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## **UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: EVALUATION OF UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

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### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this paper is to have a quick *tour de horizon* of the recent events and developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the six constituent republics of former Yugoslavia, and evaluation of the actions of the United Nations in response to the grave threat to peace and security of that country and its people as well as to the region with special reference to the emerging standards of UN peacekeeping operations. The assessment focuses on the response and actions of the UN and principal actors of peacekeeping operations rather than on the operational details.

### **UN peacekeeping Operations**

Peacekeeping operations are acknowledged to be a novel evolution by the United Nations in the field of international peace and security. Confronted with the paralyzing consequences of the realities of the post-Second World War power equation in the peacemaking mechanism provided for in the chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter where the Security Council was expected to undertake enforcement action for restoring peace, the

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General Assembly through its "Uniting for Peace" resolution<sup>1</sup> laid the conceptual and legal basis for the UN Peacekeeping Operations (Lists of such past and current operations are given in annex A and B).

Peacekeeping, as it has evolved under the United Nations, is a concept of peaceful action of non-enforcement nature applied on an *ad hoc* basis to meet emergency situations.<sup>2</sup>

However, they represent the will of the international community expressed through the relevant UN General Assembly and/or Security Council resolutions. It is designed to end hostilities through peaceful means and as such sometimes termed as "holding actions" to allow time to resolve conflicts through negotiations or other peaceful means. If nothing else is secured or achieved, it, at least, signals to non-combatants in a conflict area a return to relative security.<sup>3</sup> Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are categorized as "observer missions" with the functions to monitor implementation of cease-fire agreements or the disengagements of forces by unarmed UN personnel; and "peacekeeping forces", lightly armed deployed in conflict zones to prevent new outbreaks of fighting, maintain buffer zones between hostile parties, and patrol areas subject to cease-fire or armistice agreements.<sup>4</sup>

An analysis of past peacekeeping operations shows its use in: a) "soft areas" on the fringes of East-West rivalry such as the Balkans, Lebanon etc.; b) crisis created by decolonization such as India-Pakistan, Cyprus, Indonesia, etc.; and c) unstable situation in the newly independent countries and unstable regimes, such as in Congo and Cyprus.<sup>5</sup>

According to the opinion of a renowned peacekeeping practitioner Brian Urquhart such operation can be successful only if it has the following

1. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (V).

2. For more on the scope, nature, function and attributes of the UN peacekeeping operations see articles by Indarjit Rikhye, Brian E. Urquhart and Henry Wiseman, in Henry Wiseman (ed.), *Peacekeeping, Appraisals and Proposals*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 6-8, 163-167 and 346-349.

3. *Notes for Speakers*, published by the UN Department of Public Information, June 1992, p. 15.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

5. See, Indarjit Rikhye, in Henry Wiseman, *op cit.*, pp. 7-8.



attributes. Firstly, it is to be acceptable or consented to by the parties principally concerned in the conflict, and the operation is backed by the Security Council and troops contributing countries. Secondly, it must receive cooperation from the above mentioned parties, or countries. Peacekeeping thus seems to be highly conditional and vulnerable as any well armed and determined party concerned in the conflict can make it inoperable. Thirdly, the nature of the UN mandate must be clear and not unambiguous or unrealistic, otherwise there is bound to be trouble.<sup>6</sup>

Implicit in these operations of politico-military nature is the abstract values of commitment and determination to purpose meaning to stand up for peace and security in the conflict area without any sign of vacillation considered as contra-indication by the party who would like to see only its objectives and not that of peace and justice i.e., will of the international community succeed. On the behavioural and operational plane near ideal behaviour has to be manifested by the peacekeepers especially their leaders so that the parties concerned notice fairness and determination and world-at-large ready to back them up for upholding exemplary behaviour pattern under difficult and adverse situations. The notes for the guidance of military observers and police monitors, etc., published and issued by the competent authorities of the UN do enunciate such general principles of impartiality and other terms and conditions for observation in any peacekeeping operations.<sup>7</sup>

The characteristic of peacekeeping operations can, therefore, be encapsulated as follows:

*On their nature and goal*

- 1) they differ in size, scope and composition;
- 2) they are employed to help control and resolve international or internal conflicts with international dimension;
- 3) they are under the operational command of the Secretary General of the United Nations;

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6. See, Brian E. Urquhart, in *ibid.*, p. 164.

7. See *Notes for the Guidance of Military Observers and Police Monitors* (Field Operations Division, UN, New York, March 1992), p. 2.

### *On their attributes*

1) they require the consent of the parties, although not imposed unilaterally or from outside, they do require appropriate, mix of coaxing and pressure from members of the UN particularly the permanent members of the Security Council and other important regional/international actor (s); and

2) they do not involve military enforcement measures or coercive actions *per se*, but their continued physical presence expressing material interest and political support of the international community help greatly to bring about a settlement by peaceful means subsequently.

## II. UNPROFOR - WHAT AND WHY?

### **UNPROFOR in Croatia**

The Security Council by its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February, 1992, adopted unanimously, established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an initial period of 12 months "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis." This was the sixth resolution taken by the Security Council on the Yugoslav situation. The resolution demanded that all parties and others concerned take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent by the UN and EC Monitoring Mission. It also urged them to comply strictly with the cease-fire arrangements signed at Geneva on 23 November, 1991 and at Sarajevo on 2 January, 1992 which had formed the basis for Secretary General's report recommending formation of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

Under the Secretary General's 15 February 1992 Report (S/23592) which led to the Council's creation of UNPROFOR, the Force would consist of nearly 13,340 military, 530 police and 519 civil personnel at an estimated cost of \$634 million for the first year (cost to be borne by the Member States). The Force was to be deployed in ethnically mixed but Serb-dominated "Croatian" territories of Eastern and Western Slavonia, and



Krajina, termed "UN Protected Areas" (UNPA). It was assigned to oversee maintenance of a cease-fire, the demilitarization of the conflict areas, and an easing of ethnic tensions by assuring equitable law enforcement in areas where armed conflict raged.

Although the forces of UNPROFOR was at that time concerned with the territories of Croatia where the Serb dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and their allies Serb irregulars were following a scorched earth policy by indiscriminate bombarding of beautiful Croatian cities like Dubrovnik and Vukovar, it was decided to put the headquarters of UNPROFOR (Croatia) in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its logistic base at Banja Luka in north-west of the same country. The largely symbolic effort to forestall Bosnians from the kind of deliberate violence that already visited the Croatians was of misplaced optimism by seasoned negotiators of the UN including Cyrus R. Vance not only by reasons of hindsight but also of ordinary foresight given the single track expansionist policies pursued by the Serb leaders Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Babic and their supporters in the JNA and Serbian territorial forces much before Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June, 1991.

In his Report (S/ 23592) the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Ghali said that the complexities and dangers of the Yugoslav situation required that a UN force succeed in consolidating the cease-fire and thus facilitate the negotiation of an overall political settlement. He had concluded that the danger that a UN peacekeeping operation would fail because of the parties' lack of cooperation was less grievous than the danger that delay in its despatch would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia. While there is merit in concluding that the presence of UN peacekeepers does make some material difference in holding or accelerating holding of a cease-fire, it was not unclear by then to political observers that the Serbs would go for cease-fire and accept peacekeepers only when their strategic purpose of liberating the Serb majority area in Croatia was achieved and the UN troops would be located along the conflict line between the two sides, deep inside Croatia.



As the events turned out this was to be the case when all the Serb leaders in Serbia and Croatia accepted Vance brokered cease-fire plan in a meeting in Geneva on 23 November 1991. By that time control of most of the Serb dominated areas in Croatia was in their hand and the cease-fire terms gave the Serbs full security through demilitarization of the Croat army in those areas and the political fate of the area was made subject of the outcome of future negotiations between the concerned parties to the conflict. It also released the Serb irregulars and the Federal Serb Army to concentrate their attack on the other target, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with all the ferocity their nature allowed.

#### **UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

As stated above, the Secretary General of the UN intended to locate the UNPROFOR Croatia headquarters in Sarajevo and deploy about 100 observers in some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forty observers were deployed in Mostar region on 30 April 1992. From around that time onward the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the direct collaboration and assistance from Serb dominated JNA let loose a veritable hell in this part of former Yugoslavia. Within six weeks being only 31% of the population they were able to defeat and wrest control of about 70% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the hands of the ill equipped, arms embargo starved (S. C. Res. 713 of 25 sept. 1991) Slav Muslims (44%). The Croats of Bosnia (17%) with the help of their brethren from adjacent Croatia fared a little better before the onslaught of heavily armed and well-equipped modern Serb army and irregulars. They somehow managed to retain control of most of the rest of the country by themselves and in some areas alongwith the Muslims, while Muslims alone were tenuously holding on to the control of a patch of land north of Bihac and cities like Gorazde, Srebrenica and parts of Sarajevo, the capital. Besides fierce no holds-barred war launched by the Serb irregulars and according to news

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8. See, *Humanitarian Assistance in Yugoslavia*, Joint Appeal by UNICER-UNHCR-WHO, UNHCR Fund Raising Service, May 1992, p. 1.



reports, by Croats in secret collusion with the Serbs<sup>9</sup> in the carving up game in Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempts to create "ethnically pure" regions were also going on in the areas occupied by the Serbs.<sup>10</sup> The objective was to strengthen their negotiating stance and present a *fait accompli* to the EC conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The abhorrent acts of large scale physical annihilation of Muslim Slavs, rape of their women, loot and destruction of their property had not yet hit the international news and electronic media.

At this stage the few EC military monitors present in Bosnia-Herzegovina secretly withdrew from Sarajevo on the morning of 12 May 1992.<sup>11</sup> This move was soon followed by the peacekeepers (Croatia Operation) stationed in Sarajevo who came under increasing mortar, artillery and rocket attacks. On May 17, 1992 UNPROFOR on order from the Secretary General completed its "temporary" pull back of military and civilian personnel from Sarajevo to Belgrade leaving behind a city of hungry, frightened civilians. With that move the symbol of world's concern and a potentially stabilizing force was gone, gone because as Lt. Gen Phillippe Morillon, the deputy commander of the peacekeeping force observed in the absolute security of Belgrade where many of the headquarters staff were to work: "It was terrible to see the way things were going, we had the impression that the Bosnian population was committing suicide".<sup>12</sup> However, a residual force of 120 UN observers were left in Sarajevo under the command of Col. John Wilson, an Australian to be available as cease-fire mediators and to air relief convoys.

During this time, the Secretary General of the UN on the basis of his Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Mr. Marrack Goulding's report had concluded that:

- i) "without an agreement of some sort" from the parties in conflict, peace-keeping was "impossible".

9. Further Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), S/23900 dated 12 May 1992, p. 3.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

11. *New York Times*, May 13, 1992.

12. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1992.



- ii) The possibility of deploying an "intervention force" which could be sent in without the consent of all the parties was also not a "practicable proposition" in view of the intensity and scale of the fighting.<sup>13</sup>

On 6 June 1992, the secretary General reported to the Security Council that UNPROFOR had, on 5 June, negotiated an agreement for the handing over, to the force, of Sarajevo airport so that it could be made available for humanitarian purposes. Besides it would also verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons systems from within range of the airport and its approaches and monitor the concentration of artillery, mortar and ground-to-ground missile systems in specified areas which would be agreed by it. On the basis of this much awaited agreement of concerned parties, the Security Council by resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992 decided to enlarge the mandate and the strength of the UNPROFOR thus beginning the establishment of UNPROFOR in Bosnia -Herzegovina formally.

By resolution 161 (1992) of 29 June, the Security Council authorised the Secretary General to deploy immediately additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Based on the London Agreement of 17 July 1992 the mandate was further expanded to make arrangements for an international supervision of all their heavy weapons. There after, on the basis of periodic recommendation of the Secretary General, the Security Council step by step expanded the scope of operation of UNPROFOR and its strength to support efforts of the UNHCR to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia -Herzegovina at the latter's request, and for the protection of convoys of released civilian detainees at the request of ICRC (Res. 776 of 14 September 1992).

On 9 October 1992 the Security council adopted Resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of UN operations including humanitarian assistance. This was the first *interventionary resolution* adopted by the security Council without the recommendation of

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13. Secretary General's Report S/23900 dated 12 May 1992, *op cit*, pp. 3-11.



the Secretary General and lacking the consent of all the parties to the conflict, the requirement persistently pursued by the Secretary General to base his recommendations for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia Herzegovina. The resolution is toothless inasmuch as it lacks any enforcement mechanism. It may be recalled that the "No-fly Zone" introduced in August 1992 for Southern Iraq is based solely on the desire of some Permanent Members of the Security Council and its authority purportedly emanating from Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) which provides for humanitarian efforts in Iraq and does not specifically prescribe any action for enforcing "No-fly Zone".

Currently, the military component of UNPROFOR in Croatia consists of 12 infantry battalions (10,400 all ranks) three infantry battalions (1,500 in all ranks) in Sarajevo; logistics and other support elements totalling about 3,000 in all ranks in headquarters; and some 230 military observers. The police component comprises approximately 570 police monitors, and the civilian component is about 500 personnel.

In addition, the following elements are to be deployed throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina: four infantry battalion groups (about 4,500 to 5000 all ranks); a transportation battalion of some 500 all ranks; logistics, signals, engineering and other support elements totalling some 1,200 all ranks; 80 military observers; and approximately 80 civilian personnel. The military personnel of UNPROFOR is provided by 32 countries.<sup>14</sup>

### III. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA : RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

One of the six constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia Bosnia-Herzegovina has a multi-regional, multi-religious and multi-ethnic population of 4.4 million, of which approximately 44% were Muslim Slavs, 31% Christian Orthodox Serbian Slavs and 18% Catholic Croats. Although Serbs and Croats are living in areas where as individual

14. For details see, "The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia", 25 September, 1991-30 October 1992, Reference paper, UN Department of Public Information, pp. 8-9.



community they are in majority, the Muslim Slavs are dispersed all over with no clear majority areas of their own except in north-west and in some areas of few prominent cities. Notwithstanding this patchwork of communities of different nationalities, the three communities since many decades lived together in perfect harmony and co-existence which could have served as an ideal model for the shape of communal harmony in the century to come. However, following a wholesale challenge to federal system in Yugoslavia mounted by Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, in the name of protecting interests of "oppressed" Serbian minority in Kosovo in 1988 and after having a series of constitutional amendments which saw Kosovo and Vojvodina completely losing their autonomy, a chain reaction for disintegration started amongst the non-Serbs in former Yugoslavia. Initially, the Slovenians and Croatians took the lead through democratisation of their political system. But Milosevic and the other votaries of rabid Serbian nationalism in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to recentralize the federal system under Serb leadership by first capturing the party organs at the Congress, then using the Congress for introducing sweeping changes in the powers of the component republics in favour of Belgrade, the federal centre. The tug-of-war between the other republics and Serbia came to the brink of precipice, completely paralysing the federal government. In this exercise Serbians were the main instigators.

Having failed to organize and capture power in their way the Serb leaders waged a war of death and destruction against the civilians of Slovenia and Croatia who were first to declare their independence in June 1991. Defenceless Dubrovnik was besieged and shelled. Vukovar was raged. Meanwhile Europe maintained a false neutrality, treating Yugoslav war as a typically Balkan conflict between equally guilty adversaries although Serbs were clearly the aggressor.<sup>15</sup> Despite this blatant Serb aggression, the Slovenes being farthest from the Serb inhabited areas got their freedom with least loss while the Croats paid a lot. It would have been much worse had it

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15. *Newsweek*, January 6, 1992, p. 19.



not been for the Germans who took diplomatic initiative to rally the EC member countries for early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and bring about a ceasefire. Egged by the same group of countries Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia held their own referendum to determine their fate in February 1992. While Montenegro voted to join Serbia to form the rump Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which till recently had leaned in favour of the federation and the Macedonians though Orthodox Slavs opted for independence. But the choice in Bosnia-Herzegovina came against the decision of its 31% Serbs who under the leadership of hardliner Radovan Karadzic of the Serbina Democratic Party (SDS) not only opposed the referendum but later declared their own independent Bosnian state with all help from Serbia ensuring a savage blood bath and destruction of which there is no parallel in the recent times.

Once the Serbs began to attack the Muslim Slavs and Catholic Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina with all the fury of Jingoistic nationalism committing horifying atrocities in large scale, their inhuman plight received across the board sympathy from world public and news media. Denied of their fundamental right to defend themselves against immensely superior and well supplied and trained elements of former Federal Yugoslav army and Serb irregulars because of one-sided crippling effect of an international arms embargo, the Bosnian troops and particularly people became sitting ducks before the heavy guns, mortars, rockets, ground-to-ground missiles and air attacks of the well-stocked Serbs. While the brave amongst them bled or got maimed or killed, the weak either fled or decapitated, women and girls were raped and forced to carry the burden of "Chetniks" inhuman acts in the heart of "civilized" Europe at the threshold of the 21st century.

### **The Action and the Reaction**

The Yugoslav problem can be seen in the context of total breakdown of the existing national consensus built up by late president Tito and kept in order by his powerful personality without getting it replaced by a new

consensus under the influence of atavistic urges of its Serb population. It is ethnic and linguistic when Serbs are against Muslim Slavs. The design of the Serbs and the consequences of their acts in this carnage appear to be as follows:

- 1) to go for land grabbing before world community acts decisively to stop them;
- 2) to do the above through indiscriminate use of force against the target people and property in order to terrorize the entire Bosnian nation as well as the world community so that the latter would not venture in easily and the former accepts peace at their terms. Towards this end "horrifying atrocities", through systematic expulsions, forcible relocations, assassinations and other forms of persecution "aimed at persons for no other reason but their national, ethnic or religious origin" are being committed.<sup>16</sup> As a result, about 125,000 Bosnian Muslims have been killed, 1.3 million rendered homeless, over 30,000 women and girls got raped, and 3 million people besieged with the prospect of thousands dying in the harsh Balkan winter with no food or electricity or heat available to keep them alive;
- 3) to appear indignant to Western governments possible reactions, however, mild that be;
- 4) to appear threatening to Western governments possible hard reactions, intimidating their public to the prospect of a long and dreadful war should they decide to send in troops to enforce peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and
- 5) to divide Western public opinion, especially the conservative and orthodox Christians, by raising the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism with all their "evil" consequences for Europe. Thus, appearing to be the self-less defenders of the Christian faith and avengers of the "terrible" calamities brought upon by the heathen Muslim Turks five hundred

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16. Statement by S. Ogata, High Commissioner of UNHCR quoted in *U. N. Chronicle*, December '92. p. 18.



years before. In this they were also helped by occasional pronouncement of president F. Tudjman of Croatia who occasionally accused President Elija Ijetbegovic of being "fundamentalist" with similar sinister design.

As against the above diplomatic and military onslaught, the Bosnians had no effective answer. They repeatedly asked the Security Council and the world community to reconsider and withdraw arms embargo which was hurting them most without any success so far. They appealed to great powers and especially the USA to intervene in any manner to enforce peace and prevent Serbian carnage, to provide humanitarian aid and to give them means to defend themselves again without any success except in the field of humanitarian aid which has, however, been ensconced in a "risk free" mentality making the effort too jerky to be considered effective.

The Serbian acts in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is a member of the UN may be analyzed as follows:

1) a member nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity is under attack as it is being physically mauled and taken over much as happened in case of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, an act of aggression, a challenge to fundamental premise of international law and world order.

2) a nation is being dispersed and exterminated in flagrant disregard to the existing customs and laws of war - a war crime, and crime against humanity;

3) every possible obstruction being raised by routinely breaking cease-fires arranged by the UN peacekeepers and making delivery of humanitarian aid impossible for them - violation of human rights in worst possible manner.

To sum up, politically there is not only a breach of international peace and security but an act of aggression going on; legally, the fundamental principles concerning laws of war, humanitarian norms and fundamental freedoms of individuals are being violated consistently in a pre-mediated and planned way. The challenge in this respect to the United Nations is enormous and perhaps without any precedent since the World War II.

In the aforesaid context the Reaction of the UN through the Security Council which is primarily responsible for maintaining world peace and security under Chapter VIII of the Charter, the General Assembly under chapter IV of the Charter, the Secretary General under Chapter XV of the Charter and other relevant articles of the Charter are obliged to take note of all the developments beginning from emergence of threat to the act of aggression and its consequences. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, responsibilities of each of the institutions could form the basis of separate papers or thesis. However, in this particular context, attempt has been made to analyze the role of : (i) the Secretary General to the extent he is involved with peacekeeping Operations; and (ii) a few senior officials of the operation and the overall framework of the concept of peacekeeping and its applicability in situations like Bosnia-Herzegovina.

#### IV. PEACEKEEPING ASSESSED

The Secretary General of the UN Boutros Ghali in a report, better known as "An Agenda for Peace" to the Security Council on June 23, 1992 emphasized rightly on preventive diplomacy. The report was made pursuant to the statement adopted by the historic Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. There he stated that such a diplomacy might be performed by himself or through his staff, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. As a part of that kind of diplomacy he recommended "preventive deployment" in conditions of national crisis at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in interstate disputes with the agreement of both the parties and, furthermore on the request of a country feeling threatened on its side of the border.<sup>17</sup> He felt that such a deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence besides doing a number of other good things.

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17. Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, (UN publication, June 1992), pp. 13-15.



Under the chapter "peacemaking" the Secretary General while exploring means to prevent conflict and keep peace under the UN Charter, spoke of his apprehension that "the indifference of the international community to a problem, or the marginalization of it can also thwart the possibilities of solution".<sup>18</sup> Under the heading "peacekeeping" he spoke of peacekeeping responding flexibly to new demands of recent years and went on to list conditions for their success some of which were discussed at the beginning of this paper.<sup>19</sup>

As against the above quoted views of the Secretary General his observations at paragraph 25 and 27 in his Report no. S/23900 dated 12 May 1992 is worth noting and comparing. In that he observes:

"As will be evident from section I of the present report, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tragic, dangerous, violent and confused. I do not believe that in its present phase this conflict is susceptible to the United Nations peacekeeping treatment."

After listing the requirements of such operation, he further observes:

"The European community has been making effort, both on the ground in Sarajevo and in the constitutional talks in Lisbon, to reach agreements. If as all must hope, they succeed, opportunities for United Nations peacekeeping may emerge, though it may in this case turn out to be more appropriate for EC, rather than the United Nations, to undertake the peacekeeping as well as the peacemaking."

In paragraph 27 of the same report, he states:

"It could be argued that in these circumstances the United Nations should consider the possibility of deploying an "intervention force" which would be sent in, *without* the consent of all the parties, to enforce an end to the fighting. Indeed President Izetbegovic made such a request ... .. Given the intensity and scale of the fighting, such a concept would require many tens of thousands of troops equipped for potential combat with heavily armed and determined adversaries. *I do not believe that an enforcement action of this kind is a practicable proposition.*" (emphasis added.)

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18. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 29



And finally at paragraph 35, he concluded:

"In these circumstances, I believe that the Security Council must continue to lend its full support to the peacemaking activities of the European community. Political solutions to these tragic and complex conflicts can, in my view, be achieved only through a continuous and uninterrupted process of patient negotiation led by the European community, which has already established agreed mechanism for this purpose ...".

Thus, in this case, the Secretary General appears to contradict his own views on the use of preventive diplomacy based on preventive deployment on request from the Government in times of national crisis; and ignore the assertive role of the Secretary General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and of regional organization in cooperation with the United Nations which he recommended to the Security Council and to the world through his "Agenda for Peace" as standards for maintaining peace and security in the world. It can also be argued if one could at all tailor make a conflict situation for the UN peacekeeping intervention by not being "tragic, dangerous, violent and confused"; or have a conflict without "heavily armed and determined adversaires" to enable the Secretary General to recommend deployment of an "intervention force" at the request of either party to a conflict. His intention to abdicate the UN role to the EC in Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis does not also fit in with his later recommendation where he did not visualize the role of any regional organization without the UN in a conflict situation. Given the gravity and tragicness of the situation which has been universally acknowledged as without parallel after the World War II, his recommendation for not sending in "intervention force" and not involving the UN conveys a paralysis in the UN bureaucracy which in practical terms meant giving green signal to the Serbs to go ahead with their game plan of annihilation of the Muslim Slavs in Bosnia and perhaps preparing another one for the majority Albanians in Kosovo or Hungarians in Vojvodina in the days to come. The world has not yet heard any preventive diplomacy exercise being undertaken by anybody in the United Nations to prevent another massacre or genocide from taking place in Kosovo. There is complete sullenness in that forsaken place where 1.8



million people have been denied of their basic human rights of speaking and working in their language which was available only a few years before.

In the context of peacekeeping the stance taken by the Secretary General involving the consent of the parties in the conflict is understandable. However, it seems that by being rigid in its operational parameter he was hampering the notion of "responding flexibly" given the fact that no two conflict situations can hardly be identical. Further, the attempt to strait-jacket a concept which itself evolved out of necessity and with no prior format is, unproductive if not counterproductive and would be incongruous in a dynamic institution like the UN. Again, by being overtly negative in his recommendation, chance for deriving unstated political leverages as enunciated above seems to have been wasted.<sup>20</sup>

At the operation level, the public comments made by the Canadian General Lewis W. Mackenzie in-charge of the Sarajevo UN Peacekeeping Operation and quoted by the various important western newspapers can hardly be considered as consistent with the objectives of such operations and the explicit principle of behaviour laid down by the UN Secretariat. He was quoted to be saying repeatedly that not only the United Nations could not stop the fighting even other nations could not afford to do it in view of the difficulties of the terrain and the determination and skill of the Serbs as fighters.<sup>21</sup> This thirty one year veteran peacekeeper of the UN even helped to transport Biljana Plavsic, deputy leader of the Serb forces attacking Sarajevo in a UN armoured vehicle. Soon after his reliefment of UN command he repeated his theories in a testimony before the US congress.<sup>22</sup> His anti-peacekeeping utterances made renowned commentator Leslie H. Gelb to write:

"What he [Gen. Mackenzie] was telling as did acts of other western leaders was that 'they were asking the Bosnian Muslims to recognise their cause as hopeless, come to the bargaining table, and accept defeat. And to forget the dreams of being rescued by Western cavalry'".

20. The Secretary General in his subsequent pronouncements (3 March 1993) seemed to have advocated for an interventionary role for the UN troops. It is doubtful at this stage, however that the Permanent Members of the Security Council would subscribe to such prescriptions.

21. See, *New York Times* 22, July 1992.

22. *Ibid.*, 12 August 1992.



Such gratuitous and partisan utterances have not ceased to come from other UN peacekeepers and negotiators revealing a damaging gap in the development and practice of a truly international civil servant mentality so meticulously demanded by article 100 of the Charter and required by circumstances. Besides, at another level they sound discordant too when their Secretary General tries his best to remain or appear neutral in a conflict situation.

#### V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an interstate and intrastate problem at the same time. It is complex in as much as its causes lie in deep historical, territorial, strategic and national self-determination context. Since it is a worldly problem, it is therefore, capable of worldly solution—may be with a combination of political, economic and military doses. The United Nations as the apex body of the world community specifically empowered to resolve conflicts before or after they emerge cannot remain seated with folded hands, as it did in the first half of this year, or cannot afford to put down its marker as it did many times and especially on May 16-17 when it withdrew its peacekeepers citing risk to life. It has to face the problems squarely and directly because it is the institution of last resort for maintaining peace and security in the conflict ridden world. It cannot also afford to differentiate for long between problems coming from different areas of the world on the basis of their strategic, economic or political importance without compromising principles of justice and fairness in the world.

Within the overall context of maintaining fairness, justice and effectiveness in the international order, the functions and standards of the UN Peacekeeping Operations and the behaviour of the Peacekeepers are as important and significant as that of the organization itself. Peacekeeping is not mechanical that it can be operated automatically once certain neat conditions are met or available. Peacekeeping is also about commitment — in terms of troops, money and readiness to take risks — and about



determination to see peace through. It is also about raising hopes and not dashing them. It can not be cheap, painless or risk free.

UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina has to stand up and work for diffusing the crisis, end military confrontation, distribute humanitarian aid to whoever needs that, and create conditions for enforcing and obtaining peace. Judging by the situation prevailing today it has a long way to go.

#### ANNEX A : PAST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UN

OPERATIONS	DURATION
First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)	November, 1956—June, 1967
UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	June 1958—December, 1958
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	July, 1960—June 1954
UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)	October 1962—April, 1963
UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	July, 1963—September, 1964
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary—General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	May, 1965—October, 1966
UN India—Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	September, 1965—March, 1966
Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)	October, 1973, July, 1979
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP)	April, 1988—March, 1990
UN Iran—Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	August 1988—June February, 1991
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)	January 1989—June, 1991
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	April, 1989—March, 1990
UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	November, 1989—January, 1992
UN Advance Mission In Cambodia (UNAMIC)	October, 1991—March, 1992.

SOURCE : NOTES FOR SPEAKERS, 1992, UN OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

## ANNEX B : CURRENT PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UN

OPERATIONS (as of April 1992)	STARTING DATE	COST (US\$ millions)	STRENGTH (Approximate)
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization	June, 1948	31	Military: 300
UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January, 1948	6	Military: 40
UNFICYP UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus	March, 1964	31	Military and police: 2,200
UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Group	June, 1974	43	Military: 1,300
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon	March, 1978	157	Military: 5,800
UNKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April, 1991	67	Military: 550
UNAVEM II UN Angola Verification Mission	June, 1991	110	Military and police: 440
ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	July, 1991	70	Military and police: 540
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	September, 1991	59	Military and Police: 375
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March, 1992	1,900	Military and police: 19,500
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force	March, 1992	607	Projected Military police: 13,870
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalla	April, 1992	23	Projected Military/security: 550
ONUMOZ UN operations in Mozambique	Dec, 1992	—	—

Total rough annualized cost (all operations 1991-1992): Over \$2.7 billion

Source : Notes For Speakers, 1992, UN of Public Information