SOUTH ASIAN TRADE COOPERATION WITHIN SAARC AND WITH ASEAN: RATIONALE, PROSPECTS, REALITIES

I. Introduction

South Asia is passing through interesting times. For about a decade or so¹ an effort is on for institutionalised regional cooperation—something hardly ever before conceived of as a real possibility. The emergence of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as member-States has drawn a great deal of attention and no less of expectations. In a region otherwise bedevilled by endemic mutual mistrust, occasional hostilities and chronic tensions cooperative programmes of SAARC are expanding with an apparently well-intentioned, if not euphoric, image of regionalism for economic development and collective self-reliance.

On the other hand, whilst the process of institutionalising regional cooperation within the nascent association goes on, the prospect of SAARC as an effective organisation for regional cooperation continues to be viewed with scepticism. Indeed, when SAARC was formally launched in the wake of the first ever summit meeting of South Asian Heads of State or Government held in Dhaka in December 1985, it

^{1.} Late President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh undertook the first exploratory trips in favour of SAARC during 1977-1980.

appeared more to be an event of symbolic value than an opening for concrete cooperation, and for the growth of effective regionalism among the states of the region. This is due partly to the historical reality of mistrust and suspicion and partly to the fact that the new association has imposed on itself what has been called a 'self-denying ordinance,'2 whereby, again largely because of mistrust and suspicion, 'core' areas of the economy like trade, industry, investment, etc., have been kept out of the agenda of cooperation.

Views on SAARC are sceptic also because of the lessons from cooperation and integration efforts in many other regions of the developing world which are principally discouraging. Such efforts have been evidenced to be 'foundering on the reefs of distrust, non-cooperation and parochial nationalism.' The performance of some regional organisations often appeared so moribund that even the theoretical foundations of regional cooperation were shaken.³ Add to this the fact that the benefits of integration for the most part acrue in the long run. The governments and peoples of developing countries are not always in a position to wait for long term benefits and this tends to weaken the will to sustain integration efforts.⁴

Rehman Sobhan, "The Logic of Placing Economic Cooperation on the SAARC Agenda", A Seminar Paper presented at BIISS on 26 October 1987.

^{3.} See for example, Charles A. Daffy and Warner G. Feld, "Whither Regional Intergation Theory?", in Warner G. Feld and Gavin Boyd, Comparative Regional Systems, (Pergamon 1980) pp. 497-521. Also on the subject, Earnst B. Hass, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, (Beverly 1975), Constantive V. Watson, "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries", World Development, June 1978.

^{4.} For academic views that accompanied the emergence of SAARC see, Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 4, April 1985, M. Abdul Hafiz and Iftekharuzzaman (eds.) South Asian Regional Coorperation: A Socioeconomic Approach to Peace and Stability, (BIISS/Hakkani, Dhaka 1985); S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Coorperation in South Asia, (National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984); Atiur Rahman, Political

The rationale, viability, problems and prospects of regional cooperation in South Asia have thus been the focus of an upsurge of academic exercise.5 There seems to be little scope of consensus out of the debate and deliberation on the subject. The debate in all likelihood will continue, which is in effect contributing to a healthy growth of SAARC process. In the meantime, the present paper purports to set out some of the major issues in increasing intra-regional trade within SAARC and promoting inter-regional trade between SAARC countries and faster growing neighbouring countries of the ASEAN-a more experienced Third World regional grouping. The study consists of four main parts. In section II the major arguments in favour of increasing South-South trade (which includes both intra-and interregional trade) are briefly revisited. Section III provides an overview of the comaparative economic structure of the economies of SAARC and the ASEAN and the existing state of intra-regional trade of the two regions and the level of trade between the two regions. The final section presents the contrast between image and reality in the prospect of trade cooperation in South Asia.

II. The Rationale for Trade Cooperation

One of the significant features of global trade and economic development in recent years, particularly since the 1970s is the increasing concern of the developing countries with the deliberate promotion of mutual trade. This is an imperative stemming from

Economy of SAARC, (UPL, Dhaka 1986); Pran Chopra (ed.), Fature of South Asia (UPL/Macmillan, Dhaka 1986); Iftekharuzzaman, Abdus Sabur, Nilufar Choudhury, "Future of SAARC and South Asia", Seminar Paper presented at BIISS on 26 August 1986; Bhabani Sengupta, Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, Vols, 1-2 (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1986); Iftekharuzzaman, The SAARC in Progress: A Hesitant Course of South Asian Transition, BIISS Papers No. 7, 1988.

 [&]quot;Strengthening the Weakest Link: A Review of Certain Aspects of South-South Trade and Finance", UNCTAD, Report No. ST/ECDC/28, October 1985.

the vagaries of the existing infrastructure of international economic interaction including financial, monetary, trading, insurance, banking and marketing institutions which inherently favour North-South at the expense of South-South trade linkage and economic cooperation.

The fourth summit meeting of Non-aligned states in Algiers recommended a "doubling of the growth rate of mutual trade" to all member states, thereby stressing the need for a shift in fayour of deliberate governmental and private efforts in trade directionality as distinct from the predominance of the forces of market. At subsequent meetings of the NAM as well as other international fora including the UN and the Group of 77 the importance of South-South trade as a means of promoting sustained growth has been recognised and repeatedly stressed. Decisions and recommendations have been made to encourage expansion of trade flows through introduction of new patterns of trade cooperation and establishment of a detailed and complex preferential system for South-South trade through a global system of trade preferences (GSTP).

The various action programmes and related documents have set out the macro-economic objectives in the promotion of mutual trade within the South. These include:

- Greater exploitation of the complementarities among developing countries;
- Development of new patterns for a mutually beneficial division of labour through sub-regional specialization, thereby establishing broader interdependence among developing economies;
- -Strengthening of the collective and individual bargaining position of developing countries in the international markets; and

Taken from Boris Cizeljc, Metka Fuks, "Trade Among Developing Countries: Achievements and Potential", in Oli Havrylyshyn, Exports of Developing Countries, How Direction Affects Performance, A World Bank Symposium, World Bank, 1987, p. 141.

—Implementation of principles of a new international economic order (NIEO) among themselves, such as preferential treatment by the more advanced to the less advanced developing countries.⁷

The objectives and image of South-South trade are certainly a departure from traditional governmental concerns about the pattern of foreign trade. Indeed the focus on mutual trade for facilitating development through greater collective self-reliance has an essentially political content. The whole concept of South-South trade is often thought to be excessively politicized, particularly when it is defined as a substitute for North-South trade. Given the fact that the concept originated in politics the criticism may be partially true. But then, it is also possible to argue that the volume of trade that takes place between the developed countries would be much larger than what is warranted by pure comparative advantage. If subjective considerations have guided the pattern of trade and economic linkages of developed economies, it appears all the more justified for the developing countries to apply mutual preferential treatment in in shaping their economic relations.

Moreover, in recent times there have been serious economic analyses to substantiate the rationale of increased South-South trade. Havrylyshyn and Wolf present a comprehensive survey of the theories and evidences of South-South trade. Alice Amsden was of course among the first to undertake a study on the concept with particular focus on trade in manufactures. Frances James Stewart

^{7.} ibid.

^{8.} Iftekharuzzaman, Nilufar Choudhury, "SAARC-ASEAN Cooperation: Perspectives and Issues", The Indonesian Quarteraly, January 1988.

^{9.} Trade Among Developing Countries: Theory, Policy Issues and Principal Trends, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 479, World Bank 1981.

Alice H. Amsden, "Trade in Manufactures between Developing Countries", Economic Journal, Vol. 86 (1976).

^{11.} Frances James Stewart, Recent Theories of International Trade: Some Implications for the South, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 1982.

has shown that South-South trade relations provide a better option for the developing states.¹² Sir Arthur Lewis has also advocated intra-South trade as a means of promoting sustained growth in the face of continued recession and growing protectionism.¹³

The main arguments of these and related studies can be summed up as follows: Firstly, the developing countries of the South have suffered chronically from the 'dependency syndrome'. Efforts for simple and individual self-sufficiency have been largely unsuccessful, particularly in case of least developed countries, and hence collective self-sufficiency appears to be the available option. Secondly, and this is related to the first, colonial trade pattern and institutions have built up a bias in favour of North-South trade at the cost of potentially more lucrative trade in the South with one another. Intra-South trade is beneficial because of opportunities for learning by doing, the shared technological requirements of the South and the advantages of appropriate technology. Thirdly, as a matter of compulsion in the face of growing protectionism in the developed North and chronic phase of global slow growth, developing countries have to look for opportunities amongst themselves and increase mutual trade. Fourthly, the differential economic performance within the developing countries provides new and enhanced opportunities for trade within the South. Rapid growth and structural change in newly industrialised countries (NICs), for example, lead to increase in their demand for the primary goods exported by other developing countries in exchange for the former's enhanced supply of manufactured products imported by the latter.

The need and rationale for increased trade intra-regionally within South Asia and inter-regionally with the geographically proximate ASEAN countries fit well within the frame described above. And as it will be evident in the subsequent sections, the sooner deliberate

^{12.} W. Arthur Lewis, "The Slowing Down of the Engine of Growth", American Economic Review, Vol. 70 (1980).

^{13.} Rehman Sobhan, op. cit., p. 14.

governmental and private initiatives are taken to strengthen these trade ties rather than leaving them to the forces of market the better. Furthermore, analysts have argued that whilst increased intra and inter-regional trade would be beneficial to all member countries of SAARC the delay in acting in that direction would be more harmful to the smaller and lesser developed states. Rehman Sobhan argues, for example:

The price of inactivity within SAARC to come to grips with the need to plan for enhanced trade cooperation within South Aisa will in the final analysis be paid for by those who can least afford it. Their inherited apprehension in planning economic relations within SAARC will let the market place remain the arbiter of South Asian regional economic cooperation. The inexorable laws of the market will favour the strong and sow the seeds of new generation of political tension induced by the apprehensions of dependence and domination of the weaker by the stronger within the South Asian region.¹⁴

Before further extending the argument in favour of placing trade cooperation within the SAARC agenda we now turn to highlight the comparative economic features and trade stuctures, particularly directions of trade of the member-states of SAARC and ASEAN.

III. SAARC and ASEAN Economies: The Comparative Profile and Opportunities

Some of the main features of the economies of the two regions are presented in this section. The objective is to facilitate an understanding of the prospects and limitations of trade expansion. The relevant statistics depicting the complementarities and competitiveness at both regional and inter-regional levels are provided in tables 1 to 15. The main highlights of the information may be summarized as follows.

Mukul G. Asher, Charan Wadhva (eds.) ASEAN-South Asia Ecanomic Relations ISEAS, Singapore, 1985, Introduction, p. 3

Profile and Complementarities

Countries of SAARC and ASEAN belong to the broad category of developing countries and share many of the vulnerabilities and problems common to such category of countries. The ASEAN group is nevertheless at a higher stage of economic performance than the SAARC group in nearly all respects so that potential complementarities exist between the two regions. On a closer focus, within the SAARC group while the member-states belong to the bottom end of the low-income countries there are divergences indicating the economic rationale for greater trade cooperation.

While the population of South Asia is more than 3.5 times and GDP is more than 30% higher than that of ASEAN, the latter's per capita GNP is much higher than that of the former. The highest per capita GNP among the South Asian countries - that of Sri Lanka at US \$ 400 - is merely about 80% of the lowest in ASEAN that of Indonesia at US \$ 490 (Table 1). Moreover, growth rates of GNP are much higher in ASEAN than in SAARC thus indicating widening income differentials. The divergences are brought into sharper focus if the distribution of output and potentials of the SAARC region is taken into consideration. Nearly 80 percent of the GDP of the region is for example produced in India. The strongest South Asian economy's (India) GDP in 1986 was over 900 times that of the weakest (Bhutan), whereas in case of ASEAN the differential was about 4 times. Within South Asia, India accounts for roughly 76% of the population, 73% of the total area, 68% of of manufacturing exports, 62% of the export earnings, 79% of manufacturing value added, 59% of the import market and 41% of the external reserves. Divergences are also quite prominant in ASEAN Indonesia occupying about 62% of the land area and 56% of the population. But in terms of overall economic performance disparity is much less within the ASEAN economies with all of them at a considerably higher level than their SAARC counterparts but India.

Data on structure of production presented in Table 2 reveal reasonable prospect of both intra and inter-regional trade. Agriculture

Table 1
SAARC and ASEAN Member States: Basic Indicators

C. Walter St.	1		Varia	bles	Wall Comment				
Member-State	Population (millions/ mid 1986)	Area (thousand sq. km)	GDP US Dollars billion/1986	GNP Per. cap. US \$ 1986	CDD (0/	TONID (OA)	Total External Debt (1986) US \$ Millions	(1986)	service as % of
SAARC		19 14	7 7 11						
Bangladesh	103.2	144	15.46	160	3.7	0.4	7,282	1.8	25.1
Bhutan	1.3	47	0.21	150	_	_	_	_	_
India	781.4	3,288	203.79	290	4.9	1.8	34,511	1.6	24.6
Maldives	0.189	_	_	310	_	1.8	_	_	_
Nepal	17.0	141	2.20	150	3.5	1.9	711	1.2	9.4
Pakistan	99.2	804	30.08	350	6.7	2.4	11,794	3.3	27.2
Sri Lanka	16.1	66	5.88	400	4.9	2.9	3,544	4.6	18.4
Sub-total (SAARC) ASEAN	1020.2	4,490	257.62		-		57,842	E E	enore a
Brunei	0.232	6	_	15,400	_		_		_
Indonesia	166.4	1,919	75.23	490	3.4	4.6	35,729	7.3	33.
Malaysia	16.4	330	27.58	1,830	4.8	4.3	19,650	12.7	20.
Philippines	57.3	300	30.54	560	-1.0	1.9	21,622	6.1	21.
Singapore	2.6	1	17.35	7,410	5.3	7.6	_	_	- 1-
Thailand	52.6	514	41.78	810	4.8	4.0	14,130	7.7	25.
Sub-total (ASEAN)	295.2	3,070	192.48	-	_		91,131	-	
Total (SAARC+ASEAN)	1315.4	7,560	450.10	(185 - F) 67 Amil	SEATO SE	Predition in	148,973		

Source : World Bank, World Development Report 1988

Table 2
SAARC and ASEAN Member States: Structure of Production (1986)

Memb	er States	1	Distribution	n of Gro	oss Domestic	Proc	luct (Percent)	44	
IVICIDO	oci States	212	Agriculture	1 30	Industry	1	Manufacturing	1	Services
S	AARC		19615		2-01	- 10		11/4/2	A TOTAL
1.	Bangladesh		47		14		8		39
2.	Bhutan		Si tala				1 1/12		1 42
3.	India		32		20		19		39
4.	Maldives								
5.	Nepal		56 (1984	0	12 (198	34)	4 (1984)	T A HEAT	32 (1984
6.	Pakistan		24	- 534	28	9.0	17		47
7.	Sri Lanka	110	26	20.00	27		15	311	47
AS	EAN			2000		-		1111	
1.	Brunei				180				
2.	Indonesia		26	1111	32	2	The Table	100	42
3.	Malaysia		21 (1984	(4)	35 (198	(4)	14		44 (1984
4.	Philippines		26	dilling and	32	,	25 (1984)		42 (1964
5.	Singapore		1		38		27		62
6.	Thailand		17		30		21		53

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1988

still occupies the predominant position in South Asia in general as far as its share in GDP is concerned. But, of the five countries for which data are available, two (Bangladesh and Nepal) are relatively more dependent on this sector than in others, while the others (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) have more diversified structure of production with industry and manufacturing sectors occupying important positions. This may imply that potential complementarities exist within the region.

Compared to South Asia, the ASEAN region is significantly advanced in terms of contribution of industry and manufacturing in GDP, although the positions of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are comparable to some of the ASEAN states. The data also indicate that there are reasonable complementarities between the two regions—one with predominantly agricultural and divergent production structure and the other with increasingly industrial and more even GDP distribution.

Table 3 shows that countries of ASEAN are more export-oriented than those of SAARC. Contributions of exports of goods and non-factor services to GDP have been much higher in ASEAN countries than their SAARC counterparts. Moreover, ASEAN's shares of world exports and imports in 1981 were 3.64 and 3.75 percent respectively as against South Asia's corresponding proportions of only 0.69 and 1.32 percent. The rate of growth of export is comparable within the two regions whereas current account is in much more substantial deficit in South Asia than in ASEAN. Indeed, three of the ASEAN economies (Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) had considerable positive current account balance in 1986 whereas all South Asian countries had deficit. Total external debt is higher in ASEAN than in SAARC but the burden of debt in terms of debt service as percentage of export is not necessarily so (Table 1).

Table 3 further shows that the export structures reflect the divergences in the respective structure of production of the countries of the two regions. While the share of primary commodities in the

BISS JOURNAL, VOL. 10, NO, 1, 1989

Table 3
SAARC and ASEAN Member States: Structure of Merchandise Exports

	Percer	tage Share	of Merchand	lise Exports	s (1986)	Average ann	Export of	Current
Member State	Fuels, minerals & metals	Other Primary	Machinary and transport equipment	Other manu- factures	(Textile and clothing)	ual growth rate of exp 1980-86 (percent)	good and non-factor services as % of GDP 1986	Account Balance 1986 US \$
SAARC	a a	B E S			15 18 18	THEN	THE PER	THE
1. Bangladesh	1	25	0	73	(57)	5.6	6	-538
2. Bhutan	-	_		_	_			
3. India	15	23	10	52	(18)	3.8	6	-3,604
4. Maldives	_				_	_		_
5. Nepal	2	31	2	66	(43)	6.7	13	-112
6. Pakistan 7. Sri Lanka	1 7	31 52	3 2	65 39	(51) (30)	6.2 6.4	12 23	-778 -417
ASEAN		100	Des Alle	Harry No.	EN AV		N. E. S.	
1. Brunei		_		24		_	A BUT	
2. Indonesia	58	21	3	19	(4)	2.0	21	-4,004
3. Malaysia	26	38	26	10	(2)(1984		57	-295
4. Philippines	14	26	6	55	(7)	-1.7	25	996
5. Singapore 6. Thailand	21 4	12 54	38	30 33	(5) (15)	6.1 9.2	-	478 249

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1988.

total merchandise exports of the two regions are broadly comparable both intra and inter-regionally, in terms of export of minerals and fuels and machinary and equipments there are considerable divergences. For South Asian countries these items occupy much lesser share in total exports compared to ASEAN. Within South Asia India's export of these items is much higher than that of other SAARC states. This indicates certain degree of complementarity in these items both intra-regionally and inter-regionally. The same, although in the reverse direction appears to be evident from the table in relation to the items under the heading 'other manufactures' which include textile and clothing (particularly garments).

Table 4 shows the comparative import structure. Although between the two regions the structures are more or less similiar, at the micro level there may be some complementarities. South Asian countries' import of food items is for example in greater proportion compared to their ASEAN courterparts, The same is true for other primary commodities also. More importantly, there are considerable complementarities on these items within South Asian states. Table 4 also shows that although the position of the two regions in relation to terms of trade is comparable, South Asian countries' import have been increasing at a much greater average annual rate than that in ASEAN states over the period 1980-86.

The main implication of this brief analysis is that the countries of the SAARC region must make efforts to increase their volume of trade, particularly exports in order to improve the crippling balance of payments positions. Such efforts need to be vividly focused at both intra-regional and inter-regional levels. Agreeably, the intra-regional import and export stuctures as presented in table 3 and 4 appear to offer more of competitiveness rather than a complementarity. On a closer focus, however, there may be some opportunities as will be further elaborated subsequently. It may be noted at this stage that while all South Asian countries are exporters of non-fuel primary commodities, India's share of export of fuels, minerals and

SAARC and ASEAN Member States: Structure of Merchandise Imports

	三日子	Pe	rcentage	Share of Me	Average			
M	ember States	Food	Fuels	Other primary commodities	Machinery and transport equipment	Other manufac- tures	annual growth rate of imports 1980-86 (percent)	Terms of Trade (1980=100)
	SAARC				2 % TU !! E	RED B	3. 开港巴世市	\$ 17 AU / 1
1.	Bangladesh	27	6	11	. 19	37	3.3	109
2.	Bhutan	-	9	_			11 2 4 4 1	医自主日
3.	India	10	14	10	22	44	3.6	427
4.	Maldives	-	-			1 2	學是是自己有	
5.	Nepal	10	11	6	22	51	6.5	97
6,	Pakistan	18	14	7	32	29	3.8	103
7.	Sri Lanka	16	14	2	29	39	3.0	96
	ASEAN			1/1/4 1	15865	A II II	TO E PUBLIC	
1.	Brunei	B F-E-2	_		生日上 學世		海岸 正常长生	東島夏春
2.	Indonesia	4	14	4	39	38	-1.0	64
3.	Malaysia.	10	5	4	51	30	5.2	64
4.	Philippines	8	15	5	22	51	-6.0	101
5.	Singapore	9	20	5	37	30	3.6	101
6.	Thailand	5	12	8	34	40	2.0	83

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1988

metals as well as machinery and transport equipment are reasonably important. Intra-regionally, there seems to be good prospects of exchange of ASEAN fuels, minerals and metals as well as machinery and equipment for non-fuel primary commodities and textile and clothing from SAARC countries.

Existing Trade Directions

Table 5 shows the general pattern of trade directions in terms of exports in the two regions. It is note-worthy that for both the regions industrial market economies are much more important destinations than developing economies. Compared to South Asia. greater portion of ASEAN exports are, however, directed towards the developing economies. The pattern of intra-regional trade in South Asia in terms of direction of exports is shown in table 6. It may be observed that intra-regional export trade in South Asia is rather insignificant for most of the countries. Indeed, excepting the case of two of the smallest countries (Maldives and Nepal) none other country directed in 1987 any significant proportion of exports to South Asian partners. Bangladesh exported 4.7% of its total export to South Asian partners while Pakistan and Sri Lanka directed 2.3, 2.4 and 3.3 percent of their exports to South Asian countries. More importantly, in almost all cases the trend during 1981-87 period has been one of falling intra-regional export trade. The same trend is also valid in case of these countries' export to all the developing countries taken together.

Data on South Asian intra-regional import trade are presented in Table 7. It is almost the same scenario as in case of export trade, only that two of the largest countries, India and Pakistan, purchase even lesser share of their total import (0.6 and 1.6 percent respectively) from within the region. While the trend of intra-regional import trade during the period 1981-87 is rather erratic the overall share of imports of South Asian countries coming from all developing countries is higher than their exports. This last element may

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 10, NO. 1, 1989

Table 5
SAARC and ASEAN members: Direction of Trade (1986) Manufactured Exports

- 1		Destination of	of manufactured ex	xports (percentag	e of total)
M	Iember States	Industrial market economies	High income oil exporters	Developing economies	Others
	SAARC	TENTER!			
1.	Bangladesh	67	1	28	. 6.
2.	Bhutan	3			- 4 - 5
3.	India	59	0	24	23
4.	Maldives	29 3 E L- (E)		F 2 4 E 5	- d N
5.	Nepal	65	0	28	3
6.	Pakistan	65	11	19	5
7.	Sri Lanka	89	1	10	
	ASEAN			· 佐皇/島 科 吉	E 18 E 5
1.	Brunei				
2.	Indonesia	50	4	46	· 三流
3.	Malaysia	69	2	29	0
4.	Philippines	74	1	25	
5.	Singapore	55	4	40	1
6.	Thailand	60	8	32	

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1988

Table 6
Intra-regional Trade of SAARC Countries: Direction of Exports

S1.	Country			Destina	tion of Ex	ports (Mill	ions of US I	Dollars)	10	
No.	Year	Bangladesh	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	South Asia Total	Developing Countries Total	World Total
1.	Bangladesh 1981 1984 1987	* = 1	20.2 28.3 11.0	<u>_</u>	0.2 2.2 2.3	42.3 63.3 27.9	2.7 0.5 0.2	65.4(8.3) 94.3(10.1) 41.5(4.7)	466.4(59.0) 416.1(44.7) 295.7(33.3)	790.6(100.0) 931.4(100.0) 88 6 .9(100.0)
2.	India 1981 1984 1987	49.0 55.0 69.0		1.0 1.0 1.0	79.0 83.0 101.0	3.0 12.0 11.0	65.0 101.0 75.0	197.0(2.4) 252.0(2.5) 256.0(2.3)	2,193.0(26.0) 2,763.0(27.9) 2,791.0(24.6)	8,295.0(100.0) 9,916.0(100.0) 11,343.0(100.0)
3.	Maldives 1981 1984 1987	Ξ	12	Ξ	ΞI	0.2 1.2	1.8 1.6 4.3	2.0(23.3) 2.8(15.9) 4.3(13.9)	5.8(67.4) 10.9(61.9) 19.4(62.8)	8.6(100.0) 17.6(100.0) 30.9(100.0)
4.	Nepal 1981 1984 1987	10.7	40.6 39.8 48.3	* =	Ξ	1.9 0.4 1.0	- 4.1	53.2(37.9) 40.2(31.4) 53.5(34.2)	63.0(44.9) 47.4(37.0) 57.8(36.9)	140.3(100.0) 128.2(100.0) 156.6(100.0)
5.	Pakistan 1981 1984 1987	17.9 19.4 25.3	67.4 25.3 21.4	0.2 1.6 0.3	0.1 0.1 1.6	Ξ	30.7 20.1 49.7	116.3(4.0) 66.5(2.6) 98.3(2.4)	1,790.9(62.1) 1,275.2(49.8) 1,575.0(37.8)	2,882.6(100.0 2,558.2(100.0 4,171.8(100.0
6.	Sri Lanka 1981 1984 1987	2.7 2.8 0.8	30.0 12.5 8.8	2.0 3.9 6.3		55.5 34.2 29.3	HT =	90.2(8.3) 53.4(3.6) 45.3(3.3)	472.0(43,4) 627.2(42.8) 458.4(32 9)	1,088.1(100.0 1,467.1(100.0 1,392.8(100.0

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1988
Note: Data on Bhutan is not available with IMF source,
Figures in Parentheses indicate percentages.

Table 7
Intra-regional Trade of SAARC Countries: Direction of Imports

SI.	Country			Source o	f Import	s (Millions o	of US Dolla	rs)		
No	Year	Bangla- desh	India	Maldives				South Asia Total	Developing Country Total	World Total
1.	Bangladesh	I- OXIO		ALL SOLD STREET		-		-	, country total	THE RESERVE
	1981	0_0	64.0		110	40.5				
	1984	2.		1	11.8	46.5	2.0	124 3(4.6)	1,182.3(42.8)	2,699.1(100.0)
	1987	13.4	60.1	-		18.6	41	82.8(2.9)	1,012.0(3.6)	2,825.2(100.0)
2		1100	74.4	-	0.2	37.3	5.0	117.1(4.3)	957.0(35.4)	2,707.1(100.0)
2.	India									
	1981	14.0	-	_	45.0	77.0	56.0	192.0(1.2)	6,629.0(43.0)	5 419 0/100 O
	1984	31.0	_	_	44.0	51.0	14.0	140.0(1.0)	7,948.0(55.0) 1	
	1987	12.0	_		53.0	24.0	10.0	99.0(0.6)	6,110.0(36.8)	16,506,0(100.0)
3.	Maldives				55.0	24.0	10.0	33.0(0.0)	0,110.0(30.0)	10,390.0(100.0)
7	1981		0.4							
	1984	-	0.4	-	_	1.0	2.1	2.6(6.8)	27.2(71.6)	38.0(100.0)
	1987		0.4	-	-	1.7	4.5	6.6(9.2)	54.7(76.1)	71.9(100.0)
		-	0.4	-	-	0.3	6.7	7.4(7.4)	73.5(73.9)	99.4(100.0)
4.	Nepal									, , , , , , , ,
	1981	0.3	87.3	_		0.1		87.7(23.8)	137.3(37.2)	200 00100 0
	1984	16.1	91.2		100	0.1		107.4(25.8)		368.8(100.0)
	1987	5.5	110.7		_	1.7	1017-		149.7(36.0)	416.0(109.0)
5.	Pakistan				1 - 1 - 1	1.7	-	117.9(22.1)	243.8(45.7)	533.1(100.0)
	1981	51.3			-					
	1984		2.8	0.4	2.2	_	49.6	106.3(1.9)	2,868.7(50.9)	5,631.2(100.0)
		72.5	12.7	1.3	0.6	-	36.0	123.1(2.1)		5,853.1(100.0)
	1987	49.7	11.8	-	1.1	-	31.3	93.9(1.6)		5,822.1(100.0)
6.	Sri Lanka								-,,	-,(,
	1981	2.4	76.7	2.0	_	17.8		00 0/5 2)	003 3/63 1)	1 040 54100 0
	1984	0.2	111.5	1.8	_			98.9(5.3)	982.3(53.1)	1,848.6(100.0)
	1987	0.2	82.9	4.9	4.5	17.1	COLUMN TO WAR	130.6(7.0)	935.4(50.1)	1,866.5(100.0)
	The second second	2	02.7	4.9	4.3	56.6		138.1(6,7)	1,068.8(51.9)	2.061.0(100.0)

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook, 1988 Note: Data on Bhutan is not available with IMF source. Figures in parentheses indicate percentages. be largely because of import of fuel from the oil-rich developing countries.

Data on South Asian intra-regional import of ASEAN countries are presented in table 8 and 9. Compared to South Asia, the level of intra-regional ASEAN trade for all member countries are obviously much higher. ASEAN intra-regional export-trade in 1987 ranged from 8.9% in case of Philippines to 24.2% for Malaysia. As for import, the range of intra-regional trade in ASEAN in 1987 was from 6.9% in case of Indonesia to 37.9% for Brunei. Data on SAARC-ASEAN trade for 1987 are presented in Tables 10 and 11. It may be observed that except for Nepal for which India is the most important trade partner even globally, ASEAN is a much more important destination In 1987 South Asia of exports of all South Asian countries. exported 2.8 percent of its exports to SAARC countries themselves while 3.8 of exports went to ASEAN countries. The situation is even further striking in case of imports. Again, excepting Nepal, all South Asian countries imported at least twice-in cases many times more-from ASEAN countries than from their SAARC partners. Taken together for the region, intra-regional import is less than one-fourth of the region's import from ASEAN. On the other hand SAARC region is comparatively much less significant trading partner for the ASEAN countries as depicted by the data in Tables 12 and 13. In terms of exports only Malaysia (4.4 percent), Singapore (4.1 percent) and Thailand (2.1 percent) have some notable trade with South Asia. ASEAN's export to SAARC in 1987 amounted to 2.8 percent compared to its intra-regional export of 17.2 percent. In terms of import, SAARC is even less significant a partner, with South Asia offering only 0.9 percent of ASEAN's total import in 1987 compared to 16.1% of intra-ASEAN import trade. Thailand was the only country to have imported more than I percent of its total volume of imports from SAARC countries.

Data on SAARC and ASEAN countries' trade directions are summarized in Tables 14 and 15. It may be observed that whereas

Table 8 Intra-regional Trade of ASEAN Countries: Direction of Export

1	Country		Ι	estination	of Exports	(Millions o	f US Doll	ars)		100
.	Year	Brunei	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philipp-	Singapore	Thailand	Total ASEAN	Total Developing	Tota World
Bru	nei	3 3 3	7 2 7		- 0	O E R	12 5	Ed Sec		
	1981	_	OF 1	25.2	119.2	280 8	126 5	551 7/12 7	721 4/10 1	
	1984	_	21.7							4,036.6
	1987	_								3,183.0
Inde	onacia		_		,0		221.0	390.3(21.7)	3/3.9(32.1)	1,796.2
11141				47.0	120.0	2 222 2				
			The same of						5,751.0(25.8)	22,260.0
			12 12 17 18						4,930.0(22.5)	21,902.0
		0.0		110.0	74.0	1,011.0	93.0	1,296.0 (7.8)	3,365.0(20.3)	16,548.0
Mala	aysia									
	1981	29.0	58.0		186 0	2 683 0	106.0	2 152 0(06 9)	4 051 0/72 1	11 770 0
	1984	97.0		_		3 380 0		1 106 0(26.0)		11.770.0
	1987	93.0		_						16,448.0
Phil	innines				52510	2,205.0	311.0	4,337.0(24.2)	7,330.0(42.1)	17,939.0
		23	153.6	104 1		120.2				
										5,654.6
										5,273.5
		0.5	04.0	119.0		196.4	124.7	505.4(8.9)	1,165(720.6)	5,648.8
Sing	apore									
			-			_	883.0	4.749.0(22.6)	11,906.0(56-8)	20,967.0
			-			-	1.154.0	5.557.0(23.1)	12.513.0(52.0)	24,070.0
	1987	337,0	-	4,073.0	418.0	_	1,215.0		13,233.0(46.1	28,692.0
Thai	land									
	1981	14.2	135.3	319.9	20.3	550.8	TA INC.	1 040 5(14 8)	2 003 0(41 2)	7,030.6
	1984									7,412.9
	1987	I02.3								11,727.0
	Bru Ind Mal Phil	Brunei 1981 1984 1987 Indonesia 1981 1984 1987 Malaysia 1981 1984 1987 Philippines 1981 1984 1987 Thailand 1981 1981	Brunei 1981 — 1984 — 1987 — Indonesia 1981 — 1981 — 1981 — 1981 — 1981 — 1981 97.0 1984 97.0 1987 93.0 Philippines 1981 0.5 Singapore 1981 323.0 1984 294.0 1987 337,0 Thailand 1981 14.2 1984 133.3	Nation President Preside	No. Year Brunei Indonesia Malaysia	No. Year Brunei	No. Year Brunei	Fraction Fraction	Frunci	Fractage Process Pro

Source : As of Table 6

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages in relation to col. "Total World"

Table 9 Intra-regional Trade of ASEAN Countries: Direction of Imports

SI.	Country	1	N. F	So	urce of I	mports (Mill	ion US Dol	lars)		
No.	Year	Brunei	Indonesi	Malaysia	Philip- pines	Singapore	Thailand	Total ASEAN	Total Developing Countries	Total World
1.	Brunei 1981 1984 1987	E	1.0 1.8 1.6	30.9 31.0 102.5	2.6 1.2 0.5	139.4 150.4 370.2	14.7 15.8 17.1	188.6(31.7) 200.5(32.2) 491.5(37.9)	212.3(35.7) 232.5(37.4) 521.2(42.2)	594.2 621.8 1296.9
2.	Indonesia 1981 1984 1987	_ 1.0	Ξ	60.0 86.0 155.0	253.0 15.0 69.0	1,243.0 1,791.0 415.0	146.0 55.0 64.0	1702.0(12.8) 1947.0(14.0) 704.0(6.9)	3889.0(29.3) 4362.0(31.4) 2041.0(19.9)	13272.0 13882.0 10234.0
3.	Malaysia 1981 1984 1987	2.0 1.0 1.0	69.0 172.0 176.0		96.0 242.0 148.0	1,513.0 1,839.0 1,874.0	395.0 481.0 443.0	2075.0(18.0) 2735.0(19.5) 2642.0(20.8)	3970.0(34.4) 4608.0(32.9) 4341.0(34.8)	11550.0 14501.0 12700.0
4.	Philippines									
	1981 1984 1987	122.7 55.7 52.5	232.6 199.0 92.1	182.4 354.8 233.5	Ξ	114.1 119.4 237.4	28.4 50.8 44.2	680 2(1.0) 779.7(12.1) 859.7(9.2)	2487.0(38.7)	8479.1 6432.4 7144.3
5.	Singapore									
	1981 1984 1987	329.0 195.0 131.0)	3,412.0 4,306.0 4,500.0	107.0 185.0 178.0	$\mathbb{R}^{n} \cdot \Xi$	473.0 633.0 1017.0	4321.0(15.7) 5319.0(18.6) 5826.0(17.9)	14165.7(51.4) 13750.048.0) 13904.0(42.7)	27572.0 28667.0 32529.0
6.	Thailand							Edwarf B		
	1981 1984 1987	154.7 216.5 243.7	24.0 79.1 111.1	268.5 504.7 521.3	20.0 20.2 140.6	695.4 822.2 1,012.2	regenq u (2019 <u>0</u>)	1162.6(11.7) 1642.7(15.8) 2028.9(15.7)	391 6.7(39.3) 3873.3(37.3) 4453.9(34.4)	9955.1 10397.6 12964.1

Source: As of Table 6
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentages in relation to col. "Total World"

Table 10
SAARC-ASEAN Trade: SAARC Countries Export to ASEAN Countries (1987)

	Destination of Exports (Million US Dollars)													
Country	Brunei	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philip- pines	Singapore	Thailand	Total to	Total to SAARC	Total to Developing Countries	Total to World				
Bangladesl	h 0.1a	1.3	2.3	0.1b	38.4	1.5	43.7	41.5	295.7	886.9				
							(4.9)	(4.7)	(33.3)	(100.0)				
India	1.0	10.0	90.0	9.0	227.0	86.0	423.0	256.0	2,791.0	11343.0				
							(3.7)	(2.3)	(24.6)	(100.0)				
Maldives	II y	-	0.3b	-	0.8	12.9	14.0	4.3	19.4	30.9				
							(45.3)	(13.9)	(62.8)	(100.0)				
Nepal	-	-	0.1	0.3	1.9	_	2.3	53.5	57.8	156.6				
							(1.5)	(34.2)	(36.9)	(100.0)				
Pakistan	1.8	25.1	15.2	12.0	34.5	61.6	150.2	98.3	1,575.0	4171.8				
							(3.6)	(2.4)	(37.8)	(100.0)				
Sri Lanka		0.6	1.5	0.2	30.4	15.3	48.0	45.3	458.4	1392.8				
							(3.4)	(3.3)	(32.9)	(100.0)				
Total	2.9	37.0	109.4	21.6	333.0	177.3	681.2	498.9	5,197.3	17,982.0				
		-		THE LINE			(3.8)	(2.8)	(28.9)	(100.0				

Source: As of Table 6 Notes: (a) 1985, (b) 1984.

Figuers in parentheses indicate percentages

Table 11 SAARC-ASEAN Trade: Import of SAARC Countries from ASEAN Countries (1987)

10		200	S	ource of	f Imports (Million U	JS Dollars			
Country	Brunei	Indo- nesia	Malaysia	Philip- pines	Singapore	Thailand	Total from ASEAN	Total from SAARC	Total from Developing Countries	
Bangladesh	-	33.3	28.3	1.8	163.1	90.9	317.4	117.1	957.0	2,707.0
India		36.0	567.0	5.0	613.0	43.0	(11.7) 1,264.0	(4.3) 99.0	(33.4) 6,110.0	(100.0) 16,596.0
Maldives	-		0.7	_	48.9	3.7	(7.6) 53.3	(0.6)	(36.8) 73.5	(100.0) 99.4
Nepal	_		3.2	0.6a	33.5	28.5	(53.6) 67.6	(7.4) 117.9	(73.9) 243.8	(100.0) 533.1
Pakistan	0.2	31.0	183.3	1.7	89.9	33.0	(12.7) 339.1	(22.1) 39.9	(45.7) 2,355.9	(100.0) 5,822.1
Sri Lanka	-	17.9	60.5	2.8	148.9	38.6	(5.8) 268.7	(1.6) 138.1	(40.5) 1,068.8	(100.0) 2,061.0
							(13.03)	(6.7)	(51.9)	(100.0)
Total	0.2	118.2	843.0	11.9	1,099.1	237.7	2,310.1 (8.30)	573.4 (2.06)	10,809.0 (38.85)	27,818.7 (100.0)

Source: As of Table 6

: (a) 1984 Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

Table 12
ASEAN-SAARC Trade: ASEAN Countries' Export to SAARC Countries (1987)

	Destination of Exports (US \$ Millions)												
Country	Bangla- desh	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	to	Total to ASEAN	Total to Developing World	Total to World			
Brunei	-	11/4	60 7	3½-	0.1	18.0	0.1	390.3	575.9	1796.2			
Indonesia	32.0	33.0	-	-	27.0	9.0	(0.005)	1,296.0	(32.1) 2,989.0	(100.0) 16,548.0			
							(0.6)	(7.8)		(100.0)			
Malaysia	34.0	515.0	1.0	3.0	171.0	58.0	782.0 (4.4)	4,337.0 (24.2)	7,550.0 (42.1)	17,939.0 (100.0)			
Philippines	1.3	4.6	1-02	(.5ª	0.9	2.4	9.7 (0.2)	505,4 (8.9)	1,165.7 (20.6)	5,642.8 (100.0)			
Singapore	218.0	557.0	45.0	32.0	131.0	189.0	1172.0 (4.1)	6,043.0 (21.1)	13,233.0 (46.1)	28,692.0 (100.0			
Thailand	102.3	39.2	3.4	25.7	32.9	39.5	242.7 (2.1)	1,626.9 (13.9)	4,203.0 (35.8)	11,727.0 (100.0			
Total	387.6	1148.8	49.4	61.2	362.9	297.9	2307.5 (2.8)	14,198.6 (17.2)	29,716.6 (36.1)	82,351.0 (100.0			

Source: As of Table 6

Note : Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

(a): 1983

Table 13
ASEAN-SAARC Trade: ASEAN Countries' Imports from SAARC Countries (1987)

Country	Sources of Imports (US \$ Millions)												
	Bangla- desh	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakis- tan	Sri Lanka			Total to Develop- ing World	Total to World			
Brunei	_	1.6	_	_	2.0	0.1	3.7	491.5	521.2	1,296.9			
							(0.3)	(87.9)	(40.2)	(100.0)			
Indonesia	1.0	11.0	-	_	31.0	1.0a	44.0	704.0	1,662.0	10,234.0			
							(0.4)	(6.9)	(16.2)	(100.0)			
Malaysia	3.0	99.0	2.0b	_	16.0	2.0	122.0	2,642.0	4,341.0	12,700.0			
							(0.9)	(20.8)	(341.8)	(100.0)			
Philippines	0.1c	10.0	_	0.1d	11.4	0.2	21.8	659.7	2,512.9	7,1443			
							(0.3)	(9.2)	(35.2)	(100.0)			
Singapore	43.0	250.0	1.0	2.0	39.0	29.0	264.0	5,826.0	13,904.0	32,559.0			
							(0.8)	(17.9)	(42.7)	(100.0)			
Thailand	2.0	94.4	14.1	1.0e	71.5	20.1	203.1	2,028.9	4,463.9	12,964.1			
					N DOM:		(1.6)	(15.6)	(34.4)	(100.0)			
Total	49.1	466.0	17.1	3.1	170.9	52.4	658.6	12,352.1	27,405.0	76,898.3			
				THE			(0.9)	(16.1)	(35.6)	(100.0)			

Source: As of Table 6

Note: (a): 1985, (b): 1981, (c): 1984, (d): 1983, (e): 1986

Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

Table 14
Summary of SAARC Countries' Trade Directions

Million US \$

Year	SAAR	C Countries' E	xport to	SAARC Countries' Import from					
	World	All developing countries	SAARC region	ASEAN	World	All developing countries	SAARC region	ASEAN region	
	13,205.2	4,991.1	524.1	17/	26,003.7	11,826.8	611.8		
	(100.0)	(37.8)	(3.9)		(100.0)	(45.5)	(2.4)		
		[100.0]	[13.5]			[100.0]	[5.2]		
1984	15,018.5	5,139.8	509.2	-	25,393.7	12,877.5	990.5		
	(1.00.0)	(34.2)	(3.3)		(100.0)	(50.7)	(3.9)		
		[100.0]	[9.9]			[100.0]	[7.7]		
1987	17,982.0	5,197.3	498.9	681.2	27,818.7	10,809.9	973.4	2,301.1	
	(100.0)	. (28.9)	(2.7)	(3.8)	(100.0)	(38.9)	(3.4)	(8.3)	
		[100.0]	[9.6]	[13.1]		[100.0]	[9.0]	[21.3]	

Source: As of Table 6

Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

Table 15
Summary of ASEAN Countries' Trade Directions

Million US \$

Year	ASEA	N Countries' Exp	orts to	ASEAN Countries' Import from					
	World	All developing Countries	ASEAN region	SAARC region	World	All develop- ing countries	ASEAN region	SAARC region	
1981	71,718.8	27,452.4	12,751.0	-	71,422.4	29,430.0	10,129.4	_	
	(100.0)	(38.27)	(17.8)		(100.0)	(41.2)	(14.2)		
		[100.0]	[46.4]			[100.0]	[34.4]		
1984	78,325.4	29,636.5	14,658.1	-	74,051.8	29,312.8	12,623.6	_	
	(100.0)	(37.8)	(18.7)		(100.0)	(39.6)	(17.0)		
		[100.0]	[49.5]			[100.0]	[43.1]		
1987	82,351.0	30,093.0	14,198.6	2,307.5	76,898.3	27,784.0	12,352.1	658.6	
	(100.0)	(36.5)	(17.2)	(2.8)	(100.0)	(36.1)	(16.1)	(0.9)	
		[100.0]	[47.2]	[7.7]		[100.0]	[44.4]	[2.4]	

Source: As of Table 6

Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

for both the regions trade with all developing countries generally decreased during 1981-87, in case of ASEAN intra-regional trade remained fairly stable, if not increased. On the other hand, while SAARC countries' import from within the region during the period increased by 1 percent (3.4 percent in 1987 compared to 2.4 percent in 1981), their exports within the region had fallen by 1.2 percent (2.7 percent in 1987 compared to 3.9 percent in 1981). Table 14 shows also that South Asia's export within the region in 1987 was only 9.6 percent of its total export to all developing countries compared to 13.1% to ASEAN countries. During the same year South Asia imported 9.0 percent of its developing country source imports from the region compared to 21.3 percent from ASEAN. According to Table 15, more than 47 percent of ASEAN exports directed to the developing world remained in 1987 within the region whereas 7.7 percent went to South Asia. As for ASEAN imports on the other hand, 44.4 percent of the imports coming from developing country sources was within the region while 2.4 percent was drawn from SAARC countries.

The above discussion implies that the complementarities within South Asian region have so far been exploited at a very low level not only in simple intra-regional terms but also compared to trade with ASEAN region, although even in this latter aspect there seems to be reasonable scope for further expansion of trade. It is not possible at this stage to be specific, but the following general observations may be made by way of identifying possible avenues for expansion of commodity trade under SAARC.

Commodity Composition

1. Existing and potential commodity composition in intraregional trade in South Asia: Commodities traded within South Asia reflect the resource endowment and production structure of the countries of the region. The commodities include: a) foodstuffs like cereals, fish, fruits and vegetables, b) industrial raw materials, agricultural or mineral and c) semi-manufactures and manufactures including some kinds of capital and intermediate goods. A list of commodities currently traded in the region is given in Annexure which indicates that except for India and to some extent Pakistan, export of all the South Asian countries are too heavily concentrated in certain traditional items like foodstuffs, raw materials and some manufactures. The commodity composition, as already indicated show considerable overlapping and competiveness. This is of course the outcome of resource endowments and the absence of any regional planning or coordination in the development of the production structures of the countries concerned. It is understandable that changing the production structures to make them more regional trade oriented is an issue of long term policy planning. In the meantime, it may be possible to make a casual list of items in the agenda of intra-regional trade expansion.

a) Bangladesh for example, may expand its regional trade by exporting more of fresh water fish, vegetables, wood, raw jute, tea, naphtha, bamboo, cane, paper, newsprint, handicrafts, handloom products, molasses, raw hides and skin, leather and leather products, and fine jute carpets. These are of course already traded with some countries, particularly India and Pakistan. But there seems to be be good prospect of expanding these exports further as India and Pakistan are in a position to import larger volume of these products. Bangldesh's export trade in some of these commodities may be expanded to a considerable extent with other smaller countries of the region. Moreover, there seems to be opportunities for exportoriented joint venture enterprises with Bangladesh's South Asian partners in such items like gas-based industries, textiles, leather, marine products, cement, etc., raw materials for which are available

A. R. Bhuiya, "Intra-regional Trade Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects", Seminar Paper, published in An Anthology of Papers presented in SAARC Seminars, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, 1985, p. 227.

in Bangladesh and products of which are in demand both within the country and outside.

- b) India's export structure is much more diversified within the region, as already indicated. Scope of expansion of Indian export to the region is also much wider than any other country. India may supply larger volume of such items as various types of machinery, iron and steel manufactures, engines, internal combustion and plastic materials. Other items like telecommunication equipment, office machines, computers, medical apparatus and other scientific equipments, chemicals, dyestuffs, transport and agricultural equipments etc., also may be cost-effectively imported from India by its South Asian partners. India furthermore, as Third World's largest exporter of technology may be a very important partner in cooperation for development of technology, particularly appropriate technology in its South Asian neighbours.
- c) Items for expansion of Pakistan's export within the region include raw cotton, textiles, residual fuel oils, gypsum, onyx, rock salt, fruits and vegetables, coffee, chemical elements, metal manufactures, machinery, clothing and some scientific instruments, etc. Pakistan can also be a partner in joint venture export-oriented industries of smaller countries of South Asia.
- d) Sri Lanka may expand its intra-regional trade through such items as coconut oil, natural rubber, graphite, lobsters, tea, cinematographic film, teak logs, mineral wax, edible fats, tobacco, etc.
- e) Nepalese export trade may be expanded by such items as rice, pulses, sugar and honey, vegetables, oilseeds, wood, railway slippers, wool and other animal hair, raw jute and cuttings, etc.
- f) For Bhutan and Maldives, India is still practically the exclusive destination of intra-regional exports. In recent years however they are also penetrating other South Asian markets. Items that Bhutan may offer include vegetables, fruits, rice, pulses, soyabean, mustards, sands, and pebbles, dolomite chips, timber and

a wide range of farm and fruit products. The main items for expansion of Maldivian export are fish, copal, cowries and chanks.

The above catalogue of items for trade expansion within South Asian region is more of indicative rather then exhustive nature. The basic rationale of the discussion is that pending a more coordinated and planned cooperation in production amongst the SAARC partners, even in the existing structure, there are opportunities of expansion of the level of intra-regional trade.

2. Existing and Potential Commodity-composition of South Asian trade with ASEAN: South Asia's trade with ASEAN countries is broadly reflective of existing complementarities in resources and production structure, with South Asian export to ASEAN dominated by primary products and non-manufactures and ASEAN export to South Asia dominated by manufactures. Major items of ASEAN export to South Asia include chemicals, machinery, equipments miscellenous manufactured goods, crude materials inedible, animal/vegetable oils and fats, food, mineral fuels and lubricants. SAARC countries' export to ASEAN include food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipments, mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials.

It has already been indicated that South Asia is comparatively a less significant trade partner for ASEAN and the latter could be more important a trade partner for South Asia. The existing low level of inter-regional trade does not necessarily suggest the non-existance of complementarity between them. There are reasonable differences in factor endowments and in the levels of technological advancement to generate mutually profitable exchange of goods and services. The possibilities of closer trade cooperation have so far remained unexploited, left basically to forces of market and little planned efforts have been made. Even in the existing set up mutual trade can be expected to grow.¹⁶

Problems and Prospects of SAARC-ASEAN Cooperation have already been fairly researched. See for a very exhustive study, Charan D. Wadhya

ASEAN countries are rich in considerable number of natural resources including natural rubber (83% of total world output), palm oil (80%), tin (70%) and coconut (67%). The ASEAN also accounts for a significant portion of world production of sugar, coffee, nickles, bauxite, trungsten, copper and coal. ASEAN countries' flourishing industries include iron, steel, machinery assembly and manufacture, garments and textiles, food processing, timber, electronics and chemicals.¹⁷

South Asian countries for their part are largely deficit in mineral and industrial products and to some extent agricultural products. Most of the SAARC countries are importers of major items of export of ASEAN countries. On the other hand, South Asian countries may expand exports of such items as raw jute and jute goods, some minerals like natural gas and some manufactures like paper and paper board, newsprint and certain pharamaceutical products to ASEAN countries. Moreover, there are wide opportunities for trade oriented cooperation in product development, marketing and sales promotion, transport, communication and shipping, joint ventures in industry, agriculture and fishing.

IV The Image and Reatity

South Asia is a region of sharp contrasts. The seven South Asian states which shared the cradle of much of the cultutal and civilisational heritage recorded in history and have so many commonalities in terms of fundamental economic problems of underdevelopment and poverty, have become victims of mutual mistrust resulting in very low level of regional interpenetration. The SAARC countries along with other ThIrd World states are ardent advocates

and Mukul G Asher (eds.) ASEAN-South Asian Economic Relations, ISEAS, Singapore. 1985.

Iftekharuzzaman, Nilufar Choudhury, "SAARC-ASEAN Cooperation:
 Perspectives and Issues", op, cit. The subsequent para is also taken from this source.

of South-South trade within the framework of ECDC and TCDC. But when it comes to the question of their own practical contribubution to the concept of South-South trade in the form of trade amongst themselves they do so little despite the fact that they have so much to offer.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the level of trade coooperation among SAARC countries—both intra-regionally within South Asia and inter-regionally with ASEAN is much below what is warranted by the state of complementarities and potential opportuities. This is striking particularly since with the launching of the SAARC there has been what may be called an euphoria of rising expectation about closer economic cooperation for development. The image around SAARC generally is that through cooperative endeavours in socio-cultural and economic fields the states of the region will proceed to a gradually rising level of development. But that expectation by all indications remains far from a reality.

It has already been mentioned that the vital areas of the economy including trade are not included in the SAARC agenda of cooperation. It is reported that studies are being undertaken under the auspices of the SAARC Secretariat to examine the possibilities and implications of inclusion of trade as an area under the Integrated Programme of Action. In the backdrop of continuing mistrusts which if anything are on the increase, there seems to be very little prospect of an immediate breakthrough. Prospect of expansion of cooperative agenda to include vital economic areas (which are rightly or not regarded as contentious areas) appear to be destined to be victims of the jargon of "in-depth study". The experience so far shows that little if any progress is made by such "in-depth studies" other than bureaucratic feet-dragging in series of diplomatic carousels, which end up normally in very carefully-worded reports indicating little practical progress.

Nevertheless, compared to any other segment of South Asian history, the period since the launching of SAARC may

be regarded as one of certain degree of positivism in inter-state relations, measured particularly in terms of official and political meetings at various levels.18 But parallel with this has continued a process of further deepening of distrusts and distortions in the inter-state relations which are inhibiting the process of cooperation19. As a part of the reality in South Asia these are indeed deeply ingrained in the psycho-socio-political frame of mind of South Asian peoples. The reality in South Asia is also that as already mentioned, the countries have divergences in nearly all factors that shape their mutual relations-foreign policy orientation, size, population, resources, economic performance, power potentials, statecraft and security and threat perceptions. At the bilateral levels there are numerous thorny problems between the states. Most of the problems centre around the pre-eminant power India about whose role there is a two-way misperception-almost all India's neighbours are suspicious of the motives and designs of India while India is sceptic about the role of its neighbours vis-a-vis New Delhi.20 The reality further is that all these problems are of greater concern to South Asian states than cooperative endeavours under SAARC.

What emerges is that it would be shallow optimism to anticipate any appreciable progress in trade cooperation under SAARC auspices in the foreseeable future. What is needed is efforts for gradual reduction, if not elimination, of psychological barriers and parochialism in mutual behaviour. The fact remains that SAARC cannot be expected to work as a panacea to all the problems that South Asia faces, nor it is desirable that benefits of cooperation under the association continue to be more of a chimera than reality.

^{18.} See for details, Iftekharuzzaman, The SAARC in Progress op. cit.

^{19.} Ibid

Iftekharuzzaman, Abdur Rob Khan (eds.), ASEAN Experiences of Regional and Inter-regional Cooperation: Relevance for SAARC, BIISS 1988, p. 71.

There is the need for a strong and shared political will to increasingly focus attention to areas of agreement rather than those of dissension so that gradually and tenaciously the psycho-social and political basis is created for real economic cooperation.

Annexure

Commodity Composition of Intra-South Asian Trade

A. Bangladesh's Exports to South Asian Countries:

India: Crude materials (rayon), raw Jute, Newsprint and paper, fresh fish (hilsa).

Nepal: Hides and skin, raw jute, newsprint and paper.

Pakistan: Tea, tamarind, ginger, betel leaves, bamboo, raw jute and cuttings, cellophane, pharmaceuticals, hardboard, newsprint, paper, cables and wires.

Sri Lanka: Raw jute, hides and skin, jute goods, newsprint.

B. India's Exports to South Asian Countries:

Bangladesh: Fruits and nuts, coal, coke and briquettes, dyes and paints, textile yarn, glassware, pig iron and ferro alloys ingots and other primary forms of iron and and steel, universal plates and sheets of iron and steel, M.S. tubes and pipes, other metal manufactures, textile and leather machines, parts and accessories of motor vehicles, motor cycles, scooters, railway vehicles.

Maldives: Cane sugar, spices, medicine and pharmaceutical products, cotton fabrics, crude fertilizer, and different types of stone.

Nepal: Spices, crude vegetable materials, petroleum products, paper and paper board, textile yarn, cotton fabrics, cement and construction materials. metal manufactures, electrical machinary, spare parts, medicine and pharmaceuticals.

Pakistan: Wheat and meslin, tea, crude vegetable materials, rubber tyres and tubes, glassware, hard wood, mineral

manufactures, metal manufactures. parts and accessories of motor vehicle.

Sri Lanka: Fish dried, slated or smoked, vegetables fresh or frozen, cane sugar refined, spices, rice, cereal preparations, medicine and pharmaceuticals, textile yarn, cotton fabrics, iron and steel sheets, metal manufactures, internal combustion and piston engines, textile and leather machinery, machine tools and spares, heating and cooling equipment, electrical apparatus transport equipment, motor vehicles, scooters, electrical machinery, etc.

Bhutan: Diesel, petroleum, kerosene, coal, cooking gas, bitumen, rice, wheat, flour, dairy products, meat products pulses, sugar, molasses, edible oil, salt, tea, vegetables, oil seeds, fabrics, yarn, garments, jute, footwear, plastic goods, wood manufactures, medicine, cement, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, bricks, iron and steel pipes sheets, etc., hardwares, metal manufactures, agricultural equipment, refrigerator, metal working machinery, machinery appliances, fertilizer, wires, electric goods, toiletries, telecommunication apparatus, sewing machines, sanitary fitting, cosmetics, paints and varnishes, glassewares, sports goods, chemicals, etc.

C. Bhutan's Exports to South Asian Countries:

Bhutan's trade is almost exclusively with India. The main export items to India are cardamon, potato, chillies, orange, apple, lemon, pineapple, pear, ginger, tomato, pepper, catechu, betel nut, rice millet, pulses, soyabeans, mustard oil and oilseeds, menthol oil, turpentine, beauty powder, cold drinks, orange juice, jam mixed fruits, candles, kattha, liquors, cow skin, cane, bamboo, broom, boulder, line powder cement, sawn timber, tea chest panels, core veneers, sands and pebbles, dolomite chips, firewoods, etc.

D. Pakistan's Exports to South Asian Countries:

Bangladesh: Fruits and vegetables, coffee, cocoa. spices, sugar and honey, cereals, crude fertilizer, oilseeds, raw cotton, vegetable oils and fats, chemical elements and compounds, dying, tanning and colouring meterials, medicine, rubber manufactures, textile yarn and fabrics, metal manufactures, non-metallic mineral manufactures, machinery, clothing, seientific instruments.

India: Raw cotton.

Sri Lanka: Rice, dried fruits, sugar, cigarettes, cotton yarn, jute bags. Pakistan's exports to other South Asian countries is negligible.

E. Sri Lanka's Exports to South Asian Countries:

Bangludesh: Chanaks (conch-shell), arecanut oil, natural graphite, tyres for bicycles.

India: Dried vegetables shelled or split, cloves and clove steams, coconut oil, cocoa, residual fuel oils, furnace oil, cinamon leaf oil, natural rubber sheets, raw hides and skin, natural graphite.

Maldives: Meat and edible meat offals, arecanut, margarine, imitation lard and other edible fats, tobacco, non crude oils and motor spirit, medicaments.

Pakistan: Lobsters. black tea, betel leaves, arecanut, margarine, imitation lard and other prepared edible fats, natural graphite, cinematography film, natural rubber, teak logs, brooms and brushes, mineral wax, cardomon, coir yarn. dessicated coconut, copra, coconut oil.

Sri Lanka's trade with Nepal is very small and no trade connection exists with Bhutan.

F. Nepal's Exports to South Asian Countries

Bangladesh: Rice, pulses, railway slipper, sugar and honey, chemicals.

India: Butter, rice, maize, vegetables fresh, chilled or frozen, spices, animal feeding stuff, oilseeds and oleaginous fruit used for non-soft vegetable oil, wood rough, wood simply worked, railway slippers, wool and other animal hair, cutch extracts.

Pakistan: Large cardomon, fresh ginger, raw jute and cuttings jute bags, Catechu.

G. Maldives Exports to South Asian Countries:

India: Copal unworked or simply prepared, copal, cowries, chanks.

siles and the same of the same state of the same of th

and the same of the same of the same of the same

the ten promise and beginning the result

Pakistan: Fish. Sri Lanka: Fish.

Source: A.R. Bhuiya, op. cit.