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## **NON-ALIGNMENT : NEED FOR A VALID DEFINITION**

In a widely circulated essay entitled *Non-alignment* Swaran Singh, India's External Affairs Minister, rebuked the critics of non-alignment in the following words : "Most of those who have reviled it i.e. non-alignment have not even troubled to define it for themselves".<sup>1</sup> Swaran may be right, but only if he adds that opponents cannot be really blamed as long as the proponents of non-alignment do not themselves take care to define it. This carelessness can give rise to criticisms which the proponents and practitioners of non-alignment consider to be unfair. A dramatic illustration of this appears in the writings of retired Indian diplomats who "were privileged to play some part in implementing our foreign policy in the years following our Independence."<sup>2</sup> These diplomats were habituated to doing many things in the name of non-alignment without ever bothering to define it. They continued this practice for such a long time from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru to the days of Indira Gandhi that they equated whatever they did

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1. Sardar Swaran Singh, *Non-alignment*, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, New Delhi, 1972, p. 1.
  2. The quotation is from P.N. Haksar's 'Non-alignment : Retrospect and Prospect', *Mainstream*, 26 May 1979, reproduced in *Strategic Digest*, July 1979, p. 411.

to non-alignment. Since there was no definition of non-alignment, when the 30-years reign of the Congress Party in New Delhi gave way to the Janata Party rule during 1977-79, the new Party too began to affirm that whatever they did conformed to non-alignment. The Janata Party went one step ahead by claiming to practise 'genuine' non-alignment—without again defining it. Consequently some retired diplomats, who practised non-alignment during the Congress rule, have considered it proper to criticise severely the Janata Party's brand of non-alignment, quietly forgetting that a similar criticism applied equally well to their brand of non-alignment. P.N. Haksar, for instance, complains that in the Janata Party brand "there is greater involvement with phrases than with meaning and substance."<sup>3</sup> T. N. Kaul, again, appears to be thoroughly allergic to the use of the word 'genuine.'<sup>4</sup> Kaul bitterly observes that "genuine only raises doubts in our own mind and that of others that perhaps we have not been 'genuine' in the past."<sup>5</sup>

Bitterness can be an ally of candour and Kaul makes some observations which indicate that criticisms and counter-criticisms of non-alignment rest not merely upon the absence of a definition but upon the much more important matter of relationship between non-alignment and real-politik. "The doctrine of 'genuine'

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3. Haksar, *Ibid.*, p. 426.

4. T. N. Kaul, *Diplomacy in Peace and War*, Delhi, Vikas, 1979, pp. 5-6, 236, 238-39.

5. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 239.

non-alignment seems to insinuate that India was more friendly to the USSR than to the USA previously and the new doctrinaires would now seem to want to 'redress the imbalance'.<sup>6</sup> "A mere show of 'genuine' non-alignment is not going to fool anyone. It is only a cover to hide a pro-Western stand and is not even 'neutrality'. What does it really mean? That we are not more friendly with the USSR than with China or the USA?"<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Kaul writes: "Why should a non-aligned country ignore its own interests and 'be equally friendly with two great powers—one of whom is friendly and the other hostile to her?'"<sup>8</sup> These comments by Kaul point to the root of criticisms and counter-criticisms about the practice of non-alignment: the practitioners can honestly take certain measures in defence of national interests and others can equally honestly notice in these measures the familiar exercises in real-politik. Certainly, a state has an incontestable right to engage in real-politik. Certainly, observers too can look upon some moves of real-politik to be pro-Western or pro-Soviet. In fact, in the same period, say, the Nehru era, a commentator can choose different criteria (e.g. the quantity of economic aid received from various sources, or voting behaviour in the U.N. on some issues) to depict India's foreign policy as pro-Western or pro-Soviet. A country's interests are diverse, and measures to promote these interests may

6. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 6.

7. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

8. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 6.

vary with time, may not be fully consistent with one another, and may not always conform to high moral principles. Consequently, a country like Pakistan, "America's most allied ally in Asia"<sup>9</sup> in the middle 1950s, succeeds in joining the 1979 conference of non-aligned countries in Havana as a full member. This provides an excellent example of the lack of definition of non-alignment, for, Pakistan's military pact with America (signed in 1954) does not stand abrogated. This also points to the fundamental query of whether non-alignment -- and alignment—merely represent different forms of (though not mutually exclusive) exercises in real-politik.

In order to answer this query we have to find out whether non-alignment, although undefined, stands for some aims which can differentiate it from alignment. We have also to find out whether a country, like India, proclaiming non-alignment, can demonstrate a steadfast intention and proved capacity to further those aims.

When we survey the writings of India's political leaders, viz. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, or of Indian diplomats, viz. Foreign Secretaries K.P.S. Menon, Subimal Dutt, and T.N. Kaul, we find frequent references to Nehru's speeches and repeated affirmations of the following aims: preservation of (a) political independence, (b) world peace, and (c) independence of opinion and action on

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9. Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan American Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, p. 195.

every issue.<sup>10</sup> As to (a) and (b), a country like Britain, which is an aligned country, can certainly claim that its membership of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) has not only safeguarded its political independence, but strengthened the cause of world peace by averting war and aggression. It may be quite pertinent for British policymakers to claim that the aims of alignment and non-alignment are identical in terms of preservation of political independence and world peace. As to (c), policymakers of a country will never concede that they have to sacrifice independence of judgement and action by adopting a policy of alignment. In 1956, Britain and France defied America when they launched an invasion of Egypt.<sup>11</sup> France struck a sharp posture of independence when it began to build an autonomous nuclear force in defiance of America.<sup>12</sup> In actuality, the degree of independence varies remarkably from case to case, and

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10. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 2 (speech broadcast on 7 September 1946), 38 (speech in Constituent Assembly, 8 March 1949), 48 (speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, 22 March 1949), 54 (speech in Parliament, 7 December 1950), 66-69 (speech in Lok Sabha, 25 February 1955), 71 (speech in Lok Sabha, 2 September 1957), 79-80 (speech in Lok Sabha, 9 December 1958). Indira Gandhi, *India and the World*, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 5-6. Swaran Singh, *Nonalignment*, pp. 1-2, 5. K.P.S. Menon, *Many Worlds*, Bombay, Pearl Book, 1971, p. 267. Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*, Calcutta, Minerva, 1977, pp. 22-23, 62. Haksar, *Strategic Digest*, July 1979, pp. 411-13. Kaul, *Diplomacy*, pp. -56.
  11. Hugh Thomas, *The Suez Affair*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, 1970, pp. 60-66, 101, 148-49.
  12. Albert Legault, *Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance*, Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966, pp. 76-80, 96.

no country, aligned or non-aligned, can enjoy absolute independence in any case.

Policymakers of any country, aligned or non-aligned, encounter a variety of pressures, internal and external, on every important issue. Responses of policymakers represent an accommodation of these pressures, and vary from case to case. Barring exceptions, these responses are exercises in real-politik, and the question of independence or impartiality may not necessarily be relevant. At any rate, supporters and opponents of a response can always find some evidence strengthening or vitiating the plea of independence or impartiality. Consequently, it may be nearly impossible to identify a response to an issue as specifically connoting non-alignment or alignment.

Take, for instance, the issue of anti-colonialism. India can certainly be proud of its record on this issue. But pressures of circumstances, honest differences in interpretations of high principles, and considerations of real-politik may lead any country—including India—to take certain steps which others may interpret as supportive of colonialism. Thus, in the early 1950s India permitted Britain to operate four depots in this country which supplied Gurkha recruits to the British army fighting a war in Malaya. Faced with the accusation of pro-colonialism, Prime Minister Nehru initially denied, and subsequently acknowledged, the existence of these depots.<sup>13</sup>

At the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries,

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13. *Crossroads* (Bombay), 3 August 1952, p. 8; 17 August 1952, pp. 8—9.

held from 5 to 12 June 1961, India opposed the participation of the Provisional Government of Algeria. Subsequently, India submitted to the majority opinion, and withdrew its opposition. Meanwhile, India was accused of lack of adequate sympathy for the anti-colonialist struggle in Africa.<sup>14</sup>

India welcomed the formation of Malaysia in 1963.<sup>15</sup> To India, this was a measure of decolonisation. But, to Indonesia, another stalwart among non-aligned states, this was subservience to British colonialism. In fact, this was an important matter of discord between India and Indonesia in those days.

As to the use of force for the purpose of decolonisation, Indonesia accused India of double standards. India used force in 1961 to liberate Goa from Portuguese domination. But India had been advising Indonesia to resort to peaceful methods for freeing West Irian from Dutch domination.<sup>16</sup>

Cuban troops have played an important part in the decolonisation of Angola. Although it is a matter of debate whether Cuba has played this part at its own initiative or on orders from Moscow,<sup>17</sup> there is little doubt that the Government of India and those Indians (including this author) who have the oppor-

14. Editorial, *The Statesman*, 17 June 1961.

15. India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. 21, 1963, Col. 6280.

16. India, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. 19, 1957, Cols. 2346-48, 2357-58. India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. 10, 1957, Col. 5880.

17. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, OFNS (Observer Foreign News Service) despatch in *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 30 May 1978. Haksar, *Strategic Digest*, July 1979, pp. 422-23.

tunity to think about these matters, have, in general, appreciated Cuba's part. Suppose, however, that tomorrow, in collaboration with a new protagonist of non-alignment, viz. Pakistan, Cuban forces land in Kashmir to fight for the national self-determination of Kashmiris, we will certainly hasten to revise our opinion about Cuba.

Eritreans deeply resented the colonial stranglehold of Ethiopia led by Emperor Haile Selassie. They received enormous aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union in their struggle for independence against Ethiopia. When a Government proclaiming socialist revolution replaced Haile Selassie's Government, Eritreans found Cuba and Russia switching their loyalty towards Ethiopia, which itself happens to be a non-aligned country.<sup>18</sup>

These are only a few illustrations to show that real-politik—a shifting amalgam of high principles and cold self-interest—governs some of the complex foreign policy moves of a country, be it Cuba or India. The phrase 'non-alignment' is thoroughly inadequate as an explanation of these moves.

Circumstances facing a non-aligned country may even be such that (leaving out exceptions) the country may find it difficult to express independent views on controversial issues—not to speak of independent actions. For years India was so dependent on America (for food or economic aid for the implementation of Five

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18. Ian Murray, despatch to *The Times* (London), reprinted in *The Statesman*, 29 May 1978.



Year Plans), and on Russia (for military-industrial technology or political support at the United Nations on the Kashmir issue), that it was hardly possible for India to express opinions freely on issues considered sensitive and vital by America or Russia. Thus, in 1956, Prime Minister Nehru refrained from condemning Russian intervention in Hungary. In 1958, he refrained from condemning American intervention in Lebanon. The explanations offered by Nehru are significant in terms of real-politik. In the case of Hungary, he did not want to say anything which might worsen the situation.<sup>19</sup> In the case of Lebanon, he affirmed: "Who are we to denounce? Who are we to hold forth the light to others? We have enough darkness in our own minds".<sup>20</sup>

In 1961, Nehru expressed a mild and oblique disapproval of American intervention in Cuba. This caused annoyance to America. Subsequently, Nehru adopted a view that must have removed this annoyance. Nehru said that he was not competent to pass any judgement on the rights and wrongs in the Cuban case, and that, according to available data, American citizens did not land in Cuba.<sup>21</sup> Nehru thus showed a realistic respect for the security concerns of a superpower. He had paid a similar respect to the security concerns of Russia in a speech on 30 April, 1955. He then spoke of India's refusal to accept the view of some participants

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19. *The Times*, 4 July 1975.

20. India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. 18, 1958, Col. 1661.

21. *The New York Times*, 26 April 1961. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, New York, Signet Books, 1970, p. 96.

at the Bandung Conference that Russia practised colonialism in East Europe.<sup>22</sup> The phrase 'hegemonism' was not in vogue in those days. But India did not criticise the fact of continuing Russian intervention in East Europe.

At this stage of our analysis we can point to one valid distinction between non-alignment and alignment. A non-aligned country is one which is not a member of the NATO or Warsaw Pact. But this distinction is not of much significance if one accepts the hypothesis that a non-aligned country can do, and has done, everything that an aligned country does in pursuit of real-politik—except that it does not enjoy the formal membership of a military alliance. Moreover, this distinction loses whatever little significance it otherwise has if one takes into account numerous ways of reaping the benefits, even without any formal membership, of a military alliance. Some examples may be noted below.

In course of the India-China conflict of 1962, India asked for and received military aid from such NATO countries as Britain and America. Officers and men flew in from America and took active part in some military operations along with Indians.<sup>23</sup> Indians began to plead for a 'military association' with America whereby the American Air Force would 'back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected.'<sup>24</sup> India wanted a 'tacit

22. Haksar, *Strategic Digest*, July 1979, p. 415. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 276.

23. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, pp. 388, 426.

24. Galbraith, *Ibid.*, p. 424.

air defence pact', 'semi-military pact', which would make America "contribute the planes: the Indians, the fields and ground support. The planes would come into the field in emergencies".<sup>25</sup> Nehru and his Foreign Secretary even thought of 'containment of the Chinese' by working "with the United States both politically and militarily in the rest of Asia".<sup>26</sup> Undoubtedly, the fear of America lining up with India was an important factor deterring China from advancing further into Indian territory and explaining an abrupt withdrawal by Chinese forces.<sup>27</sup> "And I am inclined to think" Galbraith satirises aptly, "they [the Chinese] took Nehru's talk about non-alignment seriously and were honestly surprised at the speed with which we reacted. If they move again, they must wonder what they will provoke and what will happen to their very long supply lines."<sup>28</sup> After all, "you cannot be non-aligned towards a threat of war to your own country", Nehru himself observed.<sup>29</sup>

By 1971, circumstances changed so much that India invoked Soviet military support as a deterrent to the threat of probable Sino-America intervention in the Bangladesh crisis. India took the initiative in signing a Treaty of Friendship and Peace with Russia. Russians "may have been a little surprised but they did not hesitate."<sup>30</sup> The Treaty, signed on 9 August 1971,

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25. Galbraith, *Ibid.*, pp. 438-39; also see p. 477.

26. Galbraith, *Ibid.*, p. 456.

27. Galbraith, *Ibid.*, pp. 425, 433

28. Galbraith, *Ibid.*, p. 444.

29. Quoted in Kaul, *Diplomacy*, p. 116.

30. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 196.

provided for 'immediate consultations' to remove a threat of attack upon either party. T.N. Kaul, the then Foreign Secretary, is understandably anxious to preserve the honour of the phrase "non-alignment", when he writes: "This was the sovereign right of any country and non-alignment did not mean we would not enter into consultations with others."<sup>31</sup> Kaul, however does not stick to the view of consultations counteracting threats when he adds: "The Treaty served as a warning to China and America to keep their hands off the subcontinent. Although China made some noises, she did not physically intervene; America was more audacious and sent its Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal hoping to frighten India and Bangladesh. It had the opposite effect. The Seventh Fleet would not dare to land in Bangladesh because they knew Soviet submarines were following them."<sup>32</sup> Indian military operations in Bangladesh succeeded too well to need any recounting. Benefits of the Treaty were obvious. India enjoyed them without formally entering into a military pact (like the Warsaw Pact). It was futile for Indira Gandhi to plead that the Indo-Soviet Treaty was not 'aimed against any country.'<sup>33</sup>

When this writer refers to the aforesaid Indian moves in 1969 and 1971, he does not try to comment on the adequacy of threat perception or the quality of crisis management in the Government of India, for, that

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31. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 195.

32. Kaul, *Ibid.*, p. 196.

33. Indira Gandhi, *India and the World*, p. 14.

is beyond the scope of this paper. What he intends to emphasise is that Indian policymakers were taking those moves in defence of the country's interest, and thus giving a priority to considerations of real-politik rather than to preserving the purity of an undefined (and possibly undefinable) phrase 'non-alignment'. It is instructive to recall that some passages in Nehru's vital speeches, enunciating non-alignment, endorse this priority, although Nehru's proteges in politics and administration have never indicated (in what they say or write) their acquaintance with those remarkable passages. As early as 4 December 1947, in a speech before the Constituent Assembly, Nehru observed:<sup>34</sup> "We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country." On 8 March 1948, in a speech at the Constituent Assembly, Nehru said:<sup>35</sup> "It is certainly true that our instructions to our delegates have always been to consider each question first in terms of India's interest and secondly on its merits—and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this power or that power, though, of course, it is perfectly natural that in our desire to have friend-

34. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 28.

35. Nehru, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

ship with other powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate them . . . I have come more and more to the conclusion that the less we interfere in international conflicts the better, unless, of course, our own interest is involved, for the simple reason that it is not in consonance with our dignity just to interfere without producing any effect. We should either be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all." In the same speech he added:<sup>36</sup> "It may be that sometimes we are forced to side with this power or that power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialist power—I do not mind saying that; in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils . . . I am not prepared to rule out the possibility of our subordinating our viewpoint in international conferences in order to gain something worthwhile. That is perfectly legitimate, and it is often done". In a speech before Parliament on 7 December 1950, Nehru affirmed:<sup>37</sup> "The most relevant fact at the moment is that there are some great nations in the world with concentrated power in their hands that influence all the other nations. That being so, there is a conflict between these powerful nations—an ideological conflict as well as a political conflict . . . Although there is a great deal of talk about ideologies, I doubt if they come into the picture at all except as weapons . . . I can only say that in every matter that comes up we have friendly consultations with a large number of countries . . . I

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36. Nehru, *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

37. Nehru, *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

am on my country's side and on nobody else's."

In a book published in 1979, T. N. Kaul, a Foreign Secretary under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, has repeatedly pleaded for preserving a tilt towards the Soviet Union in India's policy of non-alignment, because the Soviet Union has been a friend in need, and India is high on the list of Soviet foreign policy priorities (in contrast to the American list).<sup>38</sup> Kaul has thus expressed a preference for real-politik, which is reminiscent of Nehru. In a Lok Sabha speech of 12 June 1952, Nehru commented:<sup>39</sup> "It has repeatedly been said that we incline more and more towards the Anglo-American bloc ... That some people obsessed by passion and prejudice disapprove of our relations with the Anglo-American bloc is not sufficient reason for us to break any bond which is of advantage to us."

It is noteworthy how some other countries practise real-politik in the name of non-alignment. Especially, one should point to instances of nonaligned countries gaining the advantages of a military alliance without a formal membership of such blocs as the NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Vietnam and Cuba—all are non-aligned countries. Afghanistan has at present thousands of Russian military advisers engaged in direct combat by the side of Government troops fighting rebel forces. This has prompted China to call Afghanistan 'the 16th Republic of the Soviet Union.'<sup>40</sup>

38. Kaul, *Diplomacy*, pp. 6, 154, 239, 243.

39. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 59.

40. For some comments on the situation in Afghanistan, see Gavin Young, OFNS despatch, in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 21 October 1978; editorial, *Ibid.*, 1 April

Vietnam has stationed an estimated number of 1,000,000 soldiers in Kampuchea in order to prop up the Heng Samrin Government, whereas a treaty with the Soviet Union assures Vietnam of Soviet military support.<sup>41</sup> Cuba, which is excessively dependent on Russian economic subsidy, has a brigade of Russian troops on its soil, whereas a large number of Cuban soldiers are stationed in several African countries.<sup>42</sup> It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the rights and wrongs of the exceedingly complex military situations noted in this paragraph. But one can certainly stress that all these non-aligned countries—Afghanistan, Cuba, Kampuchea, Vietnam—are reaping the benefits of a military alliance without formally joining the blocs led by America and Russia. They are certainly entitled to safeguarding their national interests by means of real-politik, although they may thereby appear to reduce non-alignment to a rhetoric.

At the sixth summit conference of the non-aligned countries held in Havana in September 1979, even the rhetorical value of non-alignment was threatened with extinction. For, a number of states, under Cuban

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and 20 September 1979; editorials, *The Statesman*, 7 August, 18 September and 17 October 1979; Reuter report, *The Statesman*, 19 October 1979. As of mid-1980, there are 100,000 Russian troops in Afghanistan.

41. Mark Frankland, OFNS despatch, in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 25 January 1979. Denis Gray, AP despatch, *The Statesman*, 8 February 1979. Denis Gray, *Ibid.*, 20 March 1979.
42. W.W. Unna, *The Statesman*, 7 September 1979. Cuba reportedly receives a daily subsidy of 1 million dollars from Russia. This cannot but militate against the pursuit of an independent foreign policy by Cuba. See V.M. Nair, *The Statesman*, 13 October 1979.



leadership, made determined, even though unsuccessful, efforts towards identifying the non-aligned countries with the Soviet bloc. Cuba and its supporters looked upon the Soviet bloc as the natural allies of nonaligned countries. Others differed, and resisted the Cuban manoeuvres. The disarray of the doctrine of non-alignment was at its deepest. Proceedings at the conference revealed more of rivalries in real-politik than of unity about the meaning of non-alignment. Even on such matters as fixing up the list of speakers, giving them proper notice, arranging press conferences, and the reporting of conference proceedings by Cuba's official news agency, the host country, Cuba, grossly discriminated against countries which refused to push non-aligned countries towards the Soviet bloc.<sup>43</sup>

Non-aligned countries have long been suffering from a crisis of identity. Rhetorical outbursts cannot resolve this crisis. This is not unexpected in a situation where 94 countries, with a marked diversity in intentions and capabilities, proclaim non-alignment. Perhaps one can do nothing better than quote Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore at the end of this essay. At the fifth summit of the non-aligned countries held in Colombo in August 1976, Lee observed:<sup>44</sup> "The question I asked myself, as I read

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53. For some reports and comments on the Havana summit, See V. M. Nair, *The Statesman*, 9, 10 and 18 September 1979; editorial, *The Statesman*, 11 September 1979; New China News Agency report, in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 15 September 1979.

44. See William Borders, *The New York Times*, 22 August 1976. Also see Malcolm W. Browne, *Ibid.*, 20 August 1976.

through the draft resolutions submitted to this conference was : Who am I uniting with, and for what objectives and purposes, and against whom ?” This leads one easily to the hypothesis that a country can preach/practise non-alignment as long as it does not raise the fundamental question raised by Singapore at the fifth summit. Burma raised the same question much more sharply and purposefully at the sixth summit when it demanded the appointment of a committee to redefine the principles of non-alignment, and the qualifications for membership of the non-aligned. This legitimate demand was turned down. Burma left the non-aligned group.<sup>45</sup> ‘Nonalignment’ is still an overworked phrase in search of a meaningful definition.

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45. For some facts and comments, see *The Times of India*, 9 and 12 September 1979; editorial, *The Statesman*, 15 October 1979.