

Lailufar Yasmin

MANAGING THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND THE CHANGING DIMENSION OF WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY

Abstract

The forty years of cold peace of Europe has been challenged in the 1990s with the upsurge of age-old ethno-nationalistic claims in the East and Central European countries. With the break up of Yugoslavia, the tide of hyper-state nationalism, imminent in the Serbs, started to threaten the peace and stability of Europe, the recent manifestation of which has been seen by the brutal onslaught of the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis shows the importance to address ethno-nationalistic problems in the broader agenda of European security policy for the greater interest of Europe to emerge as an integrated political unit, as envisaged by the planners of the European Union. This article discusses the background of Kosovo crisis and the institutional framework to establish peace in Kosovo. It also attempts to show some of the lessons particularly important for European security learned from the Kosovo crisis.

The question of West European security during the post-World War II period was mainly an embodiment of Cold War realities and concepts. The Yalta divide marked the boundary between 'protection' of democracy and 'threat' of communist expansion and *vice versa*. The Berlin Wall stood out to be a perfect

Ms. Lailufar Yasmin is a Lecturer in International Relations, University of Dhaka, and a former Research Associate of BISS.

symbolical expression of the extent of separation and division between the 'West' and 'East' Europe. Thus, though both parts of Europe shared a perception of security threat common in nature, they in-effect emerged as two separate security blocks with the USA and the former Soviet Union being the patron allies. Receiving nuclear guarantee from the United States as a trusted ally, West European states left the security affairs to the the Americans and concentrated more on strengthening their economies. The European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1953, initiated a remarkable beginning on the path of achieving highest degree of regional co-operation among the West European countries and the process culminated into the introduction of a single European currency in the year 2000.

However, with the demise of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world map, a new security framework has emerged for West Europe. In this new framework, the ideological construction of the Yalta Divide has turned obsolete and new sources of threats are emerging which might prove to be more volatile and more vicious than the ever deterred military-ideological battle of the Cold War era. On the one hand, the ending of the Cold War has provided the West Europe with a unique opportunity to emerge as the *European proper*, in accordance with Churchill's aspiration of a Europe *from Atlantic to the Urals*; while on the other, the security and development problems which are more endemic to the former communist Europe are now turning into concerns of European stability as a whole. To be precise, the more prosperous Western Europe can no longer afford to isolate itself from the security matters of the rest of Europe and go ahead with its grand design to turn Europe into an integrated political unit. However, the challenge not only rests on how quickly the Central and East European economies come into terms with market

economy, but also on addressing the long standing questions of ethnic nationalism in those regions. During the 1990s, the ethno-nationalist rivalries and disputes, long overshadowed by the preponderance of Cold War politics, are once again determining the boundaries of new battlegrounds throughout the world. And East and Central Europe have emerged as one of the most volatile regions in terms of instabilities and warfare caused by ethnic rivalries. The prolonged and violent ethnic warfare in the former Yugoslavia, in the form of the Bosnian war followed by even more violent events in the Kosovo crisis, has been perhaps a fair indication to the rest of the Europe regarding the nature of security threats facing the continent in the twenty-first century.

In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the dynamics of threats to West European security emanating from ethno-national rivalries. In this context, the author has particularly emphasised on the lessons of the Kosovo war. The shaping of the conflict and also the process of resolving it indeed provide a fair amount of indications about implications of ethnic warfare for European stability. Moreover, the entire crisis also showed the difficulties that Europe has in dealing with this re-emerged threat. The article, however, begins with examining the existing theoretical framework explaining the phenomena of nationalism and ethnicity.

Concept of Nationalism and Ethnicity

The earliest mention of the term "nationalism" can be found in the work of the German philosopher Johann Gottfried in 1774 and not until the mid-nineteenth century did it begin to enter into the general linguistic usage.¹ However, it has been always a complicated task to define the term because it is not only an idea, it

¹ See, Peter Alter, *Nationalism*: Edward Arnold, A Division of Hodder & Stoughton; 1985; p. 7.

is more of a sense of oneness of a community. Nationalism, at one end, can flourish only as "idea" among a group of people based on common culture, heritage, language, religion, ideology, ancestry or some other bonds of commonness. On the other hand, it also acts as a political force when organised group of people starts achieving nationalistic goals targeting a specific territory. Ethnicity is belonging to a ethnic group who are different from nations on several dimensions who are usually smaller; more clearly based on a common ancestry; and more pervasive in human history. In contrast to a nation, ethnic communities often feel themselves to be jeopardised in their actual rights within a state which prompt them to move securing those and at this point, ethnic conflicts take shape. Stephen Griffiths has pointed out different forms of nationalism and ethnic conflict as under, that may be considered as appropriate to delineate the existing nationalistic and ethnic claims in Europe:

- 'Sub-state' or 'potential state nationalism', which is imminent within the Slovaks and the Croats;
- 'Pan-nationalism', which signifies the movement to unify a single cultural and political community of several states;
- 'Hyper state nationalism', which is stated to signify the nationalism of states like Serbia;
- 'Trans-border ethnic disputes', which is evident within the Hungarians in the border lands of Hungary proper; and
- 'Sub-state ethnic conflict', specially that is presently evident in the former Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet Union.²

Having discussed the theoretical framework of ethnicity and nationalism, we shall now move towards examining the dynamics

² Stephen Griffiths, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security*, SIPRI Research Report No. 5, SIPRI 1993, p. 14.

of ethnic dispute between Albanian Muslims of Kosovo and the Serbs, and assess its implications for security of Europe as a whole.

Balkan Region and Kosovo: Geostrategic Significance for European Security

Kosovo is known as Kosovo and Metohija constitutionally. Kosovo is a Serbian word, which means the "land of blackbirds" and Metohija is a Greek word meaning land (property) of monasteries. Together, it is popularly known as Kosovo and in short, "Kosmet".³

In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), the total population is 11.21 million in which the religious make up of the population is: 65% Serbian Orthodox, 19% Muslim, 4% Roman Catholic, 1% Protestant, 11% from other religious sections. According to the ethnic make up, 63% Serbian, 14% Albanian 6% Montenegrin, 4% Hungarian and 13% belong to other ethnic groups. In the province of Kosovo, the total population is 1.89 million. The precise religious makeup of the province is not known. However, according to the ethnic division, 90% are Albanians and 10% belong to other ethnic communities of which Serbs are predominant.

Situated in the heart of the Balkans, Kosovo makes up the southern part of the current territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the border with Albania proper, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro covering about 11,000 square kilometres of land. Kosovo is rich in marketable resources. It has abundant mineral reserves, which include substantial deposits of lead, zinc, cadmium, silver and gold. Kosovo also holds an estimated 17

³ O. N. Mehrotra, "The Kosovo Crisis: Perception and Problem", *Strategic Analysis*, October, 1998.

billion tons of coal reserves. But this is not only the reason behind western interest towards Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

The Balkan has a critical strategic significance that has been a constant factor in international power politics. The region holds a unique geographic location both as a crucial transit point for western Europe toward the east or as a buffer against the expansion of Russia toward the south. It is well known that events in the Balkans led to the outbreak of World War I and served as major causes of the Second World War too. During the height of the Cold War, the onset of conflict between President Tito and Stalin made a great impact on Washington's policy and Tito's regime was viewed "as an obstacle to Soviet expansion via the Adriatic Sea into the Mediterranean (and, thereby, toward both southern Europe and the Middle East), the United States became a determined advocate of Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity".⁴ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the need to contain expansionism from the eastern side has lost greater importance as it used to possess during the Cold War era. In fact, under the new international strategic environment, it is the dismantled Yugoslav Federation that is seen to serve Washington's purpose to use the tiny states as vital logistical staging ground for accumulating the vast untapped reserves of oil and natural gas of Central Asia and filling the power vacuum created in the region by Soviet collapse. Thus, the Balkan region has staged itself to be a region of vital geo-strategic significance both for the USA and the West European countries.

The Kosovo Crisis: Background

The stark nature of the historical debate between Serbs and Kosovars provides a backdrop of the ferocity of the current

⁴ See for details: <http://www.wsws.org>

animosity inside Kosovo. These two groups of people are divided by the three most important defining elements of national identity in the Balkans: ethnic identity, language and religion. The Serbs, according to their ethnic identity are Slavic people, while the Kosovar Albanians are non-Slav by origin. The Kosovars speak Albanian and are mainly Muslims, and the Serbs speak Serbian and are mainly Orthodox Christians.

These two groups of people also differ on the question of possessing the lands of Kosovo. The Serbs argue that they arrived in the region in the 6th and 7th centuries, when Kosovo was virtually an empty place. They also stress that the Albanians first arrived with the conquering Turks in the 15th century. However, it has been argued by the historians that the Kosovar Albanians are descendants of the ancient Illyrians who were living in the south-east Balkans as far back as 700 BC. The Serbs arrived as part of the huge movement of Slavs as late as in the sixth or seventh centuries.⁵ In the history of Balkan region, however, these two national groups have rarely lived together in peace and harmony.

By the 12th century, however, the Serbs were well established in the possession of Kosovo. Under the most powerful of the Serbian kings, Stefan Dusan, Serbs consolidated their religious holds on Kosovo by building Orthodox churches and monasteries with pomp and grandeur. It is worth mentioning here that the most important church for the Serb Orthodox faith is located at Pec or Paya, just a few kilometres away from the present-day border with Albania which has been placed in the UNESCO's World Heritage list. It is from this position the Serbs faced the defeat and lost Kosovo to the Turks, which founded their emotional attachments with the province. In the famous Battle at the 'Field of Blackbirds',

⁵ See, <http://www.unhcr.ch/wriyug.htm>

a plain just outside the Kosovo capital of Pristina, the Serbian Prince Lazer Hrebeljanovic narrowly lost to the Ottoman Turks, led by Murad I on St. Vitus's Day (June 28), 1389. Although the defeat marked the beginning of the end of the medieval Serbian state, Serbs celebrated the battle in heroic song and verse as a glorious sacrifice, and the battle's anniversary remains as Serbian national holiday. However, it was during this period when conversion of most Albanians into Muslim marked the first steps towards creating separate identities of these two national groups.

The Albanian Question first came to the international forefront after the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the second Serbian-Ottoman war of 1877 led to the territorial reshaping of the lands of the Ottoman Empire. This was the period when the Albanian people, who became an object of permanent interest of the great powers due to their important geo-strategic position, became tired of being invaded by this or that power, demanded for their own independent land. Most of the Albanian lands were awarded to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece in the Congress of Berlin. However, though Serbia requested for Kosovo and Dukagjin Plain, the Congress of Berlin as yet did not fulfil Serbian wish. "If the great powers will condemn this brave and freedom-loving people to remain in slavery, and worse than that to be partitioned among the neighbouring states, the Balkan Peninsula will never have peace...." commented angrily one of the delegates of Albanian League of Prizren in the Congress of Berlin as early as in April 1878.⁶

The Serbian desire to incorporate Kosovo was fulfilled in the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars in the early twentieth century. The National Albanian Assembly did proclaim the independence

⁶ See: <http://www.kosova.com/expuls/chap1.htm>

of an Albanian state (which included Kosovo) in 1912, but the London Conference of Ambassadors of the Great Powers of 1913 recognised only half of the proclaimed Albanian state and allocated the Kosovo area once again to Serbia and Montenegro. The status of Kosovo has been disputed ever since. Kosovo did briefly become part of Albania during World War II. Having taken over Albania, Italy created a nascent Greater Albania including Kosovo and some Macedonian and Montenegrin territory. After the war, the victorious Yugoslav partisan leader, Joseph Broz Tito, emerged predominant and Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia.

In 1949, the status of Kosovo was reduced from the previous status of an autonomous province into an administrative zone. Since then, under the strict colonisation scheme followed by the central authority, the Serbs took the upper hand in matters relating to Kosovo. The expulsion of the Albanian Kosovar from political and economic life began from this period of time when the Albanian language was prohibited instead of which the Serbian language was to be used in the formal administration of the state, courts of law, schools and in all public forums. A new era of "denationalisation" of the Kosovar people started. President Tito handed over full freedom to the minister of security Alexander Rankovic to look after the "case of Kosovo". Rankovic's freedom consisted of all possible ways to suppress the demands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo for greater autonomy of Kosovo. Substantial political change came only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Albanians gained wider control over their own affairs. In face of the demands for a Republic of Kosovo under the Federation of Yugoslavia, President Tito improved the status of Kosovo to be a socialist autonomous province within Serbia. Again, in 1974, President Tito brought about a massive change in the Constitution

of Yugoslavia and constructed a tripartite Serbia and granted ethnic-territorial autonomy to Vojvodina and Kosovo. Though the urge of the Albanian population for a Republican status, which would bring the right to secede, was ignored, Kosovo received prerogatives generally associated with republican status, with its own parliament, police force including the right to fly the Albanian flag along with the restoration of the right to use Albanian language. Kosovo also enjoyed the right to have a representative and a one-voice vote in a rotating eight-member Yugoslav presidency.

For the Serbs, the 1974 Constitution was viewed as an attempt to limit their power and they resented turning so much authority over Kosovo to the Albanians. Albanian numerical superiority increased and by 1989 the Albanians were 90 per cent of Kosovo's population. Tito's Yugoslavia was a complex structure. In many ways, its survival depended on his authority. His death in 1980 made the fate of Yugoslavia an open question. In Kosovo, worsening economic conditions- particularly high unemployment-increased demands from the restive Albanian community. Calls for a Kosovo Republic were common as equality with the Yugoslav Federation was seen as a panacea for the province's economic woes.

The collapse of the communist order in Eastern Europe in 1989 intensified problems in Yugoslavia. The drive by the Serbians to establish hyper-state nationalism throughout the former Yugoslavia brought about direct conflict between the Serbians and the other ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. This was the time when the age-old intolerance between the ethnic groups, who were kept under the strong central command of Tito, started to surface again on the horizon. The Kosovo crisis is also a bitter manifestation of such a

case. The dispute between the Serbs and Kosovar mounted while the later started to pursue their nationalist objectives of a Republican status but the Serbians strongly opposed the idea. The central authority blatantly suppressed the Kosovars with mass arrests, long prison sentences and a purge of the Kosovo communist leadership. The period also witnessed the rise of Slobodan Milosevic who assumed control of the Serbian Communist Party and later became President of Serbia. Milosevic built his power on an appeal to Serb nationalism. His focus was Kosovo as he sought to undo Tito's legacy in the region. Marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, in June 1989 Milosevic delivered a passionate speech to his supporters in Kosovo. In his address, he made it clear that the region belonged to the Serbs. Such extreme exhibition of upholding Serbian nationalism was considered as danger signal to the other ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia. In his address, Milosevic warned that Yugoslavia was cracking along ethnic lines, which is not permissible. He also added that the Serbs could not, however, exclude themselves from ethnic battles, which they are already engaged in. This actually electrified not only the Serbs but also left for no other choice but to declare independence for other Yugoslav groups like Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians and Bosnians.

The ethnic Albanians led by Ibrahim Rugova opted for passive resistance to Serb rule. Rugova sought to internationalise the problem and prevent an armed conflict with the Serbs. The Albanians, having lost all aspects of their independence, built a parallel society providing their people with separate facilities. In 1989 and 1990, there was a series of violent riots by ethnic Albanians in response to a decision of the Serbian Parliament to amend the constitution and give Belgrade much greater power in

its autonomous provinces. The law on abrogation of the activity of the Assembly of Kosovo and its government was passed on July 5, 1990 under which Kosovo was deprived of legislative and executive power and the authorities in Kosovo lost control over the local security forces and the judiciary. The riots cost scores of lives: according to official figures, in the course of 13 months 60 people - all ethnic Albanians - were killed. Unofficial estimates put the figure at over 100.

During these periods, Albanian language — the mother tongue of the majority of the population — was banned from education, culture, science and mass media. In 1991, Serbia closed all the middle schools (the number is 65) and a number of elementary schools and stopped functioning education in Albanian language from kindergartens to university.

In May 1990, all the ethnic Albanian members of the Kosovo's Government resigned in protest to Serbian interference in its affairs. At this stage the policy of Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic of exerting Serbian power in Kosovo was forcing matters to breaking point. In June 1990, the Kosovo Assembly declared the province to be independent but the Serbian authorities dissolved the Assembly and Government. The Kosovo Presidency resigned in protest. In July 1990, the Serbs introduced special measures and imposed direct rule. By September, over 15,000 ethnic Albanian officials had been dismissed.

On 7 September 1990, a two-thirds majority of the members of the abolished Kosovo Assembly met in secret and again declared the independence of Kosovo. A year later, the Kosovo Albanians held a referendum, which was boycotted by the local Serbs. The result proclaimed Kosovo's independence with a 99.9 per cent

majority. The Serbian Government declared the vote to be illegal. But the Kosovo Albanians wanted the fulfilment of their demands. In May 1992, they organised elections, which were monitored by international observers, for a parliament in the self-declared 'Republic of Kosovo'. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) emerged predominant with 76.4 per cent of the vote. Fourteen seats in the 140-seat assembly were reserved for ethnic Serbs but these remained empty as a result of Serb boycott of the vote.

However, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the LDK opted for a peaceful means to attain independence of Kosovo. In his view, as the proportion of Albanian and Serbian people in the province was falling, independence was bound to come at the end. Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosova, which he continues to lead, had a threefold strategy:

- Refusal to be provoked;
- Maintenance of life in Kosovo through parallel institutions; and
- Lobbying for international support.

Other key organisations included the Council for Defence of Human Rights and the Youth Parliament. One important organising tool in the first half of 1990 was the petition "For Democracy, Against Violence". By the time it was taken to the United Nations in June, there were 400,000 signatures --- almost half the adult Albanian population of Kosovo.

The Crisis

The Kosovars actually looked forward to the Dayton Accord⁷ for the recognition of their cause. The Dayton accord, however, did

⁷ The Dayton Accord was signed at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to put an end to the Bosnian crisis. The Agreement was witnessed by representatives of the Contact Group nations -- the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia -- and the European Union Special Negotiator.

not put them on the agenda. In the meantime, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), formed in 1993, kept on sporadic attacks against the Serbian police patrols but could barely achieve the expected result of victory against them.

The United Nations continued its effort to find a solution to the Kosovo problem. It has passed several resolutions with an aim to bring a settlement to the issue. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998, demanding that all parties immediately cease hostilities in Kosovo and enter into a meaningful dialogue leading to a negotiated political solution.

To enforce compliance with this resolution and avert the death of thousands, NATO declared that it would launch air strikes against Serbia if it did not comply with the United Nations resolution. This air strike was averted only by a last minute agreement between President Milosevic and special US envoy Richard Holbrooke calling for Milosevic to halt the military offensive in Kosovo, comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and accept Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO verification missions.

Following the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, Generals Clark (American) and Naumann (German), on behalf of NATO, concluded an agreement with Milosevic authorising unarmed NATO aircraft to conduct aerial surveillance over Kosovo. In addition, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), representing 54 states, entered into an agreement with Milosevic that would establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) composed of at least 2,000 unarmed verifiers from the member states.

In the three months from the end of October 1998 to the end of January 1999, the KVM, with participants from many OSCE member states, established itself in Kosovo, patrolling the roads unarmed, in bright orange vehicles. Relief organisations laboured to provide shelter, food, and medical services. There were cease-fire violations on both sides, but by far the most serious ones were committed by the Serbs.

Despite the efforts of the international community, the situation deteriorated rapidly and, by late January, Kosovo again faced a humanitarian crisis. Another twenty thousand individuals were displaced from their homes, and the number was growing rapidly.

A massacre of 45 unarmed ethnic Albanian civilians by Serbian forces in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, symbolised Serbia's flagrant non-compliance with the international agreements designed to secure peace in Kosovo. After the Racak massacre, Serbian authorities attempted to eject the head of the Kosovo OSCE mission, Ambassador William Walker; they also refused to permit Louise Arbour, head of the International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia, into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Once again, Mr. Holbrooke tried to pursue the Kosovar and the Serbian to sign another peace deal to bring political solution of the Kosovo crisis. Under the new deal at Rambouillet near Paris, the Kosovars are to remain as a part of Serbia but they will manage their internal affairs. There would be safeguards for the Serbian minority. According to the agreement, the final constitutional status of Kosovo would be discussed after three years and in the mean time, 30,000 NATO led soldiers would be deployed in Kosovo to look after the implementation of the agreement. The

Kosovars, no doubt, became disappointed since the agreement did not honour their aspiration for the right to self-determination. They, however, accepted and signed the deal. On the other hand, Milosevic, particularly in defiance of the clause of the "implementation force", rejected the deal and continued assaults on the Kosovars. The stubborn attitude of Milosevic led to increasing pressure from the international community upon both the United States and other European powers to bring a decisive end to this human tragedy. Ultimately the extent of humanitarian tragedy, the implications of refugee crisis and as a whole, the possibilities of greater instabilities in Europe led the Western powers to use their collective defence might through the NATO from March 1999. This possibly compelled the Serbians to come into an agreement to resolve the conflict.

The Kosovo Peace Agreement⁸

Since the onset of NATO airstrike, attempts were made to reach in a diplomatic solution of the crisis. Proposals were placed to Milosevic by Russia, Germany and even by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, all of which went in vain. It was the proposal of the Group of Eight that finally worked on Milosevic to bow down. At this point, Russia stepped in to play the role of a mediator between NATO and Belgrade, through a complex series of negotiations. Instead of dealing directly with NATO, Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin dealt mostly with the G-8 economic group. On May 6, Russia and foreign ministers from the other G-8 nations agreed to the basic terms of an international force that would secure the safe return of ethnic Albanians to Kosovo. Chernomyrdin was joined by the European envoy, Finnish

⁸ For details of the agreement, see, <http://www.nato.int>

President Martti Ahtisaari. They took the plan to Belgrade and in early June secured an agreement to the G-8's terms. The document to include deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presence was presented by President Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and was approved by the Serb parliament and the Federal Government on June 3, 1999. The principal features of the G-8 proposal were:

- An immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo;
- The withdrawal from Kosovo of military police and paramilitary forces;
- The deployment in Kosovo of effective international and security presence endorsed by the United Nations;
- The establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the UN Security Council;
- The safe and free return of all displaced persons;
- A political process toward the establishment of an interim framework agreement providing for self-government for Kosovo and taking full account of the Rambouillet accord; and
- A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region.

The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia was signed on June 9, 1999. On June 10, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution codifying the G-8 formula for a political solution of the Kosovo conflict. The resolution was passed by a vote of 14 to 0, with China abstaining. It called for the verifiable and rapid withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces

from Kosovo, demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the rapid deployment of a international peacekeeping force in Kosovo and the return of displaced Kosovar refugees. It was drafted in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the peacekeeping troops to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The details of the agreement are summarised as follows:

- A cease-fire on the ground in Kosovo is to begin immediately;
- The phased withdrawal of Yugoslav army, police and other forces with a military capability is expected to begin immediately. As an initial test of compliance, the Yugoslavs will have **24 hours** to "demonstrably" withdraw from the northern part of the province, closest to the Serbian border;
- **Within the first 24 hours** of the withdrawal, the Yugoslavs must end all military flights over Kosovo; turn off air defence systems and radar; and stand down their surface-to-air missile systems;
- **Within the first 48 hours**, the Yugoslavs must turn over to NATO records showing the placement of land mines, explosive devices, unexploded ordnance and booby traps;
- **Within the first 72 hours**, all Yugoslav anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles and aircraft must be removed from Kosovo;
- **Within the first six days**, Yugoslav forces must be removed from the southern part of the province along the Albanian and Macedonian borders, allowing for the introduction of international peacekeeping troops;
- **The Yugoslavs would be given 11 days** from the signing of the agreement to complete their withdrawal. After the pullout is

completed, the Yugoslavs would be allowed to bring in a small force of up to 1,000 troops to guard cultural and religious sites in the province and work on mine clearance;

- Once NATO is convinced that the Yugoslavs were complying with the initial steps of the agreement, airstrikes would be suspended. Following the cessation of bombing, the UN Security Council is expected to approve a resolution, which sets out the conditions of the peace deal;
- Once the Security Council resolution is approved, a peacekeeping contingent of 50,000 troops, known as KFOR, would begin moving into Kosovo. It would be under the command of British Lt. Gen. Michael Jackson;
- Under plans drawn up at early 1999, U.S. troops would be assigned to patrol the eastern zone of the province; Britain, the central zone, including the capital, Pristina; France, the western zone; Italy, the northern zone; and Germany, the southern zone;
- About 4,000 U.S. troops would be part of the initial "enabling" force. It would include 1,900 troops from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which would be moved from Greece into Macedonia, and 1,700 from an Army task force, which would be from Albania;
- About 200 army soldiers from Germany will also be part of the initial force to set up a headquarters for U.S. forces. Eventually, the "enabling" force will be replaced by a more permanent U.S. force, which will also include about 7,000 troops from Germany;
- Once KFOR leaders were satisfied that the Yugoslav withdrawal was complete, the bombing campaign would be officially ended.

Peace in Kosovo: Institutional Structure

Operation Joint Guardian:

The principles of Operation Joint Guardian were agreed at a "special force generation conference" on 1 June when 30 countries - the 19 NATO members and 11 "partners for peace" pledged a total of 47,868 troops for KFOR, the new peacekeeping force in the Balkans.

Around 13,000 *British* troops would arrive in the Balkans and another 6,000 were on stand-by, making it the largest single force. Units include members of the Paratroop regiment, the Irish Guards and the Gurkhas.

The *United States* would be providing 7,000 troops including an expeditionary unit of 2,000 Marines. *Germany* was providing a quarter of all NATO troops in Macedonia and Albania. It would also be sending 8,000 troops into the province. *France* and *Italy* were contributing an additional 7,000 and 5,000 respectively. *The Netherlands* was sending 2,050 troops, *Spain* 1,200, *Belgium* 1,100 and *Greece* 1,000. *Turkey* and *Norway* sent around 1,000 each, *Denmark* 850, *Poland* 800 and *Canada* 800. After a deal signed with *Russia*, the country was expected to send about 3,600 peacekeeping force.

The five leading NATO members, the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, were to each administer a "sector" of the province in arrangements similar to the S-FOR command structure in Bosnia. The UK, the largest force, commanded KFOR headquarters at Pristina airport. France was to control the Pec sector in the west while the USA was to take the Grijilane sector bordering Macedonia. German troops were to operate in the south-west around Prizren and Italy was to command the northern border

regions with Serbia. Russian demand for its own non-NATO sector was denied; instead it was to operate within the US, German and French zones of responsibility.

Agreement on Russian Participation in KFOR :

Agreement on Russian participation in the international peacekeeping force (KFOR) in full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1244 was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on June 18 by US Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen and Russian Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev in full compliance with the UN Resolution 1244.

The principal bone of contention between Russia and NATO was regarding the command structure of the peacekeeping force and Russian demand to allow it a separate 'zone of responsibility' within Kosovo like major NATO countries. However, it was decided that all command arrangements in the KFOR would preserve the principle of unity of command though the Russian contingent in Kosovo would be under the political and military control of the Russian Command. According to the Helsinki agreement, the Russian peacekeepers would have Col. Gen. Viktor M. Zavarzin as the Representative to the Sector Commander for Russian Forces. At the same time, Russian request for a separate zone was rejected by the alliance on the ground that it would effectively create ethnic Albanian and Serbian parts of Kosovo. Instead, Russian troops would join in peacekeeping in 'zones of responsibility' formally controlled by the United States, Germany and France, although these troops would serve under Russian rather than NATO command. The total number of Russian troops in Kosovo is expected to reach about 3,600.

It has been estimated that Russian participation in KFOR will cost approximately \$60 million annually. The question of Russia's role in KFOR, the Kosovo Force of peacekeepers, is especially

delicate given Moscow's strong opposition to NATO intervention in the region. In addition, many Russian volunteers are believed to have aided Serbian paramilitary forces in attacks on ethnic Albanians, according to a recent *Newsday* report, confirmed in part by Pentagon spokesman Kevin Bacon.⁹ With the NATO-Russian relationship on unstable ground, it would be interesting to watch whether the presence of Russian troops in Kosovo would further deteriorate the relationship or provide for strengthening of ties with NATO in a united peacekeeping mission.

Agreements on Demilitarisation of KLA :

In section eight of the peace plan, "demilitarisation" of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is stated, leaving the exact details open to interpretation. In theory, however, it indicates confiscating heavy weapons but leaving KLA fighters with their lighter arms to allow them to eventually carry out police functions.

On June 20, 1999, the agreement on a ceasefire by the KLA, their disengagement from the zones of conflict, subsequent demilitarisation and reintegration into civil society was signed between NATO and the KLA "in accordance with the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and taking account of the obligations agreed to at Rambouillet and the public commitments made by the Kosovar Albanian Rambouillet delegation".¹⁰

However, it has been reported that there were several incidents of armed skirmishes between KLA fighters and retreating Serbs, and KLA revenge attacks on suspected collaborators. In the course of the event, it was also found out that the "KLA forces took out

⁹ See, the report on Kosovo and Russian role in the Balkan, in <http://www.policy.com>

¹⁰ For the agreement, see, <http://www.nato.int>

their revenge not only on Serbs but also on Gypsies and other minority groups accused of collaborating with the Belgrade regime".¹¹

Trials of the War Criminals:

Unlike earlier agreements, the draft resolution specifically calls on "all concerned" to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This has particular significance, since Slobodan Milosevic stands indicted by the tribunal over Serb atrocities in Kosovo, and the deal is to put NATO troops within 200km of Belgrade. But the text does not spell out under what circumstances NATO forces would be expected to arrest Serb suspects or whether they would have any mandate beyond Kosovo.

It may be recalled that on 27 May 1999 Louise Arbour, Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), declared that five ranking members of the government and military of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the government of the Republic of Serbia had been indicted on charges of crimes against humanity. The accused officials are:

- Slobodan Milosevic, FRY President;
- Nikola Sainovic, FRY deputy premier;
- Dragoljub Ojdanic, chief of the FRY general staff;
- Milan Milutinovic, president of the Republic of Serbia; and,
- Vljako Stojiljkovic, interior minister of the Republic of Serbia.

According to the indictment, acts constituting crimes against humanity - specifically murder, deportation and persecutions - and

¹¹ See, the International Crisis Group's report on 28 June, 1999, in <http://www.crisisweb.org>

violations of the laws and customs of war were executed by policemen, soldiers, and military officers are the central elements of the charges. The core of the indictment against Milosevic is based on the principle of "command responsibility" which is a firmly established principle in international law. While ICTY can issue indictments, it lacks the mandate to enforce them. Responsibility for arresting the accused persons and providing for their transportation to The Hague tribunal for trial rests with the Member States of the UN, including the FRY itself.

However, on June 24 the US State Department announced that the American government would pay a reward of up to \$5 million for assistance in arresting Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and other Serb leaders in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. It means that, in addition to Milosevic and four other Yugoslav political and military leaders indicted by the tribunal in May 1999, the reward is also being offered for two dozen people, mainly Serbs, indicted for actions in the civil war in Bosnia, including the civilian and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs during the war, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the fighting in Bosnia, most Western governments downplayed the importance of the Tribunal, and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses in Kosovo, because Milosevic was deemed essential as a guarantor of the fragile peace in Bosnia. As a result, despite spending more than three-and-a-half years in Bosnia, NATO has failed to arrest the two most notorious Bosnian Serb war criminals Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. This has severely damaged the credibility of the tribunal and the Belgrade regime did not hesitate to pursue planned ethnic cleansing on the people of Kosovo.

West European Security: Lessons from Kosovo Issue

Kosovo: A Human Tragedy

The consequences of ethno-national upsurge and the following NATO airstrike affected the Kosovars most tragically than any other parties involved in the crisis. The NATO bombing required the removal of international observers and relief workers, whose presence provided some restraints on the Serbs to carry out atrocities against the Kosovars. Therefore, the absence of any international observers, who used to act as barrier to initiate mass repression on the Kosovars, unleashed systematic ethnic cleansing by the Serbian authority against them after NATO started airstrike.

For the Kosovars, ethnic cleansing is not a new phenomenon. In fact, as early as in 1844 Ilija Garasanin, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia and one of the most outstanding Serbian officials in the nineteenth century who first composed the official Serbian expansionist policy comprised of the plan to expel other races from Serbian kingdom, believed that Serbia has a historical mission of uniting all the southern Slavs and the regions where they live.¹² This sense of mission has continued to persist in the Serbian mind for centuries, which have led to the expulsion and of brutal cleansing other ethnic races from what they believed to be their land. Such was the case in Bosnia, and also became more so in case of Kosovo.

The NATO bombing once again reinforced a fierce outburst of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo on a large scale. About 250,000 people were estimated to have fled their homes during the 13 months of war between the KLA and the Serbian authority, but remained predominantly within Kosovo and Montenegro. That makes an

¹² See, <http://www.kosova.com/expuls/chap1.htm>

average of 632 persons per day. During the NATO bombing, 600,000 people are displaced within Kosovo while 800,000 are completely driven out. However, after the signing of the peace deal, the refugees have started to return home, but it would be an awesome task for the international community to handle the refugee affair. According to the report of the UNHCR, provided on 6 July, 1999, the number of Kosovar returnees has topped 600,000, with 16,700 heading home on 5 July from Albania, the FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro. The estimated number of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced people in the region has dropped to 150,100, including 22,200 in Montenegro, 19,000 in FYR of Macedonia, 91,500 in Albania and 17,400 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Table 1, figures on displacement from and returning to Kosovo as provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on July 6, 1999¹³ are furnished.

Table 1: Kosovo Albanian Displacement and Return

Countries	Returns to Kosovo		Remaining in Country
	July 5, '99	Cumulative	
FRY- Republic of Montenegro	900	47,700	22,200
Former Yugoslav- Republic of Macedonia	3,600	203,100	19,000
Albania	12,200	351,900	91,500
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	Na	3,600	17,400
Total	16,700	606,300	150,100

* Also displaced by conflict from other parts FRY before the peace settlement: 22,500 from Sandzak in the Federation, and 30,900 ethnic Serbs mainly former Croatian and Bosnian refugees in FRY) in Republic of Srpska.

The NATO airstrike has also recharged enmity between the ethnic Albanians and Serb people living in Kosovo. It has been reported that due the possible revenge on the Serb and their collaborators with the Belgrade regime, by the Kosovars, Serbs

¹³ In <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/Kosovo/htm>

and other ethnic communities have fled Kosovo. Both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians jointly issued an appeal to the Serbs not to leave Kosovo; however, it did not work. The UNHCR has provided a statistics on Serb and other non-Albanian displacement from Kosovo.

Table 2 : Ethnic Serb and other non-Albanian displacement from Kosovo¹⁴

Countries	Numbers Displaced	
	July 5, '99	Cumulative
FRY- Republic of Montenegro	40	21,900*
FRY- Republic of Serbia	na	50,000
Former Yugoslav- Republic of Macedonia	—	—
Total	40	71,900

* Of whom, some 8,800 have moved on to Serbia. na = not available.

Arenas of Future Conflicts— Montenegro and Vojvodina:

While trying to reach a solution for the Kosovar people, the international community should take into account another ethnic conflict that might surface in Vojvodina, the northern most province of Yugoslavia. Originally dominated by ethnic Hungarian people, Vojvodina was formally transferred to Serbia in 1920 from the Kingdom of Hungary to Serbia with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The area enjoyed relative peace, under the treaties, which guaranteed Vojvodina autonomy after both World Wars. The autonomy of both Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces was further protected by an addition to the Yugoslavian constitution in 1974. A gradual distancing between the central government of Yugoslavia and Vojvodina started to occur from 1980s after the death of Marshall Tito. The 30 ethnic groups in Vojvodina

¹⁴ In <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/Kosovo/htm>

coexisted with little friction except for some discrimination by the Serbs against the Hungarians and Croats. After Milosevic came to power and forced changes in the Yugoslav constitution in 1989, the *Democratic Community of Vojvodinan Hungarians* (VMDK) was organised to promote autonomy for the province in 1990. Most of the ethnic Hungarians had no other choice but to leave the province after the Croatian civil war (1991-1992) and the Bosnian civil war (1992-1995) displaced hundreds of thousands of Serbs and approximately 130,000 to 200,000 were settled in Vojvodina. In the meantime, the Hungarian language was phased out and the repression on the ethnic Hungarians continued. The ethnic Hungarians think that if their problem is not taken into account by the international community right now, after the sufferings of the Bosnian and Kosovar people, they are the next target of the Serbian aggression. If this problem was not taken into account along with the Kosovo crisis, the Balkan peace would once again be threatened.

The debate on redefining Montenegro's post-conflict relationship with Serbia has also surfaced in the horizon. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic reiterated that intention in his meeting with US President Bill Clinton on 21 June, 1999, as in earlier discussions with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Cologne and with his neighbours in Bucharest and Sofia throughout the year.

The view from Montenegro is that Milosevic, cornered by his own manoeuvrings, is about to see his political career draw to an end. But faced with Milosevic's threats early 1999, Belgrade tried to put the Montenegrin police, loyal to Djukanovic, under the direct command of the Yugoslav army—public support for the Alliance has grown. A poll held around that time saw support for

full independence rise to close on 30 per cent. Another 20 per cent would like to see the present federation changed into a looser confederal arrangement.

Environmental Cost of the Kosovo Crisis:

The report of the Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent to Kosovo and other areas of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between May 16 and 27, 1999 was released publicly on June 29, 1999 and was transmitted to the UN Security Council on June 9, the same year.¹⁵ The report said that throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 11 weeks of NATO air strikes that ended on June 10, 1999 have had "a devastating impact" on the environment, industry, employment, essential services and agriculture, a newly released United Nations report says. land, air, rivers, lakes and underground waters as well as the food chain and public health had been affected.

Scientific reports are warning about dangerous air pollution spreading to other countries. Long range transboundary transfer of ash and benzo-a-pyrene from Yugoslavia to a number of other countries, including Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldavia is possible. Another matter of serious concern is a significant emission of sulphur and nitrogen oxides, which could cause acid rains thus affecting agriculture and forestry in the region. In the short and medium term, heavy pollution of surface waters may be a serious danger. Contamination of rivers would have negative consequences on the quality of drinking water, and fresh water ecosystems. Transboundary pollution of the river Danube is not excluded.

¹⁵ See: <http://ens.lycos.com/ens/jun99/1999L-06-29-02.html>

Experts are also concerned with possible long-term regional impacts of environmental pollution caused by the hostilities in Yugoslavia. One of most dangerous consequences is pollution of underground waters. The region is rich with underground water resources. These waters, lying at different depths, may easily spread oil, oil products, fuel, and chemical pollution to other countries in the region.

Calculating the Cost of Warfare:

It would be too early to appreciate the full extent of the devastation wrecked upon Serbia and Kosovo by the missiles and bombs of NATO. The European Union announced on June 23, 1999 that it is in the process of creating a new agency, called the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAFR), to help in the reconstruction of Kosovo. Based on costs of programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a sum of 500-700 million Euro (\$517-\$733 million at current rates) will be needed from the EU budget over the next three years. Three different types of EU assistance will be involved in the reconstruction of Kosovo:

—Humanitarian aid to help resettle returning refugees in their homes. (182 million Euro allocated to date via the European Community Humanitarian Office—ECHO—working closely with the UNHCR).

—Reconstruction aid programme based on the existing OBNOVA (Fund for the Reconstruction of Former Yugoslavia). Kosovo is eligible for grant aid under OBNOVA. Invitations to tender will follow OBNOVA rules and be open to local procurement as much as possible.

—Macroeconomic aid essentially in the form of loans (notably for balance of payments support), with the aim of building a viable

economy and increasing regional integration in the future (Stability Pact).

The Commission is proposing to the Budgetary Authority (i.e. the European Parliament and the Council) that the appropriation for this year be increased to 150 million Euro to cover the most pressing needs.

As with Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission and the World Bank will liaise with the European Investment Bank (EIB), other donors and international financial institutions to draw up master plans for Kosovo and other areas affected by the conflict. These will provide a framework for co-ordinating the various instruments available to aid reconstruction and economic development.

The first donor conference is being organised by the EC and the World Bank in July, 1999. It will concentrate on short-term needs in Kosovo arising from the return of refugees. There will probably be an initial call for pledges.

The UN Security Council resolution of June 10, 1999 authorising international deployment in Kosovo was more specific and promised reconstruction assistance to the southern Serbian province. However, there was no mention of aid to the rest of the country, which, without fundamental political change, seems highly unlikely. Both Washington and London have made it clear that financial support to help with Serbia's reconstruction is fully conditional upon Milosevic's removal.

The Lessons Learned

The process of drawing European map ended in West Europe with the consolidation of nation-states in the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The case of East and Central Europe is

somewhat different, as these areas remained under the imperial control of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and most recently by the Russians. There is ample precedence where ethnic disputes turned into pretexts of war in Europe on a number of occasions, the most recent manifestation of which may be found in Kosovo. As far as security of post-Cold War Europe is concerned, the Kosovo crisis gave a fair indication of the dire need for a comprehensive security network for Europe, combining both the Western Europe and the East and Central European countries. While the European Union is attempting to emerge as a new power block, instabilities caused by ethno-nationalism can no longer be considered as minimal issues while composing security policy for Europe. During the ongoing NATO airstrike, there were strong possibilities regarding a Serbian counter-offensive—ramifying the war into neighbouring countries like Hungary and that might easily led to a regional warfare of a far greater scale and intensity. More importantly the massive refugee crisis which accompanied the Kosovo warfare further highlighted the significance of such ethno-nationalist warfare for the stability of greater Europe.

The Kosovo crisis demonstrated the perpetual dependence of the Europeans on the American firepower. This clearly illustrates the importance of keeping the US interest engaged in Europe. But the dependence on the USA would no doubt undermine the European bargaining power. More importantly, the tendency to always look forward to the USA to press the decisive button limits the scope of quicker actions since first of all US authorities always have to draw out whether or not definite US national interest is involved in a specific European conflict situation. This process primarily involves convincing the stubborn neo-isolationist elements in the US Congress. Thus decisive action tends to come

in late and the possibilities of spreading of warfare increases. This has been ascertained both during the Bosnian war and the Kosovo crisis. To sort out such difficulties the United States in the first place may take a stand in support of "European solutions to European security issues" by assisting to strengthen European institutions like the West European Union (WEU) and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Increased European participation in the NATO should get priority in security relationship between the two continents. In this respect, the Americans can take several effective steps. The United States could propose to Europe to assume the responsibility of NATO's ground defence and rapid reinforcement missions; the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) could be handed over to the Europeans and to limit the number of American ground force in Europe while prioritising American air power. On the other hand, the Europeans should find out new roles and areas for American engagement in Europe and expand the WEU to include the East and Central European countries.

Another source of challenge to European security possibly lies with the nature of democracies in East and Central European states. Nascent democracies in these states are often providing scope for dictatorial role with democratic façade, which has been a case for Slobodan Milosevic. Such rulers might not only make a mockery out of democratic practices—which constitute one of the major foundations of European stability—but also may constantly whip up nationalist sentiments to secure power position. Thus, one of the major challenges to European security would be to devise a mechanism to keep the power aspirations of such rulers in check and strengthen the framework of democratic process in East and Central European states.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War era has emerged as a best and a worst of time for Europe. On the one hand, the region is experiencing supreme benefits of years of regional co-operation and integration efforts and, on the other hand, spectres of violent nationalism are out of their tombs to destroy the stability and prosperity that West Europe has achieved over the years. It is now mainly up to the policy makers of the more developed Western Europe to come up with appropriate strategies and visions to stop the opening of the Pandora's Box. How far they will be successful in facing such tremendous challenge will be mainly determined by the following parameters:

- a) equitable and strong relationship with the USA;
- b) developing strong European defense structures involving actors of less developed East and Central Europe;
- c) ensuring proper diffusion of the fruits of market economy and democracy all over Europe;
- d) assist the former communist Europe in building up stable and proper democratic political orders;
- e) active Russian involvement in NATO is also a important prerequisite to ensure Russia's more positive role against the spread of ethno-national conflicts. This, in turn, can be maintained by promoting stronger democratic institutions in Russia and also by taking precautions on part of the western world regarding emergence of any kind of *Versailles Syndrome* in the Russian political culture.

For the a appropriate security framework for West Europe in the 21st century prudent policies should be immediately implemented or else violent ethno-nationalism may very quickly turn this tremendously flourishing region into a play ground of violence and mass murder.