Muhammad Shahiduzzaman

THE STATE AND NATION APPROACH IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS OF ETHNICITY

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Cold War a remarkable degree of optimism was generated globally regarding the reconstruction of a desired global order that would suit human expectations more through popular consent than ever before. Such hope had a rational basis since for the first time in human history, a systemic transformation was underway without resorting to large-scale violence. The collapse of communism prompted command economies to give in to the market approach, and made way for the premises of self-determination that crept up, to operate selectively in parts of Eurasia. All of these developments were allowed to occur through the power of both reason and passion, and not brutal force.

The most pertinent question was - could we move towards the future or were we instead moving back to the future? It did not take much time to realize that the latter possibility stood by on the doorstep and the clock could tick back to 1945, driving the systemic rearrangement all the way in a bid to impose compulsions to redress the wrongs done thus far. The end of the Cold War had in fact opened up a can of worms and it was, as if, the monstrous dinosaur in the jungle was dead but then all those poisonous snakes that had never gotten out of their holes while the dinosaur reigned, have now raised their heads.

Muhammad Shahiduzzaman is Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. This is a revised version of a paper presented in a seminar in Dhaka in November 1994.

The objective of this paper is to explore the prospects for change in this current global equation of the state-nation controversy as far as it relates to the ethnicity issue. It would be my effort to place few of these conceptual issues within a theoretical framework by focusing on the current systemic structure with the state as the basic unit. The related entities including nations as well as the ethnic perceptions that revolve around the state-concept are to be treated in terms of their complex, transitional ties to it. A question may then evolve whether a theoretical framework which is state-centric can at all address the relevant critical issues linked to the emerging global hierarchy-determination. That particular controversy shall constitute an important aspect of the literature that is intended to emerge in this analytical study.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

It may be necessary at the outset to develop an operational basis for the terminology involved, specially on the question of ethnicity or ethnic identity. The expression `state' or `nation' could be spared of the pains of undergoing any serious debate involving analytical rigour since so much of perceptive focus has already been given on the interpretation of these within the formal discipline of political science. In spite of that, these terms do continue to bear controversial connotation because they are often categorized as a post-colonial legacy born out of sheer compulsions of colonial rule. In fact, the effort to bestow statehood and a consequent semblance of nationhood to so many of the post-World War II colonial entities has been treated with sarcasm by authors like Benedict Anderson who has branded them as `imagined communities'.[1] These states, whose geographical scope ranges from the western shores of Africa up to the eastern shores of Asia are said to have imitated the Western symbols of natio-

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1.   See, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* quoted in   Prashanta Tripura, "The Colonies Strike Back - Tribal Ethnicity and Modern State-Building in South Asia", paper presented at a seminar organized by BIISS, August 1992, Dhaka.

nalism which was how the anti-colonial sentiments took shape. Such sentiments moved past the pre-colonial status of loyalty to the then-existing socio-political institutions and had instead borrowed the Western ideas of modern statehood from colonial administrators. It was like inheriting the `White Man's Burden' in reverse. Colonial rulers had decided the parameters of emergent statehood, including the boundaries and frontiers. People who led freedom movements and had won great positions of honour as patriots fathering nationalist sentiments applied the art of charismatic hypnosis in winning over colonized sentiments. Most of these nationalists, however, were apt at transplanting past colonial institutions in leadership styles, governmental decision-making and, above all, in distancing themselves from ordinary man's psyche. The post-colonial concept of state or nation emerged more as a new way of governance where loyalties, political patronage and dissent involved great contrasts while adjusting traditions with modernism.

Prashanta Tripura, a noted Bangladeshi anthropologist, in a recent paper portrays powerful views on such phenomenon as he quotes Geertz in citing the perceptions of conflict between `primordial sentiments' and `civil politics'.[2] The former expression may have something to do with what we currently imply by the Euro-centric notion of ethnicity. This actually refers to the basic and ultimate human sense of identity and is necessarily linked to birthplace based on the roots of parental inheritance, language or mother-tongue, religion, race and similar attributes. With the acquisition of statehood, these Western-formulated structures of colonial legacy parted with the reintroduction of their pre-colonial basis for multiple, flexible choice for survival. They were instead immersed, in the word of Geertz, in an "Integrative Revolution", where diverse ethnic identities began their

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2. C. Geertz, *Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States*, 1973, quoted in Prashanta Tripura, *ibid*, p. 1.

uncertain journey to statehood.[3] It is difficult to conclude whether most of these post-colonial structures have actually attained the level of integrative potential which is implied by the expression `civil polity'.

TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ETHNICITY

The problem of ethnicity is by no means limited to the former colonies set free, but is, in fact, an almost global phenomenon. Western Europe, recognized as the cradle of the modern nation-state system, has not been able to set itself immune from this global malady. Britain, which is considered the birth-place of modern democracy as well as one of the arch colonial powers for several centuries, continues to nurture perhaps the worst and arguably the only serious case of ethnic crisis, i.e., the Northern Ireland problem in the heart of Western Europe. Such a puzzle perhaps nullifies the superiority-notion of the so-called Western integrative values based on such racist premises as the `White Man's Burden'. In East Europe, a new wave of ethnic reconstruction has only barely been patched up in a bid to resist forces of civil disorder and anarchic spill-overs. Powerful and complex mix of religio-linguistic diversity as well as historic alliance-choices based on past interest-perceptions have split up Serbs, Croats and the Bosnian Muslims in a totally anarchic wave of destructive transitional uncertainty that has engulfed the very fabric of social values. Non-Russian entities of the former Soviet Union have failed to find any virtue in the integrative values of almost seventy years of welfare and reforms within a command economy. Even in the not so distant past, Spain, Belgium as well as the Red Indians in American reservations had simmered in various degrees on the question of ethnic prerogatives.

It is assumed that there has been a greater proliferation of violence based on ethnicity following the end of the Cold War compared to the

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3. *Ibid.*

period that constituted the post-World War II Cold War era. Steven R. David suggests that "From 1945 to 1990, there has been over a hundred wars (both internal and inter-state) in the Third World. Since 1945, nearly 20 million people have lost their lives in wars. Of this number, about two million deaths occurred in Europe during the Greek civil war and Soviet intervention in Hungary, while the rest of the casualties were mostly Third World affairs."[4] The ethnic violence since 1990 continues to bear even more staggering comparative figures when one considers the extent of casualties in the Balkans, Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kampuchea, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Iraq, Angola and many other states. The Cold War had literally hidden most of the dormant conflicts of ethnic-origin, much due to overriding compulsions of the superpowers' alliance-structures which had in most cases created a very obvious degree of sensitivity regarding escalatory pressures from limited wars. Stephen David points out that "there is no dispute that the superpowers' competition limited American freedom of action in the Third World".[5] Stephen T. Hosmer adds to this : "Because of fears of provoking World War III, triggering direct Soviet intervention, pushing the Soviets to increase military assistance to a client, damaging detente, or provoking Soviet moves against other areas of critical interest to the U.S., Washington chose not to act as forcefully as it might have done in the Third World.[6] Charles Tilly argues on the question of formulating the state-identity in the post-colonial world: "The difference in the Third World is that while it took Western Europe three to four centuries to develop a state, Third World leaders have had only three to four decades to accomplish

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4. Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters", *International Security*, Harvard, Winter 1992/93, p. 131.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Stephen T. Hosmer, *Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts*, Crane, Russak and Company, New York, 1987, p. 11.

the same task.[7] Mohammed Ayoob, tends to subscribe to this line of thinking.[8]

On the other hand, there is a felt need to analyze such built-in perceptions based on the traditional and well-entrenched pattern of thinking in terms of obstacles that a modern state faces while trying to integrate diverse `primordial' ethnic strands into modern `nations'. Exploring the historical process in which these modern states had emerged may lead to the understanding of the very conditions that made ethnicity a political issue, thus leading to the obvious follow-up of images, stereotypes, and mostly Euro-centric historical perceptions that dominate the discourse on ethnicity and state. The European colonial expansion and its subsequent retreat had shaped state structures out of regions where there may have been none of such entities. Christopher Clapham observes: "Although the degree of correlation with existing ethnic groups varied (high in Southeast Asia, low in Africa and the Middle East), in nearly all cases, imposed borders replaced flexible demarcations."[9] Anthony D. Smith, in a paper titled, "State-Making and Nation-Building", observes: "Colonial powers further divided ethnic groups by assigning them different tasks based on ethnicity and also by playing them off against one another."[10]

Whereas such divisive methods were applied, it is possible that in pre-colonial times, the nation idea was an extra-ordinarily flexible notion that had shifted perpetually on the basis of dynastic reign based on conquest, overthrow, legitimacy-creation and the imposition of

7.   Charles Tilly (ed.), *Reflections on the History of European State-Building*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pp. 3-83, and Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of The Third World", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, January, 1991, pp. 265-266.

8.   *Ibid.*

9.   Christopher Clapham, *Third World Problem*, University of Washington Press, Mad, 1985, pp.238-42.

10. Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building" in John A. Hall (ed.), *States in History*, Basil Blackwell, New York, 1986, pp. 252-253.

empires and kingdoms on people who either succumbed or fought back to create new authoritative structures. There was no conscious concept of nation as we seem to believe in modern times for ourselves. If the Arabs are a nation, for example, it is strange why Kurds feel so different and pay such a heavy price not just against Turks and Persians but much more against Iraqis who are also Arabs. It may be said thus that nationalism was only a European invention and despite the applicability or the lack of it, the concept was made to spread throughout the world. Prashanta Tripura quotes : "Many of the ethnic problems which we encounter today, are nothing but the growth of nationalism within nationalisms"[11]

The limits of the state-nation approach in resolving ethnicity implies the barriers in embracing Western concepts. And yet, to quote Prashanta Tripura once more: "colonialism persists not only in the form of neo-colonialism, but also through the colonization of the mind by colonialist ideas, images and categories better understood as `internalized colonialism' and in the emergence of colonialist forms of exploitation and domination within the so-called post-colonial states better understood as "internal colonialism".[12] Tripura further suggests: "By definition, tribal ethnic societies lack state organization and do not live as part of state-identity. This conceptualization is considered as an accepted view of human evolution."[13] In certain cases, of course, tribal societies themselves succeeded in transforming into advanced evolutionary type through a gradual or possibly imposed process of consensus-building. Unresolved ethnicity has also been leading to the most grievous self-inflicted wounds, destroying the proclaimed spirit of its very distinct-identity *vis-a-vis* the statehood approach. It is difficult to resolve whether a million Tussis slain by the Hutu tribe in Rwanda was a direct outcome of statehood itself or of ethnicity at its

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11. C. Geertz; *op. cit.*, p. 237.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Prashanta Tripura, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

primitive worst. But on the other hand, Euro-American theoreticians who had articulated their views on human evolution were inclined to project the technologically-advantaged colonialists as being at the pinnacle of evolution and progress while the societies they colonized were rationalized to be at a comparatively low ebb. Prashanta Tripura points out that "as a result, their `knowledge' about `ancient' or `primitive' societies was actually knowledge about `contemporary' tribal societies that they came in contact with.[14] Today these very people who were `caged' into labels of this nature see the state as an instrument of post-colonial `encasement'.

In the 20th century context, the powerful forces of democracy and nationalism that had swept through 19th century Europe leading to the unification of Germany and Italy eventually compelled colonial powers to recognize similar political doctrines during the decolonization process. The Wilsonian principle of self-determination could hardly be treated seriously at a grass-roots level when, apart from the administrative expedience of colonial rule, and certain approximate parameters of religio-cultural, racial-linguistic diversity, it was con-sidered a nightmarish prospect to divide lands whose characteristics for a future date were unarticulated and yet predetermined. Stephen David indicates the likely subtle consequence: "Unlike the Western states which were built around an ethnic core that attracted and dominated other ethnic groups, in much of the Third World (especially Africa) there is no ethnic core to give identity to the state."[15]

In this context, Anthony Smith, in his work "State-Making and Nation-Building", refers to an essential prerequisite for the state-nation approach to resolve ethnicity: "Building a united state is also hampered by the lack of a common past among different ethnic groups. Without a common history and culture to build upon, it is difficult to reach a

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14. *Ibid.*
15. Stephen David, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

consensus on present and future policies"[16] But then Smith also looks at the time-boundaries dimension when he points out: "The timing of gaining independence by Third World states has also contributed to their instability. In Western Europe, state-building took place before the view had taken hold that each ethnic group deserved its own state. In the Third World, states were created at a time when ethnic nationalism had gained wide acceptance."[17] Stein Rokkan adds in this regard: "Western European state-makers had the luxury of forging their countries before the emergence of mass political participation. Third World state makers, on the other hand, need to build a state with a relatively well-educated citizenry who seek involvement in the affairs of the state."[18] Consequently, it would be fair to observe that many of the Third World transitional states fail to maintain institutions that might channel competing mass participation and mediates through an extensive use of the audio-visual media. On the other hand, the Western authors mentioned about seem to disregard the ethnic realities in their own regions and tend to stereotype the Third World in a discriminatory manner, as if post-colonial societies are the only ones that seem to suffer from the irreconcilable aspects of ethnicity.

Even if ethnicity, statehood or the limits of nationhood are castigated as imposed Western doctrines lacking viability in post-colonial structures, the problem remains that any other form of organization, even a futuristic supranational alternative, must also reckon with inevitable divisive trends unless some miracle reinforces much of the utopian ideals of integration. In the present global context, the need for systemic stability as well as an avowed consciousness to undertake a relatively less violent transition towards post-Cold War

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16. Anthony Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-244.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State-Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations in Europe" in Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in West Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pp. 3-83.

global order necessitates the continuation of stable national boundaries unless inevitable developments might impose changes in the *status quo*. None of the states today are eager to subscribe to any territorial break-up in the current times of global-hierarchy redetermination and when territorial consolidation continues to remain a sacred state obligation. There is, however, the partial exception of Canada where a liberal, non-violent option on the part of Quebec to secede, through an earlier exercise of referendum, has gained a unique degree of constitutional legitimacy. But the pro-Quebec nationalists, French-speaking, unlike the rest of English Canada, continue to flirt with a passionate urge to secede and yet they postpone it right at a threshold point for sometime in the not too distant future, that somehow never seems to arrive.

In recent times, the voluntary break-up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as the earlier secession of the former Soviet Republics on ethnic lines had, in fact, led to great expectations on the part of secessionist insurgents, who capitalized on the mood and seized the opportunity to legitimize a global spill-over of such trends. Neither the Americans nor the larger states like China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria or even Burma, could afford to treat such liberal new projection of human rights endeavor with any attitude of benign neglect for the sake of any `enlightened' new world order- which looked more of a utopia rather than reality. For China and India in particular, as well as Myanmar, their considerable size and resources introduce powerful elements of economic resource potential which, in turn, clearly place both China and India into positions of global-power aspirants at least on the basis of current market-biased economic integrative values and despite the limits imposed by certain elements of political fragmentation.

There are, however, scholarly speculations that focus on the need to project the principle of self-determination in a manner which is less territorial in nature and seeks to avoid the traumatic surgery of sece-

ssion. Gidon Gottlieb, while promoting the `state plus nations' approach, argues in favour of "functional spaces or special functional zones across state-boundaries for the creation of national home-regimes in historical lands, the grant of a recognized status to national communities that have no state of their own, the design of union between peoples - as distinct from territories -as well as an approach to issues of national identity on rights that differentiate between nationality and state citizenship."[19] Such a framework "does not preclude territorial compromises; it widens the menu of options when territorial changes do not suffice or when they are altogether ruled out."[20]

National entities which are largely homogeneous in nature are gradually turning to a more peaceful process of linguistic, religious and cultural integration based on a powerful use of the modern communications technology, especially the broad-based policies of decentralizing state-control over the audio-visual media. Exceptions are largely found due to lack of politico-institutional stability based on some legitimacy-crisis bordering on insurgency. Such chronic ailment obviously debars economic take-off, which is a much too expensive price to pay in this era of regional trading orders, global investment-competitiveness and the dawning of the GATT-based market-liberalization experimentation. The plight of Somalia, Rwanda or Afghanistan have now raised certain very serious and grave doubts whether such states can at all function on their own while they continue to make their own people the very targets of mutual annihilation. One may even be struck with the unpleasant thought that the current territorial basis of statehood grants a bizarre level of formal equality on the basis of the prevailing practice of international law. There is, indeed, a sharp divide between the status of statehood and

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19. Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations Without States," *Foreign Affairs*, June 1994, p. 101.
20.   *Ibid.*, pp.100-101.

other forms of subordinate political organizations. The gap between subordination and equality or even independence and autonomy is more formally applied and painfully felt when anarchic forces in certain state structures bedevil security and allow international relations to suffer from a sense of benign neglect.

While Gidon Gottlieb would be willing to explore the "deconstruction and rearrangement of rigid concepts of territorial borders, sovereignty and independence that originated in Western Europe," he would not go to the extent of suggesting changes in international borders or creating new states. He chooses to recommend `soft' solutions which could "reorder the standing of national communities on an internal constitutional plane as well as on the international diplomatic one along certain specific lines."[21] He offers the idea of `functional spaces and zones' which he perceives to be "overlays added for limited purposes over existing boundary lines, not meant to prejudice or modify internationally-recognized borders."[22] This is a notion that seeks to soften the overly-sensitive psychology of rigid boundaries. Perhaps such view conforms with present global trends of the market approach when ultimately the economics of free trade may help rationalize flexible boundary-structures, which in turn may dilute ethnic distinctions considerably.

Another of Gottlieb's prescriptions promotes the idea of `historical homeland'. This idea involves "the notion of a special regime for a national or ethnic community in a historical homeland that lies across an international border".[23] The distinct point here, as Gottlieb suggests, is "an oft-reckoned insensitivity of secular societies towards lands that bear mystical sanctity to certain ethnic groups with particular beliefs .... a national home is a concept that has its roots in history,

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21.   *Ibid.*
22.   *Ibid.*
23.   *Ibid.*

culture and myth—that may not coincide with state boundaries."[24] Such a view implies a greater delicacy and sensitivity rather than obstinacy and rejection to enhance the viability of internationally-recognized regimes where immunity may evolve against legal claims or even notions of legitimacy and majority rule. Jerusalem, East Timor, the Kurdish-inhabited lands and certain areas in the Balkans qualify to explore this particular approach among other possible ones. The fact does remain that it is difficult to evolve any remedy for claims and counter-claims that could demarcate the threshold to distinguish nationhood from sub-nationalist aspirations. While the Irish, the Palestinians, and the Kurds have been looked upon as closer to homogeneity in terms of nationhood, but perhaps the long periods of their violent, persistent struggle for statehood as well as their global exposure may have contributed to a morally-defined position of acceptability. In the case of the Tamils or Kashmiris, the Mizos, Nagas or even the Chakmas, however, the sub-nationalist image appears to have taken a greater form of intra-state or state-internationalized dimension where the values of defining a nation is largely seen through the prism of state-centric loyalty.

That national identity is frequently confused with state-citizenship, as Gottlieb reminds us, is also an outcome of a complex debate. The state-nation approach could become a mighty paradox if only a state-centric perception of nationhood is imposed in a manner that diminishes or ignores distinctiveness based on ancestral heritage or roots of a separate identity. The Armenians or the Chinese stocks who had been living in South Asia for several generations are perhaps close to any example of a fascinating racial alienation from mainstream South Asians. The United States, despite the Judeo-Christian domination in its mainstream political culture, promotes an overwhelming display of ethnic diversity as the key to its integration-success story. Diverse

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24. *Ibid.*

ethnic groups avail state of the art audio-visual technology and every possible symbolic theme to reaffirm their cultural or ethnic roots so that a contrasting ethnic landscape thrives with a minimum imposition of governmental regulatory function. Yet, fifty states of diverse cultural heritage ranging from Hawaii to Alaska have managed to formulate the basis for statehood with almost no insurgent attempts ever vying for secession.

On the other hand, many states within the broader Euro-Afro-Asian and even Latin African regions, that range in their political systemic pattern from formerly totalitarian to currently democratic structures, and several states with a considerably longer exposure to democracy, continue to fail in treating ethnic separatism as a force which may be reckoned with through greater tact and dialogue and a minimum use of force. Authoritarian, dictatorial, monarchical state-systems are unlikely to ever change in such directions unless they undergo basic political transformation. But despite such liberal-militant contrasts in the treatment of ethnicity, there is hardly any state that could consider a Quebec-like choice through which Canada remains united thus far. Canada's persuasive process of allowing the right to secede as well as the dialogue, debate and dissent, has enabled an amazing level of mature consensus-building political culture to grow. It offers a civilized, healthy alternative and an almost miraculous level of integration with an optimum degree of human rights protection and an almost total application of the prerogatives of self-determination.

Certain observations by Gidon Gottlieb tend to lend credence to the post-modernist perceptions of attitudinal change on the question of ethnicity in the state-nation context. His conclusive perceptions for a more guarded focus on nationalism is based on current global-economy and ecology-biased realities. Gottlieb sees "two contradictory trends - the integration and fragmentation of states - are unfolding concurrently. The rise of free trade areas that pushed states toward closer integration has paradoxically strengthened isolationist forces

that nourish a revival of nationalism and ethnic strife. Nationalism is driven by the affinity-identity passions of ethnic communities and religious groups thirsting for self-esteem and dignity."[25]

Unlike the traditionalist-realist school of the 1950s when scholars and military-strategists alike had treated the state more like a garrison, with a fortress-mentality that meant total faith on state control over media and a perverted worship of secrecy, along with an obsession for overkill in intelligence-formulation based on a total lack of accountability, current post-modernist perceptions easily expose the dismal failure of such policies of state-preservation. For most of the Cold War period, all of the post-colonial Third World societies did continue to maintain colonialist structures of bureaucratic, executive-military institutional relationships and innovated little change in terms of separating regime-based ruling-elite's interest from broad-based views of national interest as much as they affect lives of ordinary people. Such a perpetuation of institutional relationships has reduced the goodness of statehood to the level where ethnicity, insurgency and violence continue to remain unresolved by coercive solutions.

The most venomous problems lie in perhaps the poverty of mind that had gone on to create the psychological poverty of political institutions. The decolonization process has indeed been followed by an imprisonment of human creativity at the level of statecraft. Unless such poverty in the art of state-craft is eradicated, it may be impossible to release the forces of creativity. Through years of impositions on the thought-process in many of the transitional societies, better known as the obsession of establishment-orchestration, a lot of steam continues to be generated, much of which has not been released, while some of it have shown trends of violent outbursts in the form of insurgent anger - reactionary, restorational or revolutionary, even secessionist - when ethnic separatism has reached its worst fate.

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25.   *Ibid.*

In his recent work, Gidon Gottlieb sums up such a phenomenon with eloquence while adding further to his earlier-quoted observations. He says: "Deep tides of nationalist feelings and powerful financial and market interests are running in opposite directions. These tides are running up against the politically-driven forces of the governments which are jealous of the authority and jurisdiction that was traditionally theirs.[26] Gottlieb goes on to the very heart of the malady that seems to have overtaken many of the Third World transitional structures when he offers a rather sobering diagnosis that governments are "slow to relinquish control over people and activities that were long in their grasp. The spontaneous emergence of market-driven `region-states' across national frontiers has further inhibited government action and regulations."[27]

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The above mentioned psychological barrier which continues to thrive in a good number of post-colonial political systems include most importantly, the government-dictated monopoly over the broadcast and television media whereby, the most creative technological dimensions of modern political, social and cultural life are imprisoned by the bureaucratic vision of people in executive authority. Just as the era of the transistor during the post-World War II period opened up for closed `societies a window to the proliferation of ideological debates, similarly the innovative genius of satellite-technology has now opened up for the world, what we call the science of the `Informatics Revolution'. With state-monopoly over the audio-visual media continuing as in the 1950s to dictate information, a lot of the transitional democracies in the Third World suffer from a denial of a fuller use of the most powerful means of the informatics alternative - much so at the state-cum-nation level, if not at the international plane.

26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*

A market-approach, that Gottlieb had upheld, should clearly involve the privatization of the audio-visual media, i.e., both the television and broadcast networks. This may release the market forces to innovate, create and draw ideas from diverse groups including various ethnic minorities, as we see in the United States and most of the formally-recognized `civilized world'. Such a choice of communication policy at a state level may certainly allow people to release their `steam', ventilate their grievances, innovate open debates on crucial divisive issues. The current reality of state-control over the audio-visual media simply contributes to create deeper wounds in the human psyche and thereby, enhance political fragmentation against the state-nation integration process as repressed feelings of dissent continue to simmer within.

Therefore, issues of national integration, whether they be intra-bureaucratic confrontations, political deadlocks, questions of national security, or even a problem of diverse insurgent outbursts seeking violent alternatives based on fundamentalist, radical or militant objectives - all of such elements that serve as catalysts for ethnic upsurge, need to be addressed and debated openly in order to build national consensus beyond a regime's perception. Opposing groups who constitute the critical segments of political institutions should be able to vent out their steam through regular timely debates and projection of views and counter-views by using the television as a media. Privatization of such technology-biased means of communication has helped most democratic entities to remove the authoritarian image of the state and foster the instruments of accountability in a true sense - as in the case of the Western democracies.

In fact, the question of basic freedom of expression is essentially tied to the right of access to the technology that serves most effectively in capturing human imagination, in developing vibrant intellectual conflict of ideas rather than the earlier-practiced false notion for imposed premises of state loyalty that only helps to imprison the mind

and denies futuristic choices. Counter-insurgency is far less likely to grow unhindered in open societies rather than ones where subtle, unknown and unseen powers monopolize the right of access to debate and dissent. In many of the Third World states, such negative and stagnant notions of authority have only contributed to state-structures that thrive on elitist perceptions while issues, such as corruption at high places remain undisclosed, until perhaps the opposing forces assume power to take up the mantle of vengeance. The audio-visual media, if privatized, could help to expose contending forces of elitist distortions while at the same time be subjected to the norms of sanity and objectivity when overseen through the accountability to law as enforced by the judiciary rather than the imposed bullying prospects of ruling executives and the bureaucratic hierarchy. Needless to add that privatization stimulates competition and an elevation of skills to help counter the foreign media bombardment.

Democratic institutions continue to badly malfunction in a good number of Afro-Asian states due to the deliberate distortion of parliamentary practice and a consequent lack of accountability in confronting terrorism, threats to national security and ethnicity-driven insurgency. Enlightened opinion suffers a lack of well-informed sources that could possibly have been articulated through open, unrehearsed and spontaneous television encounters. Such attitudes force a far-reaching impact not only upon the establishment-orchestration psychology by making it look like a tunnel-vision, but it also goes against the current global tide of market-system transnationalism.

In many Third World post-colonial systems, ethnic integration suffers much due to inefficient and obsolete intelligence bureaucracy. This is so because accuracy and objectivity of intelligence-gathering and its consequent applicability through a process of clear-cut constitutionally-based safeguard of national interests tend to give in to the subjective loyalties produced out of regime interests and patron-client linkages at the elite-level. Career compulsions as well as lack of

professionalism often distract the sanctity and moral fibre of vital security institutions - largely in some of the fragile, vulnerable and weak political systems where institutional legitimacy has often dwindled at the behest and mercy of vested, well-fed elites. These forces may even thrive on crisis and could even foment or sponsor or instigate ethnic divisions and set into motion acts of terrorism, communal hatred and sow the most effective seeds of secessionist ethnic turmoil.

In the United States, for example, former Army Colonel Oliver North's notorious exploits at the National Security Council(NSC) could have cast a crippling blow on the image of US policy pursuits *vis-a-vis* Iran and Nicaragua, had it not been for Congressional accountability of that powerful intelligence machinery. Even the proximity to the President which the NSC enjoyed could not protect Oliver North from facing criminal charges for violating the U.S. Constitution. In the transitional Third World societies, governmental structures often suffer from chronic coercive interventions in the political process (Nigeria and Haiti in recent times) due to an almost formalized tendency of intelligence institutions, both civil and military to manipulate political institutions through a `carrot and stick' policy. Although one may not totally ignore the rationale for such acts in specific circumstances, the potential damage on political institutions do reach dire proportions when they might distort national security if and when there is a lack of enlightened and intellectually well-structured accountability.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Problems of ethnicity may help to instigate insurgency when political fragmentation is accentuated by a political legitimacy crisis between the ruling and non-ruling authorities, which again is an insurgent act by its own right. When non-ruling groups challenge

some aspects of the political legitimacy of ruling authorities, the deteriorating trends in many transitional democracies could severely handicap the economic momentum. The state-nation approach is then essentially tied to the process of avoidance of fragmentation in the political culture due to the simple reason that the latter serves as a direct catalyst in promoting ethnic turmoil.

· In many of the post-colonial societies, the political fragmentation process often acquires the form of political terrorism which, in turn, foments ethnic issues and provokes violence to the extent that the internal infrastructure of the government is crippled. Examples of Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan and Angola indicate the extreme form of these cases where the post-Cold War global system is yet to evolve any cure. If such phenomena tend to escalate into other states, they do often convert violent encounters into civil wars as the iron-hand of ruling authorities wither away due to a generally international rejection of the legitimacy of power they had wielded. The current civil war situation in Russian Caucasus involving the Chechens, the recent Haitian case, the Georgian civil war are examples at hand that relate to such a process partially.

A good number of established states continue to suffer from grave internal terrorist threats where bands of rural terror-gangs and, in some cases, even urban ethnicity-biased potential terrorist groups threaten to create deep scars in the social fabric. Diverse Islamic sects as well as caste-related divisions in South Asia tend to complicate the problems of ethnic insurgency further beyond those posed by extremists using the ideological bogey. When military powers tend to shy away from grave internal terrorist havoc, including rural bands of extremists who easily defy civilian or even para-military law-enforcement forces, that can lead to projection of an escapist image for the military - as if it is a deliberate avoidance of looking after extreme civilian rural disorder. Internal rural terrorism when it turns into a

chronic malaise may have to be treated on a war footing just as a foreign invasion.

Finally, the realities of ethnicity are unlikely to be wiped out of the current global structure of states in their present level of co-existence. The basic questions, however, shall continue to revolve around the issues related to the protection of human rights, establishing the rationale for political legitimacy, and not the least of all, the eradication of all forms of terrorist and anarchic spill-over which encourage ethnic separatism.