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A SELF-SCRUTINY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVE-MENT : THE AFRICAN MEMBERS' PERSPECTIVE

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Non-alignment in recent years has been gaining increasing relevance to the Third World countries in their struggle for economic emancipation and foreign policy making. Concomitant to its increasing importance and its significant growth, the Movement is also facing profound internal challenges. Such internal challenges range from failure to adhere to the principles of Non-alignmet on the part of some member countries to anomalous application of agreed principles and criteria and overall veering to one or the other power bloc by the Movement itself. Even though the recently held New Delhi Summit helped dispel much of the misgivings generated by the 1979 Havana Summit, the question of adherence to the principles and criteria of the Movement both by the individual member countries and the Movement itself remains a basic question. The popular clamour for self-scrutiny of the Movement raised in the post-Havana period, therefore, still retains its validity. But opinion differs as to the mode of self-scrutiny which range from restoration of pure and authentic Non -alignment to moderate and pragmatic view of accepting the shifts and changes as part of the very dynamics of the Movement. Without going into the debate as to which approach is realistic it may be observed that such macro-approaches to self-scrutiny of the Movement will lose sight of many more details essential for understanding of its dynamics. Under what circumstances do the Third World developing countries tend to violate the principles of Non-alignment ? To what extent are these violations unavoidable ? And to what extent do such violations affect the essence of the Movement ? These questions logically lead one to an objective and critical approach to No-alignment from the member countries' perspective. Such an approach also

provides an alternative framework of analysis of the Movement of Non-alignment.

The present paper takes the African member countries as a case in point. The authors have been guided by a number of considerations. As a continent. Africa has the maximum representation in the Nonaligned Body. Out of 52 countries. 51 are members of the Movement. Many African countrics like Algeria, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad and Namibia became members of the Movement even before their independence. It may be mentioned that among the 25 founding members of the Movement in 1961, 11 were African. The Organization of the African Unity has, in its Charter, among other things, the policy of "unreserved adherence to the positive policy of non-alignment."1 What, however, distinguishes the African countries from those in Asia and Latin America is that the process of decolonisation on the continent started much later and the vestiges of colonial past still haunt many of these countries. Apart from the rampant problems of famine, poverty, exploitation, racialism and appartheid, the very political and economic independence of many an African countries is somotimes threatened.

II. METHODOLOGY

The paper first constructs a profile of the African Non-aligned countries with the help of some indicators: (i) independence of the regime in power, (ii) foreign policy postures, (iii) adherence to the principles of the Non-alignment, (iv) military alliance or defence arrangements, (v) trade concentration and (vi) sources of aid. Scores have been given to each of the member countries on these indicators in ascending order of Non-alignment as reflected in the indicator. For example, with respect to independence of the regime in power, a regime backed by either Super power obtains zero, if backed by major or regional powers obtains.¹ The country obtains gradually higher scores if the regime in power just have only leaning toward

^{1.} See The Economist, 5 March 1983, p. 49

external power. Full score of 5 is obtained by the country whose regime is nationalistic as well as independent.

The second indicator is foreign policy postures where we have considered two factors : whether the country concerned is guided by any external power in its foreign policy making on the one hand and whether the country concerned pursues 'Non-alignment' as a principle or cornerstone of its foreign policy on the other. For the purpose of the article, the third variable e. g. adherence to the principles of nonalignment bears special significance for, it assesses whether the country has so far violated any of the principles of Non-alignment. Though to some extent overlapping with the third, the fourth indicator specifically points out whether the country has alliance or military arrangements with external power. The fifth and the sixth indi cators take care of trade direction and aid dependency respectively .-Trade direction looks into the trade concentration pattern on the assumption that trade concentration, particularly, imports trade in one country or few countries or one bloc necessarily puts economic constraints on Non-aligned behaviour. Similarly, the indicator of aid dependency considered whether the country concerned has high aid dependency and whether the aid flow originates from concentrated or diversified sources. Admitting that it is very difficult to follow a precoded structure to give scores to individual countries, we were always guided by the context and background of the facts that are known and visible at the surface. Extensive review of existing but scattered materials had to be made. Still, there might be scope of value judgements. It was often very difficult to keep up the scale of relative weight of indicators. But it is expected that the multi-variate framework would balance out over or under-weightage of a single indicator as happens with uni-dimensional approach. For example, the Nonaligned countries are often divided into radical, conservative and independent on their leaning toward Russia or China (radicals) tilt toward the West (conservatives) and adherence to the original purpose of the Movement (independent).² But such simplistic

2. See for detailed grouping of the member countries, Newsweek, 17 September 1979.

classification ignores other factors which determine the Non-aligned behaviour of a country.

The scores finally have been combined to obtain the total score of Non-alignment for the individual country. The details of the scores with the index have been given at Annex. 1. Once the profile of Non-aligned has been portayed the factors behind political, economic and security constaints have been highlighted.

III. PROFILE OF NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

This section briefly outlines the findings of the exercise as just indicated. It is upto the readers to make their own judgement as to which country is more or less Non-aligned than others. It may be seen from Table 1 that out of 51 African member countries, 41 countries accounting for 80 percent of the total scored above 15, of these 29 (56.9 percent) scored between 16-20 and 12 (23.5 percent) scored between 21-25 while no country scored above 25. Two countries, Algeria and Nigeria scored equal marks of 25. From this scroe pattern it may be inferred that bulk of the African countries tend to fulfil the principles or pre-requisites of the Nonalignment.

Score Class	No. of Countries	Percentage of Total
0-5	0	and the second second
6-10	2	3.9
10-15	8	15.7
16-20	- 29 .	56.9
21-25	12	23.5
26+	when and policity of	te contanto tendo
Total :	51 200	100.0
	0-5 6-10 10-15 16-20 21-25 26+	0-5 0 6-10 2 10-15 8 16-20 29 21-25 12 26+ 0

Tabie 1.	Distribution of	African Co	intries by (Combined S	Score on I	Non-alignment.
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Source: Annex. 1

While no member country in Africa obtained less than 5, 2 countries obtained scores between 6-10 (actual score 8 and 10) and 8

between 11-15. In one sense it may be said that about 10 countries (about one-fifth) fall below the modal class of 16-20.

It should be borne in mind that this is just a static picture and conceals the temporal developments which might have been more helpful to pass judgement about trends. In particular, attention should be drawn to the fact that many of the African countries entered into defence agreements or military arrangements on independence to ensure political existence or to meet the exigencies of the particular circumstances. However, as time passed, many such agreements are known to have fallen into abeyance or have lost their teeth.³ By any standard it may be said that the degree of independent behaviour and Non-aligned postures have increased over time. Also there have been attempts on the part of many African countries, particularly the nine African countries⁴ close to the appartheid regime to attain collective self-reliance in the form of regional co-operation.⁵

IV. CONSTRAINTS TO NON-ALIGNMENT

4. 1. Political Constraints

In identifying political constraints, our focus would be the independence of the regime in power. In one sense, it may be considered as a primary variable determining Non-aligned behaviour. From Annex 1, it may be seen that there is a direct correlation between total scores obtained by a country and score obtained on count of "independence of the regime in power." In all 12 countries obtained 2 or less on account of this indicator, which may be considered below the mark from our point of view. It may be observed that the dependency of the regimes of these countries fall into different categories, some are installed directly by foreign troops, some installed as well as sustained

^{3.} For details, See Talukder Maniruzzaman, Security of Small States in the Third World (Canberra : Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 1982).

^{4.} Anlgola Bostowana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

^{5.} See Enver Cavim (ed.) Africa Guide 1982 (Essex : World of Information, 1982) P. 7.

by external powers, while others have the backing and support-moral and material-from outside sources. Such support or blessing has to be distinguished from leaning or orientation of the regime itself toward external powers. In Africa as in other parts of the world, there are countries, whose governments might have leaning toward the East, or any other external powers. But at the same time they are independent and nationalistic for their existence and action. Yet in other cases, there are African countries where the regimes in power are fairly nationalistic, independent and feel reluctant to identify themselves with any external powers.

Much of this dependency results from domestic sources having their origin to the colonial legacy. The colonial rule, even the decolonisation process itself, did not allow growth of political institutions. What is more, in many cases, true independence was achieved at a much later date. Ethiopia, for example was independent, but part of the country was occupied by Italy during the World War II. Egypt got independence in 1922 but British troops were occupying the country until 1954. Libya's independence in 1951 was similarly considered to be nominal until the change-over of government in 1969. Because of this prolonged rule, political development remained highly rudimentary. Most of the countries consequently come to be ruled either by military dictatorship or by one party system. Out of 51 member countries in Africa, only 14 have multi-party system. For one, the military rulers have only very narrow domestic political constituency and therefore, they have to resort to violent repressive politics. And fully aware of the narrow domestic support base the regimes, in turn, looked toward external sources for support and sustenance. A very related obstacle is the tribal nature of the social structure of most of the African countries. The sharp tribal and ethnic cleavages make the people selfcentred. Struggle for and conflicts over, power is a common phenomenon in Africa. The civil war in Nigeria, Chad, Zaire and other countries are cases in point. For lack of tolerance and the spirit of accommodation, the dominant power groups sought helping hands from external sources to maintain their position. And thanks to the

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benign and benevolent attitude of the former colonial powers to the regimes in power, they got it stand-by.

The political orientation of many of the African countries also bears the mark of colonial past. Even after independence, many of the African political parties and leaders carried nostalgic legacy of the political parties of the colonizing countries like France, Spain and Portugal. The French Socialist Party, for example, still commands loyalty and formal relationship from amongst some African leaders.

For all practical purposes, what matters is the perceptions of the regimes in power : perception of themselves and perception of national interests. But it is very difficult to distinguish between the two. Seeking and obtaining external support for the long term interest of the nation is always justified and is not necessarily a negative point from the point of view of Non-alignment. But when such external inputs just sustain a minority group at the expense of national interests, there is no reason why such behaviour should not be called contrary to the principles of Non-alignment.

Thus it is the slow progress in the growth of political institutions and in national integration that contributed to widen the gap between the regimes and the general mass. Consequently, the regimes in power always looked outward for support and sustenance.

4. 2. Security Constraints

Military vulnerability of the African states have multi-facated features. The primary source of threat comes from the hostile neighbours not reconciled to the regime because of territorial, ethnic or other disputes. The second source of threats is the external powers seeking primarily their own economic and political gains. But in the final analysis the two sets of threats to security are related and interacting. There is hardly any country which is not affected by inter-country, bilateral and multi-lateral conflicts. The conflicts range from dislike toward a regime in power, provision of sanctuary to insurgents to territorial disputes. The Somalia-Ethiopian conflict in the Horn of Africa, the Chadian civil war, the Egypt-Libya and Sudan-Libya conficts and the Western Sahara issue, in North Africa, Uganda crisis in East Africa are examples where the conflicts did not confine to the initial contending parties but spread to other countries threatening stability of the region as a whole.

Another common source of the threats to security of the South African countries is the appartheid regime of South Africa. Apart from heavy physical and economic dependence on South Africa, bordering countries suffer from security threats the Pretoria regime. Persistent attack on Zambia, from the Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe by South Africa on this or that pretext is well known. The objective of Pretoria's millitary offensives included, among other, removal of the potential and perennial threat to her security and change of regimes. The aborted attempt of South Africa to change the Government in Seychelles in 1979 is an example of the latter motive. Such continued conflicts and regional sources of threats to security of the African member countries results in not only instability but also violation of the principles of Non-alignment. For one, such threat perception often compels the country concerned to invite external powers or regional countries for aiding in self-defence which again contains the potential seed of violation of the Non-aligned principles, This is a unique situation where external intervention is sought in the face of bilateral conflicts and sometimes in domestic crises. Such gestures provide ground for external intervention in African internal affairs. Secondly, existence of such threats to national security prompted the African countries to enter into bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements. Whether such defence arrangements can really bolster their security needs is always a question mark. But such arrangements certainly contain the seed of potential destabilisation. Thirdly, the external threats to African security is not promoted by internal causes above. In a bid to perpetuate economic

and political interests, the ex-colonial powers as well as other external powers, post military mites in different countries.

The number of troops in many African countries increased very rapidly in late sixties and early seventies as a result of growing influence of Western powers and the Soviet Union in the region. In 1980 the world armed forces was about 26 millions, of these about 1.5 million were in African countries, i.e. the armed forces populaion ratio was about 1;300.

In 1963 there were 17 air bases and naval bases of Western powers in the region. France had the target in tropical Africa in Senegal, Mauritania, Chad, Madagascar and other places. France had also special verbal arrangements with many African countries by which she could intervene in the internal affairs of those countries. Thus French troops intervened in internal affairs of Mali in 1960. in Togo and Ghana in 1962 and in Congo in 1963. Later on, France signed defence or military co-operation agreements, with Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali (now terminated) Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire. According to an agreement signed between France and Djibouti in 1977, the former has been permitted to station a number of troops there. On the basis of these agreements French troops participated in conflicts in valous African states such as in Central African Republic, Zaire, Chad and in Western Sahara. Other European powers had also significant influence in Africa, Britain had bases in Al-Addam and Tabreek in Libya until 1970. She had also bases in Freetown (Sierra-Leone), Kano (Nigeria), South Rodesia and South Africa. Britain still maintains overflying training and defence agreement with Kenya, though she has withdrawn troops from Tanzania.

USA also did not lag behind to exert her influnce in the region. As an outcome of the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, USA exerted her influence in the region by stationing her troops in Sinai under the banner of the Multinational Peace-keeping Forces. An agreement with Egypt signed in

1981 also enables USA to use the Egyptian bases. With the growing tensions in the North Africa over the crisis of Western Sahara, US increased its military position there giving continous military assistance to Morocco and other states of the region. In 1982 the US signed a defence agreement with Morocco under which arms supply to the latter has been stepped up. US has also mutual defence and assistance agreements with Ethiopia (1975), Ghana (1972) Mali (1912), Niger 1962), Senegal (1962), Zaire (1972) and Liberia (1972). However, most of them now may have fallen in abeyance. In 1980 US signed defence agreement with Kenya and similar agreement was signed with Somalia in 1982. Under these agreements US is allowed to use the base facilities in Mombasa and Mogadishu.

The Soviets and the Chinese are rather new comers in this region, Until 1970 Soviet Union had no military bases in Africa and had no formal defence agreements with the countries of the region. The Soviets first signed the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with Egypt in 1971 which was denounced by Egypt in 1976. Later on the signed similar agreements with Angola, Mozambique (1977) and Ethiopia (1978). Military aid has also been provided to Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia by USSR and her other allies, Cuba and GDR in particular. The Soviet Navy also uses the base facilities on Dahlak Island, Ethiopia, Very recently with the deterioration of US-Libyan relations the Soviets are trying to sign another defence pact with Libya. From 1974 to1978 the USSR was the main arms supplier to the African states (55% of total). Among the Soviet bloc countries East Germany has military advisers posted in many African countries. Hungary signed Friendship Treaties with Ethiopia and Mozambique in 1980. North Korea has a Treaty of Friendship with Togo signed in 1981.

China has military assistance agreements with Cameroon, Equitorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania and supplies arms to Mozambique and Zaire. According to a defence agreement with Egypt, China supplied arms and spare parts to Egypt in 1978-1979.

Belgium has a military co-operation agreement with Zaire and Spain maintains close links with Equitorial Guinea.

Country	French Troops	Cuban Troops
Algeria	98	Marine T. Y. Samera
Angola		21,000
Burundi	30	
Cameroon	90	And Children over 1
Chad	1,800	The second second second
Congo	10	300 -
Djibouti	4,500	
Equatorial Guinea		20-30
Ethiopia		12,000
Europa*	10	
Gabon	300	and the second second second
Gloriose Islands*	10	
Guinea		200-300
Guinea Bissau	Sterning on the state of	70
Ivory Coast	500	Section of the sector
Libya	25	100-125
Madagascar	50	30
Mauritania	100	30
Moyotte	2,000	A Contraction of the second
Morocco	2,000	A DAMES
Mozambique	200	
Niger	60	- 300
Reunion*	2,000	
Senegal	1,300	and the second and the second
Sierra-Leone	1,500	100-125
Tanzania		20-30
Togo	80	20-30
Tunisia	40	a careful a careful de s
Uganda	Currention and and the	20-30
Upper Volta	20	20-30
Zaire	70	- Contraction of the second
and have the second	13,595	34,160-34,340

Table 2 Presence of Foreign Troops in Africa

Source : Le Noavel Observateur, May 1978. *Islands in the Indian Ocean near Madgascar. So it is seen that most of the African countries either have direct military pacts/agreements or indirectly have military links with the major and Super Powers. Out of 51 countries only 8 have no formal military pacts/agreements with any power while 12 countries have either direct pact or allow base facilities to the Super Powers (Annex-1) which is obviously a source of threat to the security of the African states and tend to violate the principles of Non-alignment.

Most of the African countries have very weak and vulnerable defence systems. After independence, many of the countries, including those who are otherwise Non-aligned in foreign policy making, had to maintain political independence and territorial integrity with stationing foreign troops on their soil because of small and weak defence forecs.

Thus from above it turns out that it is the very weak defence force, rather fragile domestic base of many of the regimes compounded by threat perception that led the African countries to be militarily dependent on external sources.

4.3. Economic Constraints

Africa includes more than two-thirds of the least developed countries of the world, whose per capita income is less than \$ 370. Only 9 countries have the GNP per capita more than \$ 1000 (Annex-2). The economic backwardness of the African countries was not a new phenomenon and created in a day or two, rather is a legacy of colonial rule and exploitation. The colonial powers exploited the natural resources of the continent for their own economic interests and it is still continuing under various forms. The Multi-national Corporations are the real owners of the resources of the continent and the African states get only a very minor share of their own resources. In general Africa is very rich continent with a huge reserve of oil, gas, diamonds, copper, zinc, bauxite, phosphates, potash and iron. For example, Congo has the world's richest deposit of potash, Guinea possesses more than

50 percent of world's bauxite. Morocco is the third depositor of phosphates in the world. Namibia is the largest producer of diamond and gemstones and Zaire has more than 60 percent of world's cobalt reserve. Africa is also very rich in livestock, fisheries, timber and other commodities. Among the agricultural crops Africa is very rich in producing cotton, coffee, cocoa, tea, tobacco and groundnuts (Annex-2).

Inspite of having the rich natural resources, Africa still remains the poorest continent with heavy dependency on foreign aid. Except the traditional sectors of economy the African states were not able to develop other sectors of their economies. Most of these economies are not diversified. For example, 90 percent of total export earnings of Burundi comes from agriculture, while in Malawi agriculture accounts for over 94 percent of export earnings.⁶ While the main economic source of Djibouti is trade and income from the port.

Similarly many countries have to depend on only a few items for export earnings. For example, more than 60 percent of export earnings of five African countries come from oil while Libya's and Niger's dependence on oil is more than 90 percent. Raw cotton accounts for more than 50 percent of export earnings for Egypt, Chad and Sudan. By exporting coffee, Rwanda and Burundi receive 55 percent and 90 percent respectively of their total export earnings. Sao-Tome and Principie gets 80-90 percent of her export earnings from cocoa, while coffee and cocoa constitute more than 50 percent of Cameroon's external earnings. Zambia earns 83 percent of her external revenue by exporting copper, while groundnuts constitutes 70 percent of Gambia's total export earnings (Annex-2).

This sort of economic structure and export pattern will, in no way, help the African countries to achieve their economic independence and will always remain as a source of threat to their economic security. Because if for natural calamaties or for any other reasons

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Gus Liejbenow; Malawi's Search for Food Self-Sufficiency; Part-1 UFSI Reports, 1982, No. 30 p. 3.

the production of one particular item would be reduced or the price of it in international market would fall in then the economy of the producing country would be severely affected. For example, for the fall of price of cocoa and coffee in international market, the economies of Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principie and Uganda were seriously affected.

The trade concentration is also observed to be quite high for the African countries. For example, more than 40 percent of trade of 12 African countries are carried out with France. Trade of landlocked countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe is dominated by South Africa to a significant extent. Trade dependence, specially for import of Ethiopia and Angola on Soviet Union and other COMECON countries with when the former have special political relation, is quite high. Guinea Bissau has 50 percent trade with Portugal, while Spain is the main trade partner of Equatorial Guinea. Sao Tome and Principie has about 70 percent of its total volume of trade with Portugal and Holland. On the whole, the EEC countries are the main trade partners of the African states.

In case of aid, the dependecy is quite high and the donors in return expect economic and political dividend. France is giving aid to the African states and getting trade facilities, military facilities from them and also exerting significant influence on them. US aid is given to only those countries who can serve the US interests in the region. The Soviets and others have the same objective in offering aid to the people of this continent. South Africa is also giving aid maintaining trade linkage with the neighbouring countries for the same purpose. As a result, even if the African states strongly criticise South Africa's sinister policy toward Namibia, they are not always able to take any serious steps against her for their overwhelmingly economic dependency on South Africa. For example, in 1981, Robert Mugabe at the eve of his departure to Nairobi to attend the 18th Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the African states, said that his country would not

be in a position to participate in any sanctions against South Africa because more than 90 percent of Zimbabwe's trade passed in transit through South Africa and she is also a major trade partner of Zimbabwe.⁷

So the primitive structure of economy, dependency on particular items for trade, concentration of trade with particular countries and high aid dependency are considered to be the main economic constraints of the African countries in conducting their foreign policy in the real sense of Non-alignment.

In the face of these economic constraints the African states are trying to strengthen economic co-operation among themselves in various sectors by signing bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. Thus in 1976, 14 African states signed an agreement with France formally establishing an African Solidarity Fund to finance various development projects in Africa. In 1979, Zaire, Zambia and Angola signed a Trilateral Non-aggression Pact which also included a declaration on economic co-operation, particularly in the field of transport.⁸

At the same time the African states are fighting against the South African economic expansion and domination in the region. In 1979, nine African states closest to the apartheid regime of South Africa, met in Arusha (Tanzania) and formed the South African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) to work out the details of reduction of their economic dependence on South Africa. The main objective of (SADCC) was to co-ordinate policy of the member countries to increase trade within the region among the member states and build up network of roads and railways to meet the real needs of the people of the region.

The Zimbabwean Government also trying to reduce her dependence on South Africa. For example in 1981, Zimbabwe declared that she would transfer her oil dependence from South Africa

^{7.} Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1981, p. 31054

^{8.} Ibid, 1980, p. 30427

to Mozambique and for this purpose 180-mile pipe line was established, which would carry all refined diesel fuel and gasoline required by Zimbabwe and that aviation fuel, paraffin and other petroleum products would be brought by rail from Mozambique.

From what has been described above, it is evident that the African countries are overwhelmingly dependent on external sources not only for their political and military viability but also for economic sustenance despite the fact that many of the countries are rich in valuable mineral resources. Attempts to attain collective self-reliance have been undertaken. But tangible returns are yet to be obtained. Thus economic dependence put a serious hurdle to Non-aligned behaviour of the African countries.

V CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Non-alignment as a foreign policy posture has much of its origin and strength in the domestic sources of the countries concerned-their people, their political institutions, stage of economic development and economic policy stand, above all, own strength in term of self defence. One country may be more Non-aligned on one count than another. To what extent, however, each of the indicators would interact and affect one another, would depend on either or both of in what politico-economic milieu the country is located or/and how the country concerned can manipulate one against the other to produce the over all image the country commands in Non-alignment. The second factor should take and normally takes precedence over the former. Take the case of Djibouti which is militarily quite vulnerable and as such had to take help of French troops bolster her security in the face of Somali-Ethiopian conflict. But this did not bar her from taking a Non-aligned posture and playing on active role in mediating the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. On the other hand, there are countries which are just victims of circumstances and are trying to overcome those by playing a balancing game even if the outcomes may be intangible and invisible at the initial stage.

Having said this the question that arises is what would be the implications of the type of Non-aligned behaviour as we have seen on the Non-aligned Movement itself ? The answer is always compounded by subjectivity and value judgements. More so in the case of Non-alignment which has been, since its inception a very loose organization comprising diverse systems and forms of government and diverse peoples. But a little pondering would reveal that this very diversity and flexibility in organisation and course in fact adds to the strength of the Movement rather than weakening it. If the founding fathers of the Movement could conceive of the Non-align ment to be a flexible one in the dynamic sense of the term, there is no need for prescribing a path for it. The Movement itself will go its own path in the changing world context; the member countries while adhering to the overall goals and principles of the Movement will pursue their perceived national interest. Neither should infringe on self-development of each other.

SI. No.	Name of Country	Regime in Power	Score	Foreign Policy Postures	Scor	re Adherence to Nonaligned Principles	Score
1	2	3	4	5	6	1 7	8
1.	ALGERIA	—Independent —Liberal democratic	5	-Non-alignmer -Non-interfer -Suports liberation struggles.		-No violation -Dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara issue	4
2.	ANGOLA	-Pro-Moscow and Cuban backed	1	-Guided by Moscow and Cuba -Anti-apparthe Supports liberation struggles		-Permitted Cuban troops	2
3.	BENIN	—Marxist —Independent	4	-Independent by China leaning	ut 4	-No violation	4
4.	BOTSWANA	-Nationalist	4	-Independent by soft heart for South Africa	ut 2	-Passive support to appartheid and racism	1
5.	BURUNDI	—Independent —Left leaning	4	—Left-leaning	4 -	-No violation	4
6.	CAMEROON	—Independent		—Independent —Anti-South African —Anti-interventi in Chad		—No violation	4
7.		–Pro-West –Nationalist	3 -	-Independent		-No violation -Refused to sign ECOWAS sponsored defence pact	4
8.	CENTRAL - AFRICAN REPUBLIC	-Back ed by France		-Pro-West -Extreme depen- dence on France		French troops welcomed	2

ANNEXURE 1: PROFILE OF NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Military Alliance	Score	Trade Direction	Score	Aid Depen- dence	Score	Total Score
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
-None -Opposes military alliance	5 .	-Mainly West (EEC) but diversified.	4	50% of GDP (1980) Mainly West	2	25
-Friendship an Co-operation Treaty with USSR 1976 -18000-21000 cuban troops stationed	d 1 -	-Concen- trated -Cuba and USSR	2	High Cuba, USSR and also US & South Africa	3	<u>11</u>
-Military Co- operation Agr ment with France 1974	ee- 2	-France (30-40%) -China	3	—High France & Libya	2	<u>19</u>
-No alliance		-South Africa -Regional countries	3	—High —France	1	<u>16</u>
-Training assis- tance from Belgium		-E EC -Regional countries	2	-High France (100%)	1	18 —
-Military Assist Agreement with China and France 1974		France (40%) EEC (70%)	2	—High —EEC (70%)	2	21
-Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with Portugal 1975	d 3	-Ecowas -France other EFC countries	4	—High —Diver- sified	2	21
-French base at Bouar -1100 French troops	: 1	—EEC —France	3	—High —France	2	12

Annexure 1 contd.

B	H	SS	J	0	U	R	N	A	L

1 2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9. CHAD	-Backed alter- nately by Fran and Libya	1 ice	-Guided by France	1 .	–Invited French and Libyan troops	1
10. COMOROS ISLAND	-Mercenary backing for installation of the regime	1	-Islamic Solidarity -Economic and political dependent on France		—Franch troops and base facilities	3
11. CONGO	-Marxist Leninist but independent		-Balanced relation with West, USSR and China. -Non-alignment an neutrality		-Permitted cuban forces	3
12. DJIBOUTI	-Independent and nation- alistic	5	 —Independent and active non-aligned —Balancing betwee regional conflictin groups. 	n the	ing role	4
13. EGYPT	-Pro-West -Independent	4	-Influenced by USA	4	-Base and training faci- lities to RDF.	1
14. ETHIOPIA	—Pro-Moscow —Military regin	2 me	-Guided by Moscow and Cuba	2	-Permitted cuban troops and Soviet advisory to fight Somalia -Supports the Eritrians.	1

				- Indiana terretaria	1.000	S. St
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Military Co- operation Agreement with France	2	France and regional countries of UDEAC	2 6 6 6 7 7 7	-France and Libya -Libya paid civil servant salary	3	10
-French base in Mayotte and 400 Legion troops	2	Concentrated with regional UDEAC coun- tries	2	—High —France;	1	11 —
Friendship and Co-opera- tion Treaty with USSR Military aid ag- reement with France 3000 cuban troops in 1978	1	-France (50%) -Regional UDEAC countries	2	-Balanced Frnce, EEC and East Europeen countries	2	16
-Because of tense situation in the Horns, 3600 French troops for security and training	2	-France UK and Japan	3	-EEC, USA and Japan	1	20
-US basefacilities and defence asis- tance from USA	2	-West Europe and USA (18%)	3	-Mainly USA	2	16 —
-Treaty of Friend- ship and Co- operation with USSR 1978 -Base facilities to USSR(Dahlak Island) -Tripartite Allianace with Libya and South Yemen 1981.	1 T	-Observer in Comecon -50% oil from USSR -Concentrated in East bloc	1	-Mainly from USSR and Cuba		8

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1	11 2	3.	4	5	6	7	8
TT I	GUINEA	IAL —Backed by USSR(base extent) —Spain and France oriented	1	-Dictated by survival of the regime in power	2	 During fight- ing in Angola Farnado port was used by USSR Navy as base and rudder station. 	1
16.	GABON	-Backed by France	2	-Guided by France	2	 Sent troops to Benin 	1
17.	GAMBIA	-Backed by Senegal	2	-Independent -Confederation with Senegal	3	—Installed troops in Senegal	3
18.	GHANA	-Independent	5	—Independent	5	-Not violated	4
19.	GUINEA	-Independent	4	-Balanced and non-aligned	5	-Not violated	4
20.	GUINEA BISSAU	—Independent	4	-Independent	4	-Not violated -Refused to sign the West Afrcan defence pact 1981	4
21.	IVORY COAST	-Leaning towards West	3	Influenced by France	4	-Not violated	4
22.	KENYA	-Pro-West	2	-Influenced by USA	3	-Was involved in Ogaden war and signed pact with Ethiopia in 1978	2

9	10	11	12	13	14	15
-No pact but dependent on Moscow and Spain for survival of the regime	4	Spain	2	—High —Spain	2	12
-Military Co- operation Agree- ment with France, 1974	2	-France (40-50%)	3	—Moderate —France	4	14
-Mutual defence agreement with Senegal. -Presence of	3	-25% with UK -German, France, Italy	3	—IMF/EEC	4	18
cuban troops —Military Co-ope- ration Agreement with USA 1972	1	-EEC and regio- nal countries	3	—Less —Diversived	4	22
-Military Assis- tance Agreement with China -Limited cuban troops	2	-90% of foreign exchange ear- ning comes from bauxite -34% goes to EEC	1	—French, USA; EEC, Nigeria	4	20
-None	5	-Member of Lome Convention and ECOWAS -More than 50% trade with Portugal	3	-Diversified between East and West	3	23
-Military Co-ope- ration Agreement with France -Presence of limited French troops	2	-More than 35% trade with France -USA, German, Holland, Italy	3	-France, USA -Oil revenue high	4	<u>20</u>
US Naval and Air facilities and base at Mombasa Defence Agree- ments with USA and Britain	0	-About 40% trade with EEC UK about 20%	3	—USA —Britain	3	<u>13</u>

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 29. MAURITAINIAFlowestIndependentIndependent 30. MAURITIUSIndependent 5Independent 5Not violated 4 31. MOROCCOPro-West 3Influenced by 3Involved in 1 the crisis of Western Sahara,Sent troops to ZaireAttempts to change power in Mauri- 						State of the second second	NAPPIN
24. LIBERIA -Pro-West 2 -Influenced by 3 -Not violated 4 25. LIBYA Nationalist 5 Radical inde- independent 3 Interference in Chad and Uganda 1 26. MADAGASCAR Pro-East independent 3 Independent 4 4 26. MADAGASCAR Pro-East Independent 3 Independent 4 4 27. MALAWI Pro-West 3 Influenced by South Africa 2 Good relations 2 28. MALI Independent 5 Pro-West 4 Not violated 4 29. MAURITANIA Pro-West 4 Not violated 4 Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUS Independent 5 Not violated 4 4 Involved in the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire 1 1 31. MOROCCO Pro-West 3 Influenced by 3 Involved in the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire 1 Involved in the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire Involved in the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire 1	1	2 ·	31 4	5	6	7	8
24. LIBERIA -Pro-West 2 -Influenced by 3 -Not violated 4 25. LIBYA -Nationalist 5 -Radical inde- pendent 3 -Interference in 1 Chad and Uganda 1 26. MADAGASCAR -Pro-East Independent 3 -Independent 4 Not violated 4 27. MALAWI -Pro-West 3 -Influenced by South Africa 2 -Good relations 2 28. MALI Independent 5 -Pro-West Independent 4 -Not violated -Refrained from signing ECOWASS sponsoring defence pact in 1981 4 29. MAURITANIA -Pro-West Independent 4 -Not violated Independent 4 30. MAURITIUS -Independent 5 -Not violated Independent 4 31. MOROCCO -Pro-West 3 -Influenced by 3 Involved in USA and France 1 31. MOROCCO -Pro-West 3 Influenced by 3 Involved in USA and France 1	23.	LESOTHO	-Pro-West 2	and influ	ienced	-Not violated	-4
2.5. DBTR independent pendent Chad and Uganda independent independent 3 -Independent 4 26. MADAGASCAR Pro-East 3 Independent 4 Not violated 27. MALAWI Pro-West 3 Influenced by 2 Good relations 2 27. MALAWI Pro-West 3 Influenced by 2 Good relations 2 28. MALI Independent 5 Pro-West 4 Not violated 4 28. MALI Independent 5 Pro-West 4 Not violated 4 29. MAURITANIA Pro-West 4 Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUS Independent 5 Not violated 4 31. MOROCCO Pro-West 3 Independent 5 Involved in 1 31. MOROCCO Pro-West 3 Influenced by 3 Involved in 1 31. MOROCCO -Pro-West 3 Influenced by 3 Involved in 1 31. MOROCCO -Pro-West 3	24.	LIBERIA	-Pro-West 2	-Influenc		-Not violated	4
Independent 27. MALAWIPro-West 3Influenced by 2Good relations 2 South Africa 2 with racist regime of South Africa 4 Not violated 4 Refrained from spinse ECOWAS sponsoring defence pact in 1981 29. MAURITANIAPro-West 4Not violated 4 Independent 4Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUSIndependent 5Independent 5Not violated 4 31. MOROCCOPro-West 3Influenced by 3 USA and FranceNot violated 1 Independent 5 Independent 5 Independent 5 Independent 5 Independent 5 Independent 5 Not violated 4 Independent 5 Not violated 4 Not violat	25.	LIBYA		and the second second	and the second s		1
South Africa South Africa 28. MALIIndependent 5Pro-West Independent 4Not violated 4 -Refrained from signing ECOWAS sponsoring defence pact in 1981 29. MAURITANIAPro-West Independent 4Pro-West Independent 4Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUSIndependent 5Not violated 4 31. MOROCCOPro-West 3Influenced by 3 USA and France	26.	MADAGASCA	The second s	No Party reaction by the second second	endent 4	Not violated	4
28. MALI Independent 5 Pro-West Independent 4 Not violtated Refrained from signing ECOWAS sponsoring defence pact in 1981 4 29. MAURITANIA Pro-West Independent 4 Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUS Independent 5 Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUS Independent 5 Not violated 4 31. MOROCCO Pro-West 3 Influenced by 3 USA and France Involved in the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire 1 Attempts to change power in Mauri- Attempts to change Attempts to change Attempts to change	27.	MALAWI	-Pro-West			with racist	2
-IndependentRefrained from signing ECOWAS sponsoring defence pact in 1981 29. MAURITANIAPro-West 4Not violated 4 Independent 4Independent 4Not violated 4 30. MAURITIUSIndependent 5Not violated 4 31. MOROCCOPro-West 3Influenced by 3 USA and FranceInvolved in 1 the crisis of Western Sahara, Sent troops to Zaire Attempts to change power in Mauri-			1010-			South Africa	
 29. MAORITAMA — Independent — Independent	28.	MALI	-Independent	5 —Pro-V —Indep	West 4 bendent	-Refrained from signing ECOWAS sponsoring defence pact in	
31. MOROCCO —Pro-West 3 —Influenced by 3 —Involved in 1 USA and France the crisis of Western Sahara, -Sent troops to Zaire -Attempts to change power in Mauri-	29.	MAURITANI				4 —Not violated	4
USA and France the crisis of Western Sahara, —Sent troops to Zaire —Attempts to change power in Mauri-	30.	MAURITIUS	-Independnet	5 —Inder	pendent s	5 -Not violated	4
tania in 1979	31.	MOROCCO	-Pro-West			the crisis of Western Sahara, —Sent troops to Zaire —Attempts to char	ige

9	10	H	12	13	14	15
None	5	-South Africa main trading partner	3	-USA, UK	3	20
Mutual Defence	2	-24% of imports	3	-USA & EEC	4	18
greement with	-	from USA		Cont a 220		_
IS 1972		-Germany, Japan				
Friendship Treaty	= 1 -	-Diversified	4	-None	5	19
ith USSR		USA, Italy,		al second and		-
Arms supply from USSR		Britain, France and other EEC				
USSK		countries.				
Military Co-opera-	3	40% imports from	3	-Tied with	3	20
ion Agreement		France		France and		-
with France		-USA Germany		USA		
		Japan, Italy				
None	5	-Import 41% with	3	—High	3	18
The Blight	a vo	South Africa		-Tied with	-W	-
Zahk and		-Export 42% with	100	South Africa		
inge also		UK, Japan, German		and UK		
Ailitary Assis-	3	-France 30-40%	3	-World's 6th	2	21
ince Agreement		-German, Ivory Coast, Senegal		poorest country,		-
Lilitary Assis-		Japan, UK		-France USA.		
ince Agreement	8	が大学がない			34	
vith China Recently			ः नी मि	但是 國際 建筑		
lenounced).	-	manufer and the				
Military Assis-	3	-Diversified, mainly	4	-Debt 150% of	2	21
ance Agreement with France		EEC countries		GNP -France, Libya		1
and an article and				and other		
				Arab coun- tries		
UK responsible	1	-Diversified but	3	-UK	2	20
or defence		leaning to West				-
Has no defence force						
US base facilities	1	-France 26-27%	3	-High	2	13
Deferre Trucks	Ser th	-USA and other		-USA, France		2
Defence Treaty with US in 1982		EEC countries		and Saudi Arabia		
Permitted limited		A STATE AND A STATE				3.50
presence of French troops		Carles Parts				
riench noops						

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	The second second	144	Part of the Part o		and the second second
1 2	3 -1	4	* 5 Cł	6	7 8
	-Marxist-Leninis party -Pro-USSR and China	st 3	—Influenced by both China and USSR	3	-Presence of 4- limited cuban troops
33. NIGER	-Left bias but Independent	5	-Independent		-Not violated 3 Signatory of ECOWAS
	-Pro-West -Independent	4	—Independent	5	—Dispute with 3 Ghana
35. RWANDA	-Pro-West	3	—Influenced by West	3	-Disputes with 3 Zaire and Burundi
36. SAOTOME AND PRINCIPIE	-Marxist -Independent	4 -	-Independent	5	-Not violated 3
37. SENEGAL	-Moderate Islamic -Independent	and the second second	-Pro-West -Influenced by France	4	-Supports 4 Morocco in Saharan dispute -Anti Libyan -Sent troops to Gambia
38. SEYCHELES	—Socialist —Independent	4	-Independent	5	-Not violated 3

9	10	11	12	13	14	-15
-Friendship Treaty with Angola and Ethiopia -Treaty with USSR	3	Diversified South Africa, USA German, Por- tugal, Iraq, Italy, Japan	4	—High —Tied with major powers	2	11
-Military assis- tance from France -Involved in the conflict of Chad	3	 ECOWAS countries France (35-40%) Italy, Nigeria USA,UK, German 	3	—High —Diversified	2	<u>21</u>
-None	5	Imports 22% with UK Exports 42% with US German, Japan	2	—Nil	5	25 —
-None	5	—Diversified —USA, UK, Japan EEC.	4	-High -Tied with West -One of the poorest countries	1	20
-None	5	-Portugal and Holland (70%)	2	-High -Portugal	1	21
 Military Co-opera- tion Agreement with France 1979 Mutual Defence Agreement with Gambia —1300 French troops 	1	-France (40-50%) -EEC	3	-High -France	2	17
US sattelite tracing base Joins military exercise with US	1	-Diversified	3	-EEC -USA	3	19

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1 2	3	4	5	6	7 8
39. SIERRA-LEON	IE —Pro-West —Independent	4 -	-Influenced by France	3	-Not violated 3
40. SOMALIA	-Pro-West	4	-Influenced by US	3	—Involed in 4 war with Ethiopia in Ogaden
41. SUDAN	-Pro-West	4 -	-Influenced by US	3	-Involved in 3 Iraq-Iran War -Participant of Joint exercise with US RDF
	-Nationalist Independent	5	Leaning towards East	4	-Not violated 4
43. SWAZILAND	-Dependent on South Africa		-Influenced by South Africa	3	-Not violated 4
44. TANZANIA	-Socialist -Independent	5	-Pro-China -Independent		Has military con- 2 tingents in Zambia, Mozambique, Seychelles and Comoro Islands Conflict with Uganda
45. TOGO	-Pro-France -Independent	10	-Influenced by rance	3 -	-Plays significant role 4 in African affairs -Prime mover of ECOWAS
46. TUNISIA	Pro-West Independent	4	—Independent	5	-Not violated 4
47. UGANDA	—Supported by Tanzania	3	—Independent	5	-Involved in 2 regional conflicts

A CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER		Viel Sold Sold			Alaffin and the second	and the set
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
-None	3	-UK, France	3 .	-High	2	19
-Permitted cuban	1-1	USA		-Diversified	All the set	-
military experts					States -	
-US base facili-	1 .	-Italy, EEC	4 -	-High	2	17
ties in Mogadishu		USA		-USA and	S.C.L.M.A.N	-
-Defence agree-			E Di	Saudi	Alta Han	No.
ment with US 1982	2			Arabia		
-Military Co-ope-		-Diversified	4 -	-High	2	18
ration Agreement	Sector Sector	-40% export with		-USA and		118
with China 1982		EEC countries	ease in	Saudi		
-Arms assistance		-Italy, Japan,		Arabia		
from USA	13	Saudi Arabia, UK	<	1		
	and the	France, German			A Long	
-The national li-	3	-More than 50%	2	—High	2	20
beration move-		controlled by		-USSR and		_
ment is going on	0.11	South Africa	Taka A	other African	的用金币	\$ MIG
with the active		boutin r innou		States		
help of Angola and	1.17	and the second second		Diates		
USSR	Santo-			Martin Star		
-None	5	-Tied with	2	-Less and	4	19
-HOLE		South Africa	-	balanced	Electra Sunday	13
-Military Assis-	2	-Diversified	4	-70% of		19
tance Agree-	4	-German, UK,	4	budget	al a specie	13
ment with	一些	India, China,	405-	-West and	and the	P. MR.
China		Japan, USA,		China .		
Ciina		Italy	- Barria	Cuma		
THUR THUR WE	10 GT	Italy	- 164	1		
Start Barris Barris	and the			10 - C30H	ATA STATE	
-Military Co-ope-	2	-France 34%	3	-France and	3	19
ration Agree-		-UK, USA, Japan	S Mich	Arab States		-
ment with France		Holland, African	et its	shaffer sharestin	4日前市 4	
and the second		states		RESIDE FACTOR	and see . I	1 Alarta
-Strategic Co-ope-	2	-More than 60%	3	-High	2	20
ration Agree-	and the	with EEC,		-USA and	deterrition of the	1
ment with US		-Arab States	17.75	Arab States		and the second
(1981)	1 14	net big 199	-U-CALL	E Hore - with	1 × 4	
-Defence and	3	-EEC and African	3	-High	2	18
training arran-		states	and the	-UK		-
gement with UK		-Diversified	ou hru	and maintain and	ATT Capit	THE L
7-	Calco.	States and a set			AND	

1000		And an and a second	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	and the second sec	Call Contains		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
48.	UPPER VOLTA	Pro-West Independent	4	-Influenced by France	3 20	-Not violated	fani. Mail I
49.	ZAMBIA	-Independet	5	-Independent	5	-Not violated	
50.	ZAIRE	-Backed by France -Pro-West -Anti-Soviet	1	-Influenced by France and Belgium		-Disputed with Angola -Permitted foreig troops -Conflict in Shab province	The Longe
51.	ZIMBABWE	-Leaning toward East -Independent	4	-Independent	5 -	-Not violated	hanada Alanada Fizika Alanda

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(a) **Regime in Power**

1

Backed by either Super Powers

her astal

- Backed by major powers/regional powers Pro-Super Powers
- 2
- 3 Pro-major powers/regional powers
- Leaning to external powers but nationalistic in policies/action 4
- Independent 5

Foreign Policy (b)

- n
- Guided/dictated by Super Powers Guided/dictated by major powers/regional powers Dictated by geo-political factors/aid dependence 1
- 2 -
- 3 **Pro-Super Powers**
- Leaning to external powers but more or less independent 4
- **Truly Non-aligned** 5 -
- (c) Adherence to Non-aligned Principles
 - Involved in violation of Non-aligned Principles 0
 - 1 Permit/support in military intervention/support appartheid and racism
 - Interferfencs in internal affairs of others
 - 3 Acquisance to violation
 - 4 Strictly Non-aligned and no violation

	Color		the second s		13	3		Sector - Leader
	9	10	11 6	12	S 13 🚽		14	15
31	-Military Co-		-Diversified	4	-High but	10	3	21
	operation	2. 2.3	-EEC, USA and		balanced =		and and	
	Treaty with	12-	African States		XINER			
	France				and the second		-1	State -
-	-Arms supply	_ 4 1	Mainly UK and	3	-High		2	22
	from USSR	E	South Africa	E	-West		Pussel	
	E.S.S.	E	-USA, Japan	Ser The	自己·自己 20	10	No L	
			and EEC	- 3	同日日間		19	
	-Military Co-	2 .	-France, UK, USA	3	-High		3	14
	operation		Japan, Ivory	1970	-Belgium	-	1	
	Agreement with		Coast, German,		US, France			the sale
	Belgium and	No.	Belgium		2	E		1.1
	France	4	Deigrun		E E E	13	troit	A. A.
N.	and the second s	E	2 0 1		THE REAL		101 He	
1	-Presence of	Ö	0 0 0		E S S S O	1	5-	1 Sint
	Franch troops	A State		19		T		16 - Sel
20	-Overflying,	3 -	-Main trade	2	-High and		C-13 3	···· 57 21 :
	training and	-	partner South		balanced	17	23-17	
	defence agree-		Africa (about		and states in	1	T BL	1.月二月
100	ment with UK		30%)				42 31	
00	and the second s		and a second sec		Compandant States	1		

(d) Military Alliance

- 0 Belong to blocs/alliance with Super Powers
- 1 Foreign military base/presence of foreign troops or bilateral defence agreement with Super Powers
- 2 Defence agreement with major powers/limited base facilities for Super Powers

0

- 3 Defence Pact with regional powers/countries
- 4 Defence assistance from external powers
- 5 No alliance/base/troops

(c) Trade Direction

- 0
- Trade concentration with either Super Powers, Trade concentration above 75% with one bloc 1
 - Trade concentration between 50-75% Trade concentration between 30-50% Trade concentration between 25-30%
- 23
- 4
- 5 Trade diversified and balanced

(f) Aid Dependence

- 0 High and tied with either Super Powers
- High and tied to major powers 123
 - High but balanced between major powers
- High and tied to regional powers Less and tied to major powers
- 4
- 5 Nil

Sl. No.	Name of the country	Area Sq. km.	Population million (1980)	Year of indepen- dence	Year of joining NAM	GNP per capita (1980)	Political regime	Resources	Leading items of export
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 1	10
1.	Algeria	2,381,741	18.9	1962	1961	1,870	-One party	-Oil, gas, metal	-Oil and gas(58%)
2.	Angola	1,246,700	7.1	1976	1976	470	-Multiparty	A REAL PROPERTY AND	Oil (80%)
3.	Benin	112,622	3.2	1960	1964	310	-Military		Pum oil and
				P. 23		1. 夏夏	dictatorship	ton, cement	cotton (75%)
4.	Botswana	582,000	0.8	1966	1970	620	-Multiparty	-Diamonds, meat and meat pro- ducts	-Diamonds (60%)
5.	Burundi	27,834	4.1	1962	1964	200	-One party	-Coffee, cotton -Poor minerals	-Coffee (90%)
6.	Cameroon	474,000	8.4	1960	1964	670	-One party	-Oil, gas, bouxite	-Coffee, cocoa (More than 50%)
7.	Cape Verde Islands	4,033	0,4	1975	1976	350	-One party	-Fishing, small cargo fleet, mine- ral products	-Agricultural; Fish and fish products (54%)
.	Central Africa Republic		2.3	1960	1964	300	-One party	-Diamonds. coffee, timber	-Diamond, coffee and timber (more than 90%)
	Chad	1,284,000	4.5	1960	1964	120	-One party	-Oil, uranium -Other minerals expected	-Raw cotton (65%)
10.	Comoros Island	1,795	4.4	1975	1976	150	-One party	-No known minera resources; Econo- my entirely based on agriculture	

Annexure-2 Basic Ecate

*NAM : Non-aligned Movement.

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11.	Congo	342,000	1.6	1960	1964	900	-One party	-Worlds, richest de-	-Crude oil (58%)
30	建长的中门 为0	1013	all FF	定 (1)3	24, 1971		10	posit of potash	and the second second
10'	UN DRIVER	PHICE			132	1	OF CMart 14	-Agriculture is also de- veloped 35% to GDP	and the second in
12,	Djibouti	23,000	0.4	1977	1979	450	-Multiparty	-Fishing and	-Economy is totally
	No. 1 march	1.204-38	10	(3/2)		1	NE CONTRA	livestock	based on trade and in- come from the port.
13.	Egypt	1,001,449	39.8	1922	1955	580	-One party	-Phosphate, Iron	-Cotton (66%)
11	XIVALA	No. Carlo	1. 2. 1.	1.00		L'ASSAULT	al mar a so	ore, coal ,manganese	
14.	Equitorial	28,051	0.25	1968	1976	-	-One party	-Iron, copper	-Cocoa, coffee wood,
	Guinea	a- ava		14.1			ay an article	-Uranium may be present	Section of the section of
15.	Ethiopia	1,221,900	31.1	100 (* 4 10	1955	140	-Multiparty	-Gold, rock salt, copper	-Food and animals.
16.	Gabon	267,667	1.3	1960	1973	3,590	-One party	-Oil, manganese,	-Crude oil (70%)
	1100							uranium	
17.	Gambia	11,570	5.8	1965	1973	230	-Multiparty	-Deposit of gasoline	-Groundnuts (70%)
51	A Level and					- Wilde		and oil are expected	
18.	Ghana	238,305	11.7	1957	1961	420	-One party	-Gold, bauxite, manga-	-Cocoa, gold, mangea
	States 1		Train.	TA IN				nese, diamond oil and gas	nese. manager and
19.	Guinea	245,857	5.4	1958	Card a	290	-One party	-Bauxite (50%) of	-Alumina and bauxite
	TPINO		12	Part Sile		State of the	Arrest Contractor	world's deposit),	(90%)
	CERTIFICATION OF T	S. A.W.					Construction of the	Uranium, gold, iron	and and the second
		AND DESCRIPTION OF A DE						A DE CONTRACTOR OF A DE CONTRACTOR OF A DE CONTRACTOR OF A DE CONTRACTOR OF A DE CONTRACTOR A DE CONTRACTOR A D	A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL

* Was never under colonial rule. But from 1935 to 1941 was occupied by Italy.

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A SELF SCRUTINY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

1 ·	2	3	4	5	6	- 7	8	9	10
20.	Guinea-	36,125	3.2	1975	1976	160	-Military	-Poor	-Fish, mineral products
a	Bissau	TONER	and the second	120 2	And And		dictatorship	-Bauxite, salt	same chineses
21.	Ivory Coast	322,463	8.3	1960	1955	1,150	-One party	-Iron ore, diamonds	-Coffee cocoa and wood (more than60%)
22.	Kenya	582,646	15.9	1963	1964	420	-Multiparty	-Oil, gold, silver	-Coffee, tea and petro-
23.	Lesotho	30,355	1.3	1266	1961	420	-Multiparty	coal, uranium -Gem stones, dia- monds, uranium oil, coal.	lium products (60%) -Diamonds, timber
24.	Liberia	111,370	1.9	1847	1955	530	-One party	-Iron ore, diamonds	-Iron ore (50-60%)
25.	Libya	1,759,550	3.0	1957	1945	8,640	-Dictatorship	-Oil and gas	-Oil (more than 90%)
26.	Madagasear	587,041	8.7	1960	1973	350	-Multiparty	-Crude oil, cronite,	-Coffee, clovers and
385	T quitarial	28,051	0.24	16:20	一种种		Gulo htian.	graphite	vanilla (more than
27.	Malawi	118,485	6.1	1964	1964	230	-One party	-Very poor; Mainly agriculture	75%) -Tobacco (56), tea
28.	Mali	1,204,021	7.0	1960	1961	190	-One party	-Salt, tin, phosphate	(17%) -Cotton and cotton
19,	To Mpson	23,000	0.6	4634	96'31	3(÷0) ·	dolligarty -	-Diamonds, bauxite and uranium are also found	products (50%).
29.	Mauritania	1,118,700	1.5	1960	1964	440	-Multiparty	-Iron ore	-Iron ore (over 75%)
10.	Mauritious	1,974	1.0	1968	1973	650	-Multiparty	-Poor: Mainly agri- culture	-Sugar (66%), export processing zone(25%)
31.	Morocco	624,550	20.2	1956	1961	900	-Kingdom	-Phosphate (3rd in the world) coal,	-Minerals (over 35%)
								lead, manganese, uranium	State States

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20.2010
32.	Mozambique	783,030	12.1	1975	1976	230	-One party	-Coal, bauxite, copper and diamonds	-Cashew nuts (over 30%)
33.	Namibia	823,620	1.0		-	1,080	-Multiparty	-Diamonds (world's	-Meat and live
. 7	2.11°	HINE TO	4	1860	191	530 0	no han -	largest producer) uranium, iron	animals (50%) -Export figure of
	Zambia	77.410	1		toot		Our ner K	copper, zinc' ant i	diamonds are not disclosed.
34.	Niger	1,267,000	5.3	1960	1973	330	-One party	-Uranium (5th)	-Uranium (over
13:	status Adia	statisme of	AN.	in a	1311	nat .	ventilitare	Casserites coal, iron, oil.	65%)
35.	Nigeria	923,768	48.7	1960	1964	1,010	Multiparty	Oil, gas, coal, iron	-Oil (over 90%)
36.	Rwanda	26,388	4.9	1962	1979	100190	-Military dictatorship	-Poor Gas, and tin	-Coffee (over 55%)
37.	Sao Tome an Principie	der 1.03 e 1	0.8	1975	1979	310 500	-One party	-Poor Mainly agricul-	-Cocoa (80-90%)
38.	Senegal	197, 161	6.0	1960	1961	41 360	Multiparty	-Phosphate, iron ore, petrol	-Ground nuts (35%)
39.	Seychelles	288	0.1	1976	1976	1,068	-One party	-Poor -Tourism is the main sector of economy	-Copra (65%)
40.	Sierra-Leone	71, 740	3.4	1961	1964	1 230	-One party	-Diamond, bauxite,	-Diamonds (over 65%)
41.	Somalia	637,140	3.9	1969	1961	130	-One party	Rich Oil and uranium	-LivestOck 80%)
	5	31 1	4		0	S John	8	deposits are	Ter Ster State

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
42.	Sudan	2,505,813	18.3	1956	1955	340	-One party	-Precious metals, gold uranium, oil and copper are expected	-Cotton (over 40%)
43.	Swaziland	17,364	6.0	1968	1970	1,340	-One party	-Forest (largest in Africa), iron, asbestos coal	-Sugar, timber and asbestos (over 60%)
44·	Tanzania	939-361	18.7	1961	1964	280	-One party	-Gold, diamonds, salt, Coal, gas and oil are expected	-Cloves and cocu- nuts over 90%)
45.	Togo	56,000	2.5	1960	1964	410	-One party	-Phosphate (6th) Limes- tone, marble, oil	-Phosphate (over 40%) cocoa 25%)
46.	Tunisia	164,150	6.4	1956	1961	1,310	-One party	-Crude oil, chemicals and agricultural products	-Oil (45%)
47.	Uganda	243,411	12.6	19.62	1964	300	Multiparty	-Copper, iron and phos- phate are available -Main manufacturing sector	-Coffee, cotton, tea, copper
48.	Upper Volta	274,200	6.1	1960	1973	210	-Multiparty	-Manganese, limestone and phosphates are available but agricul- tural processing are prominant.	-Raw cotton nuts, live animals.
49.	Zambia	752,618	5.8	1964	1964	560	-One party	-Copper, cobalt, gold, silver, zince, coal	-Copper (83%)
50.	Zaire	2,344,932	28.3	1960	1961	220	-One party	-Copper, cobalt (60%) of world's reserve), diamonds, manganese, zinc, oil	-Minerals
51.	Zimbabwe	391,109	9.4	1980	1964	630	-Multiparty	-Asbestos, chrome, coal, gold	-Tobacco, asbestos and gold (about 50%)