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THE GLOBAL POPULATION PROBLEM : A NORTH - SOUTH DIMENSION

In historical perspective it is argued that lack of sufficient population greatly contributed to the decay of Hellenic civilization or the fall of Rome. According to a statement by Guillaume Bude representing the age of Enlightenment : "The king's glory is in the multitude of the people". Similarly, Perriere asked, "Who will carry the weapons if men are lacking?"¹ In fact, the political concern with increasing the number of population as a means of promoting wealth and power for the Lord, the King and later for the State extended through centuries well beyond the period of mercantilism which is posited to be a natural extension of populationist theory from the political to the economic field.² The provisions of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont singling out the great powers in Europe amply manifest the attribute a large population and a large army brought in its wake.

However, the population on earth could not increase at a pace desired during early periods of human civilization due to their total exposure to uncontrolled natural vagaries and predatory attack. It is only after the eighteen century Industrial Revolution in Europe that population growth got an initial

1. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. II-12 (New York : The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1972), p. 350.
2. *Ibid.*

boost and then gradually diminished. To get a comparative perspective, one may mention that world population at the beginning of the Christian era has been estimated at around 250 million,³ mainly concentrating around early civilizations of China, India and the Mediterranean basin. That number could double itself only in 1650 with a growth rate of no more than a mere 0.004 percent a year. Then world population multiplied into 1000 million in 1850 ; 2000 million in 1930 ; 3000 million in 1960 and 4000 million in 1975.⁴ Currently, with an yearly addition of about 80 million people at a global growth rate of 1.8 percent, the world total would reach 5000 million by 1988. From the above time-series data one may observe that the period needed for doubling population sharply declined and still is declining—from an initial long 1650 years to 200 years to 80 years to 45 years only.

Now, in sharp contrast to the early belief this great leap in population growth is no more viewed as a welcome phenomenon. In fact, the post-War 'population explosion' the world over has gradually come to be recognised as an increasingly global concern by all quarters—conservative moralists, liberals and even marxists alike. This explosion taking place from the 1950s onward is the consequence of a sharp decline in death rates over births owing to the spectacular development of medicine controlling epidemics and common human diseases. Although in recent years birth rates in different regions also are decreasing in varying degrees, the rapidly falling death rate is offsetting any decline of the former. The result is a world with a growing mass of population—both in absolute and relative terms.

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3. A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh (eds), *The Economies of Underdevelopment* (Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), p. 44.
 4. John I. Clarke, "Fertile People in Infertile Lands: The Demographic Situation," in Alan B. Mountjoy (ed), *The Third World: Problems and Perspectives* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Edn. Ltd, 1986), p. 32.

What is most disquieting of this great population boom is that it is taking place exclusively in the new nations, emergent from colonial rule not long ago. These newly-independent nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America together dubbed as the Third World or the South presently account for more than three-quarters of mankind with a mere 20 percent share of global income. Both the population mass and income disparity is on the increase, to the utter disadvantage of the countries presently constituting the South. Nearly 800 million people, that is, one in every four in the Third World leads a destitute living, barely surviving. While their development pursuits are significantly frustrated both by the internal and external dynamics of their environ, the increasing population pressure on limited resources is taking its toll. It is argued that real intensity of the population boom in the South and its ramifications are not yet sufficiently felt by all concerned quarters around the World.

The focus of the Paper would be on analysing the inter-relationship between demographic and socio-economic variables in the Third World, keeping in view a continuing population boom in the South against a potentially stationery population in the North.

The present paper is a brief attempt at studying the problem of global population through the prism of a North-South perspective. The focus would be on analysing the interrelationship between demographic and socio-economic variables in the Third World, keeping in view a continuing population boom in the South against a potentially stationery population in the developed North. The first part of the paper deals with the demographic dimension of the population problem and the second part—with its socio-economic dimension. Finally, the last part of the paper briefly

discusses the possible approaches to tackling the population boom in the South.

I

Pattern of Distribution and Growth of Global Population

The single most striking fact of distribution of world population is its gross unevenness. At the global level, it can be seen that an increasing concentration of population takes place in the South (Table-I). While the population of the developed North was 1131 million in 1980, that of the South was 3301 million. By 2000 the comparable figures would be 1271 million and 4847 million and by 2025 it will stand at 1377 million and 6818 million respectively. Thus, while the share of the world population living in the North is expected to shrink from 26 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 2000 and to a mere 17 percent in 2025, the population inhabiting the South would rise steadily from 74 percent in 1980 to 79 percent in 2000 to 83 percent in 2025. Between 1985 and 2025, 93 percent of world population growth would occur in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁵

TABLE - I
Share of Global Population between North and South
(million)

Year	Total Population	North	South
1980	4432 (100)	1131 (26)	3301 (74)
2000	6119 (100)	1272 (21)	4847 (79)
2025	8195 (100)	1377 (17)	6818 (83)

Figures in parentheses indicate percentages

Source : *The Far East and Australasia 1983-84* (London : Europa Publ. Ltd), 15th Ed., p. 33.

5. *Britannica World Data 1986* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.), p. 347.

Population distribution at the regional level is also most uneven. This unevenness is manifest both within the North and South themselves (Annexure-I). While USSR occupying one-sixth of global landmass contains a population of 273 million, representing a 5.8 percent only of the global total, Europe with a 3.7 percent of world area holds 10.4 percent of global population. The corresponding figures for North America are close to those of the Soviet Union. Thus while Europe represents a density of 99 persons per km², the figures for both USSR and North America are 12 persons per km². Oceania represented mainly by Australia and New Zealand is still sparsely populated with a density of only 3 persons per km². In the South, Africa—the biggest region with an area of 30330 thousand km² (22.3%) holds a population of 521 million (11.1%). The corresponding figures for Asia stand at 27576 thousand km² (20.3%) and a population of 2731 million (58.3%). Latin America with a 15.8 percent of world landmass contains 388 million population (8.3%). Naturally, the density also sharply varies among the Southern regions—only 17 for Africa, 99 for Asia and 19 for Latin America.

Annexure-I also shows that while in a span of 33 years (1950-1983) global population increased by 187.2 percent, the population of Africa and Latin America increased by about 235.0 percent each. The population of Asia during this period exactly doubled itself while that of Europe witnessed a least increase—by 124.7 percent only. In terms of annual rate of population growth (1975-80) Africa stands highest—at 3.0 percent while Europe—the lowest at 0.4 percent.

The most striking feature of world population distribution is its massive concentration in Europe and non-Soviet Asia. In historical perspective, before European expansion more than four-fifths of world population lived in Europe and Asia, a pattern of population concentration which reflected the long evolution of civilizations in these continents. One could perhaps argue that the

present concentration is the restoration of the pre-Industrial Revolution balance between continents or civilizations. Asia probably accounted for two-thirds of mankind at the time of Napoleon but population expansion in 19th century Europe and its offshoots in other continents reduced that proportion to 55 percent by 1950s.⁶ By 1983 that share already rose to more than 58 percent (Annexure-I) and this is expected to remain roughly constant until the end of the century. At present rate of progress, it will take more than 100 years for South and East Asia to achieve a zero population growth.

Even there is sharp contrast in population concentration within countries of a continent or region. The most densely-populated areas are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, mainland China, Java (Indonesia) and the sub-Continent. Also heavily settled are the greater part of the European peninsula, the Northeast coast of the US and parts of the Carribean and coastal South America. Only two countries in Asia—China and India with a world landmass of only 9.4 percent contains 37.3 percent of global population. Looking at the Indian sub-Continent, it is India, Bangladesh and Pakistan covering a world area of less than 3 percent contain about one-fifth of world population. The most dismal picture lies with Bangladesh which ranks 8th in terms of population (about 100 million) but 89th in terms of territory (Annexure-II). The density of 657 persons per km² in Bangladesh in 1983 is projected to be grown to 979 persons in 2000, making her the most population-wretched country in the world. Population density of Bangladesh in 2000 would outrank Netherlands, the most densely-populated country in Europe (352 per km² in 1983) by about three times (Annexure-III). Thus the demographic future of Bangladesh with an estimated annual growth rate of 2.3 percent during 1980-2000 is one of dread and horror.⁷

6. *The Far East and Australasia 1983-84* (London : Europa Publ. Ltd., 1983), 15th ed., p. 39.

7. *World Development Report 1985*, p. 210.

If one looks at the list of 32 countries with a density of over 100 persons per km² in 1983, 18 of them represent the South ranging with a density of 657 in Bangladesh to 108 in China and the figure is expected to increase at a much greater rate in 2000 than in countries of the North, commensurate with the former's greater growth in population, of course with varying degrees among themselves (Annexure-III).

Age Composition of World Population

The age structure of a society determines the number of people available for important social categories of special importance, here is the size of labour force and of those groups wholly dependent upon the work force—children and the elderly. Age also is biologically related to fertility and mortality. Birth and death rates can meaningfully be compared and interpreted only when age composition of the population is taken into account.

The current age structure of any population is the product of birth, death and migration rates which have operated in the past. A comparison of age composition of populations in various regions (Annexure-IV) shows wide variations among them. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, characterised by high fertility and high mortality rates, have a more or less similar age composition. They all have a high proportion of children (0-14 years) ranging from 38 percent in Asia to 45 percent in Africa. In the countries of North the range varies from 22 percent in Europe to 29 percent in Oceania. Over half the population in the South is in the 15-64 year age-group, which contains most of the economically active population. This group ranges from 52 percent in Africa to 58 percent in Asia. In the North the composition of this group does not have significant variation. In the age-group 65 and plus Africa in the South has the highest percentage (3), while Europe the highest—13 percent of total population (Annexure-IV).

The age structure in the North is the result of major fertility declines, which have had the effect of sharply reducing the propor-

tion of children and increasing, first, the percentage of persons of working age and in time that of the aged. However, further decline in fertility in developed countries means that the present broad groups of people in the working age would not be fully replaced in near future. Consequently, the proportion of those over 65 will continue to rise. This aging has attracted global attention, since it created considerable socio-economic and psychological problems. On the other hand, the developing countries of the South present a marked juvenility in their age structure, which are made even more youthful by mortality decline, because this applies mostly to infants and children.

International Migration

This is an important demographic variable as it means either a gain or a loss in a country's population. Unlike in the past, in most countries now natural increase of population exceeds the net gain by migration, yet modern governments make far greater efforts to regulate and control migration than ever they do to influence fertility. International migration is usually ascribed to demographic factors, socio-economic compulsions and political considerations.

In historical perspective great migrations began from 16th century. The first great Atlantic migration was the traffic in African slaves when between 1619-1776 more than 10 million had been transported to America. In contrast, the white migration across the Atlantic in the 17th and 18th centuries was smaller involving few millions only.⁸ These were mainly forced migrations, precipitated either by hunger and poverty or by fear of religious persecutions. But mass migration at free will from Europe across the Atlantic began from early 19th century. During this period emigration took place mainly from the soaring populations of industrializing North-West Europe and from overpopulated rural Ireland, Southern and Eastern Europe. Between 1846-1932 about 52 million people left

8. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 9-10, p. 293.

Europe for overseas destinations, mainly to North America, Australia and South Africa.⁹ In 1750 only 1.3 million white people lived in North America, but by 1930 that figure rose to 134 million, representing an increase of over 100 times.¹⁰ When this massive redistribution was over, one-eleventh of the world population were people of European origin living outside Europe.¹¹

The sharp decline in mass migration after WWI was in large part due to a change to neomercantilist migration, in which the welfare of the nation-state became the main criterion for judging whether the migrationary movement is desirable.

But mass migrations sharply declined after WWI, largely because of new political limitations imposed by both emigration and immigration countries. It is argued that this was in large part a change to neomercantilist migration, in which the welfare of the national state became the main criterion for judging whether the migratory movement is desirable. Thus, 'natural' right of the passportless persons to freely move about has been supplanted by the 'natural' right of the state to control that movement.¹²

However, international migration from areas presently constituting the South was not significant, except in case of India and China to some extent. Significant Chinese population migrated to countries of Southeast Asia and a good number of Indians to Southeast Asia, East Africa and the West. One contrasting trend of modern international migration is that while in 19th and early 20th centuries it took the direction from the more developed areas to less developed ones, present migrationary movement assumed a reverse direction. But the volume is very insignificant because

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, Vol. 11-12, p.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. 9-10, p. 293.

12. *Ibid.*, Vol. 11-12, p.

of reasons stated above. Besides, the immigration laws of the countries of Australia, New Zealand, West Europe and North America are generally restrictive and discriminatory, setting limitations upon the number and source of immigrants from the developing countries. From the point of view of the densely-populated Third World areas there are, thus, no available outlets that could possibly siphon off the undesired increases there.

II

Socio-economic Implications of Third World Population Boom.

The rapid growth of Third World population, their marked juvenility all over and massive concentration in selected areas exert heavy pressure on the socio-economic structure of these countries.

The *youthfulness* of the nations of the South serves as a strong retarding factor in their socio-economic development. The high proportion of younger people vastly increases consumption but adds little to production and means high dependency ratio, high costs in the provision of educational and health facilities. *High dependency ratio* is a constraint to capital formation for, the needs of the whole community have to be satisfied by a small working population so that little is left for investment. Besides, in terms of limited available savings for investment in these countries, high population growth is very costly. Assuming that a generally suggested 3 percent of national income must be saved to provide capital for a 1 percent increase in population, it follows that in many countries of the South 8-10 percent or so of the national income must be saved for demographic investment—merely to cope with the additional population without any increase in the average standard of living. But many of the poor countries cannot even supply that amount of investment necessary to maintain the status quo. Also when infant mortality rates are high, a large part of investment made in

the bearing and rearing of children is wasted for, so many of them never live long enough to enter the adult labour force. The result is inevitable deterioration in standard of living as is really taking place in many parts of the South, specially in the densely-populated areas.

Annexure-V shows some glaring variations in Education and Health-related indicators of selected countries of both North and South. In the field of *Education*, variation in literacy rate among populations over age 14 ranges from 29.2 percent in Bangladesh to 99.9 percent in UK. Similarly in percentage of populations over age 25 with post-secondary education and in public expenditure on education as percentage of GNP, a sea of difference exists between Bangladesh, Kenya and Canada, UK or Bulgaria. This is indicative of massive underdevelopment of vast human resources in the Third World. In like manner, in the *Health* sector public expenditure per capita varies from a meagre \$1.3 in Bangladesh to \$344 in UK. A significant segment of population in majority developing countries even cannot have the FAO-recommended minimum requirement of daily calorie intake (Annexure - V). The result is the scene of human beings merely in skeletal frame widespread all over the Third World.

Like on consumption, the most distressing impact a rapidly growing population exerts is upon the *employment* situation of a given country. The age structure as a whole in the Third World is such that every other citizen is under 20/21. Average annual growth of labour force in the developing world comprises 3-4 percent, compared with less than 1 percent in the North. Therefore the challenge is how to provide gainful employment for the vast number of school leavers entering the adult labour market. In many countries about one-third of the total labour force is either unemployed or underemployed. The problem is compounded by disguised unemployment, arising out of structural imbalances in their economies. The unemployment problem is

likely to be exacerbated with increasing participation of female work force in productive sphere. The most recent Agricultural Survey of the Asian Development Bank predicted that unemployment could rise to a level of 15 or even 20 percent in developing Asia unless governments act quickly to create new job opportunities.¹³

Urbanisation is usually an indicator of modernization, the sign of growth and economic progress. While the process is nearing completion in most of the industrialised nations, it is speedily taking place in the countries of the Third World, often outpacing the economic advances there. The proportion of population living in urban areas in 1985 was estimated at 41 percent for the world as a whole, 32 percent in less developed countries and 72 percent in developed countries. Regionally Asian population is least urbanised (28%) and Europe's the most (73%). Variation in degree of urbanization among countries of the South is also very wide ranging from 2-7 percent in Burundia and Nepal to 85 percent in Venezuela.¹⁴

TABLE - II

Population Living in Urban Areas of North and South : 1985 (in percent)

World	:	41
North	:	72
South	:	32
Europe	:	73
Asia	:	28

Source : *Britannica World Data 1986* (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc), p. 348.

However, there is a marked lopsidedness in urbanization process of many developing countries. In countries of Asia, Africa

13. *The Far East and Australasia 1983-84*, *op cit.*, p. 39.

14. *World Development Report 1985*, pp. 216-217.

and Latin America there has begun a mass exodus from rural to urban centres specially to metropolitan cities, which are not capable of absorbing this surging population. The result is partial disintegration of socio-economic life in such metropolitan cities as Calcutta, Manila, Bangkok, Mexico, San Paulo and others. The 'push' and 'pull' factors are not working in case of many countries as it did in the then growing cities of the North with concomitant facilities for habitable space and gainful employment. The upsurge of people to cities currently sweeping throughout the Third World no longer bears any relationship to expanding urban economies, amenities and opportunities. As a result about one quarter of urban population in many Southern metropolitan cities live in ghettos and slums which are breeding grounds for violence, crime, degeneration and social unrest.

Growth Pattern of Developing Economies

All these increasingly compounding problems of the Third World, accentuated by rising population pressure could be efficiently solved through rapid growth of their developidg economies. But the picture is not as it should have been because of lack of sufficient resources, absence of efficient management, improper setting of priorities and quite unfavourable external environment. Annexure-VI shows that the total GNP of about 130 developing countries in 1980 with a population of 3119 million constituted about 27% that of the industrial market economies inhabited by only 714 million people. Naturally the per capita GNP of the former is a meagre \$660 compared with \$10,480 in the latter. The figure is dismally low for the low-income countries of Asia and Africa with only \$240-290. On average although annual growth rate of GDP of developing countries during 1973-80 as a whole outpaced (5.5%) that of industrial economies (2.8%), the figure for Africa comprised only 2.7 percent. During 1980-82 *agriculture* in developing countries grew by 3.2 percent, having wide variations among country-groups with 1.4 percent only in Africa. The performance is all the

more poor in *industry* with a growth rate of 0.7 percent only during 1980-82 with again Africa having a fairly negative growth, - 4.1 percent (Annexure-VI).

Since on average more than half the population of majority developing countries live on agriculture, it naturally forms the mainstay of their economies. But growth rate in this most vital sector of national economy lagged far behind to meet the needs of increasing millions. Annexure-VII illustrates that despite the index of total agricultural and food production constitutes 125 each in less developed countries compared with the base-period of 1976-78, the index of per capita food production grew only to 103. Even in

The painfully-attained growth, if any, of majority Third World economies must be written off from the start because of rapid increase of population there.

regions like South Asia, West Asia and sub-Saharan Africa the figure went below that of base-period. In North Africa and Latin America the increase is quite insignificant. Agriculture, like industry, fared well only in countries of East Asia, offsetting the demographic pressure. For example, in a year of reasonable weather an Asian economy will grow perhaps by 4 percent, but half of that painfully attained growth must be written off from the start because of the 2 percent increase in population. That is why economics, as one commentator put it, "just does not have a chance against reproduction."¹⁵

III

Possible Approaches to Tackling Population Problem

It is evident from the foregoing analyses that whatever positive strides in any sector of Third World national life are done, the increasing demographic pressure tends to write them off. The

15. *The Far East and Australasia 1983-84, op cit., p. 39.*

question naturally arises as how to get out of this vicious circle of continuing negative interrelationship between demographic and socio-economic variables in the Third World. Social scientists so far advanced two approaches to cope with this challenging task of the coming decades.

The first approach is a *demographic* one — through use of birth control measures to attack natural increase of population. This approach was first propounded in the 1950s by Western sociologists to utter chagrin by many quarters in the emerging nations. Then it was thought by many Third Worlders that the West is frightened by the prospect of numerical strength of the newly-independent nations. Today, however, there is agreement in the South about the need, for domestic compulsions, of limiting population growth. The Asian Conference on Children and Youth in National Planning and Development in 1967 already concluded that, "Population growth is endangering the quality of mankind, as a large part of national resources must be devoted to simply maintaining existing levels of living, leaving few resources available for improving those levels."¹⁶

Accordingly, a majority Third World governments have launched, in varying degrees, some kind of family planning programme to influence the reproductive capacity of their population. The UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) with a yearly budget of about \$140 million is actively engaged in assisting the national governments in pursuing wide-ranging family planning programmes. But much success could not be achieved, except in few countries, in this regard due to, among others, lack of resources available for the programme, lack of total commitment for motivating peoples towards smaller family, mass illiteracy and above all, due to strong root of traditional values. However, the interventionist policy through different methods holds better prospect, given a stronger commitment both at the national and international levels with

16. Ibid.

sufficient institutional and resource support. But, at a time when the latest International Conference on Population held in Mexico City during 6-14 August 1984 recommended further strengthening of the UNFPA "so as to ensure the more effective delivery of population assistance, taking into account the growing needs in this field",¹⁷ the US government, yielding to conservative pressure, is slashing its contribution to the Fund.

However, the above approach can be termed as a negative solution for, a mere declining birth rate can do nothing to increase production. Therefore, the second approach suggested is *economic*, directed at developing the production base of a country at a rate higher than of population growth. But the constraints faced by a majority Third world nations to effect this are by this time well known to all. For example, due to limited agricultural lands for cultivation, areal extension is not possible specially in densely-populated countries. One may recall that in Bangladesh, of the total 35.7 million acres of land, 22.5 million acres are available for farming to cater the needs of about 100 million people. This leaves one-fourth of an acre per capita for cultivation raising the question of whether this should suffice for a mere subsistence. Similar is the case in sub-Saharan Africa with engulfing drought and desertification problem. This leaves us with the option of only intensification of farming process. But where is needed amount of capital and technology for the purpose? In like manner, despite severe resource constraints and unfavourable terms in Third world trade, whatever success in industrialization based on local raw materials is achieved, it tends to be made crippled by closing the markets of the North through an array of protectionist measures. The recent rapid development of textile industry in Bangladesh is a case in point when producers were just out on an export drive to the developed markets, their doors were slammed shut.

17. UNFPA Report 1984, p. 29.

On the contrary, the rich industrial economies of the North steadily prospered on many-times cheaper oil and raw materials derived from the then colonized South. But the latter is experiencing a totally different story in their development pursuits. Despite, the North remains intransigent still to accommodate the reasonable demands of a New International Economic Order, based on mutuality of interests between both sides. The NIEO merely seeks to redress the structural imbalances piled up long ago in the existing economic order. Sooner the North understands this, the better. Otherwise the spreading shrapnels of a potentially explosive population bomb, waiting only to be ticked, will not save the North either.

It can be argued that the global population problem is an intertwined demographic-economic issue, the solution of which lies in ensuring production rate that continuously and significantly outstrips that of population growth. This calls for as much efforts for direct control of natural increase of population as for rapid expansion of Third World economies. It is to be borne in mind that while in Europe demographic transition took place as a result of steady increase in living standard of people since the Industrial Revolution, such a process is to take place in the Third World before and simultaneously with betterment of the quality of life. The coming years are to show us whether the latter, given both domestic and external constraints, would prove to be something within the reach of the countries concerned.

Finally, a *new* approach can be proposed to be positively considered by the international community to ease population pressure off the high-density areas of the South. This could be in the form of a planned resettlement of population from high-density to low-density countries with immediate absorptive capacity. Although some migration from the former to the latter is presently encouraged, it is carefully controlled often through bilateral agreements between the governments concerned. Besides, some countries of

the North are sporadically taking some 'boat people' or refugees for resettling them in their lands. But the volume in all these is utterly microscopic relative to the dire needs of large-scale population redistribution. On the other hand, there are still vast tracts of virgin and unexploited lands in countries such as USSR, Canada, Australia and USA. Some of these countries lack sufficient number of labour force for optimum development of their economies. It is to be recalled that during growth and expansion in Europe, the Europeans could freely settle in millions on virgin lands of the 'New World'. In historical perspective, it can be argued that free movement of the population was warranted for the sake of human civilization. But the gradual evolution of the nation-state system

Together with traditional approaches to tackling the global population problem, it is considered quite feasible for the international community to think of a New International Demographic Order (NIDO) entailing, among others, a planned resettlement of population from high-density to low-density areas with immediate absorptive capacity.

all over with attributes of sovereignty and territorial boundaries put an end to free movement. These concepts are man-made and not something divine and therefore they can be made responsive to the new demands for development of human civilization. It is felt, therefore, quite feasible for the international community to earnestly think of a New International Demographic Order (NIDO) entailing, among others, a massive resettlement of population from high-density areas to sparsely-populated ones. Given political will and commitment on the part of the international community to solving the global population problem, it is believed that procedural modalities can be sorted out through an appropriately designed international mechanism toward a gradual achievement of a NIDO.

ANNEXURE - 1

Area, Population, Rate of Increase and Density for the World, Macro Regions and Regions : Selected Years

Macro Regions/ Regions	Area (km ²) (000's) 1983	Percent of Earth	Population (mid-yr Est) (Millions)					Increase in Percentage compared with 1950	Percent of World Total 1983	Annual Rate of Pop. Increase 1975-80	Density per km ² 1983
			1950	'60	'70	'80	'83				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
World Total	135837	100	2504	3014	3683	4453	4685	187.2	100	1.8	34
Africa	30330	22.3	222	278	357	476	521	234.7	11.1	3.0	17
North America	21515	15.8	166	199	227	252	259	156.8	5.5	1.1	12
Latin America	20566	15.1	165	217	284	362	388	235.1	8.3	2.4	19
Asia (Excl. USSR)	27576	20.3	1366	1666	2095	2591	2731	199.9	58.3	1.9	99
Europe (Excl. USSR and Europ. port of Turkey.)	4937	3.7	392	425	459	484	489	124.7	10.4	0.4	99
Oceania	8510	6.3	12.6	15.8	19.3	23.0	24.1	191.3	0.05	1.7	3
USSR	22402	16.5	180	214	242	265	273	151.7	5.8	0.9	12

Source : United Nations, *Demographic yearbook* 1983, p. 143.

ANNEXURE - II

Twenty Largest Countries in Population with Their Area

Rank	Country	Population (mid-83, million)	Percent of World Population	Area (1000 km ²)	Rank	Density (per km ²)
1.	China	1019.1	21.7	9,561	3	108
2.	India	733.2	15.6	3,288	7	223
3.	USSR	272.5	5.8	22,402	1	12
4.	USA	234.5	5.0	9,363	4	25
5.	Indonesia	155.7	3.4	1,919	15	84
6.	Brazil	129.7	2.7	8,512	5	15
7.	Japan	119.3	2.5	372	56	316
8.	Bangladesh	95.5	2.0	144	89	657
9.	Nigeria	93.6	2.0	924	31	96
10.	Pakistan	89.7	1.9	804	35	113
11.	Mexico	75.0	1.6	1,973	14	38
12.	West Germany	61.4	1.3	249	74	247
13.	Vietnam	58.5	1.3	330	60	174
14.	Italy	56.8	1.2	301	65	188
15.	UK	56.3	1.2	245	76	228
16.	France	54.7	1.2	547	46	100
17.	Philippines	52.1	1.1	300	67	173
18.	Thailand	49.2	1.0	514	47	96
19.	Turkey	47.3	0.9	718	36	65
20.	Egypt	45.2	0.9	1,001	29	44
Total		3449.3	74.4	63,467		

Source: *Britannica World Data 1986* (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.).

ANNEXURE-III

List of Countries with a Density of over 100 per km² and their GDP Growth Rate*

Rank	Country	Density		GNP per cap (US \$) 1983	GDP Growth Rate 1973-83
		1983	2000		
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Bangladesh	657	979	130	5.2
2.	Taiwan	531	669	3040	—
3.	Korea, Rep. of	406	501	2010	7.3
4.	Netherlands	352	366	9890	1.5
5.	Belgium	323	323	9150	1.8
6.	Japan	316	344	10120	4.3
7.	Lebanon	253	300	—	—
8.	El Salvador	249	381	710	-0.1
9.	Germany, FR	247	245	11430	2.1
10.	Sri Lanka	235	318	330	5.2
11.	U.K.	228	233	9200	1.1
12.	Trinidad & Tobago	224	400	6850	5.2
13.	India	223	302	250	2.8
14.	Rwanda	216	385	270	5.6
15.	Jamaica	205	273	1300	-1.7
16.	Israel	167	238	5370	3.2
17.	Italy	188	193	6400	2.2
18.	Vietnam	174	267	—	—
19.	Philippines	173	243	760	5.4
20.	Burundi	159	250	240	3.6
21.	Korea, DR	159	223	—	—
22.	Switzerland	158	146	16290	0.7
23.	Germany, DR	154	157	—	—
24.	Dominican Rep.	122	184	1370	4.4
25.	Czechoslovakia	121	125	—	—
26.	Denmark	119	116	11570	1.8
27.	Poland	117	131	—	—
28.	Hungary	115	118	2150	3.6
29.	Pakistan	113	165	390	5.6
30.	Nepal	112	170	160	3.0
31.	Portugal	110	120	2230	—
32.	China	108	130	300	6.0

*The List excludes City-States and tiny Island Nations.

Source: *World Development Report 1985*.

ANNEXURE - IV

Estimates of Population and its Percentage Distribution by Age for the World/Macro Regions : 1980

Macro Regions/ Regions	Population (millions)	0-14 yrs.	15-64	65 Plus
World Total	4453 (100)	1587 (35)	2610 (59)	256 (6)
Africa	476 (100)	215 (45)	246 (52)	15 (3)
North America	252 (100)	57 (23)	167 (66)	28 (11)
Latin America	362 (100)	143 (39)	204 (56)	16 (4)
Asia (Excl. USSR)	2591 (100)	993 (38)	1491 (58)	106 (4)
Europe (,)	484 (100)	108 (22)	313 (65)	63 (13)
Oceania	23 (100)	6.8 (29)	14.4 (63)	1.8 (8)
USSR	265 (100)	65 (24)	174 (66)	27 (10)

Figures in parentheses indicate percentage

Source : United Nations Demographic yearbook 1983

ANNEXURE—V

Some Education and Health-related Indicators of Selected Countries of North and South

Country	Year	EDUCATION			HEALTH		
		Literacy over Age 14 (%)	% of popul. over Age 25 with Post-Second Edn	Pub. Exp. on Edn. (% of GNP, latest)	Popul. per Physician 1982-83	Daily Calorie Intake per cap. (% of FAO-recomm. Minimum)	Pub Health Exp. per cap (US \$)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Bangladesh	1984	29.2	0.9	1.7	7,526	85	1.3
Kenya	1983	47.1	6.5	6.5	7,935	87	7.2
Mexico	1984	83.0	2.6	3.4	1,260	124	8.9
Tunisia	1984	47.4	1.8	5.4	3,883	115	30.1
Indonesia	1983	72.0	0.8	2.2	9,774	109	3.3
Canada	1986	95.6	30.9	8.2	547	129	152.0
U. K	1983	99.9	11.0	5.7	1,967	127	343.9
Bulgaria	1984	95.5	5.2	6.7	373	146	84.6

Source : *Britannica World Data 1986* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.), pp. 934-951, pp. 630-803.

ANNEXURE-VI

Growth Rates of Major Country-Groups

Country-Group	GNP (Billion US \$) 1980	Population (Millions) 1980	GNP per cap (\$)	Av. Annual growth of GNP per cap (%)		Av. Annual Growth of (%)			
				1973-80	1984 ^a	GDP 1973-80	1984 ^a	Agr 1980-82	Industry 1980-82
Developing Countries	2,059	3,119	660	3.3	2.1	5.5	4.1	3.2	0.7
Low-income "	547	2,098	260	3.1	4.7	4.9	6.6	4.2	4.8
Asia	495	1,901	260	3.5	5.3	5.2	7.1	4.6	5.3
China	284	980	290	4.5	7.7	5.8	9.0	7.7	5.3
India	162	687	240	1.9	2.0	4.1	4.2	-0.4	4.6
Africa	52	197	270	0.0	-1.5	2.7	1.6	1.4	-4.1
Middle-income Oil Importers	962	579	1,660	3.1	1.1	5.6	3.3	2.5	-0.9
East Asia & Pacific	212	162	1,310	5.7	3.4	8.1	5.4	—	—
Middle East and North Africa	25	31	830	4.3	-1.3	7.1	1.2	—	—
Sub-Saharan Africa	26	33	780	0.5	-5.4	3.6	-2.1	—	—
Southern Europe	214	91	2,350	2.9	0.2	4.8	1.5	—	—
Latin America and Caribbean	409	234	1,750	2.9	1.1	5.4	3.4	—	—
Middle-income Oil Exporters	550	442	1,240	3.1	0.1	5.8	2.7	1.8	-0.2
High-income Oil Exporters	229	16	14,050	6.2	-6.4	7.7	0.6	—	-16.4
Industrial Market Econ	7,477	714	10,480	2.1	4.3	2.8	4.8	1.2	-1.0

a. Projected

Source : *World Development Report 1985*, pp. 148-250.

ANNEXURE-VII

Selected Indexes of Agricultural and Food Production for the World, Macro Regions and Regions (1976-78 average=100)

Macro Regions/ Regions	Total Agr. Prod		Total Food Prod.		Per capital Food Prod	
	1980	1985 ¹	1980	1985 ¹	1980	1985 ¹
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
World	104	119	105	118	99	104
Developed Countries	105	113	105	113	103	107
West Europe	112	115	112	116	111	114
Centrally Planned Econ Less Developed	101	120	101	118	98	109
Countries	107	125	107	125	100	103
East Asia ²	109	134	109	135	102	114
South Asia	103	124	102	124	102	98
West Asia	103	118	104	120	96	96
Sub-Saharan Africa ³	108	118	108	117	99	93
North Africa	110	127	109	128	100	102
Latin America	112	128	112	125	104	104

Notes : ¹Preliminary, ²Excludes Japan, ³Excludes South Africa

Source : *Britannica World Data 1986* (Chicago : Encyclopedia Britannica Inc), p. 150.