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STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE THIRD WORLD : A SUGGESTED APPROACH

Introduction

Strategic Studies has grown a great deal in the post-War period both as a sub-field of International Relations or Politics[1] and as an independent field of enquiry in its own right. In recent years particularly, it has marked two major developments. The first is the broadening of the conceptual basis of strategic thinking and hence strategic studies.[2] Such a broadening has taken place mainly

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1. Becuase of international role of military force and close relations between military and foreign policy, scholars treat Strategic Studies as part of international affairs. See J. Lider, *Military Thought of a Medium Power*, Research Report 8, (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1983). It is rather difficult to distinguish Strategic Studies either from the study of foreign policy making or the wider subject of international politics. Indeed the distinction is not always clear-cut. If anything, they reflect difference in emphasis rather than difference in contents. See J. Garnett, "Introduction", *Theories of Peace and Security*, cited in Lider, 1983.

2. A distinction is made between strategy and for that matter strategic thinking on the one hand and strategic studies on the other. Strategic thinking usually gives the practitioner's perspective in contrast to its academic counterpart, applied for strategic studies. The distinction is also warranted in view of the divergence between the practitioner or actual strategists who are usually military persons and academic strategists who are usually civilians. But in some cases both converge in one person, Dr. Henry A Kissinger being the prominent example. Similarly, examples are there where strategists had military background. See P. Garigue "Strategic Studies as a Theory : An Essay on Their Contribution to Defence Policy and Operational Planning", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3. (December) 1979.

because of the growing complexities of the international environ-
ment in the post-War period resulting from spectacular growth in
technology and nuclear weapons and enlargement of the modern
battlefields involving more than one-to-one nation on the one hand,
and prominence of political factors, diplomacy and alliance, public
opinion and media in modern warfare on the other.[3] There has
been a continuous debate both at practitioners' end and academic
level—albeit among the Western scholars on issues of interest mainly
to the West—resulting in redefining the concept of strategy. Scholars
are indicating the beginning of a 'second wave' or 'new directions'
in Strategic Studies.[4] To quote one prominent strategist: "the intel-
lectual resources now being devoted to strategic studies are without
precedent and...this has resulted in a literature of higher technological
quality and a discussion of a higher standard of sophistication
than they have existed before."[5] One incidental consequence of this
development is the emergence of Strategic Studies as an appropriate
subject for inclusion in university curricula. The second development
is the growing interest in Strategic Studies and the related fields of
international relations on the part of the Third World countries. In
an evergrowing number of Third World countries centres/institutes/
foundations are coming up under the name of either Strategic Studies
or International Studies, Area Studies, within universities usually as
adjunct to the department of International Relations or Politics, or
within Government Departments usually as adjunct to the ministries
of Foreign Affairs or Defence, or as purely autonomous bodies

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3. See Robert O'Neill, "An Introduction to Strategic Thinking", Desmond
    Ball (ed) *Strategy and Defence: Australian Essays* (Sydney and London:
    George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 31

4. For an elaboration, See Colin S, Gray, "The Seeond Wave" New Direc-
    tions in Strategic Studies" *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 118, No. 4, 1973 pp. 35-44,
    and Julian Lider, "Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy", Cooperation
    and Conflict, *Nordic Journal of International Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1981,
    pp. 217-235.

5. Hedly Bull, quoted in Julian Lider *op. cit.*, p. 120 *Military Thought of a
    Medium Power, 1960s and Afterwards*, Research Report 8, The Swedish Ins-
    titute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 1983, p. 120.

sponsored by particular social, political or even religious interest groups. In the absence of a sufficiently exhaustive inventory of these organizations[6] which is a huge time and resource-consuming proposition, it is rather difficult to pass judgements on the purposes and motives behind the establishment of these organizations and to assess their activities. One scholar comments. "... a growing corps of highly trained cosmopolitan cadres capable of bringing strategic analytic skills to bear on the conflict situations of the Third world is coming forward, and the journals are beginning to fill up with Asian, Arab and even African names. It is too early to say whether or what distinctive orientations will emerge in the discipline as it conquers the periphery..."[7].

Now that the Third World is gaining prominence in both international politics and conflict situations and that the North-South dialogue is also becoming a concept with political overtone parallel to the East-West global relations, the issue raised above can be approached, partially though, by putting an alternative question: Can the conceptual framework of strategic studies, as it obtains today capture relevance to the strategic problems of the Third World countries ? This issue begs some additional questions: What are the strategic problems of the Third World ? Are they sufficiently distinct to justify an independent conceptual basis ? Even if there is no concise and handy catalogue of problems and priorities of these countries, a generalised understanding of the problems would suggest that there is indeed such a need for attempting at a conceptual basis of Strategic Studies in the Third World countries. The present paper makes a two-pronged approach: reviewing the conceptual basis of Strategic Studies as it has evolved over time, and making

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6. However, a survey of the organisations dealing with strategy (as well as socio-economic issues) has been made in John Stremlau (ed) *International Relations Research: Emerging Trend Outside United States, 1981-82*, A Special Report, The Rockefeller Foundation, USA, (November). 1983.

7. See Peter King, "A Critique of Strategic Studies", Desmond Ball (ed) *op. cit.*, p. 375.

a rather rudimentary attempt at identifying the major problems faced by the Third World countries. On the basis of this approach, the paper then prepares a tentative agenda of Strategic Studies and raises few practical issues for discussion.

Changing Concerns of Strategy

The concept and application of 'Strategy' can be traced back to Hellenistic Greece and ancient China.[8] However, the period of Napoleonic warfare has been generally considered to be a useful beginning for the understanding of modern strategy.

For the common man, strategy is intimately connected with planning wars and fighting them. It is a military activity *par excellence* in which the generals or high ranking officials plan the overall conduct of wars. Such a notion has been reinforced by Clausewitz, who, contrasting with the concept of tactics, which is the art of winning battles, defines strategy as "the art of employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war."[9] Analysing

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Certain major extensions to the conceptual basis of strategic thinking have taken place. By these extensions 'strategy' has obtained a comprehensive conceptual frame to cover whole range of national issues—political, economic, demographic and social.

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this definition, certain features of strategy becomes evident. First, armed violence in war, an exclusive preserve of the generals, was

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8. For example, Thucydides (460-404 BC) is thought to be the first important writer on war, Sun Tzu (about 500 BC) in some respect outstines Clausewitz, known to be the father of strategy. See Ken Booth, "The Evolution of Strategic Thinking" John Baylis *et. al.* (eds), *Contemporary Strategy.* (London: Croom Helm; 1975), p.23.

9. Von Clausewitz, *On War* (translation by I.I. Graham, 1908) as quoted in John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions", J. Baylis *et. al.* (eds.), *op. cit.*, p.3.

central to strategic action. Second, the conduct of warfare, rather than planning and preparations, that is logistics, was more important to Clausewitz. Third, strategy was basically an optimizing exercise in an end-means relationship in which the salience of objectives and direction of resource were preponderant.[10]

Since the days of Clausewitz, however, certain major extensions to the conceptual basis of strategic thinking has taken place. The first extension was on the *means* side. The concept of strategy went beyond the use of *armed violence* to cover the whole set of means including the political, economic, ideological and techno-scientific.[11] Since war has become a clash involving the entire nation applying their entire power, unlike the pre-Napoleonic warfares between kings and feudal lords, the strategy of the conduct of war was later interpreted as the art of using the entire state power in the pursuit of the objects of war. Thus strategy came to be related not only to the conduct of armed struggle or warfare from military point of view but to the conduct of the entire war from a national perspective.

The second extension, on the end side, was more significant in response to the changed perspective of state objectives. To be precise, strategy is about war, and the conduct of military campaigns and other forms of war as indicated above. But it is about much more than victory in war alone. Fundamentally, it is about the ways in which military power may be used to implement the political goals of the state. Thus strategy went beyond war and military campaigns to include military activities in peace time—deterrance, crisis management and manipulation of risks. Such an extension was indicated by Liddel Hart who defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends in policy".[12] Similar view was held by Von Moltke earlier.[13] Thus

10. See O'Neill, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.
11. See Julian Lider, "Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy" *op. cit.*, p.217.
12. Quoted in Garnett, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
13. Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 4. See also Col. A.J. Trythal, "The Origins of Strategic Thinking", *RUSI Journal* Vol. 118, No. 3, (September) 1973, p. 51.

strategy began to be released of the traditional straight jacket objective—that is war. This extension received more precise shape in the hands of E.M. Earle who held that strategy required increasing consideration of the non-military factors—economic, psychological, political and technological—and war was the art of controlling all the resources of a nation in order to effectively promote and secure its vital interests against actual or potential enemies.[14] Moreover, in Earle's view strategy of the highest level integrates all policies and armaments of a nation and thus it becomes applicable in both war and peace. An approach even more focused on attaining various political aims in peace time may be found in Robert Osgood's definition: "Military Strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion—in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological instrument of power—to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means".[15]

It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the change in the context of strategic theorizing, as Raymon Aron held: "Strategic thought draws inspirations each century, or rather each moment in history, from the problem which events themselves pose".[16] Following the two world wars, particularly, the proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons, the major concerns of the individual nation states as well as international community was the pursuit of peace, how not to wage war and attain the political objectives of the state through peaceful means. Liddel Hart correctly holds "Old concepts of and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but non-sensical with development of nuclear weapons. To aim at winning a war, to take victory as your object is no more than a state of lunacy."[17] Against this backdrop came the third

14. Edward Meade Earle, *The Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1944) p. VIII.
15. Robert Endicett Osgood, *NATO; The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 5.
16. Quoted in Garnett, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
17. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterant and Defence* (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 66.

extension which concerned both *means* and *ends*. According to this view strategy has been defined as the use of entire state power (or of the aggregate of its economic, polititical, ideological, military and other potentials) for attaining the whole of its political goals[18]. The notion of 'grand strategy' came into parlance to cover the whole range of issues—political, economic, demographic and social. Kissinger came to define strategy as "the mode of survival of a society"[19]. General Charles Aillet, a former Chief of Staff of the French Army said in an almost the same vein: "national strategy determines war aims, governs all national activities, provides the armed forces with weapons and manpower and ensures survival of the nation".[20] By this exten- tion, strategy obtained a comphensive conceptual basis in which direc- tion of *all* resources, not merely defence resources, at the disposal of any nation for resolving any national issue/problem or attaining any national goal became part of Strategic Planning.

However, for all practical purposes, these extensions did not find much prominence with both practitoners and academic Strategic Studies. Instead of the wide range of state goals, defence or national security became the chief preoccupation of Strategic Studies. And 'national security' meaning 'vital interests' of any nation came to be interpreted to mean concerns so intense and extremely valuable as to impel the decision makers to risk peace and wage wars.[21] Neville Brown in "New Parameters of Strategy" observes that in modern strategic science, the socio-economic dimension of strategy has been played down unduly.[22] Michael Howard also speaks passionately of the overlooking of social aspects when he refers to the 'forgotten dimension' of strategy.[23] One reason is that the body

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18. See Lider, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
19. Quoted in Ken Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
20. See Garnett. *op. cit.*
21. See Lider, *op. cit.*
22. Cited in Lider, *"Military Thought of a Medium Power, op. cit.* p, 126.
23. See Michael E. Howard, "Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy", D.J. Murray and P.R. Viotti, (eds). *The Defence Politics of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 43-48.

of knowledge that developed were used mainly to help the makers
of foreign and military policy. The latter was preoccupied with
international political and military crises and deterrence of war. It
did not thoroughly analyse domestic economic and social conflicts
and crises in the trouble spots or the prospects of solving them.

Secondly the huge stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the resu-
ltant nuclear stalemate necessitated the introduction of doctrines and
concepts to guide the threatened use of such weapons on the one hand
and subversions, ideological penetration on the other. But the West-
ern powers in their attempts to cope effectively with revolutionary

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and rebel movements overlooked the fact that in these armed conflicts
the social demension of strategy was the most important, and that
operational and technological factors were subservient to the socio-
political struggle. In the process arms control, Strategic Stability, the
controlled use of force and controlled escalation, crisis management,
the relation of the use of military force and other forms of coercion,
the nonbilligerent roles of the military and the decision making
process became major concerns of strategic studies in the West.[24]
The community of strategists in the West have sometimes been
described as the "war and peace establishment"[25] dealing with
military doctrines, technology, foreign policy, national security issues,
disarmament. Even the field of Strategic Studies has been described

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24. For an elucidation see, Laurence Martin, "The Future of Strategic Studies",
    The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, (December), 1980,
25. See Garnett, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

by variants like 'war studies' 'conflict resolution', 'national security studies'[26].

From what has been depicted above, it seems that the conceptual basis of strategic studies as has been in the Western developed countries remains focused on military and security issues which remain areas of major concern to the individual nation or group of nations, given the level of social, political and economic development. But are these also the concerns of the Third World countries ? This is the question to which we now turn.

A General Catalogue of Problems Faced by the Third World Countries

The term 'Third World' has been used in a generic sense despite the sheer diversity in size, level of social, political and economic development, intra-mural problems, conflicts and antagonism prevailing between and among these countries. Although it is because of these diversities that any empirical generalisation on these countries is rendered all the more difficult, some generalized statements may still be

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Unlike the developed and industrialised countries, the Third World nations are yet to resolve the problems of sovereignty and legitimacy and to find out viable social, political and economic development process.

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worthwhile as they share more or less a colonial past, unequal encounters with the Western developed countries, poverty, social dislocation, lack of national integration and inadequate linkages with the central issue areas of the international system.[27] At the cost of repetition, it is emphasised that the problems and issues raised below are generalised and individual country may differ on this or that point.

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26. *Ibid.*
27. See M. Ayoob, "Autonomy and Intervention: Superpowers and the Third World", Robert O'Neill and D.M. Herner, (eds) *New Directions in Strategic Thinking* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 104-106.

With this observation, some of the major issue areas pertinent to the Third World are outlined in order to mark their contrast with the developed West in the context of strategic theorizing:

a. *Threats to Security* : Threats to national security of the Western developed countries come from without rather than from within. Their security issue is characterized by external orientation, strong linkage with systemic security and ties with the security of alliance blocs. As such they may analyse the sources of threats and methods of countering then in terms of balance of power or strategic balance, deterrance, crisis management or manipulation of risks and make strategic planning of the defence resources. But for most of the Third World countries, the sources of threats to national security are as much, if not more, internal as they are external.[28] In fact, the external vulnerability of the Third World countries increases as long as the internal sources are alive and active.

In such a situation, while concepts like 'crisis management' or conflict resolution might be stretched to apply to the domestic sector with a mix of foreign policy and defence posture it is generally understood that attempt at countering domestic sources of threats to security by conventional approach of military force might be counterproductive. What is required is to go into the root of the sources from which such threats are emanating, find out the their internal and external linkages and assess resources and avenues for resolving the problems.

b. *Lack of National Integration* : A very related problem, sometimes having causal linkage with the above problem, is the lack of national integration. The entire population, often bounded in an artificially delineated boundary, is

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28. See. M. Ayoob, "Security in the Third Word: The Worm is About To Turn?", *International Affairs* Vol. 60, No. 1, (Winter), 1983-84, p 44.

divided into so many interest groups along ethnic, religious and regional, even professional lines. Urban vs rural, religion vs religion, sect vs sect, tribe vs tribe, civil vs military, bureaucracy vs academics, bureacracy vs. politics—all these dimensions of cleavages and rifts only contribute to unhealthy competition and mutual misgivings. Hardly such cleavages allow identification with national goals and aspiration. On the one hand, bulk of the population remain tradition bound and can not identify themselves beyond immediate interests and immediate environment. Indentification with the mainstream of national life on the part of many 'marginal' groups becomes a difficult task because of the contrast between traditional values and way of life of their 'own' and new rules and regulations of the modern state system. On the other hand, penetration of modernisation in such societies affect only small pockets resulting in a dualism and sharpening of the existing cleavages. While such phases of modernization are termed by optimists as transitional or periods of trial and errors, the disparate growth of different social forces along-with the divergent impact of external forces on different groups pushes the 'marginal' groups to the further end only to make the gap hopelessly wide and terminal, at least for the forseeable future.

The consequences of lack of national integration are social and communal tensions and conflicts, setback in growth of nationalistic feelings across all social groups, impediment to growth of national politics and above all, increasing susceptibility to foreign idelogical penetration and external manipulation, endangering national security. It is in this perspective that nation-building architecture should take precedence over conventional defence-oriented state security against external threats. This is not to play down the role of defence but a matter of giving priority.

c. *Lack of National Consensus* : Then most of the Third World countries are plagued by lack of an effective national consen-

sus on what should be the national interest and national goals, both short term and long term. While disparate social groups enter into coalition for attaining the goals of political independence on a broad but vague and fragile platform of consensus, actual running of the state affairs and nation building activities soon result in a collapse of the consensus. Sometimes, there are fundamental differences on basic social and political issues like ideological orientation to economic development strategy, basic tenets of foreign policy, role of religion in the state, etc. Difference of opinion and for that matter, debate on national issues are always a healthy sign. But sooner the differences are reduced to simple procedural or modality questions from differences on basic principles, the better. Unfortunately however, differences exist on basic principles. With changes in regimes, therefore, sometimes these fundamental goals and values are restated rather changed, resulting in putting of the nation building activities back to the origin point.

d. *Low Levels of Political Development* : A related problem is the low level of political development reflected in, and sometimes resulting from, lack of political institutionalisation. Factionalism, feuds and fluidity, lack of accommodation are commonplace in political activities of these countries. Rhetorical subscription to ideologies rather than firm commitment to nationalism become stands of the political parties. Continued political crisis and domestic instability paves way to military intervention indefinitely postponing the process of political development[29]. Legitimacy of the regimes sometimes becomes an issue in the country's foreign relations and its search for external resources for development. To

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29. As of 1981, as many as 54 countries in Third World had been ruled by military regimes and between 1960-80, 76 coups took place in these countries. See Ruth L. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1980 (Varginia: World Priorities Inc., 1981).

complicate the situation, often political, social and economic problems are turned into a confrontational or military one to deal with domestic dissidence only to allow the issue to conflagrate into unorganized or organized outbursts. The issue here from a national perspective is how to institutionalise political changes of these countries for creating conditions favourable for instituting responsible governments.

e. *Legitimacy of the State Apparatus* : As a result of the centuries old process of development, modern states in the industrialized Western World have reached a position which can be referred to as one of 'unconditional legitimacy'[30]. These states may also be characterized as strong and cohesive. By contrast, the state structures in the Third World do not enjoy 'unconditional legitimacy' because most of these countries participated in the modern state system at a much later time, many in the sixties and seventies and even early eighties. Thus most of these countries are handicapped in their capacity to act effectively in international system which is defined primarily by state-centric character.

f. *Unresolved Conflicts and Colonial Legacy* : Many of the Third World countries are still burdened with the problems originating in colonial legacies like boundary demarcation problem, ethnic problem which not only create domestic crisis but also give rise to bilateral and regional tensions and conflicts. Threat perception to state security differs and the resulting alignment and realignment to counter those threats themselves become an additional source of threats to the neighbour (s). Perhaps the best example of this divergent threat perception may be found in South Asia.

g. *Poverty, Low Level of Development and Resource Scarcity*: It is not only the national goals and national interests that

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30. For an account of the origins and growth of the modern system of states, see Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester University Press, 1977).

often remain undefined or vaguely defined but also some of
the vital resources and technological know-how that these
countries miserably lack in. Perhaps poverty and low level of
development may be the least controversial and most valid
generalisation about the Third World countries. Lack of basic
necessities of life and the bulk of population living in abject
poverty or below poverty line does not only create social
tensions but also deepens political crisis. Often poverty is
considered as the greatest threat to security of the Third
World countries. The potent value of this contention is
much more important than the rhetorical value often capita-
lised for political purpose. Then the given end-means paradigm
that is normally a pre-requisite of strategic planning does not
hold good for most of the Third World countries whose
arduous search for resources land them in aid-dependency.
Apart from the self-perpetuating nature of this aid-dependen-
cy one important consequence is the less of manoevrability
in foreign policy pursuits.

From the above outlines of the problem and issues of the
Third World it turns out that unlike the developed and industria-
lized countries, these countries are yet to resolve the problems of

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theorizing in the Third World is different from that in
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sovereignty and legitimacy and find out viable social, political and
economic development processes. The sources of threats to security
are mostly internal in nature and inextricably linked to overall na-
tion building process. The issues and problems strategic to the "mode
of survival" of these societies, as we have seen, are mostly and basi-

cally concerned with the inner aspects of the countries. It is in this sense that we argue that the context of strategic theorizing in the Third World is different from that of the developed West.

Conceptual Basis of Strategic Studies in the Third World

What should then be the conceptual basis of Strategic studies in the Third World countries? Obviously 'national security' can not provide the basis as it then runs the risks of limiting Strategic Studies to military strategy only without touching the basic problem. Secondly, as have been pointed out, both the ends and means of strategy for these countries are not given or predetermined. The generation of resources, defined in a broad sense to include material resources, technical, financial, manpower and organizational, should itself become part of the strategy. The scope of Strategic Studies, therefore, should also be laterally broadened. Thirdly, the role of military in support of foreign policy pursuits, or in giving the the latter credibility as is the case with the West, is rather limited. In fact the direction is the other way round. With these perspective in mind, it seems that *nation building pursuits* could be a useful starting point for Strategic Studies. The concept apparently sounds vague and rather too broad-based to be manageable. But the point is, Strategic Studies, being as important a pursuit to identify, among others, national needs, priorities, strengths, weaknesses and resources needs, a *commanding height*, a good anchoring. There is tremendous scope and requirement of Strategic Studies to analyse the problems and issues logically and rationally to offer conclusions to assist the political judgement of policy planners. An equally important terms of reference of Strategic Studies remains providing the linkages of national problems and issues. And this is possible only in an integrative view of nation building in which national development and national security appear to be inseparably linked and mutually reinforcing. Such an integrated view is presented in the flow diagram given below.

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                          ┌─────────────────┐
                          │ Nation Building │
                          └─────────────────┘
            ┌───────────────────┴──────────────────┐
  ┌──────────────────────┐              ┌──────────────────────┐
  │ Protection of Indepen-│◄────────────►│ National Development │
  │ dence and Sovereignty │              └──────────────────────┘
  └──────────────────────┘
      ┌──────┴───────┐          ┌─────────────┬────────────┬─────────────┐
 ┌─────────┐  ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────┐
 │ Defence │  │ Diplomacy  │ │ Economic   │ │ Social   │ │ Political │
 └─────────┘  └────────────┘ │ Development│ │Development│ │Development │
                             └────────────┘ └──────────┘ └───────────┘
                             ┌────────────┐ ┌───────────┐
                             │ Resource   │ │Development│
                             │ Generation │ │ Strategy  │
                             └────────────┘ └───────────┘
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Index : ──→ Direct relations
         ──→ Feed-back relations

The flow diagram is a rather simplified version of the relation-
ship both direct and feed back between different components of
nation building task.   In this framework, nation building has been
viewed as two-fold task—protective (independence and sovereignty)
and progressive (development), both having direct linkage. At the
lower level, diplomacy and defence, political development and defence,
social, political and economic development all have feed-back rela-
tionship.   In fact, the whole gamut of relationship may be epitomised
by 'Development-Defence-Diplomacy' paradigm.   In practice, often
the apparently direct relationship considered with the feed-back rela-
tionship is relegated.   But for the Third World countries sometime
these feed-back relationships assume strategic importance.

A Tentative Agenda of Strategic Studies

The objective of Strategic Studies in the Third World countries
could broadly be to *obviate* mistakes rather than rectify them, to
prevent conflicts rather than resolve them and to *anticipate* the desta-
bilizing forces within and without before they destabilize the society.

Secondly, Strategic Studies should, in addition to providing a
general understanding of the prevailing international situation, lead
to an analysis of the behaviour pattern of the international actors,

specially the neighbours, the major and super powers, having relevance to the country concerned.

Thirdly, Strategic Studies should be designed to provide policy options to the leadership vis-a-vis evolving international situations and events. Fourthly, It could provide continuous conceptualisation of issues and option, anticipate problems with shorter and longer time perspectives integrate questions both laterally and vertically to locate them in overall strategy.

In addition to the above general outline, some specific issue areas may also be touched. The question of national integration and building up of a national consensus comes to the forefront. Strategic Studies could provide two-fold role in this respect. First is providing a forum for different shades of opinion and different interest groups including the police planners, civil and military bureaucracy

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Strategic study in the Third World should address itself to the basic problems of the country concerned so that its scope is laterally broadened to comprise the total spectrum of problems related to nation building.

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academia and political leaders. Continuous series of dialogue could be initiated and the outcomes should be carefully analysed and fedback. Secondly, indepth analyses of national problems and specific policy proposals could be put forward to the policy makers for necessary action. Then comes the question of national security against both internal and external threats. The purpose of strategic studies in this context could be to identify the actual as well as potential sources of threats to national security—internal and external—establish linkages, if any, assess the defence resources and chalk out strategy to neutralise them. A third prominent issue area could be the generation of all types of resources for defence and development. The term generation has been used in a very broad sense to include procurement, mobilisation, and exploitation, even creation. As the Third

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World countries are severely resource hungry, non-conventional ways should be evolved to generate and mobilise resource. To the extent, external aid dependence is unavoidable options and avenues could be explored so that manoevrability of the country concerned is not sacrificed. But greater efforts should be given to find out ways and means of mobilising domestic resources. The point that is often lost on many counts is that the nation has to go through common suffering, common experience, common process of mobilisation and development. This is how, cleavages, parochialism gives way to nationalism and this is how a nation realises the potenital resources for development. It is in this sense that a Strategic Studies centre has to become a laboratory of nation building activities.

Concluding Observations

The strategic analysts who now constitute a distinct profession in the Western World have from the beginning faced a number of criticisms that called in question the validity of their methods, their utility to the society and even their integrity of purpose.[31] Similar criticisms may also be raised for the strategists in the Third World countries. For example, question may be raised about the utility of the piece strategic analysis to the practitioners who have little time to indulge in time-consuming exercise or go through the outcome of such studies and who mainly depend on intuition supported by experience for strategic decision making. To this, it may be said that a meaningful intercourse may only develop when sufficient time is allowed to fade away the mutual inhibitions and suspicions. It is precisely because the practitioner has little time to read, to think and to analyse that he has to be fed with an independent analysis and policy input. A second criticism may be made in the similar vein. Positing Strategic Studies on such a broad basis as above, might render it to be an unmanageale subject on the one hand and create overlapping with research pursuits in other disciplines

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31. For a good discussion on the critique, see Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and Its Critics", *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 4, (July), 1968.

like economics, sociology, political science, demography etc. That apprehension is, however, unfounded. As emphasised earlier, the unique advantage as well as requirement of Strategic Studies is that it looks at any particular issue from an overall national perspective, locates it in proper framework and provides linkages. Viewed in

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The unique advantage of Strategic Studies is that it looks at any particular issue from an overall national perspective, locates it in proper framework and provides interdisciplinary linkages.

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this sense, Strategic Studies can in fact, avoid overlapping and duplication which are prolific in the Third World countries in their adhoc existence. Nor is Strategic Studies an infringement on other fields and enquiry because of its commanding height, where it is to engage itself in prioritisation, linkages and bringing out implications on other areas rather than indulging in the micro-problem which would fall within purview of other disciplines. The Third criticism as is also labelled in the West, is that the influence of the strategists at the highest level is a threat to democratic process.[32] But this apprehension is again unfounded because the conceptual framework of Strategic Studies, as proposed above, is indeed for evolving a viable national socio-political development strategy, including the desired political system. Besides, strategists in their professional capacity offer only technical advisory resources and government would very much retain the monopoly of decision making.

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32. A good deal of literature exists on the influence of the military-industrial complex on dicision making or Laswell's "garison state", see *Ibid.* and also Garnett, *op cit.*