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CONTEMPORARY GREECE : HOPES AND REALITIES*

I

The conservative governments that ruled Greece since the end of the World War II pursued a unidimensional policy of dependence vis-a-vis the West. The conservatives neglected the fact that Greece is not only a European but also a Balkan and a Mediterranean country. She fell prey to the Western plans and wishes. Post-war political developments in Greece, like the 1967 military takeover and the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, are attributed to the American penetration of the country.¹ This naturally caused a sense of resentment in the minds of many Greeks. In addition to that the political institutions failed to keep pace with the on-the-transformation Greek society. All these factors led the Greeks make a cry for "Allaghi"—change. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) headed by its charismatic leader Dr. Andreas Papandreou, came forward with the promises of change. The Greeks gave their verdict for it in the October 18, 1981 general elections and Andreas Papandreou became Prime Minister of Greece. But he, now being at the helm of affairs already for more than one year, has come to realize that to be in the opposition is one thing and in power the other. There are constraints both internal and external. The Greek society still abounds in conservative elements. Greece is a NATO and EEC country. So Papandreou stands face to face with hard realities in carrying forward and implementing the PASOK's programme. Under the

* The present article was written prior to the agreement reached in July 1983 between the U. S. and Greece on the issue of U. S. military bases on Greek territory.

1. *Current History* West Europe, December, 1982. p. 426.

circumstances, the question that springs up is whether Papandreou should flatly compromise with the constraints Greece is facing, or run the risk of becoming orthodox in implementing the party programme, or pursue a policy of caution, flexibility and pragmatism in order to achieve and serve national interests. In the light of steps for change in both domestic and foreign policy issues already taken by the socialist government during its over one year period in power, it may be worth-while at this stage to examine these questions to explore the options before Papandreou.

II

The political, social and economic changes of the preceding two decades in Greece and growing popular disillusionment with the performance of the ruling New Democracy Party generated PASOK's rallying cry for "Allaghi", and contributed to its meteoric rise to power. The landslide victory of the Greek Socialist party bears an indication to the fact that change in every sphere of Greek society was overdue and Papandreou promised a lot, both at home and abroad.

DOMESTIC SECTOR

Dr. Papandreou made a policy statement to parliament on November 22-24, 1981 during which he articulated the major objectives of his government as "national independence and territorial integrity; the people's sovereignty and democracy; self-supporting economic and social development; cultural revival, the revitalization of rural areas; radical improvements in the quality of urban and village life; social justice, and social liberation".² The Government promised to strengthen the democratic basis of Greek state at all levels of administration and in all spheres of national life, and seek to bring about a new spirit of national unity and reconciliation. In the weeks following the new Government's assumption of office there were widespread changes in senior personnel

2. Keesings contemporary Archives, Records of World Events, 1982, p. 31263

throughout the civil and diplomatic services and other public organizations. The Government had abolished the official observance of anniversaries commemorating the civil war which had ended in 1949; had officially recognized for the first time the role of the communist-led "national resistance" during the Nazi occupation of Greece which preceded the civil war; had abolished the keeping of secret police dossiers on citizens' political affiliation; accelerated the indiscriminate repatriation of over 30,000 remaining civil war exiles (living mostly in Eastern Europe).

The government reformed the electoral system in order to facilitate the representation of minor parties; and enfranchised seamen and students who were absent from the country during parliamentary election and lowered the voting age to 18. The administration of justice has been reformed in order to minimize delays and expenses to the citizens. The government's new labour law substantially increased the wages of peasants and workers. It has legalized civil marriage and banned the custom that made it difficult for women to marry unless they brought dowries to their prospective husbands. A new law on higher education abolished entrance examinations for the universities and secured liberal student participations in decision-making. Presently the government is studying the creation of comprehensive medical care, lamentably lacking in Greece, the formation of a requirement for doctors to begin by serving in small provincial hospitals. Attempts have been made to raise the quality of Greek life through some socio-cultural reforms. Such reforms include decentralization of decisions affecting provisions for and distribution of cultural amenities, changes in Greek television programmes, abolition of film censorship and access of non-government views and opinions to the state-run radio-TV network. Steps have also been taken to introduce some environmental reforms including control of pollution in industry and ban on private cars in the centre of Athens. These overdue social reforms have helped ease the pressure Papandreou was under for his inability to work out an economic miracle.

In order to transform gradually the structure of the economy so that the basic options are determined by the whole of society,

the Government decided to bring the strategic sectors under social control, while recognizing the positive roles of private initiative. The Government has taken steps to strengthen private initiative and guide it towards serving the national development policy through the introduction of various investment incentives. Particular encouragement is given to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Foreign investment and mixed foreign and domestic investments are being welcomed subject to various development criteria and to the safeguarding of national control.

Agricultural development is planned within the framework of an integrated strategy for the whole economy, the main sectoral priorities being (i) to involve farmers in decision making; (ii) to carry out a mechanisation programme; and (iii) to improve farmers' living standards. Price subsidies, cooperativism, increased productivity and improved loan facilities are the key elements in the agricultural development programme. Dr. Papandreou also outlined new programmes in other fields of the national economy. But Papandreou faces some constraints in implementing the PASOK programme. The worldwide recession is one of them. Because of the global oil glut, hundreds of Greek tankers lie idle in harbour. Instead of earning \$ 2 billion this year in shipping revenues, as expected, Greece will take in barely half that amount.³ The legalization of civil marriage caused serious friction with the Greek Orthodox Church. Raising wages for peasants and workers has complicated efforts to bring down inflation. In January last, Papandreou devalued the Greek *drachma* by 15 per cent, a move that won the applause of businessmen (since it lowers the price of exports) but angered leftists and had given the Communist Party an opportunity to undercut the government from the left. Recently the communists denounced Papandreou for "reformism" and for an economy that harms the cause of change. PASOK could not count on the new electors who emerged after lowering the voting age to eighteen. These voters might facilitate the Communist Party's drive

3. *The New Republic*, March 21, 1983, p. 20.

to hold the balance of power in the future.⁴ If economic Conditions worsen Papandreou may risk losing support also of Centrists and Democratic Socialists who may eventually go up to the right. Strained relations with Turkey presently cause the country's budget imbalance in favour of defence expenditure. Owing to all these constraints Papandreou is still faced with most of the economic problems he inherited from his previous Administration. In order to stave off the attack both from the Left and the Right Papandreou has to pursue a policy of realism and moderation.

Foreign Policy

On the external front Pasok had committed to follow a policy of peace and solidarity with the peoples, struggling for their national independence or labouring for a non-aligned external posture and policy which has as its starting point the fact that Greece is a country which simultaneously belongs to Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Here, in its ideological pronouncement PASOK resembles more its Third World counterparts than the typical Euro-socialist Parties. Papandreou has often said that Greece has been a 'Client state' for too long, and in his victory speech he promised "a Greece belonging to its people, governed by its people". But there are a host of good reasons why Papandreou still could not take radical action. Greece is a member of the NATO and the EEC. Besides, the US military bases, the Aegean question and the Cyprus issue are some of the main constraints. Facing such realities and remembering the promises of the Megali Allaghi (the great change) made to the Greek people, Papandreou, at least as a tactical measure, had to make a shift toward more flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. The geo-strategic position of Greece in the total spectrum of international system dictates Greece to avoid unilateral actions; instead patient exploratory moves are necessary to contribute toward the attainment of PASOK's foreign policy objective. Greece's geographic location vis-a-vis Europe and the Middle East,

4. *International Perspectives*, March/April 1983, p. 15.

the problems existing in the Middle East, unresolved Graeco-Turkish differences, and Soviet attitudes toward these problems have influenced the previous governments' policy toward NATO and the United States. Any radical attempt towards breaking the existing *status quo* may turn out to be too costly an adventure.

Relations with the European Economic Community (EEC):

PASOK's theoretical position on the European Economic Community (EEC) derives from its view of Greece on the Capitalist periphery, a dependent and marginal area of global capitalism. Initially, PASOK's position on EEC membership was "no". It held that the "common market of monopoly capital" ensured that participating southern European countries would remain dependencies, by transferring sovereign decisions on economic policy to "foreign centers", creating new economic hardships and enhancing existing difficulties.⁵ Mr. Papandreou's major aim is to stop the EEC interfering with his industrial policy. In the back of Greek minds is the special protocol that was written into Ireland's accession treaty in 1973. This said that Ireland could be given special exemption from some Community rules about subsidies so that it could promote its industrial development. Ireland has exploited this to give generous tax incentives to foreign investors. Greece would like a similar deal, and might exploit it even more freely. Judging by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Yugoslav experience, however, Greece would opt to maintain economic relation with the community without membership, under a special status agreement that would allow for economic planning, regulation of foreign commerce and capital movement.

Since Greece had nonetheless, become the tenth member of the EEC, PASOK introduced the idea that a referendum should be held to determine the country's continuing membership. However, under the current constitution, the holding of a referendum is the prerogative of the President of the Republic. But it is unlikely for president Karamanlis to take such a move as he was the architect

5. *Current History, West, Europe*, December, 1982, p. 429.

of Greece's EEC membership. On many occasions, Greece has presented its views on the hardship brought to its economy and the need for adjustments in Community policy, especially in the areas of agriculture and the budget. A formal memorandum on the issue of Greek-membership was submitted to the President of the committee of Ministers and to the President of the commission on March 23, 1982 and is currently under study. Thus diplomacy has replaced the talk of a referendum and the quest for a special status agreement. It is highly unlikely that Papandreou will seek a constitutional showdown with the President over the referendum issue at this time. But the issue may be revived in the future if no tangible economic benefits are evident from the Greek membership in the EEC, or if PASOK cannot show even a minimum improvement in the terms of Greek membership.

Greek Relations with the NATO

In principle, PASOK's policy towards NATO was part of a wider policy of working for the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In practice, the Greek people could not forget that NATO had supported the military regime in Greece and had done absolutely nothing to stop the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Many Greeks maintain that there was no meaning in their belonging to the military wing of an alliance which does not guarantee their eastern frontiers against any possible threat and which at the same time, as a result of the unlimited supply of military materiel to Turkey, upsets the balance of power in the Aegean.

In earlier speeches Papandreou said it was foolish for Greece to be a member of NATO when its greatest threat came from Turkey, another member of the alliance, but more recently he has hinted that Greece might only downgrade its participation in NATO, perhaps to the status of a nonmilitary member like France. But if Papandreou pulled out of NATO, the allies would have to send more military aid to the other protector of the southern flank-Turkey, to the obvious disadvantage of Greece., And if Greece ever hopes to

force Turkey to relinquish its claims on Cyprus, Papandreou will need the influence of the United States and the other NATO allies. So it was indicated that a limited working relationship with NATO could be developed if, as a purely defensive alliance, it contributed to the defence of independence and territorial integrity, avoided pressures and black-mail, and operated on the basis of equality and respect. However, the future of Greece's continued membership in NATO will be tested in the practical application of these conditions. Papandreou has maintained his preelectoral categorical position that NATO must guarantee Greece's frontiers from the Turkish threat instead of insisting on a deployment of forces against a hypothetical threat from the Warsaw Pact.

The Greek Socialists had the opportunity to display their "new, proud and independent foreign policy", when they prevented the NATO defence Ministers from issuing their customary communique following their December 9, 1981, Brussels meeting. Papandreou, who also serves as Greek defence Minister, justified this symbolic act on the ground that NATO refused to offer satisfactory guarantees against Turkey's threat, the reality of which he had tried to explain to his colleagues. The Greek Prime Minister saw his action as consistent with Greek national interests, enhancing Greek prestige and long term interests. Thus Greece's continued membership in NATO seems to be compensated by Papandreou's crave for independent position on issues vital to Greece's national interest.

Relations with the United States

The question of the future status of the American military bases in Greece, established under the terms of bilateral agreement signed by the United States and Greece in 1953, is one of the most sensitive issues being faced by the Papandreou government. Early in the election campaign Papandreou blamed Washington for the 1967 colonel's coup and said the United States should be kicked out of the country; but later he said that talks should begin on the gradual withdrawal of American troops. The United States operates a naval

base, two air stations and a naval communication Centre in Greece; in all, some 4,000 American troops are stationed there. Some aging short-range Honest John and Nike Hercules nuclear missiles reportedly are stored on Greek soil. The US naval base at Suda Bay in Crete is one of only a handful in Europe ample enough to service the bulk of the Sixth Fleet. A NATO firing range off Suda Bay offers one of the few places in Europe where western troops are permitted to practice firing live ammunition. In northern Crete, the Heraklion Air Station is an important listening post for monitoring Soviet activities in the Mediterranean. An air base at Hellenikon, north west of Athens, supports reconnaissance and antisubmarine missions. A naval communication centre at Nea Makri outside Athens keeps tabs on ships throughout the Aegean. Five NATO early warning radar stations in Northern Greece search for hostile aircraft and troops movement (Map).



If need be, these American installations could be relocated in Turkey, Italy, Egypt and Israel. But the neutralization of Greece would seriously weaken NATO's southern flank. The Reagan administration hopes that Papandreou will permit the bases to stay in return for economic aid. Former under Secretary of Defence Robert Komer shrugged, "He wants to leverage us into giving more aid. This is a typical Greek bargaining tactic".⁶ However the matter should not be so simplified. Papandreou told in an interview with *Newsweek's* foreign editor: "They (Americans) say that I have changed my position but it is not true. We do not believe in bases—whether they are in this country or in others. Whether they are American or Soviet, we are against them. I have made it very clear I do not intend to confront the United States. We would like to sit down to arrange with the United States bilaterally the time frame for withdrawing the bases. The goal would be to eventually withdraw".⁷

What the Greeks are really asking for in the meantime is control—knowledge and information of all the activities, that go at every base - the Greek military should know it. Greece wants to avoid the launching of some kind of action from Greek soil against a country with which she maintains good relations. They also have to ensure that there is no leak of information to Turkey that relates to their defence situation, their deployment of troops and equipment, as happened during the Cyprus tragedy. A further Greek demand is that the agreement should be revived every year and both parties would have the right to pull out. There ought to be a guarantee of their frontiers or there ought to be a ratio of arms supplies to Greece that would at least guarantee their capability to defend themselves. But Papandreou and his advisers are fully aware that the Greek economy has too great a need of the world Bank and the IMF. It diminishes the bargaining strength of Greece with the United States. All this compels the Greek government to be flexible on its commitments on US-Greek relation.

6. *Newsweek*, Nov. 2, 1981.

7. *Newsweek*, Nov. 21, 1981.

Relations with Turkey

To Papandreou, Greece's ancient enemy—Turkey is more of a threat than the Warsaw Pact. That notion was reinforced in 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus, an independent island-nation with a predominantly Greek population. One of the most important issues in Greek foreign affairs is the Cyprus question, which has disturbed Turkish-Greek relations since the mid-1950s. The Greek-inspired coup and subsequent Turkish intervention of Cyprus in July 1974 not only exacerbated tension between the two countries but served to bring down the military regime of General Ioannides. It had the added consequence of precipitating Greek withdrawal from military participation in NATO. PASOK has accused NATO and the United States of complicity in 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus: it charges that they have been seeking to partition the island since the intercommunal troubles began in 1963, in order to transform it into an advanced post for the promotion of imperialist plans. According to Greek leaders, the Cyprus problem can be resolved only by the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, which provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the guarantee of freedom of movement to all Cypriots, the return of the refugees to their homes, and the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The resolution of this problem is a priority of PASOK's foreign policy. PASOK has been emphatic in rejecting any solution imposed by force; it refuses to "de-internationalize" the problem, as the conservatives did, by agreeing to talks with Turkey, or by allowing NATO to act as mediator.

Papandreou was the first Greek Prime Minister to visit Cyprus. Since his elections, he has met regularly with the President of Cyprus for the purpose of coordinating policy and avoiding the strain and suspicion that marked the relations of the two countries in the past. The Cypriots welcomed the renewed Greek commitment to their cause, but it became apparent in the late spring of 1982 that differences existed between Athens and Nicosia over diplomatic

tactics. The Greek government has emphasized the possibility of internationalization and has offered to cover the expenses of an expanded United Nations peacekeeping presence on Cyprus in order to bring about the demilitarization of the island and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Papandreou remains skeptical of the outcome of the ongoing intercommunal talks as the Turkish army remains on Cyprus. But the Cypriot Government of Kyprianou mostly for domestic political reasons, supports the continuation of the inconclusive intercommunal talks. These talks are intermittently going on under the United Nations auspices but still without success. Each time the Greek Cypriots made move to accommodate a Turkish position, the Turkish side has taken a step back, first from 'federation to federation by evolution' and then to proposals for the creation of two virtually separate states⁸. In August, 1981, the Turkish Cypriots offered to hand back 3-4 percent of the 35 percent of land now controlled by them, and also to resettle some 40,000 of the 200,000 refugees who fled from the North in 1974. The constitutional issue remained the main problem: the Turkish Cypriots want equal status for the two communities, with equal representation in government and strong links with the mother country; the Greeks, although they agree to the principle of an alternating presidency, favour a strong central government, and object to disproportionate representation of the Turkish community, who form less than 20 percent of the population. In November, 1981, a UN plan (involving a federal council, an alternating presidency and the allocation of 70 percent of the island to the Greek community) was presented, but talks faltered in February 1982 when Andreas Papandreou called for withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops and an international conference, rather than the continuation of inter-communal talks.⁹ Recently a debate on Cyprus was held in the United Nations where hopes of settlement were aired. Mr. William Sherman, a Deputy permanent US Representative to the UN told,

8. Yannis Kranidiotis, *The Negotiations for the Solution of the Cyprus issue, 1974-81*, Athens, 1982, pp.649-60.

9. *The Europa Year Book 1983-A World Survey* Vol-1, p. 486.

"There seems now to be an international climate conducive to progress in resolving the problem of Cyprus. It seems to us that the time is ripe for real advance towards a mutually acceptable settlement."¹⁰

Beside the Cyprus issue, three other critical questions remain unresolved giving rise to serious tension between the two NATO allies. 1) Turkey's demands over the Aegean continental shelf; 2) the air space dispute; and 3) the reallocation of operational responsibilities of the Aegean Sea and air space. Although the issues are apparently of bilateral nature, Papandreou's actions on these as well as the Cyprus issue are constrained by the support he can draw from the US and its NATO allies. This reinforces Papandreou's weakness in taking any radical measure against Greece's NATO membership.

Greek relations with the East European Countries

The era of detente improved relations between Greece and her Balkan neighbours, but it was ultimately disillusionment with the United States policy during the Junta period and the subsequent conflict with Turkey that was to bring about a partial emancipation of Greek foreign policy. Greece had all along been cautioned about the "communist threat" both internal and external, but to her, it was and is hypothetical. She is more anxious about Turkey than any danger from the north. In strictly regional term, the Soviet Union appears to be more interested in diminishing the threat posed to her own security than in competing with the United States for supremacy. Greece has to a quite satisfactory extent established both bilateral and multilateral relations in the Balkans after decades of mutual distrust. Since his electoral Victory, Papandreou has furthered his friendly policy towards communist Balkan states by receiving Ceausescu in Athens and himself visiting Belgrade and Sofia. Greece's major objective in the Balkans has not been to secure allies against Turkey but

10. *The Bangladesh Observer*, May 14, 1983.

rather to relieve her own border from tension in case of any attack from the East.¹¹ Developments in Poland and the Greek reaction to them provide additional evidence of PASOK's intention to chart a foreign policy 'independent', from that of its western allies and its conservative predecessors. Greece has supported the liberalization process in Poland and has condemned the imposition of martial law (now suspended). But it has opposed the policy of sanctions, condemnations and other measures against the Soviet Union in the absence of a direct military intervention on the grounds that such actions would lead to an East-West confrontation, threaten world peace, undermine negotiations for arms reductions and increase the hardship in Poland. Greece has to play a very cautious role here. She does not want to endanger increasingly valuable economic relations with the Eastern bloc or to anger Greece's Western allies either. Papandreou has attempted to do so by 'disassociating' Greece from the decision of the European Community of January 4, 1982, and by expressing reservations on NATO's "Declaration on Poland", rather than vetoing it.¹²

Greece and the Middle East

Greece's outlook towards the Middle East symbolized its new 'independent' foreign policy which is marked by Papandreou's substantial departure from his predecessor's line. Though previous Greek governments had recognized the economic and political significance of the Arab World, none undertook the expansion of Greece's relations in this region with the commitment displayed by PASOK. Significantly, the first foreign diplomatic envoys to be granted an audience with Mr. Papandreou after his elections, were representatives of Syria, Algeria, Iraq, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Libya. Soon after Papandreou was sworn in, he invited the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to Athens. Arafat's visit that took place about two months later was his first to an EEC member and his third to a

11. *Adelphi Papers*, IISS, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, 1982, No. 179, p. 9.

12. *The New York Times*, January 5, 1982, p. 7.

NATO country. The PLO information Office in Athens was granted the status of a diplomatic mission with standing equal to that maintained by Israel.¹³ Papandreou sharply condemned all recent unilateral Israeli actions, and especially Israel's actions in Lebanon. Greece refused to endorse the despatch of an EEC peace force to the Sinai in November 1981 and in February 1982 voted in the UN against Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. Greece offered humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians during the siege of West Beirut and accepted 200-300 injured Palestinian fighters for treatment in Greek hospitals as part of the PLO evacuation plan from the Lebanese capital. Arafat visited Greece immediately after his expulsion from Beirut. Papandreou's pro-Palestinian position may be linked with Greece's economic interest associated with the issue. When Lebanon fell apart in the mid-1970s, a lot of Arab money went to Athens, Papandreou would like to keep it there. He has tried to establish economic links with the Arab States through joint economic projects. He also wants Arab support in the United Nations on the Cyprus issue.¹⁴ All this signifies an altogether new Greek stance with respect to the Middle East and a compliance with the pledge of a multidimensional foreign policy.

Security Aspects of Greece

The postwar orientation of Greek defence was based on the American belief that Greece's main security concern was of an internal rather than an external nature. Of course Greece is no longer divided by civil strife, her economy has made important strides since 1950s and her defensive position was transformed after 1974. Since 1974 Greece attempts to conduct a foreign policy intended to cope with the perceived threats to Greek security from Turkey and the Warsaw Pact. But American and NATO officials deny the threat to Greece's interests from Turkey and make more of the Warsaw

13. *Current History*, West Europe, December, 1982, p. 431.

14. Ronald Steel, Andreas Papandreou is a one man Greek drama, NATO's Bad Boy. *The New Republic*, March 21, 1983, p. 21.

Fact threat. But with the PASOK government in office Greece attempts to redefine her security priorities.

Greeks of all political shades are convinced that, although the Turkish regime is incapable of offensive action, due to its present economic and social problems, it has nevertheless staked claims for future demand on Greek sovereign rights. Greece's current security concern is to safeguard her sovereign island territories. More than any other country in the region, Greek economy is dependent on sea. Half her population lives in three major Mediterranean ports—Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras—and most of their inhabitants are employed directly or indirectly in trades connected with the sea. So Greek concern over the welfare of the islands should not be underestimated.

Greek security is naturally in part defined by the state of her armed forces. It implies not only physical readiness but more importantly, the willingness of officers to confine their activities to the protection of the homeland. The seven years of military dictatorship caused serious damage to the capabilities of the Greek forces. The Greek Army now appears to be free from the problem associated with its recent history. Papandreou has tried to ward off the danger of a military coup by providing the army with weapons and benefits, wooing it with patriotic speeches and thrilling it with fiery denunciations of the Turks. He has also sought to control it by guarding the key portfolio of defence minister for himself. His balancing act is agile, but not without risks. There are still, right-wing elements in the military whom he should be cautious about.

Under the circumstances, Greece is bound to pursue a number of objectives to ensure both the independence of her national security from external constraints and a constant supply of military hardware. The latter objective is being pursued by improving the domestic arms industry and maintenance facilities. In parallel with expansion of domestic procurement, Greece has indicated to diversify her sources of military supply to avoid the foreign policy constraints imposed by reliance on a single source.

III

It is well over a year that Andreas Papandreou is in power. He won a sweeping victory after a promise of change in Greece. If the steps taken so far by him are weighed against his electoral commitments, it may appear that Papandreou's ambitions greatly outweigh Greece's means. This does not, however, imply that he has sacrificed much of his ideological commitments. The fact is that, generally, the programmes of political parties aspiring to seize power and rule the nation are laden with high hopes and commitments to people which are almost always idealistic in terms. But after coming to power one encounters realities which come into partial 'conflict' with the pronounced ideals. Papandreou faces constraints both at home and abroad. Although he brought about some overdue social changes, political stability and improvement in the socio-economic sector still remain the prime concern in domestic affairs. Papandreou knows that economic failure would soon bring the right back to power. And probably that is why he has engaged PASOK radical leaders in domestic sector. Greece is an EEC and NATO country, but the resentment of Greece lies in the fact that she contributes more to the Atlantic Alliance than she receives. The equation between the benefits and the liabilities is uneven to the disadvantage of Greece. Turkey, another NATO ally, is her prime security concern although paradoxical. Other NATO allies are not active in resolving the problem between the two contending NATO partners. All these facts make Greece diversify her policy matters and security consideration. Some elements of independence in foreign policy are already seen unlike his predecessors. Papandreou has made an opening with the Middle East and is making attempts to diversify his sources of military supply, but at the present stage Papandreou can not go the whole hog as was promised. On the other hand, he has to justify his voters' mandate. So he is left with the choice of making the best use of the given circumstances. Being within the framework of NATO and EEC, Greece has to keep on haggling, in the first place, for securing a resolution with Turkey. By cautious and measured

policy-steps Papandreou can perhaps make the west meet at least partially some of Greece's demands. Parallel to this by continuing with the flexible and pragmatic policy measures already adopted elsewhere including the East, Papandreou's Greece may hope to achieve the long-desired independent foreign policy. Coupled with domestic socio-political reforms such a foreign policy posture may at the least make a fruitful overture to the *Megali Allaghi*.