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PATHWAYS TO PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA*

If you want peace, you must prepare for peace.¹ If South Asians want peace, they must be clear what kind of peace and how to achieve it. But they are not clear what kind of peace they seek, and the most frequent prescription for peace is "political will". Seminar after seminar ends with the portentous (but vacuous) recommendation that South Asians summon up the political will for peace and cooperation -- a counsel of virtue, which we would no doubt do well to heed, but essentially tautological. The question is: under what conditions does the political will for peace assert itself? This paper attempts to clarify the notion of peace and the different pathways to peace available to us in South Asia as part of the intellectual preparation for peace in the region: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be erected."²

1. See, to the contrary, the classic dictum of Vegetius: *Si vis pacem, para bellum* -- "If you want peace, prepare for war."

2. The quote is of course from the preamble to the UNESCO Charter.

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THREE NOTIONS OF PEACE

What is peace? There is no agreement altogether on the notion of peace, but we can distinguish between three different usages or levels of peace: peace as the absence of war, that is, a *hegemonic* or *deterrent* peace; peace as functional and economic engagement and interaction, what could for convenience be called a *transactional* peace; and, peace as a situation where the conduct of relations is regulated by the assurance that the use or threat of use of force is not countenanced, in short, an *integrative* or *perpetual* peace.³

These three notions of peace may be derived from three basic visions of social and international life. Kenneth Boulding, in his work over several years, has used the image of threat systems, exchange systems, and integrative systems to denote the three basic ways humans relate to each other in virtually all social arenas, from the family to the international system.⁴ In a compatible if not parallel way, Hedley Bull in his work on "international society" has divided Western views of international life into the Hobbesian, the Grotian, and the Kantian tradition.⁵

Boulding has argued that humans relate to each other in three ways -- by means of threats, exchange, and integration. The first way in which they regulate their interactions is by the use or threat of use of force. When superiority of capability or the threat of use of such superiority achieves a certain equilibrium between humans, they are in the realm either of hegemony or a balance of power, respectively. If the command of superior capability is one-sided, then a hegemony obtains. A hegemon can impose peace by the preponderance of capability. If the command of capability is

3. A useful anthology on peace is Raimo Vayrynen (with Dieter Senghaas and Christian Schmidt), (ed.), *The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures, and States* (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, 1987).

4. Kenneth Boulding, "Peace and the Evolutionary Process," in Vayrynen, (ed.), *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 48-59.

5. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

more or less equivalent, then a balance of power obtains. In a balance of power, mutual deterrence -- the mutual threat of unacceptable punishment -- achieves peace.

The second way in which humans regulate their relations is by means of exchange. In an exchange, both sides benefit. The prospect of future exchange for mutual benefit ensures good behaviour in the present. To the extent that what is exchanged is necessary and non-substitutable, the incentive to exchange and the incentive to behave in a manner consistent with a continuation of the relationship remains strong. Peace is achieved and maintained by a mutual interest in continued exchange.

Beyond threats and exchange, humans can resort to various integrative relationships. In an integrative relationship, humans arrive at a position of ethical and moral convergence or respect for others. They recognise certain obligations or responsibilities towards others flowing from that position -- minimally and negatively, not to visit violence on them, but, more positively, to invest in a continuous process of mutual communication, comprehension, and accommodation.

Three points are worth some attention here. For one thing, at any given time, most human relationships are regulated by some combination of all three, that is, by threats, exchange, and integration. The international system, commonly, is thought to be closer to a pure threat system, at least in the view of so-called political realists. Nevertheless, even it is marked by exchange and integrative relationships.

Second, while any relationship features some combination of threats, exchange, and integration, one can think of these systems as arrayed in ascending order of stability. Threat systems, he suggests, are prone to instability because over time unless threats are actually carried out their credibility decays. Moreover, a threat system is not an efficient system: compelling someone to act or not act in a certain way is always less efficient than having him or her behave in a certain way voluntarily. Thus, threat systems are prone to periodic collapse -- either when the threat is carried out, or when the threatener overextends and is either challenged or

must withdraw his or her threats. Exchange systems are superior: mutual benefit is the lure to action. However, even exchange systems have their limits, perhaps the chief of which is that when the prospects of exchange are nearing exhaustion or are exhausted the incentive to maintain certain behavioural patterns may disappear. Moreover, in an exchange system there is the constant fear that one side is profiting more than the other and will eventually turn this relative gain to permanent advantage. If this fear persists, an exchange system can well unravel. Integrative systems are the most stable and durable. These are built not on punishment or greed, crudely put, but on normative commitments issuing out of a recognition of common humanity. They are not, therefore, liable to decay or reversal.

A third point worth reflecting on is whether there is a relationship between the three systems. Is a stable threat system - for howsoever long - a precondition of mutually advantageous exchange relations which in turn are the foundation for progressively higher order integrative relationships? Put more concretely: is a stable balance of power, built on deterrence, a precondition for functional and economic cooperation; and are deterrence and functional and economic cooperation preconditions for a permanent peace? There are those, clearly, who would argue this case, for South Asia and elsewhere. Others would claim that deterrence freezes relationships and, in so doing, impedes functional or economic cooperation and progress towards integration. It is not, therefore, a precondition of the other levels of peace; rather, its dismantlement is a precondition of the other levels. So, for instance, functional and economic cooperation may help thaw relations frozen at the level of deterrence. Or, a certain degree of integration may be prior to long-term functional and economic cooperation. If cooperation is constantly beset by the relative gains problem, one way of overcoming the fear of unequal exchange is to recognise certain transcendent, integrative values.⁶

6. See. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation". *World Politics* 40 (April 1988), pp. 3332-350 for the view that integrating values are important for cooperation.

The Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian perspectives on international society and the implications of each perspective for the notion of peace is compatible with Boulding's schema. The Hobbesian perspective is that of international relations as threat systems. States are the primary actors in international affairs. As sovereign entities, they recognise no higher authority which can adjudicate disputes or enforce certain norms of behaviour. Therefore, they are left with no recourse but to settle matters among themselves, in the end by the threat or use of force. Military preponderance or balances of power and deterrence: these are the bases of peace.⁷

The Grotian view is that of international relations as a regulated exchange system. States are the primary actors in international affairs and they are sovereign, but they come to recognise and respect certain constraints on their behaviour in order to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation. For Grotians, international trade and commerce not war most typifies international life, and the entanglements and benefits of these and other regulated interactions with other states is the basis for peace.⁸

The Kantian view regards international relations as a transnationally integrated system. For Kantians, the interests and values of human beings are similar and will gradually be seen to be so. Trade and commerce, education and communication, even war and conquest, and a certain ethical imperative will cause the convergence, diffusion, or deepening awareness of common values and interests. To the extent that they do, these will bring into being a community of mankind over and above the community of states.⁹

Bull, like Boulding, argues that international life is at any given time a mix of the coercive, convergent, and cooperative. Thus, he notes: "The modern international system in fact reflects all three of the elements singled out, respectively, by the Hobbesian, the Kantian and the Grotian traditions:

7. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 25.

8. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 26-27.

9. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 25-26.

the element of war and struggle for power among states, the element of transnational solidarity and conflict, cutting across the divisions among states, and the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states. In different historical phases of the states system, in different geographical theatres of its operation, and in the policies of different states and statesmen, one of these three elements may predominate over the others."¹⁰

Where does South Asia stand and what changes if any are in motion? I shall argue that South Asia is showing signs of progress along all three paths towards what Barry Buzan has called a mature anarchical system in which deterrence will be stabilised, economic and functional cooperation will deepen, and political convergence will increase leading to a greater sense of integration.¹¹

Pathway to Peace I : Hegemony and Deterrence

The first pathway to peace is the coercive one of the political realists: either hegemonic power pacifies, or a balance of power and mutual deterrence prevent the outbreak of war.

Hegemonic Peace: Are There Any Hegemons Out There?

In a regional system, there exist potentially two sorts of hegemons: powerful outside states and powerful inside states. Either or both could impose a peace by the deployment of superior capabilities. This might simply be an existential threat which operates for the most part at the level of a realisation of the superiority of the more powerful state or it might be calibrated as part of a deliberate and careful policy. It may rest on military or economic power or both or even what may be called discursive power, that is, the power to frame the ways in which we think about problems and formulate solutions to them. The last of these, discursive power, it may be objected, sits uneasily with the notion of "threats" but the power to overwhelm or jeopardise another's worldview is a potent one.

10. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 41.

11. Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

Powerful outsiders. South Asia has a history of powerful outsiders involving themselves -- or being asked to involve themselves -- in regional affairs. Britain and the US, the Soviet Union, China, and Iran have from time-to-time intervened in regional matters. All of them except China have attempted to bring principally India and Pakistan together so as to avert polarisation and war in the Subcontinent. They have done so primarily in the service of their own geopolitical interests.

If one stands back from the history of the region from 1947 onwards, one can see in retrospect quite clearly that powerful outsiders were involved continuously but consecutively in trying to bring peace to the region: Britain and the US from 1948-1963, the Soviet Union from 1964-1969, Iran from 1969-1979, and the US since 1980.¹² Britain was an imperial power on its way to becoming a regional military and economic power, although as a partner of the US and later as an influential member of the European Community it has had greater reach than most regional powers. For some years, in the aftermath of colonialism, it disposed of a certain degree of discursive power in South Asia. Iran never possessed the military, economic or discursive power of a hegemon, nor does it now fourteen years after the Revolution, but its oil wealth gave it a certain leverage in regional affairs. The Soviet Union possessed the military attributes of a hegemon although its economic and discursive power was limited.¹³ The US, which commanded the three attributes of a hegemon, when it was not indifferent to the region, either cooperated with the Soviet Union or was balanced by Soviet power in respect of South Asian affairs.¹⁴ In sum, from 1947-1989, no one power was in a position to play hegemon in South Asia.

12. See, Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, "Cooperative Security and South Asian Insecurity," in Janne Nolan, (ed.), *Shared Destiny: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D. C. : Brookings Institution, forthcoming) for a brief recovery of this history of outsider involvement in the region.

13. Stephen Clarkson shows how even at the height of its involvement with India the Soviet Union made little intellectual impact on Indians. See, his "The Low Impact of Soviet Writing and Aid on Indian Thinking and Policy", *Survey* 20 (Winter 1974), pp. 1-23.

14. For the nature of US-Soviet "cooperation" in South Asia during the Cold War, see, Stephen P. Cohen, "Superpower Cooperation in South Asia", in Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej, (eds.), *The Cold War as Cooperation* (London : Macmillan, 1991), pp. 281-309.

Have matters changed with the end of the Cold War? Britain and Iran, obviously, remain regional powers and exert little influence in South Asia. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and its major successor, the Russian Federation, is beset by enormous internal political, economic, and social problems which preclude an active role except in more or less adjacent regions such as the Balkans. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has left but one outright superpower, namely, the US: the US possesses military, economic, and discursive power of global reach. The US may be over-extending itself, but it is, to use Joseph Nye's nicely ambiguous phrase, "bound to lead."¹⁵ However, in addition, China, at least in Asia, is already a quasi-superpower. No region in the continent can escape the shadow of Chinese military power; and in the years to come, few will escape the shine of its economic power. One pathway to peace in South Asia, in theory, then, is for the US and China, jointly or separately, to manage relations between India and its neighbours, and specifically between India and Pakistan, which is the only relationship of any great geopolitical significance for powerful outsiders.

What are the prospects of a US- or Chinese-powered peace in South Asia? First of all, do the US or Chinese want peace in South Asia? I would claim that they do. The US wants peace because it is anxious to stop if not roll back nuclear proliferation worldwide. It sees the India-Pakistan conflict, now centered about Kashmir, as a situation that could lead to war and even escalate to nuclear war. The India-Pakistan crisis of 1987 and the putative crisis of 1990 have been read by Washington as near-nuclear crises. They have spurred US diplomacy to do something about proliferation and by extension about Kashmir which they see as the primary cause of tensions.¹⁶ The Chinese since 1976 have encouraged

15. Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

16. Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," *The New Yorker*, 29 March 1993. For the view that the nuclear dimension of the crisis and the prospect of war has been exaggerated by Hersh and the authors of *Critical Mass*, see, C. Raja Mohan, "Claims on 1990 Crisis Disputed," *The Hindu*, 18 February 1994 which cites various US policy-makers in and outside the region to this effect.

India's neighbours, including Pakistan, to resolve their differences. Beijing's stand on various regional quarrels such as Kashmir and on India's internal problems especially in the Northeast has ameliorated.¹⁷ China's interest in peace is related to its broader and bigger ambition, namely, to be in aggregate the third or fourth largest economic power. To do this, it must reduce tensions in and around its borders. China does not see South Asia, and India specifically, as a great military threat. Far more threatening are the US, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- and a united Korea of 80 million or more if unification should happen. Beijing, therefore, has engaged India in a process of confidence-building including force reductions along the border.¹⁸

Given that both the US and China have an interest in fostering peace in South Asia, can they do so? Hegemons can bring peace in three ways. They may through their superior power quite simply demand peace with the threat ultimately that economic but also military power will be applied to obtain compliance. On the other hand, they may promise to underwrite a peace by economic and other rewards. Yet another view of hegemony is that it is the power to make and enforce the "rules of the game" which encourage or constrain certain types of behaviour -- the ultimate threat is the threat of economic sanctions or denial and military coercion, but in an

17. Diplomatic relations between India and China were restored in 1976. The following year, the two countries resumed trade relations. In 1979, Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited Beijing which led to the reopening of border talks, and in June 1980 Beijing declared Kashmir to be a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan. See, Rosemary Foot, "The Sino-Soviet Complex and South Asia," in Barry Buzan, Gowher Rizvi, Rosemary foot and Nancy Jetly, *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London: Macmillan, 1986). Manoranjan Mohanty, "India-China Relations on the Eve of the Asian Century," in Ramakant, (ed.), *China and South Asia* (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1988), p. 73 and p. 79 refers to Chinese signals to India's neighbours to settle matters with New Delhi.

18. On India-China confidence-building measures, see, Kanti Bajpai and Bonnie Coe, "Across the High Himalayas: Confidence-Building Measures Between India and China After the Cold War," a paper for the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., forthcoming. Also see, Kanti Bajpai, "Brother Enemies: Conflict, Cooperation, and CBMs With Pakistan and China--A View from New Delhi," in Sumit Ganguly and Ted Greenwood, (eds.), *Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in South Asia*, forthcoming. I think it is worth adding that China has more neighbours than virtually any country in the world. A quick count reveals that it has 15 neighbours. This makes for a very complicated threat structure, one that could take a heavy toll on the Chinese economy.

everyday sense it is the ability to "legislate" for others which defines hegemony. Underlying this legislative ability is ideological power wherein the values, goals, rules, institutions, and practices of the hegemon are so widely diffused and legitimated that its worldview is naturalised and internalised as the correct view. Put somewhat differently: hegemons possess not just military and economic but also discursive power.¹⁹

What are the prospects, then, for a hegemonic peace in South Asia brokered by the US and China? First of all, it is unlikely that the US and China will combine to put military or economic pressure on South Asians. They have a parallel interest in a peaceful, stable South Asia, but the issue of proliferation divides them. The US is aggressively anti-proliferationist. It opposes the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles and sees proliferation as a powerful de-stabiliser of the region. China has joined the NPT but remains softer on proliferation, arguing that while it opposes the spread of weapons of mass destruction states must choose according to their security needs. Thus, Beijing has, by many accounts, helped Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme, although the Chinese deny that what they have done contravenes anti-proliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Second, while China is going to be a first-rank power in 20 or 30 years, it is not yet hegemonically placed in relation to the rest of Asia or even South Asia. It has neither the requisite military or economic might. At best, it may be in a position to play some form of mediatory-cum-pressure role. China has been a long-time Pakistani ally and has a substantial arms relationship with Islamabad. On the other side, relations with India continue to improve: over the past five years the two countries have instituted a confidence-building measures (CBM) process; they have begun serious talks on troop reductions along the border (and India has in

19. Jack Donnelly, "Progress in Human Rights," in Emmanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, (eds.), *Progress in Post War International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 348 refers to this more Gramscian notion of hegemony. See, also Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

fact redeployed up to three divisions); they have liberalised border trade; and they have even made some -- if small -- progress on the border issue. China has reassured New Delhi on Kashmir, and India continues to reassure Beijing on Tibet.²⁰ Given its diplomatic friendship and arms relationship with Pakistan, improved relations with India, and the desire for a more peaceful and stable South Asia, Beijing could play a role in moderating Islamabad's stand on various India-Pakistan issues.

However, there are constraints on China's ability to play even this relatively modest role. Washington is unlikely to cede leadership in South Asia to China which it already views as perhaps the greatest threat to US power in the 21st century. Then, while the relationship with Pakistan has endured and while the arms relationship with Islamabad gives Beijing a certain degree of leverage, its influence with Pakistani leaders has limits. Pakistan's Islamic connections and credentials are important to Beijing which is worried about the resurgence of Muslim religious feeling in Central Asia and inside its own borders, particularly Xinjiang.²¹ Finally, New Delhi remains suspicious of Beijing and is fiercely opposed to Chinese meddling in what it sees as India's strategic backyard.

This leaves the US as a potential hegemonic peacemaker in South Asia. Washington, after the Cold War, the victory in the Gulf war, and the Israeli-PLO interim agreement, is in a position to play an ambitious diplomatic role. Indeed, in recent months, as a function primarily of its non-proliferation concerns, it has shown much greater interest in playing a peacemaking role in the region. The recent pronouncements of US diplomats John Mallott and Robin Raphel are part of Washington's effort to move back to what it sees as a more "balanced" and therefore more mediatory position between India and Pakistan after the pro-India "tilt" at the end of the Bush presidency. In addition, the US has attempted to place itself in a more neutralist role with respect to Kashmiris. Washington has

20. Haroon Habib, "Kashmir Issue Should be Solved Bilaterally," *The Hindu*, 28 February 1994.

21. Beijing has stated, however, that it is not seeking to mediate between India and Pakistan. See, Habib, "Kashmir Issue Should Be Resolved Bilaterally."

clarified that an India-Pakistan agreement on Kashmir should take into account Kashmiri opinion.²²

However, while Washington appears moving towards a more active role in South Asia, various factors will also constrain the US playing hegemon. For one thing, though it is premature to talk of US decline, Washington does have an enormous amount on its strategic plate: economic and political reform in the former Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe; economic and diplomatic relations with major competitors in Europe and Asia; proliferation problems in the former Soviet Union and North Korea; civil war in Bosnia; warlordism in Somalia; and the economic and military growth of China. All this, too, must be tackled by an Administration which has stressed that it is more interested in "domestic" than in foreign affairs and in economic over political matters. Moreover, this heavy agenda of international issues must be engaged at a time when the US no longer has a clear "grand strategy" and when it must, therefore, spend time inventing a basic strategic posture even as it tries to deal with day-to-day problems in various theaters.²³ In addition to these general constraints, there are various constraints particular to South Asia. Proliferation or not, the region remains a relatively minor US concern. It is difficult to see the US committing military might, diplomatic attention, and economic resources to cajole and coerce India and Pakistan in the way that it has done over 20 years or so in the Middle East -- and yet nothing less than that kind of hegemonic engagement will suffice for a

22. Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 4 February 1994, makes the point that Kashmiri input into a solution of the state's problems is desirable. See, USIS handout entitled "Raphel Offers South Asian Overview for Senate Panel."

23. Anthony Lake has tried in recent months to articulate a grand strategy for the post Cold War period but much remains to be done to give this any kind of operational significance. See, his speech before the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, reproduced as "Effective Engagement in a Changing World," *USIS Wireless File*, 20 December 1993. For the notion of grand strategy, see, Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's press, 1983) and *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A. D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

Subcontinental peace.²⁴ Then, India and Pakistan are not just ordinary regional adversaries. In population, India is the second largest country on earth. It has the fourth largest military and in aggregate is one of the top ten economies in the world. Pakistan, if it was located in any other region, away from such giants as India and China, would be a regional power on the order of Indonesia, Nigeria, or Brazil.²⁵ Neither country, therefore, is susceptible to the kinds of pressure that the US has been able to apply in other regions -- the Middle East, southern Africa, and Korea. Finally, as US power balances Chinese, in Asia, Chinese power will check US power. Beijing is uneasy with the idea of US hegemonism on China's peripheries and can be expected therefore to play a limiting role.

What the US is doing and will continue to attempt to do is to use primarily its discursive power to help forge agreements on nuclear weapons and on Kashmir. Washington is trying to shape the way South Asians think about both issues. Official and non-official US contacts with both India and Pakistan are aimed not so much at prescribing a solution as setting a framework within which a solution will be formulated, one that is consistent with US interests.²⁶ A case in point is the US' diffusion of the idea of confidence-building measures (CBMs). Washington has provided official and academic literature on the CBM experience in Europe and other regions. US officials have travelled in the region to delineate the European experience with CBMs and the conditions under which they are plausible and useful. US think-tanks and think-tankers have popularised the concept through their publications and visits. A similar effort may be underway with respect to the notion of "Open Skies," a more ambitious confidence-building measure. In sum, hegemony as the discursive power to shape the way South Asians think about their options is likely to be the major thrust of US diplomacy.

24. Stephen P. Cohen has called for an ambitious engagement with the Subcontinent in his articles on a "South Asian Regional Initiative" or SARI.

25. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984), p. 11 has made this point.

26. This does not mean that the solutions will necessarily be incompatible with the interests of South Asians.

Powerful insiders. A hegemonic peace in South Asia may, alternatively, be based on Indian military, economic, and discursive power. That India has not been able to accomplish such a peace with Pakistan is obvious enough: the two countries have gone to war on three occasions (1948, 1965, and 1971). In January 1987, there was the most serious war-scare in the Subcontinent since 1971. Three years later, there was reputedly another major crisis.

With respect to the smaller states of South Asia, though, India does indeed enjoy a militarily and economically hegemonic position. Over the years various disputes have marked their relations, but India and the smaller states have not gone to war and, apart from the 1986 India-Sri Lanka war scare, there has been no prospect of war. This is not particularly surprising. Indian military and economic power is so vastly superior to the power of any combination of smaller states in South Asia that no one is in a position to confront New Delhi for long.²⁷

There is little prospect that India's hegemonic position with respect to the smaller states will change. Indeed, there is a good chance that it will increase, especially if India enjoys a spurt in economic growth. Were India, under the push of the recent reforms, to chart a course of economic growth of 5-7% per annum, in roughly ten years its per capita GNP would double to US\$800 and in twenty years, that is, by 2015, it would double again, to US\$1600. By 2025, it would double yet again, to US\$ 3200. With one billion people, this would make for a GNP of US\$3200 billion or US\$3.2 trillion. To get an idea of what that means, we should note that in 1986 Japan had a GNP of US\$2 trillion.²⁸ With a GNP of US\$ 3.2 trillion, India would probably be the fifth largest economy after the European

27. Nepal, in 1988-89, discovered that India could reshape its political choices rather effectively. New Delhi simply curtailed the number of transit points at the border and the supply of various commodities. The troubles with India ended monarchical rule and led to the resumption of democratic politics.

28. The Japanese figure is drawn from Nye, *Bound to Lead*, p. 163. US GNP in 1986 was US\$ 4.2 trillion and the European Community in 1987 had a GNP of US\$ 3.8 trillion. See, Nye, *Bound to Lead*, p. 144.

Community, the US, Japan, and China. At that moment, even India-Pakistan relations, the most fractious in the Subcontinent, should begin to change.²⁹

In addition to military and economic power, India has been partially successful in articulating a vision of its role and the role of the smaller states which has won acceptance, if grudgingly, from the rest of the region. Nehruvian non-alignment was bigger than a purely regional doctrine, although it had implications for regions, but in any case Pakistan did not subscribe to it. Apart from non-alignment, India has urged the adoption of the Panchsheel principles but these were a rather formal and unexceptionable set of norms which after the war between the chief proponents of the idea -- India and China -- were quietly packed away.

Where India has been more successful is in its insistence on bilateralism.³⁰ Bilateralism has prevented a gang up of the smaller states against India and has limited the intervention of outsiders in regional affairs. New Delhi has a series of agreements and treaties with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These are of two types: functional agreements and treaties relating to specific issues (e.g., trade, transit, migrants, territory and borders); and general purpose agreements and treaties that seek to regulate the nature of the overall relationship (e.g., the India-Bangladesh Treaty of 1972, the India-Bhutan security treaty of 1949, the India-Pakistan Tashkent and Simla agreements of 1966 and 1972 respectively, and the India-Sri Lanka accord of 1987).

A review of the agreements and treaties between India and its smaller neighbours shows that India in effect has a *droit de regard* over the policies of the smallest states -- and not just their foreign and security policies because domestic policies have implications for external issues. Bhutan and

29. This is a point made in Abid Hussain, Kanti Bajpai, and Varun Sahni, *Of Money and Matters Military: Thinking About An Affordable Defence for India in the 1990s and Beyond*, a paper of the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi, forthcoming, 1994.

30. I draw here on my essay, "Regions, Regional Politics and Regional Security in South Asia," a chapter in a forthcoming volume on South Asian security to be edited by Marvin Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar of the University of Illinois.

Nepal (and Sikkim before it was incorporated into the Union) are in different degrees constrained by Indian concerns about Himalayan security. In return, India is responsible in large measure for the security of the smaller states. It is directly so for Bhutan and Nepal for whom New Delhi has also taken on broader responsibilities, particularly developmental. It is Bhutan's major aid donor and allows Nepalis to own property and work in India without hindrance (with no obligation on Nepal to reciprocate). After the Indian operation to save the government of Abdul Gayoom, there is an implicit recognition that India is expected to guarantee the Maldives' security as well. Should Bangladesh so desire, it can invoke the 25 year Friendship Treaty to enter into consultations with India on how to meet its security threats. Similarly, after the 1987 accord, India has a tacit responsibility to respond to threats to Sri Lankan security if called upon to do so.³¹ India has not entered into security-related responsibilities with Pakistan (although the two sides raised the idea of a no-war/common defense pact or friendship and cooperation treaty in 1949-50, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1968, 1969, 1974, 1977, and 1980-82)³²; but even here what is worth noting is that after the Simla agreement of 1972 Pakistan was forced to accept bilateralism and the normalisation of relations with India.

In sum, India is a full-fledged hegemon for Bhutan and Nepal and a quasi-hegemon for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Indian power will overshadow the region, although Pakistan will continue to challenge India. New Delhi's insistence on bilateralism with Pakistan, though, is under pressure. Islamabad increasingly disregards it in respect of their most serious quarrel, namely, Kashmir. The US, while supportive in principle of the Simla agreement, views the accord with skepticism and, in any case, feels that Kashmir cannot be solved in a purely bilateral fashion if that means ignoring Kashmiri wishes and preferences.

31. One should recall here that India came to Sri Lanka's aid during the JVP rebellion in 1971.

32. See Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, "Cooperative Security and South Asian Insecurity," in Janne Nolan, (ed.), *Shared Destiny: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming).

The limits of hegemony. Let me end here by reconsidering the more general point. A peace that rests on hegemonic force and economic power is not an efficient, lasting, and warm peace. As soon as a hegemon turns its back or appears to be losing military and economic power, hegemonically-brokered agreements may unravel. Moreover, what a hegemon at one strategic moment giveth, it may at another moment take away if it suits it to do so. On the other hand, a hegemony which modifies how to diagnose conflict and how to conceptualise solutions will be more durable because it will fashion a psychological and intellectual shift.

Deterrent Peace: If You Want Peace, Prepare for War

A deterrent peace is a minimalist peace. It is the absence of war as a function of mutual threats. While India's relations with its smaller neighbours are hegemonic, the relationship with Pakistan is closer to mutual deterrence. Since 1971, the two sides have maintained an uneasy deterrent peace.³³ With the near-nuclearisation of the Subcontinent, South Asia is moving closer to a deterrent system based on conventional and nuclear threats. Deterrent systems are ultimately unstable, however, and India and Pakistan need to incorporate confidence-building measures (CBMs) and arms control into their military relationship in order to supplement and thereby stabilise deterrence.

Glenn Snyder has clarified that deterrence is achievable in two ways -- by *denial* and by *punishment*: one can deter by convincing a potential attacker that one has the will and means to deny it a tangible military objective (usually territory); and one can deter by convincing a potential attacker that one has the will and the means to inflict unacceptable levels of punishment.³⁴

33. That it is a peace based altogether on deterrence is a hard proposition to prove. The fact that two parties have not fought is not necessarily a function of deterrence. The absence of war may mean that neither was spoiling for a fight, that there were not *cassus belli*. Nevertheless, certainly since the early 1980s, when India began to accuse Pakistan of involvement in the Punjab, and later, with the Kashmir troubles, there have been two potential *cassus belli*. Yet in spite of periodic crises, India and Pakistan have not gone to war. *Prima facie*, one could argue, that what has prevented war has been deterrence.

34. Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

In the India-Pakistan case, deterrence has operated at the conventional level and appears to be moving towards the nuclear level as well. At the conventional level, both sides have opted for a combination of denial and punishment. They have erected various forms of static defence along the border aimed particularly at stopping armoured and mobile columns from rapidly breaking through and gaining territory or moving towards key nerve centers. They have also, since 1972, attempted to refine "offensive defence" postures which are postures of punishment. An offensive defence may consist of a *diversionary attack* or *pre-emption*. In 1965, India showed that diversionary attack was a viable defence when, to relieve pressure along the Line of Control in Kashmir, it crossed the international border and sent its forces into East Punjab and Sind. The possibility that either side could use a major diversionary attack as an effective defence remains a threat and therefore, potentially a deterrent.³⁵ Moreover, both India and Pakistan have stressed that in the next round -- if there is one -- they will not rest content to wait for an attack but will launch an attack if they detect preparations for a strike. The possibility that an opponent is prepared to pre-empt may also serve to deter.

While the threat of diversionary attack or pre-emption may enhance deterrence, it should be noticed that this form of deterrence is unstable and may invite the very hostilities it seeks to prevent. First, if either side cannot clearly distinguish between rehearsals for a diversionary attack (which are motivated by deterrence and defence) and rehearsals for an offensive-minded first-strike, it may be tempted to pre-empt, thus bringing on war. Second, if either side cannot distinguish between a posture of pre-emption in a defensive and deterrent sense and one that, once again, is a first-strike posture, then it may choose to "pre-empt pre-emption," leading to war.

35. For the uses of a diversionary attack in conventional deterrence, see, Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," in Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, (eds.), *Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview, 1984). Also on conventional deterrence, see, John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

At the nuclear level, various nuclear choices are being articulated, each consistent with some form of deterrence. In India, one can identify the following: *tous azimuts*, *minimum*, *recessed*, *short-order weaponisation*, *nuclear incrementalism*, and *ambiguity*.

At one end of the spectrum of choices is *outright and full nuclearisation*, what in French is called a "tous azimuts" or "all horizon" strategy. This would involve an ambitious programme geared eventually to meeting every and all threats -- nuclear but also conventional -- from rivals near and far. What such an ambitious programme risks is expanding the horizon of threats. A *tous azimuts* Indian programme would instil fear in Southeast Asia, the Gulf, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean rim, and, depending on missile capabilities, as far away as Europe including Russia, North America, and East Asia. These states and regions might move towards counter-capabilities, thus vastly complicating India's threat structure. Nobody responsible in India has advocated such a posture: it is evidently beyond India's technological and economic capabilities in the foreseeable future; and would seem to run against the grain of nuclear politics globally which are in recession with the US and Russia making serious cuts in strategic weaponry.

Minimum deterrence is a transparent posture. It does not attempt to hide the possession of nuclear weapons, indeed, quite the reverse -- it advertises their availability, even their numbers. Moreover, it rests on assembled and reliable weapons -- reliable in the sense that they have been tested. K. Subrahmanyam, who has advocated a minimal deterrence posture, calculates that for India 60 warheads on airplanes and the *Prithvi* and *Agni* missiles are enough if they are dispersed and mobile so that they cannot be eliminated in a first strike.³⁶ The most important problem here is how to handle the transition period between the ambiguous present and a minimum deterrence future.

36. See, K. Subrahmanyam, "Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for Indian," in Bharat Karnad, (ed.), *Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond* (New Delhi: Viking, 1994), pp. 176-195.

A third set of nuclear choices are *short-order weaponisation*, *recessed deterrence*, and *nuclear incrementalism*.³⁷ A general term for these may be "non-weaponised deterrence". While there are differences between these three postures, a non-weaponised posture is one in which the components of a deliverable weapon have been or are closed to being assembled, and there is a high degree of confidence that when a device is fully assembled it will, if delivered on a target, detonate. These postures may or may not require weapons tests. Computer simulated testing may suffice.³⁸

Non-weaponised postures are different from a posture of ambiguity. They are different in the degree of proximity to a usable weapon and the extent of transparency in respect of the posture. The closer to a usable weapon and the more transparent, the closer one is to non-weaponised deterrence.

The fundamental question though is this: what are the costs and benefits of non-weaponisation? Why not go outright nuclear, if only up to a minimal deterrent posture? What is gained by non-assembly? What is lost? This remains to be clarified beyond the assertion that it is a more economic posture and one that invites less opprobrium and anger on the part of powerful outsiders such as the US. It may not turn out to be financially cheaper than minimal deterrence -- indeed one could argue that it may be dearer: and it may not invite less opposition from outsiders who will see it as virtual weaponisation - indeed, once again, it may invite greater opposi-

37. See, George Perkovitch's article "A Nuclear Third Way?" *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1993 on short-order weaponisation (my term not his). Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, is the author of the notion of "recessed deterrence". Manoj Joshi of the *Times of India* has referred to India's missile and nuclear tests as "technology demonstrators." Joshi seems to suggest that an incrementalist programme consisting of progressively-ordered demonstrations of technological competence may be enough to deter.

38. The key questions regarding short-order weaponisation for deterrence are: how quickly should one be able to go from an unassembled to an assembled, deliverable weapon; how many of these should a country possess; what targets will they threaten--countervalue (cities) or counterforce (conventional or nuclear weapons); where should the different components be stored--in dispersed locations or not; who will assemble them in high alert situations; who will choose from a possible menu of targets; and finally, should one clarify these details to one's opponents so as to leave no doubt in their minds as to one's capacity and will to punish or should one hint and manipulate the uncertainties?

tion on the argument that it is a less stable posture than outright weaponisation which is the basis for arms control and confidence-building. One gain, it may be argued, is that it avoids investment in most of the infrastructure that the other nuclear powers undertook to build. But this depends on which non-weaponised posture is chosen -- with or without testing, elaborate command and control and infrastructure, and rigorous doctrine.

However, the key difficulty of answering the cost/benefit question can be seen if we ask: is the slowness to anger of this posture a cost or a benefit? Is this a forgiving posture which slows escalation and, therefore, allows plenty of time for an opponent (who sees moves towards assembly) to recant, retrench, and repent; or is too forgiving and does it invite aggression and risk-taking from an opponent?

Ambiguity is a position wherein research and production moves towards a weapons option but leaves fuzzy how far it has gone. Thus, this position would be compatible with denial of a nuclear weapons programme along with carefully leaked information on progress towards weaponisation. It achieves deterrence, it is argued, by playing on uncertainty. The target of an ambiguous posture can never be certain that the opponent does not possess nuclear weapons and may thus be frightened into avoiding war. The trouble with ambiguity as a strategic posture is that it is difficult to sustain beyond a point: as more and more information is leaked regarding progress towards a usable weapon, ambiguity will verge over into a non-weaponised or minimal deterrent posture; and if not enough is leaked, an opponent may doubt that a usable device exists and, therefore, may be tempted to challenge the would-be deterrent. Moreover, ambiguity makes confidence-building and arms control difficult. If states are unwilling to admit or deny certain capabilities, how can they enter into confidence-building and arms control agreements which are premised on verifiability and transparency?³⁹

39. One could argue that there is another nuclear choice consistent with deterrence based on ambiguity. If India and Pakistan signed the NPT or a regional accord which had the character of the NPT, one could argue that a certain degree of ambiguity might yet remain. It has not been lost on either state that Iraq, a signatory to the NPT, was able to erect a massive, clandestine nuclear weapons programme and that, even now, after its defeat and massive international intervention, no one is altogether sure that the full extent of the Iraqi programme has been uncovered.

As this "debate" indicates, in India there is in motion a shift in thinking (though not as far as we know in policy) -- from postures that stress ambiguity to more overt postures. From among the more overt postures, some form of short-order weaponisation seems most likely wherein India and Pakistan declare and keep but do not augment their stocks of fissile material, join a comprehensive test ban, and abstain from deploying a fully assembled weapon.

The limits of deterrence. This more transparent nuclear environment in South Asia should be the basis for a dialogue on CBMs and arms control as a means of stabilising mutual nuclear postures. But why bother with CBMs and arms control and how are they linked to deterrence? As argued earlier, threat systems tend to degrade as the credibility of threats decline. The credibility of threats may be a function of a myriad of factors but three are fundamental: capabilities, provocability, and commitment. A deterrer must be seen to possess a reliable means of carrying out the threat of punishment; it must communicate clearly the conditions under which punishment will be visited on an adversary, that is, it must clarify its provocability; and it must demonstrate a willingness to punish infringements of those conditions, that is, it must leave no doubt about its commitment.⁴⁰ CBMs and arms control are a means of stabilising deterrence: they can clarify that capabilities are tied to deterrence postures and not to first-strike postures and they can outlaw practices, deployments, and systems which may be seen as aggressive rather than defensive: they can help define each side's provocability and commitment; and, if deterrence appears to be decaying, they can provide structures for crisis management.

South Asia has begun a CBM process. India and Pakistan have agreed to various measures.⁴¹ On the other hand, they have not yet begun a serious

40. Alexander George and Richard Smoke summarise these in their massive study of deterrence: *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 58-66.

41. See the various writings of Moonis Ahmar, Karachi University, on India-Pakistan CBMs, especially the following: "Indo-Pak Relations: Confidence-Building Measures and the Normalisation Process," *Globe*, February 1993, pp. 47-59.

arms control process which defines mutually agreed and acceptable force structures. This is necessary both at the conventional and nuclear level and, in respect of the nuclear, will require both to move away from ambiguity to overtness. To say that it is necessary is not to say though that it will be easy or that it is likely. At least two problems face India and Pakistan beyond the unwillingness to move away from nuclear ambiguity. First, some conventional arms control measures -- such as force levels and deployments -- will have to factor in internal security requirements. Second, India's concerns regarding Chinese conventional and nuclear capability will have to be accommodated.⁴² Prior to these, of course, must be the recognition in both countries that arms control measures are desirable as adjuncts of deterrence and are not surrenders to the West or to each other. In a situation where domestic opinion has been aroused against the other and where leaderships fear charges of appeasement from internal rivals, such a recognition will not be easy.

Even if India and Pakistan, in spite of these problems, were to reach a state of stable mutual deterrence at the strategic levels based on conventional and nuclear weapons, there remains the problem of deterrence at the sub-strategic level. India and Pakistan have accused each other of interference in various subnational conflicts including Punjab, Kashmir, and Sind. Yet they have not constructed a deterrence posture which can cope with this level of aggression. In particular, India has not been able to deter Pakistan from providing arms, money, training, and refuge to Sikh and Kashmiri militants. Neither conventional nor nuclear retaliation is credible at this level: there is no proportionality between the extent of aggression against India and the extent of pain that would be visited on Pakistan by conventional or nuclear war.

In the absence of a deterrence posture effective at this level in addition to the strategic level, there exist instabilities. If both sides calculate that

⁴² There is increasing recognition of this in the US. Most recently, at a conference of non-official Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis and Americans in Shanghai, a Chinese contribution acknowledged the problems posed by China's nuclear weapons. See 'India Should Keep N-option Open'. *The statesman*, 4 March 1994.

they have achieved strategic stability, there is the danger of brinkmanship at the sub-strategic level. This is ironic: the existence of stability at the higher levels, aided by CBMs and arms control, may actually encourage both states to sail perilously close to the wind. Thus, Pakistan, bolstered by the calculation that India is deterred from attacking to relieve the pressure in Kashmir, may choose to increase its support to the militancy and even to send some regular forces into Kashmir, as in 1948 and 1965. India, encouraged by the calculation that Pakistan is deterred from punishing hot pursuit forays into its territory, may choose to test the line of control or the border.

If brinkmanship and the dangers arising out of it are to be avoided, it would seem that for India only two *deterrent* possibilities exist at the sub-strategic level:⁴³ the threat of retaliation in kind, that is, support of subnational militancy in Pakistan (e.g., Sind, Baluchistan); and the force of international opprobrium backed in the end by the threat of diplomatic isolation and various types of sanctions. Pakistan has accused India from time to time of involvement in Sind. And India has certainly attempted to mobilise international opinion against Pakistan. The Sind option for India, of course, is virtually Kashmir reversed, as it were, with all the attendant dangers. Deterrence by mobilising international public opinion is evidently less dangerous, but not without dangers necessarily. For instance, in retrospect, one can see that the crises of 1987 and 1990 could have been the outcome of rather elaborate games of brinkmanship (though this is not to say that they were not also, substantially, military exercises) which were intended to draw the attention of the international community to the follies of the other side and thereby to mobilise international opinion as part of a larger deterrence game.⁴⁴

43. I stress the word "deterrent" because India has other possibilities in respect of a solution to the Kashmir problem-- an internal solution, military or peaceful: and persuading Pakistan that, even in the absence of Indian retaliation, the political, economic, social, even moral costs of its involvement are out of proportion to any possible gains.

44. There is no definitive account of the 1986 and 1990 crises as yet. Ravi Rikhye, *The War That Never Was* (Delhi: Chanakya, 1988) is provocative but seems exaggerated. Neither Hersh nor Morrow and Sigel, *Critical Mass*, the latest attempt to explicate the 1990 crisis, have won much notoriety but little acclaim.

Pathways to Peace II: Functionalist Cooperation

David Mitrany and Ernst Haas are the most prominent proponents of what I shall call the functionalist path to peace which is based on the notion of exchange and is consistent with the Grotian image of international life.

Mitrany argues that "a working peace system" which does not abolish but transcends and makes irrelevant nation-states is the route to peace. States, Mitrany suggests, will increasingly be forced to deal with various "functional" tasks in collaboration with each other. Government experts or government-designated experts will interact with their counterparts in other countries and will produce rational solutions to shared problems. Agencies will be created to implement and manage the agreements and as agencies in related functional areas group together they will likely require budgets and an overall coordinating authority. This functional structure, increasingly institutionalised, would overlay nation-states in the sense that it would deliver services and benefits beyond the capacities of individual states to provide. In such a situation, Mitrany suggests, states would continue to exist, but they would not risk war or else incur the wrath of citizens.⁴⁵

Ernst Haas' "neofunctionalism" suggests that not spontaneously chosen functional areas but carefully chosen economic and "welfare" areas with political import which "spillover" into more ambitious and central decision-making arenas are the key to peace.⁴⁶ Neofunctionalists argue that the kind of almost spontaneous functional processes envisaged by Mitranean functionalists would be too *ad hoc*, would risk being carried out in innocuous areas, and would, therefore, fail to create political pressure for political integration. Haas' neofunctionalism also suggests that not technical experts but political elites will lead the way to peace. As elites find

45. David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

46. Haas' key neofunctionalist works include *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), especially, chapters 1-4, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", *International Political Community* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 93-129 and, with Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," also in *International Political Community*, pp. 259-299.

they cannot deliver a standard of living their constituencies desire, they will see the advantage of cooperative linkages with elites across the border, even former enemies. Haas recognises that the process will not be linear, that there will be plateaus, "spillbacks" and "encapsulations" in cooperation. But he suggests that periodic crises might reinvigorate cooperation by signalling the need for fresh thinking and activity, thus leading to progressively higher levels of mutual involvement and peace: elites would come to understand that earlier levels of involvement and cooperation had yielded benefits and modified relations sufficiently, so that any recursion or stagnation in the process would be too costly.

Does either the Mitranian or Haasian brand of functionalism describe a pathway to peace in South Asia? Are South Asians engaged in normal exchange -- functional and economic -- with each other? India certainly has a number of functionalist and economic arrangements with Bhutan and Nepal, and there is little prospect of war with either state. But it stretches the imagination to suppose that this is *because* of these arrangements. Indeed, both countries, but particularly Nepal, are uncomfortable with the extent of functional and economic relations with India. They fear exactly what New Delhi counts as an advantage, namely, the penetration of their societies by official and non-official Indians and the influences on their policies as a result of that penetration.⁴⁷ They also fear that the benefits of functional and economic cooperation notwithstanding, these benefits are unequally distributed to India's gain. The "normal" state of functional and economic exchange between India and the two small Himalayan states is, therefore, a source of unease. What keeps the peace then is not so much economic and functional exchange as India's overwhelming size and power.

With Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, matters are somewhat different. They also fear functional and economic linkages with their large neighbour but have managed to keep the density of exchange with it much lower -- indeed, many would argue, artificially low. Thus, Bangladesh and India could

47. I have borrowed the term "penetration" from Andrew Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration* (New York: Random House, 1965).

cooperate far more extensively on economic, ecological, and riverine issues in particular. Sri Lanka and India too could do more on economic issues. Both states could use Indian technical expertise and assistance far more than they choose to do. That they have managed to keep a distance functionally and economically from New Delhi probably reflects their geographic and geopolitical position. Unlike Bhutan and Nepal they do not inhabit a strategic zone that is of comparable importance to India. Whereas in the north, India faces Chinese power, to the southeast and south, India faces no comparable threat. New Delhi, therefore, allows these two states much greater autonomy. Bangladesh, it should be noted, is in any case a country of over 100 million and not susceptible to the kind of pressure and penetration to which Bhutan, Nepal, or Sri Lanka are vulnerable.

The India-Pakistan relationship is well outside the realm of normal functional and economic exchange.⁴⁸ Rather than build functional and economic linkages, the two countries in the wake of Partition and the 1948 and 1965 wars over Kashmir have disentangled themselves from each other.⁴⁹ This despite the fact that the most ambitious functional agreements, the Indus Rivers Treaty (1960) and the Salal Dam agreement (1978), albeit with some grumbling, have been honoured by both sides and have worked to the advantage of both. The disentangling of India and Pakistan reflects Pakistani preferences more than Indian. Pakistan sees in exchange relations the danger of gradual assimilation to an Indian sphere of influence if not outright domination. Islamabad fears dependence arising out of functional and economic exchange because it feels that India's resources will render exchange unequal. It has therefore systematically dismantled or stalled economic and functional interaction in spite of numerous formal agreements, the latest of which were signed after the Simla Treaty (1972) and the last of which is contained in the Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), signed in April 1993.

48. On the other hand, India and Pakistan have a rather impressive record of cooperation in the period from 1947-1962. See, Bajpai and Cohen, "Cooperative security and South Asian Insecurity," in Nolan, (ed.), *Shared Destiny*.

49. A simple indicator of India-Pakistan disintegration is the abysmal state of trading relations. Mutual trade accounts for about 2% of their total trading volume.

Why have India and Pakistan not entered into other functional and economic agreements? There is of course the fear of unequal gains, what cooperation theory calls the "relative gains" problem.⁵⁰ But neofunctional theory points usefully to another factor. If cooperation arises when elites perceive an interest in exchange, could it be that these elites have been absent in the India-Pakistan case? Hamza Alavi has argued that in many post-colonial settings the elites are what he calls a "salariat" composed of the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the intelligentsia, professionals (lawyers, doctors), and a strata of businessmen who are primarily managers (in South Asia, the "boxwallah" class).⁵¹ This elite had no great economic stake in better relations between the two countries: it was a salary-drawing sector, and its economic linkages and preferences were with former colonial powers or the US.

Recent changes in India and Pakistan reflect the rise of a new elite. These changes are, at the same time, helping to consolidate this elite. A new middle class is pushing upwards, whether the salariat likes it or not. This is a middle class which is spearheaded by a more entrepreneurial strata. Moreover, it is a class that did not live through Partition and, while it may share the prejudices of older generations, it is a materialistic and acquisitive sector. It is also outward-looking: it is not bound by the mindset of import substitution and self-sufficiency; it feels it can compete abroad; and it, therefore, has an eye on export markets. It is a class, finally, that has helped the push towards economic reform and liberalisation in both countries, even though sectors of it oppose certain trends in the reform process.

This class, one can see, could have a stake in functional and economic exchange between India and Pakistan. Its financial and economic power could be wielded to influence government policies in respect of bilateral relations. There is already evidence that not just in India but in Pakistan as

50. See, for instance Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507.

51. Hamza Alavi. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies," in Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma, (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (London: Penguin, 1973).

well there is a nascent group which sees an interest in more normal economic relations between the two states. For instance, the Chambers of Commerce in both countries are beginning to argue more forcefully for trade. A SAARC Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, inaugurated in Dhaka in early February 1994, has been opened in Karachi.⁵² It strongly supports SAPTA. There is growing feeling that, while unequal exchange is a political and economic problem, SAPTA can incorporate protection for weaker economies even as it liberalises regional trade.

A related trend is likely to help. Haas' work indicates that an important condition of greater exchange leading to peaceful relations is a certain plurality of social, economic and political structure.⁵³ For five years now Pakistan has been a pluralist democracy. A democratic Pakistan reflects in part the rise of a new elite that felt suffocated by military government and by the old salariat which is in large part supported military government. This new elite finds more room for dissent and for influence. In sum, Pakistan is seeing the growth of a more vibrant and confident civil society which is increasingly capable of opposing, influencing, and questioning the state and its policies, including its foreign policies.⁵⁴ In India, which has been democratic longer and where civil society has been stronger, the new elite insists on what might be crudely be called "economics over politics," even in the realm of foreign policy. This sector does not want to be friends with Pakistan nor is it necessarily willing to make deals on issues such as Kashmir, but it is interested in increasing economic interactions and it wants to avoid tensions and hostilities.⁵⁵

52. On the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SAARC CCI), see, the "Approved Draft Copy of the Constitution of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (Karachi, 28 March 1989) Including Amendments adopted on 6 June 1991 (Karachi), Suggestions Made at New Delhi 1 Octobe. 1991, and the Recommendations of SAARC Secretary General, Dated 16 December 1991 and 20 July 1992. Unanimously Adopted at Kathmandu on 12 March 1992."

53. Haas, "International Integration," pp. 104-106.

54. On the transition to democracy in Pakistan, see, among others David Taylor, "Parties, Elections, and Democracy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 30 (March 1992), 96-115 and Kanti Bajpai and Sumit Ganguly, "The Transition to Democracy in Pakistan," *In Depth: A Journal of Values and Public Policy*, Fall 1993.

55. It should be added that not everyone in this sector is interested necessarily in more economic ties with the other country. What is in their general interest is a more stable economic environment and greater fiscal responsibility. War, the threat of war, heavy defence spending, these threaten stability and fiscal responsibility.

In sum, South Asia shows signs, even in its most contentious relationship, of moving down the path of a cooperative peace.

Pathways to Peace III: Community

The third, and according to Boulding the most enduring, pathway to peace is the route of community based on the evolution of common, integrating values as in the Kantian vision of international life. Here I want to turn to Karl Deutsch et al's work. Deutsch et al's *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* describes how erstwhile enemies and rivals who from time-to-time may have fought each other come to be confident that the other will not resort to force to settle disputes. This is not necessarily a relationship of harmony where conflict is absent but rather one where conflict is routinely resolved short of war. Deutsch et al argue that, broadly speaking, there are two types of peaceful relations that meet this test: an "amalgamated security community" and a "pluralistic security community." An amalgamated security community is one that has a single center of political authority and is, therefore, the merger of previously autonomous units. A pluralistic security community is one with two or more autonomous centers of political authority in which there exists a long-term expectation that conflict will be resolved peacefully. The latter, namely, a pluralistic security community is of interest here.⁵⁶

Deutsch *et al's* cases suggest that the "background conditions" which are essential to the establishment or success of a pluralistic security community are:

* "the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making";

* "the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence" which in turn depends on "a great many established political habits, and of functioning political institutions, favoring mutual communication and consultation" within each state or unit:

⁵⁶ Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community*, pp. 5-9.

* the mutual predictability of behaviour.⁵⁷

The authors argue that value compatibility was "most effective when they were not held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behavior which permitted these values to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people's attachment to them. This connection between *values, institutions, and habits* we call a 'way of life'."⁵⁸ (My emphasis.) With respect to Deutsch *et al's* second condition, we can read this to say that political responsiveness between states is greater when their internal political structure and institutions favour "mutual communication and consultation," that is, loosely, when they are more pluralist or democratic. Finally, if there is a convergence in ways of political life, and if political life is moving towards a pluralist and democratic conception which is more accepting of signals and communications from insiders and outsiders, there is likely to be greater predictability of behaviour. From Deutsch *et al's* reasoning we may further argue that greater predictability is an important factor for peace because unpredictability encourages fear, fear encourages the demonising of others, and demonising others is the condition for violence against them.⁵⁹ It may be objected that predictability in itself is not a condition of reassurance much less peace. A predictably implacable foe is a disquieting entity. I think we must read the Deutschian scheme as suggesting by predictability not so much a precise judgement about future behaviour and disposition but a reliable comprehension of what moves and motivates the other side and how the other side interprets incoming signals and communications. As noted earlier, the greater the degree of openness in the other polity, the more likely is such a comprehension.

57. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community*, pp. 66-67. I use Deutsch *et al's* work for the most part heuristically, that is, as a way of interrogating the South Asian case. Their work has been criticised on various grounds: the conditions for an amalgamated security community in particular have been challenged. Nevertheless, their findings are based on extensive case histories, the bulk of which were never published but which were drawn on to generate their general findings. It is, therefore, an instructive work and one with a certain degree of reliability.

58. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community*, p. 47.

59. Clearly, this chain of reasoning is too linear. For instance, one could say that violence between groups and states is the condition for mutual demonisation as much as the other way round.

Does the Deutschian scheme hold out any hope for a South Asian peace? Can South Asia be said to be converging on a political way of life? Is it moving towards more pluralist and democratic political systems? Is there, commensurately, greater predictability of behaviour between states and, therefore, a greater sense of reassurance with respect to each other?

Since 1988, South Asians have moved towards convergence in their political way of life, in two important respects -- democracy, and the relationship of religion and politics. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan have turned to democratic government and have consolidated democracy, albeit differentially and not without hiccups and instabilities.⁶⁰ Sri Lanka, in spite of its devastating civil war, has maintained an open political system, and India, internal violence notwithstanding, has remained democratic. Thus, for the first time since 1947, all the major South Asian states are democratic. Moreover, those who have come to power in recent elections are parties of a secular character -- Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's IJI in Pakistan, Khaleda Zia's BNP in Bangladesh, and the Nepali Congress.⁶¹ In the most recent Pakistani general elections, the religious parties were almost obliterated. In the Indian state elections of December 1993, Hindu forces were checked: the BJP, the political face of *Hindutva*, lost three of the states it had governed -- Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. So, one could say, to use Deutsch's terms, that a key habit on which South Asians are converging is democracy and a key value on which they are converging is secularism. Finally, institutionally, all operate mutually comprehensible political systems: they are all familiar with and have opted for British-style parliamentary politics.

60. On the transition to democracy in Nepal and Bangladesh, see Farzana Hossein, "Transition to Democracy in Nepal: The Process and Prospects," *BIISS Journal* 12 (July 1991), pp. 313-335. Iftekharuzzaman and Mahbubur Rahman, "Transition to Democracy in Bangladesh: Issues and Outlook," *BIISS Journal* 12 (January 1991), pp. 95-126, and Nadeem Qadir, *Bangladesh: Realities of Democracy and Crises* (Dhaka: Naveed's work and Academic Publishers, 1994).

61. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only secularist parties in the countries mentioned. Nor do I wish to suggest that their secular records are impeccable, but one can agree that they are not avowedly fundamentalist or religious parties.

Not only are they converging on a similar way of political life, that life, as suggested above, is democratic. At the most profound level, democracy is a political ethic of tolerance and respect for others from which follows the habit of, indeed commitment to communication and consultation. A democratic political culture is premised on and, in turn, encourages greater internal communication and consultation. States which make a habit of greater communication and consultation internally are also more likely to communicate and consult externally simply because political culture, while not a prison-house, is not readily dispensable either. It should be added that between democracies greater external communication and consultation will occur not only at a state-to-state level but also transnationally. Thus, it is worth noting that non-official contact between South Asians has scarcely been more frequent and widespread.⁶²

If South Asians have moved closer in their political way of life and if the increasingly democratic way of South Asian political life is the condition for more communication and consultation, then one can say that over time there should be greater mutual predictability and reassurance. Specifically, one should expect that India and its neighbours -- because all conflicts in the region are bilateral between India and the rest -- will draw closer to a pluralistic security community wherein they remain sovereign states but regulate their conflicts short of force or the threat of force.

The key bilateral relationship is of course India-Pakistan. Now, it could be argued that India-Pakistan relations have scarcely been worse -- in spite of a certain degree of political convergence as a result of Pakistan's transition to democracy and growing non-official contact. Indeed, some outside the region and even some within fear that "the long peace" since 1972 may be broken over Kashmir, at least in part because populist parties, given free rein in increasingly turbulent democratic systems, will use the conflict to maneuver for domestic political advantage and thus force those in government to harden their stands. While such a view is plausible enough,

62. A charting of the numbers of non-official contact between the two countries before and after the democratisation of Pakistan would be a very useful exercise.

and while the history of India-Pakistan relations shows that democratic governments can be fractious and jingoistic, over the long-haul in an open polity governments will be more accountable and those who oppose war and support a warm peace will have greater political space in which to say why they oppose war, why they support a warm peace, and why their cause is right. There is nothing inevitable about this (especially when we reflect on the fact that democracy is compatible with internal war such as in Sind, Kashmir, Sri Lanka), and we should not lose sight of the possibility of a populist engendered war, but accountability and organised debate and dissent in the long-run should cause the proponents of peace to prevail over the proponents of war.⁶³

CONCLUSION

South Asians, as all other groups of conflictual and cooperative states, have a choice of three pathways to peace: a hegemonic or deterrent peace; a functional peace; and an integrative peace. The region displays movement along each path. However, hegemony and deterrence are inherently limited in their ability to bring peace beyond a point. Functionalist and economic cooperation leading to peace encounters the problem of "relative gains," but this can be overcome by cooperative agreements which protect weaker actors. Moreover, with the growth of a more vibrant civil society led by a new, more entrepreneurial middle class, the prospects of this path have improved. The most stable, long-term path to peace is the integrative path of community-building wherein force as a means of resolving conflict is more or less permanently absent. Convergence in South Asia's political way of life towards democracy, secularism and parliamentary institutions, while by no means irreversible, presages a unique moment in regional politics, one that should lead down the integrative path.

63. In the meantime, stable deterrence and growing economic exchange should prevent hostilities.