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THE SUPERPOWERS, GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION

The end of the Second World War was followed by the emergence of a new international security order with the two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union - at the apex. The politico-military and ideological rivalries between the two superpowers have shaped, controlled and dominated the security order completely for the last four and half decades. The pre-Second World War Euro-centric international order was soon replaced and divided Europe became the major ground for the deadly rivalry and hectic competition of the two superpowers. The unending military confrontation soon found institutional expression in the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) respectively in 1949 and 1955. In the new European security system Germany remained divided and European members played the role of junior partners in both alliances. Major alliance decisions, especially the nuclear ones, have been formulated and dominated by the superpowers keeping in view their strategic and other considerations. The explicit and implicit objective of the U.S. - led NATO alliance was to contain and thwart the impending Soviet threat to European and American security. The United States became so capable of building a close and tight-knit politico-military interrelationships with the West

European countries that any independent urge for European security cooperation became a secondary consideration. The communist phobia was so prevailing in Europe that the West European States thought that their security could be best ensured within the NATO structure, although some sporadic efforts like the creation of the West European Union (WEU) were made.

The post-war superpower-dominated European security order is now in transition. The process of change has clearly and undoubtedly started with the bold initiatives of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to normalize East-West relations. The rigid military bipolarity produced by the cold war has waned almost totally creating new avenues for better understanding and cooperative relationship between the two superpowers. The Gorbachevian initiatives that range from nuclear arms reduction to conventional force withdrawal from Europe, human rights and trade with the West, have apparently succeeded to convince the West, more importantly the West Europeans, that the Soviet Union can be considered a reliable member of the European community. With these initiatives the alarming 'red threat' to Western security has receded considerably. The military alliances - NATO and Warsaw Pact - that have been the central mechanism in East-West security management since the Second World War, now seem to have lost their validity.

Until the mid 1980s the Western states insisted that any improvement in East-West relations be dependent on progress towards German unification and other manifestations of Soviet retrenchment in East Europe. The changing superpower relations have made the German unification a reality in Europe in a swift course of time. The democratization process in almost all East European states through the overthrow of all the 'old guards' indicate that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has not only retrenched in but also retreated from East Europe. It goes in close conformity with the explicit objective of post-War US-led Euro-

pean and international security order - reduction and perhaps elimination of the Soviet Communist threat. On the other hand, efforts for European security cooperation in a new European order are also underway. The erstwhile West European Union which was a loose alliance of major West European, NATO and European Community (EC) member countries for security policy has been reactivated in 1988. The EC integration is also linked to the security of Europe through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), although the latter has Canada and the US as its members. A multilateral structure called the European Political Cooperation (EPC) has been established within the EC to deal with political dimension of security. All these lead us to raise a series of questions : Would the West European countries, with the diminution of the Soviet threat need any security cooperation among themselves ? Would this cooperation be independent of the US or in collaboration with the US under the cover of NATO ? Can NATO, in view of the near-elimination of the military threats stemming from the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, have any rationale for the future defence of Western Europe ? Would the German unification undermine or strengthen European security cooperation and/or NATO ? What would be the position of the East European States in the new European security order ? What prospects do the European security cooperation hold for the future ? This paper proposes to examine and analyze these questions and related issues.

The paper is organized into four parts. The first part highlights the background of the West European security cooperation in order to understand the relevance for cooperation in security matters in the future. The second part examines the forces both favouring and opposing European security cooperation in an attempt to determine their impact on any security arrangements in Europe. In the third section an attempt is made to analyse the impact of Soviet-American changing relations on European Security Cooperation. Two pertinent issues, the

NATO and the German question, are to be addressed here. The last part of the paper examines the future prospects of West European cooperation in Security matters.

I. The Background to European Security Cooperation

In the aftermath of the Second World War West Europe faced a severe threat of communist expansion stemming from the Soviet Union. It prompted the United States to undertake responsibilities for the political, social and economic reconstruction of Europe. The major west European states accepted American role and, later, domination as the lone viable alternative to check and thwart communist ideological drive. The United States by that time was the world's supreme military power and also the only nuclear power. Therefore, she became capable of extending her security umbrella towards the recovering democracies of Western Europe.

Under the U.S. security umbrella and through the unhindered implementation of the Marshall Plan the West European countries succeeded in recovering from War ravages, solidify stable democratic governments and build strong national economies which now collectively rival that of the U.S. The U.S. role has, however, left a legacy of dependency in Europe. That dependency has manifested in the failure of West European countries to achieve in security matters the same degree of independence which they have achieved in economic matters. The only serious attempt they made to build a European security system was the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty of 1954. But the treaty could not be given a practical shape because of the opposition of the French. This immensely contributed to U.S. hegemonic role in Western security affairs. But within the NATO alliance there has been a persistent call for developing a new trans-Atlantic balance to reduce West European Security dependence on the U.S. Its basic objectives have been to give western Europe greater control of its own security

management and to relieve the U. S. partly of the defence burden of its allies.¹

President Kennedy first raised the voice to construct a 'European pillar' of the Atlantic Alliance. In an Independence Day speech in 1962 he called upon the West European countries to assume the role of "a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome task of building and defending a community of free nations."² The creation of a Multilateral Force (MLF) was the main objective behind Kennedy's call for 'Atlantic partnership'. The purpose of the MLF was to spread responsibility for nuclear deterrence and to raise the nuclear threshold through substantial increases in manpower and combat readiness in Europe.³ But effort like this made so far has ended in fiasco and the idea of 'Atlantic partnership', more specifically, the 'European pillar' of the Atlantic Alliance, has not been given a practical shape till now.

But prior to mid 1980s certain forces in international politics compelled the Atlantic partners to seriously rethink of having two pillars - one in Europe and the other in North America. The relative decline in American power which has occurred, at least, in part because of the economic integration of Western Europe is the first such force. The U.S. was facing increasing difficulties to cope with the economic burden of the defence of Europe. On the other hand, the West European 'peace movements' that gained major prominence in the 1970s and early 1980s and played major role against incessant U.S. nuclear weapons deployments on European soil was regarded as an expression of dissatisfaction in the domain of 'pax Americana'. Added to it, the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in East Europe in the latter half of the 1970s gave many Europeans the impression that the Soviet threat could not be

1. Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 244, (IISS, London, Autumn 1989), p. 3.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

3. *Ibid.*

neutralized by individual national action of European countries. The somewhat erosion of American hegemony and invulnerability at the hands of the Soviet and the pressure of the Nunn Amendment to increase West European defence expenditure added to the impetus of a sort of European security arrangement. The European leaders were in agreement that in order to provide an effective counterweight to US policy in NATO - on issues such as arms control and military strategy - a more coordinated approach was necessary. Finally, the economic difficulties faced by European defence industries and the need to address the affordability of major weapons systems have also provided a positive incentive to cooperation in security areas.⁴

The dramatic developments in Europe after mid 1980s and the realities arising out of the developments have undoubtedly forced the European leaders to ponder security arrangements in Europe in terms of their own. The developments, which are of an unprecedented character, clearly mark the end of the cold war and the cold war dominated security structure in Europe. They have also brought about basic changes in the mutual or collective threat perceptions among the European states. The West Europeans do not now perceive the Russians as an impending source of threats as they did until Gorbachev's assumption of power in the Kremlin. On the other hand, the new developments have also set in motion superpowers' disengagement from Europe. The Soviet Union has already started disengaging itself from Eastern Europe, the so-called Soviet security belt created after 1945 to withstand western imperialistic aggression. In the changed situation, despite her nearly half century politico-economic and military involvement in Europe, the United States would find no strong rationale to justify her previous direct role in future European affairs. Therefore, it

4. James B. Steinberg, "European Defence Cooperation : Why Now ?" in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt (eds), *Europe in the Western Alliance : Towards a European Defence Entity*, (The Macmillan Press, London, 1988), p. 53.

seems that the ultimate goal and destiny of Europe would be determined and achieved by the Europeans themselves. It makes European cooperation in Security matters more imperative than anything else.

II. Forces Favouring and Opposing Security Cooperation

There is, indeed, a number of identifiable powerful forces that have worked both for and against security cooperation in the past. These forces are still believed to exert major influence on any future security arrangements in Europe. Although it is not possible to classify them, we may, however, place the issues of the uncertainty of the American extended nuclear guarantee for West European security and the unequal burden sharing in NATO in the category of favouring forces, while issues like the U.S. commitment to West Europe and the conflicting security interests of sovereign West European states can be included in the category of opposing forces. In most cases, however, these forces have overlapping trends that make the classification less pertinent.

Extended Nuclear Deterrence

The US security umbrella extended to post-war Western Europe included nuclear guarantee too. The West European states were guaranteed nuclear security against possible Soviet nuclear attack. But by the decade of 1960s, the validity of the extended nuclear guarantee was questioned and doubted by the Europeans as the Soviet Union by that time attained parity in nuclear weapons with the United States. French president De Gaulle first voiced concern about the basic requirement of extended deterrence. Under any deterrence doctrine, deterrence in Europe depends ultimately on the willingness of the United States to put its own population and cities at risk on behalf of West European defence. The U.S. is committed to fight communism in Europe and elsewhere but she may not be committed to save West

Europe by destroying her cities and killing millions of her own population. It led many West European leaders including the British to take the view that an independent nuclear deterrent was an essential insurance policy to cover the risk of dependence on American nuclear protection against the Soviet Union. It was clearly the basic impetus behind West European quest for maintaining independent strategic nuclear forces. The French and the British argued that their nuclear forces would act as insurance against US failure to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The European obsession with independent nuclear deterrents, however, demonstrated the concern felt in West Europe about being abandoned by the United States, a fear that it may become decoupled either before or after a conflict begins.⁵

The West European concern over American nuclear guarantee points out to the fact that European and American interests in the nuclear issue are far from identical. The US nuclear security policy has been generally inimical to European security interests. The most recent example is the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), originally promulgated by former US president Ronald Reagan in 1983. SDI aims at rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete through strategic defences but it has nothing to do with European defence against Soviet nuclear attack. As a result, the principle of a community of risk and indeed the ethics of nuclear deterrence against the Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, were implicitly rendered debatable by a US president.⁶ It was undoubtedly forcing the West European leaders to extend cooperation in common security interests.

On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that extended deterrence largely discouraged the West Europeans to embark on

5. Stuart Croft, "The Impact of Strategic Defence on European American Relations in the 1990s" *Adelphi Papers*, No. 238, (IISS, London, Spring 1989) p. 17.

6. Ian Gambles, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

building a security system independent of the United States. Immediately after the Second World War the West European states had no nuclear defence system and, therefore, in the absence of American deterrence they could easily fall prey to Soviet expansionism. Even the current Franco-British nuclear forces are very much insignificant to match those of the Soviet Union.⁷ So it was impossible for the Europeans to build a security system without American nuclear security guarantee.

Unequal burden-sharing

The major part of NATO's defence burden is shared by the United States. The contribution by the European allies has been always below the mark. But starting from 1949 up to 1986 the US share in NATO defence expenditure has been constantly on the increase. In the year 1979 the US alone contributed 62.04% of the total NATO defence expenditure. In 1983 and 1986 her shares were 65.95% and 68.77% respectively. The succeeding two years' shares, however, show a slightly decreasing trend. The percentage figures for 1987 and 1988 were respectively 67.72% and 67.18%.⁸ The recent decline in US economic power may be said to have been responsible for her declining share in NATO defence burden. It has also made her highly critical of the West European countries which share a limited amount of the total NATO military expenditure. In 1988 there was a strident call from US sources, at all levels, for a greater economic contribution by the European allies to the common defence. Z. Brezezinski, a former US National Security Adviser, summed it up : "Surely 374 million Europeans with an aggregate economy of \$ 3.5 trillion

7. In strategic nuclear forces alone the Soviet Union has 1386 ICBM, 36 Theatre SLBM, and 1195 Strategic bombers in comparison to Britain's 64 SLBM, France's 96 SLBM, and 18 Strategic bombers. Source : *The Military Balance 1988/89* (London, IISS, 1988).

8. *SIPRI Yearbook 1989*, p. 193. (Percentages are counted from figures given in US \$, at 1986 prices and exchange rates).

should not need to depend for their defense as heavily as they do on 241 million Americans with an economy of \$ 4 trillion against an opponent with 275 million and a GNP of only \$ 1.9 trillion.⁹ Most recently, the Reagan and Bush administrations, in cooperation with the NATO authorities, have sought to recast the burden sharing issue under the rubric of 'shared roles, risk and responsibilities in the Alliance' and a major report has been issued on this issue by the NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC).¹⁰ Besides, a section of senators and representatives in the U.S. congress strongly oppose large-scale American financial contribution for European defence. U.S. senators like Pat Schroeder and Richard Gephardt have given voice to a popularly felt resentment at the perceived exploitation of the U.S. by its allies. They want the West Europeans contribute a higher portion of the cost of defending their own continent. America's recent budgetary difficulties, her trade disputes with the EC and, in some cases, European opposition to US security policy such as French refusal of overflight rights for the Tripoli raid in 1986 or the Spanish decision in 1987/88 to close the US air base at Torrejon reinforced the position of these groups in the Congress.¹¹

In fact U.S. criticism of the inequitable distribution of the defence burden has been a direct incentive to the progress of a European security arrangement. The slow increase of European share to NATO defence budget, especially after 1986, was perhaps influenced by American criticism and pressure to some extent.

The issue of unequal burden sharing has also worked as a major disincentive to European security cooperation. The development of a European security system would have required major financial contribution which could be possible

9. Quoted in *SIPRI Yearbook* 1989, p. 141.

10. Ian Gambles, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

only through the redirection of resources from socio-economic development to the military sector. Since the US-led NATO arrangement provided maximum security guarantee the West Europeans carefully avoided security cooperation among themselves.

The American Commitment

The American commitment to European security has undoubtedly worked as the most powerful discouraging force to European security cooperation. The general view to which most Europeans subscribe is that, for all practical purposes, the signing of the NATO in 1949 put a stop to the first serious effort made so far to form a separate European defence entity.¹² Earlier, a beginning had been made to establish a common European defence with the Brussels Treaty signed by the UK, France and the three Benelux countries in March 1948, but this endeavour was discarded when NATO negotiations with U.S. and Canadian participation were initiated. Since then the major European states have accepted the idea that their security was dependent on the militarily powerful United States and they were willing to accept a subordinate role in the alliance. On the other hand, with the passage of time NATO, despite some deep internal crises such as the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command in 1966 and the deep divisions over the INF deployments in the 1980s, has proved an extremely resilient alliance. This crisis management capacity of the alliance has been perhaps the most powerful disincentive for the development of West European security cooperation. As a result, even the construction of a European pillar of the alliance has remained a matter of not serious concern to the Europeans.

In some cases, the United States has also often produced counter-pressure towards increased European cooperation

12. See Niels J. Hagerup and Christian Thune, "Problems of Transition" in Jonathan and Kenneth Hunt (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 84.

in security issues. The U.S. has single-handedly dominated NATO all through the past years but the institutional development of European security cooperation might put an end to her dominating role in the alliance. It could also create possibilities that might oblige her to negotiate alliance decisions on equal or even on inferior terms with Western Europe as a bloc. This fear has perhaps prompted the US to express her dislike of European independent security efforts. In December 1984, for example, in the early stages of the revival of the WEU, a sharp circular letter from then US Assistant Secretary of State warned the European allies against forming a collective view on arms control issues outside the NATO framework.¹³

Conflicting Security Interests of European States

In the post-war Europe common threat emanating from the Communist Soviet Russia created common security perceptions which brought all European states under common security arrangement. It helped minimise differences between and among west European states and brought into being cooperative structures designed to foster unity. But the indulging rationale of the common security structure began to cease with the diminution of the Soviet threat. As a result, security perceptions in Europe have again begun to be conflicting. Now most European states perceive alternative source of threats, although not of universal character like the Soviet threat, from another powerful neighbour, notably Germany, the formidable economic and also military power. Indeed, German unification has alarmed many states including France and the UK to rethink of their security. Among the East European states Poland is particularly concerned about German threat as she controls a portion of German territory east of Oder-Neisse rivers. All other members of NATO have so far kept close military contact with the US only to fend off the

13. Ian Gambles, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

bogey of the Franco-German and British domination. Belgium and the Netherlands have always directed their diplomacy to hold the balance among these three big neighbours and to find allies against the hegemonic tendencies of one or the other.¹⁴ The increase of German power through unification may prompt these states to join in alliance either with France or Britain. In that case there are possibilities for the initiation of a process of security alliances in Europe akin to inter-war period.

There are, also, some other indications that hold wide possibilities for conflicting security perceptions among European states. For example, the issue of modernization of NATO's short range nuclear forces and the negotiations with the Soviet Union on their reduction or elimination had brought the then West Germany and the U.K. into sharp conflict. Besides, further developments in nuclear arms control may bring British and French interests into conflict with those of non-nuclear European states which would prefer a non-nuclear Europe. The historic mutual antipathy between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean also points to divergent security interests that may retard, although at the minimum level, the development of a European common security structure.

However, development of commonality in security perception is a time-consuming process. The West European states united after World War II to withstand external threat. The internal issues like border and ethnic conflicts have remained dormant during the past years. If sincere efforts are made, what seems to be logical in the changed circumstances, the internal spectre of insecurity can be effectively overcome.

III. Changing Superpower Relations and the Issue of Cooperation.

The dramatic changes that have recently occurred in superpower relations have evidently brought the issue of Euro-

14. *Ibid*, p. 14.

pean security cooperation into the forefront. The changes have undoubtedly influenced the European states to rethink of their security in a new perspective. The *raison d'etre* of the post-war security arrangement under the umbrella of NATO - the need to respond collectively to the Communist threat - has faded away. And as Soviet threats to Western security recede the need for collective response diminishes correspondingly. In the absence of Soviet threat in Western security perceptions relations between the two competing power blocs may rather improve steadily.

The spectrum of improved relations has, however, brought about some new developments on the European political scene. The new developments include such issues as the German unification and the debate about the continued existence of NATO. The unification of Germany has created a sense of insecurity among the Europeans including the Russians. Germany's past political behaviour and her role in precipitating the two World Wars are obviously responsible for future German phobia. Therefore, the questions that naturally arise are : with a unified Germany what sort of security cooperation does Europe need now ? Would the cooperation be against Germany or any other power ?

United Germany and Europe

Although the German nation has a long chronology of divisions and unifications, the German state was territorially bifurcated for the last time following the defeat of Adolf Hitler in the Second World War. Since then the German question has remained at the heart of East-West relations for more than four consecutive decades. The question has recently been settled following a 'two-plus-four' formula where four principal victors of the Second World War and the erstwhile two German states participated to discuss and reach conclusion on the internal and external issues of unification. The completion of the

unification process has proven Stalin right in his prediction that, in the long run, it would be impossible to keep Germany down and divided.¹⁵

The unification of the two German states has brought some major changes in the economic and military power structures of Europe in particular and the world in general. With a formidable fast growing export economy the erstwhile Federal Republic was Europe's leading economic power. Unification with East Germany will ultimately add new impetus to it. Table 1 shows United Germany's position within the community of European nations.

The table reveals that except area, united Germany is in a leading position in all other respects. Especially in the areas of GDP, exports and strength of armed forces Germany's dominance is a prevailing fact. The important thing to note is that she nearly exceeds the combined position of France and Britain in economic power.

The recent breakdown of the cold war structure in Europe has further widened the prospects for German economic boost. From economic view point Germany is best positioned to make major investments in Eastern Europe. This has already created a feeling among the Europeans that the 1990s would be a decade for the Germans alone. It can be said that if German economic power develops at its present rapid pace in the future the combined economic power of major West European states would probably fail to counter-balance her. It may put Germany in a position to dominate Europe perpetually.

15. Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification : Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power" in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXIX, July-August 1990, p. 1.

Table-1 : United Germany at the European Level.

Basic Indicators	United Germany	France	Britain	Italy	Belgium*	Spain*
1.Area (in thousands of sq. miles)	138	210	94	117	31	505
2.Population (in millions, 1988)	78	56	57	57	9.9	39.0
3.GDP (in billions \$ 1988)	1412.9	762	755	754	153.81	340.32
4.Growth of GDP (average annual growth rate in percent 1980-88)	1.8**	1.8	2.8	2.2	1.4	2.5
5.Total exports (in billions \$ '88)	354	168	145	129	88.95	40.45
6.Growth of exports (Percentage 1980-88)	4.6**	3.4	3.1	3.8	4.7	7.7
7.Total Armed Forces (in thousands '88), +	660.7	456.9	316.7	386	88.3	309.5

Source : *The Time*, March 26, 1990.

* Data on Belgium and Spain and growth rates of GDP and exports for all countries are taken from World Bank, *World Development Report, 1990*.

** The Figure is for FRG alone.

+ Data on Armed Forces are from *The Military Balance 1988-89*, IISS, London.

On the global econo-military level United Germany also occupies a very significant position. Table 2 shows United Germany's position at the global level in comparison to other leading economic and military powers.

Table-2 : United Germany at the Global Level.

Basic Indicators	(1988 Data)			
	United Germany	United States	Japan	USSR
1.GNP per capita (in US \$)	13,987	19,770	14,340	8,850
2.Exports (in billion \$)	354.1	321.6	264.9	110.6
3.Balance of Trade (in billion \$)	73.9	-138	77.5	3.3
4.Total GDP (in billion \$)	1,412.9	4864	2570.6	2535
5.Total Armed Forces (in thousands)	668.1	593	290	2458

Source : *Newsweek*, February 26, 1990.

It is evident from the above statistics that united Germany has risen to the status of an economic superpower. At least, in the area of exports she dominates world economy and maintains a favourable position in her balance of trade. In the year 1989 alone the Germans produced a gross national product of close to \$ 1.3 trillion, invested \$ 63.8 billion abroad, and rang up a trade surplus of \$ 71.2 billion.¹⁶ While the United States exports only 11% of its output Germany exports 37% of everything it makes.¹⁷

16. *Newsweek*, July 9, 1990.

17. M. Aminul Islam, "German Unification and a New Europe", in *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1990, p. 375.

Although in military power United Germany occupies no major position in the World she has nevertheless the most formidable army in Europe with 1.8 million regulars and reservists. Perhaps, a sort of German military phobia that dominated millions of Europeans till the end of the Second World War has forced the two superpowers to get United Germany compelled to maintain a low military profile and reduce her armed forces by significant numbers. The Soviet Union, in particular, became extremely concerned about the rise of militarism in the Unified Germany. Therefore, the Russians got a terse statement codified in the Zheleznovodsk agreement between Mikhail Gorbachev and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Statement reads : A unified Germany will refrain from producing, owning, or controlling atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and will continue to adhere to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.¹⁸

The other European states seem to be more concerned about the rise of German economic power than military might. The French and the British position on Unified Germany, which is also shared by the United States, delineates this point clearly.¹⁹ Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher showed less enthusiasm for German unity. She publicly expressed the concern that the spread of German economic preponderance in Central and East Europe would ultimately lead Germany to opt for a 'looser' confederation than pursuing the 'deepening' of integration in the West alone. Mrs. Thatcher's fear of an economically preponderant Germany undermining integration in the West arose out of some realities like Germany's public and private resources, technological advancement, and super management skills. These resources are

18. Hannes Adomeit, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

19. For Franco-British position on German unity see Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the German Question" in *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, July-August 1990, pp. 293-4.

such that they allow Germany to hold the economic course in East European zone which realists consider a power vacuum created after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. It may push Germany to go for developing stronger ties with the countries of the power vacuum zone while giving less importance to the EC integration process.

The French views regarding Germany's economic dominance more or less reflect the British concern. They fear the growing German economic and monetary predominance in Europe, particularly in the East, as a strong counter to their own position. Over the past years, France has concentrated particular economic efforts on Poland and Rumania but her efforts cannot match those of her much more export-oriented neighbour. Besides, France also fears a loss of German interests in a further deepening of the EC, in so far as either full monetary union or political institutional reform would place new constraints on the Bundesbank and the German government. If constraints are not imposed a European single market and monetary system controlled by the Bundesbank would be entirely in Germany's interests. On the contrary, imposition of constraints aimed at checking German economic dominance may force a powerful Germany decline to accept any such constraints and refuse to pursue economic policies more confined to the narrower horizons of Western Europe.

The East European nations which badly need foreign economic and technological assistance to put the wheel of their economies back on the track seem to be also concerned about German economic dominance over them in the future. The Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians want their economies not to be dominated and controlled by Germany or any particular nation. This is perhaps the reason why they are equally eager for other investors from Western Europe, Japan and the US.

The American realists are specifically concerned about the danger of a nuclear Germany.²⁰ They believe that a multipolar world is more unstable than a bipolar world and hence, the withdrawal of superpowers from the two halves of Europe is likely to exacerbate inter-state conflicts and to create the danger of a nuclear Germany. The assumption underlying this view is that so far NATO has assured the survival and security of West Germany but a United Germany which is no longer to be constrained by NATO may opt for ensuring its own survival and security by any means including the nuclear option. This view is also shared by London and Paris that prefer a United Germany integrated into NATO.

According to a German view, the post-war order in Europe was beholden to two specific purposes : the explicit one was dedicated to the containment of Soviet power and the implicit one was devoted to the constraint of Germany, the previous claimant to European hegemony.²¹ The explicit purpose has waned with the appearance of a new image-bound Soviet Union. And the implicit purpose is difficult to be maintained in the changing politico - strategic landscape in Europe. In fact, in the absence of a cold-war structure in Europe German power will revive vigorously in several directions.²²

First, the waning of German dependence on NATO for security guarantee will increase its margin of diplomatic manoeuvre in the West. Second, the retraction of Soviet power widens Germany's access to Eastern Europe where it is best positioned to convert economic prowess into political influence. Third, the end of military bipolarity in Europe enhances peculiar

20. *Ibid*, p. 294.

21. Josef Joffe, "Once More : The German Question", in *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, March-April 1990, p. 131.

22. See, *Ibid*, p. 136.

sources of German power. The political value of economic potency and geo-strategic location are bound to bring Germany once again at the centre of European power.

However, the fear of German economic dominance and military might seems to be more exaggerated than real. It would be rather unjust to judge Germany's economic rise and prospects for military resurgence by the criterion of the historical past. The present day situation is entirely different. The erstwhile FRG has thoroughly reformed its political, educational and class systems in conformity with other Western states. With the passage of more than four decades since 1945 there has surely occurred change in German mentality and psychology. So far as security is concerned a state rarely opts for complete revision of its security policy until and unless it is threatened by the fear of encirclement by other states hostile to it. In Germany's case there is no such fear. As long as she maintains close relations with France, the UK and the US, and friendly ties with the USSR, Germany is free of any sort of threat to her security. On the other hand, Germany has no powerful neighbour that may create the danger of war. All these give less justification to Germany's resurgence as a military giant.

As for economic dominance, Germany is surely in a position to dominate Europe. But through her long involvement in the EC structure Germany in the past years has obviously developed a cooperative behaviour and a tendency to make concessions to others. Therefore, a powerful Germany would not be necessarily an economic threat to other European states. German economic assistance to East Europe would also bring about prosperity in that impoverished part of Europe.

Despite all these the prospects for the rise of German power, economic and military, creates a sort of nervousness among the European states. The Soviet Union being Europe's largest conven-

tional power, and one of the World's two nuclear giants, is also not immune from this nervousness.

The USSR, Germany and NATO

In the post-war period NATO was the ultimate Euro-American choice for Western security. But the recent demise of its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, which has been formally dissolved at a meeting of the foreign and defence ministers of the member states held in Budapest on February 25, this year,²³ has put the continued validity of NATO into question. Since 1949 NATO has basically rested on a three-legged base of "Soviet obduracy, European dependency, and American prosperity",²⁴ but all these three conditions have now changed. Then, would NATO fade away by giving way to the creation of a new European security order? Or is there any convergence of Russo-American and European interests that creates pressures for its continued existence?

The Russian attitude towards NATO has been traditionally inimical. The Soviets have sought to destabilize and dissolve NATO by creating dissension among the European partners of the alliance. The new Soviet leader Gorbachev was no exception. He has although opposed NATO's continued existence as a military entity. Rather his earlier views were that with the demands of the time both NATO and Warsaw Pact should be transformed into a new kind of organizations. Such views were particularly expressed during the 2-3 December, 1989 Bush-Gorbachev Malta Summit. Gorbachev stated that NATO and Warsaw Pact "should not remain military alliances" but instead evolve into "military political alliances and, later on, just political alliances".²⁵

23. *The Bangladesh Observer*, Feb. 26, 1991.

24. Jasjit Singh, "The future of NATO" in *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIII, No. 9, December 1990, p. 981.

25. Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO" in *Survival*, Vol. XXXII No. 2, March/April, 1990, p. 144

The changes that occurred after the Malta Summit contributed to the building of a new Europe. The issue of German unification was moving, although slowly, towards having a practical dimension. But Gorbachev still remained unconvinced to see NATO operating in Europe. In an interview he recently stated :

"NATO is associated with the cold war ... as an organization designed from the start to be hostile to the Soviet Union, as a force that whipped up the arms race and the danger of war. Regardless of what is being said about NATO now, for us it is a symbol of the past, a dangerous and confrontational past. And we will never agree to assign to it the leading role in building a new Europe. I want us to be understood correctly on this".²⁶

Although Gorbachev denied to assign to NATO 'the leading role in building a new Europe' at least one significant factor that reflects high Soviet security concern brought about change in his perception. This factor is united Germany's future military status in Europe.

The West, since the initial stage of German unification process, upheld the view that a unified Germany must remain within NATO alliance. The Bush plan of 4 December 1989 clearly required that a united Germany be a part of NATO. But the Soviets had diametrically opposite views on this question. In his address to the Political Commission of the European Parliament, on 19 December 1989, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that one of the issues that had to be resolved before unification could be discussed was that the GDR could not be expected to leave the Warsaw Pact while the FRG remained in NATO.²⁷ The Soviet military subscribed to the same view on this

26. *Time*, June 4, 1990.

27. Peter Corterier, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

issue. Col. Gen. Nikolay F. Chervov, a Soviet military officer, has written that a united Germany in NATO would be "definitely unacceptable, both politically and psychologically, to the Soviet people. It would seriously upset the military balance of strength that has developed in Europe".²⁸ The Soviet leaders opposed united Germany's participation in NATO for two reasons.²⁹ First, it feared that in future, with the US reducing its forces in Europe, Germany might become the dominant member of the alliance, and second, after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and essentially the disappearance of the GDR, a united Germany in NATO would represent the victory of one of the 'blocs' over the other. This was perhaps the only reason as to why the Soviets have sought a united Germany with a neutral and demilitarised status. The Soviet President Gorbachev was also influenced by this factor.

Some Soviet officials, however, argued Germany's future status differently. The view to which they subscribed was that "the Soviets want to keep the US in Europe and would prefer a Germany integrated into NATO' and the common market to an independent Germany". This view was also shared by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.³⁰

In addition, the Soviets now also recognize US economic, military, security and political involvement in European affairs. It is said that Gorbachev's concept of the 'common house of Europe' has always included the idea that the US should play an important role in European affairs. Based on the philosophy of the 'Common House of Europe' leading proponents of 'new political thinking' have advanced a number of logics as to why this should be so.³¹

28. Quoted in Hannes Adomeit, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

29. Stanley Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

30. Peter Corterier, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

31. Hannes Adomeit, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

First, the economic ties that bind the US and Europe are objectively stronger than the issues that divide them. Second, the advances in transport and communications technology have significantly reduced the geographical distance between the US and Europe. Third, in security terms, America is now as close to Europe as Great Britain was at the beginning of the century. During the early years of the present century Great Britain was the predominant military power of Europe. Therefore, she was capable of playing the role of an effective balancer against German and French dominance in Europe. After World War-II America has been entrusted with a similar assignment against the Soviet Union. It paved the way for her to get an inseparable economic and military involvement in Europe. In practical terms, even after the demise of the Soviet military dominance the abolition of US military presence in Europe would be impossible because American policy-makers have no intention of disengaging the US from Europe. The fact is that the greater attention given to Asia-Pacific region can not be a substitute for US involvement in Europe. Rather, US military presence in Europe helps maintain European salutary influence on American policy and military strategy. Finally, US withdrawal from Europe could create fears and feelings of insecurity in some of the West European countries which would not work in Soviet Union's favour, because that might induce the Europeans to strengthen their defences.

The subsequent Soviet policies towards United Germany's future status in Europe have necessarily been guided by the above views. And the objective that can be found behind Soviet recognition of united Germany's membership in NATO and continued American presence in European affairs is to control and curb Germany militarily. Despite it, the Soviet President Gorbachev did his best to obtain the assurance from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany no nuclear weapons or foreign troops would be stationed in that part of German territory.³²

32. *Ibid*, p. 16.

For the United States NATO is the only formal vehicle that establishes her linkages with Europe. The other European organizations like the EEC or CSCE deny the US any direct role in European affairs. The EC-1992 process, on the other hand, may emerge as an alternate to NATO and tend to ignore American role in shaping the future of Europe. This would be surely a great loss for the Americans in their global strategic posture. Despite Soviet inactiveness in international politics the American leaders are reluctant to downgrade their global strategic balance in the world, especially in Europe. So to keep the US-European coupling intact the Americans are still obsessed with the continuation of NATO. They put forward the following two strong logics in support of their position.

First, NATO can be the best guarantee against any future revival of German militarism about which the Soviet Union and some European states, especially Poland, are afraid of. Second, the US policy-makers believe that a military machinery is the only means that can provide future security guarantee for Europe. This approach is based on the belief that NATO has won the cold war and it will continue to provide a security structure to Europe.³³

Among the European states the UK is most vocal for an uninterrupted continuation of NATO. She is also in the forefront of advocating an expansion of its role. Perhaps, the close and almost similar Anglo-American stand on international issues may be the reason for it. However, a representative European view on NATO's future and US role in Europe can be found in Michael Howard's arguments. Howard, a prominent European scholar on international relations, argues that the Atlantic alliance should be sacrosanct and especially sacrosanct should be the participation of the United States. He finds three strong reasons for it.³⁴

33. For such views, see O. N. Mehrotra "New European Security Order" in *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIII, No. 8, November 1990, pp. 902 and 904.

34. See Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe" in *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, March/April, 1990,

First, the Soviet Union, despite her recent moves, will remain a very strong military power with a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons. And it will remain, at least for the time being, an alien power with different sets of values and structures. Gorbachev's vision of a 'Common European Home' will take a long time to be materialized. But, in the mean time, Soviet powers, conventional and nuclear, need to be balanced in Europe by that of the US.

Second, the German unification requires the continuation of the Atlantic alliance. An alliance without the US would be an alliance dominated by Germany. The peoples of Europe including the Soviet Union, rightly or wrongly, would see this as a threat. The West European allies would feel uneasy to live with an emerging powerful Germany. This will need America to balance German influence in Europe.

Third, the Atlantic alliance was intended not as a temporary expedient but as a supra-national community that would last long, not only protecting but also enriching its members. So its purposes demand an uninterrupted continuation of the alliance.

The German views on NATO's future stands to be in close conformity with that of the British. A prominent German journalist scholar defends NATO on three basic grounds.³⁵ First, there must be a reliable counter-weight to the Soviet Union which, though no longer a direct threat, does pose a latent problem to European security. The Soviet Union is inherently an unstable country and it packs a big punch. Second, NATO is the only institution that might at least slow down the renationalization of defence and then the return to the old rivalries that specifically torn Europe during the inter-war period. NATO is also the only institution that has defused and still can defuse the problem of

35. See Josef Joffe, "The Security Implications of a United Germany", in *America's Role in a changing World, Adelphi Papers*, No. 257, part II, IISS, London, Winter 1990/91, pp. 90-91.

German power. The fear of the rise of German nationalism and militarism can be checked through the preservation of the Atlantic framework that NATO provides. Third, NATO should also be viewed as the counterweight against the uncertainties of German and Soviet power which Europe cannot hope to deal with alone. This would be the most reliable anchor to draw closer a west-ward-drifting US.

The analysis made here points to the fact that both the Soviet Union and the European states find continued NATO operation in Europe conducive to their respective security interests. The common factor that brings their interests to the convergence point is the fear of possible resurgence of German militarism. United Germany also favours the continued operation of NATO.

IV. Prospects for Cooperation

The wide-ranging changes in East-West relations have certainly increased the independence of European states in their security decision-making. Apparently, they have no existing major and serious source of threat as was the Soviet Union in the past and their past dependence for security guarantee on the United States would not be as strong in the future as it was in the post-war world. It can be said that the time is there to decide what sort of security order they would prefer for Europe. But certain serious tendencies, as discussed in the previous sections, tend to undermine independent European cooperation in security matters. These tendencies, as such the fear of German military resurgence and US obsession with NATO etc., actually tend to support the NATO-based post-cold war security structure in Europe. In the changed politico-economic and strategic perspectives some other factors have also appeared that are believed to make deep impact on future European security arrangement. These factors merit our discussion in their proper perspective.

The post-war European security order was based on the fear of Soviet expansionism. But the Soviet card can no longer be used to put into operation a new European security order. In fact, Gorbachev's vision of a 'Common European House' puts up the fact that the Soviet Union is an integral part of Europe. Any future European security order is, therefore, bound to involve the Soviet Union. Attempts to create military oriented security system in Europe without Soviet cooperation and participation is most likely to be challenged by the Soviets in the future. The Soviet Union would rightly or wrongly perceive it as an emerging encirclement built to undermine her security or as an attempt to oust her from the common European house. The Soviet leader Stalin created a circle of satellite states in Eastern Europe exactly for security reasons and did everything to keep Germany down and divided. This security maintenance measure has come to an end with Soviet withdrawal from East Europe. It has drawn her closer to the West European nations and for that matter to the United States. Despite it if the Soviets find anything practically inimical to their interests, that might unleash cold war style competition between the West and the USSR.

The Europeans, on their part, have so far adopted two distinct approaches to build a stable security order in their continent. The first approach relates to the EC process that seeks security through economic integration and the second approach is based on the CSCE process that advocates a broader security canvas with the involvement of extra-European powers - the US and Canada.³⁶

The EC stands for economic integration of West European states and stresses more on economics than anything else to security. The basic rationale behind this approach seems to be the idea that integration in economic matters necessarily expedites integration in all other matters including security. The EC has

36. See O. N. Mehrotra, *op. cit.*, pp. 905-7.

been making frantic efforts to turn Europe into a single economic unit. The West European states have agreed to form the European Union (EU) of EC members by 1992 with the creation of a supranational structure under parliamentary control. But it deals more with matters of details than with a grand design of security dimension. Of the over 200 directives, to be issued by the European Commission and approved by the Council of Ministers, no one directly relates to security. Its only apparent connection with defence is through the overlap between civil and defence industries and technologies.³⁷

Even if the EC-1992 process takes a practical security dimension there would appear certain difficulties to put this approach into operation. First, it would require the member states to surrender some of their conventional sovereignty rights to the EC supra-national structure. The member states may find it difficult to do so. Second, the EC-1992 process, in the changed European situation, cannot but eventually involve the East European states in the all-European security order. Some of the newly democratic countries of East Europe - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic have recently applied for EC membership. But EC membership is approved on the basis of the fulfillment of certain economic and socio-political EC norms by the applicant states. East European states may take years to fulfill such norms. Therefore, the final shape of the EC approach to security may remain open for many years.

The CSCE approach, on the other hand, envisions a pan-European security order in a broad-based perspective. This approach was launched in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act signed by 35 nations including the US and Canada as non-European parties. The CSCE is a multilateral forum created to promote

37. Ian Gambles, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

security in Europe by placing it in a larger context of East-West cooperation based on the overriding principle of non-violent resolution of conflicts.³⁸ At the same time it has also emphasized the need to create confidence-building measures among the member states. In the changing East-West relations the objectives of the CSCE have not lost validity but gained further prominence.

However, the major weakness of the CSCE approach is that it has no permanent institutional structure. A permanent governing body is a must for any approach to be effective. Besides, the encompassing character of the CSCE makes it less attractive as an effective alternative to replace the existing order. It is generally viewed that the CSCE idea is actually a very old one - a return to the collective security concept of the 1920s and 1930s.³⁹ A security alliance and a collective security system differ in basic character. A collective security system is the very opposite of an alliance which is built on pre-conflict commitment and a determinate foe. The rule of the Three Musketeers : one for all, and all for one, is the basic principle on which the idea of collective security is based. Under it whoever breaks the peace would encounter the sanctions of all the others, regardless of national interests or geographical position. But history is replete with the failure of such systems. One may recall here the hapless history of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie who went before the League of Nations in 1935 to invoke collective security against Italian aggression of his country.

The United States remains a non-European party to the CSCE approach. But it is most likely that she would be definitively less enthusiastic to support this approach as it puts limits to her direct role in European affairs. The US official position towards it is

38. Michael R. Lucas, *The Western Alliance After the INF : Redefining US Policy Towards Europe and the Soviet Union*, (London, 1990), p. 224.

39. Josef Joffe, "The Security Implications of a United Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 88.

unfriendly. In the 1970s Henry Kissinger, echoing US official opinion, was convinced that the CSCE would be a shortlived experiment and he upbraided West Europeans for making so much of the Helsinki Final Act.⁴⁰ No shift in US policy towards the CSCE has been declared since then.

The scope for European security cooperation is, therefore, very limited. External variables like superpowers' inseparable presence and internal variables like the phobia of German militarism effectively narrow down the avenues for the creation of a new European security order. This reality pushes forward the major European states to support the continued existence of NATO. In the changed circumstances, NATO's two major objectives remain to counter probable threats, potential and actual, that may stem from Gorbachev's Soviet Union in the future, and to contain the future outburst of German militarism.

The prevailing realities in Europe actually deny the building of a new European security order. Perhaps the most viable option remains to be the effective development of a 'European pillar' of the Atlantic alliance which President Kennedy called for in 1962. This option appears to be beneficial to both European and American interests. For the US it would be a positive step to relieve herself of the pressure of unequal burden sharing and for the Europeans it would put a permanent check to the threats to their future security and stability.

New exclusive European security arrangement in conformity with changing politico-economic and strategic realities, as our analysis suggests, appears to be very difficult. The implications of the changing realities are so pervasive that they discourage the European leaders to exploit the benefits of the changed situation. It also creates a tendency among them not only to accept but also

40. Michael R. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

to maintain the status quo in their security decision-making. It seems that the Europeans for an indefinite time would find themselves quite incapable of discarding their legacy of security dependency on the United States. NATO, the hallmark of such dependency, still stands valid for European security and permits the Americans, despite the fall of the Russians, maintain and tighten their grasp in European affairs. One may recall here Lord Ismay's somewhat cynical formula that NATO was "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down".⁴¹ In European perspective this formula still stands valid in terms of undermining independent European cooperation in the security realm.

41. Quoted in Manfred R. Hamm and Holger H. Mey, "Transatlantic Relations and the Future of European Security" in *Strategic Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Spring 1990, p.44.