues in the “human security box” and made it an election issue. For instance, the older slogan of “Garibi Hatao” (alleviate poverty) and the present slogan of “Bijli, Pani aur Sadak” (electricity, water and road) both have in them a strong element of human security, yet elections have never been fought on the issue of “Manav Suraksha” (human security) in an holistic and wholesome manner. National security in the military parlance has, however, been openly and widely mentioned as an election agenda. For instance, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came into power on the major plank of nuclear India in the aftermath of the nuclear test in 1998.

1.2 INTROSPECTING THE DEBATE

A very common discontentment with orthodox security analysis is related to its neglect of the wider meaning of security. There are intrinsic assumptions that have helped in evolving, spreading, consolidating and firmly establishing the orthodox account of security as the dominant practice. The basic assumption that the international
system is fundamentally anarchic has militated the entire discourse. This encourages and coerces states into pursuing domestic and international policies that bring order. They inherently consider international politics to be totally different from the domestic system. In such a situation, threats are targeted directly at the sovereignty of the state as represented in territorial integrity, political institutions and people's right to self-determination. Therefore, to provide for the common good domestically, the state needs to be secured from the sovereignty angle. In this regard, the military-defence framework has been the handiest tool to ensure minimum deterrent to external aggressors.

In other words, the security of a nation depended primarily on the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defeat any foe that might come its way. The very core of these policies is far removed from the demand of any particular group or society in the country. Consequently, the state-society relationship is separated from the international relations. This makes the domestic realm more exclusive, thereby keeping the two concepts of security—domestic and international—mutually exclusive matrices. The neo-realists have added another dimension to the issue. Their primary concern is not individual nations but the entire international system.

The contention of these hardcore advocates of traditional national security is that these two discourses are altogether different processes in terms of their nature, dimension, reach and their short and long-term impacts. They only fall short of stating that there is no meeting point. In many cases the human security element remains unidentifiably and inextricably submerged in the tight compartment of national security. Unlike the dominant and orthodox security approach where the state is a primary referent point, for human security approach human beings are the core elements. In the traditional framework of security

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the primacy is that of the national interest whereas in the human security approach it is essentially the fulfilment of humans’ security. At the same time human security does not seek to replace but rather to compliment and build upon measures established to assure state security. Are we then only talking about the security of the state or also what Page calls security of both state and certain other entities? This is where the real difference arises in the entire conceptual dilemma. Unlike advocates who are for the traditional concept of national security, the group that propound “state and certain other entities,” including individual human beings, sub-statal groups (ethnic or linguistic minorities), supra-national organisations, essentially belong to the other side of the fence as they bring into focus the “radical rubric of human security.”

Subrahmanyam, India’s well known strategic thinker, states that “national security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity. It means also ensuring that the country is industrialised rapidly and has a cohesive, egalitarian and technological society. Anything which comes in the way of this development internally or externally is a threat to national security.” There are other areas of discontent related to the fact that such definitions and ideas of security generate the very problems that one actually aspires to encounter. Wilkin, while citing Buzan, Jones and Little and Griffiths, Cox, 10

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8 K Subrahmanyam, Our National Security, Minerva Associate, Delhi, 1972, p.7.
Baldwin and Linklater enumerate three major criticisms of the orthodox understanding of security that have fuelled the human security debate. Firstly, this orthodox concept is essentially ahistoric and abstract and assumes that nothing ever changes substantially in the international system in terms of essential characteristics and interests. It ignores the fundamental changes that time and space could bring wherein rationality, anarchy, power and the state itself remain universal and constant factors.

Secondly, this approach is deficient in theorising the state, particularly in the context of its varied nature, structures, institutions, tasks and functions both in domestic and international affairs. And finally, the assumption of the neutrality of the state both in terms of treating domestic affairs and international relations as mutually exclusive and considering states as discrete and separate rational actors is misplaced. In the real world scenario both these perspectives are unrealistic and unachievable.

Ullman stresses that such a narrow definition of national security conveys a profoundly false image of reality, one that is both misleading and dangerous. It makes states concentrate on military threats and ignore other, perhaps even more harmful, dangers thereby, making them vulnerable. The resulting pervasive militarisation of international relations in the long run can only increase global insecurity. On the other hand, a national security threat in broader sense could threaten drastically and degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state. This can even significantly shrink the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. "For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human


security all over the world.” In other words, safety from chronic threats (like hunger, disease, and repression) and protection from sudden disruptions in the patterns of daily life are two critical aspects of human security. “As an approach that focuses upon the importance of the insecurities facing people rather than governments or institutional agencies, human security is concerned with transcending the dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy that views critical concerns of migration-recognitions (i.e. citizenship), basic needs (i.e. sustenance), protection (i.e. refugee status) or human rights (i.e. legal standing)—as problems of inter-state politics and consequently beyond the realms of the ethical and moral.”

It is in this context, Beaton has argued for the need to expand the conceptions of security outward from the limits of parochial national security to include a range of system considerations. The Copenhagen School exactly did this in the 1990s by arguing for a more profound widening of security concepts than simply discussing non-military issues as threats to the state. While describing how regional and local issues have come to the fore as core elements in understanding security, Subrahmanyam looks at it from the perspective of a “pattern of amity and enmity.” He states that these patterns have political, social, economic and ecological factors. The pattern is so intricate that the primary security concern of the state cannot be understood in military terms in isolation from other concerns of governance.

There has been conscious and consistent efforts to relocate the security discourse “from the traditional terrain of an international system composed of discrete territorial units called sovereign states and to embed it in a global social structure composed of humanity in a capitalist world economy that has been developing since the sixteenth century.” Among the advocates of the narrow statist concept of security for whom

23 Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds) (1999), p.3.
the “only coherent and useful understanding of security is that of national security,” there are no specific answers to why the scope of security studies should be restricted to cover nation states only. “According to both “critical” and “human” security approaches, security is about attaining the social, political, environmental and economic conditions conducive to a life in freedom and dignity for the individual.”

Amidst the domino effect of the cold war-led military-centric security discourse, there have been attempts from a score of scholars and institutions to bring in issues of human security as indispensable for any macro and micro level insurance of security. Even the consistent highlighting of non-military security issues did not get into the mainstream discourse on security issues of global human concerns for a long time. However, the human aspects of security got a boost when the threats to security from non-traditional sources became more serious and wider. These include threats of environmental degradation, deadly infectious diseases, human rights violations, violent conflict, energy crisis, famine and water shortage, accessibility to food and poor state of governance.

Against the convention of treating security exclusively as the defence of territory from external attack, the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence have now assumed more serious dimensions. Ayoob showed how for most of the less developed countries internal rather than external threats have become the principal security concerns. In a survey of 15900 people across the fifteen EU member states in November-December 2000, 77 per cent felt that organised crime was their biggest fear, 75 per cent said nuclear power plant accident, 74 per cent terrorism, 65 per cent ethnic conflict, whereas only 45 per cent said that for them it was world war and conventional war and 44 per cent said it was nuclear war. Similarly,

in a BBC World Service Poll conducted among the 7671 respondents in African countries in 2004, 37 per cent said that the economic insecurity was the single biggest fear, 21 per cent said it was disease and only 6 per cent said war.29 As has been observed, "... we conceptualise human security as the objective- the ultimate ends- of all security concerns. In this schema, other forms of security, such as military security, are not ultimate goals. Rather, these other forms of security are simply means for achieving the ultimate objectives of human security."30

What makes people feel secure? Asking this question is another way of initiating a comprehensive treatment through the alternative course of discussion on security. The intrinsic feeling of security both at the individual and the community level emanating from meeting of things that people cherish most could in fact overwhelmingly determine the state of human and national security. What do people cherish? Certainly, basic needs such as food and water for the family, shelter, good health, schooling for the children, employment, physical environment, protection from violence both inflicted by men and nature, and the feeling that the state does not oppress its citizens but rules with their consent.31 Also freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights and safety of lives32 and a life free of fear and free of want.33 At a very macro level they also want the nation to be fully secured.

At the same time, "when a privileged elite defends its too large share of too few resources, the link is created between poverty, inequality and the abuse of human rights."34 For instance, in case of sub-Saharan African

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31 Statement by the United Nations Deputy Secretary General Louise Frechette to a high level panel discussion on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Vienna International Centre (VIC), October 9, 1999, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991012.dsgsm70.doc.html>


states the dominant approach to security overlooked the failure to establish effective state-society relations as a key security concern. The state became a source of citizen’s insecurity and not as long assumed the provider of security. The predominant intra-state conflicts reflect the legitimacy crisis of the state where citizens became victims of insecurity. However, “when conflicts became rampant within states, when states seemed to possess neither the will nor the capacity to protect their people, external measures increasingly were identified as a means to ensure human security beyond the boundaries of sovereign states. Subsequently, two approaches have emerged. One is more preventive in orientation; the other is more interventionist.”

Human security however, does not merely envelop matters of individual benefit such as education, health care and protection from crime. This is because these matters could be thought of as part of the objectives of sovereign states like as enshrined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution under “the Directive Principles of State Policy.” Rather, human security also denotes protection from the unstructured violence that often accompanies many aspects of non-territorial security such as violence emanating from environmental scarcity or from mass migration. Therefore, just as traditional notions of territorial security involve structured violence; human security also addresses issues of unstructured violence. Human security, in short, involves the security of the individual in their personal surroundings, their community, and in their environment.

Besides the possibility of all citizens living in peace and security within their own borders, the key elements in making up human security include enjoyment of all rights and obligations without discriminations, social inclusion and the establishment of rule of law and independence of the justice system. This move from traditional territorial security to individual security can be ensured both by

safeguarding the state as a political unit and also from access to individual welfare and quality of life. "In policy terms, human security is an integrated, sustainable, comprehensive security."\(^{40}\)

Like sustainable development, democracy and human security are very closely related. Democracies place greater value on human life, as evident from the absence of genocide and famines, and from the rare occurrence of civil war in established democracies.\(^ {41}\) However, within a democratic system also if the practices are poor, institutional bases fragile, and system of governance weak, human security remains threatened as in Nepal and Bangladesh and states like Manipur, Assam, Bihar, and Jammu and Kashmir in India.

Therefore, human-centred approach to security is widely discussed nowadays. At the same time, the concept of human security is not new and has a long history. Such concepts like right to life, liberty and personal security of every individual were adequately embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. These are the core ingredients of human security. They also provided a much larger connotation to human security, extending beyond the absence of violent conflict. "Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law."\(^ {42}\)

Indivisibility of human security is vital, as it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the cost of another.\(^ {43}\) In its report, the Commission on Human Security [co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata] discussed human security as the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment. This involves protecting fundamental freedoms that are the essence of


\(^{42}\) Kofi Annan, "Towards a Culture of Peace," [http://www.unesco.org/opi2/letters/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html](http://www.unesco.org/opi2/letters/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html)  08/22/01

\(^{43}\) Thomas Caroline and Peter Wilkin (eds), (1999), op.cit. p.3.
life and protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. This further means empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities for making informed choices and determining their wellbeing. The Commission developed three approaches as operational tools to facilitate the implementation of the concept of human security. First approach is the protection of people’s security and their basic rights and freedom. The second approach is the centrality of empowering individuals and communities in order to overcome a wide range of deprivations through devising and implementing solutions. And the third and most formidable approach is to find ways to link the broad issues that comprise human security.

1.3 MEASURES OF HUMAN SECURITY

Many people are deftly debating about converting these human security concerns into real practical parameters and measurable variables. Given so many complex varieties of components embedded in the concept of human security, the identification of measurable variables themselves becomes an intriguing and contestable issue. Some scholars have identified measurable components such as the sustainable sense of home, constructive social and family networks, acceptance of the past and a positive grasp of the future. They also suggest that these components can best be measured by trends in their inverse indicators, including social dislocation, dynamic inequality, and discount rate.

In other words, a comprehensive notion of human security involves qualitative aspects like human dignity that entail full participation in community and national life, control over decisions and “democracy at all levels” as much as quantitative parameters like “fulfilment of basic material goods.” The question is how far aspects such as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—

whether in homes, in jobs or in communities could be brought into the ambit of actual measurements. Could these be measured in quantitative terms?

At the same time, yardsticks that determine the state of human security may not be exactly useful when they are considered to evaluate the quality of life. It is perhaps because the term quality of life is both relative and largely subjective. However, broadly one can state that demographic pressures, economic slide and diminished access to resources and poor governance could erode and degrade the quality of life. On the other hand, economic growth, political and social empowerment and improved access to resources could also improve the quality of life. This process of erosion and improvement in the quality of life brings in insecurity and security respectively.

In the World Bank's theoretical framework one of the measures through which one can express and possibly measure some aspects of human security and sustainable development is "genuine savings rate." This is monetised in terms of economic, natural and human resources. It can help maintain and create wealth which is vital for environmental sustainability and human security. Negative savings rate would mean erosion in community resource base, and decrease in the access to vital economic, social and natural resources essential to human livelihood.

Lonergan has proposed a set of 16 indicators that can be combined to form an Index of Human Insecurity (IHI). This has a one to ten scale and assigns equal weight to each indicator. IHI attempts to link human insecurity and conflict to global environmental change and can be used to determine the vulnerability of regions to such insecurities (Table 1.1). His results suggest that incidence of conflicts and the level of human development and human insecurity do coexist. The zones of turmoil and insecurity are mainly located in the poorer regions of the

49 Savings rate is residual of production less consumption, depreciation of produced assets and drawing down of natural resources.
world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. In fact, poverty explains the risk of civil unrest most strongly and environmental change or stress could be just a secondary reason. There has been a conspicuous shift in the geographical pattern of conflict towards the poorest countries. Today most wars are fought in poor countries with armies that lack heavy conventional weapons or superpower patrons. The low income countries accounted for more than half of the total conflicts in the world during 1990-2003 as against just one-third during 1946-89.

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Though an increasingly contested concept, the strands of thought that characterise the debate on human security tries to “offer an alternative to the realist, state-centric, militaristic, male-dominated terrain of orthodox security and strategic studies.” Possibly this is the reason that no consensus is on view with regard to the actual fields of inquiry in furthering this concept. The scope of the question and its content remain unresolved.

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1.4 MANAGING HUMAN SECURITY

A major cause of human insecurity is conflict. This implies lack of effective political and security mechanism to address conflicts\textsuperscript{55} thereby resulting a horde of internally displaced persons and exodus of people as refugees. Displacements of people, a major indicator of human insecurity, are caused by a variety of factors including natural disasters, gradual accumulative change in environment like river course changes in Bangladesh, nuclear and industrial accidents like in Chernobyl and Bhopal, mega development projects, conflicts like in north and east region of Sri Lanka and state triggered "ethnic cleansing" like in southern Bhutan. There are other factors that are far more important including the role of the capitalist system in creating inequity as a source of violence (dependency theory), the inadequate response of states to disaffected groups causing rebellion (resource mobilisation theory) and agrarian uprising against, among other things, market forces like the Naxalite movement in India (peasant revolution theory).

Like national security threats, even organised violence could endanger certain entrenched societal values or goals. It could even adversely affect respect for law and order, individual and collective human rights and norms of justice and cultural diversity. Therefore, the capacity of states and citizens to prevent and resolve conflicts through peaceful and non-violent means and the ability to effectively carry out reconciliation efforts in the post conflict situation\textsuperscript{56} are central issues in ensuring human security.

Suhrke mentions that the core of human insecurity is extreme vulnerability as found among victims of war and internal conflict and those who live close to subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disasters and are victims of natural disasters. Abject poverty and powerlessness also characterise the most vulnerable people.\textsuperscript{57} Lost opportunities for education are transmitted across generations in the form of illiteracy and reduced prospects for escaping poverty.\textsuperscript{58} Violent conflicts not only lead to loss

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


of life, injuries and other inhuman suffering but also collapse the food system, disintegrate heath and evacuation services, cause severe dislocations of societal activities, and psychological distress and trauma and loss of income. All these have serious adverse implications for human security and human development.

In other words, a secure livelihood, absence of armed conflict within and between societies, and creation of structures and processes that challenge and prevent insecurities are obtaining conditions for human securities. 59

The list of threats to human security is long. The major categories emanate from insecurities related to food, health, environmental, personal, community, political, water, energy and violence. 60 Efforts to cope with threats require cooperation among various actors at the local, national and international levels that involve communities, governments, organisations and civil society. "The promotion of human development and good governance and when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security. States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and other groups of civil society in combination are vital to the prospects of human security."61 Therefore, human security requires a much more coordinated approach to a range of issues that directly threaten it including international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug, arms and human trafficking. 62 The Commission on Human Security goes further to make human security the goal that triggers strong integrated response. 63

To achieve human security individuals and communities should have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to a variety of threats they face. 64 For this purpose the capacity and freedom to

60 Ibid.
exercise these options and actively participate in attaining them are necessary conditions. Though physical survival is a key to human security, it can only be sustained through “emancipation from oppressive power structures” that prevail at global, national and local levels.

There have been some interesting efforts to place security of people ahead of other security concerns. Besides the reconstruction efforts of state and society in Afghanistan, the Canadian Government made it an important foreign policy agenda and Japanese Government in its response to the Asian financial crisis focussed on human security concept to mobilise social safety nets. Even the UN Human Security Trust Fund and incorporated this concept in its development assistance programme. In 2004, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” was presented to the European Union which proposed a “Human Security Response Force” and organisation like “Human Security Volunteer.”

1.5 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

Human development is inevitable for ensuring human security. The “human development approach” as elaborated in various Human Development Reports (1990 to 2006) produced by the United Nations Development Programme, presents an alternative theoretical and practical approach to understand, assess and resolve the problems of a large number of countries having human insecurities as their overwhelming concerns. This approach focuses on people and their security. It is all about the well-being of people—widening their choices, addressing deprivations, highlighting the shortcomings of the present development strategy, and identification of new resources. It suggests interesting and novel policy frameworks for developing human capabilities and the formation of and use of these capabilities.

This approach attributes the failure of human development during the last few decades to the lack of political commitment reflecting in the inability of the State to undertake suitable policies to overcome persistent human deprivations. It regards people as the real source of wealth and emphasises the development of human capabilities. It

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envisages their expansion and extensive use, whilst advocating the widening of choices available to people.\textsuperscript{67} The human development approach has been emphatic in stating that increase in the level of income is not the only objective of development. It advocates much larger combination of human choices that need to be valued equally in development policy-making. These choices impinge upon attaining longer and healthier life and enjoying greater economic, social and political freedom. The scope of peoples’ participation is to be widened in all spheres of development and their effective contribution to the decision-making processes that shape their life style and living standards in future has to be ensured.

The people-centric approach to human development is the core issue that matches the critical constituents of human security.

1.6 GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN SECURITY
The process of globalisation affects human security as it not only compounds inequalities of power and resources already in place but also creates new ones. Since the globalisation process broadly works through global social formation and related social and economic networks and capital accumulation principles, territorially based states are likely to be increasingly weakened and newer dimensions of human security including fledgling state-society relations are likely to emerge. This is where the entire traditional social capital, institutional practices and knowledge bases will come under vicious attacks. This could bring unprecedented fragmentation and dilution of the states, societies and people living in them.

Economic liberalisations, the most powerful means of globalisation process, have contributed directly to anarchy and civil wars such as in Rwanda,\textsuperscript{68} Sierra Leone,\textsuperscript{69} Angola and Sudan.\textsuperscript{70} This has happened amidst the fact that the decision-making power has been increasingly taken away from national authorities and usurped by international agencies and drivers of neo-liberalism such as international financial institutions. The key ministries in a government have also tended to


\textsuperscript{68} Michel Chossudovsky in Thomas Caroline and Peter Wilkin (eds), (1999), op.cit.

\textsuperscript{69} Max Sesay, op.cit.

serve the interest of global capital. The redistribution of resources will again be the core as the traditional unidirectional resources flow from the poor to the rich and from the South to North could further be speedily consolidated. This is a “zero sum” gain as all these take place at the expense of the others. “A clever government can still be effective as a gate keeper between its own people and the external pressures. In fact the global recession that has set in since 2008 has deeply exposed the serious weaknesses and dangers of globalisation and liberalisation processes even in developed market economies.”

Stiglitz states that “the most adverse effects have arisen from the liberalisation of financial and capital markets—which has posed risks to developing countries without commensurate rewards. The liberalisation has left them prey to hot money pouring into the country, an influx that has fuelled speculative real-estate booms, as investor sentiment changes, the money is pulled out, leaving in its wake economic devastations... Even in those countries that have managed to grow, such as Mexico, the benefits have accrued largely to the upper 30 per cent and have been even more concentrated in the top 10 per cent. Those at the bottom have gained little; many are even worse off.”

Speth notes that “an emerging global elite, mostly urban based and inter-connected in a variety of ways, is amassing great wealth and power, while more than half of humanity is left out.” It was found that during the period 1990-95, 57 per cent of countries experiencing war were ranked low on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). It indicated a somewhat positive correlation between lack of entitlement and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts have been responsible for an overwhelming majority of civilian casualties.

The challenges are diverse. Accumulation of power is now based on usurping the so far guarded and protected largely local knowledge base located in various developing countries and their indigenous communities. This means accessibility to these resources to its actual owners will be both difficult and expensive. Class, which hardly figured

71 Guest in Thomas Caroline and Peter Wilkin (eds), (1999), op.cit.
in the orthodox security concept, can be a major vehicle in both understanding and promoting human security. Under globalisation, the aspects of human security are threatened as elements that are anti-democratic and anti-needs satisfaction emerge prominently. These elements undermine and exacerbate already existing tensions in state-society relations. This is manifested in polarisation and intensification in class inequalities in social power central to human security. The policy instruments that facilitate this precipitation are austerity measure, cutting down on development budgets, and withdrawal of economic and social services.\(^7^5\) Policies are imposed by an array of national and international institutions in the name of liberalisation and globalisation. They could be detrimental at the grass roots as they both threaten already fragile social orders. They tend to consolidate private social power at the expense of meeting the basic needs of the vast majority. Hence there is resistance to illegitimate acts of the state and expansion of the global capitalist economy. This generates and aggravates human insecurity.

Further, globalisation can also impinge upon prevailing structures of social solidarity, thereby disturbing grass root constructions. However, in a society which is already deeply divided and violent, globalisation could also lead to novel constructions of community where communitarianism that promote non-universalist, non-culturalist and non-violent models of community could build substantive social solidarity, thereby enhancing human security.\(^7^6\)

Gender as an analytical category has been widely examined in feminist perspectives of security. It has multi-dimensional and multi-level ramifications as it involves physical, economic, social and ideological elements. In doing so, the social relations are more critical than inter-state relations as a source of citizen’s insecurity. The aspects of human insecurity including various forms of oppressions and feminisation of poverty are driven by gender hierarchies and their intersection with race and class.\(^7^7\)

1.7 HUMAN SECURITY: INDIAN PERSPECTIVES

India has always been a theatre of major security concerns. During the period 1946-2003 India was the most conflict-prone country in the

\(^{7^5}\) Peter Wilkin, “Human Security and Class in Global Economy” in Thomas Caroline and Peter Wilkin (1999), pp.31-32.

\(^{7^6}\) Scholte, op.cit.

world, second only to Burma (Myanmar). India recorded a total conflict years of 156 as against Myanmar’s 232 and Ethiopia’s 88 during this period. During 2003, India recorded the highest number (15) of armed conflicts and one-sided violence, including state-based, non-state and one-sided cases. In 2002 it also recorded the second highest number (4046) of political violence in the world, next only to Congo-Brazzaville. The concerns and vulnerabilities at the federal, constituent state, and local levels are becoming more diverse and are related mainly to non-traditional paradigms. These range from political demands pursued through terrorism and insurgency to forced and voluntary migration resulting from socio-political conflicts and from environmental displacement caused by natural disasters and development projects as well as smuggling, drug trafficking, and the arms trade. At the heart of many of these security concerns is the deplorably poor state of human security directly related to livelihood and nutrition concerns, accessibility to public utilities, human rights violations, natural resource management, individual safety, development and technological interventions, natural disasters, production structure, market-based reforms and even the very character of Indian federalism.

There are newer concerns. The ongoing reform measures and globalisation linkages may bring about newer security concerns. For instance, the presence of a large number of multinational companies engaged in harnessing natural resources in the country may lead to newer concerns, including environmental degradation, mass socio-economic alienation, livelihood confiscation and displacement and migration. Similarly a new dimension has been added to conflict and violence by Naxalism, now perceived to be the “gravest internal threat” which killed 749 people in 2006 alone.82

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80 For some of these concerns in various regions of India please see Comprehensive Security: Perspectives from India’s Regions, Seminar Proceedings, Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi, 2001.
81 Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the Conclave of Chief Ministers and representatives of 13 Naxal-hit states. Times of India, New Delhi, April 14, 2006.
As in other countries, the state has been a referent object of both military and human security in India also. The primacy of the State in human security-related issues has been very obvious. It actually flows from the canons of the Constitution. The Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) of the Constitution of India clearly mentions the State's role in promoting the welfare of the people "by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life." It further states that "the State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations." Therefore, in understanding and managing the sources of insecurity in India, both the orthodox-external dimension of security threats and the diverse internal dynamics of insecurity need to be analytically and substantively juxtaposed. In other words, the role of the state, omnipresent in every sphere of life in India, and the long-prevailed dictum that development is government and vice versa needs to be examined seriously in the context of the emerging political economy of human security. The state continues to see itself as an impregnable fortress that is the intermediary between the evolving global economy, forces of globalisation and the basic tenets and principles of human security practices at the grass root level. Therefore, the understanding and assessment of human security issues need to be done to a large extent in the framework of traditional state-society relationship. This is not to understate the authority and influence of external powers and institutions that represent the forces of globalisation.

If we downplay the role of the state as a primary referent object and focus exclusively on the complex social and economic relations that impinge upon human beings, this may change the very understanding of security and the strategies needed to tackle any security threats. To what extent can one realistically ignore the State? Rana observes, "with respect to economic governance, if the state did not exist, which agency would coordinate the activities of the multi-pronged forces that globalisation has let loose? It is the state alone that orchestrates all these factors and forces. It is the lynchpin. For instance, in a hypothetical

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84 Ibid.
situation, say a state in this area called India did not exist, how would the MNCs work? There would be chaos, because there would not be a state to coordinate.... Remove that idea and globalisation simply goes awry, it simply cannot deliver the goods." Hence, the idea here is not to marginalise the State in the discourse and understanding of the diverse security issues that characterise real life in India. The issue is of recognising the massive presence of the State and going along with it to unravel the fine yet intricate relationship between the State and "everyday experience of humanity embedded within" India's global, national and very local perspectives and socio-economic structures.

It is therefore, vital to first elucidate national security concerns even in an orthodox framework. Besides the concept of "unity in diversity" that drives the integrational paradigm of India, the very notion of nationalism in India emanates mainly from the perspectives of territoriality. This presupposes the sacro-sanctity of the borders on which the entire fabric of security rests.

Much importance has been consciously placed on traditional military-based security issues. This is to a large extent justified by four critical factors. Firstly, independent India inherited a long land border of over 15000 km (with China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and later Bangladesh) and a coastline of 6100 km, which need to be protected militarily with indivisible attention. Geographic-natural features, politico-historical circumstances, demographic developments and strategic manipulations have influenced these border regimes. The character and content of the border varies from open to fenced, porous to regulated and natural to scientifically demarcated. There are still significant ranges of the borderlands that remain disputed between India and neighbours particularly Pakistan and China. The issues involved and causes for which four wars with Pakistan (including Kargil) and the Sino-India war of 1962 were fought revolve round the core of India's national security concerns. In all these engagements the centrality of the role of the military and the resultant orientations, mobilisation of resources and gearing up of forces that strengthen it, has confirmed the pursuit of the military-led paradigm of security consistently followed by Indian state. The issue of military security

based on external parameters and determinants has thus come to dominate the national psyche.

Secondly, the three wars India fought against Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and the one with China in 1962 forced India to further re-emphasise on criticality of military security and build up its armed forces. While summing up the cascading effect, Bajpai remarks that "when our image weakened as a result of the 1962 military setback it emboldened Ayub Khan to test whether one Pakistani was not equal to ten Indians. Our weak image was responsible for the Chinese decision to arm the [rebellious north east tribal groups such as the] Nagas and Mizos and to extend support to Maoist revolutionary group in West Bengal, the Naxalites. Finally, our weak image tempted Yahya Khan to force ten million refugees into our territory."\(^{86}\) This is where the entire question of arms build-up and nuclearisation of India became paramount to the security debate.

Thirdly, the cold war that engulfed a major portion of India’s neighbourhood till its end in the early 1990s not only sharpened India’s focus on military security but also exposed it to serious external vulnerabilities. Finally, the massive accumulation of arms and nuclear arsenals in its neighbourhood, particularly in China and Pakistan, further forced India to join the arms-building race, thereby further confounding the military security discourse in the country. All these were done largely against the backdrop of feeble and relatively poor economic performance topped by heavy dependence on external economic assistance and imports of sophisticated weaponry. The protracted border disputes with China and Pakistan, insurgencies, terrorism and secessionism triggered from across the border, and India’s own lofty desire to emerge as a great military power kept and continues to keep military-based security high on India’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. Interestingly, national security issue has remained an all-pervasive phenomenon. No one questions its matrices and operational aspects and access to details and mechanisms of its working is insurmountably difficult.\(^{87}\)

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1.8 CENTRALITY OF BORDERS

At the same time, borders essentially connote the kind of order that facilitates a system to function and operate.\(^{88}\) Though national security concerns encompass the entire country as a collective unit, it is interesting to note that some constituent border states, including Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, West Bengal and the eight states of the North East region because of their very geographical locations are “sensitive” zones and represent higher degree of national security concerns compared to other non-border states. India’s centrality in South Asia region is due both to its size and to the exclusive status it shares through its common border with almost all neighbouring countries. No other two countries in the region have common borders. What is more, seventeen provincial states of India (out of 28) have international land borders.\(^{89}\) The North East region of India, comprising of eight states, has a unique geographical configuration since 98 per cent of its borders are shared with neighbouring Asian countries.\(^{90}\) This, along with the fact that most of these states vary significantly in terms of their ethnic composition, political ideologies, socio-economic characteristics and cross border interactions, make a major difference in national and local perspectives on borders.

At the same time, the uniformity and single-mindedness that seemingly prevail in the perception and handling of border concerns at the national level very often are diluted and blunted by the very local and micro-understanding of and interactions at border areas. Many a times local conditions and essentialities are so different that national policies and institutions very often are not able to take into account these micro-nuances. These include security threats related to natural resources, environmental dislocations, insurgency and terrorism,
migration, cross-border crimes and other developmental deprivations. These could be threats to the security of the people at the local level if not at the national one. This becomes more complex and ambiguous when there is no formal border policy except on purely national security issues and to a certain extent on trade and commerce. Most of these sources of threat may not immediately and directly threaten the territorial integrity of India as a nation state. However, in the long run, their persistence and the possibility that could spread could threaten political order, dislocate and fragment societies, and inject protracted instabilities in the affected regions.

It has also been noted that as long as the national security and foreign policy interests at the national level match the immediate local interest of the state governments there definitely will prevail some similarities in border management and approaches towards the exodus of people from across the border. This is substantiated by the hosting of East Pakistanis before the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu, denial of asylum and ousting of Lhotsamapas refugees from Bhutan from the first asylum districts of Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling in West Bengal. However, there are and could be many more situations in the near future where the larger national interest may come into direct clash with local provincial interests. A major example of this is the much debated migration from Bangladesh. For decades, the views of the Union Government and the State Government of West Bengal and Tripura have varied widely on this issue. Both the Congress and the Left parties in West Bengal have liberal views on these migrants for both politico-geographical and ethno-cultural reasons. Such views differed from those of the Union Government. Moreover, there were serious differences of opinion on handling of these migrants between the two state governments of Assam and West Bengal. It is a widely known fact that during the height of Assam’s anti-foreigners movement in the early 1980s, the “foreigners” coercively ousted by the All Assam Students Union were given shelter in various camps in the adjoining border districts of West Bengal.

1.9 HUMAN-NATIONAL SECURITY LINKAGES

Even security dimensions are becoming more local than national. The concerns of protecting the border have steadily receded both because of

improving relations with neighbouring countries and other economic compulsions and priorities. This in a way is expressed as "no redefining of boundaries, making the border irrelevant." However, these concerns are transforming themselves into more serious and threatening local problems. For instance, easy availability of small lethal arms, primarily facilitated by the very nature and structure of the border regime, has been the key factor in all the low intensity conflicts and unconventional wars that are now fought in various regions of India. The central question of how these arms are procured and diffused by militants, civil war perpetrators, and anti-social elements and their complex narcotics linkages bring the national security concern into sharp focus. This is however, not in the traditional mode of inter-state conflicts and sovereignty protection. Here the very nature and content of security are of un-orthodox variety in order to deal with which the Indian state has to enter into cooperation rather than conflict with the concerned neighbouring countries. This new dimension of security threat injects elements of new orientation in the security thinking and discourse in India.

Both national and human security concerns tend to converge at least in certain specific cases. For instance, the prolonged deprivations from sharing development resources and benefits, uneven harnessing of natural resources and poor provisions of social and physical infrastructures in certain parts of India have tended to endanger the security of the local people as compared to "mainstream" Indian states. Various constituent states of India have exhibited varying capacities and different levels of political and social motivations to harness these resources and cope with adverse situations. This is where the understanding and degree of human (in)security also varies within the country from region to region, from society to society and among communities. Some of them have remained deprived and marginalised for long whereas those who started at a higher pedestal continues to dominate both the decision making process and the fruits emanating from such decisions.

The Human Development Report 1996 showed the importance of "specificity" even more clearly. It revealed that in India, there may be disparities in female opportunities among regions, ethnic groups or urban and rural areas. Because of specific government policy

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92 Oft repeated remarks by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on various occasions.
interventions or cultural practices, the resulting disaggregation, even class or gender groupings, may well highlight diversity as much as uniformity. Generating such figures is crucial because they show in very stark manner the complexity of human security and the inappropriateness of bland, universalistic assumptions and solutions that pay no respect to local specificities.93

In some situations, these human insecurities have resulted in protracted violence, insurgencies and terrorism and have attracted cross-border sympathies and affiliations. This in turn has injected threats to both “internal” and “national” security. For instance, over 160 districts of 13 States remain affected by Naxalite violence, making it the “single biggest internal security challenge faced by our country.” Unlike the 1960s and 1970s when the Naxalites used to liquidate their class enemies with knife, shovel, sword and pipe guns, today their firepower and ability to detonate is massive and sophisticated. In their “compact revolutionary zone” and “red corridor,” they possess the rocket launchers and ability to manufacture claymore mines. Maoist looted sophisticated weapons like AK-47 rifles, LMGs, carbines, grenades, INSATS 9mm pistols, ammunition from their raids like in Orissa’s Koraput district armoury, NMDC store at Dantewara district in Chattishgarh and Home Guard Training Centre at Giridih in Jharkhand.94 Prime Minister responded by stating that “our strategy therefore, has to be to walk on two legs—to have an effective police response while at the same time focusing on reducing the sense of deprivation and association. We are dealing, after all, with our own people, even though they may have strayed into the path of violence.”95 This underscores how human insecurity issues like deprivation and alienation bring people together to fight against the State, thereby posing a threat to national security. This also means that under a particular situation of human insecurity “our own people” become a threat to “internal security.” This further indicates how the “internal security dimension” is distinguished from the “national security” concerns of the State.

95 Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the Conclave of Chief Ministers and representatives of 13 Naxal-hit states held in New Delhi, Times of India, New Delhi, April 14, 2006.
The next level at which "internal security" vulnerability becomes a "national security concern" is when Maoists and Naxalites start networking with outside forces, say with the Maoists of Nepal and when the insurgents in the North East region of India started striking visible and tangible linkages with their counterparts and even the state agencies across the border. Therefore, unless there is an external dimension to any chaotic problem or conflict situation the State tends to give it an exclusive internal rubric even if the said problem conflagrates and engages half of the nation. This is a very noticeable trend in the State's thinking and behaviour in India.

Let us look at other examples, that of the Kargil war fought against the Pakistani forces of 1999\textsuperscript{96} and of the communal riots of Gujarat in 2002\textsuperscript{97}. Both these events killed and displaced a large number of people, destroyed property and caused huge losses to the exchequer. Both created serious human insecurity. The central security forces, including the army, were deployed and used in both situations. Both were covered extensively by the media and widely discussed in the Parliament. Both were followed by the appointment of enquiry commissions.

Despite these striking similarities, the second remained an "internal security" concern, popularly called a "law and order" problem, while the former was viewed as a "national security" problem. Is this because the Gujarat communal riot took place essentially within the country and the Kargil episode had an external dimension? Is it the case that unlike Kargil episode, the second was not connected to state institutions and national identities? Or was this the case because the second was relatively localised and the first had a national appeal? In fact, both were localised problems with the potential for spreading further and flaring up over a large area. Both had strong national appeals. The Kargil war also had a high level of human insecurity, which was possibly overshadowed by "externality" and "national security" concerns. Could it be a problem of political denial and power-risk to declare internal human security related problem as a national security problem? Or had it something to do with what Anil Agarwal


has characterised as "the nature of the State itself, the nature of the institution as such. This is not an institution that has organically grown from amongst us. It has been imposed upon us by a foreign power who was interested essentially in ruling us." On the other hand, there have been instances where the internal security problems like the terrorism in Punjab in 1980s and insurgency in states like Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur which not only matured into but were also recognised as national security issues. This was again partly because there was a cross border linkage of these conflicts and it could galvanise consensus among the national political parties and their constituencies.

Similarly, why is extreme left violence and conflicts like the Maoist movement an "internal" "law and order" problem and the insurgency in the North East region, such as in Nagaland and Manipur, considered in the ambit of national security and not law and order? Even the score of terrorist attacks in different parts of India (Guwahati, Delhi, Rajasthan, Bangalore) during the whole of 2008 and terrorist attack in Mumbai in December 2008 are treated differently in terms of giving them national security importance. This is despite the fact that these attacks have more or less similar human security angles.

The question here is about the extreme situation of communal conflagration engulfing a major portion of the country when a national emergency is declared to quell the violence and maintain order—will it continue to be an internal security problem then? Or at this stage will it transgress the impregnable wall of "internal" to become a "national" security problem? After all, in the conflagrating war situation a national emergency could be declared. The proclamation of emergency under Article 352 is done "if the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or [armed rebellion]". When the last "infamous" emergency was declared in 1977 there used to be an additional clause of "internal disturbance" which was struck off by the 44th amendment act of 1978. Once inside the "national emergency box" could one continue to maintain this

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exclusivity between human insecurity as an “internal” problem and war as a “national” problem wherein both could have debilitating impact and reach?

Why this fine distinction between communal riots led “internal security” threat and external dimensions like Kargil led “national security threat?” The former is non-traditional and the latter a traditional security threat. What stops us from recognising the former also as a national security threat? What is the distance between “internal” and “national” here? Where is the meeting point? They all have elements of convergence yet in the State’s thinking they hardly have a centrifugal point. What makes these two concepts deviate? Are there any substantive factors that keep these two concepts mutually exclusive and tightly compartmentalised? Or is it only a perceptual difference based on a static state mindset? In the answer to this question lies a solution close to these inexplicable issues of orthodox vs non-orthodox paradoxes of security. In the answer to this question too lies possibly the fundamental issues that could explain and sustain the ongoing claim about the emerging broader definitions and dimensions of security. In fact the smaller the distance between these two “internal” and “external-national” concepts the closer we are to the human security concerns. Only the shortening of this distance could make human security a national security concern. This could also perhaps begin the end of monopolisation and the domino effect of orthodox security thinking.

There could be several reasons for this strict compartmentalisation of national and internal security. Firstly, unlike in cases of cross border problems with say Pakistan, China and Bangladesh where there has been a clear cut national consensus to call them issues of national security, there is serious division among the policy makers and political parties in calling internal security issue as a national security issue. Secondly, unlike the internal security issues, the defence (establishment) that deals mainly with national security issues is provided with full resources support that is required. In such circumstances, if an internal security issue like Naxalism and communal riots are also declared the national security threats, they need to be treated as seriously as defense (establishment) in terms of both resources allocation and institutional importance.

Does the nation have resources to this effect? Is there any visionary with political will in the nation who is willing to invest more on human security? Thirdly, to what extent internal security is an electoral issue?
In what way political parties see this as an electoral mileage? Could internal security triggered human security issue also get a popular social pedestal and political acceptance like that of reservation and other affirmative action issues? Unlike Kargil, in most circumstances of internal instabilities and conflicts even leading to serious human insecurity, the political parties treat them as local issues and of no electoral value. This is more likely to be so as more and more regional parties constitute the national coalition government.

Banuri sums it up well with the following four broad propositions, "insecurity is a structural condition of our times"; "insecurity is the leading cause of violence"; "every response to insecurity produces new forms of insecurity" and "the leading contributor to insecurity is the injustice inherent in the idea of development."

The very distributive imbalances brought about by development intervention like Green Revolution became a major source of conflict in India. For instance, the secessionist movement in Punjab in mid-1980s containing strong elements of terrorism in it has very significant contents of inequitable sharing of development benefits. This was a movement that directly threatened the national security of India.

The skewed distribution of the benefits of Green Revolution became conspicuous, when just 20 per cent of rich Jat farmers grabbed more than 60 per cent of the total land. Also the skewed distribution acutely remained in various districts. A study conducted to assess income distribution over six different categories of Punjabi farmers concluded that the level of mechanisation largely paralleled the size of holdings. It showed that hiring out of assets, including equipment, draft animals and land to smaller farmers, constituted almost 22 per cent of the non-farming income of Class 6. This only reflected the grossly unequal distribution of technological benefits.

This uneven distribution of benefits was amply reflected in the caste structure also. The Jat capitalist farmers who are usually pitched


102 Size of operational holdings were defined as: class 1–10 to 2.49 acres; class 2–2.50 to 4.99 acres; class 3–5 to 7.49 acres; class 4–7.50 to 12.49 acres, class 5–12.50 to 24.99 acres and class 6–25 or more acres). GS Bhalla and GK Chadha, "Green Revolution and the Small Peasant: A Study of Income Distribution in Punjab Agriculture," Economic and Political Weekly, May 15, 1982, pp.826-33.
against the scheduled castes (Mazhabis) have been an overwhelming beneficiary. The Mazhabis along with other low caste artisans like Lohar Sikhs (blacksmiths), carpenter Sikhs (Ramgarhias), Rai Sikhs, Labana Sikhs, and Cheema Sikhs have developed their own “culture of deprivation.” At the political level their hostility against Akali capitalist farmers [and liking for Congress(I) or communist parties] and their Nirankari background made them special targets of Sikh extremists, which force them to fall into the Akali fold.\textsuperscript{103}

The contents of economic policy and programme in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) made clear the basic reasons behind this conflict. It demanded land ceiling at 30 standard acres instead of 17.50 acres, cheap inputs and abolition of excise duty on tractors, and remunerative agricultural prices. To have a wider appeal it also talked about workers, middle-class employees, and agricultural labour and the educated unemployed. The resolution expressed very clearly the opposition of the capitalist farmers to traders and monopolists. It demanded complete nationalisation of trade in food grains and unrestricted movement of food grains in India.\textsuperscript{104}

The All Assam Students Union (AASU) and also the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have been highlighting the mismatch between their State’s natural resources based (oil, forests and water) wealth and its relatively backward situation. They view that the resources of Assam have been exploited by others without the benefits accruing for the State. Its resource-based industrial activities have not really brought any substantive transformation in the State. The backward linkages of these industries are rather limited while their forward linkages are with industries located in big metropolises elsewhere. The result has been the emergence of an enclave type economy, i.e., a few modern industries in the midst of traditional industries having very little or no interactions between the two.\textsuperscript{105} The


Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling district and Dooars region seeking a separate statehood for last 100 years within the constitution of India has more or less similar genesis of identity loss, economic deprivation, political alienation and colonial attitude of West Bengal in exploiting the rich natural resources without passing any tangible benefits back to the people. ¹⁰⁶

A hard-hitting booklet named “Eclipse in the East” that appeared at the height of the Assam agitation in early 1980s remarked, “Assam had been treated nothing better than a colony ... the state has been fragmented beyond recognition .... The tea industry which produces 270 million kgs of tea worth over Rs.400 crores every year, is controlled from Calcutta and London.”¹⁰⁷ The AASU lodged a scathing attack on the Union Government for “deliberately” keeping Assam deprived and for not commensurately sharing the gains from the exploitation of its natural resources.¹⁰⁸

This feeling of deprivation has other dimensions. Kothari mentions “that separatist identities in India have been more potent in regions inhabited by distinctly non-Aryan ethnic groups which have experienced varying degrees of assimilation into the all-India cultural mainstream. Thus the more serious problems confronting India’s territorial integrity come from the unassimilated tribal periphery in the north east regions of the country.”¹⁰⁹

During 1990-2002 a total of 5268 incidents took place in Jammu and Kashmir wherein 1151 government buildings, 643 education buildings, 10729 private houses, 337 bridges, 1953 shops and 11 hospitals were destroyed. During the same period in the total 56259 incidents of violence 11092 civilians, 3537 security forces and 16236 terrorists were killed. The physical and psychological costs of all these destructions and dislocations are beyond any quantitative measurements and


analysis. These also indicate a clear linkage between human and national security. More so, the extent of recovery of weapons both in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East region of India give us an idea about the extent of damages the militants and terrorists could cause to human lives. How could this non-war accumulation of small arms and their use not create human insecurity and how could this in turn be delinked from orthodox national security issues?

In Andhra Pradesh, the PWG's acts of violence and vandalism have hindered industrial growth and development in the State. "The State is unable to achieve the expected development and growth due to their [the PWG's] anti-government stance." The implications of extortions have been many and varying. Firstly, it has shaken the business confidence of the people. Investment has gone down drastically and the private sector has withdrawn from the development participation process. Development efforts have become exclusive to the government. Further, businesses have either stayed away or moved to safer areas. For instance, in the PWG infested areas of Karimnagar and Warangal districts in Andhra Pradesh the tendu leaf (tobacco) contractors either have not been bidding for the annual contracts to collect the leaves, or are choosing to do business in neighbouring Chattisgarh. This has undermined the very livelihood patterns of a large number of tribal farmers in forest areas who collect the tender leaf on a seasonal basis and for whom it has been a major source of livelihood.

Secondly, most government contractors are also affected by the extortion of substantial proportion of funds by the extremists. This has directly affected the quality of public works. A very critical dimension of the recurrence of terrorist violence is de-concentration of and


112 This was stated State Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu while speaking in Warangal district, on November 19, 2002. The PWG with a significant presence in many of the 23 districts of Andhra Pradesh is supposed to have set up 'special guerrilla zones' North Telengana, South Telengana, Nallama and the North Coastal regions. Sanjay K. Jha, "The Maoist Maze," and "The Compact Revolutionary Zone," South Asia Intelligence Review, Institute for Conflict Management, Volume 1, Nos. 1 and 34, March 10, 2003.
diversion of systems of governance from the core development sectors. This contributes significantly to the persistence of the general level of backwardness in the region.

In Jammu and Kashmir and the North East regions of India the huge cost involved in tackling the militancy and terrorism have meant diversion of a significant portion of development budgets, which could otherwise have been used for more productive activities. For instance, in Jammu and Kashmir, the reimbursement of security-related expenditure incurred by the State Government has cost a whopping Rs.2357.85 crore to the Union Government during 1989-2002.113 During the period 1997-98 to 2002-03 alone, the reimbursement of the security-related expenditure114 by the Union Government in the North Eastern States amounted to over Rs.760 crore. In addition, the modernisation of the police forces with an emphasis on the supply of (i) arms and ammunition, (ii) vehicles, (iii) communication equipment and (iv) other essential equipment have cost the Union Government over Rs.284 crore during the same period.

One of the major fallouts of terrorist violence has been the withdrawal of both national and international development agencies from affected areas. Development programmes have been disrupted and dislocated. In every developmental project or any business transaction, militants extort the lion’s share and the amount left for development is thus meagre. A large number of development projects have been either suspended or totally terminated half-way, causing state exchequers a loss of millions of Rupees.

At the same time, in many cases it is the State, which in the process of protecting human lives and their lives have brought threats to

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113 This includes assistance to Kashmiri migrants and related activities (Rs.530.45 crore), welfare activities (Rs.362.79 crore); security work and related activities (Rs.233.23 crore), election-related additional security-related expenditure (Rs.192 crore), additional expenditure on police (Rs.872.73 crore) and action plan SRE (Rs.166.65 crore). Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002-2003, Government of India, New Delhi, 2003.

114 These include expenditure incurred by the State Governments on transportation, new vehicles/bullet proofing of new/existing vehicles, purchase of automatic/semi-automatic weapons along with ammunition, bullet proof jackets and other protective gear and procurement of latest communication equipment, both mobile and static, bomb detectors, explosive detectors, computers etc. It also includes expenditure made on capital works on jails and detention centers attached to police stations, special training provided to State Police and Prison administration personnel for counter insurgency purposes, raising India Reserve Battalions, provisions for CPMFs/Army deployment, ex-gratia grant and gratuitous relief to the victims of extremist violence, and for transporting arrested militants to jails outside the State or those arrested from outside the State and brought to the State by special flights etc. Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002-2003, Government of India, New Delhi, 2003.
human security. These threats have later accumulated to become a major national security issue. This has happened in the whole of the North East region and to a large extent in Jammu and Kashmir. A series of acts including Armed Forces (Special Powers) regulation Act 1958 widely used in the North East region, Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) 1971 used during the internal emergency in 1975-77, the National Security Act, 1980 (or NSA), the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, (TADA) promulgated in 1987,\textsuperscript{115} Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002 and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2004 have been in use one after another mainly to curb and prevent terrorist activities and maintain internal security. Most of these acts have come in for criticism for substantive and procedural reasons. While the threat from terrorism to Indian society and polity is real, these acts tended to become regular parts of the Indian criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{116} There have been extremely low rate of convictions under the TADA, which broadly justifies the apprehensions of civil rights groups about the misuse of these acts by the government. For example, out of 17,391 cases registered under the TADA in Punjab, only 111 (i.e., 0.63 per cent) have ended in convictions.\textsuperscript{117} In Jammu and Kashmir out of 20,000 TADA cases, no one had been convicted by 2000. As a matter of fact, 11,000 cases had to be dropped after preliminary investigations, 2,000 cases were dropped under Section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code due to lack of evidence, 1,400 persons were freed on parole, 1,500 accused were bailed out, and 778 cases involving 1,504 militants were still pending.\textsuperscript{118}

The People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), a Delhi-based human rights group has questioned the very definition of "terrorist activity" in these Acts, finding it to be both vague and broad. It has given the state and governments extensive power to apprehend political opponents, protestors and criminals.\textsuperscript{119} It was found that in the Gujarat communal riots the government grossly misused the POTA


\textsuperscript{117} The Times of India, 17 January 1994.

\textsuperscript{118} The Hindustan Times, 22 February 2000.

\textsuperscript{119} Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, No More TADA's Please!: A Critique of the Proposed Prevention of Terrorism Bill, New Delhi, 2000.
against the minority community. Since these acts were in operations throughout the country, analysis of the TADA cases reveal that 30 to 60 per cent of the total accused belonged to States with no incidence of terrorism and were booked for offences other than terrorism or disruptive activity. This included “political activists, leaders of farmers' movements, trade union functionaries, students, lawyers and even a former judge involved with human rights issues.” In fact, the very misuse of these acts has led to repealing and promulgations of a series of acts in the last three decades.

The imposition of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regulation Act 1958 in Nagaland was primarily aimed at curbing the violence perpetrated by Naga rebels like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) which wanted right to self-determination. Over the years this Act has been extended to other states in North-East region. It has been utilised in such a manner that it is increasingly violating human rights of people in general, and in Manipur in particular. In fact, this Act has become the rallying point for the people against the state. The Union Government had to order the review of this Act against the unusual form of protest registered by some members of Meira Paibis in Manipur. Women members stripped in front of the Kangla Fort, then the headquarters of the Assam Rifles in July 2004. This was followed by an unprecedented civil disobedience movement led by Apunba Lup, a congregation of 32 civil society organisations of Manipur. The protests were against the alleged extra judicial execution of Thangjang Manorama Devi on the night of 11 July 2004 by the Assam Rifles personnel, they demanded withdrawal of the AFSPA. Though this protest was based in Manipur, such internal

120 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, Terror by Proxy: Lives, Livelihood and Democratic Rights in Godhra in the aftermath of POTA, New Delhi, September 2003.
121 Ajay K. Mehra and O.P. Sharma, Terrorism and the Rule of Law: The Indian Perspective, Centre for Public Affairs and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, New Delhi, 2005.
disturbance could have flared up in neighbouring states like Assam and Nagaland and could have engulfed the entire North-East region, causing major national security problem. This is a pertinent example of how human insecurity and national security are in fact intertwined.

More recently, the launching of Salwa Judum (Path of Peace) an anti-Naxalite campaign, Maoist violence hit in the tribal dominated Dantewada district of Chattisgarh in June 2005 by the State government is fast turning out to be a major threat to the Adivasi population. This “spontaneous people’s movement” is primarily to combat repressive Maoist diktats such as the ban on collection of tendu leaves and the embargo on participation in State elections. Under it, “hundreds of the cadres (are) being given full military training as Special Police Officers (in camps). This “criminal vigilantism” has created a civil war where one is either with the Naxalites or with the Salwa Judum. As the Naxalites followed the policy of forcibly recruiting one cadre from each family, in numerous cases, members of the same family have been pitted against each other.” The Naxalites are responding with violence against the Salwa Judum cadres. Interestingly, the “security forces and Salwa Judum activists have been responsible for gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws, including torture, killings and rape, especially during joint operations to bring scattered villages under the Salwa Judum.”

It is officially estimated that 243 civilians and 65 security personnel were killed during 2005-2006. The once well knit Gond society is vertically split, village by village and family by family. This anti-Maoist strategy has pitted brother against brother and village against village. Civil strife is rife in Dantewada. Rights activist Sen mentioned that “Salwa Judum continued to be major threat to peace in the area.”

125 The Adivasis of Chattishgarh: Victims of the Naxalite Movement and Salwa Judum Campaign, Asian Centre for Human Rights, New Delhi, 2006, pp.3-6; Also see, Ajit Jogi, "Time to call off the Salwa Judum," Indian Express, New Delhi, 30 June 2006.
128 Binayak Sen, Vice President of People's Union of Civil Liberties who had been in Chattishgarh jail since May 2007 was released in May 2009. He was charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, The Statesman, Kolkata, 27 May 2009.
1.10 DEVELOPMENT BACKDROP

The role of the State vis-a-vis its citizens is emphatically stated in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) of the Constitution. It states that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:  

a) that the citizen, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;

b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;

c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;

d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women

e) that the health and strength of workers men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;

f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.

Unlike fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution these statements under the Directive Principles of State Policy are not justifiable and enforceable. However, they clearly indicate the State’s role and responsibility in ensuring aspects of human security that are critical to the survival and sustenance of India. These are fundamental to the governance of the country wherein it becomes the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.

Development plans in the last six decades clearly reflect incorporation and to a large extent practice of these principles. The underlying philosophy of growth with equity and self-reliance in the planned development of

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130 Fundamental rights broadly include right to equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedoms of religion, cultural and educational rights, saving of certain laws and right to constitutional remedies under Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution of India, Universal Law Publishing Co Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2006, pp.4-13.
India has remained unchallenged for almost 45 years of its post-independence journey. The removal of poverty with a distinct slant on progressive reduction of inequalities in income and wealth remained the quintessential slogans in all the plans since 1950. "Inclusive growth" slogan in the 11th Plan (2007-2012) is again a re-emphasis of the same. People and their welfare have been central to all these plans. There has been remarkable progress because of the "green revolution" and "white revolution," bringing tremendous relief to people in terms of availability of food items and income and employment generation in rural areas.\textsuperscript{131}

The ability of modern varieties of food grain with definite innovative technological slants and a complementary package of inputs including fertilisers, controlled irrigation and chemical for plant protection to doubly enhance productivity has been adequately manifested in the self-sufficiency and sustainability of the agriculture sector in India. Food grains production, which stood at 54.92 million tonnes in 1949-50, reached 217 million tones in 2006-07, surpassing easily the growth rate of population.\textsuperscript{132}

However, the institutions that framed and shaped planning process somehow could not foresee and cope with the massive and highly diverse challenges that lay ahead. It could not really match developmental needs arising out of India's gigantic size and was unable to harness its latent potentialities. This inability was increasingly exposed in the domestic front by deepening poverty and inequality, or what has been called static "Hindu growth rate" and an inefficient public sector. In the international front it was evident in the ever-dwindling position of India in terms of trade, investment, technology and the debt situation. A massive current account deficit of $9680 million in 1990-91, further exacerbated by the Gulf crisis, led to a severe liquidity crunch and a crisis of unprecedented dimensions. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled to a level of Rs.2236 crores, barely sufficient to finance two weeks' imports. India's creditworthiness touched the nadir and subsequently a massive outflow of deposits took place.\textsuperscript{133}

"Development is government and government is development." This has always been more or less the case in India. This thinking of


government as the only development agency ruled India for almost 50 years. In other words, entire development issues have been handled in such a way as to give the distinct impression that development is the prerogative and duty only of the government and state machineries. It made people dependent on the government in every aspect of life and suppressed people’s action. The Government’s inability to reach all corners and all levels was adequately exposed.

It was against this backdrop that economic reforms were undertaken by India in the beginning of 1990s. The remarkable success stories of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), expansion of their production base and massive structural dynamism contrasted with the slow-moving Indian economy. Reforms were imperative as their postponement would have further institutionalised a syndrome of severe price distortions, administrative over-regulation and myriad forms of controls and subsidies, public sector inefficiency, falling savings and low yielding capital investment.

1.11 GROWTH AND POVERTY: DILEMMA AND CONCERNS
The gradual change in the structure of production in India has hardly been matched by any tangible change in the dependence spread of the labour force. For example, the agriculture sector's contribution to its Gross Domestic Product has fallen from 56 per cent in 1950-51 to 22 per cent in 2005-2006, but the labour force dependent on this sector continues to be over 60 per cent. All these figures essentially indicate that the basic agrarian character of India has so far defied any significant transformation.

Though there are arguments to show that growth picked up full one decade prior to the liberalising reforms in 1991, in the overall growth pattern, India has recorded some significant deviation from the traditional growth regime, particularly in the very recent years of post-reforms period (Table 1.2). The regional growth patterns in most of the crucial sectors, including agriculture, industry, manufacture and services have also recorded perceptible increase in recent years as compared to the periods 1965-80 and 1980-90.

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Table 1.2 Growth Performance in the Five Year Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plans</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Plan (1951-55)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan (1956-60)</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan (1960-65)</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Plan (1969-73)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Plan (1974-78)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Plan (1980-84)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Plan (1985-89)</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Plan (1992-1996)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Plan (1997-2001)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Plan (2002-06)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The planning period mentioned in this 11th Plan document varies from the periodicity followed by Planning Commission in the past.


Poverty has one to one link with human security as this is the most primary indicator of a citizen’s health, economic and social status in a given society. A driving force in the reforms process is the unabated hope in significant poverty reduction over the long term through its contribution to economic growth, productivity and consumption benefits. Poverty in all forms is alarmingly massive in India. The issue of poverty alleviation has been central to the planning process since the First Five Year Plan (1951-56). Though several economists and organisations have been consistently conducting studies on the state of poverty in India, broad methodological questions like the criteria for identifying the number of people below the poverty line, samples, their geographical coverage and the periodicity have always dominated poverty studies. The poverty scenario has been showing a declining trend after the mid-1970s but acquired a controversial dimension particularly in the 1990s. As per the Tenth Plan document, the percentage and absolute population below poverty line came down steadily from 54.88 per cent (321.3 million) in 1973-74 to 26.10 per cent (260.3 million) in 1999-2000. The 61st Round of National Sample Survey for 2004-05 estimated the poverty ratio at national level to be 27.8 per cent (under uniform recall period of 30 days of consumer expenditure data for all items) and 22 per cent (under
mixed recall period of 365 days of consumer expenditure data on five non-food items\textsuperscript{136} (Tables 1.3 and 1.4).

In some states like Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Nagaland the absolute numbers of the poor in the population has actually increased over the last three decades. More seriously, the percentage of scheduled caste population below poverty line (2004-05) continues to remain as high as 58 per cent in Jharkhand as against 15.4 per cent in Andhra Pradesh. Similarly almost 59 per cent (2004-05) of the scheduled tribes in Madhya Pradesh and 44 per cent of the backward classes in Uttarakhand remain below poverty line.\textsuperscript{137}

Official claims that poverty is declining has continuously faced sharp criticism particularly in the light of ongoing economic reforms. Official estimates firmly show that the decline in poverty continues to take place whereas the other school of thought not only contest this view but also raise very critical methodological questions. So much so that the Government had to appoint an Expert Group to decisively deal with this controversy.\textsuperscript{138} Bhalla makes a very caustic remark on the reduction in absolute poverty to 15 per cent by 2015 at the global level when he states, “that I had documented how the poverty reduction goal had already been reached by 2000, the very year of formulation of the goals for 2015.”\textsuperscript{139} Srinivasan attacks the very quantum of fund government allocated in the name of poverty alleviation and points out that the government spends hardly 10 per cent of the central budget and 1.45 per cent of the GDP on such a gigantic mission like poverty alleviation. He finds it to be modest in scale and very ineffective and costly in execution.\textsuperscript{140}

Though the poor has been in the core of discourses on “growth with equity” in India, the focus has been on macroeconomic growth. The relatively much higher growth rate that India has recorded in the last few years has in fact, raised some vital questions. Will this growth rate


\textsuperscript{139} Surjit Bhalla, “Crying Wolf on Poverty or how the Millennium Development Goal for Poverty has already been reached,” \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, Mumbai, 5 July 2003.

alone mitigate India’s deep-rooted problems of poverty and inequality, poor-health and illiteracy? Will it be sustainable without causing too much of human misery? The poverty-human development interactions are complex and could lead to serious conflicts and instability thereby endangering crucial aspects of human security (Table 1.5).

### Table 1.3 Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line (arranged in decreasing order of 1999-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
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<td>24.24</td>
<td>25.17</td>
<td>3.48</td>
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<td>Punjab</td>
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<td>16.18</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>6.16</td>
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<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>26.39</td>
<td>16.40</td>
<td>28.44</td>
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<td>49.61</td>
<td>26.22</td>
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<td>8.23</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Haryana</td>
<td>35.36</td>
<td>21.37</td>
<td>25.05</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>59.79</td>
<td>40.42</td>
<td>25.43</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>32.79</td>
<td>24.21</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>46.14</td>
<td>34.46</td>
<td>27.41</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>48.86</td>
<td>28.91</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>50.52</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>25.66</td>
<td>19.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>54.47</td>
<td>38.24</td>
<td>33.16</td>
<td>20.04</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
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<td>51.66</td>
<td>35.03</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>53.24</td>
<td>43.44</td>
<td>36.86</td>
<td>25.02</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>63.43</td>
<td>54.85</td>
<td>35.66</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>49.96</td>
<td>37.02</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>28.54</td>
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<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>57.07</td>
<td>47.07</td>
<td>40.85</td>
<td>31.15</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>50.81</td>
<td>39.25</td>
<td>37.92</td>
<td>32.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
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<td>40.88</td>
<td>39.35</td>
<td>33.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
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<td>38.81</td>
<td>37.92</td>
<td>33.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>39.01</td>
<td>34.44</td>
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<td>Assam</td>
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<td>40.86</td>
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<td>37.43</td>
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<td>62.22</td>
<td>54.96</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Orissa</td>
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<td>65.29</td>
<td>48.56</td>
<td>47.15</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India</td>
<td>54.88</td>
<td>44.48</td>
<td>35.97</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.4 Estimates of Incidence of Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Number of Poor (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007*</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Poverty projection for 2007 as indicated in the Tenth Five Year Plan.


Table 1.5 Effects of Poverty: Human Development Perspectives

- Poverty makes people risk-averse, and therefore, people do not undertake entrepreneurial risks to improve their economic status.
- Poverty is detrimental to the mobility of people. Due to lack of resources, job seekers are unable to look for new jobs frequently or look for more appropriate jobs.
- Poverty is an obstacle to improving the health and education of children.
- Leads to gradual and exodus variety of migration.
- Migration induces scarcity, political and social imbalances and distortions.
- Migration is sometimes seen as a major security risk.
- Local resistance and political unacceptability lead to conflicts.

There is a lot of scepticism about the ability of economic reforms alone to mitigate human miseries. This has been borne out by the experiences of other countries where economic reforms-led growth has not automatically been translated into noticeable poverty reduction and human development. More seriously, globalisation-led newer tentacles of poverty are yet to be known, as they are yet to unfold fully. Will the existing institutions and delivery mechanisms meant to mitigate poverty in India be able to tackle the emerging newer fangs of poverty, particularly when they are likely to be more complex and intractable?
Mahbub-ul Haq, a Pakistani Economist and the author of *Human Development in South Asia Report 1997* has aptly remarked,

“my own rude awakening came quite early after a decade's experience with Pakistan's development planning. After generating a GNP growth rate of 7 per cent per annum during 1960s, our team of young and enthusiastic economic planners was getting ready to a bow on the national stage in 1968. It greatly puzzled us that the majority of the people were not as impressed with the quantum of growth as we were and instead were asking for an instant demise of the government. What had really happened was that while national income had increased, human lives had shrivelled, as the benefits of growth had been hijacked by powerful pressure groups.”

Therefore, it is not just the pace of economic growth that matters for poverty alleviation, but also the kind and quality of growth. The old delivery mechanisms remain more or less intact, thereby not really changing the command chains and grass root machineries. A critical question is how the aggregate gains of globalisation are translated into net benefits for the poorer segments of the population. While economic growth is the main transmission channel, there are many other complex factors that characterise it. The trade-investment liberalisation affects the income and consumption of the poor in terms of employment, output growth, lending rates and also cause general shifts in relative prices. Trickling down of all these will depend upon many other factors, including political arrangements, degree of economic openness, composition of their output growth and the efficiency of policy, governance and institutional environment. For India all these mechanisms are yet to be tested in the new scenario.

It is not that government has not invested on poverty alleviation. What really has happened is the imposition of programmes from the top totally disregarding local conditions, capacities and potentials. As a consequence, the fledgling and unaccountable delivery mechanisms and leakages all became secondary. Many policy thinkers are now switching over to micro-level interventions. The failure of the traditional intervention mechanism has been attributed to three glaring problems. Firstly, the stock of knowledge that was perfected and experimented in industrialised countries were forcefully transferred and imposed on this region. Secondly, it assumed poor communities to be harmonious entities, thereby disregarding hard realities like dominance-dependence relationship in a village and gender and equity conflicts which adversely

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influence the effectiveness of delivery system. And finally, it neglected the issue of income distribution. When cumulative benefits failed to trickle down to the poor, all kinds of state mechanisms were used which paid insufficient attention to detail.\textsuperscript{142} Near absolute reliance on insensitive bureaucratic system is proving to be the main hurdle in the delivery of goods and services to the poor. The Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007) of India states rather frankly that:

"In almost all States, people perceive bureaucracy as wooden, disinterested in public welfare, and corrupt. The issue of reform in governance has acquired critical dimensions, more so in the poorer states .... Weak governance, manifesting itself in poor service delivery, excessive regulation, ...is seen as one of the key factors impinging on growth and development. There has also been less than adequate decentralisation of the functions of Govt.... The spirit of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments has not been observed in many of the States. It is believed that little improvement will be possible until such decentralisation becomes effective, both in terms of functions and resources."\textsuperscript{143}

Political leaders are now therefore, looking for alignments other than those with the traditional partners, i.e., the bureaucrats. They are seeking more efficient, effective, sustainable and people-friendly alternatives to the existing delivery mechanisms. They want new development partners including NGOs, NPOs, the private sector and other civil society agencies. This definitely augurs well for strengthening the cause of human security in India.

At the same time, there have been a number of NGOs-led activities that have made significant difference in the alleviation of poverty, betterment of people's access to health, education, and legal systems and in the management of conflicts. Their main thrust has been on local leadership, indigenous technology, local resources, empowerment and capacity building. There are several examples of these micro-level interventions in the country today.\textsuperscript{144}


1.12 HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

India is confronted with an array of human security related challenges today. Though the country's Human Development Index (HDI) shows a steady improvement in human development from 0.412 in 1975, 0.476 in 1985, 0.546 in 1995 to 0.6092 in 2006, the continued deprivations of a large section of people from basic needs like health, education, shelter, drinking water etc. make their lives both unstable and uncertain. (Table 1.6) For instance, infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) of the poorest 20 per cent is 96.5 as against 38.1 of the richest 20 per cent. These are indicated in Table 1.7. This situation could be inimical for any process of national development and consolidation as it could create pockets of vulnerability and conflicts.

Table 1.6 HDI Trend in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HDI</th>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.438</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>0.602</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>0.609</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Further, there is a very limited knowledge, a controlled sensitisation and knee-jerk responses to issues related to gender in most States. "A lack of quality and gender-disaggregated data remains a major obstacle to gender-sensitive policy making."145 The discrimination starts right at birth as indicated by both declining and very low sex ratio in the 0-6 age group. In the capital city of Delhi, the sex ratio recorded was as low as 865 girls for every 1000 boys in the age group of 0-6 years in 2001. Despite the ban on the sex determination test, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi recorded its decline to 814 in 2005. A more

### Table 1.7 Selected Health Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>Current Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude Birth Rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>23.8 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Birth Rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.6 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fertility Rate (per woman)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.9 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100000 live births)</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>301 (2001-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child (0-4) Mortality Ratio (per 1000 children)</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>17.0 (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple Protection Rate (%)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>48.2 (1998-99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>63.87 (2001-2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>66.91 (2001-2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Not Available.


An alarming trend is the fact that in certain areas like Narela and Town Hall in Delhi this ratio has already gone below 770. This shows how rampant has been female foeticides in the capital city itself, which had a literacy rate of over 81 per cent in 2001. The *Human Development Report in South Asia 2000*, summarised the situation as follows:

1. Although more women are entering the paid labour force, many still face severe impediments in entering and participating in the work force.
2. Gender-specific inequalities in pay and job security are widespread.
3. Outside the agricultural sector, women are concentrated in a limited number of sectors: the majority in traditional or service sector employment, others in poorly-paid manufacturing work.

146 *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 6 March 2006.
147 Ibid., p.57.
iv) The impact of the modern agricultural technology introduced has not benefited women.

*National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (1996)* indicates this belated realisation of how women have been suffering but awaits implementation of measures to overcome them.

Though the link between inequality and conflict are “complex and varied,” both horizontal and vertical inequalities widely and deeply prevalent in India have caused and could cause serious conflicts, thereby seriously impinging upon both human and national security. The vertical inequality is illustrated by the fact that the poorest 10 per cent of the population has a claim over only 3.9 per cent of the total income or consumption whereas the richest 10 per cent has a share of over 28 per cent. The poorest 20 per cent hardly have 9 per cent share of the income and consumption as against over 43 per cent share of the richest 20 per cent.\(^{148}\) Besides social dislocation, crime and personal insecurity, this type of highly skewed distribution of income could ultimately generate pockets of conflicts and instabilities that could lead to human and national insecurity. On the other hand, there are protracted and high degree of horizontal inequalities between regions, states, ethnic groups and other social and economic classes. Quality of population, geographical difficulties, political representation and articulation and the very historical backdrop of the political economy of their development cause these kinds of inequalities.

However, a simple look at the regions afflicted by one or other forms of armed conflicts do not show any particular correlations with the state and extent of poverty prevailing in those regions. The popular hypothesis that these conflicts could be associated with less poverty may not stand a full test. Some of the states where violence has been a strong feature like Assam, Nagaland and Bihar have a hefty percentage of their population below the poverty line. In contrast, other conflict-ridden states (in varying degrees) like Andhra Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab have comparatively much smaller percentage of people below poverty line. This makes us conclude that both the situations of high and low levels of poverty tend to generate conflicts, violence and hence human insecurity. The combinations of other causal factors could be in sharp variance. In the case of Punjab, it is higher aspirations from its plateau-type position that may have led to armed

conflicts whereas in states like Bihar, Assam and Nagaland, their inability to take off from the base itself could have triggered their conflictual situations.

Two important facets that are increasingly faced by Indian states that have recorded protracted violent conflicts are related to the “capacity gap” and the “legitimacy gap.” Both of the gaps are related. The former relates to the ability of the state to handle such crisis and the later denotes the erosion of public faith on the state machineries. The former to large extent is triggered by resource and commitment fatigue whereas the dysfunctional and decaying institutions that are supposed to handle such situations mainly cause the latter. Both these have very direct and adverse impact on human security.

There has been a near-anarchic situation in some places. The basic institutions of law and order seem to be collapsing. This has been a major factor in the support given under duress to insurgent terrorist groups by even reputed private companies like in Assam.149 This is the second stage of the chaotic situation. Initially, because of certain state actions, including historical injustices, inappropriate economic policy, unsuitable political intervention, and the resulting protracted confrontation with State forces, the insurgency, extremist and terrorist activities tend to appear. Accumulation of weapons of all varieties becomes vital to sustain such activities. This brings in instability in the system and weakens the sinews of state controls, particularly in the area of law and order. When the state fails to protect people, particularly those with economic clout, “insecure” groups tends to organise their own security system by succumbing easily to the financial demands of insurgents and also by aligning with them. This more often institutionalises extortion and consolidates the nexus between politicians-insurgents and other parties. In the process the state gets side-tracked. This is what has been happening in the North East. The most vital examples are of business community and industrialists including tea, jute and timber tacitly but directly supporting insurgent activities. A very crucial example is that of the Tata Tea Company’s case

149 At times it is found that the payment of “maintenance grant” of the terrorist groups or “security expenses” by the private companies has been well institutionalized. This was revealed when in 1997 cultural secretary of ULFA Pranati Deka was arrested in Mumbai who was taken there by the Tata Tea Limited (TTL) for delivery of her baby in the local hospital. Also see Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Assam: Resisting Extortion—HLL Leads the Way,” SAIR, Volume 2, No. 13, October 13, 2003.
of 1997, which was found to be funding militants in Assam.\textsuperscript{150} Most tea gardens had to willy-nilly part with some cash to protect tea garden managers or members of their families.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, a situation such as this clearly indicates how bad the situation must have been for the public at large.

At the same time, the national averages do not tell the whole story. State-level data show enormous differences between states. Though the spread of Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) at current prices across various states may not be a good index of the inequality in the distribution of the national income generation mainly on the ground of sharp variations in sizes, natural resource endowments and infrastructural facilities in these states, one can still check the extent of the inequality in terms of both growth rates in the State Domestic Product (SDP) and the geographical size-SDP performance in the total Indian context. There have been records of poor performances by states having larger geographical sizes. For instance, Madhya Pradesh with 13.5 per cent, Rajasthan with 10.4 per cent and Jammu and Kashmir with 6.7 per cent of the total geographical area contribute 6 per cent, 4 per cent and 0.9 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India. On the other hand, some states like Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have contributed a much higher amount to the national GDP.

This itself would not help us in seeing socio-political discontentment in certain regions of India. However, this analysis certainly indicates how certain states continue to remain disproportionately bigger in terms of physical size despite attempts to reorganise them in the last few decades. In fact, these very sizes have been usually cited to justify the creation of smaller states like Chattisgarh in Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand in Bihar and Uttaranchal in Uttar Pradesh. Others states likely to be formed are Gorkhaland in West Bengal, Vidharva in Maharashtra and Telengana in Andhra Pradesh.

Regional imbalance increased gradually during the 1980s followed by a relatively steep increase in the early years of the reforms period and got consolidated in the rest of the 1990s. Some states like Jharkhand recorded a growth rate of 11.1 per cent during the Tenth Plan whereas Madhya Pradesh grew by only 4.3 per cent. The income

\textsuperscript{150} Statement given by the Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Mahanta, \textit{Telegraph}, September 22, 1997, Calcutta.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Deccan Herald}, Bangalore, 17 September 1997.
inequality across states is worsening.\footnote{152}{Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2012, Volume I, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 138-139.} “What is of concern is that there is a concentration of poverty and backwardness in a group of contiguous states accounting for about as much as 50 per cent of the total population.”\footnote{153}{Raja Chelliah and KR Shanmugam, “Strategy for Poverty reduction and Narrowing Regional Disparities,” \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, August 25, 2007, pp.3475-3481.} Table 1.8 shows the great variations in the projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Rural % of Poor</th>
<th>Urban % of Poor</th>
<th>Combined % of Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>18.99</td>
<td>8.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>29.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>44.81</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td>43.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>28.73</td>
<td>31.77</td>
<td>29.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>16.96</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>16.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>30.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>31.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>20.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>31.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>41.72</td>
<td>37.46</td>
<td>41.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>11.09</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>33.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>31.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>24.25</td>
<td>26.17</td>
<td>24.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>21.98</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>18.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India</td>
<td>21.09</td>
<td>14.99</td>
<td>19.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of people below poverty line in states by the end of the 10th plan in 2006-07. It varies from 2 per cent in States like Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab to 41 per cent and 43 per cent respectively in Orissa and Bihar. Ahluwalia carried out a study which showed that inter-state inequality as measured by the Gini-coefficient has clearly increased from 0.152 in 1980-81 and 0.171 in 1990-91 to 0.225 in 1997-98.\footnote{Montek Singh Ahluwalia, “The Economic Performance of the States in the Post-Reforms Period” in Rakesh Mohan (ed), \textit{Facets of the Indian Economy}, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp 221-222.} The HDI of constituent states very clearly indicates the deep crevice in the state of human development. For instance, in 2001 Kerala had the highest HDI of 0.638 and Bihar had almost half of it with HDI value of 0.367. What is worth noting also is that rural Kerala with an HDI value of 0.576 contrasted starkly with 0.286 of Bihar in 1991.\footnote{Government of India, \textit{National Human Development Report 2001}, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 2002, p 141.} Similarly, it is found that the per capita asset holding in the wealthiest state (Punjab) was Rs.77,051 per person in 2002 as against Rs.19718 of Bihar (25.59 per cent of Punjab). This disparity has sharply increased from the situation in 1991 where Bihar’s per capita wealth constituted over 31 per cent of that of Punjab.\footnote{Arjun Jayadev, Sripad Motiram and Vamsi Vakulabharanam, “Patterns of Wealth Disparities in India during the Liberalisation Era,” \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, 22 September 2007, pp.3853-3863.}

The ranking in the social development indicators also very emphatically reveal that Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh remained the least developed states during 2001 in both rural and urban areas. Their aggregate indices (consisting of six component indices of demography, viz., health care, basic amenities, education, unemployment and poverty and social deprivation) in rural areas were 16.13, 16.22 and 23.65 respectively as against that of 68.73 of Kerala and 63.55 of Himachal Pradesh. In urban areas these indices were 27.10, 33.96 and 33.94 respectively as against that of 70.37 of Himachal Pradesh and 62.94 of Kerala.\footnote{Council for Social Development, \textit{India Social Development Report}, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, pp.220-223.} Even physical infrastructure related indicators show serious imbalance. For instance, in 1996-97, Madhya Pradesh with 22 per cent and Rajasthan with 38 per cent of their villages connected by roads were at the bottom whereas Kerala,
Karnataka, Haryana and Punjab had near 100 per cent connectivity of such villages by roads.¹⁵⁸

There are very striking development variations in crucial social indicators among the states. As against the 90.86 per cent literacy rate of Kerala in 2001, Bihar achieved only 47 per cent. Similarly, 97.6 per cent of households had access to safe drinking water in Punjab in 2001 as against 23.4 per cent in Kerala. The infant mortality rate is 11 persons per 1000 population in Kerala as against 83 persons in Orissa. These variations clearly show varying stages and levels of human insecurity in different corners of India (Tables 1.9-1.11).

Table 1.9 Variation in Literacy Rates 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best States</th>
<th>Literacy Rates</th>
<th>Worst States</th>
<th>Literacy Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>90.86</td>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>47.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>88.80</td>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>53.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>82.01</td>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>54.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>76.48</td>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>55.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.10 Variation in Access to Safe Drinking Water* in Households 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best States</th>
<th>Access to Safe Drinking Water in Households</th>
<th>Worst States</th>
<th>Access to Safe Drinking Water in Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttaranchal</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Tap/Handpump/Tubewell


Table 1.11 Variation in Infant Mortality Rate 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best States</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Worst States</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 46.
There are serious apprehensions that the nexus between TNCs, multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank), trade regimes like the WTO and economic and political elites may bring the entire nation under one homogeneous economic regime, thereby disturbing the diverse strengths of the regions and people. If this is not handled effectively, it could trigger serious human insecurity and pose a threat to federalism and sovereignty in the country.159

1.13 REFORMS AND SOCIAL SECTOR

The two main segments in the social sector that directly impinge upon human security are health and education. Illiteracy, access to education and quality of education continue to be a major challenge. The Human Development in South Asia 1997 drew a grim picture of India. It observes that “the extent of human deprivation is staggering: 135 million people have no access to basic health facilities; 226 million lack access to safe drinking water; about half of India’s adult population is illiterate; and about 70 per cent of its people lack basic sanitation facilities... nearly one-third of the total number of absolute poor of the world live in India.” This report further mentions that, “children and women bear the brunt of human deprivation in India. About 62 million children under the age of five years are malnourished. Nearly one-third of the children below 16 are forced into child labour. As many as 88 per cent of pregnant women aged 15-49 suffer from anaemia. Over two-thirds of the female adult population is illiterate.”160

Traditionally both these sectors have received relatively much little attention as reflected in the resource allocations made to these sectors in the entire planned development process. Despite the slogans of people-centric development programmes, the education and health sectors never received more than 7 and 5 per cent respectively throughout the planned development process upto the Tenth Plan (Table 1.12).

However, at the state level, percentage of expenditure in social sectors has registered increases. Even in less developed States like Orissa and Madhya Pradesh the share of social sectors in Plan expenditure has risen. If one looks into the two basic indices of human development i.e. education and health, one finds that as a ratio of total public expenditure both have shown a rising trend. This is definitely a positive sign. Nevertheless, the health ratios are still very low for many States.

### Table 1.12 Percentage Share of Education and Health in the Total Plan Outlay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Period</th>
<th>% Share of</th>
<th>Total Plan Outlay**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Health b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan (1961-66)*</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Plan (1969-74)</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Plan (1974-79)*</td>
<td>4.33a</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Plan (1980-85)a</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Plan (1985-90)*</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Plan (1992-97)</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Plan (2002-07)c</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Plan (2007-12)</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- ** The plan outlay includes that of the Centre, States and the Union Territories.
- a Also includes scientific research.
- b Includes medical and public health and family planning (welfare).
- c The Ninth Plan onwards allocations were made broad sectorwise and education and health were put under Social Services. The data for Ninth Plan is actually allocated as per cent of the actual total plan outlay of Rs.8139979 million.

Social sector, a key and sensitive area, which so far was practically treated as a residual sector in policy planning, is likely to come under severe stress under changing economic policy regimes. Particularly, when many central and state level social sector activities like health and education are fairly closely correlated, playing up the fiscal variables by the Union Government through much talked about measures like withdrawal of subsidies will seriously impinge upon state level activities. Since these inter-sectoral and inter-governmental sympathy effects are fairly high in less-developed conflict prone states like Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and the northeast region, any cut in the social sector budget by the Centre would hit these states most. For these states “social cost of adjustment” will be rather very high. Though most of the items of the social sector are under the state list, the glaring absence of any coordination and collaborative efforts between the states and the Centre in the formulation of reform measures are of serious consequence. This has been clearly manifested by the unilateral
implementation of reform measures by the Union Government wherein many States are just followers.\textsuperscript{161}

The transition process from an essentially welfare state with heavy slant on public sector to a more liberalised market-oriented regime, may also lead to a severe and massive dislocation of the already employed and absorbed population. This will include in particular retrenched workers in the public and parastatal sector, privatised firms and import competing enterprises. There are apprehensions that as the services sector which absorbs the maximum number of gainfully employed in the formal sector prepares to open to multi-nationals and other private sector giants, the process of displacement will be further deepened. As these retrenched formal sector workers mostly are unable to find other comparably paying work, they tend to enter into the crevice of the "new poor." This is what was recorded in Africa and Latin America with the debt crisis of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{162} Only a decade after reforms were initiated has the unemployment rate varied from 2.96 per cent in Himachal Pradesh to over 20 per cent in Kerala.\textsuperscript{163}

For instance, the employment intensity of the growth process of the Indian economy is coming down. Though growth of output in the economy accelerated between 1983-1993/94 and 1993/94-1999/2000 from 5.2 per cent GDP growth to 6.7 per cent, the pace of employment growth slowed down from 2.7 per cent in 1983-1993/94 to 1.07 per cent in 1993/94-1999/2000. This was mainly because of the drastic fall in public sector employment. As against this, employment in the private sector showed acceleration in the pace of growth from 0.45 per cent to 1.87 per cent. The decrease in the employment intensity of output growth can be explained either by an increase in capital intensity or increase in labour productivity, releasing labour. Both happened partly in this period. Incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) increased greatly as capital substituted labour.

However, the 61st NSS survey revealed that a faster increase (2.54 per cent for labour force and 2.48 per cent for workforce) in employment during 1999-2000 to 2004-05 as compared to 1.60 per cent and 1.57 per


\textsuperscript{153} Government of India, Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), Planning Commission, New Delhi.
cent respectively during 1993-94 to 1999-2000. The 10th Plan started with an estimated backlog of 34.85 million unemployed person years in 2001-2002. The 10th plan addition to this is likely to be another 35.29 million person years. This plan aimed at creation of approximately 50 million jobs. The 61st NSS survey shows that over 47 million persons were provided employment during 2000-05. In fact the rate of unemployment increased from 6.1 per cent in 1993-94 to 7.3 per cent in 1999-2000 and further to 8.3 per cent in 2004-05. The Eleventh Plan projected creation of 58.07 million employment during 2007-12.

In the similar context abroad, Stiglitz has made a very scathing attack on the IMF's policy when he remarked, "it is easy to destroy jobs and this is often the immediate impact of trade liberalisation as inefficient industries close down under pressure from international competition. IMF ideology holds that new, more productive jobs will be created as the old, inefficient jobs that have been created behind protectionist walls are eliminated. But that is simply not the case.... It takes capital and entrepreneurship to create new firms and jobs and in developing countries there is often a shortage of the latter, due to lack of education and of the former due to lack of bank financing." In fact, the East Asian countries carefully and systematically phased out protective barriers only after new jobs were created. China is just dismantling its trade barriers twenty years after its march to a market economy began and in a period in which it grew extremely rapidly.

1.14 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The basic objective of this study is to examine the possibility of enlarging the scope of security by breaking the rigidity brought about to it by traditional forms of dominant state-centric security concepts and their determining matrices. This will be done mainly by drawing knowledge, experiences and practices from human security-related issues and institutions based on various spatial and geographical situations. The primary idea is to promote security rather than create security concerns.

The traditional "negative" concept of security is related mainly to the security of the State perceived in terms of threats from other states or militancy at home. The effort in this study is to relate security to the more positive aspects of human and other wider dimensions of security in India. Apart from this, understanding and analysing the said linkages through empirical and qualitative methods, the study attempts to focus on the process by which the gains from effective management of human security parameters get translated into enhanced security both at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, we examine how gains from environmental, food and energy security can transform the security perception of the nation as a whole with a view to orienting it towards building a broader framework of security. At the micro level, we examine how addressing such issues and making interventions at a decentralised level can in turn enhance security at the more local and sub-national levels.

Though the central themes of development and the nation-building process have overwhelmingly characterised the ensuing discourse on human security in India, they are yet to be discussed in the emerging framework of human security. The issues directly related to human security started to occupy a major area of the present discourse only after human development-related issues were taken up as more specific measures of interventions. Therefore, human development parameters constitute some of the key determinants of human security.

The "human development" thesis came into discourse after the first Human Development Report was published in 1990 by UNDP. Surrounding this discourse, a number of initiatives both at the governmental and academic level have been taken in the last decade or so. For instance, the Planning Commission of India published the National Human Development Report for the first time in 2002. Earlier, at least five states (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Sikkim, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu) published reports on the same issue, focusing on the respective States. A number of research projects on human security-related issues are being conducted across the country by organisations like Delhi Policy Group, Centre for Policy Research, National Council for Applied Economic Research, Indira Gandhi Centre of Development and Research, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, WISCOM and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

All these initiatives have helped the discourse on human security to develop at a popular level. A parallel discourse among hard-core
military strategists and strategic writers on the changing nature of external and internal security threats has further helped foster the discourse on human security in the country. There is an acceptance of watering down of conventionally propounded inter-state rivalries and conflicts based threats partly because of peace initiatives and the increasingly visibly effective impact of "newer" varieties of threats. This trend seems to be coinciding with rising concerns of people-centric development and deprivation issues including malnutrition, hunger death, internal conflicts and displacement. This is what is steadily bringing non-traditional security issues to the forefront of national discourse on security. A lively debate could ultimately emerge as the impact of globalisation and reforms unfurls and increasing sensitisation of civil society takes place.

It is against this backdrop that this study makes an attempt to examine the issues related to human security in India keeping in view the newly emerging discourse and concerns at the global level. This will partly help us in understanding and designing a new framework of concerns and complexities involved in the interactions of the various constituents of human security including peoples' perception, institutional perspectives and instrumentations involved. Such a framework can provide space for exploring the possibility of arriving at a collective notion of security on a national and regional basis, away from state-centric and threat perception-dominated determinants of security.

While doing so, we still remain haunted by the dilemma of "reflective equilibrium" and "coherentist approach" where common sense belief is not well represented in the theoretical underpinnings. It is difficult, however, to adopt the common sense belief without empirically testing it. On the other hand, the acceptability of these beliefs is constrained by considerations of already existing theories. So they prevent each other from acquiring newer dimensions.

Though there have been attempts to study aspects of human security in the past, the data, literature and knowledge continue to remain limited, scattered and unorganised. Not much systematic and focused research has been done on these issues of human security concerns. On the whole, there are serious gaps in theoretical-conceptual and applied research on human security-related issues in

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India. Policy makers in the country have had to rely on scattered knowledge and unorganised information-database in formulating policies and making decisions on human security concerns. At the same time, critics maintain that the core issues that have been raised in the human security discourse have long been discussed in India in a much more intimate and intensive manner. What is new is the framework that has been evolving in western literature which we are now trying to replicate and practice in this sub-continent.

There are several key themes and issues that need to be studied in the context of human security discourses and debate in India. The main thrusts of this study is however, on three very critical areas, viz.,

i) environmental security,

ii) food security, and

ii) energy security.

Besides looking at the macro features and aspects of these three areas of concern, some specific cases and examples in each of these themes from across the country have been cited.

An attempt has also been made to trace the political economy of these issues both in the context of state and societal interventions.