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CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA : A COMPENDIUM

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present article is to undertake a survey of contemporary international conflicts in the region of South Asia,[1] with a view to providing the general characteristics of the South Asian international conflicts. This we propose to achieve through building a compendium of the international conflicts in the region, with focus on their spatial and temporal characteristics during the period 1974-90. Some questions that come to the mind in this context are: Is there any discernible pattern in the occurrence of international conflicts in the region over time? Are they in any way temporally and spatially linked? Are there any particular type(s) of conflict in the region which has (have) become more salient in recent years than in the past? Finally, what type of conflicts in the region are more persistent or protracted than others? These are indeed

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1. For the general characteristics of international regions including South Asia on a comparative basis, see, Louis L. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *International Politics of Regions* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.) 1970. For discussion on the characteristics of South Asia as an international region, see, Partha S. Ghosh, *Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia* (Dhaka: University Press Ltd.) 1989: pp. 4-14. For historical, geographical and political profiles of both ancient and contemporary South Asia, see, Francis Robinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1989: pp. 68-146.

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pertinent questions, but apparently they are unmanageable to answer satisfactorily within the confines of a single paper. However, two interlinked thoughts underlie these broad questions: one is the temporal and spatial links among international conflicts within a distinct geographical area, and the other is the temporal changes that may have occurred in the pattern of the conflicts. Secondly, as our purpose is to undertake a compendium exercise, rather than a focused analysis of any particular aspect, it would be useful that we touch on most of the inter-related questions to help formulate theoretically and empirically useful propositions for future rigorous analysis.

While writing about conflicts as a general phenomenon at this vantage point of time in the post-Cold War era, one feels hesitant whether one is really not going against the hopefully-to-be christened norm of what has been termed as 'new world order' of 'cooperation',[2] or what the scholarly community envisioned long ago as the 'world society approach' to international relations,[3] in place of the prevailing 'politics-as-conflict' paradigm.[4] Apparently, the forces released by the demise of the Cold War seem to have a favourable impact on transforming some of the old conflicts into tractable ones.[5] Evidence, however, is more on the contrary

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2. For an American perspective of different facets of the 'new world order', see articles under the general caption, 'The United States in the New World Order' in *The World Policy Journal*, 9(3), Summer 1992: pp. 365-429.

3. See, John W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1972. See also some interesting articles in Ray Maghroori and Bennet Ramberg (eds.), *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press) 1982: pp. 9-22, 81-97 and 223-32.

4. Traditional conflict analyses usually begin with claims that the history of the world politics is a history of conflicts and wars. See, for example, Philippe Braillard, "Towards a Reorientation of the Empirical Study of International Conflict," *UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 1981*. (Paris : UNESCO) 1982: p. 51; Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press) 1982: 1. For a critique of this realist world view, see, "Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy Behaviour: Reaction and Memory," *International Studies Quarterly*. 26(1), March 1982: pp. 87-90.

5. The Iran-Iraq conflict remains dormant since the late 1980s. The very recent independence of Eritria, and some semblance of peace in Afghanistan after the decade-long Russian intervention, are also prominent examples. Peace in Kampuchea seems to be imminent but such prospects in Angola seem to swing between hesitant steps and relapse to violence.

side.[6] In the first instance, there remains "a huge array of traditional quarrels, in a world where ... the disappearance or decay of secular ideologies leaves nationalism, over much of the planet, as the only glue of loyalty."[7] The "Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir and Cyprus are daily reminders of [the] gloomy forms of [their] permanence."[8] Even a cursory perusal of the course of these very old conflicts would suggest that their persistence is not linear. On the contrary, a much more complex process might be involved. Thus, we have a *prima facie* case for observing and studying these conflicts. Secondly, the post-Cold War period has also witnessed the outbreak of several new conflicts, which by all indications, are not going to die down soon. Some of these new conflicts are taking place in historically conflict prone spots, as in the Central Asia,[9] and the Balkans.[10]

Of course, some countervailing forces are also in operation in the international system. For example, the conscious attitudes towards war and militarised violence have changed, and have changed substantially indeed in the post-Cold War era.[11] However, historically there has always been a time lag between conscious attitudes and their becoming part of the culture

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6. In should be also pointed out that international politics does not span a homogeneous landscape of the globe and thus, the end of Cold War does not necessarily mean end of conflicts in the Third World. See, a brief 'focus' in M. N. Katz, "Why Does the Cold War Continue in the Third World?", *Journal of Peace Research,* 27(1), 1990: pp. 1-7.

7. See, Stanley Hoffman, "A New World and Its Troubles," *Foreign Affairs,* 69(4), Fall 1990 : 115. For similar argument on the backlog of conflicts in Asia and the Pacific region, see, Michael Howard, "Old Conflicts and New Disorders" in *Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part I,* Conference Papers, *Adelphi Paper 275,* IISS, London, 1993 : pp. 7-8.

8. See, Hoffman, *ibid· p.* 115.

9. See, Martha B. Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapulting to Independence", *Foreign Affairs,* 71(3), Summer 1992: pp. 108-30. For interesting discussion on the spillover of the continuing Middle East problem on Central Asia, see, Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs,* 71(4), Fall 1992: pp. 102-6.

10. See, F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Changes and Instability in the Balkans", *Internatinal Security,* 15(3), Winter 1990/91: pp. 58-91. See, also, Charles Gate, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo" : pp. 64-78, and Sabrina P. Ramet, "Wars in the Balkans" : pp. 79-98, in *Foreign Affairs,* 71(4), Fall 1992.

11. See, E. A. Cohen, "The Future of Military Power: The Continuing Utility of Force" in C. W. Kegley, Jr. and E. R. Wittkopf (eds.) *Global Agenda,* (New York: McGraw-Hill) 1992: pp. 33-40.

or entrenched norms of international behaviour.[12] There is also the real possibility of at least short term reversals on counts of recurrence of the old conflicts or new causes of conflicts like the resurgence of ethno-nationalism throughout the world, reinforcing the old and entrenched norms.[13] Thus, the "civil wars, forms of violent international conflicts, falling short of war, are widespread and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future."[14]

Arguably therefore, in international conflicts, we are dealing with an aspect of international politics, which has always been near the top of the agenda of international politics at global, regional and bilateral levels, on the one hand, and of conflict resolution attempts, and possibly also, of scholarly pursuits, on the other. As South Asia is a typical Third World region, it is expected that a profile of contemporary conflicts would help raise questions of comparative value.

Coming back to the context of the present paper, the concept of international conflict (IC) is defined in Part II, in terms of its essential components: actor criterion, which would basically indicate the level at which the conflict is manifest, and the threshold and intensity of hostile interactions. A number of competing concepts like interstate disputes/ conflicts, crises, hostilities, wars, are often used to describe and measure rather closely related and at times, empirically overlapping phenomena. These concepts are compared with respect to their conceptual and empirical boundaries in our efforts to arrive at a working definition of IC. As a follow-up, Part III gives a comparative overview of South Asian conflicts,

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12. See, Hedley Bull, "Force in International Relations: The Experiences of the 1970s and Prospects for the 1980s", in Robert O'Neill and D. M. Homer (eds.), *New Directions in Strategic Thinking* (London: George Allen & Unwyn) 1981 : pp. 17-33; See also, Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?", *International Security*, 16(3), Winter, 1991/92 : pp. 48-49.

13. See, Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15(3), Winter 1990/91 : pp. 23-50.

14. See, Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? : A Review Article", *International Security*, 14(4), Spring 1990: pp. 42-64. Similar conclusions have been reached by John L. Gaddis, "Towards the Post-Cold War World", *Foreign Affairs*, 70(2), Spring 1991: p. 111. See, also Raimo Vayrynen, "The International Conflicts in Future International Relations": pp. 99-120; and Alexander L. George, "Regional Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era" : pp. 121-34, in Geir Lundestad and Odd Anne Wested (eds.) *Beyond the Cold War: New Dimensions in International Relations* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press) 1993.

as contained in different data sets and data based studies corresponding to different measuring criteria of these competing concepts (Appendix Ia-Ie). While acknowledging that the concepts and measurement criteria of each of these studies differ substantially, the overview will provide a varying perspective of more or less similar set of episodes which we shall call South Asian international conflicts, and also help prepare a comprehensive and general list of what we call 'candidate cases'[15] (Appendix II). These candidate cases are screened following the criteria of international conflicts, as set in Part II, to obtain the list of international conflicts in South Asia (Appendix III). The relevant characteristics of the IC cases are recorded. It is on the basis of this compendium that the substance of the discussion of the paper follows in Part IV. The conclusions drawn from the discussion are presented in part V.

II. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Conflicts, in general, are "overt, coercive interactions of contending collectivities",[16] having the following properties: (i) two or more parties are engaged in opposing actions: (ii) they use coercive behaviours, 'designed to destroy, injure, thwart or otherwise control their opponent(s).[17] Applying this definition to the international context, international conflicts could be defined as overt and coercive or hostile interactions between international actors. But for empirical purposes, more explicit criteria are needed with regard to the level of the international actors, and the threshold of coercive or hostile interactions. In most of the available empirical studies, both these aspects are not pursued with the same amount of rigour, leaving the possibility of loose ends - residual or otherwise - in their empirical boundaries. For example, in some studies, the threshold of hostile interac-

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15. By candidate cases, we mean all possible cases of disputes, crises and conflicts in the region which have the possibility of inclusion in our compendium as international conflict. The criterion of inclusion in the list of candidate cases is that they satisfy the inclusion criteria of at least one of the available data based conflict studies.

16. See, Ted R. Gurr, *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York :Free Press) 1980 : pp. 1-2.

17. See, R. W. Mack and M. C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict-Toward an Overview and Synthesis", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1(1), 1957: p. 218.

tions have been raised quite high, but the actor criterion has been left open-ended, with the possibility of the inclusion of an *unspecified* number of sub-state actors.[18] While admittedly the international actors of conflicts should not be confined to state-centric actors only, we propose to consider only those sub-national groups as international actors who are organised, and are capable of launching substantive defensive or offensive campaigns and reaching out beyond borders of the concerned state. In other words, we shall be confined to the sub-national actors with border-crossing political and/or military clouts only.[19] This explicit actor criterion would enable us to limit the study to only meaningful and relevant cases. It would also help us ascertain, partially of course, the entry and exit of international conflicts from the international arena.[20]

The next question is: what constitutes the threshold of hostile interactions for international conflicts? There are empirical studies on international conflicts which either do not require militarised violence for a dispute to qualify as conflict/war, or are statisfied with nominally hostile

18. This is the case with Singer's Correlates of War (COW) project in which the violence criterion has been raised to the level of at least 1000 battle casualties. Yet it has been argued that "any understanding of international wars in general, cannot rest on inter-state wars alone; we must consider other international wars ... in which the system member's forces fought against those (however irregular and disorganized) of a political entity which was not a qualified system member, but in which the member nevertheless sustained a minimum of 1000 battle connected fatalities". See, J. D. Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York: John Willey & Sons Inc.) 1972: pp. 19, 30-32. For similar open-ended definition of war, see, Istvan Kende, "Twenty-Five Years of Local Wars," *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(1), pp. 1971 : 5-8 and his follow-up, "Wars of Ten Years (1967-76)", *Journal of Peace Research*, 15(3), 1978: pp. 27-29.

19. In order to exclude minor rebellion, border skirmishes or sporadic fighting, Kende required a "certain degree of organization and organized fighting on both opposing sides" and a "certain continuity between armed clashes, however sporadic". See, Kende ((1978), *op. cit.: p.* 227. For more on this debate, see, Frederick W. Frey, "The Problem of Actor Designation in Political Analysis", *Comparative Politics* 17(2), January 1985: pp. 127-52; Richard Mansbach, *Non-state Actors in the Global System* (Englewood-Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall Inc.) 1975. See, also J. D. Singer, "International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis", *World Politics*. 12(2), 1960: 453-61.

20. The other criterion of entry and exit of international conflicts concerns the threshold and duration of violence, to which we are turning now.

interactions like, threat to use or mere display of military force.[21] However, we believe, militarised or organised violence is an essential element of international conflict. By this criterion, we are excluding those conflicts in which violent has not been used at all. Arguably in certain kind of conflicts, violence may not usually be used, as in sharing of resources and intangible issues which cannot be apportioned or physically occupied. However, the difference between violent and non-violent conflicts lies not so much in the type of issues,[22] as in the very act of using force by one or both sides, because once violence has been used, "a significant threshold has been crossed to a second phase, in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least reasonably expected."[23] Even if military option is not frequently exercised, the dyadic or triadic interactions begin to operate at a different level of relational range with the actual exercise of military option.[24]

On the basis of the above discussion we may define international conflict (IC) as: overt and explicitly hostile interactions over substantive power and security related or some vital issues between international actors, including sub-national actors with border-crossing political and military clout.

In this definition, we have included the conceptual components of most of the major works on conflict studies. The 'overt and explicit' hostile interactions is roughly Correlates of War (COW) project related criterion,[25]

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21. The example of the first category is Butterworth's concept of "interstate power-security conflict". See, R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict, 1954-74 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press) 1976: p. 3. For the second category, see, Maoz, *op, cit.: p. 2*; and Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crises in World Politics", *World Politics*, 34(3), April 1982 : p. 383.

22. One is reminded of the Football War between Honduras and Elsalvador in 1969. Although the football game was merely a trigger, it nevertheless, signifies that violence need not relate to any specific category of issues. For case description of the Football War, see, Butterworth, *op. cit.: pp. 438-41.*

23. See, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s* (London:Allen Lane the Penguine Press) 1969: p. 26.

24. The other reason for dropping non-violent conflicts is that different sets of analytical frame is needed to deal with these conflicts. See, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *et al* (eds.). *Non-violence in International Crises* (Vienna: European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences) 1990.

25. See, Maoz, *op. cit.* : p. 2.

the 'substantive' or 'vital issues' link with both Butterworth and the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) data, and the bottomline of the 'subnational' actors has been borrowed from Kende. The introduction of substantive issues, which may be political and security related, territorial, resource sharing types and identity related, is justified on the ground of checking against ephemeral conflicts, clashes, incidences of shoot-outs which may happen quite frequently without affecting the overall political relations. We also introduce the additional criteria of entry and exit of a conflict to and from the international arena, respectively. These may be stated as follows:

1. A conflict crosses the thereshold of international arena when there are overt and explicitly hostile or violent interactions between international actors, including also sub-national actors with border crossing linkages and clout; and

2. An international conflict ceases to be international when the actor exits from the international arena for a significant period of time and at the same time there are no hostile interactions between the antagonists.

The exit criterion mentioned above needs a little bit more elaboration. In traditional conflict studies, conflict is conceptualised basically as single-event based ahistorical phenomenon.[26] This conceptualisation has some fundamental implications. For example, one underlying assumption behind this conceptualisation is that conflicts are independent over time and space.[27] This means, even if several episodes occur in the same conflict spot involving more or less related issues and dyad, they are to be considered unrelated, which is unrealistic. Likewise, even when the occurrence of one conflict ostensibly leads to the occurrence of another, and there are evident linkage through the medium of geographical proximity or alliance, they are still independent events. The fact is, conflict is basically a *process* and an

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26. A critique of traditional conflict studies literature on this point may be found in Braillard, *op. cit.* : pp. 54-55.

27. See, David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations: Toward A Causal Theory of War". *International Studies Quarterly*. 35(3). September 1991: 337-55.

outcome of evolution of 'prior conflictual process' and any "arbitrary separation of the outbreak of international violence from the global process of which it is but a specific phase" leads to distortion in the findings.[28] So, some amount of historical continuity is an essential part of the concept of international conflict.

Finally, a note on the inter-relationships among the different concepts of the general phenomena of conflicts. First, international conflict is a specific phase of combination of actors, issues and hostile interactions. But, as we have introduced the elements of continuity and exit criteria, conflicts become a generic phenomenon to include very specific phases like crisis and war. Such a conceptualisation also corresponds to common-place identification of episodes of wars and violence as conflicts. The interrelationships between conflict and war, on the one hand, and crisis, on the other, however, are a bit tricky. A crisis is transient and may precede, accompany or succeed wars in particular, and conflicts, in general.[29] This inter-relationship would be helpful when comparing the different aspects of the same episodes of conflicts/crises/wars.

III. SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN RELEVANT LITERATURE

In this section, we take an overview of the South Asian international conflicts/crises/disputes, as contained in major data based studies. While the concepts and measurement criteria in these studies differ from one another significantly, a comparative picture would nonetheless provide a useful stepping stone for the proposed compendium of IC, as we have just defined in the preceding part. Five such data based studies are considered. These are, correlates of War (COW) project,[30] International Crisis Behaviour (ICB)

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28. *ibid:* p. 56

29. See, Michael Brecher, "International Crisis and Protracted Conflicts." *International Interactions*, 11(3-4), 1984: p. 239.

30. See, Melvin Small and J. D. Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications) 1982: pp. 78-96, for listing of all international and civil wars between 1816-1980 with basic information.

project,[31] Butterworth's interstate power-security conflict data with synopses,[32] Maoz's serious interstate dispute (SID) data, which is basically an offshoot of the COW project,[33] and Kende's data on 'local wars'.[34] In what follows, an individual as well as comparative profile of the datasets are given.

The COW data deal with three categories of wars: inter-state wars between state directed armies, colonial/imperial wars, and civil wars, in which at least one participant was not a member of the state system, meaning basically, civil wars, with the common criterion of 1000 battle casualties.[35] In all, thirteen conflictual incidents in South Asia during 1816-1980 qualified as wars following COW criteria[36] (Appendix Ia). Of them, five - British-Maharattan war (1817-18), British-Afghan war (1938-1842), First British-Sikh war (1845-46), the Sepoy Mutiny (1857) and the Boxer rebellion - could be excluded because they occurred before the reference period of the study, 1947-1990. Of the remaining seven, the COW project characterised two - the First Kashmir war (1947-49) and the Hyderabad war (1948) - as imperial wars,[37] three - the Sino-Indian war (1962), the Second

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31. See, Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *op. cit.: pp.* 380-417, for concepts and basic profile of the international crises between 1945-1980. Region-wise international crisis data, organized at both actor level and system level, are available in the Minitab, University of Kent at Canterbury (UKC), courtesy, Dr. Keith Webb of the Board of Politics and International Relations, and the Centre for Analysis of Conflict, UKC.

32. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.:* pp. 381-509, for the Codebook and data.

33. See, Zeev Maoz, *op,. cit.:* pp. 233-46, for a randomly sampled list of SIDs during 1816-1976.

34. See, Kende (1971), *op. cit.:* pp. 5-22; and Kende (1978), *op. cit.:* pp. 327-41, which, when combined, give a list of local wars' in South Asia for the period 1947-76.

35. Small and Singer, *op. cit.:* pp. 36-47.

36. See, *ibid:* pp. 79-80, 222. Although Afghanistan has not been considered as a member of the South Asian sub-system, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the protracted wars that ensued could well be considered a South Asian conflict by fallout and linkages. In that conflict, Pakistan was an important, even if not direct, party, to the conflict. The Pakistani perspective may be found in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security," *Asian Survey*, 23(3), March 1983: pp. 227-43; the Indian perspective in Raju G. C. Thomas, "The Afghanistan Crisis and South Asian Security." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 4(4), 1981: pp. 415-34; an American perspective in Sptephen P. Cohen, "South Asia after Afghanistan", *Problem of Communism*, 34(1), January-February 1985: pp. 18-31.

37. Although India and Pakistan were two newly born Dominions, to describe the First Kashmir war between them as imperial war is, however, to stretch the meaning of the concept of Dominion too far and is, therefore, contrary to the accepted practice of considering it as an inter-state war.

Kashmir war (1965) and the Bangladesh war (1971) - as interstate wars, and two - the Pakistani civil war (1971), which is basically the Bangladesh liberation war (1971),[38] and the Trotoskite insurrection by the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) in Sri Lanka - as civil wars. If the COW criteria are applied to the period beyond 1980, no significant inter-state war would be added to the list,[39] but a number of civil wars, notably, the Mujahedin insurgency in Afghanistan, the Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, 1983-90, and the Kashmiri militancy in the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989-90, and the Sikh separatism in the Indian Punjab, would be included. Although all these four internal conflicts were internationalised, the degree of internationalisation varied, with perhaps the Sikh separatism scoring the lowest.[40] Only the Sri Lankan insurrection in 1971 may be considered as a decoupled civil insurrection from the point of view of internationalisation.

Overdall, the COW data, generated by probably the most extensive and ambitious on-going research project on conflict studies at global level,[41] is, however, not exactly suitable for conflict studies at micro-regional or sub-regional levels. This is for two reasons. First is the loss of valuable details and lower threshold cases because of the 'telescopic effect', as one shifts focus from the regional to the global level. Secondly, the COW criteria are too exclusive in some respects, and at the same time, too inclusive in others. For regional and sub-regional focus, a lowered threshold of violence but combined with otherwise explicit criteria of inclusion would be suitable.

We move to the ICB dataset on international crises. Apart from other differences, the major contrast between COW data and the ICB data is that in the latter, actual military force may not at all be used, while in the COW

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38. Thus, there is also a double counting.

39. A notable omission is the Rann of Kutch battles between India and Pakistan in the spring of 1965 possibly because of the battle casualty criterion. Another is the Siachen conflict which broke into open confrontations several times between India and Pakistan during 1984-88.

40. It is hard to sift through the polemics available in plenty on this issue which boils down to interference in the internal affairs of neighbours. A refreshing departure is, K. M. de Silva and R. J. May (eds.) *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Pinter Publishers) 1991: pp. 42-57; 76-124.

41. For this comment, as well as some critique of the COW project, see, Dessler, *op. cit.:* p. 337.

conception of war, not only militarized violence has actually been used, the battle casualties also have to reach a certain threshold, e.g., 1000. A crisis, on the other hand, is basically a perceived situation for an actor arising out of an act, event or change in a system that poses grave threat to central values of the concerned actor with only finite time to respond.[42] A crisis, according to the ICB study, may develop with a single crisis actor, in the first instance, and without violence or hostile interactions at all. These caveats are necessary to keep in mind when the question of comparing the datasets arises.

The ICB dataset identified 15 crisis cases in South Asia for the period 1947-85[43] (Appendix Ib). However, there are two glaring cases of omission. The first one is the perilous April 1971 Marxist insurrection by the JVP, which almost toppled the Government in Colombo and was put down with military assistance from different countries including India and Pakistan. The second omission is the July 1983 ethnic riot in Sri Lanka. It was certainly an international crisis for the Jayewardene Government which perceived a real threat to its existence, and reportedly sought assistance from a number of countries other than India in apprehension of the event of an Indian attack. This, in trun, provoked India to enunciate what has come to be dubbed as the India Doctrine or the Indian version of Monroe Doctrine.[44] There is yet another anomally. The Goa 1961 crisis case in the context of South Asia, has been recorded as a single actor crisis case. However, this was far from the fact, because the Indian military action in Goa was a sequel of earlier hostile interactions between India and Portugal.[45]

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42. See, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *ICB Codebook, Actor Dataset*, McGill University, (mimeo) 1989.

43. See, ICB System Dataset, in the Minitab, UKC, *op. cit.*

44. See, *India Today*, August 1983; Abdur Rob Khan, Strategic Factors in Indo-Sri Lankan Relations, *BIISS Papers* (Dhaka) No. 4, 1986; also see, Iftekharuzzaman, "India Doctrine: Relevance for Bangladesh" in M. G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassan (eds.), *Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy* (Dhaka : Bangladesh Society for International and Strategic Studies) 1989: pp. 18-44.

45. For some detail, see, O. Salazar, "Goa and the Indian Union: The Portuguese View", *Foreign Affairs*. 34(3), 1956: pp. 418-31.

Some inconsequential cases have been included while important cases have been omitted. Thus, the Punjab War Scare case in mid-1951 occurred when both India and Pakistan mobilised troops in the Punjab borders, but the crisis soon fizzled out. Similar crises occurred in India-Pakistan relations several times and more serious crisis cases like the Bengal communal riot, over which both India and Pakistan came to the brink of a war in 1950,[46] have not been mentioned in the ICB data. In the period beyond 1985 up to which ICB data were available, several crises took place in the South Asian region. Mention may be made of the Siachen Glacier issue, and the possibility of India-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir, and the air dropping of relief goods in Jaffna escorted by the Indian air force planes in May 1987.[47]

When we compare the COW sub-set of South Asian wars with the ICB sub-set of South Asian international crises, the inter-relationship becomes evident. Focusing on the three common episodes - Kashmir, Sino-Indian border war and the Bangladesh liberation war - it is evident that within a war, several crisis cases may develop, as with Kashmir and Sino-Indian border wars. A perusal of the ICB data also reveals[48] that the international crisis cases seemingly develop from external sources. But, as we have indicated earlier, internal developments like the JVP insurrection in 1971 and the ethnic riot in July 1983 in Sri Lanka may give rise to crisis situation.

Butterworth built his dataset using the concept of 'interstate security conflicts', which included post war conflicts that "centrally involve specific power political aims and demands having direct impact on national behaviour and that which were perceived internationally as being focused on

46. See, *The Round Table*, 40(159), June 1950: p. 264.

47. The India-Nepal trade and transit *impasse* in 1989-90 by all counts was a crisis for the regime in Kathmandu, excepting the military dimension, becuase there was no threat, display or use of military force, for some details of the Nepali perspective, see Dhruba Kumar, "Managing Nepal's India Policy". *Asian Survey*, 30(7), July 1990: pp. 697-710. Incidentally, the dropping of the India-Nepal trade and transit issue from the domain of international crisis/conflict on ground of the absence of military dimenasion reflects more a limitation of the definition we have adopted. But we have to accept this cost for the sake of drawing an otherwise useful line between violent and non-violent conflicts. See, discussion in Part II.

political-security affairs."[49] Butterworth excluded domestic strife, that did not lead directly to inter-state conflicts, diffuse antagonism and instances of general interstate competition. The decolonization process involving technical negotiations, as happened with Sri Lankan independence from the UK, was excluded while the decolonization process involving intercommunal hostilities, competing territorial claims, as happened with the Indian Subcontinent in 1947, was included. During his period of reference, 1945-74, a total of seventeen cases were recorded by Butterworth. (Appendix Ic) of which, the India-Pakistan negotiations during 1949-64 could be excluded because he considered it as a separate case from conflict management perspective. This long interregnum was characterised by protracted negotiations and mediations over Kashmir and other issues. A number of crisis situations also developed but there was no conflict or war in the dyad over this period.[50] If the Butterworth criteria are extended for the period beyond 1974, up to 1990, at least twelve more cases could be included. Thus, following Butterworth, the number of interstate security conflicts during 1947-90 in South Asia will be 28. Evidently, the threshold of violence, despite the fact that Butterworth calls his unit of analysis interstate power security conflict, is rather low.[51] The case of Nepalese Exiles in 1960, in which violence at interstate level was non-existent, is an example. Furthermore, the issue of the transfer of the French Territories, which took place without much fuss from the French authorities, the Indus Canal Water disputes, in which military force was displayed, but not actually used, have been included as interstate conflict cases. Yet there are cases which the COW project took on board but Butterworth did not, because of the absence of the international dimension, as with the 1971 Sri Lankan insurrection.

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48. See, Appendix Ib.

49. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.:* pp. 2-3.

50. The Rann of Kutch incident, 1956 has been separately accounted for by Butterworth as a conflict case, although it was a mere incident, compared to what happened in April 1965. The latter has also been counted by Butterworth.

51. Lower than what we indicated in the context of giving a critique of the COW data.

The next dataset that we would compare is that of Serious Interstate Dispute (SID) of Zeev Maoz, which, as we mentioned earlier, is a by-product of the COW data. The SID data recorded nine dispute cases for the period 1945-76 (Appendix Id). However, as the list of the SIDs is only sampled, one has reason to believe that the actual number of SIDs will be much higher. Especially, the military confrontation activities that constitute SIDs also includes even verbal acts like mere threats or display of military force, in which case, it becomes comparable to ICB data set and our comments in connection with the ICB dataset applies here. Secondly, SID/MCA is incident dependent, rather than interaction dependent, and in this sense, it again becomes comparable to ICB data. In fact, a single shot in a single day, so to say, would qualify as a case of SID. If such standard is followed, perhaps, the universe of cases would be unbounded, specially in a Third World region like South Asia with more than half a dozen countries having contiguous borders.

Finally, we review Istvan Kende's local war dataset. Kende, on the basis of the criteria of the use of state-controlled armed forces at least on one side and at least some form of organized activities at the other end, identified twelve local wars in South Asia for the period 1945-76 (Appendix Ie). If his criteria are extended beyond 1976, the figure would possibly go up to about twenty.

Apart from providing a broad understanding of a wide variety of conflictual situations that had developed in South Asia in the post-decolonization period, the overview also helped us identify a total of 31 candidate cases (Appendix II) on which we shall apply the criteria of international conflict, as defined in this paper. The discussion in the following part is based on this exercise and a reading therefrom.

IV. A COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA 1947-89

We have seen that there have been two levels of omissions in the individual studies covered in the article, first because of the problem of updating, and second, on count of simple and unaccounted cases of

omissions. All these cases which satisfy the criteria of at least one data based study mentioned earlier have been tentatively listed in Appendix II. The actor, issue and hostility criteria, as outlined in Part I are applied to this list to arrive at the sub-set of international conflicts in South Asia during 1947-90. We have a total of fifteen ICs in South Asia during the period under reference (Appendix III). Basic characteristics like duration of the conflicts, issues, actors, level of violence, linkage of issues and actors have been recorded on the basis of consultation of available information. One important thing that needs to be mentioned is that in those conflict episodes in which evidently the same set of issues, actors and spots have been combined to represent a single conflict case. A prominent example is the Kashmir conflict. The two spells of wars, 1947-48 and 1965 and the period up to the Simla Accord of June 1972, constituted a single conflict, but its resurgence in 1989 with a different complexion represents a different phase, and hence a different conflict case.[52]

Trend of International Conflicts

The comparative overview in Part III has made it evident that different manifestations of conflicts, ranging from minor irritants and non-violent disputes to full-scale wars, are observed to have taken place in South Asia over the contemporary period of 1947-90, with the decolonization and accompanying partition of the Subcontinent into two independent states of India and Pakistan being taken as a watershed. The first ever conflict was the one involving the accession of the Princely State of Junagadh (1947-48) on 18 August 1947, only within four days of decolonization of the Subcontinent, followed in quick succession by conflict over Kashmir Accession (1947-65) in October 1947 between the newly independent

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52. Admittedly, there is certain amount of artificiality in these split cases, as also found in the data based studies covered in the paper. The reason which guided our decision was the exit criterion that was found to apply for the post -1972 period until the late 1980s. However, under a separate set of criteria of the phenomenon of Protracted International Conflicts (PIC), continuity of the conflict could be upheld and Kashmir 1947-1990 has been considered as a single PIC case by the present researcher in his on-going research work.

countries of India and Pakistan.[53] In the interregnum several other conflicts have taken place and of them 13 qualify as IC. Both the Tamil ethnic conflict and the Kashmiri uprising had been on-going international conflicts at the terminal year of the reference period of the study.[54] Punjab has been excluded on two grounds. First, despite Indian Govenment's claim to the contrary, there is a general consensus, even among Indian scholars, that Pakistan's involvement in Sikh problem is tenuous and indirect and the nature of dispute between India and Pakistan over the issue did not fall in the category of substantive hostile interactions. The Chakma insurgecy in Bangladesh could also be dropped on the same grounds.

Before we go into some details of these 15 IC cases for South Asian region, it would be pertinent to touch on what these figures mean in broader perspective. In other words, has South Asia become more conflict prone

53. While British India, on the eve of the partition, was directly ruled by the British, about 560 Princely States within the Subcontinent were autonomous except defence, foreign affairs and communication, on which, they acceded to the British Crown. They were governed in those respects by the Crown representative in the British India. As decolonization came to a close, the Indian Independence Act, 1947 stipulated that the Princely States would be advised to accede to either India or Pakistan keeping considerations of geography and religious composition of the population in view. Opinion varies as to whether there was any third option of their remaining independent. On decolonization, all but mainly three - Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, acceded mostly to India and some to Pakistan. The first and second had Hindu majority population with Muslim rulers while the third had Muslim majority population ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. The first and third became bone of contention between India and Pakistan while the second preferred to remain 'separate', in the face of opposition from India. Eventually military force had to be used in all three. On two other fronts, Bengal and the Pubjab were partitioned. East Bengal became East Pakistan, India being wedged between the east and western wings of Pakistan for a distance of 1400 miles. The then East Pakistan eventually became independent Bangladesh in 1971. This again is a separate conflict case. The Eastern Punjab, that is, roughly the present Indian state of the Punjab, has also been witnessing one of the serious violent cases of religious and centre -state internal conflicts in recent years. For details of the history of independence and political developments, see Robinson, *op. cit.*: pp. 71-166. Also see, Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 1961. Synoptical view of these conflict cases may be found in Butterworth, *op. cit.*

54. The Tamil ethnic conflict exited from the international arena with the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in March 1990. After that the conflict again collapsed into an internal one between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil militants, LTTE (Liberation Tamil Tigers for Eelam). For early developments, see, Shelton U. Kodikara, "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops and Tamil Politics", *Asian Survey*, 29 (7), July 1989; pp. 716-24; while a good account of the post-IPKF developments may be found in "Sri Lanka Slips into Yet Another Cycle of Civil Violence: The Background to the Renewed Civil War between the Government and the Tamil Tigers", *Financial Times*, 5 July 1990.

compared to some of the adjoining regions? As we have arrived at the
number of ICs in South Asia following our own definition for the region of
South Asia only, it will not be possible to provide a straightway
comparison. However, on the basis of available studies for which data for
other regions are available, it appears that South Asia may not be as
conflict prone as the two flanking regions of the Middle East and South
East Asia.[55] If, however, allowances are made for the number and age of
states in the respective systems for the comparable period, it may possibly
be argued that the region of South Asia has not been any less conflict prone
than the other two regions. We have also to take into consideration the fact
that both the flanking regions have been strategically more important than
South Asia during the period under review. This observation seems to be
borne out by the trend of military spending, which again is at best a rough
indicator of conflictual tendencies, especially given the fact that a good
number of cases of ICs involve non-state actors. While the five larger
countries of South Asia[56] with nearly one-fifth of the world population has
spent only 1.4 percent of the world military spending in 1985 compared to
7.5 percent for the Middle East during the same year, what is significant is
that military spending for the region of South Asia has been increasing at a
real annual rate of 6 percent since 1975 when military spending of the other
two regions had at least experienced retardation, if not actually declined.[57]
This suggests that more insights about the trend of conflicts may be
obtained from looking at the time pattern of the ICs in South Asia.[58]

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55. For example, Butterworth data, the unit of analysis of which is inter-state power-political conflict,
suggest that 43 inter-state conflicts took place in the Middle East (excluding Gulf for which the figure is 14)
during 1945-74, 24 in South East Asia while the corresponding figure for South Asia was 18. Another more
updated set of indicative figures may be found in the ICB data on international crisis cases which give the
corresponding three figures at 54, 30 and 16 respectively for the period 1945-84.

56. These are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Data on military spending for the tiny
countries of Bhutan and Maldives are not usually available. Maldives, in fact has no standing army excepting
500 police force (known as, *laskareen*).

57. Figures are quoted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for SIPRI,.
Stockholm) 1986: p. 23.

58. It may, however, be pointed out that the number of IC cases is rather limited so as not to warrant any
meaningful statistical treatment. However, in order to make the best of it, conclusions have been drawn
keeping the relevant factors and forces in mind.

Among the fifteen ICs under consideration, four ICs (Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad and Pakhtunistan) were initiated in the 1940s (1947-49), five (Naga Insurgency, Goa, Rann of Kutch, Sino-Indian Borders and Sino-Nepalese Borders) were initiated in the 1950s, while three (Tamil Ethnic Conflict and Siachen Glacier) in the 1980s. Apparently there has been a relative decline in the number of conflicts initiated in a decade during the 1960s and 1970s after which again the curve begins to rise.[59]

An important aspect of the trend of conflict in the region concerns the duration of the conflicts, which apart from having an interest of itself, will provide an understanding of the distribution of on-going conflicts in a given time period. In Part II, we have indicated that a dispute/conflict enters the IC threshold when a substantive form of hostile interactions begins and an exit from IC occurs when such hostilities cease or subside or the actor exits from the international arena. Following this criterion, it is observed that conflict duration in South Asia ranged from little over one month (Junagadh and Hyderabad) to long 25 years (Kashmir, 1947-65). On average, the conflicts are of a duration exceeding five years. In terms of ongoing conflicts it is observed that four conflicts were on-going during the 1940s, out of which one continued into the 1950s. In the latter decade, seven conflicts were on-going of which 6 were initiated in the same decade. While the number of conflicts initiated in the 1960s was lower than the 1950s, as many as 8 conflicts were on-going in the 1960s, the highest in a decade. While some of the conflicts initiated in the 1950s and 1960s dragged on into the decade of the 1970s along with the ones initiated in the same

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59. If the number of candidate cases that have been screened out (from Appendix II) are taken into consideration, the decade of the 1980s witnessed the highest number of dispute/conflict cases followed by 1970s. The conclusion remains valid even if we take into view the size of the system membership in different decades. While the two most conflict-prone countries, India and Pakistan came into being in 1947, a significant addition was Bangladesh in 1971. However, Maldives' emergence in 1965 and Indian protectorate Sikkim's disappearance in 1975 as a semi-independent entity had little impact on South Asian conflict system. Likewise, Bhutan's pre-existence as an independent state in 1947 also did not have any impact on the region's conflict situation.

decade, the decade of the 1980s seems to have started with almost a clean slate, so to say.[60]

From this discussion, some clustering pattern of the conflicts may be discerned. The first clustering is observed during the period 1947-49, the immediate aftermath of decolonization and partition, with all the legacies of colonial period beginning to surface in the new and changed circumstances. The countries of South Asia began their nation building efforts but were yet to come out of the colonial legacies as a second clustering of conflicts is observed during the period 1959-65 in which an assortment of conflicts, related to both colonial legacies and nation building efforts is observed. With a brief lull in the 1970s, a third clustering of conflicts occurs in the late 1970s and 1980s. What do this time pattern of ICs tell us? Obviously, one cannot expect a categorical statement because of the limitation of only few observations. However, this reading is combined with a typological analysis, as will be undertaken shortly, some tentative conclusions might be reached.

Conflict Parties

Is there any pattern in terms of type or mere identification of which countries or regimes or actors involve themselves in international conflicts? Before we answer this question, we would like to make a distinction between conflict parties and involved parties, as the distinction is very crucial. Conflict parties are literally the 'combatants' of the conflicts. On the other hand, involved parties are the ones who are not directly involved but make politically significant contribution to the cause of either side of the conflict. The ICB Codebook for international crises refers to involved actors in terms of substantial involvement which include the following types of activities: direct military, semi-military, covert, economic and political other than mere statements of approval or disapproval by officials.[61]

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60. Whether this suggests a qualitative change in the nature of conflicts initiated only recently needs to be scrutinised.

61. See, ICB Codebook 2 for System Level Dataset, vide Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *op. cit.*: p. 15.

This, however, is rather an all-inclusive criterion. For example, during the liberation war of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma and Iran provided landing and also possibly, refuelling facilities to Pakistani aircrafts. This we shall not consider to be a politically significant involvement in the conflict case of Bangladesh independence. On the other hand, India's substantial assistance to the Bangladesh Liberation Forces until it itself became a party directly in November 1971, US Gunboat Diplomacy in terms of moving the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, and for that matter, Soviet assistance as well as veto in the UN in favour of India, are examples of involved parties. To be precise, politically significant involvement is a relative term depending on the scale and intensity of violence and hostile interactions in the core part of the conflict. An example may be given in terms of the candidate IC case, Nepali Exile, 1960-61 (Appendix II). Considering the size of the country and power base of the Nepali monarchy, vis-a-vis the scale of armed violence throughout the country, Indian covert assistance, ostensibly unofficial, in terms of allowing rebels to launch attacks on Nepali police outposts and other installations, may be an example of involvement.[62]

From a perusal of the conflict parties (as may be found in Appendix III), it turns out that international conflicts which exceeded the dyadic frame were mainly the internationalised secessionist conflicts, like the Bangladesh independence, Tamil ethnic problem and the Kashmir conflict, 1989-90. Incidences of involved parties also occurred mainly in the context of these types of conflicts. Examples are Kashmir, Pakhtunistan, Naga and Mizo insurgencies, Baluchistan, Bangladesh, Chakma insurgency, to cite the prominent ones. Apparently, proximity and stakes are two explanatory variables, as exemplified by India's involvement in the Bangladesh and Tamil cases. The same set of variables possibly can also explain the limits of involvement as was the case with US in Bangladesh Independence case. Proximity alone, however, cannot explain involvement or the lack of it, as was exemplified in the extent of Iran and Iraq's involvement in Baluchistan

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62. For detailed accouns of the rebel activities and diplomatic tussle between India and Nepal, see, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XIII, 13-20 October 1962: pp. 19024-28.

case or (the then East) Pakistan's involvement in Naga and Mizo insurgencies, and for that matter, Pakistan's involvement in the more recent Punjab problem. In recent years, it has been argued, that the proclivity of involving or interfering in each others internal problems has increased.[63]

Coming to some quantitative trends, it is observed that among the fifteen ICs, India, by far the biggest country with frontiers with all other Subcontinental countries, was involved explicitly in nine cases in addition to two cases in which there was a role transition from involved to direct (Bangladesh and Tamil Ethnic conflict) and another case in which her role has been indirect (Chakma insurgency). Compared to this Pakistan was involved directly in seven cases and nine as involved actor.[64] Secondly, as with historical tradition, South Asian conflicts also involved external parties, both extra-regional as with Portugal, and proximate countiries, like China and Afghanistan. Thirdly, South Asian conflicts, as we have already noted, also involved subnational actors, as with the Pakhtuns, Mizos, Nagas, the Bangladesh Liberation Forces, the Baluch Nationalists, the Chakmas and the Tamils. As an individual category, they outnumber the state actors in South Asian conflicts.

Discussion of parties to the conflict needs mention of the war proneness of regimes, an area that has attracted scholarly attention in recent conflict studies.[65] Both logical arguments and empirical evidence suggest a mixed trend. This implies that regime type may, at best, be one of the determinants of war proneness. In the context of South Asia, often the issue of compatibility of regime types and political preference for regime types in managing bilateral relations are heard. But evidence from South Asia is also mixed. Frictions on this count have mostly been reflected in

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63. See, Bhabani Sen Gupta and Amit Gupta, "Changing Patterns of Regional Conflicts in South Asia" in Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed.), *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia* (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers) 1985: p. 263.

64. However, if the Sikh separatism is considered, Pakistan becomes very much involved, so is it in the context of the present Kashmiri militancy.

65. See, Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflicts, 1816-1976", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33(1), March 1989 : pp. 3-36.

diffused antagonism between India on the one hand, and the military and authoritarian regimes in the neighbouring countries on the other. Such antagonism has been observed in India-Pakistan relations during long spell of military rules in Pakistan, in India-Bangladesh relations after 1975 change-over (followed by a succession of military regimes), and in India-Sri Lankan relation following Jayewardene's changeover from a Parliamentary to an executive Presidential system in 1982. The only case of regime-type dispute that came to a head was the Nepali Exiles case, 1960 when India's assistance to the rebel exiles, though covert and unofficial, was a matter of serious concern for the Nepali monarch that ousted the Nepali Congress from power. In the 1980s, however, specially following the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), it seems that the chemistry of regime friction had given way to a modicum of coexistence of divergent regimes.

Types and Issues of South Asian Conflicts

Several typologies of international conflicts combining issues of conflicts, status of conflict parties and systemic characteristics are available. Butterworth, for example, proposed the following typology of regional conflicts: inter-state cold war,[66] internal cold war,[67] general inter-state,[68] colonial,[69] and general internal.[70] Following Butterworth, Bloomfield and Leiss suggested more or less a similar classification: conventional inter-state (Kashmir, Sino-Indian borders), unconventional inter-state (no parallel in South Asia, Indonesian-Malaysian *confrontasi* period), internal with

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66. None in South Asia.

67. Meaning communist insurgency, obtaining ideological inputs from external bloc politics. For example, the tribal insurgencies in North East India, like the Naga insurgencies were of this type. However, there has been a monotonic decline in these conflicts since the 1970s, and with the demise of the Eastern bloc, they could be considered as a defunct species.

68. For example, Kashmir, Rann of Kutch, Sino-Indian Borders.

69. Goa and Hyderabad.

70. Baluchistan, Nepalese Exiles. For details of the typology, see Butterworth Codebook, vide Butterworth, *op. cit.*: 487.

external input, primarily internal, and colonial (Goa).[71] Morris and Millan, in the context of Latin American conflicts, suggested a primarily issue-dependent classification: ideological related to differences over domestic political system, an important aspect of regional politics described as regime compatibility, territorial, hegemonic and power related, ethnic, refugee and migration related.[72] In the context of South Asia, four types of issues have been identified: territorial, ideological, ethnic and security related.[73] In what follows, brief profiles of the issue based typology of conflicts - colonial, territorial, ideological, ethnic, and power-security related - are presented.

   Colonial Conflicts : The colonial conflicts are mainly related to the decolonization process of the Subcontinent. The earliest case of colonial conflict would have been the India-Pakistan independence movement, 1946-47 which witnessed one of the bitterest and most violent communal conflicts leading to a death toll of about 800,000(Appendix II). We, however, dropped the conflict in our first screening of IC cases because it was basically a conflict between two religious communities and the difference between them on the one hand and Britain, the colonial power, was a technical one concerning the modalities of decolonization. More importantly, it was mainly spontaneous and haphazard rather than organized violence. A second colonial dispute, which we dropped concerned the French Territories in India, in which case also the question of transfer of the territories to India was of technical nature, unlike the Goa case in which Portugal was positively unwilling to transfer the territories and a conflict ensued.[74]

   Conflicts related to accession of territories, like Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Pakhtunistan had to an extent colonial aspects. In a sense,

71. See, L. P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970.* (Allen Lane, London: The Penguine Press) 1969: 301-02.

72. Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan (eds.), *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches,* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press) 1983.

73. See Sen Gupta and Gupta, *op. cit.:* pp. 248-49.

74. See, Salazar, *op. cit.*

the Bangladesh liberation war could be considered as a case of internal colonialism.[75] It was also a decisive power struggle between India and Pakistan. Some considered it possibly more than that, in terms of a part of the broader global conflict, a viewpoint that has been attributed to Henry Kissinger.[76] On the basis of these viewpoints, it could be argued that the colonial conflicts are largely discontinued. However, the legacies that the colonial period has left have given rise to several international conflicts in the region.

Territorial Conflicts : The territorial international conflicts of South Asia during 1947-90 are: Kashmir, Rann of Kutch, Sino-Indian borders, Sino-Nepalese borders, and the latest, Siachen Glacier.[77] Most of the territorial conflicts arise either because of undemarcated borders, as with the Sino-Nepalese borders and the Rann of Kutch, or because of disagreement about acceptability of existing boundaries, as with the Durand Line in case of Pushtunistan or Pakhtunistan, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Macmohan Line in case of the Sino-Indian borders.

It has been argued in the South Asian context that the countries of the region and the proximate areas have obtained more or less stabilised borders, and the territorial conflicts are not an extant type of conflict any more, nor the colonial conflicts.[78] At least in the 1970s, it appeared, that the countries of the region were unlikely to go for any more round of territorial

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75. The theory of internal colonialism, as propounded by Michael Hechter in his *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1975, has been applied in the case of Bangladesh, by Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (Dhaka: Oxford University Press) 1972, and more recently by Khwaja Alquma, *Bengali Elites [sic] Perceptions of Pakistan : The Road to Disillusionment : Uneven Development or Ethnicity?* unpublished Ph. D. thesis in International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1990.

76. As revealed in much discussed Anderson disclosure and reported in *New York Times,* 15 January, 1972 and *Times of India,* 16 January 1972.

77. Several territorial disputes, all incidentally between India and Bangladesh, namely, the Tin Bigha Corridor, South Talpatty Island and the Muhrir Char, did not qualify as ICs, because no violence was involved nor was the level of hostile interactions sustained enough.

78. Sen Gupta and Gupta, *op. cit.:* 250-51.

conflicts.[79] However, the major territorial conflicts, like the Kashmir problem, are far from being resolved and that they can resurface again has been evidenced by the Siachen Glacier, and more recently, by the near-war situation over Kashmir itself. Moreover, new types of conflicts, like, maritime demarcation and resource sharing, environmental disputes, which have obvious territorial dimensions, may sharpen and take violent shape in future. However, the fact that neither Kashmir nor Siachen Glacier repeated the 1947, 1965 and 1971 experiences, also indicate that the countries of the region probably have been able to leave behind territorial type of conflicts.

Ideological Conflicts : As the term implies, ideological conflicts may be of two types: systemic or Cold War related, which is externally originated, and nationalism or domestic political system related, which are internally originated. A review of the IC cases in South Asia would reveal that none of conflicts in South Asia was directly related to Cold War politics, excepting of course, the recent problem of Afghanistan.

The intra-regional dimension of ideological conflicts pertain to the bases of divergent nationalism and subsequent divergent regime types. The history of the political development of the region shows how antagonistic communal relations between Hindus and the Muslims were encapsulated in the Congress-Muslim League rivalry, which in turn, provided contradictory bases of nationalism: secularism for India, and Islam for proposed Pakistan within the framework of the 'two-nation theory' as enunciated by Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. The basis of partition of the Subcontinent was religion, and on independence this was transformed into inter-state conflict and the immediate outburst was reflected not only in conventional conflicts on Junagadh and Kashmir but also in inter-communal riots in one country being linked to similar riots in the other. Even the Kashmir conflict had significant religious content of local origin. As early as 1941, the two local

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79. For similar arguments, see, M. Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente," *Pacific Community*, 8(1), October 1976: 149-69; Dieter Braun, "Changes in South Asian Internal and External Relationship", *World Today*, 34(10), October 1978; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "A Solution for Kashmir Dispute?", *Regional Studies*, (Islamabad), 4(4), Autumn 1986: pp. 3-15.

political parties, All Jammu and Kashmir National Congress and Muslim Conference mirrored the Congress-Muslim League rivalry.[80] The trigger to the Kashmir conflict also had religious content, in terms of Pakistan's sponsoring tribal invasion from the North West Frontier Province, revolt by the Azad Fouz (volunteer soldiers) in Gilgit following the rumour that the Hindu Maharaja was suppressing the Muslims in Kashmir.[81]

Although the post-1971 period witnessed a decline in the cross-border aspect of religious conflicts, radical reversals took place in the 1980s, whether as an outcome of regional dynamics or as a part of the global trend of sharpening of ethno-religious identity or both.[82]

Ethnic Conflicts : South Asia is an ethnic powder keg, with ethnic overlappings, giving rise to a majority-minority complex in almost every country. If we disregard the rigid conflict criteria for a moment, the present catalogue of ethnic problems in South Asia will be sizable indeed.[83] The catalogues includes the Bodo tribal insurgency in Assam (India), recently subsided Gorkhaland problem centering on ethnic Nepalese in India, Sind and Baluch problems in Pakistan,[84] Chakma tribal insurgency in Bangladesh, ethnic Indians in Terai area of Nepal constituting 40 percent of Nepali population, and Tamils in Sri Lanka.

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80. see, D. C. Jha, *India-Pakistan Relations*, (Patna : Bharati Bhavan) 1972.

81. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.*

82. The Ayodhya issue, which does not fall within the period of reference of the study, its fallout on bilateral relations in India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan dyads, signifies the salience of religion in the interstate relations in South Asia.

83. For a general review, see, A. Jeyarantnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), *The States in South Asia: Problems of National Integration*, (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.) 1982; and Shaukat Hassan, *Problems of Internal Stability in South Asia*, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1, (Geneva), June 1988.

84. The Sind problem flared up following the execution of the former Prime Minister Bhutto who hailed from Sind. The Sindhis, like the Baluch people, believe they have been discriminated against by the Punjabi-dominated military regime. On the other hand, in the wake of Afghan problem when Pakistan became the conduit of arms and other assistance, the Pakhtuns got co-opted in the Punjabi-Muhajir (Muhajirs, based mainly in Karachi are the immigrant Muslims from India in the wake of the Partition of 1947) ruling coalition and to that extent the problem has subsided. For more discussion on this, see, Abha Dixit, "Ethnic and Regional Tensions in Pakistan". *Strategic Analysis*, XII (12), March 1989: pp. 1465-66.

From the time pattern of the ethnic conflicts in South Asia (Appendix II), it appears that ethnic conflicts have occurred in the region in all the five decades. However, they seem to have been more numerous in recent times, especially in the 1980s. While many still remain dormant, they are likely to surface in violent forms as economic, political and cultural deprivations, especially, perceptions of deprivations harden among the ethnic minorities.

Power and Security Conflicts : Power and security related conflicts are not new in the region. In fact, the religious, territorial and ideological issues of conflicts, at least between India and Pakistan, were viewed in power-security terms by the elites of the respective countries. The power-security related conflicts in South Asia originate mainly from divergence in national. role conception and security perceptions of South Asian nations in relation to India, the biggest and most powerful of the lot. The general pattern has been: what was viewed by Indian elites as Indian pre-eminent position in the 'natural hierarchy' of power structure of the region,[85] was viewed by its neighbours as an attempt at domination on the part of India. Attempts at redressing the imbalance in the power relations have, in turn, been viewed by India as anti-Indian postures. The role conceptions of the neighbours, in the like manner, has contributed to antagonism. Thus, Pakistan's security relations with the USA in the late 1950s and 1960s, and another spell in the 1980s, and its religious and geopolitical links with the Middle East have been important determinant of India-Pakistan relations. Similarly, Sri Lanka's diversification of foreign relations including the possibility of military links with the West, Nepal's role conception as a buffer between China and India, encapsulated in its plea for a 'Zone of Peace' status, and Bangladesh's Islamisation as well as diversification of foreign policy, have at one time or other, been important factors in respective dyadic relations vis-a-vis India. These were also reflected in bilateral conflict management.

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85. See, Ashok Kapur, "Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary Structure of Power and Development of Power Relations", *Asian Survey*, 28(7), July 1988: pp. 693-710.

Having gone through the typological description of the conflicts, it should be pointed out that the typology of conflicts, especially those in the Third World regions including South Asia, is largely an analytical artifact. Even a cursory perusal of the compilation of conflict cases under different conceptualisation as well as those of the present study (Appendix Ia-Ie, II & III) would reveal that a single conflict case has multiple issues involved. Earlier, we have also seen that in most of the conflicts, multiple actors, both direct and in involved capacities, were involved. In a given geopolitical setting, it is likely that these issues and actors across conflicts would interact and link up. Likewise, if the element of time is introduced, it is also natural to ask, do issues and actors in the same conflict change and transform the complexion of the conflict. Although much more rigorous exercise than the present compendium is needed to answer these questions,[86] we shall nonetheless attempt at making some tentative propositions.

Spatial and Temporal Linkages of the South Asian Conflicts

The usual agents or vehicles of spatial linkages of conflicts are contiguous borders and alliance relationship.[87] The basic idea is : the more borders a nation has the more uncertainty it will face in its security calculus, and thus, will, in the event of its neighbours' being engaged in a war, join the war to reduce uncertainty. The side on which it will join will be determined by the nature of political relationship with the warring dyad, that is alliance.[88] The underlying assumption behind this version of the spatial linkage of conflicts is the rational actor frame of decision making. However, war participation, although a matter of high politics, does not always happen by rationalistic calculations. Often nations are sucked into or dragged into the vortex of conflicts. This version of spatial linkage is

86. These questions have received scholarly attention under what has come to be known as the Conflict Diffusion Theory. See, Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War", *American Political Science Review*, 74(4), 1980: pp. 932-46.
87. See, B. A. Most, Harvey Starr and Randolph Siverson, "The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict" in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston, M. A. : Unwin Hyman): pp.111-39
88. *ibid.*

known as 'contagion' or 'epidemiology' of conflict diffusion,[89] In any case, in the context of South Asia, contiguous border condition has been present. Moreover, because of India's centrality, it happened to be a party to most of the conflicts in which its neighbours were involved. Yet, spatial linkages between South Asian conflicts were really negligible. That is, in India vs X neighbour conflict, Y neighbour did not participate, or initiate a new war to take advantage of the principle of *tertius gaudens*,[90] excepting of course, some minor tit-for-tat cases like Sri Lanka and Burma's offering transit and refuelling facilities to Pakistan during the Bangladesh War of Independence, or Pakistan's offering some training and personnel assistance to Sri Lanka in the pre-1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord period. With regard to alliance, a limited working of the principle was observed during the September 1965 Kashmir war when China threatened India to open a new front in Sikkim, unless the latter stopped its massive push against Pakistan. The threat, however, fizzled out in the face of a counter threat from the Western friends of India, backed by the former Soviet Union. Basically it boils down to coincidence of interests rather than the principles of formal alliance. The occupation of Goa took place in 1961 when the Western alliance system was worried about India's security in the face of impending Chinese threat but at the same time the stake of one of its formal allies, Portugal were involved in Goa. Yet, Salazar's frantic efforts to invoke the alliance did not help him. Nor did the apparent convergence of two allies - Pakistan and Portugal - led the West to put pressure on India to extract some concessions on Kashmir front, for example.

Thus, spatial linkages in conflicts in South Asia worked in a limited way. From the point of view of conflict management in a regional system, this is certainly an advantage, especially when compared with the complex of interlocks in conflicts that exists, for example, in the Horn, so that even if one axis could fortunately be resolved, another one flares up almost by

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89. See, Henk Houweling and Jan. G. Siccama, "The Epidemiology of War, 1816-1980", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29(4): 641-63.
90. See, *ibid:* p. 641.

'hydraulic action.' This advantage, however, seems to be counter-balanced by the other dimension of linkages, that is, temporal persistence of conflicts within a dyadic frame. Kashmir again is a prominent example. One possible explanation is that perhaps the issues of the conflicts are of fundamental importance, comprising possibly some aspects of the ontology of the parties, like identity, basic needs including security.[91] Such an argument is intuitively appealing for ethno-religious conflicts like Kashmir. However, in most of the conflicts, including even the ethno-religious ones, the ontology paradigm is empirically untenable, because ontology is not usually a pre-existing issue, it is defined within a conflict situation, and gradually snowballs in something immutable and unbargainable. So, the focus of enquiry should be directed to the very dynamics of the conflicts, rather than issues alone. In focusing on conflict dynamics, one has to take on board the whole set of interactions, conflictual and cooperative, because in a neighbourly geopolitics, nations do not only fight, they cooperate, and then come out with an explanation why amidst such dual transactions, the conflitcual dimensions prevail and certain conflicts become intractable.[92] Recalling the series of interactions in the India-Pakistan relations, especially in the first decade of their independence, the two newly born dominions fought on Kashmir in 1947-48, they attempted negotiated settlements, they accepted mediations after mediations to resolve the issue of accession of Kashmir to either India and Pakistan. At the same time, they also cooperated with each other, on issues like the division of assets, financial settlements, minority issues, trade and water.[93] On each of these issues, often they went to the brink of war, as we have noted in the context of review of crisis cases in India-Pakistan relations. What is interesting here is

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91. Azar has been an ardent advocate of the ontology paradigm. See, Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Case* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing), 1990.

92. Similar arguments may be found in the present researcher's forthcoming paper, "Conflictual and Cooperative Interactions in Prolonged Dyadic Conflicts: A Framework of Outcome Analysis", University of Kent at Canterbury, 1993.

93. See, G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966*, (London: Pall Mall Press) 1968: pp. 40-222.

the interactions between the prevailing tensions on Kashmir, on the one hand, and the net impact of conflicts and cooperation in other areas. In short, what happened is that the hostilities on Kashmir easily maligned other areas of bilateral relations and the feedback tensions continued to accumulate on Kashmir, simply because any breakthrough in Kashmir did not come, in the meantime, through negotiations and mediations. However, when they could manage to arrive at some reconciliation on the disputes like minority issue, trade or water, the positive feedbacks were feeble and did not impact significantly on Kashmir issue. So at any point of time bilateral relations are a function of a complex process of interactions of conflictual and cooperative transactions. Which one would set the tone of overall relations depends on whether the decision makers are undertaking cooperation amidst conflicts or conflicts amidst cooperation.[94] Overall, the South Asian conflicts have displayed a proclivity of temporal persistence more than spatial linkage.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions may be drawn from the discussion of the paper. South Asia has been a conflict-ridden region all throughout its contemporary history. Several phases of geopolitical and demographic transformations in the region, including the colonial phase, have left legacies of conflicts. From the point of view of conflict management and resolution, several complicacies are observed. One is the legacies of the past. Although certain conflicts have ceased to recur, some are only dormant, far from being resolved to the satisfaction of the parties. Secondly, new issues of conflicts have emerged or are in the process of coming to the surface from pre-conflict or dormant phases. We have noted the potency of the ethnic and intercommunal tensions, which may explode into violent conflict, domestically, and internationally. Resource sharing and environmental issues are militating for serious attention in bilateral

94. See, "Conflictual and Cooperative Interactions...", *ibid.*

relations. What is more disconcerting, although conflicts may not be interlinking across dyads, the old and new issues in a given dyad quickly interlink to produce a complex web, and become temporally persistent amidst the dynamics of conflict and cooperation. The situation is complicated by the existence of the multiple issues and multiple actors, which is possibly a common characteristics of any social penomenon.

Our remarks on spatial and temporal linkages of South Asian conflicts need confirmations by further probing, lest they look superficial. In particular, if a nation is/was engaged in more than one conflict within short span of time, either with the same opponent or with more than one opponent, whether such conflict behaviours are spatially and/or temporally linked could be looked into. In order that such analysis is realistic and has predictive value, we could, likewise, incorporate cooperative interations as well, and hypothesize that cooperation in the dyad (x, y) is accompanied, followed or preceded by conflict or cooperation in the dyad (x, z) or similar other propositions with diffrent permutation and combination.

One area we have not touched properly is the role of external parties, which may come from regional as well as extra-regional sources. The external involvement in regional conflicts has been extensively covered elsewhere.[95] However, the puzzle that still remain unresolved is the exact nature of external involvement and its impact on the conflict course. Thus far it can be said that unlike many other regions in the Third World, external involvement has reinforced rather than changed the regional power balance in the Subcontinent. But beneath this surface, there remains a lot many questions about the qualitative and quantitative aspect of this involvement and the changes that have occurred in the pattern of external involvement in South Asian conflicts.

A few other areas of conflict research on South Asia could be suggested. We have on the question of national attributes, especially regime characteristics and war proneness. This could be looked into in more detail

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95. See, M. Ayoob (ed.), *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, (New York: St.Martins), 1980.

in the context of South Asia. A related hunch that circulates widely is the domestic sources of national conflicts. Often it is said that certain regimes whip up public opinion on international issues to attention from the pressing and sensitive domestic issues. The question is: who is hostage to whom? Is it the regimes that whip up the public opinion or is it the public opinion to which the regimes are hostages? Perhaps a more realistic hypothesis would be one of a mutually reinforcing relationship. Another area is the interface between violent and non-violent conflicts. In South Asia, the catalogue of non-violent conflicts is sizable indeed. Whether they need to be studied as a distinct category or could be placed on a non-violence-violence coutinuum could be ascertained in the first instance.

As an end note, we come back to the sub-question we posed at the beginning regarding conflict studies in the post-Cold War era. The utility of conflict research in the context of South Asia cannot be overemphasized. Much of the contents of the South Asian conflicts are wrapped in emotions, misperceptions and misgivings, which contribute to hardening of postures. A dispassionate study that unpacks these emotions and myths could go a long way in conflict resolution. But the approach should be comprehensive to take on board both conflictual and cooperative interactions between nations.

APPENDIX Ia

INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WARS IN SOUTH ASIA
1947-1980—COW DATA (1)

WAR/PARTIES	DURATION (Months)	BATTLE CASUALTY	TYPOLOGY
FIRST KASHMIR India(Vs?) 1947-49	14.3	1500	Imperial(2)
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1948	0.2	1000	Imperial
SINO-INDIAN China-India 1962	1.1	1000	Interstate
SECOND KASHMIR India-Pakistan 1965	1.6	6,800	Interstate
BANGLADESH India-Pakistan 1971	0.6	11000	Interstate
RUSSO-AFGHAN Afghanistan-Russia 1979-80	12.4	10500	Interstate(3)
PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR Rakistan-Bengalis 1971	8.3	50,000	Civil war
SRILANKAN CIVIL WAR Colombo-Marxist Guerillas 1971	1.3	2000	Civil war (Guerrilla insurrection)
AFGHANISTAN Kabul-Mujahedins 1978-79	18.6	10,000	Civil War

Source: Correlates of War(COW) project data. See, Small and Singer(1982) : 79-80, Table 4.2 : 82-99; Tables 13.2 and 13.2 : 222-32

Notes:

1.   The following extra-systemic wars have been dropped because they took place before 1947: British-Maharatta War (1817-18); British-Sikh war (1945-48) First British-Afghan War 1848-49); Sepoy Mutiny (1857-59) and the Second British-Afghan War (1878-79).

2.   The First Kashmir War, 1947-49, by any standard, was an interstate war, not an imperial war. Hyderabad might be considered as an imperial war.

3.   Russo-Afghan war was not an interstate war between Russia and Afghanistan.

APPENDIX Ib

INTERNATIONAL CRISES IN SOUTH ASIA 1947-85—ICB DATA

CRISIS/ACTORS/DATE	TRIGGER	VIOLENCE	VALUES THREATENED
JUNAGADH India-Pakistan, 8-47—2-48	Junagadh's acceding to Pakistan	Minor clash, violence important	Territorial integrity
KASHMIR I India-Pakistan, 10-47—9-48	Tribal infiltration from NWFP in Pakistan	Full-scale war, violence pre- eminent	Territorial integrity
HYDERABAD Hyderabad 8-48—8-48	UN's inability to deal with India's invasion	Minor clash, vio- lence pre-eminent	Grave damage, survival threatened
PUSHTUNISATIN I Pushtuns, Pakistan-Afghanistan 3-49—10-50	Pakistan's miliatry build-up on Afghan borders	Serious clash, violence important	Ethnic bonds, territorial claims
PUNJAB WAR SCARE India-Pakistan 7-51—8-51	Pakistan moved a brigade near Punjab borders	Display of force, no violence	Territorial integrity
PUSHTUNISTAN II Afghanistan-Pakistan 3-51—11-55	Pakistan's fromal integration of Pushtunistan	None	Territorial claims
GOA I Portugal 8-55—9-55	Indian volunteers (Satyagrahis) crossed into Goa and began resistance	Minor clash, minor violence	Subversion, threat to poltical system in the colony
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS I China-India 8-55--4-60	Chinese troops occupied Ladakh and Southem Tibet near McMohan Line	Minor clash, violence pre- eminent	Territorial integrity

CRISIS/ACTORS/DATE	TRIGGER	VIOLENCE	VALUES THREATENED
PUSHTUNISTAN III 5-61—12-62	Afghanistan raided Pakistan territories	Serious clash, violence not important	Territorial integrity
GOA II Portugal 12-61	India invaded Goa	Minor clash, minor violence	Survival of the regime in the colony
SINO-INDIAN II China-India 11—12-62	Chinese military thrust	Full scale war major violence	Territorial integrity
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan 8-65—1-66	Mutual accusation of attacks	Serious clash, minor violence	Territorial integrity
KASHMIR II India-Pakistan 8-65-1-66	Pakistan attacked Indian held Kashmir by sending infiltrators	Full-scale war violence pre- eminent	Territorial claims
BANGLADESH Pakistan Bengalis-India 2-71	Crackdown of Pakistani troops on Bengalis, resistance and reufgees, India's role	War, violence pre-eminent	Grave damage, survival threatened
AFGHANISTAN INVASION Pakistan-Afghanistan US-USSR 3-79—7-79	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Serious clash, violence major US-Russia global rivalry	Pakistan—threat to independence
SOVIET THREAT TO PAKISTAN 6-79—7-79	Verbal political	No violence	Low threat

Source: International Crisis Behaviour(ICB) 1930-1980 System Level Dataset, decoded from dataset available in the Minitab, University of Kent at Canterbury (UKC), courtesy, Dr. Keith Webb, Centre for Analyis of Conflict, Board of Politics and International Relations, UKC. For details of Codebook, see, Brecher and Wilkenfeld(1989).

Notes :

1. Month(s) & year(s) indicate dates of the international crisis.
2. NWFP-North West Frontier Province, which just joined Pakistan on the basis of a popular vote /referendum.

APPENDIX Ic

INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA
1945-74—BUTTERWORTH DATA

CONFLICT/PARTIES/DATE	ISSUES	VIOLENCE	TYPOLOGY
INDIA-PAKISTAN INDEP- DENCE MOVEMENT Hindus-Muslim—UK 1941-1947	Mode of decoloni- zation; religious vs secular basis of partition	Major non-convention- nal communal violence	Colonial
ACCESSION OF KASHMIR (1) India-Pakistan 1947-49	Whether Muslim majority Kashmir ruled by Hindu ruler to join India or Pakistan, religion salient	Major military operation, conven- tional war	General Inter-state
PAKHTUNISTAN (Pushtunistan) 1947-1963	Territorial and ethnicity; Afghan rejection of Durand Line border and sym- pathy for separate Pakhtun state	Several military incursions & clashes	General Inter-state
INDUS CANAL WATER DISPUTE India-Pakistan 1948-1960	Sharing of common Indus waters, linked to Kashmir problem	Non-violent but display of military force by both	General Inter-state
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1948	Accession, demand for separate status rejected by India; communist insurgency (Telengana problem)	Major military operation by India	Colonial, General Inter-state(2)
FRENCH TERRITORIES IN INDIA India-France 1948-1962	India asked transfer of French territo- ries, communist problem	Minor non-military violence	Colonial
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS I India-China 1954-1960	Territorial claims and counter-claims disputed borders; (MacMohan Line)	Massive military deployment, several incursions and clashes	General Inter-state
NAGA-MIZO UPRISINGS(3) Delhi—Naga & Mizo Tribes-Pakistan 1955-1972	Ethnic/cultural identity autonomy, secession	Violent insurrect- ions & military operations	General Internal

CONFLICT/PARTIES/DATE	ISSUES	VIOLENCE	TYPOLOGY
GOA Portugal-India 1955-1961	Portugal's unwilling- ness to transfer its colonies to India	Mobilisation & display of force & sizable military operation	Colonial
RANN OF KUTCH I India-Pakistan 1955-1964	Territorial claims & disputed borders	Display of force and minor clash	General Inter-state
SINO-NEPALESE BORDERS China-Nepal 1959-1961	Border demarcation pursuit of Tibetan rebels	Display of force incursions and minor clash	General Inter-state
NEPALESE EXILES ISSUE Kathmandu-Exiles-India 1961-1962	Royal Palace coup against Nepali con- gress Govt., Indian support for exiled Nepali Congress	Non-conventional non-military violence, rebel raids and uprisings	General Internal
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS II INDIA-CHINA 1962-1963	Continuation of TERRITORIAL & border dispute	Major conventional war	General Inter-state
RANN OF KUTCH II India-Pakistan 1965-1969	Continuation of on-going territorial disputes	Military clashes	General Interstate
KASHMIR WAR II India-Pakistan 1962-65	Deadlocks in mediations, Pakistan's frustrations, internal unrest in Kashmir	Major military operation, full-scale war	General Inter-state
BANGLADESH Bengalis (East Pakis- tan)-Islamabad-India 1971-1974	Autonomy, liberation war, refugee, interstate issues	Non-conventional (guerilla) & conventional warfare	General Internal & Inter-state
BALUCHISTAN Ialamabad-Baluch Tribe 1973-1974(4)	Autonomy, linkage with Pakhtun & Kurdish porblems	Insurgency & major military operation	General Internal

Notes :
1.   Kashmir Negotiations 1949-64 (Case Nos. 047, 048) are not included in the list as a conflict, though
these constituted a conflict management case in Butterworth, 1976 : 117-120
2.   Hyderabad, 1948 should constitute a 'Colonial' conflict case rather than a 'General Inter-state' conflict.
3.   Naga and Mizo insurgencies are otherwise separate cases.
4.   Baluch problem was an on-going conflict at the terminal year of the coding period.

APPENDIX Id

SERIOUS INTERSTATE DISPUTES (SID) IN SOUTH ASIA 1945-7 MAOZ DATA

SID CASE/PARTIES/DATE(1)	TYPE OF SID(2)	OUTCOME(3)	COMPATIBLE WITH
JUNAGADH DISPUTE India-Pakistan 1947	Minor-minor	Win (no war)	Butterworth ICB, Kende
GOA CRISIS India-Portugal 1954	Minor-minor	Win	Butterworth ICB, Kende
PUSHTUNISTAN CRISIS Afghanistan-Pakistan 1955	Minor-minor	Tie	Butterworth ICB, Kende
INDO-PAKISTAN(4) India-Pakistan 1856	Minor-minor	Tie(no war)	
INDO-PAKISTAN(4) India-Pakistan 1956	Minor-minor	Tie(no war)	
KASHMIR DISPUTE(5) China-India 1959	Major-minor	Win	Butterworth ICB, Kende
PUSHTUNISTAN Afghanistan-Pakistan 1960	Minor-minor	Lose	Butterworth ICB, Kende
PRELUDE TO INDO-PAK WAR(6) Pakistan-India 1965	Minor-minor	Lose	Butterworth ICB, Kende
INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR Pakistan-India 1971	Minor-minor	Loss	COW ICB, Kende Butterworth

Source: The sample of 9 South Asian SIDs are part of the 146 global SIDs dawn randomly from universe generated from the COW data. For details see, Zeev Maoz (1976) : 233-46

Notes:

1. First party is the initiator of the SID against the target whose name appears second.

2. Type of SID follows from the combination of initiator and target depending on respective power status as in Cox-Jacobson scale. For details, see, Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven : Yale University Press) 1973.

3. Outcome signifies initiator's perspective.

4. It is unknown that there was any significant military incidents between India and Pakistan either in 1956 or in 1958, other than perhaps building of tensions over deadlocks in Kashmir negotiations.

5. To be precise, this is a SID between India and China in the Ladakh-Tibetan sector, as a prelude to 1962 Sino-Indian border wars. Designating it as a Kashmir dispute is confusing.

6. This SID refers to the Rann of Kutch war between India and Pakistan, which was distinct from the Kashmir war of 1965. Of course, the two wars were linked.

APPENDIX Ie

LOCAL WARS IN SOUTH ASIA 1945-1976 — KENDE'S DATA

LOCAL WAR/PARTIES/DATE	ISSUES/TYPLOGY	COMPATIBLE WITH
INDIA-PAKISTAN Hindus-Muslims 1946-47	Religious; Internal Tribal, with foreign participation(2)	BW(1)
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1947-48	Internal anti-regime, without foreign participation	BW ICB(3)
KASHMIR I India-Pakistan 1947-48	Frontier war with foreign participation(4)	COW BW ICB, SID (5)
NAGA INSURGENCY Delhi-Naga Tribe 1956-64	Internal tribal, without foreign participation (6)	BW
NEPALESE ROYAL PALACE COUP Kathmandu-Nepali Congress, 1961-62	Internal anti-regime, without foreign participation(7)	BW
GOA India-Portugal 1961	Internal tribal, with foreign participation	ICB BW SID
SINO-INDIAN India-China 1962	Frontier war, without foreign participation	COW, ICB BW, SID
PANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan 1965	Frontier war without foreign participation	ICB BW SID
KASHMIR II India-Pakistan 1965	Frontier war without participation foreign participation	COW ICB SID

LOCAL WAR/PARTIES/DATE	ISSUES/TYPLOGY	COMPATIBLE WITH
MIZO UPRISING Delhi-Mizo Tribe 1966-67	Internal tribal, without foreign participation(8)	BW
BANGLADESH Islamabad-Bengalis 1971	Internal tribal, war with foreign participation	COW ICB BW, SID
LEFTIST INSURRENCTION IN SRI LANKA Colombo-JVP(9) 1971	Internal anti-regime war, war without foreign participation	ICB

Source: Local wars 1945-76, in Istvan Kende, "Wars in Ten years (1967-1976)", *Journal of Peace Research*, 15(3), 1978 : 327—41.

Notes:

1.   Butterworth's criteria of international conflicts are :(i) specific power political aims and demands and, (ii) focused on political and security affairs in international perception. See, Butterworth (1960).

2.   Kende considered war being fought between tribes, ethnic and religious groups, for separation of certain territories or for a certain degree of autonomy, as 'tribal war'. Apart from the fact that 'tribal' is a misleading expression, especially for cases like the India-Pakistan independence movement which was distinctly internal communal, tribal wars, at least empirically, are primarily anti-regime, and secondarily, inter-tribal. Thus, there is a certain amount of overlappings between Kende's internal tribal' and 'anti-regime' types of local wars. See, Kende (1978).

3.   ICB criteria(See Appendix Ib) for international crises are three-fold: threat to basic value, finite time for response, and the likelihood of involvement in military hostility. See, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1982) : 381-417.

4.   It is not clear what Kende meant by 'foreign participation', because there was no foreign participation in 1947-49 Kashmir war.

5.   Serious Interstate Dispute (SID) is a set of interactions among states involving the explicit, over, and government directed threat, display or use of force in short temporal intervals. List of SIDs in South Asia are presented in Appendix Id. For details, see, Zeev Maoz(1982).

6.   There was some amount of foreign participation in the insurgency from the Chinese and the Pakistani sides.

7.   There was some Indian involvement in terms of moral and material help to the rebel Nepali Congress.

8.   The Mizoes, like the Nagas, received some foreign assistance.

9.   The insurrection was quelled with military assistance from India and other countries.

APPENDIX II
CANDIDATE CASES OF SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 1947-90

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPATIBLE WITH (1)
INDIA-PAKISTAN INDEPENDENCE Britain-Congress- Muslim League 1946-47	Secular vs religious nationalism; united vs partitioned India	Major non-conven- tional communal violence, approx. death 800,000(2)	BW Kende
JUNAGADH'S ACCESSION JNGDH State- India-Pakistan 1947-48	Accession of Hindu- majority, Muslim ruled princely state to Pakistan, opposed by India,	Clashes between JNGDH & neighbouring states; 'display' of force by by Pakistan; military occupation by India(3)	BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
KASHMIR-ACCESSION & PLEBISCITE India-Pakistan 1947-65	Accession of Muslim majority & Hindu ruled Kashmir to India, opposed by Pakistan; India's unwillingness to hold plebiscite on Kashmir's status	tribal invasion from NWFP; Indian troops clashed with tribals, and Pakistani troops, two conventional wars	COW BW ICB SID Kende IC[PS](4)
HYDERABAD Hyderabad (princely state)- India 1948	India not accepting separate status of the Hindu majority Muslim ruled state	Minor communist insurgency followed by Indian military operation(5)	COW ICB BW SID, Kende IC[PS]
INDUS CANAL WATER DISPUTE India-Pakistan 1948-60	Sharing of waters of common rivers; linked to Kashmir conflict	Basicalloy non-military & non-violent hostile interactions; brief display of force, resolved by WB mediations(6)	BW ICB SID(nc)
FRENCH TERRITORIES IN INDIA India-France 1948-62	Transfer of French colonies to India; communist insurgency	Minor non-military violence, mutually resolved	BW

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPAITIBLE WITH (1)
PAKHTUNISTAN Pakistan-Afghanistan 1949-63	Ethnic autonomy for the Pakhtuns; disputed Durand Line borders	Several military incursions & clashes	ICB BW Kende SID, IC[F]
GOA Portugal-India 1955-61(8)	Portugal unwilling to cede colonies- Goa, Daman & Dieu to India	Local violence, display of force by both sides, sizable military operation by India	BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
NAGA INSURGENCY Indian Govt-Naga Tribal Insurgents 1956-64	Ethnic identity- regional autonomy; secession, external links	Violent guerrilla campaigns and counter- insurgency measures by Indian troops	COW(nc) BW Kende IC[PS]
RANN OF KUTCH India Pakistan 1955(9)	Disputed borders and territorial claims	Military incursions & clashes ending in near full-seale war	BW ICB, Kende SID, IC[PS]
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS China-India 1959-62	Disputed borders, Macmohan Line- territorial claims	Military incursions & clahses ending in full-scale conventional war	COW, BW ICB, Kende SID IC[PS]
SINO-NEPALESE BORDERS Chaina Nepal 1959-61	Undemarcated borders, hôt persuit of Tibetan rebels inside Nepalese territories	Display of force incursions & minor military clashes	BW Kende(nc) SID(nc) IC[PS](10)
NEPALEESE EXILES Nepalese Govt.— Exile Nepali Congress—(India) 1960-61	Internal anti-regime rebellion;monarchy vs democrcy; covert Indian assistance	Violent armed rebellion & Govt. violent response(11)	BW Kende
MIZO-INSURGENCY Indian Govt-Mizo Insurgents 1964-72	Ethnic identity, regional autonomy, secession	Violent guerrilla activities with covert help from Pakistan; Govt.counter-insurgency measures	COW(nc), BW Kende IC[PS]

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPATIBLE WITH (1)
BAGNLADESH INDEPENDENCE Pakistan Govt- Bangladesh Libera- tion-Forces-India	Autonomy movement, secessionist turn, Bengali refugees to India, interstate power rivalry	Non-conventional guerrilla and conventional full-scale war	COW, BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
CEYLON LEFTIST INSURRECTION Colombo regime Leftist Guerillas 1971	Internal anti-regime leftist insurrection by JVP(12)	Major armed insurr- ection lasting five weeks, quelled with external military assistance	COW Kende ICB(nc)
BALUCH INSURGENCY Pakistan Govt— Baluch Insurgents- (Iran Iraq on opposite sides) 1973-78	Edthnic identity and autonomy, linked to the Pakhtun & Kurdish problem(13)	Armed insurgency, major counter-insur- gency operation by Bhutto regime	COW(nc), BW Kende(nc) IC[PS]
TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR India-Bangladesh 1975-90	Treaty non-compliance by India in handing over corridor for access to enclaves	Non military, non- violent tensions, diplomatic tussles	BW(nct)
INDO-BANGLADESH GANGES WATER DISPUTE India-Bangladesh 1977-90	Resource sharing, use of common rivers, linked to other bilateral issues	Non military, non- violent but heightened tensions	BW(nct)
SOUTH TALPATTY ISLAND India-Bangladesh 1978-82	Maritime boundary demarcation, territorial dispute over new island in the Bay of Bengal	Display of force- naval ships by India(14)	BW(nc) SID(nc)
MUHRIR CHAR India-Bangladesh 1979-85	Boundary demarcation of border rivers, territorial dispute	Clashes between paramilitary forces(15)	BW(nct) SID(nc)
AFGHANISTAN Russia-Mujahedins- Pakistan-USA 1979-89(16)	Foreign military, intervention, anti- regime war, refugees to Pakistan	Major military operations in protract- ed conventional & non-conventional warfare	COW, BW ICB, SID Kende IC[PS]

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPAITIBLE WITH (1)
CHAKMA INSURGENCY Dhaka-Chakmas & other Hill Tribes- (India) 1980-90	Ethnic identity- autonomy; repatriation of tribal refugees from India, training & other support to the insurgents	Armed insurgency & counter-insurgency	BW(nct) Kende(nct) IC[PS](17)
ASSAM PROBLEM New Delhi-Assamese Youths-(Bangladesh) 1981-90	Expulsion of Bengali (allegedly Bangladeshi) settlers from Assam, secessionist turn(18)	Major communal violence, tensions in in India-Bangladesh relations; couonter- insurgency measures against ULFA	BW(nc) Kende(nc)
TAMIL ETHNIC CONFLICT Colombo-Tamil Militants LTTE—Indian Forces (IPKF) 1983-89	Separate Tamil Home- land (Eelam), Colombo's attempt in pulling in external powers, withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka(19)	Violent armed insur- gency & major military- operations by Lanka forces and IPKF	COW(nct), BW(nct) ICB (nct) Kende(nct) SID(nct) IC[PS]
PUNJAB PROBLEM New Delhi-Sikhs- (Pakistan) 1984-90(20)	Centre-state relations, Separatist demand, alleged Pakistani support for the Khalistan movement	Persistent internal violence, major security operations, display of force by India & Pakistan	COW(nct), Kende(nct) ICB(nct) IC[PIC]
SLACHEN GLACIER India-Pakistan 1984-87(21)	Border and territorial disputes	Several major military clashes	ICB(nct) BW(nc), SID(nc:) Kende(nct), IC[PIC]
INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ISSUE India-Pakistan 1984-87(22)	Bilateral power issue, nuclear rivalry	Non-military non-violent hostile interactions, threat to each other's nuclear facilities	BW(nct) ICB(nc)
ABORTIVE COUP IN MALDIVES Male Govt.- Coup Makers 1988	Internal anti-regime coup by Soldiers of Fortunes	Major military operation by India when requested by Male, minor violence(23)	ICB(nct)

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPATIBLE WITH (1)
INDO-NEPAL TRADE & TRANSIT DISPUTE India-Nepal 1988-89(24)	Economic-mutual reprisals on trade and manpower, power-security-Nepal's purchase of Chinese arms	Non-military-economic blockade against land-locked Nepal	BW(nct) ICB (nct)
KASHMIRI MILITANCY Kashmiri Militants-India-Pakistan 1989-1990	Secession from India; independence or joining Pakistan(25)	Insurgency & major counter-insurgency operation by the Indian forces; training & assistance by Pakistan	COW(nct) ICB(nct) BW(nct) SID (nct) Kende(nct), IC[PS]

Sources: Based on Appendix Ia-Ie, consultation of secondary sources, as indicated mostly case by case. For most of the disputes/conflicts upto early 1970s, the general source is the data matrix and case descriptions in R. L. Butterworth(1976).

Notes:

1. IC[PS] — Internatinoal Conflict, according to the present study; COW- Correlates of War project Data; BW - Butterworth(1976)-Inter-state Conflict; ICB - International Crisis Behaviour Project-International Crisis; Kende - Kende(1978)- Local War; SID- Maoz(1982)- Serious Interstated Dispute; JNGDH - The Princely State of Junagadh; NWFP- North West Frontier Province of Pakistan; IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Forces in Sri Lanka; LTTE - Liberation Tamil Tigers for Eelam (Sri Lanka); ULFA - United Liberation Forces of Assam(India); WB - World Bank; nc- not covered by the study; nct- not covered by the time period of the study.

2. In a sense, the case of India-Pakistan Independence movement meet the COW criteria of extra systemic or imperial war, especially the phase of 'Quit India' movement during the early 1940s in which the fatality figure exceeded the COW threshold. The fatality figure has been quoted from Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts: Why and Where they are happening* (London : Bloomsbury) 1989

3. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. VII, 1948-50 : 9593, 9995; ICB Data on South Asian subset. See also, Sultana Afraz, "The Junagadh Affair and the Hyderabad Case", *The Round Table*, 78(309), January 1989 : 101-106.

4. Kashmir Wars, 1947 and 1965 have been considered as a single conflict case as per definition of international conflict, provided in this paper.

5. See, Afraz, *op. cit.*

6. At one stage of the hostile interactions in 1951, it seemed that war between India and Pakistan over the canal water dispute was imminent when Pakistan moved a brigade to Poonch near the Punjab borders. See, Tufil Jawed, "The World Bank and the Indus Basin Dispute: Mediation by the World Bank, II", *Pakistan Horizon*, 19(1) 1966 : 34-44. This particular incident has been recorded as a crisis case under the title, PUNJAB WAR SCARE in the ICB data set.

7. Considered as three ICB cases, 1949, 1955 and 1961 and two SID cases.

8. Considered as two ICB and SID cases.

9. Considered as two separate cases in ICB, Kende and SID - 1955 and 1965.

10. Apparently, the clashes between the Chinese and the Nepalese armies with some fatalities, were substantive, as the Chinese authorities regretted after the first incident that it was a case of misunderstanding. However, the nature of clashes and repetition thereof suggest that it was not so. Given the nature of Sino-Indian relations at that time, the Nepal factor to both India and China was of substantive importance. For description of the case, see, Butterworth, *op. cit.*: 263-64.

11. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, III, 13-20 October 1962-28.

12. JVP - Janata Vimukti Peramuna, a Marxist rebel group consisting of Sri Lankan educated unemployed youths. The insurrection, believed to be organised with North Korean assistance and at indirect Chinese help (the Chinese Government later cleared its position to Sri Lanka), was quelled military assistance from India, Pakistan, Britain, USA (through Britain), USSR and Yugoslavia. S. Arasaratnam, "The Ceylon Insurrection of April 1971: Some Causes and Consequences," *Pacific Affairs*, 45(3), Fall 1972; 356-71; and Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection", *New Review*, 69 September-October 1971 : 55-59.

13. See, Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan, Pashtunistan, Baluchistan", *Aussenpolitik*, 31(3) 1980: 301.

14. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXVII, 18 September 1981 : 31091

15. *Ibid.*

16. The ICB data set considered the Afghanistan case upto 1980, while the problem itself dragged on protracted warfare until 15 February 1989 when the Soviet troops were withdrawn. After this, however, the problem collapsed into an anti-regime insurgency with reduced involvement of Pakistan and the USA. The Afghanistan case, however, has been excluded from the purview of the present study because it is not a South Asian conflict in geographical terms and Pakistan's involvement roughly parallels India's involvement, if any, in the Tibetan Autonomy case, which, also was not a Sub-continental conflict.

17. See, Gowhar Rizvi, "Bangladesh : Insurgency in the Hills", *The Round Table*, 305, 39-44

18. For earlier phase of the anti-immigrant agitation, see, Amalendu Guha, "Little Nationalism Turn Chauvinist: Assam's Anti-Foreigner Upsurge, 1979-80", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15(41-43), October 1980 : 1699-1720. With the signing of an agreement between former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the AASU, the Assamese youth organisation spearheading the movement, and formation of a new state government by the AASU President after the elections held under the agreement, the mainstream Assamese problem seemed to be over. But, the resurgence of secessionist feelings among the groups again in the late 1980s belied such hopes.

19. See, Shelton U. Kodikara, "Crisis in Sri Lanka : The JVP, the Indian troops and the Tamil Problem" Asian Survey, 29(7), July 1989 : 716-24.

20. Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order," *Asian Survey*, 29 March 1989 : 330.

21. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXXIII, 1987 : 34990

22. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXXII, March 1989 : 34241

23. *Times of India*, 3, 4, 5 November 1988. Also see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Maldives Confirms India's Role in South Asia, " *Dhaka Courier*, 18-23 November 1988.

24. Nirjan Koirala, "Nepal in 1989 : A Very Difficult Year", *Asian Survey*, 30(2), February 1990.

25. See, A. Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertford: Roxford Books) 1991 : 322-34

APPENDIX III

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA, 1947-1990

CON FLICT/PARTY/ DURATION/STATUS(1)	VIOLENT PHASES	ISSUE LINKAGE	PARTY LINKAGES(2)	CONFLICT LINKAGE
JUNAGADH India-Pakistan Very short, R(F)	One	Accession+religion power-security	Original dyad+ [UN]	Kashmir
KASHMIR India-Pakistan Prolonged stalemate	Two	Accession+religion+ territorial+power- security+Cold War	Original dyad+ [UN+West]+ Russia+ China	Linked to most India-Pak dyadic conflicts
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad Short, R(F)	One	Accession+ communist insurgency	Original dyad+ [UN]+indirectly Pakistan	Indirectly to Kashmir
PAKHTUNISTAN Afghanistan- Pakistan-Pakhtuns Prolonged Subsided	Two	Accession+ borders+ ethnicity	Original triad Russia+[Iran/ Turkey]	Baluch problem
GOA India-Portugal Extended-R(F)	Two	Colonial+law & order	Original dyad+ [UN+ICJ]	None
NAGA Insurgency, India- Naga Insurgents, Prolonged, Subsided	Several	Ethnicity+internal cold war+internal security	Original actors+ Pakistan+China+ Burma	Linked to several insurgencies in Northeast India & Burma
RANN OF KUTCH Pakistan	Two	Disputed borders+ territorial claims	Original dyad+ [UK+ICJ]	Kashmir
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan Extended-(R(P)	Two	Disputed borders territorial	Original dyad+ [UK+ICJ]	Kashmir

CONFLICT/PARTY/ DURATION/STATUS(1)	VIOLENT PHASES	ISSUE LINKAGE	PARTY LINKAGES(2)	CONFLICT LINKAGE
SINO-NEPALESE BORDERS China-Nepal extended subsided	Two	Disputed borders territorial	Original dyad	Kashmir+ Cold War
MIZO INSURGENCY India-Mizo Insurgents; prolonged-subsided	Several	Ethnicity+ Internal security	Original dyad+ Pakistan+China	Other insurgencies
BANGLADESH INDEPENDENCE Pakistan Govt. short-R(F&P)	sustained violence, major war In Dec '71	Autonomy to secession+ territorial refugee+ power-rivalry	Original triad+ Great Powers+ [UN]	Kashmir+ Cold War
BALUCHISTAN Pakistan-Baluchis prolonged-dormant	More than one	Autonomy, ethnicity	Original dyad+ Iraq+Iran+ Afghanistan	Pakhtun problem+ Kurdish rebellion
BALUCHISTAN Pakistan-Baluchis prolonged-dormant	More than one	Autonomy, ethnicity Afghanistan	Original dyad+ Iraq+Iran+ rebellion	Linked to Pak problem+Kurd
CHAKMA INSURGENCY Bangladesh-Chakmas Prolonged-continues	More than one	Ethnicity+ autonomy territorial integrity	Indian/Tripura Govts.	TNV(3)+ inter-state issues(4)
TAMIL ETHNIC CONFLICT Colombo-Tamil militants (LTTE) Prolonged, continues (internally)	Sustained violence	Ethnicity+ secession+ Tamil Homeland, territorial	[Indian Govt]+ Indian Govt	Broad Indo- Sri Lankan security issues, Tamil Nadu politics

CONFLICT/PARTY/ DURATION/STATUS(1)	VIOLENT PHASES	ISSUE LINKAGE	PARTY LINKAGES(2)	CONFLICT LINKAGE
PUNJAB PROBLEM India-Sikh Separatists Prolonged- continues	Sustained violence	Centre-state relations+ secession (Khalistan)+ external interference	Pakistan involvement	Kashmir & Sindh problem
SIACHEN India-Pakistan Extended- dormant	More than one	territorial, power-security	Original dyad only	On-going bilateral conflicts-Kashmir, nuclear issue
KASHMIRI MILITANCY India-Kashmiri Militants Extended- continues	sustained violence	Kashmir's separation, from India, joining Pakistan	Original dyad+ Pakistan+ [Great Powers]	On-going bilateral disputes

Source: Based on Appendix Ia-Ie, Appendix IId, and consultation of literature.

Notes:

1. Status: R(F) = Resolved by Force; R(P) = Resolved Peacefully; R(F&P) = Resolved with both means.
2. Parties joining the conflict as mediators or peace makers are placed in parenthesis [ ].
3. TNV= Tripura National Volunteers.
4. The main Indo-Bangladesh irritant, namely, the Ganges water issue, has often been linked as a bargaining chip.