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THE USSR AND NON-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA : MINIMAL RETURN

It is generally believed that ideology exerts an influence on the formulation of foreign policy. According to McGowan and Shapiro ideology seems to be a more potent force in the formulation of policy than is national interest.¹ We should be aware, however, that ideology may be an important determinant in formulating general policy but it is less relevant to making decisions on specific foreign policy actions.²

In the conduct of inter-state relations certain principles, i.e., respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs etc., still remain fundamental. The Soviets view these rather differently. In the Leninist view, these principles cannot be achieved until the influence of "imperialist" powers and their allies has been eliminated.³ It is argued that Soviet leaders do not always decide foreign policy issues solely on the basis of ideology but "in Soviet foreign policy national interest and ideology have been inextricably fused since arguably, the era of Trotsky. To this extent the language of power shapes the exercise of power itself. Ideology, and therefore, national interest as Soviet leaders define it, requires that Soviet power and influence, avoiding direct confrontation, be projected into their world regions....."⁴ This particular theme of Soviet

1. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy : A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hills, California : Sage Publications, 1973), p. 126.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Les Buszynski, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia Since the Fall of Saigon", *Asian Survey*, vol. 21 no. 5 (May 1971), p. 537.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 537-538.

policy—referred to as “dominance without war” by Douglas Pike⁵—explains most of Soviet actions in Southeast Asia in the recent past.

III II

Many Soviet foreign policy experts assert that Southeast Asia holds minimal Soviet interests. But this may be changing now, especially after, the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea in late December, 1978 and the open conflict between China and Vietnam (February—March, 1979). Soviet Southeast Asian policy revolves around the attempt to curb Chinese influence in the region. As such the Soviets would like to influence if not dominate the countries bordering on China. Judging by Soviet activities in the region the following objectives apparently dominated Soviet policies toward the region until the end of the 1970s: “First, fill the vacuum left by the U.S. in Indochina. Second, reduce U.S. influence in the region, eliminating the U.S. military presence entirely if possible. Third, woo ASEAN nations (opposing ASEAN as an institution but without appearing to do so) with three levels of policy: (a) open door policy—i.e., ASEAN insulated from global power politics as a “zone of peace”; (b) increased ASEAN-USSR economic and political ties that it is hoped will tilt the region toward the USSR and away from China; (c) an ASEAN-USSR collective security arrangement, in effect a renovated SEATO aimed at containing China. Fourth, improve bilateral relations in the region, particularly with Indonesia. And fifth, increase Soviet naval/air/military presence; develop a base system in Indochina; and gain naval ascendancy in the Indian Ocean”.⁶ More specific current Soviet objectives appear to be: to intimidate Japan in its efforts to move into the region, particularly to block geopolitical and noneconomic moves; to discourage resurgent United States interest and involvement in Southeast Asia; to woo ASEAN nations and at least nullify their influences; to increase Soviet naval, air and military presence; and above all to neutralize China, isolating

5. Douglas Pike, “The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp”, *Asian Survey*, vol. 19 no 12 (December, 1979), p. 1160.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 1160-1161.

it militarily and psychologically.⁷ In addition the Soviets would like to establish Soviet image in the region as a Super Power.

III

The Soviet Union has used several instruments to enhance its influence in the region. These include political relationships, both government-to-government level and communist party-to-communist party level; economic assistance, trade and investment through joint ventures.

The Soviet Union since the end of the 1960s, has undertaken steps to expand its influence in the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia. Moscow set up diplomatic relations with Malaysia and Singapore in the latter part of 1960s. With this the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with all the countries of Southeast Asia except the Philippines. A breakthrough in this respect was finally achieved in May 1976, during President Marcos's trip to the Soviet Union and Moscow-Manila diplomatic ties were at last established.

The major instrument with which Moscow had attempted to increase its political influence and check Chinese influence in the area was the proposal for an Asian collective security arrangement. Proposed by Leonid Brezhnev during the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969. It appeared to be directed against China. The Soviets never defined it purposefully and called for its acceptance in the name of high principles. The USSR apparently "sought to take advantage of the impending American disengagement from Indochina and British withdrawal from the 'East of Suez', in an attempt to introduce a regional presence that would not be subject to explosions of nationalism in any one country".⁸ Precisely because of the concept's vagueness and its hostility toward China, no Asian country has lent open support to it.

7. Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia and the Super Powers : The Dust Settles", *Current History*, vol. 82 no. 483 (April 1982), p. 148.

8. Les Buszynski, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

Moscow has had weak communist party-to-communist party relations in the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia and admittedly its government-to-government level relations have been less than elsewhere in the world. The USSR does not seem to be interested in establishing leftist regimes in the region as these would serve China more than the USSR.⁹ The Soviet Union under Brezhnev did not view non-communist Southeast Asian governments as imminent recruits to the socialist bloc.¹⁰ Politically and economically, the non-communist Southeast Asian countries are oriented toward the Western world and Japan. Their largest trading partner is Japan and the U.S. is second.¹¹ All these countries are anti-communist, in terms of domestic policies yet while all like to regard themselves as non-aligned in foreign policy, four countries, i.e., Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore still retain some form of formal security connections with either the United States or Great Britain. Hence Soviet political goals in non-communist Southeast Asian countries are, as described by Sheldon W. Simon, both more modest and of greater direct security interest to the USSR—to enhance Soviet influence through increased trade, aid, and investment (joint ventures) while concomitantly expanding the Soviet naval presence and more port calls in Southeast Asia which demonstrate the capability of the USSR to create and protect its growing merchant marine activity.¹²

9. For details see Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam". in Robert H. Donaldson (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and the Third World: Successes and Failures*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1981), pp. 251-252.

Also see Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, Constraints", *Orbis*, (Spring 1981), p. 69

10. *Ibid.*

11. Charles Morrison and Austri Suhrke, "Asean in Regional Defence and Development", in Sudershan Chawla and Sardesai (Eds.) *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 192.

12. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, Constraints", *Orbis* (Spring 1981), p. 69.

The USSR has now stopped supporting spectacular aid projects like the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Instead the Soviets like to cast their aid and trade agreements in longer-range framework through bilateral economic commissions and motivating integration with Soviet and East European modes for development. In addition to economic factors like debt repayment, the acquisition of new markets and access to raw materials, Soviet leaders consider strategic factors like the degree of Chinese or Western interests in a specific country, its importance to Soviet security, or its ability to provide support facilities—including airports, harbours and sites for communication stations—for Soviet military activities.¹³

Soviet economic activities in the non-communist Southeast Asian countries appear to follow two patterns. On the one hand the Soviets are developing government-to-government level economic relations. On the other hand the USSR is also involved in commercial activities like shipping, trade, finance, and banking etc.

Overall, Soviet economic assistance to Southeast Asia ranked the lowest in its aid to Third World regions. Between 1954 and 1977, regional non-communist countries received only \$ 157 million out of a global aid total of \$ 15 billion.¹⁴ In this area of economic aid, Moscow has only won limited successes. Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, all have resisted substantial Soviet economic aid proposals. It is only in Indonesia that a significant Soviet economic aid programme has been undertaken. During the late 1950s and 1960s the Soviet Union assisted Indonesia by giving both economic

13. Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in the Third World", *Current History*, Vol. 81 no. 477 (October, 1981), p. 314. The Soviets, however, disagree with this point of view. As one Soviet commentator puts it, "The pivot of Soviet aid policy is assistance to the countries which appeal to the Soviet Union in making their industries and agriculture work, organizing economic management and developing their culture, health care and education." For details see Henry Trofimenko, "The Third World and U. S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet View", *Foreign Affairs* (Summer, 1981) p. 1033.

14. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, Constraints", *Orbis* (Spring 1981), p. 70.

and military aid. Soviet military aid provided to Indonesia proved to be instrumental in regaining Irian Jaya from the Dutch. However, ever since 1965 following the attempted coup in Indonesia, Soviet-Indonesian economic relations have remained strained. But during 1974-75 steps were taken to increase Soviet economic aid to Indonesia. In 1974 a Soviet-Indonesian economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed, and in 1975 the Soviets agreed to build two hydroelectric plants in Indonesia. Nevertheless, this cooperation has been limited as Soviet offers have not proven lenient enough or large enough to meet Indonesia's massive economic needs. The Suharto regime has thus continued to look primarily to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan for assistance.¹⁵

The activities of Moscow Narodny Bank in Singapore are worth mentioning. As Moscow's only financial institution in the region, this bank has become involved in a number of regional industrial investments. But these are modest in monetary terms compared with other banks. However, the Singapore government has tightened its surveillance of the bank because of its extension of loans for projects in Singapore in violation of its original intention to provide overseas or offshore loans.¹⁶ The USSR has successfully invested in shipping in the region. It set up joint shipping companies on a fifty-fifty basis with Thailand and Singapore. Recently the Philippines was added to this list. As these lines are not members of the Far East Freight Conference, these usually undercut normal freight rates.

The Soviets' attempts to increase trade with the non-communist Southeast Asian countries met with very limited success. Table I shows the low level of Soviet trade with Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union failed to develop the region's markets for its goods. There seems to be a number of reasons for this. The quality of Soviet

15. Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Union and Asian Security", in Sudershan Chawla and D. R. Sardesai, (Eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, (New York : Praeger, 1980), p. 81.
16. Jusuf Wanandi, "Politico-Security Dimensions of Southeast Asia", *Asian Survey* vol. 17 no. 8 (August, 1977), p. 773.

manufactured goods is generally lower than international standards, service arrangements are virtually nonexistent, and Moscow has not developed sensitivity to changes in consumer tastes.¹⁷

In recent years non-communist Southeast Asian countries have developed as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs because natural resources abound there. As the Soviet Union and its East European countries are now fully industrialized economies, they also have a strong demand for such industrial raw materials as natural rubber, tin, jute, cotton, wool, hides, and wide range of nongrain food items such as sugar, tea, coffee, and cocoa.¹⁸ But, as seen from Table II socialist countries have not yet constituted an important factor in the region's commodity market excepting one item—rubber—for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union purchases 97 percent of its required natural rubber and latex from Malaysia.¹⁹ In terms of volume, trade between the countries of ASEAN and the Soviet Union has been almost insignificant, and while it increased from \$ 134.1 million in 1971 to \$ 432.2 million in 1977, it represented a smaller share of total ASEAN trade in 1977 (0.7 percent) than it did in 1971 (0.9 percent).²⁰

IV

The leaders of the non-communist Southeast Asian countries view Hanoi first and then Peking, as the foreign capitals with which accommodation has to be sought to ensure the stability of international relations in Southeast Asia. Improved relations with the Soviet Union are welcomed by ASEAN countries primarily for balancing purposes against China; it is the passive weight rather than the active

17. Sheldon W. Sinmon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia : Interests, Goals, Constraints", *Orbis* (Spring 1982), p. 70.

18. John Wong, "Southeast Asia's Growing Trade Relations with Socialist Economies", *Asian Survey*, vol. 17 no. 4 (April, 1977) p. 333.

19. Thomas L. Wilborn, "The Soviet Union and ASEAN", in Robert H. Donaldson (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and the Third World : Successes and Failures*. (Boulder, Colorado : Westview. 1981), p. 274.

20. *Ibid.*

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influence of the Soviet Union that is being sought.²¹ By establishing relations with Peking, the ASEAN states sought (a) to demonstrate that regional security must be ASEAN's responsibility and (a) to acknowledge Peking's importance to, and legitimize interests in South-east Asian affairs.²²

Moscow has always been suspicious of development of regionalism in non-communist Southeast Asia. The USSR has been suspicious and sometimes critical of ASEAN since 1967 when it was set up. The Soviets fear that this organization could take up a western-influenced military character. Moscow preferred to suggest that ASEAN was designed as a "political" body, with the intent to transform it into a new SEATO or military alliance.²³ In mid-1978, however, Moscow endorsed ASEAN on the occasion of its 11th anniversary lauding its successes. The Soviets warily greeted ASEAN's 1971 proposal for making Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, preferring their own Asian collective security plan.

Rivalry within Southeast Asia between the two great communist states accelerated after the American withdrawal from Indochina in 1975. Beijing warned the countries of the region not to let the tiger (Soviet) in the back door while driving the wolf (U.S.) out the front.²⁴ For its part, Moscow warned Chinese efforts to capture Southeast Asian markets by using its oil to secure economic footholds in Thailand and the Philippines.²⁵ The Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia accelerated at a greater pace than ever before over two issues: The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Sino-Vietnamese

21. Arnold Horelick, "Soviet Policy Dilemmas in Asia". *Asian Survey*, vol. 17 no. 6 (June, 1977), p. 504.

22. Sheldon W. Simon, "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation", *Orbis* (Summer, 1978), p. 415.

23. Bernard K. Gordon, "Southeast Asia", in Kurt London (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and World Politics*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 180.

24. Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 58.

25. *Ibid.*

border clash. Soviet support of Vietnamese expansion into Kampuchea—funding the war there and backing the effort diplomatically at the United Nations—has driven Moscow's stock in Southeast Asia to its lowest level in more than a decade.²⁶ The Soviets did not endorse the UN Conference on Kampuchea and supported Indo-chinese communist states' call for regional conference.

In recent years the USSR has expanded its Pacific Fleet as is seen from tables III and IV. The deployment of the new ASW carrier *Minsk* and amphibious assault ship *Ivan Rogov* increased Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability and its overall power projection in the region. Submarines assigned to the fleet were also increased by 15 percent.²⁷ Despite its expansion, the Soviet Pacific Fleet possesses virtually no capability to project power ashore.²⁸

The governments of non-communist Southeast Asian countries have placed limits upon Soviet involvement in the region defined by the region's economic and military ties with the West, fear of provoking China, and natural suspicions of Soviet intentions.²⁹ Among the non-communist Southeast Asian countries Philippines has become a target of persistent Soviet attempts to influence. Filipino-Soviet trade picked up within a year of setting up formal diplomatic relations. In 1975 USSR's imports from the Philippines were \$ 17.1 million and Soviet exports to the Philippines were only \$ 600,000. In 1977, Soviet imports from the Philippines multiplied almost nine times, to \$ 144 million and exports quadrupled to \$ 2.4 million.³⁰ The Soviets signed an agreement with the Philippines for cultural cooperation during Mrs. Marcos's visit to the USSR during the summer of 1978. Under this agreement Philippine students are being offered scholarships.

26. Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia and the Super Powers: The Dust Settles", *Current History*, vol. 82 no. 483 (April, 1983), p. 147.

27. Richard H. Solomon, "East Asia and the Great Power Coalitions", *Foreign affairs* vol. 60 no. 3 (Special issue, 1982), p. 690.

28. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals and Constrains", *Orbis* (Spring 1981), p. 74.

29. Les Buszynski; *op. cit.*, p. 538.

30. Bernard K. Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

Soviet attempt to conclude a similar cultural agreement with Thailand was flatly rejected by the Thais. As recorded by Bernard K. Gordon, a Bangkok editorial amply reflected the Thai government's view :

The Soviet Union will remember that Russian Ballet troops have been here and a Thai classical dance troupe has visited the Soviet Union. Such cultural exchanges can take place without any necessity for an agreement..... Perhaps such an agreement will enable the Soviet Union to increase its personnel in the embassy, but we are not sure whether that is an advantage.³¹

The withdrawal of American military from Vietnam in 1975 signalled an increase in Soviet influence in the region. The Thai leaders had no alternative but to accept this, and requested the Americans to close down their bases in Thailand. Since 1975 the Thais have time and again demonstrated to the Vietnamese, by their relations with the Soviets, that they are not solely dependent on the U.S. or China. The Thais sought to get a Soviet assurance that the Vietnamese do not have any design on Thai territory. This Soviet assurance was received by Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan's March 1979 visit to Moscow.³² But within less than one year Vietnamese troops were on Thai soil making incursions across the border from Kampuchea, Earlier the Thais had made moves to send Khmer refugees back into Kampuchean territory. This decision was regarded by Vietnam and the Soviet Union as a provocation because it was perceived to be the reinforcement of the Khmer Rouge forces in Kampuchea.³³ It finally dawned on the Thai leaders that they could not rely on the Soviets to restrain the Vietnamese. Soviets watched with alarm as American arms began to arrive in Thailand as a response to these Vietnamese incursions.

The Soviets have tried to take advantage of Indonesia's suspicions of China's interests in Southeast Asia. This Indonesian image of China is largely based on alleged Chinese involvement in the

31. *Nation Review* (Bangkok) 1 September, 1978 Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 188.

32. Les Buszynski, op. cit., p. 542.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 545.

attempted coup of 1965. But it should be made clear that Indonesian desire to remove all great powers from the region conflicts with Soviet intentions in the region. Soviet economic aid programme in Indonesia suffered a setback in 1977 when Indonesian authorities rejected an offer of \$ 360 million to build an alumina plant on Bintan Island.³⁴

Like Indonesia, Malaysia also feels that a strong Indochina can be a buffer against China. Obviously, this is in direct conflict with the Thai and Singaporean views that it is only Vietnam which poses a threat to Southeast Asia. However, an open split has so far been avoided "by careful consultations prior to any bilateral negotiations with Soviet, Chinese or Vietnamese officials".³⁵ Malaysia is a multiracial nation with tense coexistence among the Malays and Chinese. The Malays dominating the Malaysian Foreign Office believe that a higher Soviet posture in Southeast Asia is not necessarily bad for Malaysia.³⁶ However, this had not led to any Malaysian break with its other ASEAN partners over the Kampuchean issue.

Among the noncommunist Southeast Asian countries perhaps no one is more hostile to the Soviet Union than Singapore. It's hostility intensified further following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Lee Kwan Yew on a number of occasions, proposed military co-operation between the United States, Japan and ASEAN. It was only due to Singapore's insistence and active role that a coalition government of the Kampuchean resistance groups was formed in 1982.

V

In conclusion, we may say that in general non-communist Southeast Asian countries have not responded favourably to repeated Soviet overtures made to them. The chief aim of Soviet thrust into Southeast Asia has always been in the past and probably will remain ideological, defined as national interests. The Soviets view Chinese

34. Thomas L. Wilborn, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

35. Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals and Constraints", *Orbis* (Spring 1981), p. 79.

36. Bernard K. Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

challenge in the region in ideological and geopolitical terms, and 'China syndrome' probably will continue to colour Soviet policies in the region. The leaders in Kremlin sought in vain to win over ASEAN to its position in the political struggle with China. Moscow has been dissatisfied with the ASEAN support for the coalition government of the Cambodian resistance groups led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Every major move made by the USSR in Southeast Asia is not an action but a reaction. Instead of pursuing a clearly defined policy the USSR chose to move according to unfolding events. This has led to reduce its activity thereby limiting its success.

The USSR's reactive approach to events in Southeast Asia has resulted in a considerable Soviet investment yielding only modest Soviet return. As Douglas Pike notes, "nothing seems to work very well for the USSR in Asia, and despite considerable input and energy over the years it has surprisingly little to show for its efforts."³⁷

Table I : Soviet trade with Selected Southeast Asian Countries, 1978 (US \$ Millions)

Country	Exports	Imports
Singapore	121.0	24.8
Malaysia*	137.0	12.0
Thailand	7.3	10.9
*1977		

Source : *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 7, 1979, p. 50.

37. Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam" in Robert H. Donaldson, *The Soviet Union in the Third World : Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1981), p. 252.

Table II : Import Demand of Socialist Countries for Commodities from Southeast Asia, 1974

	Imports by Socialist Countries	
	(US \$ 1,000)	(As % of World total)
Natural Rubber	655,681	24.8
Palm Oil	18,165	2.1
Tin (tons)	18,561	11.5
Coconut, Copra and Coconut oil	62,713	4.3
Spices (papper)	27,078	10.6
Rice	523,094	14.5
Sugar	1,541,914	16.2
Forest Prodcets	1,248,331	5.1

Source : John Wong, "Southeast Asia's growing Trade Relations with Socialist Economies", *Asian Survey*, vol. 17 no. 4 (April, 1977), p. 341.

Table III : Soviet Pacific Fleet Force Levels

	1968	1973	1978
	Number (Percentage)	Number (Percentage)	Number (Percentage)
Submarines ^a	100(27)	101(30)	113(32)
Major surface combat ships ^b	58(29)	58(27)	67(29)
Minor surface combat ships	n.a.	135(22)	113(22)
Amphibious ships ^c	n.a.	18(25)	18(22)
Mine warfare craft	n.a.	n.a.	110(25)
Auxiliary/ support ships ^d	n.a.	n.a.	225(29)

Source : Sheldon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security*, (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 126.

^aIncludes ballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack boats.

^bIncludes cruiser, destroyers, and frigates.

^cIncludes medium and tank-landing ships only

^dIncludes a wide variety of ships such as intelligence collection vessels, tug, icebreakers, rapairships, oilers, etc.

^ePercentage figures show percentage of total Soviet naval forces.

Table IV : Soviet Pacific Aircraft Inventory, 1978

	Number	Percentage ^c
Strike/bombers	95	23
Tactical support ^a	85	35
Antisubmarine warfare	115	32
Transport and training	60	21
Total	355	27

^aIncludes reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and tanker aircraft.

^bIncludes both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

^cPercentage figures show percentage of total Soviet naval forces.

Sources : Sheldon W. Simon, *The Asian States and Regional Security*,
(Stanford : Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 127.

ANNEXURE—4

Important Groups of PLO

Name	Founded	Political Orientation	Leader
1. Fatah	1957	Embraces a coalition of varying views from conservative to radical	Yasser Arafat
2. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	1967	Marxist-Leninist	Dr. George Habash
3. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (Gc)		Split from PFLP Pro-Syrian	Ahmed Jibril
4. Saiqa (Vanguard of the Popular Liberation war)	1967	Syrian backed	Samini Attari
5. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	1969	Split from PFLP Marxist	Naif Hawatmeh
6. Arab Liberation Front (ALF)		Iraqi backed	Abdel Rahim Ahmed
7. Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	1969	—	Samir Ghousha
8. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	1977	Split from PFLP-Gc	Talaat Yaqoub
"Black September"-		a hardcore group which draws its support from a variety of organizations.	
"Black June"-		the split from Fatah, the "Fatah Revolutionary Council" in Bagdad, and is headed by Abu Nidal"	
"The Rejectionist Front"-		consists of those who reject any settlement which recognises Israel.	

Source: *The Middle East and North Africa* 1982-83 Twenty-ninth edition, p. 93.