

## SECURITY OF SMALL STATES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

*This article is the synthesis of two separate papers by Major General Abdul Mannaf and Chowdhury Mohammad Shamim presented earlier at a BISS Seminar on The Security of Small States in the Contemporary World.*

—Editor

Security is indivisible, it cannot be achieved piecemeal. A threat to security anywhere is a threat to security everywhere. To achieve security one must attempt it totally, for insecurity in a part will ultimately lead to the insecurity of the whole. Quite often analysts do not take pains to gain a comprehensive view of the *whole* security situation, but look at selective parts and give a distorted view of security. There is a tremendous need for objectivity in security thinking, to look at facts as they are without analysing them on the basis of personal preferences and interests.

Although the distinction between Great Powers and Small Powers was implicit in the political practice of earlier centuries, it was only raised into a formal principle during the struggle against Napoleon.<sup>1</sup> Under

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<sup>1</sup> One of the primary obligations of the Treaty of Chaumont, concluded in March 1814, was the promise to provide 60,000 men each for the next twenty years in the event of another French aggression. Those powers which were capable of fulfilling this obligation came to be known as Great Powers while the rest fell into the category of small powers.

the Old Political Order, the operating principle was clear : the Great Powers, in concert, were to decide; the Small Powers were to obey. However, by the first half of the 20th century the Old Order was crumbling. The end of the Second World War saw the rapid eradication of colonialism and there was a proliferation of newly emergent nations mostly in Africa and Asia; measured by a combination of such criteria as land area, size of productive population, total GNP, and level of military capabilities, the overwhelming majority of these new nations were small powers. This led to a structural change in the International Order. Previously in the Old Order while the small powers were less in number, in the New Political Order, the small powers came to constitute more than 70% of all the nation-states of the world. Furthermore, because of the Cold War the Great Powers were unable to act in concert. And because of the nuclear stalemate among the superpowers, the Third World became the hot spots around the world. Since the Second World War there has been a number of wars among regional powers in these turbulent peripheries of the international arena, especially in South and South-East Asia and Middle East. The potential for international conflict among third world powers is enormous; some of them can even embroil the superpowers in direct confrontation which would lead to a nuclear holocaust.

Thus, while in the old Order the small powers were neglected, in the New Order this is no longer possible. In the era of the Cold War both the superpowers sought

to increase their influence in the Third World courting the small powers. Gradually other power centers developed so that bipolarity gave way to multipolarity and we see a future trend of further diffusion of power in the international system. Thus the issue of security must be examined in the context of current realities. This paper proposes to discuss both the external and internal forces that affect the security of Small States.

## I

There are many external factors affecting the security of a Small State, and the importance of any one particular external factor would depend on the time period or the particular context in which the Small State finds itself.

The term Small States may be too broad for any analytical exercise. The chain of evolution and revolution of social and political thoughts which has started occurring from the end of the last century has given the Small States definite voice in the world politics to-day. The democratic nature of the organisation of World Bodies and Institutions do make provision for equal influence irrespective of the size and strength of states. The modern day analysts have categorized the states by their range of national and international interests, freedom of activity and military strength with the provision of mutual recognitions of such categorization. Thus we find that modern analysts have defined Small Power as "a state which recognizes that it can not

obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments and so; the small power's belief in its inability to rely on its own measure must also be recognized by the other states involved in the international politics". Obviously the Big Powers have greater range of interest, more freedom of activities and almost infinitely superior military strength. The national and international interests of the Big Powers have given rise to Big Power rivalry. Big Powers in their rivalry have been trying to assume greater influence through national actions in terms of military, economic and political build up. In the international scene the Big Powers have been trying to bring other states of the world, specially the Small States of strategic or political significance, under their direct or indirect influence. Very few small developing or underdeveloped states have managed to stay out of any Big Power rivalry in real sense.

The security and stability of Small States is thus constantly threatened by subtle or direct political, economic or military overtures by the Big Powers. In this context some of the Bigger Powers have found it expeditious and convenient to allow considerable freedom of action to Middle Ranging Powers with favourable leaning towards the Big Power in question. Thus we find that polarization has been attempted and are still being attempted through some of the Middle Ranging Powers.

*Absence of Conflict Between Great Powers—The Main Guarantee of Stability and Security of Small States:* The main guarantee of peace, stability and security of the Small States lies in the absence of conflict between the great powers. In any intense conflict or rivalry in Asia and Pacific regions between the four powers of the region i.e. United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan, the smaller states of South and South-East Asia will suffer as the great powers move and manoeuvre in the pursuit of major interests—to which South and South-East Asia is peripheral. Any conflict in the European regions between United States and Soviet Union or between the NATO and WARSAW countries, will definitely have considerable influence in Pacific and Indian Ocean region where Soviet Union and United States also play a dominant role. In the event of such conflicts the Middle Ranging powers may have the capability to weather-out the turmoil but are also likely to be tempted to take advantage of the world and regional confusion to bring into reality their aspiration of dominance over the neighbouring Small States.

*Effect of Unattended Conflict Between Small States:* Conflict amongst Small States or between Small States and middle ranging states of a region if unattended by the Great Powers may not affect the stability of the region as a whole in immediate sense but may force some of the smaller powers to seek definite alignment with one of the Great Powers. This will disturb the balance of power in the region and thus bring about chain reactions.

This aspect is of special significance for the Small States of South and South-East region.

*Effects of Economic, Political and Military Security of Big Power or Affluent Power on Small States' Security:* The well-being and security of Great Powers or Middle Ranging Powers may have direct influence on some of the smaller states of under-developed or developing world, however non-aligned or aligned they may be. The degree of influence will depend on the extent of economic dependance of the small power on the Great Power or on the States of the Super Power Bloc. The continued well-being and prosperity of the Big Powers will ensure continued or increased economic assistance to small underdeveloped states. In the eventuality of aid giving powers getting involved in conflicts with other powers, however geographically remote they may be from the aid receiving country, the aid or economic assistance is most likely to dry up. The discontinuing or significant reduction of the economic assistance on which probably the very stability of the small state depends will bring about serious economic imbalance in that state causing major upheaval in the economic and social order and probably ideology also. The resulting social, economic and ideological upheaval might make other power or states of the region apprehensive that such upheaval if not controlled will affect their own security. Thus a neighbouring stronger power or group of small powers may decide to intervene in the affairs of the state undergoing such convulsions. It might even give excuse to

some more powerful state to fulfill its expansionist ideas and hopes.

In the regional context of South Asia, Bangladesh could easily be a victim of such eventuality. External economic assistance is of vital importance to Bangladesh. The country today is in, what is economically called, a low level equilibrium trap. The major portion of the economic assistance to Bangladesh today is coming from the countries of NATO and WARSAW PACT. In the eventuality of any conflict in the European and Atlantic region, however controlled they may be, Bangladesh is going to be directly affected as the economic assistance from these countries is going to surely dry up—at least till such time the conflicts continue. The resultant economic and social upheaval is quite predictable, and the very existence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation might be then threatened.

Lure of comparatively much more economic assistance might make a smaller state depart from its regionally accepted ideological, economic and socio-religious order and adopt a new stance. Such departure again may make other countries or more powerful countries of the region apprehensive of the effect of such change in regional or individual nation context. Such apprehensive countries may possibly react in a manner detrimental to the security of the Small States in question.

The gap between rich and poor of the Third World countries has actually continued to widen. A Small State may be influenced by an offer or promise

of creation of new economic order through increased economic assistance or combination of economic assistance and adoption of a new socio-economic order of the preference of the Power offering such assistance. In other words economic assistance may be utilized to bring about ideological change or a new socio-economic order under controlled system. This again might upset the ideological balance of the region and might provoke the apprehensive nations to react in a manner detrimental to the security of the state undergoing such ideological and socio-economic change. Whereas such events are not uncommon in South American region, the possibilities are also not unlikely in the regions of South and South-East Asia.

The conflict between secular and non-secular beliefs have also elements of security imbalance in the context of Small States of a region where different beliefs exist amongst the nations of the region. A nation of a region may also have within itself different secular beliefs due to heterogeneous and divergent composition of its population. Thus we find that most of the nations of the South and South-East Asian regions are inclined to avoid clearly non-secular ideology. Lure of considerable economic assistance and the prospect of economic solvency may force a nation to accept an ideology based on religious faith alone which may not be acceptable to all her own population or by the other nations of the regions. Such regional ideological non-conformity may invite threats to the security and stability of the state from other nations of the region.

*Ideological Conflicts:* The inherent pitfalls of ideology based on socio-economic order and non-secular issues have made many small nations of the world strive to attain their own ideology of Nationalism. The ideology of socio-economic order on communist line however continues to play significant role amongst the underdeveloped states due to ever increasing gap between rich and poor in those states; Islamic ideology is also gaining strong influence in the regions of Middle East, South and South-East Asia. The rise of such ideologies is making the nations of non-communist socio-economic order or secularism more apprehensive. The resultant ideological conflicts in the region where such situation is prevalent is but natural. The danger of ideological conflicts escalating into civil war within a nation or a war between the nations of a region is now very much a reality.

Ideological conflicts usually leads to dominant states endeavouring to infiltrate their ideology into another state. The ideological infiltration may take shapes of insurgency operation. The aim of such ideological infiltration and insurgency operation is to weaken a government which will bring about loss of physical control so that the territory could be occupied and force used by the dominant states at a low risk. In the eventuality of success of such manoeuvre by any state, the balance of power in the regional sense will be affected. The possibility of such events are most likely in the regions of South and South-East Asia, Africa and South America. In the South-East Asian region

there is this possibility, even if at present it is most unlikely that the external powers may be tempted to intervene in the event of such ideological conflicts either directly or through proxies, or may be induced to take up dominant position in one country or group of countries. Under the present circumstance such intervention on the part of external power is most likely to be political and economical rather than military.

*Military Imbalance:* In the regional context the security of Small States may be affected by military imbalance as compared to other states of the region. Most of the Small States of the underdeveloped and developing regions are dependent on the super power or some of the middle ranging powers for their military hardware and technical knowhow. The military dependence has been effectively used by the Super Powers to exert pressure on military aid receiving states for furthering their own interest even at the cost of security of such Small States. Small States' dependence in the military field on any of the Super Powers is likely to make the security problems of the Small States more complicated and security measures more ineffective. To offset this grim possibility the Small States must reduce their dependence on super power or big power for their basic military hardware and knowhow. A sense of cooperation amongst the Small States in sharing of knowhow and making effort to obtain self sufficiency within themselves will be a very welcome and correct step.

## II

There are equally many internal factors affecting the security of a Small State. These factors are particularly significant when one realises that while a Small State has little power in influencing the external factors, it does retain to a greater extent the capability to decisively shape the scope, character and composition of the domestic factors.

*Nationalism & National Integration:* Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the world to-day. Nationalism has been variously defined; by Hans Kohn as "a state of mind, an act of consciousness"<sup>2</sup>; Carlton J.H. Hayes defined it as "a modern emotional fusion of...nationality and patriotism"<sup>3</sup>. Certain geopoliticians hold the view that an expansionist power would tend to enlarge its boundaries till it meets a barrier. In this missile age, nationalism more than any other natural barrier like a river or a mountain or harsh terrain can offer the most effective barrier against expansionism. Nationalism is a centripetal force that binds the nation together and keeps its territorial integrity and independence. It is therefore imperative that a Small State should with all vigour fuel the fires of nationalism in order to further its own security. The raising of national consciousness contributes to the growth of national integration. The contribution of national integration to the security of a small nation cannot be

2 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York : Macmillan, 1944) P-10.

3 C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays in Nationalism* (New York : Macmillan, 1926) P-6.

overemphasized especially since most of them are composed of heterogeneous groups, tribes and sub-nations and where primordial ties are strong. Failure in national integration can lead to secessionist movements and the sundering of the state's territorial integrity and security.

*Political Stability:* The scope and opportunity for Great Power interference tremendously increases when the domestic political scene of a Small State borders on chaos and anarchy. In the international sector, the nation's diplomats can negotiate from a position of strength when there is political stability at home. But often political stability can be a two-edged sword and can also lead to suppression and repression of the legitimate grievances of the people. This generally happens under dictatorial rule which does not ensure orderly change of government. Such political stability is actually a calm before a storm. In other words, such stability produces greater insecurity since the grievances are repressed, sowing the seeds of future anarchy and instability. To achieve security it is absolutely imperative for the Small State to create a viable political system which will ensure proper political participation. There is much truth in Bhutto's remark that "If a coup d'etat becomes a permanent part of the political infrastructure, it means the falling of the last petal of the last withered rose. It means the end".<sup>4</sup>

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4 Z.A. Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated* (New Delhi : Vikas, 1979) Inside Cover.

*Economic Stability* : Almost all the newly emergent Small States are underdeveloped. Their most pressing problems are economic in character. While the development of underdevelopment continued under colonial rule, the sovereign governments of the new nations suddenly found themselves faced with the task of reversing the process into the development of development. It is a truism to say that economic development can only be achieved in an atmosphere of economic stability. The campaign against poverty and illiteracy cannot be waged in an anarchic economic situation. The requirement for economic planning that takes into consideration the needs of the state as a whole and not just a particular elite cannot be overemphasised. Economic stability and political stability are two sides of the same coin; they reinforce each other. Likewise economic stability can also cut both ways. If proper economic participation and distribution is not ensured then the gap between the rich and the poor will increase, thereby causing frustration among the poorer classes. Such frustration is likely to generate aggression and unrest and lead to a breakdown of stability. To further its own security the Small State must ensure not only economic growth and development but also the just distribution of resources among all classes.

*Military Preparedness* ; In the final analysis the security of any nation depends upon the state of its military preparedness. It is a weapon that must be used only in the last resort after all other means of achieving secu-

rity has failed. Economic do-gooders as well as cynics and skeptics often scorn at the utility of striving towards optimum military preparedness. The argument generally given is that a Small State cannot afford a strong armed force, that it stymies the economic growth and development of the state. We hold the view that one must depend on oneself to maintain security and the necessity of being militarily prepared to defend the state against an aggressor is of paramount importance. By military preparedness we are not emphasizing the building up of a large defence force. It is the sum total of the quality of political and military leadership, the quality and quantity of the armed forces, and most important the will of the nation's populace to defend their homeland, their undying commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity and national independence. In the face of an adequate and optimum military capability an aggressor will think before it will attack a Small State. Military capability will act as a deterrent in a majority of issue-areas where the aggressor will rationally decide that the costs resulting from its aggression will be more than the benefits accruing from such a venture.

*Communication : The Use of the Psychological Dimension:* This is an age of communication. The press, radio, television and satellite are daily bombarding our minds with millions of words and images designed to influence our thinking and action. To achieve security the Small State cannot neglect this psychological dimension. It can be utilised in a myriad of ways. It can

be used to portray our national image to the world in a correct and favourable light, since how other nations view us greatly affects our security posture. Communication can play an important role in raising national consciousness, in countering parochialism and regionalism, in forging national unity and furthering the cause of national integration.

In the military field, it is imperative to communicate to the aggressor our desire to maintain our independence, our commitment to fight to the last if necessary, our willingness to make sacrifices, for otherwise military capability will lose its deterrent value. Many a times nations have entered into war based on miscalculations and misconceptions. Would the United States have escalated the war in Vietnam if they knew fully the Vietnamese total commitment to fight on despite such odds? Communication is the weapon by which the Small State can dispel any misconceptions or false ideas that an aggressor may have of achieving an easy victory. It is in the aggressor's interests also not to get bogged down in a costly or protracted war. The Small State must clearly communicate that any aggression will be costly for the aggressor with little benefits.

### III

To offset the various factors affecting the security of a Small State, a number of security options may be considered.

*Alliance and Non Alliance:* To align or not to align that is the dilemma being faced by many of the

Small States of the contemporary world. The Small and Middle Ranging States of the world are wary of any definite alignment and have subscribed to the non-aligned movement. In reality, however, the non-aligned movement itself can be termed as alliance of Third World countries in the political sense. The Small States' options available in this context are:-

- a. Alignment with one of the Big Power Bloc.
- b. Complete non-aligned and neutral posture.
- c. Regional Alliance among Small States of a Region.
- d. Regional Neutrality.

*Alliance Options :* Alliances are instruments of statecraft. The need for alliance is felt by any power when it feels that its resources and capabilities are inadequate for its political, economic or military security against any existing or imagined collective or individual power threat.

*Military and Political Alliance:* Alliances usually have both political and military aspects. A military alliance will essentially have a political alliance as a prerequisite. A political alliance may exist without military implications. Military alliance envisages an alliance as essentially an element in a war policy. Such alliance would be necessary for a nation to have deterrence and defence in strategic sense. Military alliance will act as deterrent by making the combined strength credible and also it facilitates combined defence if deterrence fails. On the other hand political alliance is valua-



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ble in terms of the diplomatic support it provides for a particular policy. Such political alliance may be aimed at gaining political support of both internal and external policies of a state. Such alliance will also be used by a state to master favourable world opinions and master big power opinions and thereby exert political and diplomatic pressure on any other state which might have political or ideological design detrimental to the security interest of the state in question.

*Alignment with Big Power Bloc:* In psychological term, alignment constitutes a serious derogation of independence and a loss of prestige and status. Small State Alliance with Super Power may imply loss of independence and flexibility, an increase of outside intervention in the affairs of a Small State. Despite the disadvantages some of the Small and Middle Ranging States have entered alliance with United States or Soviet Union or their great power allies. It can be presumed that such decision on the part of a Small State has been affected by the perception of an external threat of very high degree from a superior regional state or from Big Power who has interest in the strategic and economic value of the Small State.

Alliance of South Korea, Philippines and Japan with United States in the South-East Asian region has been out of apprehension of Chinese and Russian direct domination or domination through one of their staunch allies in the region. Such alliances today are seldom bilateral but usually are mixed and multilateral. Small  
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States, through such alliance with a great power, may enjoy the advantage of the fact that the likely adversaries will recognize that the small power has the ability to commit its ally, as the Big Power is not likely to accept the losses or setback on the part of its weaker partner. This can be of special significance if both the Small and the Big Powers have ideological affinity and have mutual fear of another Major Power. For Small States like Bangladesh it will be prudent to continue not to identify with ideology of any Big Power or Middle Ranging Emerging power blocs and have her own ideology of Nationalism based on friendship with all and enmity with none.

*Policy of Non-Alignment:* Some of the modern day analysts have described non-alignment as the most effective and useful political weapon available to a Small State to have advantageous relationship with Great Powers during the period of 'Cold War' or period preceding actual outbreak of hostility between the Great Powers. Non-alignment is viable for a small power only so long as it is not threatened by a Great Power or a Super Power. Once directly threatened it will be difficult for the Small State to avoid alignment with another Great Power. The Indian scholar, Mr. Rajkrishna, in his book *India and the Bomb*, has more or less defined the policy of non-alignment with all its underlying implications: "non-alignment has always been in reality an informal, un-stated, unilateral alignment with unnamed powers". It is not very difficult for us to guess that in case of any

direct threat from China, India is likely to activate the "unstated unilateral alignment" with powers like Soviet Union and other South-East Asian countries with anti-China stance. Any non-alignment devoid of any such provision is likely to have inherent security weakness, specially so for a small underdeveloped state desiring to follow independent policy.

Emerging Small States of the underdeveloped world find non-alignment psychologically, politically and economically attractive. Through adoption of the policy of non-alliance the recently freed nations find the policy of non-alignment an expression complementary to their independence struggle. In international poilitics the non-aligned Small States are likely to get more consensus of support and opinion if the ideology of the Small State concerned does not directly contradict the ideology of the Great Powers. While adopting a non-aligned policy it will be expeditious for a small nation to adopt that strain of ideology which will not cast doubts on its non-aligned stance. An underdeveloped state by being non-aligned can draw more wide spread economic aid benefit from other powers of any alignment. The Big Power may also find it expeditious to nurture such non-aligned state to maintain a balance of power in the region through non-commitment.

However it must be analysed by the Small States that the movement of non-alignment may have some of its own pitfalls. It might degenerate into another power bloc dominated by emerging great power or middle ranging power. The movement of non-align-

ment has attracted many small or middle ranging power of definite known alignment. This may be aimed at distorting the non-aligned image of the movement. Participation of a small underdeveloped state in such non-aligned movement with distorted image or confused principles may bring about serious re-thinking on the part of a major power who may doubt the non-aligned status of the movement itself. The controversy that has arisen on the selection of Havana as the venue for 1979 Non-Aligned Conference is one of the pointer to such possibility. Even China, an ardent supporter of non-aligned movement, has recently expressed that the movement is now getting Soviet bloc leaning. To have continued success the member countries of the movement must ensure that all such controversy including acceptance of membership of a nation with non-alignment are avoided, otherwise such confusion may bring about failure of such movements and super power rivalry will continue to dominate the world politics entirely. Bangladesh, with her economy considerably dependent on aids and assistance from some of the super powers, must steer herself clear of such controversy.

*Regional Alliance:* The Small States of a region following the policy of non-alignment can still opt for collective political, economic and military security measures with other Small States of a region to confront any threat of regional nature. Such alliance can be along the combination of natural or geographical locations and ideological affinity. Such alliance will be

mostly made to act as deterrent to any comparatively stronger power of different ideology indirectly backed by any of the Super Powers.

The effect of such political or economic alliance with or without the combination of military alliance, is likely to sufficiently impress upon any adversary the possible adverse consequences of any dominant overtures on her part. In the event of a greater risk taking capability on the part of the adversary the deterrence is likely to fail, and in case the alliance contains the military alliance also, it will increase the military defence potentials of the Small States of the alliance. Thus we find regional, political and economic alliances like ASEAN, OAS, and the Islamic Conference.

In the eventuality of such alliance forming into opposing military grouping of the Small States, such alliance will degenerate into arms race. As Small States are mostly dependant on Big Powers for armaments and technological knowhow, the Big Power's direct or indirect involvement will be unavoidable. In that eventuality such an alliance will loose its regional identity and must be ready to face the consequences of Big Power rivalry. Bangladesh with its current role in the world politics will do well to steer herself clear from such definite grouping and commitments without detaching herself from the regional security problems.

*Regional Neutrality:* The nations of regional neutrality does hold out more hope for security of the Small States in the regional basis. Such neutrality will

imply strategic and political neutrality in the global sense. Such neutrality can be attained only if the Small States of a region ensure that the strategic areas and resource in their own areas are not utilized by external powers. Thus we find as long as Philippines continues to allow the American use of Subic Bay and Clark Base, even under Philippine national control, the commitment of Philippines to regional neutrality is not likely to be accepted by the Soviet bloc.

Through such regional neutrality the complete benefit of economic discourse in a region can be taken by the Small States of the region irrespective of the difference in their ideology and political thinking. If Small States, especially the underdeveloped states, have to draw significant benefit from such regional neutrality, they must also adopt a tolerant and cooperative stance.

Small States of such regional neutrality even if not likely to be subjected to direct external threat, can be subjected to externally supported ideological infiltration, subversion or insurgency. In South-East Asian and South Asian region many such insurgency movements have now taken root with or without any external support. Such movement is likely to affect the neutrality of the region in case the insurgency movement gains significant stronghold. To maintain such neutrality the states of the region will have to resort to consultation and cooperation amongst themselves on external and internal political, economic and security problems. It may even be necessary for a Small State to accommodate such infiltrating ideologies as far as possible within the

scope of their own nationalism and sovereignty.

*Military Arrangement:* Another option that may be left to the Small States is to adopt a policy of bilateral or multilateral military arrangements as opposed to military alliance to offset her military deficiencies or handicaps. By now most of the Small States have realized that the notion of non-alignment or regional neutrality does hold out more hope for their individual or regional security. Whatever may be the policy that a Small State adopts, it must ensure that it achieves deterrence and defence against any potential collective or individual power threat. Small States of a region while resorting to collective security measure must steer clear of any definite military grouping or alliance, as it is likely to create opposing military groups in a region and fall into the traps of arms race and eventually become victims of super power rivalry. The Small States of a region may not only need to share each others resources of military hardware or technological knowhow, but also will have to depend considerably on the supply of military equipments and knowhow from outside power. The Small States of a region must offset this problem by military arrangement, as distinct from military alliance, amongst themselves to share technological knowhow, possible collaboration in the field of weapons and equipment as more economical way and thereby releasing much needed funds for their respective developmental sector in the long run. It is also possible for the Small States to have similar military arrangement

with outside power or Big Powers without any binding military alliance for obtaining military equipments, knowhow, sharing of intelligence etc. In the regional context, Bangladesh with her vast resources of manpower will do well to take initiative to attain regional self sufficiency in military technology, weapons and equipments through collaboration and cooperation with other Small States of the region. An underdeveloped Small State like Bangladesh must continue to maintain her neutrality; but the deterrence and defence potential must continue to be developed through such military arrangements till such time she achieves either individual self sufficiency or draws benefit from regional self sufficiency.

*Arms Control*: The world powers today realize that the option of arms control is one of the effective instruments available in any power rivalry for building and managing a mutual security order. In the global sense Big Power arms control measures will also have to be filtered down to regional level amongst the Small States of a region to have any meaningful security order both at global and regional level. The basic goals of Arms Control at regional level amongst the Small States may be:

- (1) Reducing the probability of security threats or apprehensions from each other.
- (2) Reducing damage and sufferings if physical conflict should occur.
- (3) Reducing obstacles to a quick and equitable end to a physical conflict.

- (4) Reducing costs and burdens of the arms competition.
- (5) Reducing the impact of military factor in the regional Small States politics and relations.

The arms race among the Small States is alarming. The arms build-up of a developing dominant state has forced under-developed weaker states of a region to increase its military expenditure at the most damaging cost of its national economic development. The nuclear race between India and Pakistan, arms race between states of South America, arms build-up in Indo-China will continue to threaten the security of the different regions and the security of the Small States of the regions. Small States of the region must adopt mutually acceptable arms control to ensure regional stability and security. The non-aligned movement and regional neutrality must have arms control as one of its principal instruments.

## CONCLUSION

Small Powers today have more influence and receive more attention than they ever had in the past. Being non-aligned, Small States are likely to exert more balanced influence and receive wider attention. Small States have realized that non-alignment, in sum, is a tactical principle designed to extract the widest range of advantages from particular kind of power configuration. Regional neutrality and cooperation within the framework of non-aligned movement does hold out more hopes for long lasting security and stability of the Small States of the region.

The Small States must utilize all possible options available which are complementary to non-alignment. They must adopt policies which support freedom of actions, regional neutrality, effective arms control measure, and most important of all ensure equitable sharing of world wealth. Without such measures neither neutrality nor any security measure will be meaningful or long lasting.