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STRATEGIC MATRIX AND NATIONAL SECURITY

1. INTRODUCTION

'Strategy' has been an inherent and indispensable element of strategcraft at all times and its planning is one of the most fundamental responsibilities in the management of a nation's security. Since the days of Clausewitz, strategy has been recognized as an instrument of politics, as well as national security. At the initial stage, both strategy, as the art or science of employing military force to gain the objects of war, and national security as an objective to be attained only through efficient control of war, were confined to the realm of defence planning. And the relationship between them was apparently a simple one. But in course of time, the concept of strategy widened and so did national security to accomodate the changing circumstances. In order to protect national interest, different nations had to adopt different kinds of strategies in different fronts to shape the future course of their history.

From 1950s onward, strategic thinking, more appropriately, strategic studies began to gain an institutional base as a field of systematic inquiry, initially as a sub-field of political science and international relations and subsequently as distinct discipline. But as the concept widened through obtaining inputs from various related disciplines, the relationship between strategy and national security became less obvious and more problematic. More importantly, because of the fast changing nature of national and international politics, national security needs continual redefinition. In fact 'strategy' in the present

day world has for all practical purposes become a complex word and so has been the concept of national security. This situation demands a careful review of the concept of 'strategy' and its different components, termed as the strategic matrix, as they evolved over time, to understand the role of strategic thinking in national security. Of equal importance is to examine the various dimensions of national security.

The present paper is an attempt at understanding the relationship between strategy and national security in terms of their different components and dimensions. The paper first traces the evolution of the concept of strategy, outlines the components of strategy and strategic thought process. Then the concept and dimensions of national security are delineated with a view to examining the relationship between strategy and national security.

2. CONCEPT OF STRATEGY AND ITS EVOLUTION

The word 'strategy' has been derived from the Greek word 'strategos' which means 'the art of the general' or 'generalship'. As such strategy is a military activity *par excellence* in which high ranking officers plan the overall conduct of war. The Oxford English Dictionary in its meaning refers more or less the similar theme and action. According to the Dictionary, it is "the art of projecting and directing larger military movements and operations of a campaign". For a common man strategy till today is a phenomenon that intimately relates to the planning of war and how to fight it. Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) defined it as the "art of employment of battles as a means to attain the objectives of war"¹. The essence of this definition is that strategy is a 'means' to an 'end'. His concern for the relationship between 'ends' and 'means' was further expressed in his famous dictum: War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means. In other words, it is about the ways in which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Von Clausewitz's

1. Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Trans. by J.J. Graham, (reprinted, London ; Routledge, 1966) p. 165.

work Von Kriege (On War) published in 1832 has been considered to be a classic in many countries.

With the passage of time, the meaning of strategy has expanded far beyond its original military definitions. Such an extension of the conceptual bases of strategy was indicated by Liddell Hart (1895-1970), who defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy"². Von Moltke also held similar views earlier. Edward Meade Earle gave precise shape to it. In his opinion, strategy of the highest level integrates all policies and arrangements of a nation and thus it became applicable both during war and peace. National strategy was defined in the Dictionary of the United States Military Terms for Joint Usage as "the art and science of deploying and using the political, economic, psychological powers of a nation together with its armed, forces during peace and war, to secure national objectives"³. It implies the application of national power along with socio-economic and political instrument for attaining a country's objectives in a planned way.

In short the present day concept of strategy covers the direction of resources. It is not a substitute of resources rather it is the art of making the appropriate use of them. The art of strategy is inherently flexible and subject to change as situation demands. Military force is regarded as necessary to support the pursuit of all important interest. Moreover, fundamental to national strategy are the national purpose, its goals, policies and commitments. And finally it is the product of its own age and society.

The roots of Strategy have been traced as far back as the period of ancient China and the Hellenestic Greece. Sun Tsu is considered to be the father of Strategy for his writings and collected maxims in his world famous treatise the "Art of War" written in China about

2. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy : The Indirect Approach* (London, Faber and Faber, 1967) p. 335.
3. Department of Defence, *Dictionary of the United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*. (Washington D.C : Government Printing Office, 1974).

500 B.C. The Greeks, especially Xenophan and Thucydides are important in this field because their chronicles on histories contained long statement of Greek Generals often revealing fascinating strategic insight. Besides, Thucydides (460-404 B.C.) is often thought to have

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been the first important writer on war. Another early author Vegetius who wrote about the military institutions of the Romans (A.D. 370) deserves particular mention. It is worth mentioning in this context that Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar were the forerunners of the modern art of general strategy. Two other figures who touched on the field of strategy and are often remembered are Nicolo Machiavelli of Italy and Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632), the King of Sweden. Despite such ancient roots of strategic thinking the study of strategy as an area of rigorous intellectual inquiry did not develop until the eighteenth century. However, in the evolution of strategic thinking the evolution not implying qualitative improvement in the sense of better thinking, rather the unholding of strategic happenings—there are many outstanding persons, events of history and institutions which have played significant role. The most eventful and the influential ones will be highlighted here.

As with the era of enlightenment in the eighteenth century the different fields of intellectual activity had undergone major development, warfare also conformed to the spirit of the age. French Philosopher Voltaire was moved to remark, "The art of war is like that of medicine, muderous and conjectural."⁴ During this period strategy like all warfare became mathematical and 'scientific'. The French

4. Quoted by Robert O, Neill in "Introduction to Strategic Thinking", in Desmond Ball (ed), *Strategy and Defence* (Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 33.

Revolution and the Napoleonic period (1789-1815) which witnessed great changes in the methods of war gave birth to "Nation in Arms". Indeed the art of strategy, as evolved by the theorists, since 1800 may be traced largely to Napoleon's operations as he is considered to be the first great military strategist of modern western world. Although some of the old traditions of war remained for another century, the Napoleonic era was the harbinger of the fact that his tactics and Strategy influenced military leaders for a century. Two great interpreters of Napoleonic strategy—Anoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869) and Von Clausewitz were apparently responsible for its development. Jomini contested Clausewitz's views. The heart of Jomini's theory lay in the theatre of war and the campaign, but he thought primarily of occupying all parts of enemy's territory rather than annihilating his army.

In the period between 1815 to 1914, the American civil war (1861-65) was an interesting milestone to mark a transition to a new era in strategy. As the first war fought with military products of industrialization and the fervour of the age of nationalism and ideology, its most significant feature was not the actions of the battlefields but the economic, industrial and the general staying power of modern societies. The famous figures who contributed by their actions and imagination during this period are Robert E. Lee, Ulysis, S. Grants and T. Sherman of the battlefield and Count Von Moltke, Von Alfred Schlieffin, Hans Delbruch and Alfred T. Mahan for their contribution in the literature of strategy. Moltke did not believe that a strategist could follow a rigid set of rules and emphasised on 'offensive' and "ad-hoc expediments". Marshall Schlieffen (1833-1913) concluded in his conception of strategic "annihilation". And both these Generals considered war as military action—the speediest decision for defeat of the main opponent.

The early years of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of new approaches and different emphasis in strategy. The two thinkers who made historical contribution in this field of strategic theory were—Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914) and Hans Delbruck (1848-1929). Each of them recognized an intimate relationship between war and

politics in every age. Furthermore in their strategic analysis they found a harmonious co-ordination of political and military strategy. Added to this, their writing showed a growing awareness of the gradual importance of geographic location, economic bases and state policy as the determinants of modes of strategy and coordination of strategic action to suit the particular time and requirement.

World War I was an important landmark in the history of evolution of the modern concept of strategy. During the war, along with military factors, economic and psychological factors proved significant in the conduct of war and gaining victory. The war became increasingly total in nature. Winston Churchill and George Clemenceau recognized that military strategy had become a part of greater national strategy. Clemenceau's widely quoted statement was symptomatic of this thinking that "war was too serious a matter to be left to the generals"⁵. However, it should not be read to mean that those who are not generals could necessarily do better in war. Rather it meant that because of the complex nature of modern world it demands the participation of the widest range of society's relevant intelligence.

During the interwar period (1918-1939) the most interesting factors in the evolution of strategic doctrine were the theories of mechanized warfare and airpower. Theorists began to develop the third dimension of the strategic warfare. The Italian Brigadier Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) was the forerunner of this doctrine who first propounded the idea that air alone would decide wars of the future. His main emphasis was on strategic bombing and industrial objectives.

During this period the contributions of Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Erich Ludendraft is significant to note. The later propounded the theory of total war in which he envisaged total mobilization of nation's manpower and resources of war. Fuller's contribution lies in mechanization and motorization that arose in England, and

5. Quoted by Ken Booth in "The Evolution of Strategic Thinking", in Baylis Booth, Gurnett Williams, *Contemporary Strategy*. (London, Croom Helm, 1975), p. 29.

he was farsighted to see the immense potentialities of tank operation being organized into sufficiently large groups and be coordinated with mobile artillery, mechanized infantry and integrate air power. Fuller's inspirations was enthusiastically taken up, developed and publicized by Liddel Hart to produce his own strategic concept, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*—which was published in 1929. The indirect approach involved an attempt to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it, which was to be achieved by exploiting movement and sur-

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prise away from the line of natural expectation. However, of the groups advocating mechanized warfare, French General De Gaulle was the most famous. In Germany and Soviet Union the ideas of mechanized warfare, provided the fertile ground in which 'blitzkrieg' idea could develop.

The World War II with its very nature set new trends in Army, Naval and Air strategy—a strategy representing a curious mixture of of the old and new. It became evident from the experience of the World War II that modern war had grown more total than ever before and that science, industry, diplomacy and psychology had to be harnessed for its successful and effective operation.

In short, by studying World War II, one may fully appreciate the meaning of Dr. Kissinger's dictum that "strategy is the mode of survival of a society"⁶ in a most detailed way and in its manifold dimensions. The World War II is also a reminder that strategy is ultimately a very practical business. As Brodie put it "There is no other science

6. *Ibid.* p. 33.

where judgements are tested in blood and answers in servitude of the defeated".⁷

The advent of weapons of mass destruction of the contemporary world has given rise to conditions resulting in a new branch of strategy—nuclear strategy which has upset the entire basis of conventional strategy. In the new environment resulting from the revolutionary characteristics of nuclear weapon there is no longer any relations between power and numbers. However, in view of the need to avoid general war the main aim of nuclear strategy has to look for methods of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. The result has been strategic nuclear deterrence—which is the core of nuclear strategy. Since the nuclear strategy had a modest aim—just deterring the enemy, it is a strange strategy unlike the strategic concepts of the past which were formulated to defeat the enemy, even an enemy, superior in numbers and equipment. Nuclear strategy has become exceedingly complicated because of the continuous and constant necessity of maintaining the precarious nuclear balance among the nuclear powers.

From all that has been discussed above, it is evident that since Clausewitz, Strategy has widened its meaning and contents in three important aspects. First its extension went beyond the use of armed violence to cover the whole arsenal of the means of policy—the art of using the entire state power in the pursuit of victory. In the second, the concept has gone beyond war to include military activity in peacetime. The third development has introduced an extension of both means and ends which refer to the entire state power (the aggregate of its economic, political, ideological, military and other potentials) for achieving the whole of its political goals.

3. SCOPE AND CONTENTS OF STRATEGY

a. It has been evident from our discussion of the evolution of strategy that the term 'strategy' with the passage of time underwent a wide variety of changes from its original military meaning thus relie-

7. B. Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Society", *Memorandum 18*, (Yale Institute of International Studies, Nov. 1945), p. 21.

ving itself from the 'war-Jacket' to assume the all encompassing characteristics of the grand strategy or total strategy. The varying degrees of changes in different periods of time has caused changes in its contents and scope of study. Besides, the various interpretation of the 'vital interests' has also led to the narrower and broader approaches of strategy with difference to its contents and scope. As strategy has involved itself with the perception problems, necessity arose from period to period for enlargement of its scope of study for filling in the military requirement. Thus one is to know the 'cluster of questions' which has affected the scope of its study. To some scholars these are as follows :

- (i) The rise of conflicts and problems in the anarchical and complex world community.
- (ii) Transformation of the present day political system from small nation state to larger transnational political entities.
- (iii) Rising expectation of the people and political polarization for solution of the confronting problems.
- (iv) The growth of dynamics science and technology having far-reaching impact on production and nuclear weapons having tremendous impact on the notion of world survival.
- (v) The new techniques of action derived from scientific research and the idea of objective knowledge.

As such the scope of strategy is no longer limited to the means to reach any political ends, rather strategic studies have become an extension of the growth and expansion of knowledge and are subject to constant expansion to take into account all the relevant aspects which conditions the resource capacity, ideologies, scientific knowledge and the impact of the phenomenon upon the objectives and means of war. However, the contemporary contents of strategy broadly speaking, include the following :

b. Dimensions of Strategy

It corresponds most closely to the component parts of strategy and deals with the "various fields of activity,—political, social, opera-

tional and logistical which make the strategy effective.”⁸ Neglect of any of these dimensions for strategy influence the loss or defeat as evident from the lessons of the two world wars and their aftermath. Some scholars believe that, following the World War II western powers suffered defeat to cope with the revolutionary movements in different parts of the world as they overlooked the social dimensions of strategy which were tremendously important in these conflicts than the technological and operational factors.

i. Means for Attaining the Aim

There are various means and ways to attain the desired objectives. The interplay of the various factors, of strategy and the interaction of the different means in the complex world environment has given birth to ‘total planning’ and ‘total strategy’. The eight operating factors of strategy viz, “Military, Political, Diplomatic, Economic, Psychological, Ideological, Cultural and Semantic”⁹ collectively constitute a major part of the content of strategy.

ii. Methods Used

Strategy includes in its study the ‘methods’ used for attaining its objectives. These constitute two broad categories : (i) One is the “open methods” which has assumed the form of war and the (ii) Second is the “Covered methods or indirect methods”¹⁰ used in peace time. Many scholars are of the opinion that in the contemporary era of power struggle there has been a shift in emphasis from war strategy to ‘diplomacy of violence’. Ken Booth writes that general war has become unthinkable ‘brinkmanship and military demonstration have replaced positive coercive threats’. It is relevant to mention that in peacetime strategy, deterrence, blackmail and other concerned forms

8. Julion Lider, “Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy : Cooperation and Conflict”, *Nordic Journal of International Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 1981.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

of the use of military force aim at forcing a weaker country to make concessions. However, all these go into play for the success of strategic move.

iii. *Functions of Armed forces*

This relates to the functions corresponding to the main functions of the armed forces. The most frequently recurring functions which scholars of various shades of opinion propounded for are the following:

- (i) Strategy of fighting, (ii) deterrence, (iii) compulsion and (iv) factors operating behind the scene in support of diplomacy

The strategy of fighting i.e., participation in war is usually termed as strategy of defence or briefly defence and the other three partial strategies pursued in peacetime are in fact interconnected and fall within the broad purview of its study.

iv. *Mission of Strategy*

In an approach which analyses the main objectives or mission of strategy fundamentally deals with two aspects : (i) purpose of war and (ii) Measures undertaken to achieve the mission. However, among the military elements which are to be studied in this aspect the following deserve mention : (i) The political objectives of the war (ii) The military goals (iii) The pattern of military operations (iv) The methods of employment of forces. "This approach equates strategy with doctrine"¹¹ (Selection of methods to be used and the weapons required).

It is in the fitness of things to be said that these approaches are different but still collectively they contribute to some generalization to constitute the component parts of strategy rather than the contents of strategy which is evolving into a future field of inquiry. Moreover, "since in the broadest sense strategy also deals with the use of military force in peacetime in support of policy the methods for successful

11. *Ibid.* p. 220.

deterrence of wars have been added to the set of basic strategic missions."¹²

4. MILITARY STRATEGY AND STATE STRATEGY

Since there is an intimate relationship between the military strategy and state strategy. It is worthwhile to explain them in brief. As a matter of fact the modern concept of strategy owes their origin to the principles of military strategy. Military strategy is related to the political objectives of the state and it is developed around national interest and objectives. The principles of military strategy are no different to the principles of national strategy. The planning of military strategy is very significant component of national strategic planning. It directly affects the national security which is essentially required for progress and national development. While military strategy is executed by the highest military command, 'State strategy' (often used interchangeably as 'political strategy') is made by the government.

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Military strategy which in time of war is closely integrated with political (also called national) strategy is similar in principle to that in war. The strategic thought process and the environment are equally applicable to military strategy. Now we will turn to strategic environment and the strategic thought process.

5. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND THOUGHT PROCESS

"Strategy is a universal preoccupation whose meaning is always contextual, set by problems, perceptions, traditions, and ideology of a

12. *Ibid.*

particular nation or group".¹³ The different strategic thought which has been developed in different times demonstrate the prevalent circumstance or the environment. Since an accurate determination of the strategic environment is an essential element of the strategic thought process, it is important to know what these actually mean.

a. Strategic Environment

It is very difficult to "correctly gauge the prevailing strategic environment"¹⁴ which refers to the prevalent circumstances of a given period of time under which the strategy is formulated. It has both national and international dimensions. The list of factors, which determine the environment is inexhaustive and may differ from situation to situation. However, of the factors importantly to be taken into consideration on national front are : political and economic situation, capacity to meet the eventualities, resources, strength, public opinion, opposing forces, national morale, etc. The influence of history and culture are also to be considered for its evaluation. On the other hand, the international side include the Superpowers' attitude, interests, intentions, and capabilities, their proximity, current policy commitments, geo-political situation, world public opinion, alliances and treaties, international moral values and priorities, international law, etc. The factor, which influence the environment being variegated in nature make its evaluation a complex task. It is needed much for strategic planning and not only for the person at the top but for all members of his team.

b. Strategic Thought Process

Strategic thought process is a problem solving process. When a nation confronts a problem or conflicting situation, it needs to think to find out a solution to resolve the conflict. It is this very process which is referred to as strategic thought process. In other words, it

13. Ken Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

14. Capt. Fasahat H. Syed, "Concept and Scope of Strategy in Modern Times", *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April-June 1977, p. 7.

is the process which deals with the mechanics of evolving the strategy and the task of implementing it for attaining the desired objectives. The four fundamental aspects of this thought process viz (i) the identification of conflict (ii) policy decision (iii) strategy decision to attain the objectives (iv) execution of strategy are cyclic in character. "In its modern context, strategy is a collective term which covers many modes of thought and patterns of action."¹⁵ The starting point in the strategic thought process is the identification of the conflict and the

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remaining ones are the other three stages of the cycle. The strategic thought process is also a 'decision—action process' to protect one's national interest in a conflicting situation within the bounds of the strategic environment. In this context the important factor, which bounds the strategic thought process and often referred to as strategic framework deserve mention. They are as follows : (i) Interests (ii) Objectives (iii) Resources (iv) Environment (v) Point of Time and (vi) Time-span. The basic aim of understanding strategic framework, whether it is political, economic, psychological or military, etc., is to ensure that no important factor is overlooked and all of them are considered with care and prudence. It is needed for planning one's own strategy or for analysing, evaluation or estimating strategic plans of others.

In sum, it is evident that a number of factors and elements go into play for the formulation of strategy. The spectrum of national strategy is comprised of political, economic, psychological and military aspects. Military aspects is one of the many components of national strategy. A planner of a national strategy is needed to have a clear

15. William Retzel, "The Strategic Process : In Theory and Practice". *Naval War College Review*, May-June, 1975.

understanding of both national and international strategic environment in which foreign factors are neither under the control of the national system nor part of it but may have direct bearing on national situation. This being one of the characteristic realities must be recognized. An illustration of the strategic thought process is given Figure I.




Fig-I. Cycle of strategic thought process in the framework of global environment.

Illustration : Circle 'A' shows national interest as the core of the process. In block 'B' a, b, c & d are the four cyclic order of the thought process which is determined in the domestic environment by six important factors as shown in circle 'C', and the context of functional or global environment. In circle 'D' where D₁, D₂, D₃, D₄, D₅, D₆, etc. are conglomeration of other political entities for which similar order is applicable.

6. NATIONAL SECURITY

What is security ? The concept of security is intimately linked with national interest as the nation must provide security and protection to its interests. While security is the end, strategy is the means. This "end and means" relationship is one of the major forces that effects all interstate relationship in world politics.

The decision makers decide in the name of the nation what national interest is in a given historical concept. Traditionally military security was almost always the primary concern of both statesmen and policy makers, but in modern world economic consideration and welfare of values are of increasing importance. It is no longer referred only to the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of the nation state. It now also relates importantly to the protection of a state's citizens, their distinction, institutions and values and external environment (economic, cultural, ecological as well as military) within which each state must operate. Besides, the changed notion of security in the industrialized countries in the post war period includes as well the problem of access to raw materials at reasonable prices and the protection of their spheres of economic interest and safeguarding of social and economic stability.

As such economics is an inextricable part of both national and international security and economic health is the pre-requisite to the broad objectives of security in the present day world. However, the dictionary meaning of security is freedom from exposure to danger, protection and insurance of safety or certainty. A state usually uses the term for the prevention of whatever it conceives to be her vital interests. Because security is the sum total of all the fundamental interests of the state. The concept of national security, thus, will vary from regime to regime and from state to state, in accordance with the concept of vital interest, that a given state entertains.

Professor Holsti devided national objectives into categories viz., 'Core' values and interest, middle range goals which normally impose demands on other states and universal long range goals which

seldom have definite time limits." ¹⁶ It is clearly the preservation of the 'core values' which have to be regarded as vitally important to the security of a state, especially where this effects its very survival. In the context of small states of the Third World, Talukder Moniruzzaman has stated that : "By security we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation : political independence and territorial integrity." ¹⁷

In the words of Walter Lippman, "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in a danger of having to secure core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged, to maintain them by such victory in such a war." ¹⁸ According to Arnold Wolfers, Lippmann's definition "implies that security rises and falls with the ability of the nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it". ¹⁹

In this context it would be relevant to refer to the Atlantic Charter. According to the Charter "security for the nations as for the individuals refer both freedom from fear, the desire of a nation to pursue its own interests by its own methods". It is for this search of national security which includes the victory of their different ideologies that the USA and the USSR have entangled themselves by military, economic and political commitments throughout the globe after the Second World War.

However, security is a relative condition and there can be no absolute security for any state, big or small, strong or weak, as long as others continue to exist. The search for security has created ever ending struggle for power from which no country can escape. Finally it cuts the complex relationship of the nation states of the world resulting in many strategies adopted by them in the changed requirement during war and peace.

16. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics*, (Englewood Cliffs, 1967) p.131-2.

17. Talukder Maniruzzaman, *The Security of Small States in the Third World*, Canberra Papers No. 25 (Canberra : Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1982) p. 15.

18. Walter Lippman, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. (Boston; Little Brown, 1943), p. 51.

19. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration : Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1962) p. 150.

7. DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

The domestic and the external environment in which a state is to live and survive shapes the two inherent dimensions of security, viz. (a) internal and (b) external. A state may feel insecure for various reasons from both within and outside.

a. Internal Security

Internal security in its traditional meaning includes concern over subversive activities within the state i.e. espionage and sabotage. It also includes concern for the stability and continuity of the regime and non-military threat to socio-economic and cultural system. It is pertinent to mention that due to diametrically opposite values and manifestly incompatible national objective there exist mutual distrust and hostility between the communist and anti-communist states. Besides, most of the underdeveloped countries of the world are now confronted with internal security problems to which their leadership are to find reasonable and constructive answers without which national security cannot be achieved.

b. External Security

A major aspect of national security shows the concerns of a state for her external inviolability. External security includes preservation of sovereignty free from external aggression, values, relative power position which is thrust upon by history, geography, technology and other situational factors. In a given world order when some powerful state or groups of states purposely attempt to overthrow or subvert the order or aims to attack the integrity or independence of the state there obviously cannot exist a full sense of security. It is a psychological phenomenon since it is a concomitant of the perception by state of its relations to other. From an objective point of view a given international order or external environment the state might not like to change but subjectively a perception of this order may result in uncertainties and worries. For instance, regardless of their objective

relations France feared Germany and vice versa, likewise after the breakup of the strange alliance, since World War II the communists fear imperialist aggression as the western democracies fear equally communist aggression and subversion.

8. STRATEGIES FOR SECURITY

The security of a state is of vital importance. Each state is responsible for its own security. As such a state is always in search for security either through unilateral actions or bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Even if there is agreement on the amount of security required, still there can be disagreement on the means for achieving it. In other words, there is no uniformity in search by states for security while searching for all types of security a nation attempts to establish or align herself with that framework of international order in which she can well preserve her national objectives. In that world order the state at the same time preserves the internal situation, particularly the continuity of the ruling regime and those social, economic and political institutions which it values. This is both a means to the achievement of other objectives and an end in itself. Hence the necessity of state strategy. However, there are two principal strategies whereby states endeavour to pursue their security, viz. (a) by unilateral action and (b) by action with and through collaboration of other states. We will discuss them in brief.

a. Unilateralist Strategies

Unilateralist strategies or strategies adopted by unilateral action is essentially "an attempt by a state to pressure security values by its own efforts alone".²⁰ Its success depends upon its self-sufficiency, relative power position, the nature of the existing world order, strategic location and the strategies of other states. The two important forms

20. Kenneth J. Twitchell, "Strategies for Security : Some Theoretical Consideration", in Kenneth J. Twitchett International Security, (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971) p. 16.

of this strategy are (i) interventionism and (ii) isolationism. By following this pattern of strategy a state relies on its own power, makes no alliances, and has no obligation to defend others; on the other hand no state has any responsibility for abiding it—this 'lone wolf' approach is called 'Unilateralism'.²¹ The United States, with three thousand miles of ocean on one side and something like that on the other, with no formidable neighbours, was able to exist between 1815 and 1917 without fighting a non-American power (except Spain) and without consummating a single alliance. For more than hundred years it was the steadfast and accepted policy of the United States. States on the peripheral peninsulas of Europe, situated from the great strategic crossroads were able to follow unilateralism during the same period even unprotected by great navies. Sweden remained neutral in both World Wars and still maintains that policy today. Both China and

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Japan followed the policy for over a period of centuries. With technological progress and the very emergence of the concept of collective security unilateralism in our time has declined substantially in importance and viabilities as a pattern of security strategy.

b. Strategies Through Collective Collaboration

The strategies whereby states endeavour to preserve their security in the multistate system by action with and collaboration with other states included (i) balance of power, (ii) collective security and (iii)

21. See Frederick H. Hartman, "Away with Unilateralism", *The Antioch Review*, Vol. II, No I (Spring 1951) p. 3-9. A term coined by Hartman to relate what has been isolationism, neoisolation and neutrality.

contemporary collective defence and regional arrangements. As one of the oldest models of strategies, it has been practised by the members of the international community before it had its modern name. In fact, "the trouble with the balance of power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings".²² Transition in meaning from "distribution" to equilibrium" and finally to "hegemony" can sometimes be detected in contemporary references to the balance of power. However, the simple balance of power model in equilibrium primarily refers to a stable bipolar situation in which either two states, or two groups of states ; one state and a group of states confront each other. After the Second World War there emerged a bipolar balance at the global level between the Soviet Union and the United States. The global balance has in fact been largely multiple rather than simple

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because of the amalgam of various local and regional power configurations. Furthermore, constant race for overwhelming superiority in qualitative and quantitative possession of nuclear weapons led to the creation of the 'balance of terror' to characterise the present day world. Recently the traditional perceptions of the balance of power concept themselves are of relatively limited use for understanding some contemporary strategies for security. Economic rather than military and political balances are becoming more and more important. Balances of aid and trade are now sometimes more relevant than military balances of power.

We now turn to collective security which in the fullest sense purports to provide security for all states. Collective security focuses on

22. Martin Wright, "The Balance of power," in Herbert Butterfield & Martin Right (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations*, London, 1966.

aggressive policy, whereas balance of power is more concerned with aggressive capacity. Furthermore, collective security postulates one world, organized for the cooperative maintenance of order within bounds. Since World War II the concept of collective security has been persistently advocated. In a sense, the UN itself is the most important agency for collective security. Earlier, the members of the League of Nations were committed to undertake collective security under article 16 of the Covenant. The price of failure to provide collective security by the League after World War I was the World War II. Regional arrangements for collective defence and for other purposes establish a collective security. While the ethos of both NATO and Warsaw Pact contradict the spirit of the UN security system and the very essence of global collective security, they do institutionalize a desire for collective resistance to aggression. Besides the cold-war alliances established by the USA like the SEATO and the Regional arrangements such as OAS and the emergence of other mutual security cooperations which grew out of a fusion of collective security and the collective defence ideals in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Arab World and Black Africa, are instances of the strategies for security by action in cooperation with other states.

With the advent of nuclear age the contemporary world has witnessed many new strategies in the broad purview of the power-game between the nations particularly in the global politics of the Superpowers among which particular mention may be made of deterrence—a new device to protect the national security by preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. It operates as Schelling says through the "Skillfull non-use of military forces."²³ General Beaufre said, "The object of deterrence is to prevent an enemy power taking the decision to use armed forces ; the result which is desired to achieve is, therefore, psychological one and it is sought by means of a threat."²⁴

23. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (New York 1963), p. 9.

24. General Andre Beaufre, *Deterrence and Strategy*, (London Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 24.

9. RELATION BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY

There is no denying the fact that an intimate relationship exists between national security and national strategy. While the government is to find protection and safeguard for all that it considers important for its existence, its people and the values it adheres to, the strategic postures that the country adopts from period to period is to find guarantee for both internally and externally. With the national objectives determined, the national security and strategy go side by side. As the security perception varies from nation to nation, so does the national strategy.

The development of national security concept in the recent years aims at blending factors like logistics, the strength of national economy, new technologies, alliance diplomacy, public opinion and media together to determine the optimum strategic postures. It also aims to examine the ways in which their interaction will effect others' national aims and policies. Since the proper concerns of security studies is the identification and analysis of the threats and where necessary and possible prescribe methods for dealing with them, such treatment of the security studies involve the formulation of strategic objectives and the choice of strategy. As such both are interdependent and one cannot be studied without the knowledge of the other. This basic nature of their relationship has made the strategist a security analyst and vice versa. And for this reason for many scholars the other title sometime considered for 'strategic studies' was the "*National Security Studies*". Since the world War II with the increasing participation of civilian scholars with field of strategic studies, the monopoly of the subject by armed services officers have been broken. Strategists have become government advisers and government executives. The connection between national security and strategy has been well expressed by Reymond Aron. According to Aron, "Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment in history, from the problems which events themselves pose".²⁵ Today, Strategic thought is so inextricably

entwined with international politics and its security aspects that it would be 'misleading and dangerous' to try to separate the two subjects.

"The field of national security has its roots in defence and foreign policies".²⁶ There is a high degree of overlap from the established pursuit of international politics, foreign and domestic policy, defence analysis and military science. The characteristics of the new or evolving areas of inquiry has made the substance of its field of study a transitory area highly subject to shifts in the political and technological context from which it is drawn. However, the presence of force and its employment remains an inseparable part of the international environment which in the contemporary setting defines the abiding role of national security 'policy as closely tied with the evolution of strategy. "Power and force endure as instruments of policy."²⁷

The present crisis in world security caused with advent of nuclear weapons in making the end of an epoch and a turning point in the history of strategic and national security analysis. Their studies have, therefore, taken a very broad outlook of locating in the nuclear age the conditions of survival of the communities and in inquiring the complex causes of the conflict confronting the humanity. In this role they have become the most basic mode of understanding what defence policies and operational planning should be, i.e. strike a reasonable balance between the national security policy and its strategy to achieve the national objectives.

The multifarious problems and crises which have beridden the present day world caused its security problem unprecedented in any period of history and has resulted in a turning point in the history of

25. Raymond Aron, "The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought" *Adelphi Paper* 54, 1969, Feb. 1969, p. 7.

26. Thomas Trout and James E. Harf, "Teaching of National Security," in Trout & Harf (eds), *National Security Affairs*, New York, (National Strategy Information Centre 1982,

27. *Ibid.* p. 3,

strategic analysis. The policy makers, are now confronted with the problems of how to answer this vital issue. Its responsibilities have fallen on the shoulder, of the analysts of the fields of national security and strategy. However, the contribution of the studies of this subject is not the implementation of the decisions, nor the giving of advice on how best to achieve the desired objective of the policy makers

A harmonious relationship between the analysts and the policy makers is required for successful execution of national strategy may it be during peace or in war. In the bedrock of strategic thought process, the aspect of national security is so remarkably ingrained that one cannot be thought of without the other. In is inherent, delicate and permanent.

but primarily to make explicit through research what are the causes of conflict, what are the concepts and assumptions upon which objectives and means are based, and to set forth in critical terms in which policy making is valid or not. Their purpose is to develop the knowledge which will broaden and extend the policy makers capacity to choose the right policy. However, a harmonious relationship between the analysts and the policy makers is required for successful execution of national strategy may it be during peace or in war. In the bedrock of strategic thought process, the aspect of national security is so remarkably ingrained that one cannot be thought of without the other. It is inherent, delicate and permanent.

10. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion it is clear that neither the field of strategy nor of security could be defined satisfactorily. But one thing is certain and that is the continuity as well as change in both the fields. The new concerns so to say, are additions, not replacement to traditional elements inherently associated with them.

In the changing strategic environment with new problems while nations, their boundaries and government remain initially important

fact, proper identification of the prevailing strategic environment and its functioning within the bounds of the strategic framework is essentially required for formulation of the national strategy for adjustment of national objectives. As the security perception changes, interest changes, the strategy is also required to be changed for necessary adjustment. Consequently strategic and security studies will remain an important, dynamic and skillful business for the days ahead.

As long as nation-state remains the demands for security will remain and so will be the search for security and strategy. But the demands for the security of small states may be complex and difficult than those of the large states. In any case, the success of strategy will depend on a sound calculation and co-ordination of the ends and the means.

Finally, in view of the changing pattern of power politics resulting in new problems faced by the community of nations new conceptualization of strategy and security seemed required. The "world wide economic concerns such as the energy crisis, the general resource problem, the strains on the industrial and monetary system, the problems of the international trade—all are productive of a sense of strain and interdependence. They also produce a belief in some quarters that economic security will replace military security as the primary occupation of governments"²⁸. However, the circle of offensive and defensive strategies for defence seems certain to continue as long as civilization lasts.

28. See Richard Rosecrance, *International Relations : Peace or War ?* (New York, McGraw Hill 1973) p. 320.