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EXPLAINING DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN INDIA AND INSTABILITY IN BRAZIL: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DETERMINANTS

Abstract

This paper explains the phenomena of democratic stability and breakdown in two industrially advanced developing countries, India and Brazil respectively. Key variables used are economic-military dependency, economic development, and civil-military relations. None of the existing explanations for the stability of the Indian democracy and the 1964 breakdown of the Brazilian democracy combine both internal and external variables. Modifying the existing mono-causal explanations, this paper argues that interactions among such variables as economic and military dependence on the United States and the multilateral financial institutions, and role of the military and the counter-hegemonic forces account for most of the variations between the two cases. A combination of prolonged economic crises, weak, polarized and fragmented political institutions, counter-hegemonic forces, pro-US Cold War policies, and dependence on the US military aid caused the breakdown of Brazilian democracy in 1964. Quite opposite nature of these factors and interactions among them accounted for democratic stability in India. It also finds that prolonged economic crises coupled with mild counter-hegemonic threat, external dependence, and deinstitutionalization of the Congress Party led to the imposition of a brief authoritarian regime in India in June 1975. India's non-political military, with no US military links, its national security doctrine and a host of other domestic factors ensured that military did not takeover political power.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of democratization in developing countries has been an important field of Comparative Politics since World War II. The immediate post-WW II period saw democratic expansion in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But the period between the late 1950s and mid-1970s was marked by a series of breakdown of democracies. Since the transition to democracy in Ecuador in 1979, many developing countries again have experienced democratic transition from authoritarianism. But the uncertainties about the future of many of these democracies still exist. What would be the next phase of the cycles of democratic expansion, contraction and expansion in the developing countries? What is the relative significance of economic, political and military variables? How about internal and external factors and various combinations thereof? A study of democratic stability and instability/breakdown in the developing world in the past in the light of these questions may help comprehend the issue in contemporary and future perspectives.

Democracy is understood here as a process of renewal of consent by the population for a particular set of politico-legal and socio-economic arrangements through free and fair elections with full opportunities for participation and contestation without force or intimidation. As defined by Dahl,¹ democracy is used here in a political, not economic, sense. This paper also recognizes that juridical and political dimensions of democracy depend on some sort of compromise (or pact) between the subordinate sectors (workers, peasants, etc.) and the propertied sectors (the bourgeoisie, rich peasants, professionals including the military officers) and among various other factions of the propertied sectors needed to mitigate

¹ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

potentially disruptive consequences of an asymmetric distribution of political and economic power between the above mentioned forces.² Breakdown of juridical and political democracy is likely to be preceded by the breakdown of this compromise. Various socio-economic, political, and external factors contribute to sharpen the cleavages and conflicts leading to the failure of democratic arrangement.

Democratic stability refers here to a situation where political and civil rights of the citizens are guaranteed, opportunities for full participation and contestation of the citizens, and various democratic institutions such as elections, interest groups, political parties, elected representative bodies, free press and judiciary remain at work for a fairly long period of time and hand over of power from one party to another party takes place smoothly and in routinized manner more than once. Absence of such conditions are the situations where democratic instability/breakdown occurs. This paper considers democratic stability and regime and political stability as different things.

There is no dearth of theories of democratic stability and instability and specific studies on democratic breakdown in the 1960s and 1970s.³ But most of them are single case studies, only a few being cross-national statistical studies. Few are comparative in nature and include examples of both democratic breakdown and stability.⁴

² Adam Przeworski, "Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System," *Political and Social Theory*, 1(1980), pp. 21-66.

³ For a review of the literature on democratic stability and breakdown, see, Bhuian Md. Monoor Kabir, *Internal Crises, External Dependence, and Democratic Stability and Instability in the Developing World: A Comparative Study of Brazil and India* (an unpublished dissertation, Tucson: The University of Arizona, 1995), Chapter 2, pp. 39-62.

⁴ Notable exceptions are, Kevin Neuhofer, "Democratic Stability in Venezuela: Elite Consensus or Class Compromise?", *American Sociological Review*, 57 (February, 1992), pp. 117-135;

Existing perspectives are inadequate to explain democratic stability and breakdown in the developing world. Few attempted to combine various internal and external variables to understand the issue of democratic stability and breakdown.⁵

This paper, therefore, intends to provide an understanding of the issue by trying to combine both external and internal factors as explanatory variables juxtaposing the cases of both democratic breakdown (Brazil) and democratic stability with a brief authoritarian interlude (India) in the post-World War II period.

THE CASE PROFILE OF BRAZIL AND INDIA

The issue of democratic stability and breakdown in developing countries will be studied here applying what Lijphert⁶ has called Comparative Case Strategy taking Brazil and India as cases. Both began their post-WW II journeys with democratic political systems almost at the same time but one (Brazil) could not maintain democracy, the other (India) did. Brazilian democracy was installed in 1946 after the Brazilian military, with US encouragement, had overthrown the corporatist regime of Getulio Vargas. The democratic republic continued until March 30, 1964 when the military took over power ousting President Joao Goulart, a Vargista. India started as an independent state in 1947 with democracy which worked fairly smoothly until 1967. The Indian democracy began to face some

Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁵ For example see, Rueschmeyer *et al.*, *Ibid.*; Edward N. Muller, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (1985), pp. 445-469.

⁶ Arend Lijphart, "Comparable Cases-Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, 8: 2 (July 1975), pp. 158-177.

strains from the late 1960s resulting in the declaration of the state of emergency in June 1975 that lasted until March 1977. Notwithstanding lingering doubts of some scholars⁷ about the future of Indian democracy at that time, specially under the Indira Gandhi regime, democratic restoration continued and the system remained intact since, despite some governmental uncertainties, increasing violence, and problems of efficient governance.⁸

Brazil and India differ in respect of culture, colonial heritage, and foreign policy. India was blessed with a dominant party, the Indian National Congress. Brazil, on the other hand, had three major parties with the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democratico*) -- PSD being the dominant one. Brazil saw the rise of more powerful counter-hegemonic and militant subordinate classes' mobilization during the democratic period than India did. Unlike India, Brazil had a politicized military and was militarily dependent on the US as a Cold War ally.

But they also have some similarities. Both are relatively advanced developing countries in terms of level of industrialization. Both are large countries containing large population. Both are dependent on the world economy (though with variations). Each adopted the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model in the post-WW II period.

⁷ See, Rajni Kothari, "The Crisis of Moderate State and the Decline of Democracy," in Peter Lyon and James Manor, eds., *Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), pp. 29-48 and "Rebuilding the State," *Seminar* 257 (January 1981). Also see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Crisis of the Indian State," *Economic and Political Weekly* (April 16, 1988), pp. 764-766.

⁸ See, Mahendra Prasad Singh, "The Crisis of the Indian State: From Quiet Developmentalism to Noisy Democracy," *Asian Survey* 30, 8 (August 1990), pp. 809-819; Subrata Kumar Mitra, "Crisis and Resilience in Indian Democracy," *International Social Science Journal* 129 (August 1991), pp. 555-570; Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Problems of Governability* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

At one point or another, both had adopted some sort of IMF-prescribed economic stabilization programmes. Despite these similarities, their experiences with democracy were different.

How could India with its modest economic growth, low per capita income, low rate of literacy, dependent status, maintain democratic stability while Brazil, with higher rate of growth, expansion of literacy, could not do so? The answer to this question has implications for understanding of democratic stability and its relationship to various internal and external economic and politico-military variables employed in this study. These two cases would provide us an opportunity to compare the reasons for democratic breakdown in Brazil with the reasons for the authoritarian interlude in India in the mid-1970s and see if the reasons were same for the rise of authoritarian interlude In India in 1975 and collapse of Brazilian democracy in 1964.

The stability of Indian democracy remains an enigma to most social scientists. No theory of democratic stability seems adequate in explaining India's democratic stability as India did not meet most of the conditions put forth by these theories.⁹

In explaining the smooth functioning of democracy in India, at least in the first phase (up to 1967), many¹⁰ have suggested that Indian political culture and British political heritage are important factors for the maintenance of stable democracy in India. Others¹¹ have argued

⁹ For further discussion of the limitations of the existing theories of democratic stability in explaining Indian democratic stability, see, Bhuiyan Md. Monoar Kabir, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ See, Atul Kohli, "Introduction: Interpreting India's Democracy - A State-Society Framework," in Atul Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 3-17; Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Be Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, 2 (1984), pp. 193-218; Myron Weiner, "The Wounded Tiger: Maintaining India's Democratic Institutions," in Peter Lyon and James Manor, eds., 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-57.

¹¹ Rajni Kothari and Morris Jones are the two early advocates of this institutional argument. The term Congress system was coined by Rajni Kothari. For their views, see, Rajni Kothari, "The

that the Congress System, the dominance of the Congress party, at least up to 1967, had great contribution to India's democratic stability.

The second phase (1967-March 1977) was characterized by growing authoritarian tendencies. Some scholars have attributed the eventual authoritarian rule in the mid-1970s to the erosion of institutional ability, performance failures of the government and the rise of the administrative state, deinstitutionalization resulting from the policies and practices of Indira Gandhi.¹² The government and the Congress blamed¹³ the irresponsible opposition forces, particularly the "Right Reaction", abetted by mysterious foreign hands, for the imposition of the state of emergency. The government felt it necessary to foil their ploys to defeat them, to improve law and order, and to protect democracy itself. Marxist and the leftists discovered the root cause of the rise of authoritarianism in the economic crises of Indian capitalism and the Indira government's adoption of IMF-prescribed austerity measures.¹⁴ Orthodox Marxists, like Selbourne,¹⁵ saw the authoritarian interlude as the political outcome of intense class conflicts in the Indian society.

Congress System", *Asian Survey* 4, 12 (December 1964), pp. 1161-1173; *Politics in India* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970); W. H. Morris Jones, *The Government and Politics of India* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964); *Politics Mainly Indian* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1977), pp. 196-263; Weiner, *ibid.*

¹² For details see, Rajni Kothari, *Democratic Polity and Social Change in India: Crisis and Opportunity* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1976), pp. 9-36; Mitra, *op.cit.*; Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 83-87.

¹³ For official view, see, Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs, *Why Emergency?* (laid in both houses of Indian Parliament on July 21, 1975); M. A. Naidu, *Why Emergency* (Shivaji Press, n.d. and n.p.); V.P. Dutt, "The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale," *Asian Survey*, 26, 12 (December 1976), pp. 1124-1138.

¹⁴ For some discussion, see, Prem Shankar Jha, *India: A Political Economy of Stagnation* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 143-153.

¹⁵ David Selbourne, *An Eye To India* (Penguin, 1977).

The third phase (since 1977) is characterized by the rebirth of Indian democracy. Although this period has experienced problems of efficient governance, the democratic system has remained intact. Some have cautioned about the viability of Indian democracy in the face of denationalization, increasing privatization, stabilization programmes, and structural adjustments suggesting that the resistance to these policies by the beneficiaries of the public sectors might cause democratic uncertainties.¹⁶ Despite gradual weakening of major political institutions, Indian democracy has shown resilience in the face of crises. The expansion of the women's movement, regional movements, civil rights movements, autonomous participation of the *Dalits*,¹⁷ and the intermediate castes over the years has also strengthened India's democracy. After all, the dynamics of Indian democracy has expanded democratic participation in India which, in turn, has further strengthened Indian democracy.¹⁸

The breakdown of Brazilian democracy had generated a large volume of studies trying to explain it from economic, political, and politico-military perspectives. The Brazilian case was used by many as a critical case to find common reasons for democratic breakdown in industrially advanced developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

One dominant economic interpretation of the breakdown of the Brazilian democracy was the functional requirement of the deepening (vertical integration) of the ISI to move Brazil from light consumer

¹⁶ E. Sridharan, "Leadership time Horizon in India: The Impact of Economic Restructuring," *Asian Survey* 31, 12 (December 1991), pp. 1200-1213; Alan Heston, "India's Economic Reforms: The Real Thing?," *Current History: A World Affairs Journal* 91, 563 (March 1993), pp. 113-116.

¹⁷ *Dalit* literally means the oppressed. It refers to the scheduled castes, an euphemism for the former untouchables at the bottom of Hindu ritualistic and social hierarchy.

¹⁸ Kohli, 1988, *op. cit.*, Mitra, *op. cit.*, Rajni Kothari, "Caste, Communalism and the Democratic Process," *South Asia Bulletin* 14, 1 (1994), pp. 11-13.

goods production to intermediate and capital goods production stage. That requirement led to the formation of the coup coalition between the state, domestic capitalists, military and civilian technocrats, and foreign capital which established what O'Donnell called the Bureaucratic Authoritarian (BA) regime in Brazil.¹⁹ Subsequent studies, however, found this argument inaccurate.²⁰ Others have argued that when unorthodox policies became dysfunctional and led to very high inflation, serious balance of payment disequilibrium, and depletion of foreign exchanges, the governments were faced with the choice of adopting orthodox stabilization and anti-inflationary measures. They failed to do that for a variety of reasons leading to the collapse of democracy in Brazil. Economic crises and political restraints made it impossible for the Brazilian democracy to adopt necessary rational economic policies which could count on political support of any of the major social groups. It was not possible to maintain a populist coalition while implementing the stabilization programmes.²¹

From political perspective, Stepan²² argued that despite serious political implications of economic factors, it was the mistaken policies

¹⁹ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, 1979).

²⁰ See, Jose Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection Between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 99-163; In the same volume, Albert Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants," pp. 61-98.

²¹ Hirschman, *ibid*; Michael Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants," *Latin American Research Review* 15, 3 (1980), pp. 3-39; Thomas Skidmore, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Postwar Latin America," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 149-190, especially, pp. 167-171.

²² Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 110-137.

of the leadership, especially, of Goulart, in his last days which were responsible for the collapse of Brazilian democracy. According to him, the Brazilian system in the early 1960s lost the sources of interest aggregation as division between the PSD and Brazilian Workers Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* – PTB) began to take divergent views on different issues, including agrarian reform, workers strike, and autonomous labour movement. Radicalization, growing polarization and fragmentation of the polity, especially the party system, in the early 1960s led to the breakdown of democracy.²³ Employing a game theoretic explanation of the breakdown of Brazilian democracy, Cohen²⁴ argued that the moderates of both left and right faced a dilemma in their dealings with each other and the radicals of their own parties. The radicals of both left and right prevailed over the moderates resulting into the breakdown of democracy. Like Stepan, Cohen also emphasized Goulart's weak leadership and turn toward the left after March 13, 1964 as a factor that ended all hopes for compromise.

The coup leaders, quite predictably, justified their actions in the name of democracy which, they contended, was in danger of being destroyed by subversion, communist infiltrations, and Goulart's attempts to establish a Syndicalist state (*Republica Syndical*). They also offered the excuse of poor economy resulting from government policies and labour militancy.²⁵ Yet, others argued that Brazil's economic and military dependence on the US and the pursuance of aggressive Cold War policies as well as anti-Goulart policies by the

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-119; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Pattern in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Wandehery Dos Santos, *The Calculus of Conflict: Impasse in Brazilian Politics and the Crisis of 1964* (Stanford University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1979).

²⁴ See, Youssef Cohen, *Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); "Democracy From Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil," *World Politics* 40 (1987), pp. 30-50.

²⁵ See, Humberto Castello Branco, "Speech by Humberto Castello Branco 1967," in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., *The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America [2nd Edition]* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 227-230.

Johnson administration were responsible for democratic breakdown in Brazil in 1964.²⁶

From civil-military relations perspectives, some scholars have argued that the Brazilian military's takeover was consistent with its long history of participation in political affairs.²⁷ The Brazilian military's development of national security doctrine (NSD) asserting and legitimizing its domestic role helped the military to move from a moderating role to a ruling one. In such a circumstance, growing polarization, radicalization, perception of Goulart's inability to control the labour movement and the radical left, and fear of Goulart establishing a *Republica Syndical* (Workers State) eventually forced the military to takeover to protect its corporate interests.²⁸

Going back to the Indian case, studies on Indian democracy reveal two things. First, with few exceptions, most of these studies have looked only at internal variables and have not taken external variables into account. Second, no study of Indian democracy was found to have been done in a comparative manner. Absence of such a study highlights Indian uniqueness or exceptionalism.²⁹ This paper rejects such notion of Indian uniqueness. It argues that Indian democratic

²⁶ See, Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); Jan Knipper Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966); Muller, 1985, *op. cit.*,

²⁷ See, Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); Jan Knipper Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966); Muller, 1985, *op. cit.*,

²⁸ See, Frank D. McCann, Jr., "Origins of the "New Professionalism" of the Brazilian Military," *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs* 21, 4 (November 1979), pp. 505-522; John Markoff and Silvio R. Duncan Baretta, "Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil: Critique of a Thesis of Alfred Stepan," *Comparative Politics* 17, 2 (January 1985), pp. 175-191.

²⁹ Stepan, 1971 *op. cit.*,

experience can be understood better by taking external as well as internal factors into consideration and placing India in a comparative perspective.

Brazil has often been used as a critical case to explain breakdown of democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s in the developing world. The proponents of both the dependent development perspective and the politico-military dependence perspective have used breakdown of Brazilian democracy in 1964 as a critical case. But neither of these perspectives has explicitly dealt with the issue of economic crises requiring the implementation of anti-inflationary stabilization programme. They also paid little attention to a developing country's dependence on multi-lateral financial institutions and the role of the IMF. Although Skidmore, Wallerstein, Hirschman stressed those economic factors, they too have not taken other important variables such as politico-military dependence into consideration. Similarly, the proponents of politico-military dependence perspective have not taken economic crisis seriously. The proponents of political perspectives virtually ignored the military dependency as an explanatory variable. In short, although these arguments have some utility, none attempted to integrate them into a broader and interconnected explanation.

The paper suggests that despite economic dependence in the early phase of its democratic experiments, India's absence of prolonged and severe economic crises, politico-military dependence on the US, and non-alliance with the US during the Cold War, presence of strong political institutions and absence of a counter-hegemonic threat in most of its post-independence period, would largely account for democratic stability there. But severe and prolonged economic crises, coupled with economic aid dependence, and weakening of democratic institutions and the rise of counter-hegemonic forces (though mild), resulted into the authoritarian interlude in the mid-1970s. In a similar vein, Brazilian democratic breakdown was the result of the

combination of and interaction among prolonged and severe economic crisis, economic and politico-military dependence on the US, alliance with the US during the Cold War, a politicized military with a pro-US Cold War position, weak, fragmented, polarized, and radicalized political institutions, and the rise of counter-hegemonic forces.

ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN AND STABILITY

Economically, both Brazil and India started their post-WW II journey with an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy,³⁰ however, with different mechanisms and policies both in terms of internal resource mobilization and external economic linkages. In this section, an attempt will be made to review the developmental experiences of Brazil and India with a view to bringing out the economic variables in democratic breakdown and stability in Brazil and India respectively.

Brazilian Experiences

Brazil had a high rate of inflation, expansionary fiscal policy, overvalued currency, foreign borrowing, and deficit financing. Brazil also suffered from serious and consistent balance of payment problems which first started in 1950 when Brazil purchased huge extra raw materials, capital and intermediate goods in anticipation of a prolonged war in the Korean peninsula. Decline of the prices of Brazil's primary export commodity, coffee, in the international market also contributed to the problem. From that time on until 1961, Brazil's balance of payment problem worsened. Similarly, inflation was high in Brazil. From 1950 to 1958, inflation in Brazil was never below 10% and experienced violent increase after 1958 and reached 86.6%

³⁰ Myron Weiner entertains the view of Indian exceptionalism. See, Weiner, 1983, *op. cit.*, especially, p. 51.

in 1964. This was compounded by budget deficit reaching nearly 5% of Brazil's total GDP in 1963.³¹ After 1961-62, GDP growth rate became negative. Successive governments subscribed to the notion that inflation was useful for "forced savings" for industrial investment. Prolonged economic crises in Brazil bedeviled successive Brazilian governments from Vargas (1951-54) to Kubitscheck (1956-1961) in their efforts to bring down the rate of inflation and bring about balance of payment equilibrium. None of the efforts was successful in stabilizing macroeconomic situation.

Both the Vargas and Kubitscheck governments were populist, based on a coalition of workers and industrialists who continually demanded benefits in the form of higher wages and easier credits for their respective groups. The governments had either to risk the break up of the coalition if they carried out stabilization programmes or to accept high inflation and balance of payment problems with higher budgetary deficits to keep the coalition intact. At the same time, both Vargas and Kubitscheck governments were pursuing a developmentalist strategy giving more emphasis on growth than on inflation and balance of payment problems. Consequently, neither Vargas nor Kubitscheck was able to carry out sustained stabilization measures out of fear of slowdown in growth.

³¹ For some ideas about Brazilian ISI, see, Warner Bear, *Industrialization and economic Development in Brazil* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Trwin, 1965) and *The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989). Also see, Joel Bergsman and Arthur Candal, "Industrialization: Past Success and Future Problems", in Howard S. Ellis, ed., *The Economy of Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 29-73; ECLA, *Economic Bulletin For Latin America* (March, 1964), pp. 1-56. For India's Import Substitution Industrialization, see, for example, Achin Vanaik, "The Rajiv Congress in Search of Stability", *New Left Review*, 154 (November-December, 1985), pp. 555-75 especially, p. 58; V. N. Balasubramanyam, *The Economy of India* (London: Weinfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 80; Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Export-Led Growth and Import-Substituting Industrialization", in Deepak Nayyar, ed., *Industrial Growth and stagnation: The Debate in India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 78-88.

The situation was further complicated by the nature of Brazil's external economic linkages. The most important external economic linkage of Brazil was its tie with the US. Brazil was dependent on the US for economic aid, export market, and foreign investment. In this regard, Brazil found it very hard to secure long term loans from the US for Brazil's development as well as balance of payment bail out purposes. Although in 1950 Brazil received a mere \$105 million Ex-Im Bank loans, only in 1953, after intense lobbying and diplomatic pressure by Brazil, did the US give Brazil \$300 million long term loans and \$119 million long term developmental loans. The new Eisenhower administration, however, refused to pay the US share of the developmental projects chalked out by the Joint Brazil-US Economic Development Commission (JBUSEDC), committed by the previous Truman administration. The US also denied a Brazilian request for \$300 million balance of payment loan during 1954-56.

Instead, the US insisted on prior agreement between the IMF and the Kubitscheck government and urged the Brazilian governments to depend on foreign investment as a sure way of development and overcoming balance of payment problems. In fact, under Kubitscheck, Brazil received about \$500 million worth of foreign investment. His government, however, refused to accept IMF conditionalities to impose austerity measures and reduce imports to balance the books out of fear of slowing down growth and fracturing the political coalition. Kubitscheck, instead, began to take (after June 1959) short term loans from international commercial markets at higher interest rates. Thus, Kubitscheck left behind a Brazil which had experienced higher growth but with high inflation, serious balance of payment problem, and large amount of short term debts.

Foreign investment itself contributed much to the formation of cleavage in the Brazilian society, politics, and the Brazil-US relations. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) became a lightning rod for the leftists and nationalists as a symbol of exploitation of Brazil by the

core countries. The ultra-nationalist leader and governor Leonel Brizola's expropriation of US companies created a difficult issue in the relationship between the US and the Goulart government. Although President Quadros, predecessor to President Goulart, appeared serious in carrying out stabilization programme, his premature resignation itself testified to the difficulties that he faced.

It is in the light of this circumstance, that President Joao Goulart's tenure should be understood. By the time Goulart took office in September 1961, and assumed the full power of the President in January 1963, Brazil's economic woes were already too obvious. Goulart, like his predecessors, faced the dilemma of keeping the populist coalition together and maintaining economic growth, and, at the same time, stabilize the economy. Goulart tried to stabilize the economy through the implementation of the *Plano Trienal*, the three year plan to stabilize economy with growth whose success, however, largely depended on US assistance.

Unfortunately for Goulart, already a suspect in the eyes of many US officials for his alleged willingness to work with the Communists, he was put on a "short leash" by the Kennedy administration. Although the US agreed to a package of \$398.5 million aid to Brazil under the Bell-Dantas agreement, the US actually disbursed only \$85 million. The disbursement of the rest of the money depended upon IMF certification of Goulart government's accomplishments in stabilizing the economy and controlling inflation. This, in itself, was a manifestation of the US distrust of Goulart. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right forces were emboldened; they tried to undermine his authority to carry out the stabilization programme.

If the populist coalitional compulsions prevented his predecessors from carrying out anti-inflationary stabilization measures, it was more true for Goulart who had a less strong position for his dependence on the left radicals and less credibility with businesses. This made it

much harder for Goulart to carry out forcefully the stabilization measures. His policy of persuasion of both the workers and businesses was ignored by both sides whose cooperation was key to the success of any stabilization programme. Instead, under pressure, Goulart had to slacken the stabilization programme by raising wages for workers, military officers, civil servants, and withdrawing some credit restrictions.

Understandably, the IMF team visiting Brazil in May 1963 found the stabilization efforts unsatisfactory and refused to give Brazil \$100 million stand-by loan. This ended any hope of receiving further loans from the US and stabilizing the economy. The Brazilian economy continued its downward slide accompanied by hyper inflation, huge balance of payment problems, and hefty foreign debt burden.

Indian Experiences

In terms of economic growth, fiscal policy, inflation, balance of payment, and its external economic linkages, Indian experience was significantly different from that of Brazil during the first phase of India's democratic experience. However, some similarities between the Brazilian economic experiences and Indian economic experiences in the second phase from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s can be discerned.

The Indian economy performed fairly well until 1965 as far as growth was concerned, although the rate was not as high as that of Brazil during 1950-62.³² During 1947-65, the Indian governments of Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), and Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), had generally followed conservative fiscal policies. Noisy defense for "inflationary growth" was not attended to by the Indian policy makers. Instead, the governments had always consciously avoided any

³² For detailed data on this, see, Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-114.

escalation of inflation partly because it was politically unpopular. Except for two years (1957-58, 1964-65), India's rate of inflation during this period never reached double digit figures.

In this respect, India differed from Brazil in a significant way. While Brazil found it difficult to secure economic assistance from the US, India received \$3.7 billion in economic assistance from the US during 1948-63. The amount for the same period for Brazil was just \$1.28 billion. In fact, from the early 1950s, India's food shortages were covered by the US food aid. That kept the food prices and thus, inflationary pressure, down. This kept the urban middle classes and rural and urban poor appeased.

Economic aid from the US also contributed significantly during this period to India's development efforts. Indeed, by the time of completion of the Third Five Year Plan (FYP), about one third of India's import and developmental expenditure was paid for by US assistance. When India faced serious economic (balance of payment) crisis in 1957-58, and the Second FYP was at stake, the US and other western countries rescued India by forming the Aid India Consortium. Importantly, aid during this period was highly concessional, and carried very little, if any, political conditionalities. Foreign aid also enabled the Indian governments to avoid increasing taxes on the upper middle class and thus could the risk of antagonizing politically influential stratum. Data show that although the US was the dominant donor, India was also able to receive aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries making the Soviet Union India's 5th largest donor during 1951-71.³³

³³ For this, see, Kabir, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-227. Also see, Government of India, Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan (1956)*; *Third Five Year Plan, 1969-74* (n.d). Also see, D.N. Prasad, *External Resources in Economic Development of India* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Limited).

All these provided India with roughly 18 years of fairly smooth macroeconomic situation allowing Indian democracy enough space and time to consolidate on firm ground which the Brazilian democracy was not fortunate to have. Moreover, during that period, India's efforts to carry out its heavy industrialization policy had overwhelming support of the industrialists, Communist parties, and the vast middle class and policy intellectuals.³⁴

Nonetheless, the Indian economy during 1966-75 manifested some similarities with that of Brazil which contributed to eventual imposition of authoritarian rule in June 1975. Despite a low inflation rate during 1947-66, after 1957-58 crisis, India's balance of payment position was deteriorating as a result of a combination of lack of exports and increasing cost of imports of capital and intermediate goods as India moved to the deepening phase of the ISI. India's foreign exchange reserve also at times faced extreme shortage.³⁵ Under severe balance of payment crisis when after first withdrawing \$200 million in 1965, India again wanted to withdraw all \$187 million of its gold tranche from the IMF in 1966, the IMF refused to let India withdraw that money without agreeing to implement various measures including devaluation of the *Rupee*. Indeed, the US, donors, and the World Bank, had been insisting upon devaluation of the *Rupee* as a way to bolster India's exports to overcome balance of payment problem. Eventually, Indira Gandhi devalued *Rupee* by 36.5% in June 1966 on the understanding that the World Bank would raise a \$1.6 billion aid package for India. The aid did not materialize, but prices of imported goods went up and political opposition from the nationalist-leftists within the Congress and outside became strident. That led Indira Gandhi to take a nationalist posture by criticizing the US war

³⁴ For this, among others, see, Balasubramanyam, 1984, *Ibid.*, p. 80; Vanaik, 1985, *Ibid.*

³⁵ On Indian economy, see Bhuian Md. Monoar Kabir, "Performance Failures, External Shocks and Dependence, and Structural Changes in Indian Economy", *Asian Profile*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 45-61.

efforts in Indochina in a joint communique while she was visiting Moscow.

The economic pressure on India increased with the Johnson administration's "short tether" policy of providing India with only about 30 days of food during a severe drought in 1966-67 which also saw the beginning of industrial stagnation in India that continued until 1976.³⁶ Thus, the balance of payment problem, devaluation, stagnation, and drought together contributed to inflationary pressure in India.

Like the Brazilian governments, the Indira government also assumed populist-leftist postures after the 1967 electoral disaster with a view to reconstructing a new populist coalition. In order to create a new coalition, the Indira Gandhi government adopted a less conservative fiscal policy by expanding money supply and increasing subsidy contributing to the fiscal deficit and inflationary pressure. This trend got tremendous boost by another round of drought in 1973, sharp drop in US aid share following the 1971 Indo-Pak war, increase of oil prices in international market, high inflation in mid-1974, and serious balance of payment problems. All this caused several episodes of socio-political unrest (Table 1). Economic crises led to demands by the left as well as the right for Indira Gandhi's resignation.

This whole situation also presented the Indira government with a dilemma as to how to continue with reconstruction of her party's social base, and, at the same time, carry out an anti-inflationary stabilization programme. This was the same dilemma the Brazilian governments, including that of Goulart, faced during 1950-64. To deal with such a dilemma, Indira Gandhi evidently chose to downgrade her populist-leftist posture by early 1974 and took retrogressive politico-economic anti-inflationary stabilization measures by ruthlessly breaking strikes

³⁶ See Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-218.

and announcing conservative fiscal measures to restrict credit, freezing benefits, and slowing down money supply. She, in effect, broke her alliance with the populist-leftist path and adopted a new growth-oriented approach.

The court decision against Indira Gandhi for minor violation of election laws in the 1971 elections provided her the final reason to impose authoritarian rule in 1975. She also used the slogan to "protect democracy" from the forces of "right reaction" as a pretext for her decision in 1975. In fact, the logic of breaking her ties with populist-leftist forces led to her imposition of authoritarian rule when she largely completed the process of separation from the populist-leftist elements and began a new growth-oriented strategy.

Here, interesting similarities and differences in intentions and attempts between Indira Gandhi and Goulart can be detected. In a similar situation, in October 1963, Goulart requested the Brazilian Congress for emergency power so that he could carry out the stabilization programme, but the Congressional right, as well as the left, declined his request. Although Goulart ostensibly asked for emergency power to carry out the stabilization programme, the left clearly felt, as the Communist Party of India (CPI) in India realized in retrospect, that the power would be used against it to suppress strikes and labor movements to carry out monetarist anti-inflationary measures, which would have hurt them the most. They were right. Goulart could not break ties, however, with his populist-leftist allies without emergency power nor would the right have accepted him had he abandoned his traditional ally, the left. Few months later, the system turned right without Goulart and under military rule which did not require Congressional approval.

Since 1977, India has gradually liberalized its economy and had also suffered two crises; a mild one in 1980-82 and a severe one in 1991-92. Neither occasion had affected India's basic democratic

structure adversely, although the later crisis and the governmental policies to overcome it have apparently cost the Congress the mid-1990s state elections as well as the early 1996 *Lok Sabha* elections. In both cases, the Congress was routed from power and the Hindu fundamentalist *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) emerged as the single largest party in the *Lok Sabha*.

India could deal with the 1980-82 economic crisis with relative ease. Despite some protests, demonstrations, and agitations, the Indira government weathered the crisis fairly smoothly.

Again, here is a clear contrast as to how the IMF dealt with Brazil in the 1950s and early 1960s and with the Indian crisis of 1980-82. The IMF agreed upon a \$5 billion aid package for India in 1981, the largest loans the IMF ever gave to any developing country to that date, with surprisingly few and mild conditionalities, despite the fact that India's crisis was not extraordinarily severe. Anticipating conditionalities, the Indian government in advance incorporated policy changes to avoid the appearance of capitulating to the IMF.

In the 1980s, however, India adopted more liberal fiscal and import policies including increasing money supply, and growing governmental expenditures. Share of concessional aid also went down. All these resulted in severe economic crises in 1991-92 with India about to default on loans. That forced the Indian government to borrow from the IMF and other multilateral and bilateral sources on conditions of economic restructuring along neo-liberal lines to integrate the Indian economy with the world economy.

Since the early 1990s, the Indian economy has improved considerably. India has overcome its macroeconomic crisis of the early 1990s (1991-92). Indeed, economic reforms carried out by India appear to have resulted in higher economic growth since the mid-1990s (1994 to be more precise). India's adoption of free market economy, further opening up of more areas of India's economy to

foreign investment, and greater emphasis on exports have resulted in increased private sector activities, increased foreign investment, and increased exports. That is not to deny the adverse, though many suggest short-term, impact of these reforms on social services for the less well-to-do sections and small to medium size enterprises of the Indian society.

Despite adoption of neo-liberal economic programmes and accepting IMF conditionalities, India's democracy remains stable. The puzzle can be explained, first, by taking into account the fact that this neo-liberal model in India did not come overnight; the process has been going on since the 1980s. There really was no shock of suddenness and the crisis was of very short duration. Secondly, part of the puzzle can be explained by the absence of a strong counter-hegemonic threat. That is discussed next.

POLITICAL VARIABLES IN DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN AND STABILITY

As for the political variables, the two cases show significant differences. Both had multiparty systems. Yet, they were different in significant ways in terms of the nature of party system, political polarization, radicalization, strength of radical counter-hegemonic forces and militant subordinate class mobilization etc.

Brazilian Experiences

The Brazilian democratic period witnessed the activities of three major parties such as the PSD, PTB, Democratic National (*Union Uniao Democratica Nacional*) – UDN. There were other minor parties of which the Popular Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular*) -- PSP, Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democratico Christian*) -- PDC, and Brazilian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro*) -- PCB had some influence in the system. The PCB, outlawed since the late 1940s, impacted the system significantly (Table 2).

Of these parties, both the PSD and PTB were the parties created by Vargas and his supporters anticipating electoral politics in the last days (in 1945) of the *Estado Novo*, the corporatist system created in the early 1930s by Vargas. The PSD had been the ruling party in Brazil until 1961 when Quadros, with UDN support, became President. The PSD was also the majority party in the Congress for the entire democratic republic. Except for the Kubitscheck period, the "PSD-PTB coalition" had not worked in the perfect sense of the term. Indeed, participation of the UDN members in almost all cabinets indicates that the system's stability, to a certain extent, depended on cooperation of the UDN.

The Brazilian parties, particularly the PSD, PTB, and partly the PSP, were formed to maintain continuity between the pre-1945 and post-1945 regimes through vertically maintained social control keeping most of the corporatist elements from the past intact. Interestingly, the professedly anti-corporatist and anti-Vargas party, the UDN, could never really rule Brazil during the democratic period. The PTB was the party meant to represent the workers and to cut down the influence of the PCB on the labour movement while maintaining corporatist control over it. The PSD was the ultimate party of the "ins" representing primarily rural landed elites and urban industrialists who favored statist policies. Brazilian democracy as well as the party system were designed to maintain the hegemony of the landed elites and industrialist-workers coalition through vertical social control. This translated into a combination of corporatist control over labor and exclusion of the illiterates (numbering half of the Brazilian population at that time) from the political process denying them voting rights and banning the PCB. The percentage of people registered as voters in the presidential and legislative elections between 1945 and

1964 never rose above 26.5% of the total Brazilian population. It reveals how non-accommodative the Brazilian system was.³⁷

Brazilian democracy faced some internal tensions and conflicts. One such tension was between the UDN and the pro-Vargista corporatist-statist-nationalist tradition of the PSD and PTB. The *Udenistas* (followers of the UDN), especially, its ultra right wing, always viewed that as long as the pro-Vargistas remained in control of Brazil, Brazilian democracy would remain imperfect. They repeatedly called for the Vargistas' purge from the political system through military intervention. To them, the rise of the PSD-PTB to power was incompatible with democracy because a goal of democracy itself was to erase the Vargista past.

This tension continued to the end, and indeed intensified during the Goulart period, and contributed greatly to the breakdown of democracy. This broad tension between the "ins" and "outs" was compounded and reinforced by the growing fragmentation and radicalization of the political institutions and the rise of counter-hegemonic forces like the Peasant Leagues, the Front for the Popular Movement (FMP) of radical nationalist leader Leonel Brizola, General Workers' Command (CGT), etc. which appeared to have challenged the corporatist arrangement and, worse, were poised to take over power from above or within.

Industrialization, urbanization, as well as the gross inequality in terms of resources, measured by land property (Table 3), and income distribution had also contributed to the growth of autonomous workers movements, partly organized by the CGT and Peasant Leagues, particularly in North Eastern Brazil. This was added to by the awakening of Latin American nationalism and radicalism inspired by the Cuban revolution. Various groups emerged

³⁷ See, *Brazil: Election Fact Book, 1965* (Washington, D.C: Institute For the Comparative Study of Political Systems, September 1965), p. 19.

demanding social justice, anti-imperialist (anti-US) policies, land reform, and inclusion of illiterates in the mainstream of Brazilian politics. All these foretold the breakdown of the post-WWII democratic system which was based around a narrow perimeter. This created fear and uncertainty within the system heightened by the ascendancy of the PTB in the 1962 Congressional elections, loss of the PSD hegemony (Table 2), and rise to presidency of Goulart, a suspect in the eyes of both the US, the Udenistas and military right wing elements.

In this atmosphere of increasing polarization, fragmentation, and radicalization, Goulart tried to recreate a centre around a centre-left coalition comprising workers, industrialists, and the peasants through land reform and expanding voting rights to the illiterates. In a sense, his attempt was to create a more inclusive, accommodative, and egalitarian society but within the democratic framework. Maintenance of centre-right exclusionary democratic arrangements through vertical control became almost impossible due to polarization and radicalization. However, this very polarization and radicalization itself guaranteed the failure of Goulart's efforts to create a center-left coalition. Neither the radical left nor the right allowed any space for the center. Eventually, the vertical control was maintained by the military which along with the right was alarmed by Goulart's inability to control the radical left and the CGT and by the specter of a *Republica Sindical*. The military also feared an outright Communist takeover with devastating consequences for its ideological-corporate interests.

Indian Experiences

By contrast, India was blessed with an enormously powerful, centrist, and inclusionary Congress party which ruled for the first 30 years after Indian democratic experience (Table 4). The Congress party was coalitional in nature. Unlike the PSD and PTB in Brazil,

as a coalitional (umbrella) party, the Congress structurally incorporated professional, industrialist-business groups, and the rich peasants. At the same time, at least up to 1967, it was able to maintain an enormous mass base among the Indian scheduled castes, and Muslims. Politically, it was coalitional in the sense that it accommodated in its fold people representing political viewpoints ranging from neo-liberal conservatism to socialism. It is this coalitional nature which guaranteed the hegemony of the Congress for long allowing Indian democracy to consolidate in its formative phase. Not only that, the legitimacy of the Congress and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru provided the system with a high level of continuity, stability and predictability. The Congress party's enormous ability to accommodate divergent social forces combined with its ability to improvise played a crucial role in consolidating Indian democracy.

India did not experience any sharp social or political polarization in the first two decades of its independence. Although the CPI posed a counter-hegemonic challenge to the existing order during 1947-51, the entire CPI was not behind that arms struggle. The CPI was unprepared and too middle class-based to carry out sustained arms struggle. The Indian state was powerful enough to crush that incipient struggle. The CPI effort was short-lived and the mainstream communists had never since attempted to overthrow the democratic order through violent means. Instead, they set in firmly as early as 1951 for parliamentarism. That removed the most serious potential challenge to the Indian democratic order. Even the parliamentary leftists were very weak and fractious (Table 4). The history of the leftist movement is replete with division, parliamentarism, and dependence on foreign parties' "friendly advice" eventually leading to the split further weakening various communist factions.³⁸

³⁸ See, Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-272; and Bhuiyan Md. Monoar Kabir, "The Indian Communist Movement: From Radicalism to 'Pro-System' Constitutionalism", *Asiatic Society of Bangladesh Journal* [Humanities], Vol. 43, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 159-177.

The counter-hegemonic forces' own weaknesses were added to by various policies of the Nehru government in the formative years. Here, unlike Brazil, India started with an inclusionary and accommodative democratic system based on universal adult franchise. This gave the communists as well as the subordinate classes of the society the illusion that they could share power through electoral means. The Congress' land reforms in the 1950s and 1960s also robbed the Communists of a very useful weapon for mobilization of the rural masses. Not only that, the abolition of the *Zamindari* system removed the "labor-oppressive" agricultural system creating a large middle and small cultivating category. They not only opposed any collectivization of land, but also emerged as a powerful group in India expanding the perimeter of the democratic system.

Significantly, it was Goulart's efforts to carry out agrarian reform to make the peasants as part of the Brazil's politics and thus, deepen democracy that highlighted the polarized nature of the Brazilian polity, and resulted in the breakdown of democracy. Such polarization was highlighted in the distribution of votes on the two different agrarian reform projects put forth respectively by the PTB and UDN in 1963. The votes on the different projects for much-needed agrarian reform by the members of the Congress (parliament) were highly informed by partisan ideology.³⁹

Despite India's dependence on the US for economic assistance, unlike Brazil which was an ally of the US, the Nehru government and subsequent Indian governments had firmly pursued a non-aligned foreign policy. This non-aligned foreign policy removed a cleavage from Indian politics. Moreover, India's non-aligned foreign policy (later with a pro-Soviet tilt) brought the Soviet pressure to bear on the CPI to support the Congress governments. Nehru's declaration of

³⁹ Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-150.

"socialist pattern of society" and "socialism" as its goals also took a significant issue away from the CPI agenda making it very difficult for the CPI to come up with any clear tactical and strategic line *vis-a-vis* the Congress. Eventually, this issue of relations with the Congress led to the split in the CPI and the pro-Moscow CPI turned into an ally of the Congress.⁴⁰

By contrast, Brazilian foreign policy was pro-US. It was a member of the US-led multilateral security arrangement, the Rio-Treaty (Rio Pact). This contributed to the creation of political cleavage in Brazil over Brazil's position on the Cold War with the radical leftists and nationalists demanding anti-imperialist (anti-US) and nationalist foreign policy and the conservatives and a large section of the military favoring a pro-US policy. When the Quadros and Goulart governments began to adopt a more "independent foreign policy", the systemic cleavage on the Cold War issue became acute further contributing to the ongoing fragmentation of Brazilian politics.

The prolonged economic crises in India during 1966-76 was coupled with a much weaker Congress party, vehement opposition movement, and a short-lived and fractious counter-hegemonic threat during 1967-72. After the loss of Congress hegemony in the 1967 elections due to social changes and also after the 1969 Congress split, Indira Gandhi adopted a populist-leftist posture to reconstruct the party's support base among the poorer sections.

In the process, in line with the populist strategy, Indira Gandhi ignored the importance of the party as an institution and concentrated power into her own hands. She replaced state Congress leaders with her hand-picked personal loyalists and stopped organizational elections of the Congress party at all levels. Basically, Indira Gandhi

⁴⁰ See Kabir, 1998, *op. cit.*,

transformed herself into an institution causing deinstitutionalization of that great party.

The government's growing authoritarian nature was revealed in brutal suppression of the Naxalbari movement, and quelling of the railway strikes and demonstrations in June 1974. With the economic crisis intensified by early 1974, Indira Gandhi chose to shift her strategy from a populist-leftist one to a growth-oriented one which itself required dismantling of the populist-leftist alliance. On top of all these, when Indira Gandhi as an institution – since she already deinstitutionalized the Congress – faced a legitimacy crisis because of the court verdict against her for violation of election laws, there was no institutional mechanism to go back except for concentrating power further into her hands by imposing State of National Emergency.

India's institutional configuration has changed since the 1977 restoration of democracy. As has been mentioned earlier, India experienced a milder economic crisis in 1980-82 and a severe one during 1991-92. Nonetheless, democracy has remained stable.

The decline of Congress hegemony has been steady though at times slow since 1977 despite its return to power in 1980, in 1984 (though a landslide victory). It lost power in 1989 and returned to power as a minority government in 1991. Its share of votes and seats in the Lok Sabha elections have gradually declined. Various regional parties have firmly established themselves in different states. In the 1996 *Lok Sabha* elections, the Congress lost its majority to the BJP. The third power bloc, the United Front (UF), a gathering of the center-left and some regional parties, with the support of the Congress from outside the UF in a bid to keep the BJP out of power formed the government and ruled India till April 1997 when the new Congress President, Sitaram Kesri, withdrew support from the UF government

led by H.D. Deve Gowda. (Tables 4 & 5) Although the Congress remains an important player, it no longer plays a hegemonic role. It is just one important party, and in some cases not even a dominant one.

While Congress hegemony has been eroding, new social forces such as the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Dalits have emerged lately as powerful socio-political forces in India, particularly, in North India. The social changes, and importantly, open and inclusionary democratic system have permitted the emergence of active autonomous forces of the OBCs and *Dalits*. While the OBCs emerged as a powerful force in the 1960s and 1970s, the *Dalits* have emerged as an autonomous force only in the 1980s and 1990s. The *Dalits* were previously mobilized by the Congress. That mobilization was not autonomous but elite-controlled. The new OBC and *Dalit* strength while provoking upper caste backlash resulting in "criminalization of politics", nonetheless, testifies the resilience of Indian democracy.

Again, one finds a clear difference between Indian and Brazil. Brazilian system could not accommodate new social forces into the system due to structural inability of the Brazilian democracy while the old order was losing control. Inclusion of new social forces would have been possible if there were an open and inclusionary political system which in turn would have deepened Brazil's democracy. That is exactly what happened in India.

Despite the Congress' decline, economic liberalization, crises, and India's dependence on the IMF and other multilateral agencies and donors, democracy has been working in India, due, no less, to the fact that the two CPIs have firmly set in for parliamentarism and virtually there is no counter-hegemonic challenge to the existing order. The Communist parties' persistent refusal to accept the caste system as a unit of social organization has also kept them out of increasingly powerful *Dalit* movement. In the post-Cold War era, neo-liberal policy

itself is the dominant economic strategy. What is more important, the economic crises were of short duration and, despite some opposition from organized workers and nationalists, the necessity for structural adjustment has been accepted by many Indian policy intellectuals over the years.

Another factor has emerged as a dominant theme in Indian politics; the religio-political forces in the 1980s and 1990s. This has its roots in Hindu-Muslim distrust and differences, the economic crisis and liberalization, and the search for a new identity of the Indianness. There is no denying that most Indian political forces, including the Congress, have used religion in politics, but the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP has excelled in championing the Hindu identity; *Hindutva*. This was facilitated in the 1980s and 1990s by uncertainty, confusion, and sufferings of many Indians resulting from economic problems and adoption of neo-liberal measures. The BJP has exploited these fears and put forth more nationalist economic policy proposals and a new ideology of legitimization in terms of Hindu nationalism.

Congress hegemony is in the process of being replaced by other forces such as the OBCs, *Dalits*, BJP-RSS-led Hindu right, *Janata Dal* (JD) and CPI-CPI (M) left and center-left alliance, various regional parties. This configuration of party strengths has resulted in minority and coalition governments in the centre. Since 1996, India has seen five governments in New Delhi. All were coalition governments and were very short-lived (Tables 4 & 5). The decline of the Congress hegemony discussed earlier had continued during this period. For some time in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there appeared a possibility for the combination of the leftist parties and the parties of the *Dalits* and the *OBCs* -- the so-called *National Front* (NF), UF or *Third Force* -- to become an alternative to the Congress Party. That, however, now seems a distant possibility in the wake of the disarray of

these forces leading to their disappointing electoral performance in the latest *Lok Sabha* elections in 1999. Tables 4 and 5 clearly highlight this scenario. The BJP-led coalition, the National Democratic Alliance -- NDA, of some small anti-Congress, regional and *Hindu* parties seems, at the moment, to have been emerging as the leading force to fill up the vacuum created by the decline of Congress hegemony. But, any prediction in this regard would be too early and risky since the NDA is a combination of diverse ideological, regional, and personal interests. Differences among the components of the NDA might flare up at any time on any issue that might undo the NDA coalition.⁴¹ Resignation of defense minister George Fernandes of the Samata Party, an important NDA leader, from the cabinet and withdrawal of support from the NDA by the *Trinomul Congress* of Mamata Banerjee over the *Tehelka.Com* defense purchase scandal indicate that. Very recently, Fernandes has threatened to quit the NDA over the issue of the fall of the Samata government in the State of Manipur due to the withdrawal of support of the Manipur State BJP from the minority government led by the Samata Party. Moreover, despite being the leading party in the NDA, the BJP did not make much electoral gains in the 1999 *Lok Sabha* elections compared to its performance in the 1996 elections (Table 4). What it tells is that neither the *Third Force* (National Front), nor the Congress Party, nor the BJP has created a hegemonic

⁴¹ In one such situation, a contradiction recently flared up on the issue of the orders by BJP-led state governments (first of Gujarat, and then two other states) allowing the government officials to participate in the activities of the RSS -- the ideological and political guide of the BJP claiming that the RSS is a cultural than a political organization. Things got worse when Prime Minister Vajpayee defended the state government order but his Defense Minister and the leader of the *Janata Dal (United)*, George Fernandes, and two south Indian state governments opposed the order. Eventually, the government had to cancel the order that would have allowed the government officials to participate in the RSS activities. Such contradictions are more likely to continue to bedevil the BJP-dominated NDA government as no party has won absolute majority in the Lok Sabha. For this see, *The Independent* (Dhaka: an English-language daily) February 16, 2000.

bloc on their own. Indeed, the Indian politics is facing a crisis of a hegemonic bloc which has led India to a Coalitional system. As has been mentioned at the outset of the paper, frequent rise and fall of coalition governments do not mean democratic instability since *Governmental* instability and *Democratic* instability are two different things.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY VARIABLES IN DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN AND STABILITY

Finally, Brazil and India differed in terms of the military's role in domestic politics, its international linkages and the governments' foreign policy positions.

Brazilian Experiences

In the context of prolonged economic crises, external pressure, internal policy dilemma, weak institutions and increasing counter-hegemonic forces, the military took over in Brazil in 1964. But, despite some early speculations of military takeover and recent concerns about the military's internal role expansion, the Indian military has not yet taken over power and is not likely to do so in the near future.

The Brazilian military had a long tradition of engagement in domestic politics. The military overthrew Vargas in 1945 paving the way for democratic inauguration in 1946 thus earning the position of the guardian of democracy. Such self-perceived obligation of the military encouraged it to intervene in the face of any perceived threat to that system. The Military's political importance was recognized by giving the Military Cabinet posts in democratic Brazil.

But more important were the sources of military assistance, Cold War stand and the ideology of the military. As some scholars have suggested, the Brazilian military had always been concerned with

domestic security and law and order.⁴² This was reflected in its earlier ideology of Order and Progress (*Ordem E Progresso*). With the onset of the Cold War and the formation of the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Rio Pact, the Brazilian military lost both the roles of protecting Brazil's security from external threat of Communist invasion (possibility of which was minimal) and peacekeeping abroad. The first role was taken over by the US through the Rio Pact, and the second by the OAS. The only possible external role the Brazilian military could have played was as expeditionary forces in the event of Super power conflicts, prospects of which also receded significantly with the growing US-Soviet detente. These factors left the Brazilian military with very little concern about an external threat. The only realistic role that was left for the military was internal. Repeated interventions in politics prior to the 1964 takeover highlights this point. This domestic role was reinforced by the nature of the conflict and the new doctrine of the military, the National Security Doctrine (NSD) which articulated its internal role in fighting international communism at home. The NSD was influenced by and compatible with the US counter-insurgency strategy developed and promoted since the 1950s.

This was further reinforced by Brazil's pro-US position in the Cold War and its military dependence on the US. Crucially, a large portion of the military officers were trained either in the Superior War College (*Escola Superior Guerra*) – ESG or various US military schools, and held strong Pro-US views. There was a clear ideological affinity between the US Cold War goals and ideological interests of a large portion of Brazilian military officers against international communism at home and abroad. Defeating the communists was also very closely related to their corporate interests as a Communist take over would sever not only their US linkages but also might dissolve the military itself, as happened in Cuba after the revolution.

⁴² Markoff and Barreta, 1985, *op. cit.*, McCann, Jr., 1980, *op. cit.*,

Linkages with the US military, the NSD and the Cold War position of Brazil (and a large portion of the Brazilian military) had important impact on the breakdown of Brazilian democracy in 1964. As Stepan⁴³ has argued that New Professionalism of the Brazilian military helped the boundary change in the Brazilian military from a moderating one to a ruling one. Out of fear that Goulart might adversely affect US interests, push for a *Republica Sindical*, or let the Communists takeover and threaten US-Brazilian military linkages hampering military's ideological-corporate interests, the already NSD-indoctrinated Brazilian military took over. The extent of training and indoctrination with the US Cold War ideology of the Brazilian officers has been shown elsewhere.⁴⁴

Goulart's advocacy for land reform, the profit remittance law, and Quadros-Goulart shift toward an 'independent foreign policy' all convinced them about the Communist threat, perceived or real. This fear first led the US policy makers to adopt the policy of destabilization of the Goulart government in June 1963. The USAID, under policy of the so-called "Islands of Sanity", disbursed over \$100 million to the right wing anti-Goulart state governments to undermine Goulart. It underlined the effects of dependence on the US and Cold War position on the breakdown of Brazilian democracy. Finally, the Mann Doctrine, adopted in March 1964, indicated US readiness and willingness to support military takeover against any real or perceived communist threat. It gave the Brazilian coup plotters green light.

From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was ruled by successive military governments. After the coup leader, Castelo Branco (1964-67), the

⁴³ Alfred Stepan, "New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion", in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47-65.

⁴⁴ For details, see, Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-201.

Brazilian military ruler, Arturo Costa e Silva (1967-'74), initially attempted to liberalize (*abertura*) -- not to democratize -- political system. But, his attempt invited greater mobilization by the opposition including the radical nationalists, populists, and the leftists. That prompted Costa de Silva to abandon his liberalization attempts and cracked down on the mobilized political opponents, primarily, the radical leftists. An authoritarian government turned into a dictatorial one (*dictadura*).

By 1973, government "successfully" quelled the opponents and paved the way for the next military president Ernesto Geisel (1974-'79), a moderate General, to pursue a policy of political liberalization in Brazil once again.⁴⁵ His problems, however, came from the security and intelligence apparatuses (both civilian and military) and the hardliners within the military regime and institutions. The security and intelligence apparatuses gained virtually free hand in quashing the radicals during 1969-73. Their fear was that attempt to democratization would be exploited by the radicals as was the case during the earlier attempt during 1969-73. Indeed, one of the factors that forced the moderates to follow the democratization path was to dissociate the military as an institution from the government and to reduce domination of the security and intelligence apparatuses. But, apart from these reasons, the fundamental problem of the military governments was how to ensure electoral victory in a freely contested popular elections.

Eventually, military President Joao Figueriedo (1979-84) delivered on the promise of direct elections. As part of political liberalization process, all the governors, Federal deputies, a third of all

⁴⁵ See, Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* [Third Edition] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 180-181.

Federal senators, and virtually all the mayors, state representatives, and local council members were elected in directly contested elections in 1982. In those elections, the opposition party, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), did extremely well in the developed states and took control of the Chamber of Deputies – the lower house of the Brazilian Congress. Though the government party, the Democratic Social Party (PDS), lost majority in the Chamber of Deputies, it, however, retained control over the electoral college to elect the new president in 1985.

In January 1985 presidential elections, the shift of allegiance of enough members of the electoral college from the ruling PDS candidate, Paulo Maluf, ensured the victory of the PMDB candidate, Tancredo Neves, and his Vice-presidential running mate and a pre-coup PSD leader and once a pillar of the military regime, Jose Sarney. This victory, however, came as a result of serious ethical compromise by the PMDB candidates with the military government as well as the traditional elites. A lot of concessions had to be granted to the military government and the PDS (later renamed *Frente Liberal* – the Liberal Front). With the sudden death of president-elect Neves before swearing in, vice-president elect, Jose Sarney, became the president. Transition to democracy from authoritarianism thus took place with the handing over of power to Jose Sarney. A good proportion of former "traditional" Brazilian elites, most of whom supported the pre-1964 conservative and authoritarian forces and the military governments since 1964, joined the PMDB in the 1980s and ensured the victory of the PMDB presidential and Vice presidential candidates in 1985. In the process, it diluted the prospect of the PMDB's becoming a "true" party for future democratic consolidation. Indeed, it led the PMDB to the path of ethical compromise reflected in the intense negotiations for the drafting of a new constitution for full

democracy in Brazil during 1982-1988. A new Democratic Constitution was agreed upon in 1988.⁴⁶

The new constitution, inspite of incorporating many strongly-worded provisions for civil liberties and socio-political rights, and strengthening the Congress somewhat, was marked by its provisions for Presidentialism (strong presidency) instead of Parliamentarism and Federalism. Both Presidentialism and Federalism are considered having some sort of authoritarian bias in the Brazilian context.⁴⁷

Free and directly contested presidential elections on the basis of the new constitution (ratified in 1988) took place in 1989 in which a relatively young and lesser known former governor Fernando Collor de Mello of a poor and insignificant North Eastern state, Alagoas, became president defeating the charismatic former labor leader of the PMDB, Ignacio Luis da Silva ("Lula"). Interestingly, Collor de Mello ran in the name of a virtually non-existent new party, the Party of National Reconstruction (PRN). This election completed Brazil's transition to democracy. Brazil has been struggling since for the second transition; consolidation of democracy.⁴⁸

As in most other cases of democratic transition, in particular case of Brazil also, the economic crisis played an important role in democratic transition in the early 1980s.⁴⁹ Although the Brazilian

⁴⁶ For further details, see, Frances Hagopian, "The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 258-259.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 272-277.

⁴⁸ For many-fold weaknesses and some strengths of the new Brazilian democracy, see, *Ibid.*, pp. 273-281.

⁴⁹ The present author has discussed them in his book. See, Bhuian Md. Monoar Kabir, *Politics of Military Rule and the Dilemmas of Democratization in Bangladesh* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1999), Chapter 1. There is a large body of literature on the demise of authoritarian

military governments during 1968-'74 presided over economic boom, called the "Brazilian Miracle", that boom came to a halt and all sorts of economic problems rose their heads by the end of the 1970s. Although the Brazilian military rulers achieved economic successes, as Smith shows, it was also suffering from economic problems during the years prior to the final transition from military rule.⁵⁰ Brazil's external debt rose to an unprecedented \$87 billions (unofficially about \$100 bn) in 1982, inflation in 1980 was more than 100% and 227% in 1985 and, after dramatic fall, rode back with new vigor to reach 1500% by 1990. After a high economic growth in 1985-87, growth rate soon became stagnant. Balance of payment difficulties became acute and Brazil had to suspend payments on principal. Brazil had to agree to an IMF-architected economic restructuring plan for getting "Bridging loan" essential to meet immediate debt obligations. Implementation of the Plan involved a brutal reduction of imports to earn a trade surplus leading to economic stagnation and hardship for the poorer section of the society.⁵¹ Among others, global economic recession made the situation worse.

The Brazilian military governments came under pressure from the US, particularly under President Jimmy Carter, for greater political liberalization and respect for human rights. This policy was consistent with the post-Nicaraguan revolution US policy toward the authoritarian regimes based on the assumption that elected and

regimes in the 1980s. William C. Smith, "The Political Transition in Brazil: From Authoritarian Liberalization and Elite Conciliation to Democratization," in Enrique A. Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 179-213.

⁵⁰ William C. Smith, "The Political Transition in Brazil: From Authoritarian Liberalization and Elite Conciliation to Democratization," in Enrique A. Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 179-213.

⁵¹ For these figures, see, Skidmore and Smith, 1992, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

democratic systems were the best guard against the success of the leftist revolutionaries as they thrive in authoritarian situations.⁵² That, to a certain extent, forced the Brazilian military governments to open up political space and liberalize the political system gradually leading ultimately to full transition. Militarily, economically, and logistically dependent military regimes became concerned when their supplier, the US, put pressure.⁵³

Another factor that contributed to transition was the "successful" crushing of the radicals by the Costa de Silva government. That "success" removed a reason for continuation of hardline military rule (*dictadura*) and the following military governments adopted policy of soft authoritarianism (*dictablanca*) accompanied by gradual political liberalization. The military's concern for its own institutional interests also played an important role its decision to transfer power to the civilian elected government. In the course of crushing the radicals, the security and intelligence forces gained considerable power and greater role in the government. The worried professional officers wanted to avoid further increase of influence of the security and intelligence apparatuses through transition to democracy.

However, the New Democracy has been facing some difficulties. The adoption of Presidentialism and Federalism have incorporated an in-built authoritarian bias in the Brazilian democratic constitution. Consequently, the new Brazilian democracy remains weak and vulnerable in terms of its consolidation and stability. The election of Collor de Mello as the President in 1989 defeating the more democratic PMDB candidate, Luis da Silva "Lula", reflected the fact that the Brazilian democracy lacked institutional strength. That

⁵² For this point, consult the literature listed in footnote 49.

⁵³ Ulf Sandhausen, 1984, *op. cit.*, pp. 543-559.

was partly the case because of the joining of a sizeable portion of "traditional" elites and former supporters of authoritarianism in the PMDB. The prolonged military rule and its profound impact and legacy also has made the consolidation harder. The task of democratic consolidation and stability has become further difficult by serious economic difficulties. President Collor de Mello was, however, forced to step down in the face of impeachment motion against him in the early 1990s over the issue of corruption. Since then the great dependency theorist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has been serving as the president of Brazil. He, as president, has pursued neo-classical type economic reform programmes. True, Brazil was suffering from economic crisis. True also that the Brazilian foreign policy gives emphasis on strong political and strategic ties with the US. However, neither economic crises and adoption of neo-classical reform programmes, nor strong political and strategic ties with the US has affected Brazilian democracy adversely. It is the institutional weakness that has been causing trouble for Brazilian democracy which has remained a weak one.⁵⁴

Brazil's new democracy still remains intact, albeit weak, can be explained by the US policy in favour of democratization (as long as democracy does not threaten US interests). Moreover, despite economic crises, the Brazilian governments in the last 6-7 years have been able to manage the crises satisfactorily. More importantly, Brazil now lacks the combination of factors whose presence together lead to the breakdown/instability of democracy. The New Democratic Brazil does not have any significant counter-hegemonic force such as the radical nationalists/leftist revolutionary forces. There is no longer Cold War and the military, the propertied classes, and the US are not

⁵⁴ Hagopian, 1992, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-283.

afraid of threats to their interests from the radicals. The experience of prolonged military rule has also probably taught all sides (the democrats, radicals, other politicians, the US, and the military) about the cost of military rule. Hence, none has any interest in destabilizing New Democracy even though the Brazilian new democracy is not functioning as ideally as it should have been.

Indian civil-military relations were different with the military having played no role in the national freedom movement or inauguration of democracy. Indeed, the military was viewed by many in the early years of independence as a discredited institution for having carried out British governments' orders against the nationalist leaders during the freedom movement. The Indian military had thus no moral claim to power and politics in independent India. That was reinforced by the dominance for long of Nehru and the leaders of the freedom movement generation who derived legitimacy from the masses reducing the military's political role and position. Civilian control was further institutionalized consciously through a series of institutional mechanism such as removing the post of C-in-C and creating a politician dominated defense ministry. Moreover, unlike in Brazil, the military had no place in the Indian Cabinet, not even membership in the Political Affairs Committee and National Security Council, the two highest decision making bodies regarding defense.

India's non-aligned foreign policy with a pro-Soviet "tilt" not only removed a significant cleavage from domestic politics but also contributed to the non-political nature of the military. Unlike Brazil, India was neither a member of a pro-US nor a pro-Soviet security alliance. It was able to minimize the political implications of its economic (not military) dependence on the US because India always had a greater maneuvering space due to its friendly ties with the Soviet Union. That was not the case with Brazil which was economically and

militarily highly dependent on the US and, until the late 1950s, did not even have any diplomatic tie with the Soviet Union and most East European countries. Lack of such diversified international linkages deprived Brazil of any maneuvering ability. For instance, when the US and IMF refused to bailout Brazil in 1959 and in 1963, Brazil had no Soviet Union to turn to, but India had.

In particular, because of lack of any military and Cold War linkages with the US, the Indian military, unlike the Brazilian one, never had to concern itself to fight international communism at home (or abroad) and did not feel any necessity to develop a NSD-type ideology.⁵⁵ Even, the politicians' use of the military in "aid-to-civil" which according to some⁵⁶ has probably moved in to a new relationship called "Civil-Military Partnership" is resented by many military officers for such deployments' potential adverse effect on professionalism. Even those deployments are ordered by civilian authority.

Indian Experiences

Unlike the Brazilian military, the Indian military faced a clear external threat to security since the very beginning of India's independence when it had to fight in Kashmir. Since then, it has been preoccupied with a real and concrete external threat, Pakistan, and a potential threat, China, which became real with the 1959 and 1962 Sino-Indian border wars. Dealing with these threats requires the Indian

⁵⁵ For details about it, see, Bhuian Md. Monoar Kabir, "Internal-External Linkages, and Continuity and Change in Indian Civil-Military Relations", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 58-71.

⁵⁶ See, for example, Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Military and India's democracy", in Atul Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 99-143; Sumit Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to Civil: The Army in Contemporary India", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 26, 1-2 (1991), pp. 11-26.

military to focus externally despite increasing peacetime use of the military in "aid-to-civil" in the 1980s and 1990s.

While recent increase in deployment of the military in "aid-to-civil administration" is a concern and perhaps the military has achieved the status of partnership (though junior) with the politicians and bureaucracy, there is no immediate danger of a military intervention.⁵⁷ Generous spending in defense has also been a reason why the military remains calm.⁵⁸ The prolonged internal deployments remained limited mainly within the remote and non-peninsular North Eastern India until 1984 when massive military force was used in Punjab which indeed created significant tension in Indian politics and the military. But deployment in the North East can be more appropriately considered in light of external security problem in the event of those tribal states' cessation and independence. The North East, except Assam, has little politico-economic and cultural impact on the mainstream (peninsular) Indian life. They really do not reflect real domestic political role of the military with political impact on the military.

Since 1995, India has seen both change and continuity in terms of variables of this study. In terms of politico-military aspects, India reestablished military purchase links with Russia (heir to the former Soviet Union). At the same time, as a departure from policy during the Cold War, India has been improving relationship with the US in economic, security, and strategic areas. This change was best reflected during the visit of the US President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000 when the two sides signed agreement for dialogue for strategic partnership opening up a new chapter in the Indo-US strategic relationship.⁵⁹ Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to the US in late

⁵⁷ For this see, Cohen, 1988, *Ibid.*, Ganguly, 1991, *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ For this see, Kabir, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-338.

⁵⁹ For details, Raj Chengappa, "Charming of India", *India Today* (April 3, 2000), pp. 30-41.

2000 has further solidified the Indo-US relationship. Yet, Indo-US military supply links remains at a very low level and there remain divergent views on such important issues as India's signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

In the realm of civil-military relations, no significant change has taken place other than the removal of the Naval Chief, Admiral Vishnu Bhagat, in December 1998, apparently on Navy's internal matters. In the Vishnu Bhagat case, too, no party other than the AIADMK of Jayaram Jayalalitha tried to make it an issue. Eventually, the Defense Ministry prevailed and Jayalalitha's demand for the conduct of investigation by a joint parliamentary committee did not materialize.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the military has gained both in prestige and materials. India tested nuclear devices in May 1998 and carried out several missile test fires since the late-1980s. The Indian military also gained in prestige by its "success" in the Kargil conflict in Kashmir in early 1999.⁶¹ Added to the prestige was increase in India's defense budget by roughly 28% in the year 2000-2001 over the previous year.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The paper aimed at providing an understanding of the issues of democratic stability and instability by trying to combine both external and internal factors as explanatory variables juxtaposing the cases of both democratic breakdown (Brazil) and democratic stability with a brief authoritarian interlude (India) in the post-World War II period. It has been argued here that the likelihood of democratic stability in a developing country in the post-WW II period depended on internal factors such as a country's economic development, economic crises, policies pursued by various

⁶⁰ For the whole episode see, various issues of *India Today* during December 1999-January 2000.

⁶¹ See various issues of *India Today* during and immediately after the Kargil crisis.

governments of that country, strengths and weaknesses of democratic as well as counter-hegemonic forces, and civil-military relations. The fate of democratic system in a developing country also depended on the external factors such as the economic and politico-military dependence on multilateral financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (the Bank) on the one hand, and the core countries of the world, particularly the United States (US), on the other. Democratic system also depended on the country's position in the Cold War and the military's international linkage(s). The nature of combination of and interactions among the various forces and factors determine democratic stability and instability.

In this era of democratization and globalization, democracy is viewed as a regular and non-democracy as a non-regular political mode. Democracy has become the only ideology of the post-Cold War political order. Its universality is beyond question as the hegemony of the US and western democracies are seldom questioned. The military coups and non-democratic political modes are no longer supported by the hegemonic power (the US and the Western democracies). With the weakening of the counter-hegemonic radical socialist forces in world as well as domestic politics of the developing countries, the threat to the hegemony of the US (and western countries) and the democratic systems in the developing countries has reduced greatly allowing the operation of democratic system there. Ushering in of the information age has contributed to the surge of democratic culture in the developing countries too.

The propositions of this study can be adjusted to the changing global reality in the post-Cold-War context though the changes could be detected since the mid-1980s when the Soviet challenge to the US hegemony began to recede. Since then, the US has settled for

democracy in the developing countries due to the sharply reduced level of ideological, political, and military threats to the US hegemony in the changing global context. Other than some sporadic and weak Islamist challenges to the US-Western ideo-politico-cultural hegemony, they are not facing any other serious challenge. This new US posture to the dependent developing countries may auger well for democratic stability there. It should be mentioned that while the US posture to democracy in the developing world has changed the basic proposition that the position of the core countries is important for democratic stability or instability still remains valid.

Despite these positive indications, one must not lose sight of the harsh reality of the world system under which the new and old democracies in the developing world are trying to remain stable. In this regard, it should be noted that the support for democracy is not a fixed US policy. Its pro-democracy posture toward the developing countries is largely informed by its threat perception to its national interests resulting from activities of a government in a developing country --a democratic one or not. Its record of either supporting or remaining indifferent to non-democratic regimes in Africa and the Middle East tells it all. Indeed, counter-hegemonic threat from Islamic "fundamentalist" movement may lead the US and western countries to accept non-democratic regimes (a military or non-military) in order to contain the "fundamentalists".

Prolonged and severe economic crises in the developing countries also cut deeply into the legitimacy of the democratic government and create dissatisfaction amongst the masses. Macroeconomic crises continue to haunt the developing countries and implementation of the "corrective" measures prescribed by the IMF and various donors and multilateral institutions may put strains on the democratic systems. Growing income inequality in the developing countries, partly resulting from the economic reforms,

also may contribute to this. It is, after all, very difficult to maintain a democratic system and, at the same time, carry out these measures. Under such a circumstance, weak, polarized, and faction-ridden democratic political institutions may not bear the pressure of such crises and may give way to some sort of non-democratic authority. Whether that would be a military government or not will largely depend on the history of military's takeover, its previous performance, and the military's external linkages.

In the end, it can be said that some positive changes have taken place in favour of democratic stability in the developing countries in the post-Cold War era of globalization. The paper holds that the lack of prolonged and severe economic (mainly macroeconomic) crises, the lack of counter-hegemonic forces (be it socialists or "fundamentalist"), the presence of strong political institutions, pro-democratic approach of the US and Western powers are going to play a positive role in maintaining democratic stability in the developing countries. On the other hand the presence of prolonged and severe economic (mainly macroeconomic) crises, counter-hegemonic forces (be they socialist or "fundamentalist"), pro-interventionist military, weak democratic institutions, and indifferent or hostile approach of the US and Western powers to democratization in a particular developing country will contribute to democratic instability there. It should be stressed further that, at times, one or other of these factors may become salient and play key role in either maintaining democratic stability or causing its instability. But, it is more likely that the absence or presence of combination of these factors will determine stability and instability of democracy in a developing country.

Table 1. Indicators of Unrest in India (selected years)

Governments	Riots (Thousands)	Student "Indiscipline"	Workdays Lost (Millions)
Nehru (1952-63)	23.3 (Yearly average)	55.9 (Yearly average)	5.3 (Yearly average)
Shastri (1964-65)	33 (Yearly average)	333 (Yearly average)	7.1 (Yearly average)
Indira (1966-68)	41 (Yearly average)	1091	16
1969	56	3,064	19.0
1970	68	3,861	20.6
1971	64	4,380	16.5
1972	--	6,365	20.5
1973	--	5,551	20.6
1974	81	11,540	40.3
Indira (1975-76)	65 (Yearly average)	2,518 (Yearly average)	17.35 (Yearly average)

Source: Adapted from, Loyd I Rudolph and Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political-Economy of the Indian State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 227.

Table 2. Number and Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Obtained by the Major Brazilian Parties in Five Federal Elections, 1946-1962.

Parties	1945 (N=286)	1950 (N=304)	1954 (N=326)	1958 (N=326)	1962 (N=409)
PSD	151 (52.7) 42.3%	112 (36.8) 22.2%	114 (34.9) 22.0%	115 (35.2) 18.4%	122 (29.8) 15.6%
UDN	77 (26.9) 26.3%	81 (26.6) 14.0%	74 (22.6) 13.6%	70 (21.4) 13.2%	94 (22.9) 11.2%
PTB	22 (7.6) 10.1%	51 (16.7) 13.6%	56 (17.1) 14.9%	66 (20.2) 14.7%	109 (26.6) 12.1%
PSP	4 (1.4)	24 (7.8)	32 (9.8)	25 (7.6)	22 (5.4)
PR	7 (2.4)	11 (3.6)	19 (5.8)	17 (5.2)	4 (1.2)
PSB	---	1 (0.3)	3 (0.9)	9 (2.7)	4 (1.0)
PDC	2 (0.6)	2 (0.7)	2 (0.7)	7 (2.1)	20 (4.9)
PCB	14 (4.8)	---	---	---	---
Alliance	---	16.7%	25.7%	33.3%	41.0%
Others	20.3%	15.8%	18.9%	12.9%	5.1%

Notes: Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentage of seats obtained by the respective parties. Figures with % sign indicate the percentage of valid votes (total ballots cast less invalid ballots) obtained by the respective parties. Percentage of votes for the minor parties like the PSP, PR, PSB, PDC, and PCB could not be provided here separately. They are shown under the columns titled, OTHERS, and ALLIANCE. Sources: Adapted from, U.S. Army, *Brazil: A Country Profile, 1964* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 314. Also, *Brazil: Election Fact Book, 1965*, p. 60.

Table 3. Land Tenure and Land Use in Brazil, 1960

Amount of Land (hectores)	Number of Farm Units (1,000)	Size of Farm Land	Cultivated Area	Farm Units (%)	Farm Land (%)
Below 10	1500	5,920	3,950	44.8	2.2
10-100	1,495	47,700	13,300	44.6	18.0
100-1000	315	86,300	9,000	9.4	32.5
1000-10000	31	72,800	2,960	.9	19.8
Over 10000	1.7	52,740	460	.1	19.8
Unclassified	7.3	---	---	.2	---
Total	3,350.0	265,460	29,670	100	100

Source: IADB, *op. cit.*, 1964, p. 180. Note: Size of Farmlands and Cultivated Areas are estimated in 1,000 hectares.

Table 4. Votes and Seats by the Indian Political Parties in the Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-'99 (Upper Cell Figures indicate % of Votes)

Party	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977
Indian National	45.0	47.8	44.7	40.8	43.7	34.7
Congress (INC)	364	371	361	283	352	154
Janata Party (JP)/ Samajbadi Janata Party (SJP)	---	---	---	---	---	41.3 295
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS)/Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	3.1	5.9	6.4	9.5	7.4	---
Communist Party of India (CPI)	3.3	8.9	9.9	5.0	4.7	2.8
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M)	---	---	---	4.4	5.1	4.3
Socialist Party!	16.4	10.4	9.5	8.0	3.4	---
Swatantra Party	21	19	18	36	5	---
Indian National*	---	---	7.9	8.7	3.1	---
Congress (INC)*	---	---	18	44	8	---
Hindu Mahasabha	---	---	---	---	10.4	1.7
	4	---	---	---	16	3
	---	---	---	---	---	---

Ram Rajya Parishad		3	---	---	---	---	---
Scheduled Caste Federation		2	---	---	---	---	---
Others		38	31	34	45	53	52
Independent		38	42	20	35	14	9
Total		489	494	494	520	518	542
Party	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999
INC	42.7	48.1	39.5	36.4	---	140	112
	353	415	197	244	136	(166)@	(134)@
Telegu Desam Party (TDP)	---	28	2	N.K	16	12	29
CPI-M	6.1	5.7	6.5	6.1	---	--	N.K
	36	22	33	35	32	32	N.K
CPI	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	---	---	---
	11	6	12	14	11	9	N.K
All India Anna Dradva Munnetra Kazgham (AIADMK)	---	12	11	N.A	00	18	15
BJP	---	7.4	11.4	20.2	161	40.1	41.3
		2	86	119		179	182
						(258)#	(296)#
JP/SJP	19.0	6.7	1.0	3.3	---	@@	N.K
	31	10	00	5			
Janat Dal (JD)	---	---	17.8	11.8	43	6	N.K
			142	59		(98)@@	
INC*	5.3	5	1	1	4	N.K	N.K
	13				(Tiwari)		
JNPS/LD/DMKP	41	3	--	--	--	N.K	N.K
Other Left	--	--	8	--	--	N.K	N.K
SDP	---	---	---	--	--	1	N.K
AIICS	---	---	---	--	--	1	N.K
ASDC	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K

SJP	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)	--	--	3	--	11	5	14
Tamil Manila Congress (TMC)	--	--	--	--	20	3	N.K
JP	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhgam (MDMK)	--	--	--	--	--	3	4
Dravida Munetra Kazhgam (DMK)	--	--	--	--	17	6	12
United Akali Dal	--	--	6	--	--	8	N.K
Shiv Sena (SS)	--	--	--	--	15	6	15
Trinamool Congress (TC)	--	--	--	--	--	7	8
Samata Party	--	--	--	--	7	12	***
Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)	--	--	--	--	--	4	5
Haryana Lok Dal	--	--	--	--	--	4	N.K
Haryana Vikas Party (HVP)	--	--	--	--	3	1	N.K
Forward Bloc (FB)	--	--	--	--	3	2	N.K
MIM	--	--	--	--	--	1	1
Samajwadi Party (SP)	--	--	--	--	17	20	26
Ahom Gano Parishad (AGP)	--	--	--	--	5	N.K	N.K
Shiromoni Akali Dal (SAD)	--	--	--	--	8	N.K	2
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)	--	--	--	--	5	5	N.K
Muslim League	--	--	--	--	--	2	N.K
Tamilaga Rajiv Congress (TRC)	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K
Arunachal Congress (AC)	--	--	--	--	--	2	N.K
Lok Shakti (LS)	--	--	--	--	--	3	***
Republican Party of India	--	--	--	--	--	4	N.K

(RPI)							
Kerala Congress (KEC)	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K
RJP	--	--	--	--	--	1	N.K
Rastriya Janata Dal (RJD)	--	--	--	--	--	17	7
Biju Janata Dal (BJD)	--	--	--	--	--	9	10
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)	--	--	--	--	--	--	6
Janata Dal- United (JD-U)	--	--	--	--	--	--	20
Indian National Lok Dal (INLD)	--	--	--	--	--	--	5
National Conference (NC)	--	--	--	--	--	--	4
Independents	9	5	--	--	9	9	N.K
Others	35	34	31	--	11	--	57!!
			includi				
			ng				
			Indepe				
			ndents				
Total	529	542	532	477	534	537	537

Notes: JNPS = Janata Party (Secular), LD = Lok Dal, DMKP = Dalit Mazdoor Kishan Party. The full name of some minor parties is not provided here. They include: AIICS, ASDC, SJP, MIM, RJP. *** Stands for merger into the JD (U). !! Others include AGP, JD, HVP, TMC, and the components of the Left Front (CPI, CPI-M, FB, RSP). # BJP and allies (Allies in the 1999 elections are: SS, JD-U, SAD, LS, BJD, TC, DMK, TDP, PMK, MDMK, TRC, INLD). # Congress and allies (Allies in the 1999 elections are: AIADMK, KEC, Indian Union Muslim League [IUMML], RJD, Indian National League [INL]). **Sources:** Constructed from, V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose, *Elections in India: Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-1985*, 2nd edition (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), 30, 38; V.B. Singh, *Elections in India: Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections, 1986-1991* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 49, 58. The 1996 election results were taken from *Shaptahik Bichitra* (Dhaka: a Bengali weekly), May 17, 1996, 20. * Indicates various breakaway factions of the INC. Congress (Tiwari) in 1996. † Includes various factions of Socialist Parties (SP, SSP, KMPP). +The JP (Secular), BLD, DMKP, LKLD (various formations of breakaway factions of the original JNP) received 9.4% votes and 41 seats in 1980 and 5.6% votes and 3 seats in 1984. JD in 1996. @ INC and its allies. @@ Components of the UF which together got 98 seats. Results for the 1984 elections had also been drawn from, Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "India in 1984: Confrontation, Assassination, and Succession", *Asian Survey*, February 1985, pp. 131-144; and results for the 1989 elections had also been drawn from, Richard Sisson, "India in 1989: A Year of Elections in a Culture of Change", *Asian Survey*, February 1990, pp. 111-121. *India Today*, February 6, 1998 and March 30, 1998. Also, *The Independent*, March 11, 1998.

Table 5. Duration of Central Governments in India Since 1947

Election Year	Election Types	Ruling party or Bloc	Prime minister	Period Ruled	Duration of a Govt. (Yrs.)	Average Duration of Governments
1946	Plebiscitary	Congress	J. Nehru	1946-1952	6	6
1952	Normal	" "	" "	1952-1957	5	5
1957	" "	" "	" "	1957-1962	5	5.3 years during 1946-1962 period (Total 16 years ruled by 3 governments)
1962	" "	" "	" " (1963) Shastri (63-65) Indira (65-67)	1962-1967	5	3.3 yrs. during 1946-'67 (Total 1.8 years ruled by 6 governments)
1967	" "	" "	Indira	1967-71	4	4
1971	Plebiscitary (Bangladesh War)	" "	Indira	1971-77	6	6
1977	" (anti-Congress, anti-emergency)	Janata Party	M. Desai (77-79) Charan Singh (79-80)	1977-80	3	1.5
1980	Plebiscitary (against the <i>Janata</i> misrule and need for stability)	Congress	Indira Gandhi	1980-84	4	4
1984	Plebiscitary (Indira killing, and pro-Congress sympathy vote)	" "	Rajiv Gandhi	1984-89	5	3.7 years during 1967-'89 (Total 6 government ruled 22 yrs.)
1989	Normal (with strong anti-Congress sentiment)	Janata Dal-National Front (with BJP and Left Front support from Outside)	V. P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar	1989-1991	2	1

1991	Plebiscitary (JD-UF misrule, sympathy vote, and need for stability)	Congress	Narsimha Rao	1991-1995	5	5
1996	Normal (with anti-Congress, and anti-BJP sentiment)	BJP United Front-Left Front	Atal Behari Vajpayee (for two weeks) H.D. Deve Gowda and Inder Kumar Gujral	1996-1998	2	8 Months
1998	Normal	BJP-led coalition with some regional parties	Atal Behari Vajpayee	March 1998-October 1999	13 Months	13 Months
1999	Kargil War, anti-foreign-born leader, Nuclear Doctrine, and Capable leadership of Vajpayee	BJP-led coalition with some regional parties.	Atal Behari Vajpayee	October 1999-	----	1 1/2 yrs. during 1989-2000 (8 governments ruled 12 years). (Each election held in about every 04 years during 1946-2000 on average). (Each government averaged 2 3/4 years during this period. Since 1946, 20 governments ruled India for 55 years).

Note: For the full name of the parties, please see Table 13.