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NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN SOUTH ASIA: POLICY CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of nuclear proliferation has raised concern not only in the club of nuclear and the potential nuclear powers but also in the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) as well. More disconcerting is the fact that there has been a spread of ballistic missiles throughout the developing world. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute confirmed in a report that there are around 25 countries which have acquired or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles.¹

But there are still regions in the developing world where some states cannot dream of possessing nuclear weapons in the near future. One such region is South Asia where persistent conflicts and endemic tensions and instability still haunt the parameters of its international relations.

Certain characteristics of South Asian conflicts may be mentioned here. The sources of conflicts in the region have primarily been intra-regional. External interventions have taken place, mostly guided by extra-regional motives, but the pulling-in force has largely been provided by the internal forces. This means

1. Aaron Karp, Ballistic missiles proliferations, SIPRI yearbook 1991

that threats to security of the regional countries come from the region itself. The peculiarity of the threat matrix is that India considers its individual neighbours as the possible source of troubles while the neighbours individually consider India as the source of insecurity. Even if the potency of such threat perceptions has been reduced in recent times, the feelings nonetheless remain. The conflicts have mostly been self-sustaining feeding as well as being fed by linkages with other conflicts as well as a spiralling arms race. The late eighties witnessed the addition of nuclear dimension to the arms race which is a new element in the security calculus of both types of states in South Asia, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. On the part of the nuclear states we observe an overriding urge to establish their supremacy whereas there is an overriding fear in the non-nuclear weapon states of being prevailed upon and of the eventuality of a nuclear fall out. There is thus an ongoing debate at both the levels. But how much powerful a nuclear weapon state is and how far the NNWS are threatened is a case to be analysed.

Since a mode of behaviour emanates from one's perception of reality, a discussion on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear rivalry and the security of non-nuclear weapon states etc. cannot be fruitfully conducted without reference to the underlying concepts of power held by the actors.

The all out emphasis laid on nuclear weapons as power resources by states who possess such weapons, or those aspire to acquire nuclear weapon and those who fear the usage of nuclear weapons indicate a conceptualisation of power resources that is capable as one of universal application.

However, if nuclear weapon as a power resource is not conceptualised in this way, the issue of non-proliferation, nuclear rivalry and NNWS insecurity is likely to acquire different meaning.

The purpose of the paper thus is to explore the conceptualisation of power and analyse the issues of nuclear rivalry and the insecurity of NNWS of South Asia. And this will be done by using Policy Contingency Framework (PCF) which makes the operation of a variable contingent upon many others. So that there is no scope of linear or unidimensional policy analysis. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part concerns itself with the theoretical framework. The second and the third parts examine the dimension of nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and the security of the NNWS in the light of policy contingency framework. The fourth part draws on the conclusion and suggests recommendations.

II. POLICY CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK: A RELATIVISTIC AND CONTEXTUAL FORMULATION OF POWER

Power is one of the most important and basic concepts in international relations. Although the use of the concept of power (and related concepts) in understanding human phenomena can be traced from the remote past, the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new. The vast improvement in the clarity of power concepts was due to the fact that during the last several decades there were more systematic efforts to tie these concepts than the previous millennia of political thought. One could not agree more with the authorities such as Baldwin, Cartwright or Dahl that conceptual sophistication, refinements, increased precision and 'interminable theoretical distinctions' tend to overwhelm an analyst. Admittedly, there are values in achieving precision of and theoretical distinctions among such concepts as power, influence, resistance, control etc. However, given the task at hand it appears useful to consider power in a generic sense and focus on the essential question: Is power something that can be applied over wide range of circumstances or is it context bound?

Perhaps, it will be more convincing to consider power, as a means, within a contextual framework, than to treat it something capable of universal application and unaffected by any contextualities.

The 'realist school' of international politics maintains that the power of a national political community is a function primarily of its mobilizable and deployable military force.² Power is viewed as a quantifiable and commensurable mass which can be measured and weighed.³ Chan in his study of Taiwan's trade relations with the US noted,

in general, structural models of international relations are apt to posit the analytic or policy importance of one or more tangible assets, to treat these assets as proprietary properties, and to assign national status on the basis of these assets. The world is seen to have a hierarchy and countries are somehow locked into this structure. Attention tends to be directed to the more objective or quantifiable aspects of national assets, to the domestic rather than foreign sources for generating these assets, and to the basic rigidities and asymmetries of the international relation system.⁴

Snider asserted that the general concern of most empirical approaches to the definition and measurement of power in world politics has been with power as a strategic resource base for a very specific purpose: to index the war fighting potential of nations.⁵ Researchers such as Singer *et. al.*⁶, Choucri and North⁷, Doran

2. See Sprout and Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 137-138.
4. S. Chan, "The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the United States", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 251-292.
5. L. W. Snider, "Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 314-356.
6. J. D. Singer, Bremer, S., and Stuckey, J., "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in Russett, B., (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers*, California, 1972.
7. N. Choucri and R. C. North, *Nations in Conflict*, San Francisco, 1974.

and Parsons⁸, Handel⁹, Cline¹⁰, Wayman¹¹ and Stoll¹² combined dimensions such as industrial, demographic and military (or their equivalents) in constructing capability index to assess war fighting potential of nations. Snider observed that all these indices held an underlying assumption that additional increments of resources are somehow converted into additional increments of power.¹³

Power is being treated as a quantifiable, monolithic, homogeneous and highly fungible entity, which can be acquired, possessed, accumulated, measured, compared and used irrespective of time and contexts. However, our experiences often contradict our expectations derived from the notion of power based on tangible 'power assets'. In commercial negotiations, diplomatic disputes, even military conflicts, the weaker side is sometimes able to prevail over the stronger side to obtain a more favourable settlement than its objective assets and liabilities would suggest.¹⁴

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8. C. F. Doran and W. Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1980.
 9. M. Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, London, 1981.
 10. R. S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*, Boulder, 1981. Also, Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift*, Boulder, 1975. Recognising Cline's World Power Assessment as a pole opposite of contextual analysis advocated by the Sprouts and Lasswell and Kaplan, Baldwin commented that, 'if one wanted to promote the idea of power as monolithic, homogenous, unidimensional and highly fungible, it would be difficult to improve on Cline's approach. See Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", *op. cit.*, p.171-173.
 11. F. Wayman, J. D. Singer and G. Goertz, "Capabilities, Allocations and Success in Militarised Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1983.
 12. R. Stoll, "Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984.
 13. Snider, *op. cit.*, p. 317.
 14. Chan, *op. cit.* Also R. Keohane and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, 1977. and A. F. K. Organski, and J. Kugler, "David and Goliaths: Predicting the Outcomes of International Wars", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 11, 1978, p. 141-180.

The observation of frequent failure of power predictions has led Baldwin to label the problem as 'the paradox of unrealised power'.¹⁵ Using this paradox Baldwin argued the usefulness of contextual analysis and the inadequacy of a monolithic, homogeneous and highly fungible conception of power. Fundamental to this contextual analysis is the relational conception of power which enable us to resolve the anomalies of power prediction.

The relational definition of power has been one of the most important element of social power analysis since 1950.¹⁶ Power according to this formulation is perceived as a product of the relation between two or more actors. Such a relationship may be actual or postulated.¹⁷ The Sprouts wrote that,

Conclusions regarding the capabilities of nation are always comparative. That is to say, the capabilities of a given state are relative to the capabilities of the other states with which it is or may be involved in demand-response relationships. There is no such thing as political capabilities in the abstract or in general- in a vacuum, so to speak any more than there can be any concept of political potential that is not comparative.¹⁸

Similarly, in his critique of Knorr's formulation of 'putative' power as inherent in the things of value¹⁹, Baldwin wrote,

A relational concept of power assumes that actual or potential power is never inherent in properties of A, but rather inheres in the actual or potential relationship between A's properties and B's value system.²⁰

15. Baldwin, *op. cit.* 1979, p. 163,

16. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", *International Organisation*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p. 496.

17. On the relational definition of power, see, Lasswell and Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, 1950. H. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power", *Journal of Politics*, 15, November, 1953; Dahl, "The Concept of Power", *op. cit.*; Cartwright, *Op. Cit.*; and Rosenau, J., "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World", *International Security*, Fall 1976.

18. Sprout and Sprout, *Op. Cit.*, 1962, p. 164.

19. Knorr, *op. cit.*, 1975.

20. Baldwin, *op. cit.* 1979, p. 171.

What Baldwin disagrees with Knorr is that power is not inherent in the properties of A; i.e., A does not possess power in an independent or absolute sense. However, he recognises that power can emanate from the properties of A in his relationship with B's perception, values and propensities.²¹ Thus from a relational point of view, A's properties are just as important as B's value system; i.e., A's power is contingent upon himself just as it is contingent upon B. For example, the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of A's threat not only depends on whether A has the motivation/willingness and power potential to make a threat but also whether B is a coward or a masochist.

The failure of the power predictions may also result from the mistaken belief that power resources are highly fungible, i.e., those power resources that are useful in one policy-contingency framework will be equally useful in other policy-contingency frameworks. The Sprouts insisted that a discussion of capabilities should always take place within some framework of policies and operational contingencies, actual or postulated.²²

The policy-contingency frame of reference is important because data (for example, of physical geography, demographic condition, technological state, economic affairs etc.) have no intrinsic political significance whatsoever. Such data acquire political significance only when related to some frame of assumption as to what is to be attempted, by whom, when and where, and vis-a-vis what adversaries, associates and neutral bystanders.²³

The need for contextual specification of power relations was also highlighted by Lasswell and Kaplan²⁴, Dahl²⁵, Baldwin²⁶,

21. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

22. H. Sprout, and M. Sprout, *op. cit.* 1962, p.164.

23. *Ibid.* p. 164.

24. Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, 1950, p. 75-76.

25. Dahl, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 29-33.

26. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 1979 and 1980.

Nagel²⁷ and Lamborn²⁸. While Baldwin offered a complete list of contextual specifications, he suggested that there is a general agreement in the social power literature that a minimum specification of a power relation must include both scope and domain²⁹. Emphasizing the importance of specifying scope and domain Dahl wrote,

Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. When one hears that A is highly influential, the proper question is: Influential over what actor with respect to what matters? The failure to insist on this simple question often leads political observers astray.³⁰

A similar emphasis can also be observed in the Sprouts' work.³¹ The underlying rationale for such emphasis is that the situational diversities render a particular power-resource useless across context. Baldwin³² cited Schelling, who stressed that even slight changes in the context of an influence attempt can convert a power asset into a power liability; that threatening voters with nuclear attack is not merely one of the less effective ways to win a mayoral election in New Haven, it is a guarantee of defeat; that possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelevant to securing the election of a US citizen as UN Secretary-General; it is a hindrance; that 'first strike weapons' may not only decline in effectiveness in deterrent situations, they may actually impair one's ability to deter.³³

27. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

28. A. C. Lamborn, *The Price of Power*, Boston, 1991.

29. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 1980. The complete description of a power relation would include who is trying to get whom to do what, by what means, where, when, how, at what cost, with what degree of success and so on.

30. Dahl, *op. cit.*, 1976.

31. Sprout, H., and Sprout, M., *op. cit.*, 1962.

32. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 1979.

33. Schelling, T. C., *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, 1976, cited in Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 166.

This is because political power resources are relatively low in fungibility. However, this does not imply that some power resources are not more fungible than others. Power resources such as money, time, information etc., are most likely to be effective in most situations with regard to most people over most scopes³⁴ than perhaps power resources such as ethnic homogeneity of one's own constituency or elite consensus. However, as Baldwin noted, there are tendencies to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared. These tendencies are considered to be counter-productive in theorising about international politics.³⁵ Although Lasswell and Kaplan gave 'special consideration to the role of violence', they repeatedly asserted that power does not rest 'always, or even generally, on violence'; that 'power may rest on various bases'; that 'none of the forms of power is basic to all the others'; and that 'political phenomena are only obscured by the pseudo-simplification attained with any unitary conception of power as being always and everywhere the same'.³⁶ Hence, if power is treated as situation specific rather than generalized, idea of an 'ultimate' form of power does not make much sense.³⁷ Finally, Baldwin asserted,

The proposition that military force is more effective than other power resources is both ambiguous and debatable. In the absence of clearly specified or implied policy-contingency frameworks, the proposition that force is more effective than other power bases has little, if any, meaning.³⁸

Hence contrary to the conventional conception of power, the relational concept of power brings contextual analysis to the fore front in assessing the effectiveness of threats.

34. Baldwin, *Ibid.*, p. 167.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

36. Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. ix, 76, 85, 92, 94.

37. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 1979.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

In this paper the nuclear rivalry, insecurity of NNWS and non-proliferation in South Asia will be examined from this theoretical position. Using the argument of contextuality as advocated by Policy Contingency Framework, attempt will be made to show that nuclear weapons are not fungible. Therefore, an all out emphasis to acquire these weapons is utterly misplaced and inappropriate. A realization of the infungibility of nuclear weapons will therefore devalue the need to proliferate.

III. DIMENSION OF NUCLEAR RIVALRY IN SOUTH ASIA

Acquisition of nuclear weapons in South Asia is part of a long reactive process in which rival states have developed nuclear programme in response to each other's deployment of nuclear weapons. India's nuclear programme got incentive from China's nuclear explosive test, following on the heels of latter's victory over former in the 1962 territorial disputes. In May 1974, India tested its own nuclear explosive device at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert close to the Pakistan border. This was an evidence that India has developed all the required expertise and technologies needed to be a nuclear power. More recently, it is believed that India has designed smaller and more efficient war heads using beryllium and tritiums which it can produce domestically.³⁹ It is also suspected that India is also working on a thermo-nuclear device, with reports claiming that she came close to testing such a device in 1984.⁴⁰ The current general perceptions about India's nuclear capability are such that India can make dozens of nuclear weapons at short notice.

A decade later, Pakistan in response to India's nuclear test, developed a programme of its own which was made public by the

39. Newsbrief (United Kingdom: Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), South Hampton University, July 1989.

40. *Newsbrief* PPNN, March 1988, p.3.

late President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Huq in March 1987. He disclosed that Pakistan has developed the requisite technology but had not chosen to exercise the weapons option. This was also pronounced by A.Q.Khan, the brain behind Pakistan's nuclear programme that Pakistan has mastered the technology for making nuclear weapons.

Gradually, the idea of being a nuclear weapon state became entrenched in the political discourse of both the countries. Various polls conducted by the media have revealed that there is wide public support for going nuclear in both countries. The political parties in both the countries are also very much in favour of going nuclear. About India's position, Subramanyam once opined that, 'if you are living in a world of nuclear weapon powers, then you must have it'. He further asserted that, 'if the world can live with five or six nuclear powers it can live with eleven or twelve'.⁴¹ The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a leading advocate in India, and its party manifesto calls for a strong nuclear deterrent. In Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has been the most vocal pro-bomb political party.

Although both India and Pakistan claim that their nuclear research and development programmes are meant for peaceful purposes only, the worrisome aspect of South Asian nuclear proliferation threat in the 1990s remains the India-Pakistan security dilemma. It is very much unlikely that either country will abandon their nuclear option, in the near future.

But there are substantial differences between India's and Pakistan's approach to nuclear issues. It is India's contention that while Pakistan represents a self-evident military challenge, the greater security threat to India comes from China. They show the instances when India suffered defeat at the hands of China in the

41. *Time*, 1989, p.2.

1962 border war and feel insecure about China's massive nuclear deployment compared with India's nascent nuclear capability. As such India thinks that it must maintain its nuclear sovereignty to deter potential Chinese military threats and to enhance New Delhi's bargaining programme with Beijing. It may be noted here that China has of late demonstrated no aggressive designs against India and Sino-Indian relations have improved gradually over the last several years.

On the other hand, Pakistan's main security concern is the perceived threat from a much larger and more powerful India, with which it has already fought three major wars, in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Besides, they were also engaged in two limited armed conflicts over the Rann of Kutch in 1964 and the Siachen Glacier since 1985. Besides wars, limited armed conflicts and military intervention, India-Pakistan relations have also been marred by the use of force for political intimidation as for example, India's 'Brasstacks' military exercise, which was conducted in winter 1986-87, when the two sides came very close to a major military clash. Pakistan's concerns are aggravated by the growing power disparity and compounded by its lack of territorial depth for defence by conventional means. Pakistan thinks that India continued its military build-up for no apparent reason other than its aspiration to regional dominance. For years, it has been one of the largest recipients of arms transfer in the Third World. It has the fourth largest military in the world and an expanding military force. For 1994-95, it has added a further 20 percent to its budget for the armed forces. Pakistan is aware that it can never, even in its wildest of dreams, hope to match India's superiority in conventional forces, not to mention about India's nuclear capability.

The pattern of Indo-Pakistani hostile relationship led Pakistan to perceive the nuclear explosion of India as its intention to

permanently bring the Pakistanis under Indian domination. Interestingly enough, the explosion took place only after three years of Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India over the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Bhutto, the former Pakistani Prime Minister, who made an abortive search for security guarantees from the US against nuclear threats, expressed his country's acute sense of insecurity by stating that the Pakistanis would 'eat grass' if necessary to match the Indian nuclear capability.⁴² A Pakistani scholar sums up the perceptions of the time thus,

At the time many Pakistanis felt that not only India had demonstrated its superiority of numbers in the 1971 East Pakistan crisis but by going nuclear it had also acquired qualitative technological superiority over them. This meant to them they will not only have to forget about the Kashmir issue but will have to learn to live under the shadow of a hostile and powerful nuclear neighbour. For them this was bitter pill to swallow.⁴³

The Kashmir dispute that flared again in 1989 aggravated the tensions further and heightened the mistrust between the two countries. As such Pakistan views its nuclear option as the country's only deterrent against political or military bullying by India. Pakistan thinks that in acquiring nuclear capability, it committed no violation of any obligation under international law.

In sum, India's nuclear rationale largely rests on its ambitions to be a world class power, a power to be recognised by the world community in its proper setting. While speaking on 'India's role in the world today', the former foreign secretary of India once said that by virtue of being the second largest populated country, India

42. Md. Nuruzzaman, "South Asia without Nuclear Bombs?", *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. I, No. 2, January-June, 1994, p.160.

43. Pervaiz Cheema Iqbal, "Pakistan's Quest for Nuclear Technology", *Working Paper No. 19, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University*.

had the right to become a nuclear power.⁴⁴ On the contrary, Pakistan's nuclear rationale is based not on global ambitions but on her historical confrontation with India.

IV. NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES' SECURITY THREAT

Almost all non-nuclear countries not only in South Asia but throughout the world regard a cessation of the nuclear arm race. They want to halt the testing, production and further development of nuclear weapons. In other words, they want to stop both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The fact of the matter is that the vast disparity in the level of conventional force between non-nuclear weapon states and of those states possessing nuclear weapons, particularly in South Asia makes it practically impossible for NNWS to be able to resist intervention - conventional or nuclear as the situation stands today. As such these countries have consistently opposed proliferation of nuclear weapons as is evident from their voting pattern at the UN on the issue.⁴⁵

Although the capability of having a nuclear weapon does not necessarily imply that it will be used, nevertheless, the capability does imply that it may be used. As such the non-nuclear weapon states are fearful by the very presence of nuclear weapons and their deployment in the region. They are also worried about the nuclear fallout in the eventuality of a nuclear exchange between India and China or India and Pakistan. Also their fear erupts from the fact that even if the nuclear war is limited to India and Pakistan, the physical consequences of the nuclear radiation could

44. Quoted in *The Hindu*, May 17, 1995.

45. Dhruva Kumar, "Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and the Future of Regional Security in South Asia", *BISS Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, January, 1994, p. 85.

be equally disastrous to all of them. Moreover, there is a possibility that nuclear weapons might be used inadvertently or accidentally in the course of a conventional war.

Also there is no safe waste disposal system on earth for the radioactive elements produced by the nuclear industry, either for spent fuel from power reactors or for dismantled, redundant nuclear warheads. Plutonium, for example is the most toxic radioactive substance on earth. Just one billionth of an ounce, which exceeds permissible human intake, can destroy genes, kill white blood cells and cause cancer.

The non-nuclear weapon states in South Asia such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka are all signatories of the NPT regime. It may be mentioned here that the treaty came into force in 1970 as a sort of package bargain in which non-nuclear states renounced nuclear arms in return for promised disarmament by the nuclear powers.

Although Bangladesh possesses a nuclear reactor, it is under IAEA safeguard as required by its adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. Nepal and Maldives were the first two countries of the five South Asian Smaller states to sign the NPT at its inception. In the recently concluded NPT Conference Bangladesh declined to side with neither the western powers who are advocating indefinite extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty nor with the dissenting states. Bangladesh took an independent stance and presented a number of conditionalities as an appendage to the proposal for indefinite extension of the NPT. It also called for negative and positive security assurances by nuclear states to non-nuclear states and for establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in South Asia. It also demanded special preference to Least Developed Countries in terms of transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses as well as for their sustainable development.

V. ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK

In the foregoing section, India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry and the perception of threat emanating from such rivalry on the NNWS was discussed. The emphasis on nuclear capabilities by India and Pakistan and the perception of fear of the South Asian NNWS seems to have emanated from the conceptualization of power as an absolute, highly fungible, monolithic entity that can be used irrespective of time and context. However, as was stated earlier, policy contingency approach negates such notions of power. Instead, it recognises power as a relative, infungible entity that is very much context bound.

According to this perspective then, the nuclear weapons, a form of power resource, is also likely to be differentially effective across PCFs. Particularly, in case of South Asia, the effectiveness of nuclear weapons appears to be extremely marginal when a whole range of contexts etc. are taken into account. Logically, an all out emphasis on acquisition of nuclear weapons appear to be very ridiculous. Let us examine this in some greater depth. We shall consider effectiveness of nuclear weapon with respect to the context of low intensity conflicts, high intensity conflicts and regional or global aspirations.

In the South Asian context, the low intensity conflicts such as border incursions, minor territorial conflicts etc. constitute the majority of instances. It is almost axiomatic that nuclear weapons have no role whatsoever, to play in these conflicts. Given the contextualities, these weapons provide their users no exploitable military power. In fact they were never intended to counter the border incursions and limited wars, territorial conflicts etc. that pose them the real threats. Moreover, the actual use of nuclear weapons would only ensure their own destruction.

Likewise, the role of nuclear weapons in major wars, i.e., high intensity conflicts is non-existent. Since the end of second world war, in none of the many battles that were fought around the globe, not one single nuclear weapon was used. One might point out the fact that their effectiveness is that they enabled to deter nuclear fall out. This argument may be used either way. While it is possible to acknowledge the merit of the argument, by the same token it may also be pointed out that the opponents' nuclear deterrent capability renders one's own nuclear capacity void and vice versa. Since one's own capacity is rendered void, these weapons turn out to be ineffective. In addition, our experience of the wars fought since second world war suggest that the use of non-nuclear weapon largely suffices the needs making the nuclear one superfluous and thereby ineffective.

From the foregoing discussion of the various policy contingency frameworks, we observe that the nuclear weapon as a power resource is effective as a deterrent only. Can it then account for Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes?

Basically, the nuclear rivalry can be said to have emanated from a relational insecurity. The spread of nuclear weapons can be viewed as a historical process where adversary threat perceptions lead to a kind of chain reaction...the US nuclear weapons capability catalysed the Soviet nuclear programme, the Chinese nuclear deterrent was directed both at the US and the USSR. The Chinese capability spurred India towards its acquisition of nuclear capability possible which in turn triggered the Pakistan's sense of insecurity thereby enabling her to be a nuclear power.

Apparently, Pakistan's relational insecurity with a nuclear power, India and India's relational insecurity with another nuclear power, China provide the policy contingencies in which both the

countries acquired nuclear capabilities which were put into effect as deterrents. While these policy contingencies offer plausible explanations in case of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear deterrents, in case of India they appear less convincing. This is because, although India suffered severe defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-India border conflict, Sino-Indian rivalry was never as volatile as the Indo-Pakistan relation to necessitate a nuclear programme. India's nuclear programme can best be explained in terms of its regional and global aspirations rather than deterrence emanated from relational insecurity with a nuclear power.

The argument of deterrence emanated from relational insecurity with a nuclear power also offers contextualities in which acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by other South Asian states will not be effective. The South Asian states like Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives are not nuclear powers and do not have any relational insecurities with each other. These states also do not have any relational insecurities with Pakistan either. However, they do have insecure relations with India. But that is not because India is a nuclear power. **With or without nuclear power India is a threat to them.** Although the states in South Asia have adversarial relationship with India, nevertheless they cannot be characterised as volatile as that of India Pakistan relationship.

Admittedly, the vulnerability posed by the nuclear rivalry is enormous for the NNWS. However, the geographical proximity and the degree of havoc caused by the nuclear fall out appear to have a restraining effect on the nuclear powers.

VI. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the Policy Contingencies in South Asia suggests that in most contexts nuclearization remains both

unnecessary and avoidable. Unnecessary because the legitimate security concerns of both India and Pakistan can be assured without the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And avoidable because they are unusable and ineffective. Taking PCFs into consideration, the statesmen in both India and Pakistan must realize that the most important threat to the region come from internal social and economic sources. Both India and Pakistan are going through a painful process of social and economic transformation. It must be remembered here that South Asia is the home of world's largest concentration of poverty. It produces not more than one percent of global GDP. The region is faced with a severe threat of population explosion. It is chronically vulnerable to various forms of natural disasters and environmental degradation and millions here are deprived of proper food, shelter and clothing, education and medicine. Hence an overemphasis on nuclear weapons will only drain out valuable resources away from urgent economic and development tasks.