Abstract

The paper evaluates the background, rationale, and on-going drive of Japan’s strategic rise. Over and above its drive, Japan has American protection guaranteed. Japan is, though hamstrung between entrapment and abandonment, rising steadily as a reckonable strategic power. Self-Defense Force (SDF) can now be called a ‘normal military’, and its offensive capability, may still be limited, is being sharpened and beefed up gradually. Japan is showing signatures of its tilt towards collective self defense – to be seen different from UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations which is also on its card – apart from getting sufficiently ready to meet its own military compulsions. Such overtures are likely to have geopolitical fallouts for the region, at the least. There are enough contentious issues in the region to spawn polarizations and, thus, have their ramifications. The paper provides a framework of an emerging security scenario along with resultant alignments.

1. Introduction

1.1 Theoretical Framework in Outline

Power politics or geopolitics or political realism is the well ingrained reality that comes along since the dawn of human civilization. On the other hand, liberalism, idealism, altruism, dialogue, diplomacy etc are the desired end state when it relates to inter-state or inter-civilization relations. They definitely leave their marks. But oftentimes geopolitics rules the roost in deciding inter-state relations. Anarchic inter-state relations and imbalance in power distribution system, apart from inherent ‘nasty and brutish’ nature of the human beings as observed by Hobbes, propel the nation states to generally go all out in crafting viable and potent foreign and security policies oriented towards national interests. Commensurate to it, state develops its national power including military resources. According to Morgenthau, “The struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience”.1 Reinhold Niebuhr makes no bone in articulating that there is “no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will to power”.2 In this anarchic inter-state system, there is always the possibility of threat-to-use or misuse, at least perceived so, of power by some states; deduction may, therefore, be drawn: other states should have power. Relations between states are determined by their summation of power drawn mainly from military and economic resources.

2 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1933, p.42.
Palmer and Perkins, quoting E. H. Carr, comment, “military power is the end-state, last word, the final court of appeal”. “Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon but as a weapon, which it may require in the last resort to use”. Palmer and Perkins, like typical realists, think national power ultimately leads to military power; however, military power is the complex outcome of many powers. This would be elucidated later in the paper. To concretize further, Bertrand Russell says, in a somewhat crude manner, in his masterpiece *Power*, “Nothing but lack of military force limits the power of one state over another”. Military power is related to hard power; this, however, sidelines the concept of soft power. Putting hard and soft power together gives rise to the concept of smart power. The crux of the smart power is liberal (democratic) internationalism and it suggests for the use of multiple foreign policy tools to realize the end state. Employment of smart power is a better option to reach the desirable end state for a safer world.

Some analysts including Paul Kennedy argue that economic and technological development are the basis for creating hard power as well as other sources of power. Now, this notion of power should also be seen more in a relational context than as an attribute. Pecking order of states continually changes on which Paul Kennedy comments, “relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another.” Added to it, although the aim of geopolitics is to impose political predominance by having power in terms of human and material resources but what is also important is the geographical context within which that power is exercised. “The factors of location, space and distance between the interacting parties have been significant variables”.

Be that as it may, in the present geopolitical environment, power does not imply only military component, as already indicated, it is rather a mixture of

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capabilities derived from domestic, regional, and global wherewithal. In order to be a reckonable powerful state, it needs to have a strong economy, a shared historical past, a good technological base, a strongly bonded and patriotic citizenry, and an updated and potent military. Even the geostrategic location of a particular country can make difference in its power potentials and security as already highlighted. Rationalist concept of leadership concludes that "power capabilities" are the main determining factors of state choices. They include the concepts like hegemony, power geopolitics, and, to a lesser degree, the value of institutions. However, the focus continues to remain on material strength. But soft power should also not be ignored.

Power is related to national interests and that is the signpost. We always see statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power; and this is borne out by history. Hartman defines national interests, "as those things that states could or do seek to protect or achieve vis-à-vis other states". Again related to the concept of power is the concept of security which as Hartman outlines, "is the sum total of the vital national interests of the state" and it is for vital national interests a nation is prepared to go to war. "Each state has power problem and it is fundamental. The power problem is at the core of international relations." In extrapolating the broad terms like power, national interests and security, certain related terms like balance of power, deterrence, containment, bandwagoning, and alliance/alignment deserve a broad brush.

Balance of power, as Morgenthau says, "creates a precarious stability in the relations between the respective nations, a stability that is always in danger of being disturbed and, therefore is always in need of being restored". It is difficult to create stability in the power relations since it is always in a state of flux. Morgenthau further elucidates that independence of respective nations depend on the power of each individual nation to prevent the power of encroachment by other nations. Kenneth Waltz, a neorealist, concludes "if there is any distinctive political theory of international politics, balance-of-power is one." In the spectrum of balance-of-power a state may choose balancing or bandwagoning in order to determine its survival during war. Kissinger argues, "the balance of power serves to restrict the ability of states to dominate each other and to limit the scope of conflicts."

To cite relevant historical examples, China and Japan have been great powers and civilizations for many centuries. Until the 18th Century, China was stronger than Japan. In the late 19th Century, Japan was clearly stronger than China almost in all components of national power. So, the balance tilted

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towards Japan. China lost all the wars it fought including 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, when Taiwan fell to Japan. Now again in the 21st Century historical balance of power, seemingly, starts to reverse. And, therefore, the Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew justifiably warns America that it “risks losing global leadership as China rises militarily and economically” indicating the context of the Asia-Pacific. He provokes, “Who needs to be balanced?” He candidly answers, “Frankly speaking, the target is China.”

It is discernible that some Asia-Pacific countries want U.S. to balance China in the 21st Century.

Such a concept is associated with power politics and has historically explained the actions of the states in an insecure environment. In balance of power system, pretensions of the powerful member of the community are kept in check by a combination of others, in other words by the same operation of balance of power. Balancing game is an age-old concept. Its desirable end state is an ideal world. It sows distrusts, retards amicable and cooperative relations. It also disturbs regional stability and prosperity. R. J. Rummel provides a further insight into the concept as he says,

Wars begin in objective uncertainty over the balance of powers and in subjective certainty of success.... Wars will end if and only if a new balance of powers is determined. This determination is helped by opposing domestic interests, mutual expectations of outcomes, shift in military power, and ideological devaluation.\(^{12}\)

In the modern state-system, Hedley Bull feels balance of power has three positive functions. It has prevented the international system from being transformed by conquest into an empire. Secondly, in the regional context, smaller powers are being protected from being absorbed or gobbled up by the preponderant power. And thirdly, it creates conditions favorable to develop other institutions like diplomacy, war, international law and great power management. His analysis is seen to be perceptive. If we consider the third function, which is supposed to mitigate the general anarchy, war is seen as the central feature of the system. However, war as an instrument either restores or rearranges the balance. War, at times, becomes a necessity. There have been, however, exceptions to these assumptions even in the recent history. Key

ideas like action-reaction, challenge-response, revisionist/status quo and dissatisfied/satisfied are associated with the operation of the system.  

Containment is related to balancing. When balance gets disturbed, containment purports to maintain it by preventing a rising power from further expansion. George F. Kennan, an American diplomat is the main architect of the containment strategy. Kennan categorically insisted for a “policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of peaceful and stable world.” Kennan advised his government to “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s prescription to contain and wear down Soviet Union served well America’s Cold War strategy. Kennan considered containment against Soviet Union primarily as political suggesting above anything else the use of economic assistance and psychological warfare. However, Paul Nitze, who was Kennan’s successor in the National Security Council (NSC), interpreted Kennan’s call primarily in terms of military means to thwart Soviet threat. In 1950, a policy document (NSC 68) prepared by NSC and approved by President Truman called for drastic increase in U.S. defense budget. This policy turned out to be open ended applicable across the board. And America got sucked in every nook and corner of the world.

The concept of containment in respect of Soviet Union, which while expanding global communist movement, at times, leading to “regime change” in collaboration with the fellow local communist organizations, entailed discouraging “local communist forces, deterring direct use of force, and balancing Soviet efforts to gain influence through arms supplies and aid.” The concept of containment spawned the American policy of supporting any dictatorship if it were anti-communist. It also created a dangerous situation which placed the world on the brink of nuclear holocaust. As a recent case, America initially started with containment strategy against Iraq but it was overturned by the neo-cons by going into open hostility. This has not brought

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about desirable consequences for the region and the world. To see things in a softer and defensive mode is the concept of deterrence.

Deterrence puts a check on the potential aggressor to the venture that the costs of his aggression may outweigh the gains he makes. It is, therefore, seen as “politically meaningful, militarily reasonable and morally justified”. It also entails credible and potent armed forces and the will to use them in case of a contingency. It must be credible and it should be so perceived by the adversary. Deterrence is both a psychological and military concept. Deterrence and defense may be conceptually different but they are inextricably linked. They are, in fact, the two sides of the same coin. Where the effectiveness of deterrence ends, defense then takes over. Deterrence is an age-old concept of power-politics or geopolitics among nation-states. However, it has acquired a fundamentally new dimension with the advent of nuclear weapons. There is a dilemma as to which deterrence is more effective: conventional or nuclear? In a geopolitical setting a relatively weaker conventional power may be able to deter a stronger power if it goes nuclear. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) concept, which was in vogue during the Cold War between U.S. and Soviet Union, comes back into similar kind of operation even between relatively smaller nuclear armed powers. Pakistan, India, Iran, Israel, and North Korea could be the cases in point. However, it can also be argued that mere possession of nuclear weapons, as is the trend with these states, is not a sufficient deterrent. It is not a cost-effective option since it has to have different other related systems and facilities which ultimately make it exorbitantly expensive when considered especially in the context of counter retaliation. This may then turn out to be counterproductive.

Deterrence strategy may, at times, give rise to miscalculation. It so happened during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel took it for granted that given its overwhelming military superiority, no Egyptian or Syrian attack would be forthcoming. It proved wrong since President Sadat had to go to war in order to create leverage to negotiate peace. In the process, Syria was also drawn in the fray. This strategy may even give rise to action-reaction cycle which is covered in the next paragraph. North Korea’s nuclear blackmail tends to make South Korea feel threatened. America, as such, provides assurance to South Korea by providing ‘Extended Deterrence’ that consists of the “U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforcement of conventional forces on the Korean peninsula and enhancement of overall war capabilities, and it also includes the missile defense programs.” Nuclear deterrence is still considered as a strategic deterrence although MAD as a deterrence concept for the entire world, when taken as a single entity, may appear redundant.
Action-reaction cycle stimulates the actors, in a reactive mode, to respond to what the other is doing. State A reacts to State B’s military capability by increasing its own expenditure. The process leads to a chain reaction. It gives rise to arms race. Action-reaction ideas may also be applied to decision-making in international relations. If one power deploys a ballistic missile defense (BMD), to protect its assets, the other power, as a reaction, in all likelihood, will deploy multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), with more penetrability and refinement.

In June 2006, U.S. and South Korea conducted the largest military exercise after the Vietnam War in the Pacific with 22,000 soldiers and three aircraft carriers. As a reaction, North Korea, in July the same year, test fired seven ballistic missiles, including the medium-range Nodong. This creates a vicious cycle with no end in sight. If both sides continue to respond to latest action of the other, as if there was no precipitant, then the cycle may spin into a war. Action-reaction cycle generally gives rise to more sophistication, penetrability and refinement as highlighted. In the cycle, as Barry Buzan observes, a scenario is developing where,

States will arm themselves either to seek security against the threats posed by others or to increase their power to achieve political objectives against the interests of others......Anarchy at the level of the international system is, therefore, a form of political relations that tends to produce military competition among states along action-reaction lines. Power struggles usually reflect an attempt by one or more states to increase their influence and control in the international system at the expense of others already well entrenched.

An alliance could be a formal agreement between two or more actors to meet the consequences of common perceived threats. An alliance strategy gives rise to deterrence or a defense pact may operate in the event of a war. Generally by joining an alliance some or all may be precluded from joining other alliances. Allies may also support each other in the conduct of their foreign policies. An alliance formed to deter a common threat is likely to dither when practically that threat diminishes. However, if a newer threat emerges that impacts all or some of them, the alliance then reorients or reasserts. Joint military activities, staff planning, and weapons procurement may come under the rubric of alliance-strategy. The strategy is a key variable

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17 Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, op. cit., p.4.
19 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, op.cit., p.15.
in ensuring balance of power. Waltz has suggested in the dynamic of balance of power that it would be desirable for states to ‘bandwagon’ behind a putative victor rather than against it.\textsuperscript{20}

Both Wright and Waltz view bandwagoning opposite to balancing, however, they are related. “Bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side.” Even the great powers may involve in bandwagoning basically preserving the balance. That great power may be at a disadvantage when to hold a more powerful one in check. Bandwagoning behavior may be induced by offering the spoils of war or promise of future gains to bribe hitherto neutrals or even enemies.\textsuperscript{21} This can be called a kind of jigsaw puzzle in the power political game. Historically, it is seen that Japan has a tradition of bandwagoning.

1.2 Geopolitical Setting

Having given an overview of theoretical discourse let us relate the concepts to its practical dimension. Contemporary free market based globalized world is, time and again, over-shadowed by the traditional security concerns of the actors, be it in Eurasia, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa or America. One may wonder why such an undesirable shadow keeps on haunting the human civilization over and over again. Its naked manifestation can be checked or delayed but sad enough it could not be uprooted once and for all. It, therefore, drains out a lot of resources needed otherwise for meeting the needs of human security. Human security, although rhetoric wise is given importance, having many dimensions, gets a lesser share of the pie compared to traditional national security. However, such presumptions may not hold good for the backward Third World countries especially in Asia and Africa. As a matter of fact, both in Asia and Africa, there is not enough money to meet all ends. Notwithstanding such facts, “the centre of global geostrategic and geo-economic gravity is shifting” to the Asia-Pacific region. Although there are endemic poverty, corruption, malnutrition, illiteracy, deprivations in various parts of this region, still Asia comes to the forefront in the geostrategic calculus or otherwise as highlighted by Australia’s Prime Minister,

\textit{Asia includes the world’s two most populous countries, the world’s largest holders of foreign exchange reserves, two of the world’s top-three economies and three of the world’s five largest militaries....The simple truth is this:}

\textsuperscript{20} K. N. Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1979.
This is reinforced by an academic, who finds similarities through a cursory glance,

A cursory glance at numbers suggests that all the biggest ones are in Asia. The fastest growth rates, the most rapidly expanding economies, the largest exporters, the holders of the most foreign reserves, as well as most of the biggest cities, the tallest buildings, the majority of the world’s PhDs in science and engineering, the largest infrastructure projects on earth and, of course, the most people.

The demise of the Cold War upped the ante that traditional security concerns would be relegated to a back burner, but sad enough, it did not really come to such a pass. Newer security concerns have added to the list of the traditional security threats. Ethnic violence, clash of civilizations, appetite for dominance and energy, transnational crimes, global, regional, and local terrorism, piracy, insurgency etc. have taken a ride to offset the developmental goals of many developing countries where also the developed countries have their stakes. Even the transnational crimes like gun running, drug and human trafficking, spread of AIDS, Avian Influenza, climate change resulting in sea rise etc are likely to directly affect the traditional security concerns of the actors where even militaries may get involved. The world is in the throes of such complex amalgamation. In such a conundrum, Asia-Pacific comes to the fore as articulated by Professor Rohan Gunaratna, “On a global scale, guerilla warfare and terrorism in Asia-Pacific have surpassed the violence in the Middle-East”.

1.3 Japan in Perspective

Given the overall backdrop, Japan, although committed to be a pacifist country, is much concerned about the traditional security issues that affect Japanese mainland and the surrounding. After Japan regained independence, following the surrender during the Second World War, it has been steadily and gradually realigning itself, being buttressed by the United States, to be a reckonable power, both militarily and economically. However during the period since the Second World War, two main factors militated against a global role for Japan. The first is the lingering distrust of Japan felt especially

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22 Keynote Address by Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 29 May 2009.
by China, Korea and other victims of aggression mainly from Southeast Asia. On such distrust, Professor Aurelia George Mulgan makes critical observation,

Japan has never fully reconciled itself with Korea, China, and other countries that were the victims of its aggression in the World War II era, and who remain unwilling to accept Japan as the dominant political and military power in Asia. Several of these nations are hypersensitive to expressions of Japanese nationalism.\textsuperscript{25}

The second is Japan’s reluctance to reassert itself internationally that reflects its formal “self disarmament” as stipulated in its 1947 Pacifist Constitution. Article 9 of its Constitution reads,

\begin{quote}
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
\end{quote}

Now there are indications that such a course may take a different direction. “It (Japan) has the economic and technological resources to play a very different role in the world if it musters the political will to do so”.\textsuperscript{26} Since its power potentials are tremendous and it has enough issues to handle in the surrounding, its power political ambitions may not be kept under check, given that United States, and China, two major actors in the region have their high stakes that may directly impinge on the traditional security of Japan. North Korea is also a factor here. As a matter of fact, Japan often identifies North Korea as a potential threat to the regional security. Some authors brand North Korea as a short-term threat while China being called the long-term threat. Professor Francis Fukuyama’s observations may be pertinent here,

Cold War bipolarity has given way, however, to a more complex situation: North Korea has become the chief short-term regional threat; China presents a long-term danger but can be helpful with Korea now; South Korea has moved toward North Korea and away from the United States; and Japan seeks to use the U.S. alliance to balance China and North Korea.\textsuperscript{27}

Fukuyama’s observations may be read in conjunction with Rex Li,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Aurelia George Mulgan, “Why Japan can’t Lead”, World Policy Journal, World Policy Institute and the MIT Institute, Summer 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Gerald Curtis, “Obama and East Asia: No Room for Complacency”, Issues and Insights, Vol.9, No.15, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, August 2009, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons – America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama Profile Books, Yale University Press, 2006, pp.174-175.
\end{itemize}
From the Japanese perspective, to become a political power, it is necessary to develop its economic strength and military capabilities accordingly. This is thought to be the rationale behind Japan's active involvement in the US-led 'war on terrorism' and the diplomatic activities related to the North Korean nuclear crisis... Chinese security analysts believe that Japan's 'United Nations diplomacy' is an integral part of its attempts to reach the status of a political power.²⁸

Map 1: Map of Asia Pacific

Source: http://www.botanicals.com/sales_map_asia.php

Japan is making commendable strides in its security pitch between the traps of entrapment and abandonment, a hang-over of the Second World War, as a possible way out from American imposition. America and Japan are inextricably linked in crafting the security policy that offers seemingly a win-win outcome for both. Efforts are being mutually superimposed and reinforced. Japan is an economic powerhouse, being the second largest economy of the world²⁹ and America is the superpower on both counts i.e., economic and military. Japan, being robust economically, is catching up in

²⁸ Quoted in Rex Li, “A regional partner or a threatening other? Chinese discourse of Japan’s changing security role in East Asia”, in Christopher M. Dent (ed.), op. cit., p.103.
²⁹ Chinese GNP is larger than Japanese GNP measured in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, in per capita terms, Japan is more than ten times larger than China.
military modernization although it is constitutionally debarred from going overtly militaristic. However, its present economic recession may put a damper, at least for some time, in its whooping military upgradation. Nonetheless, an active military cooperation between Japan and America makes their military machines quite potent, flexible, responsive, and mobile.

There are other actors available round the corner to beef up their alliance strategy like South Korea, Japan, India, Australia and Taiwan. Taiwan is the main bone of contention between China and America where Japan has its stakes too. Taiwan is the ‘renegade’ province of China, as China calls it, and China is determined to reunite it with the mainland by any means including military. And as such, power politics is activated surrounding this island. Although officially America has accepted Taiwan to be a part of mainland China, America’s military planning is also focused on Taiwan where Japan is also factored. China is already there in the conundrum. There are many other issues like ownership of different islands, resources, and use of sea lanes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that have kept the security planning and posture alive and pulsating in the areas surrounding Japan.

1.4 Objectives of the Research

Given the evolving scenario, this paper attempts to show the rationale, objectives and alignments of Japanese military dovetailed, to a great extent, to the force structure planning and objectives of America’s Military. American Military here generally involves the Pacific Command. Implicit in this surrounding, the Japanese Military has been showing its desire to showcase and craft its own security policy and build a strong military machine. The paper attempts to provide the background, limitations, and action-plan of gradual rise of Japan as a strategic power. It is a natural desire of any economically vibrant nation, with a rich strategic legacy, to be in possession of a credible military force. Military force is a significant component of national power. ‘Realists predict that, as states grow wealthier and more powerful, they tend to seek greater world-wide political influence (control over territory, the behavior of other states, and the world economy) commensurate with their own capability.’

Relatively, structural realism, changing structure of the international system like moving from bi-polarity to multi-polarity, may drive a power to play a more significant role in the world and the region.

A power may also resort to offensive realism, based on the argument that states would exploit any opportunity to maximize their relative power.

Mearsheimer opines that in an anarchic international system, all great powers tend to be non-status quo powers. Power transition theory, that features certain realist assumptions, in a regional context, pinpoints a regional dominant state that establishes and maintains a status quo. Other states are either satisfied or dissatisfied in such a milieu. In case of transition of dominance from one power to another there is potential for conflict. However, when there is complex interdependence between two competing powers in areas like trade, cross-border investment, export of manpower, and cooperation in non-traditional security issues, the prospect of war and conflict are likely to decrease. The neo-realist security perspective and mercantilist theory of international political economy, where the state is taken as the primary actor in the inter-state relations and perceived that economic activity should not be separated from a nation’s overall interests, may also be considered in the geopolitical game. Morgenthau considers that political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy; and it is deemed that rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy. It minimizes risks and maximizes benefits.

In evaluating such statements or assumptions the paper would attempt to answer the following questions:

a. Is Japan trying to find a midway between entrapment and abandonment to reach its national strategic objectives?
b. Is Japan seemed to be critical and concerned about the power political environment including the flashpoints that concern its vital interests mainly in the Asia-Pacific?
c. Are Japanese and American security interests inter-related?
d. Are their militaries complementary to each other?
e. Is Japan going for flexible, modern, and normal armed forces?
f. Is Japan tilting towards collective self-defense apart from actively engaging in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations?
g. Is Japan looking for an independent slot in the geopolitics of the world, more specifically in the Asia-Pacific? In the process, is Japan suffering from identity crisis?

The paper, while answering the questions, would illustrate the likely ramifications of its gradual rise as a strategic power. The need to understand such ramifications to envision the future security architecture in the Asia-Pacific cannot be underestimated. Understanding such emerging security

architecture would greatly benefit the security analysts, foreign policy and military planners. For perspective planning such a discourse is a necessity.

1.5 Structure and Methodology

The paper basically follows the realist school (mostly within the spectrum of geopolitics); it nonetheless has a tinge of eclectic analysis. Power politics, geopolitics, balance of power, deterrence, action-reaction, bandwagoning, alignments, alliance etc. are the areas that are generally encapsulated and illustrated in the paper. A cursory theoretical idea of these terms has already been provided.

The paper contains six Chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces the subject with a theoretical outline. The Chapter provides the rationale and objectives of the Study. Terms and concepts related to power politics or geopolitics are discussed briefly in the theoretical portion. The Chapter provides a broad picture for further deliberation and scrutiny.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the contemporary strategic and security environment. It shows American pre-eminence, Russian-Chinese game plan, Australia-India’s likely involvement and Japan’s posture in the scheme of power politics. It sets scene for the role, present or projected, being or to be played by Japan.

Chapter 3 provides a brief background of Japan’s strategic role in the recent past followed by an overview of Japan’s foreign and security policies. The Chapter shows the power relations of different actors that impact Japan’s policies in the present day time. Different actors in the Asia-Pacific region are examined also from the point of view of inputs they are providing to the overall architecture.

Chapter 4 gives an analogy of Japan’s military’s hierarchy and its on-going military modernization drive along with its future direction. Role, capabilities and force structure planning of the component forces of Self-defense Forces are shown in the Chapter. Japan’s likely nuclear capability, if at all, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, Military Space Program, Military Cooperation with the U.S., Higher Defense Organization etc. are highlighted in the Chapter.

Chapter 5 shows the ramifications of such developments in an analytical mode. Contradictions are highlighted. Different variables, often time conflicting, are examined to come to a reasonable balanced deductions and
inferences. Complexities of different pros and cons are taken into consideration.

Chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks. In the final analysis, the paper attempts to conduct a scenario development exercise. It suggests certain modalities and ideas as to how Japan may transform its vision into real world geopolitics. It indicates normative approach to hard geopolitics. It suggests for more institutionalized framework.

The paper generally follows the content analysis, using both primary and secondary sources originating from both East and West. Author’s own professional background helps him in arriving at certain deductions and inferences.

1.6 Limitations

The paper may have limitations of penetrating into ‘military’s veil of secrecy’ which could be true to any such case study. Right focus and direction may get distorted due to economic fluctuation, as is happening in Japan today, often leading to recession. However, much care has been taken to obviate such limitations.

2. Overall Strategic and Security Environment

2.1 General

Generally the world over, present strategic and security environment is plagued by non-state-actors apart from traditional security issues that also afflict the state actors. Globalization, rise of non-state actors, rise of China and India, persistent ethnic, religious conflicts, scarcity of resources and environmental degradation etc would greatly rattle the global security environment in next two decades as succinctly articulated by few American experts,

*The large-scale trends most often cited are increasing globalization (with both beneficial and disruptive side effects); the continued rise of China and India; the quickening pace of technological innovation; the accelerating proliferation of mass disruption/destruction technologies; the growing power/capacity of non-state actors relative to nation-states; the persistence of corrosive regional, ethnic, and religious conflicts; and increasing resource scarcity and environment degradation.*

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Juxtaposing the actions of the non-state actors with state actors may lead to conflagration. This is borne out by U.S. Joint Forces Command assessment, “It can be expected that nations, transnational actors, and non-state entities will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and nature of warfare. Local conflicts and wars will be commonplace and will always carry the risk of escalation into broader conflicts.”\(^{35}\) Assessment given by Chinese Defense White Paper is also relevant here, “Struggle for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance have intensified. Meanwhile, hegemonism and power politics still exist, regional turmoil keeps spilling over, hot-spot issues are increasing, and local conflicts and wars keep emerging.”\(^{36}\)

Globalization may not be able to put an end to the geopolitical or ideological struggles among the powers. Along with globalization, power political ambitions are finding their manifestations in the form of newer blocks or alignments. Things are somewhat moving towards Cold War scenario. The end of the Cold War resulting to uni-polarity is being eclipsed by moves towards multi-polarity. Although it is not clearly discernible, things are apparently moving towards that direction. Rise and fall of the powers continue, as an inexorable dictate of the history.

2.2 American Preeminence

America’s uni-polarity and predominance are being questioned, if not overtly, both by Russia and China; although militarily both powers are still far behind America. But America’s unilateralism and predominance continue to melt especially in Afghanistan at the moment and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq. “Although the United States will be the leading global power, uni-polar moment of American dominance has passed and the U.S. will exercise global leadership only if it can encourage action by a coalition of power”.\(^{37}\) Its global war on terror has been costing the Americans heavily. Its economy is still the largest but now badly battered by “Depression Economics” as Paul Krugman calls it. It is fighting trillion dollar wars, as Steigleigh has dubbed, especially in Iraq and elsewhere. It is probably overstretched as Huntington pointed out some time back. Overstretching indefinitely may make things go beyond control. America, in the process, is exposing its hard power i.e., brute military

force to settle scores in the international battlefields. America, historically, is highly eulogized for its values like democracy, diplomacy, institutions, human rights, justice etc. What is apparent to the world community: America has been ignoring the soft power i.e. values to develop fine relationship with the stakeholders in the international game of geopolitics.

One thing has become pretty crystallized that through hard power only you can not do the policing job which America, on its own, has taken as its responsibility especially after the Cold War. The Cold War ended with the signal that there would be no more bitter fights, skirmishes or conflicts. But it proved wrong. However, the present American administration under Obama is now putting more emphasis on diplomacy, negotiations, and reconciliation. His recent message of reconciliation towards the Muslims of the world is a step in that direction. This is reinforced by his recent decision to abandon the much-vaunted missile-defense system in Eastern Europe which restores the confidence in the idea that the United States is not a war-mongering nation. This is also going to placate the Russians' apprehension to a great extent. His administration is even taking steps to bring peace, reconciliation and development in Africa. Both China and America have huge stakes especially for energy in Africa. A kind of influencing potential is palpable in Africa. America already has direct bilateral talks or contacts with Iran and North Korea, ostensibly on nuclear issues. In spite of the soft approach to the contemporary issues, American pre-eminence in terms of maritime hard power and the resultant struggle for power in Asia are well articulated by Paul Dibb who states,

*The emerging struggle for power in Asia will focus on political fault lines that are maritime rather than continental in aspect. The development of China's military power and the response to it of India and Japan are likely to put pressure on the chain of America's friends and allies in the long littoral extending between South Korea and Taiwan in the north to the ASEAN countries and Australia in the south.*

Approximately 90,000 to 100,000 American troops are deployed in Asia-Pacific, basically in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and Diego Garcia. Seventh Fleet, the core force within US Pacific Command (PACOM), is the largest of the American Navy's forward deployed fleets. It also includes 40-50 ships, 200 aircraft and about 20,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. American pre-eminence in military maritime hard power is clearly overriding in the

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The objectives of having such strong maritime military hard power are clearly outlined by Marvin Ott,

*United States objectives in East Asia have remained consistent over the last five decades: Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon; keep open the sea and air routes that transit the area; maintain commercial access to the economies of the region and the peace and stability that commerce requires; and preserve and strengthen security ties with allies and friends in the region.*

2.3 Russia-China in the Game Plan

Ethnic religious conflicts had multiplied in almost every nook and corner of the world immediately after the Cold War. However there is a lull now. Soviet Union has collapsed; Russia has, therefore, gone into remission. However, it is now trying to regain especially after a kind of boom in its economy being animated by the sale of energy resources to the European powers. There are significant concerns among the Europeans over Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier. Russia is likely to use energy as an “instrument of political intimidation”. China got disarrayed especially after the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Tse Tung. China, after opening up its economy under Deng Xiaoping, has made significant strides in economic field resulting in its military revolution.

Both Russia and China are now reasserting, given the fact that economies are booming as indicated. However, Russian economy is yet to come to the centre-stage. Both powers might have felt sidelined or ignored. Russia played a very competitive game with the U.S.A. during the Cold War. It was recognized as one of the two superpowers challenging American maneuvers anywhere both ideologically and militarily or even at times economically. It formed WARSAW pact to forestall the influence of NATO in its periphery. It propounded the famous Brezhnev Doctrine- which dictated socialism once established in any country was irreversible. This was designed to checkmate the expansion of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Huge military armada was in place in the European theatre to take care of the NATO forces. China was relegated to next level of power imperiled by internal divisions and confrontational posture with the then Soviet Union. Both the powers felt humiliated, given the grandeur and greatness they had enjoyed during most of the period of recorded history. America took advantage of the situation and created wedge between these two powers in 1971. However, there are also contradictions between these two powers, both between and within them.

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Now these two powers are seen to be asserting and re-claiming their central place in the world politics. They have, along with other Central Asian powers, formed a geopolitical entity called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to presumably checkmate the ingress of American power in the periphery of the Euro Asian landmass. China’s objective of establishing SCO was also to promote a multi-polar order and prevent its strategic encirclement. It is already pushing the Americans to vacate Central Asia. This has definitely been successful in fulfilling some of its intrinsic objectives. SCO has the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) established in 2004. There are controversies about the efficacy of SCO as a strongly bonded geopolitical entity, may be, to some extent, due to conflicting interests and orientation between China and Russia. Leadership role may be also a deciding factor here. However, from China’s perspective, “establishment of the SCO was also to serve the promotion of a multi-polar order and the prevention of the country’s encirclement”. SCO members in a joint declaration in June 2001 made it clear that SCO is not an alliance.

Be that as it may, combined efforts of SCO and Russia, China and other Central Asian states, may be even individually, within certain framework and interests, are producing ripples that impact on the geopolitical game of the region. In 2002, the Comprehensive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) comprising Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (joining in 2006) was founded. Russian leadership has a vision to develop a structure similar to NATO. CSTO leaders, except Belarus and Uzbekistan, signed an agreement to establish Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) which is comparable to NATO forces. Under the SCO framework, peace mission military exercises including the Peace Mission 2009 “represented China’s and, to a less degree, Russia’s interests in securing Central Asia.” Such exercises also underscore their apprehension about the three threats such as separatism, extremism, and terrorism. “Joint military drills, ostensibly under the rubric of the SCO, may suggest readiness to

combine forces in a crisis, although there is no particular situation in which that would likely occur.\textsuperscript{44}

Along these developments, America has been expanding the reach of NATO to the extent of even reaching to the backyard of Russia. Again Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) shows China as an emerging threat which, however, has been strongly rebuffed by the Chinese government, "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages ..."\textsuperscript{45} A Chinese source pointed out that QDR plans to deploy six aircraft carriers, and 60 percent of the total 70 nuclear submarines in the Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{46} So, power game is clearly visible between the great/super powers in the Eastern hemisphere which is also called the Old World. It has been the consistent policy of the New World, coming from the Western hemisphere, to keep the Old World contained and divided as suggested by its geopolitical thinker Spykman.

2.4 India and Australia in the Game Plan

India is turning out to be an ally of the United States especially after signing the civilian nuclear and military cooperation deals. India's vision of creating a 'multi-polar world' and a 'multi-polar Asia' is, indeed, an interesting proposition.\textsuperscript{47} India wants to work as a balancing factor in the Asian balance of power game. India by going into such security cooperation with the great powers like America and Japan would like to ensure such balance. Australia has always been a strategic ally of America. Australia's "development of Force 2030 is consistent with its strategic interests of the security, stability, and cohesion of its immediate neighborhood as well as the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region."\textsuperscript{48} Such vision of force projection and its alliance relationship with America and Japan call for serious scrutiny.


South Korea is also a staunch ally of America. It has, however, irritants with Japan spurred by historical legacy.

2.5 Japan’s Posture

Over and above these developments, Japan can be called the most allied ally of America, at least militarily in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, sequel to the surrender after the Second World War, and treading the tightrope, between entrapment and abandonment, has got involved in the security process of the Asia-Pacific, and lately even the world, as manifested in its involvement in UN peace keeping operations around the world.

America’s occupation of Japan after the Second World War, acute Sino-Japanese animosities spanning hundreds of years, militarization of North Korea especially launching its ballistic missiles towards Japan in the recent past and also carrying out underground nuclear tests with the latest news of its advanced weapon enrichment program, the presence of a contentious issue like Taiwan that also involves the Americans and the overall security architecture of America in the Asia-Pacific are some of the issues that propel Japan to get intimately involved in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Over and above these, the disputed islands in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and involvement of Southeast Asian Countries in the disputes are the other impinging factors for such development. China claims virtually the whole of South China Sea based on what, it says, from the historical data. Linked to it, in the 19th and 20th centuries, China asserted claims to both Spratly and Paracel Islands, presently also claimed by different Southeast Asian countries. Interestingly, Japan in the late 1930s, established a strong presence in the South China sea using Itu Aba as a submarine base for intercepting commerce in the region. Historically, Japan had been active in South China Sea like a Japanese company began mining in the Spratly Islands in 1918 and during early 1920s; several Japanese companies occupied various islands and excavated guano for fertilizer.

Befitting the overall traditional security environment, Japan today is much more emboldened to take on a multilateral approach to security involving especially India and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. It is no more only a bilateral actor with America to tackle multi-dimensional security threats, emanating from both state and non-state actors. Terrorism is another specter of threat that is battering the region. All the states in the region are outraged by such threats; attempts are there to combat this menace through combined efforts. To all these developments, where Japan is involved, its legacy as a major strategic player deserves mention.
3. Foreign and Security Policies of Japan

3.1 Japan’s Background as a Strategic Power

Japan’s geopolitics has been generally shaped by its geographic location, particularly its insular character, its limited endowment of natural resources and its exposed location near potentially hostile neighbors. Such factors have also influenced Japanese nationalism. It has helped in promoting a strong cultural and ethnic unity. Such strongly bonded national consciousness has greatly influenced its strategic behavior as well especially, in Asia-Pacific. However, one tends to see a difference between its cultural nationalism and state-sponsored nationalism which was military-dominated.

Thus said, Japan maintained a policy of seclusion for more than 200 years which started to open up in the mid of 19th century. In 1853 Commodore Mathew Perry of the US Navy steamed into Japanese waters with four warships to showcase the muzzle power of the gunboats. In 1854, Perry returned with more ships and requested Shogun to sign the “Treaty of Peace and Amity”; this resulted in establishing formal diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, this ended Japan’s self-imposed isolation and also paved the way for American metamorphosis from a colony to a colonial power in this part of the world. Within five years, Japan signed similar treaties with other Western countries. Meiji Restoration in 1868, following Shogunate, abolished feudal system, and adopted numerous Western institutions including quasi-parliamentary constitutional government and legal system. Although basically Meiji restoration was fuelled by anti-foreign sentiments, Japan embarked upon adopting the techniques of Western Civilization and it abolished feudalism in 1871. It undertook an ambitious program of military, social, political, and economic reforms. Japan transformed itself into a modern nation-state and a major world power. A strong military build-up was undertaken to gain respect of the western powers. Meiji Constitution of 1889 obligated allegiance to the state as the citizen’s highest duty. Since the Meiji restoration, central figure of the state was the Emperor, who was also the supreme commander of the Army and the Navy.49

In the meantime, Russian pressure coming from the north resulted in Japan yielding Sakhalin in exchange for Kuril/Chishima Islands (1875). However, Ryukyu Islands were secured by Japan (1879). In 1898, Japan got rid of

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49 As a matter of fact Japanese militarism can be traced to its ancient Samurai tradition. To the Shogunates militarist philosophy was intrinsic; however it got nationalist fervor during the Meiji Restoration. Centuries of civil wars in Japan provided a rigid and especial place for military rule and its influence in government affairs. This continued until Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II when United States brought about democracy in this otherwise militaristic nation.
unequal treaties with Western powers. It thought it would remain vulnerable to aggressive Western imperialism unless it extended its line of advantage beyond its borders which would help repel foreign incursions and strengthen Japanese economy. It put special emphasis on Korean peninsula, once described as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. It was Korea and Manchuria on which Japan got involved in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan defeated both the powers. After the first Sino-Japanese War, Japan won the possession of Taiwan and earned China’s recognition of Korea’s independence. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan won possession of southern Sakhalin and earned a position of paramount influence in Korea and Southern Manchuria.

During the First World War, Japan’s role was, largely, confined to attacking German colonial outposts in East Asia. It also occupied the German coal port of Qingdao in the Chinese Shandong Peninsula. Japan joined the peace conference at Versailles in 1919 and earned the official recognition as one of the “Big Five” of the new international order. It became a member of the League of Nations and was awarded a mandate over Pacific Islands north of the Equator formerly held by Germany.

In 1931, when Chinese nationalists began to seriously challenge Japan’s position in Manchuria, Japan occupied Inner (Chinese) Manchuria and established a puppet government there. As a reaction to the international condemnation of the incident, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. The Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937. As a matter of fact, Korea and parts of Manchuria and most of North-eastern China were occupied by Japan since 1905 and 1937 respectively. Japanese forces committed genocide on the Chinese population, especially during the fall of the capital Nanking. A Key instrument for subsequent Japanese expansion was Japan’s much heralded 1940 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere doctrine. Japan formally announced the doctrine in August 1940 basically to create an empire based on European models, although rhetoric-wise it wanted to free Asia from colonialism and domination. The Great East Asia would comprise of Japan, Manchukuo, China, and other parts of Southeast Asia.

Emboldened, Japan joined the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, after it occupied French Indochina (Vietnam) upon agreement with the Vichy government of France. This was retaliated by the United States and Great Britain who imposed an oil boycott. Japan, having failed to solve the conflict diplomatically, decided to capture the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (Indonesia).

All these gave enough sparks to start a war with the US and Great Britain. Japan attacked the American forces at Pearl Harbor, destroyed the British
Battleships in Singapore, and invaded the Philippines, almost simultaneously, all between 7th to 10th December 1941. All these provoked an American retaliation against Japan and its allies. During the same time, Japanese Army attacked colonial Hong Kong and occupied it for years. Japan had also conquered Burma (Myanmar) and reached the doors of India and Australia. It conducted air raids on the port of Darwin, Australia. Japan, thus, established an empire stretching over much of the Pacific. Virtually all of Southeast and East Asia was under Japanese control from 1942-45. However, Japanese Naval offensive ability was crippled by the Americans in the Battle of Midway; and it turned the tide against the Japanese. Finally, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan the day before the second atomic bomb was dropped. Japan signed an instrument of surrender on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor on 2 September 1945. USS Missouri was flying two American flags; one of them had flown on the mast of Commodore Perry’s ship when he had sailed into the same Bay nearly a century ago as already mentioned.

At the end of the World War II, Japan lost all of its overseas possessions and retained only the home islands. Manchukuo was dissolved, and Inner Manchuria was returned to the Republic of China; Japan renounced all claims to Formosa (Taiwan); Korea was placed under UN control, southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles/Chishima became part of the USSR. Relations between the Soviet Union and Japan remained tensed during the Cold War, as Japan was wary of the military threat emanating from the north. However, the dispute over the ownership of the islands (Chishima/Kurile) off the northeast coast of Hokkaido greatly cooled down after the Cold War. In September 1951, San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and most of its rivals in the Second World War. Nonetheless, it went into effect in April 1952 when Japan resumed full sovereignty.

According to Chapter 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan lost all claims to its occupied territories, apart from Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Spratly and Paracel Island chains. However, Japan and China are engaged in a dispute over the ownership of Senkaku (Diaoyutai) island north-east of Taiwan, each side claiming sovereignty. Japan’s defeat in the War brought about a new posture – inward looking and pacifist – in its diplomatic and strategic outlook. Bandwagoning is also a way of security-related posture of Japanese strategic culture as observed by Huntington. Japan did so with Britain in early 20th Century. It also bandwagoned with Germany during the

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Second World War and with the United States after the War. However, within the spectrum of bandwagoning, it was capable of displaying spectacular diplomatic and military maneuvers and assertiveness.

3.2 Salient Features of Japan’s Foreign Policy

3.2.1 General

With its surrender, Japan was placed under international control of the American-led allied powers in the Asia-Pacific. In the closing days of the War, Allied leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration which clearly spelt out the goal of the US occupation of Japan: ‘the elimination of the old order that had misled the Japanese people into the path of imperialism, and the establishment of a new order of peace, security, and justice’. This was the first time since the unification of Japan that the island nation was successfully occupied by a foreign power. However, the country’s new constitution came into effect on 3 May 1947. The United States and 45 other allied nations signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan in September 1951 under the terms of which Japan was handed over full sovereignty on 28 April 1952 as already mentioned. According to Akihiko Tanaka, Japan’s foreign policy was based on traditional three pillars: “strong ties with the US and advanced industrial democracies; emphasis on Japan’s role in Asia; and according importance to international organizations such as the United Nations”. Japan’s vision probably remains focused to creating a synergy between its strong ties with the United States and its working relations with Asia.

However, Japan encounters contradictions in creating such synergy. Harmonizing between regional/extra-regional geopolitics and regional/national identity question is a great foreign policy challenge for Japan. It’s interactive/adjustment fallouts are being covered later in the paper. Having said so, by the time Prime Minister Yoshida left office in 1954, the fundamental direction of the Japanese foreign policy was set: Japan decided to follow an economics first policy along with its narrowly defined self-interest. His successors further elaborated his doctrine by adopting Non-Nuclear Principles, principles proscribing arms and military technology exports, and the 1 percent of GNP limitation on defense spending. Without such

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52 See the Potsdam Declaration, 1945.
54 The principles are: Japan will not possess nuclear weapons, nor produce nuclear weapons and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan.
extrapolation, and for having constitutional sanction, Japan, in all probability, would have got involved directly in the Cold War, may be by sending troops to Vietnam War much like South Korea.

This was a brilliant success story of Japanese Foreign policy: firstly, it relied on the United States to guarantee its security and secondly, it followed the policies of economic nationalism. This was a kind of departure from its cultural and ethnic nationalism. One of its major foreign policy objectives, immediately after the war, was to assuage the suspicions and resentments of Asian neighbors who suffered the ignominy of Japanese imperialist aggression. Japan’s diplomacy tended to be more accommodative and conciliatory.

However, at the outset of the Cold War, Kent Calder described Japan’s foreign policy a reactive one. It was done in response to pressures from outside with little input coming through the deliberate process of strategic calculations by domestic actors. He defines reactive foreign policy as “the impetus to foreign policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict”. This is also substantiated by Gerald Curtis in a clear language,

*Japanese do not formulate their foreign policy goals in the pursuit of a strategic vision – Japan is not like the U.S. or like China in that regard – but as reaction to what Japanese refer to as the dominant “trends of the time”, in the international system. This kind of reactive diplomacy has been the hallmark of Japan’s foreign policy since 1850s when Commodore Perry’s black ships appeared at Japanese shores.*

A reactive state fails to take independent policy. It was so because of its defeat in the War and Occupation by the United States from 1945-1952. After the Cold War, Japanese started questioning the reactive nature of foreign policy making. Since there were already substantial economic achievements, it was time propitious to flex its diplomatic and economic muscle. And there was also a call for Japan to become a “normal nation” meaning Japan to maintain a military capable of defending the country itself. Present foreign policy of Japan attempts to be more pro-active although still constrained by both internal and external factors. It does not, however, seek to directly challenge the status quo but rather seeks to pursue its national interests.

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56 Gerald Curtis, op.cit., p.9.
Japan invoked its right, without altering the Constitution, to participate in collective security arrangements. And this is how it joined the United Nations in 1956.\textsuperscript{58} The 2009 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) manifesto differentiates between “participation in UN collective security activities from the exercise of self-defense”. The document stipulates that DPJ will free itself “from old debates over individual and collective self-defense (regarding Article 9 of the Constitution) while defending Japan under a strictly defensive national security policy.”\textsuperscript{59} This could be a kind of tactical deception.

Japan’s pure isolationism in 1950s started to get replaced by a kind of regional collective security arrangement. It got more involved for defense of its sea-lanes and an increased level and sophistication of joint military training with US and other Pacific nations around 1980s. The intimate relationship between Japan and US, basically founded on security cooperation, is one of the hallmarks of Japan’s foreign policy. Such cooperation fostered at the behest of the US was because of Japan’s closer geostrategic location to the USSR and may be also to China. This was again, mainly, the hangover of the Second World War. The relations get further impetus especially after 9/11. Japan’s reactive foreign policy undergoes a shift, basically, as a reaction to three international events i.e. the Gulf War, the restive situation in the Asia-Pacific and the 9/11 attack. These events had a profound impact on Japan’s foreign policy and its perception of security issues.

Kyoko Hatakeyama somewhat challenges the reactive model of Japan’s foreign policy as described by Calder.\textsuperscript{60} Apart from the outside pressure, domestic political elites and public opinion played significant role in shaping Japan’s external policy. This is also reaffirmed by Yongwook Ryu when he says, “to say foreign pressure (gaiatsu) was the main reason for the change is to miss the domestically generated determination to become a ‘normal’ nation-state, to convert its economic power into political power, and to increase its voice in international affairs.” During 1950s to 1990s, Japan’s foreign policy was characterized by two P’s i.e. passivity and passivism while


post-Cold War strategy is by two A's i.e., activism and assertiveness. Newly-elected Prime Minister of Japan, Hatoyama, asserts he wants “more equal” partnership with Washington. “Hatoyama wants to use Asia to offset what he sees as the declining influence of the United States”, comments Yoshihide Soeya, Director of the Institute of East Asia Studies at Keio University in Tokyo. “He thinks he can play China off the United States”. This might imply Japan pulling out Japanese ships refueling U.S. warships in the Indian Ocean and reducing the American troops in Okinawa. As a matter of fact, Japan has already ended its refueling mission in support of allied forces in Afghanistan. Is China also capable of driving a wedge between the United States and Japan? Such question comes to the fore since Ozawa, a shadowy kingmaker, is widely believed to be behind Japan’s latest overtures to China. It is little premature to comment on further developments.

Be that as it may, Japan continues to maintain an alliance relationship with the US, apart from deep economic ties. The strategic relationship was initially necessitated by some kind of deterrence against North Korea and the “possible Chinese ambitions to dominate the region.” And they share the common values like “respect for freedom, human rights and democracy and the desire to maintain peace and security”, as highlighted in Japan’s Defense Policy. Notwithstanding the alliance relations with America, Tokyo is somewhat disappointed with Washington’s lukewarm support to Japan for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. There are also other irritants like sharing of financial costs in relocating US marines from Okinawa to Guam. Obviously, Japan has a long felt desire to reform the UN and promotion of frameworks for multilateral security, like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is also interested in actively promoting arms control and disarmament by participating in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and addressing the issue of proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Today, Japan faces several international irritants and vexed issues. Of these, the North Korean nuclear issue and the rise of China top the list as

61 Yongwook Ryu, “Road to Japan’s “Normalization”: Japan’s Foreign Policy Orientation since the 1990s”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 2007, pp. 64 and 71.
63 “Who is the Real Yukio Hatoyama? Japan’s Elusive Leader may be Asia’s First in the Mold of Blair and Clinton”, Newsweek, 28 September 2009.
64 J.A.A. Stockwin, “The Evolving Dynamics of Japanese Foreign Policy and Implications for Southeast Asia” in Lee Poh Ping and Nasrudin Md Akhir (eds.), op. cit., p.146.
shown in Figure 1. These two issues and others along with their fallouts are being examined in the paper. Issues are generally interwoven and one may impact the other. So, the entire spectrum has to be examined holistically.

**Figure 1: What Are the Two Most Serious International Issues for Japan Today?**

![Pie Chart with issues](image)


### 3.2.2 North Korean Issue

Japan’s real Achilles’ heel, at this point in time, turns out to be North Korea after the Korean War and as a byproduct of Cold War. North Korea follows ‘military first’ policy. As Michishita Narushige states, “North Korea pursues ‘calculated adventurism’ strategy that utilizes its military to realize its grand strategic objectives.”

Apparently, North Korea would appear to be a single largest foreign policy irritant that Japan has to tackle at the moment. And it is basically over the nuclearization program and development, and testing of varieties of ballistic missiles. Apart from Taepodong missile tested in 2006, DPRK is reported to have tested KN-02 short-range missiles with a range between 100-120 Kilometers. It is also developing Musudan missile with a range between 2,500 to 4,000 Kilometers. And those could be fired both from land and submarine. (Source: “The Korean Peninsula- Active US-DPRK Dialogue and a new

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67 Apart from Taepodong missile tested in 2006, DPRK is reported to have tested KN-02 short-range missiles with a range between 100-120 Kilometers. It is also developing Musudan missile with a range between 2,500 to 4,000 Kilometers. And those could be fired both from land and submarine. (Source: “The Korean Peninsula- Active US-DPRK Dialogue and a new
that in 2006 “the probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test was extremely high” is quite ominous.\textsuperscript{68} The Central Intelligence Agency of America suspects that North Korea has enough plutonium to produce at least one or two nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{69} According to Pentagon, North Korea has already installed 100 Nodong missiles capable of threatening Japan’s main cities.\textsuperscript{70} Again, Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense disclosed on 17 October 2002 that North Korea already had a small number of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{71} Rod Lyon’s apprehension is also relevant here, “If Pyongyang reprocesses all the stored fuel rods in 1994, and those downloaded from the reactor in April 2005, it would gain plutonium sufficient for about another six to seven weapons, assuming that it has a workable weapon design”.\textsuperscript{72} However, a South Korean scholar cautions that “we should refrain from jumping to conclusions that North Korea has the capability to launch a nuclear strike on Japan”. Anyway, abduction issue, development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missiles, espionage, and other illicit activities may justify North Korea to be a “security concern for Japan”.\textsuperscript{73} Again Francis Fukuyama smells something more dangerous while visualizing the bigger picture, “The combination of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles means that Japan is under nuclear threat from an unstable and erratic regime, which is more frightening in many respects than the much larger Soviet nuclear threat during the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{74}

Of these Japan has raised the “abduction issue”\textsuperscript{75} as a precondition for normalization of relations along with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s denuclearization commitment. Japan’s position relating to these issues in the Six-party Talks is clear and unambiguous: the resolution of abduction along with nuclear issue is a prerequisite to the normalization of relations. Japan insists that North Korea dismantles “all nuclear programs”.

\textsuperscript{68} Ministry of Defense, \textit{Defense of Japan} 2008, p.34.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{The New York Times}, 1 July 1999.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{The Washington Post}, 18 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{74} Francis Fukuyama (2008), \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{75} In the 70s and 80s as many as 80 Japanese civilians were abducted by the North Korean government agents. In 2006, North Korean government officially acknowledged they had kidnapped 13 Japanese nationals. (Source: Catherine Makino, “Japan/US: Obama’s Election Unlikely to Disturb Ties-Analysts”, Global Geopolitics Net Sites/IPS, 16 November 2008.
"The dismantling should be comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible". Since September 2006, Japan has been using the "dialogue-and-pressure" tactics in continuation to earlier practice.

Lately, it is putting more emphasis on pressure aspect. Prime Minister Abe ratcheted up the pressure after North Korea carried out nuclear test in October 2006. He introduced separate Japanese sanctions that forbade all North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports, banned all imports from North Korea and prohibited in principle any DPRK citizen from entering Japan. Japan also pushed for strong UN sanctions against North Korea. The Economist reported Japan launched its first ever spy satellites to get an in-depth look at North Korea. It joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict North Korean ships carrying weapons and contraband items. It, thus, puts a restraint on its hard currency earning. America’s position on this issue is also unambiguous as articulated by its Defense Secretary, "Our goal is complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state. North Korea’s nuclear program and actions constitute a threat to regional peace and security." Denuclearization of DPRK is one of the major foreign policy objectives of Japan.

Six-party Talks have apparently stalled. However, North Korea is now more interested in bilateral talks with the US especially, after the recent visit by former President Clinton. North Korea would abandon nuclear weapons in exchange for economic aid (or even a peace treaty), as the indications hint. Japan would be happy in such an outcome. That would, in an implied way, make China’s standing as the Chair of Six-party Talks less conspicuous. However at this point in time America would give a guarded response to such proposals in view of America’s near-total dependence on China’s hard currency. Even if America goes for direct bilateral talks with North Korea, it would not like to make the Six-party Talks dysfunctional. North Korea’s position on abandoning nuclear weapons seems to be an enigma. Beijing expressed its ire on North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 and

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78 "Japan’s Foreign Policy- from Pacifism to Populism", The Economist, 8 July 2004.
Washington depended on China to play the carrots-and-sticks approach. Washington wanted to offer many carrots and China the sticks, if necessary. But the enigma remains. North Korea wants to use the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip. North Korea is making moves to draw outside attention and derive economic benefits. It is also soliciting “closer engagement with both Japan and the United States”. “North Korean ‘brinkmanship diplomacy’ in the form of belligerent rhetoric and missile and nuclear tests are effective means of communicating its resolve as well as getting Washington’s attention, and, thus, strengthening North Korea’s negotiating position.”

A South Korean security expert makes certain interesting observation on North Korea’s bargaining tactics in the form of receiving “packages of rewards” from the individual countries in the Six-party Talks. For instance from Japan it intended to get 10 billion dollar monetary compensation in return for diplomatic normalization. From America it asked for “a pledge of non-aggression, full diplomatic relations, and a peace treaty that would presumably be followed by the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea, its long standing goal.” It succeeded in concluding the Geneva Agreed Framework, an agreement with America which puts North Korea on an equal footing to negotiate with America. However, although North Korea always insisted on a bilateral talk with the U.S., Washington always communicated Beijing that Six-party Talks would be the appropriate forum. North Korea wants others to dance to its tune. North Korea is also taking advantage of the contradictions prevailing between China and U.S., Russia and U.S., and Japan and China. South Korea’s role as a balancer is also fading. However, overall it can be construed that North Korea is playing a dangerous game. As a follow up to its nuclear test on 25 May 2009, UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Resolution 1874 which condemns strongly such an action and builds upon the sanctions under Resolution 1718.

One has to appreciate Japan is an economic superpower who needs to rely heavily on uninterrupted imports of energy and raw materials, and unfettered access to world market. Without such foreign policy objectives and priorities, Japan’s viability to continue as a potent and dynamic economic superpower would be at stake. It would like to remain friendly with as many countries as

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81 Gilbert Rozman, *op. cit.*, p.41.
82 Rod Lyon, *op. cit.*, p.179.
possible. But, in the longer term, it has to eye China both on trade and security terms. Again, managing its alliance relationship with American is a priority foreign policy objective of Japan to fend-off would-be-aggressors.

3.2.3 China Issue

The Nixon “shock”, which opened America’s door to China, propelled Japan to go for more independent foreign policy. Japan-China politico-strategic relations are strained although they have deep economic ties. This is historically linked leading to deep-seated mistrusts. Over and above that present day geopolitical compulsions make the relations even more complicated. The relations took a downward spiral since 2001, with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to visit the Yasukini shrine where war criminals are also enshrined. This was also publicly done in 1985 by Prime Minister Nakasone. Such gestures, in fact, add salt to the wound. Added to it are the Japanese text books denying Japanese war atrocities throughout the region during the Second World War.

Presence of America in the region with the promise to ensure the security of Japan itself along with “areas surrounding Japan” make such complications really visible. This is further linked up with the vexed issue of Taiwan and disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Both China and Japan made efforts to stabilize their diplomatic relations. But the Japanese got apprehensive when they saw China had carried out anti-satellite missile test and in February 2007 a Chinese vessel Deng Fang Hong 2 had been conducting research near Senkaku Islands, another disputed area in the East China Sea. There is a huge concentration of energy reserves around the islands which are claimed by both Japan and China. The claim is compounded by the legal basis on which China and Japan assert their claims. Both cite 1982 Law of the Sea Convention but its interpretation and application vary widely. Reinhard Drifte provides the perspectives from both the sides, “... Japan claims that there is no sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands, since it is in the comfortable position of having de facto control over them, a claim strongly refuted by China.” Takashi Hoshiyama, a Japanese diplomat fears if Chinese

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86 “Japan: Evolving Security Policy”, Strategic Survey, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. China claims the Okinawa Trough as the division line between the two countries. Japan, on the other hand, claims the Senkakus fall within its Exclusive Economic Zone and sees the division to the west of Okinawa.

argument regarding natural extension of the continental shelf were to overshadow Japan's claim that intermediate line is the line of extension, which he thinks is supported by international law, the entire East China Sea would fall under Chinese influence and Chinese power would extend up to Okinawa's doorstep. These disputes carry potential for military confrontation where America may also get involved, when considered it to fall under the scope of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Noel M. Morada finds disagreements over a Chinese natural gas project near the disputed so-called median line in the East China Sea. In September 2005, a Chinese destroyer aimed its guns at a Japanese surveillance plane near the disputed waters of the Chunxiao gas field. Obviously, Chinese vice Foreign Minister claims differently, “The sovereign rights of Chunxiao oil and gas field in the East China Sea belong to China”. Early 2009 tensions flared up again when Japan protested China's unilateral development of the Tianwaitian gas field. Issue of Taiwan, where China, America, and Japan are also the actors, would be treated separately in the paper.

Map 2: Map of Disputed Senkaku Islands

Source: http://encarta.msn.com/map_701577363/Senkaku_Islands_(disputed).html

Japan’s 2000 Defense White Paper for the first time described China as a threat to the security of Japan. “The objective of Tokyo’s bilateral and multilateral security diplomacy is to hedge against possible Chinese hegemony while integrating China into the region.”\(^{91}\) Japan is actively involved in engaging China in multilateral forum like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).\(^{92}\) Such efforts, in an implied way, serve to involve China “to be a responsible member” of the international community. Two countries’ trade volume exceeded US$260 billion in 2008 setting a new record. China is, now, Japan’s largest and Japan is China’s third largest trading partner. They also hold defense consultations and exchange visits between their naval vessels.\(^{93}\)

Notwithstanding such interaction, Japan’s foreign policy planners cannot overlook China’s strategic rise. This rise has implications both in strategic and economic terms. This is also highlighted by Australian Defense White Paper 2009 (Strategic Outlook),

*China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities. A major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size ... here is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.*

Strategic rise of China is likely to trigger the inevitable strategic competition between Japan and China, as candidly articulated by Professor Kent E. Calder, “As in the case of Anglo-German naval competition a century ago, technology, regional transition, and domestic politics all deepen the prospect of serious conflict between Japan and China today, in ways that economic interdependence alone cannot resolve.”\(^{94}\) Michael Swaine and

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\(^{92}\) The ASEAN Regional Forum was launched in 1994 with basically three key objectives to be realized in three stages: Stage 1, which is underway, is the generation of Confidence-building Measures (CMBs). Stage 2 is the development of preventive diplomacy mechanism and lastly, stage 3, is the development of conflict-resolution mechanism. In 2001, the ARF issued the “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy” which suggested for measures as confidence building, norms building, enhancement of communication channels and institutionalizing ARF chair’s role. To put it in perspective ARF is yet to transit to the second stage. However, its achievements are no less commendable so far.


Ashley J. Tellis argue that “China’s grand strategy seeks to preserve domestic order, defend against external threats and eventually attain geo-political influence as a major, and perhaps, primary state.” China is concerned about external security, internal stability and reunification of Taiwan. And to achieve such goals, China is bent upon increasing its “comprehensive national power.”\textsuperscript{95} Deng’s “24 character” strategy reflects realist values. Those are: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”. Overall the strategy seems to “advocate the need to downplay the country’s ambitions in favor of building up the country’s power to ‘maximize options for the future’, comments Paul J. Smith.\textsuperscript{96}

As part of this concept, the Chinese are aware that a strong economy is the foundation of military modernization as could be true for Japan also. On such common variables comparison between China and Japan stands convincing and relevant. As noted by J. Christensen, “Although they (Chinese analysts) harbor suspicion toward the United States, they view Japan with less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in attitudes towards America.”\textsuperscript{97} Such a projection and impression of China call for concern for the geopolitical competitors in the region. In this competition, Taiwan as an issue is given almost on a platter. Taiwan, as a case in point, continues to remain a bone of contention/flashpoint in the strategic milieu of the region where Japan is also likely to get involved.

3.2.4 Issue of Taiwan among Japan, China, and the United States

As a reaction to China’s missile tests in 1996, Japan committed itself to providing logistical support for American military operations in the Taiwan Straits under the revised US-Japan Security Cooperation Guidelines. That makes it difficult for Japan to make a choice between preserving its alliance with the United States and maintaining stable relations with China. This is a dilemma like Germany who tends to avoid the choice between the United States and France. Japan, it is reasonably assumed, is doing a kind of balancing in this part of the world. Tokyo, in all probability, will have to provide the support to America at the cost of triggering a confrontation with China, when there are deep seated historical animosities between Japan and China. The scenario would be quite tricky since, after the Sino-American

\textsuperscript{96} Paul J. Smith, \textit{op. cit.} pp.245-246.
rapprochement, Japan normalized relations with Beijing and severed its official relations with the nationalist government in Taiwan in late September 1972. But the scenario would change in case China uses force in the Taiwan Strait, American military intervention would be obvious, as America is committed to Taiwan’s security through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Use of force in the Taiwan Strait would pose a serious security threat to Japan as it would in reality disrupt Japanese air and sea traffic. China might blockade sea lanes around Taiwan, which would be critical for Japanese oil shipping, or might even attempt capturing the disputed Senkaku islands.

Map 3: Map of Taiwan


The revision of 1978 guidelines for US-Japan Security Cooperation in 1996, one month after the Taiwan Strait crisis, has inexorably linked US-Japan alliance with Japan’s relations with Taiwan and it may further strain its relations with China. Prior to the revision, Japan tended to reap benefits from both the powers. It continued to maintain stable relations with China, which was critical for Japan’s security, while maintaining close economic relations with Taiwan. Revisions guidelines mention that Japanese rear-area support in areas surrounding Japan is not a geographic concept but a situational concept and cannot be defined on a map. The phrase, “areas surrounding Japan”, is

interpreted by the former vice-president of Japanese Defense Agency in terms of “interests rather than geography”. He suggests, “Japan will take part in operations if core Japanese security interests are at stake”.

In an annex to the Guidelines, although it defined the cooperation as non-combatant evacuation operations and rear area support only, “it did mean that Japan would provide direct regional support for US military operations under certain contingencies”. New guidelines raise the unpleasant possibility of a Japanese military conflict with China in the event that Washington becomes involved in armed conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. It can be surmised that the revised guidelines are a step forward towards a more consolidated US-Japanese strategy to contain China. In November 1998, during Jiang Zemin’s visit to Tokyo, Jiang pressed Tokyo for a private acknowledgement that the revised guidelines did not cover Taiwan. Jiang also asked for a nod to the “three nos” policy in the bilateral joint declaration. They included “no support for two Chinas, no support for Taiwan’s independence, and no support for Taiwan’s representation in international organizations such as the United Nations”. This policy is even supported by the Americans. Japan formally pledged that it would support the “one China” policy in accordance with the 1972 Sino-American communiqué and verbally committed that it would not support Taiwan’s independence. China got no commitment from Japan that it would oppose Taiwan’s representation in international organizations.

Added to all these, what disappointed and worried the Chinese most was the fact that Japan made no promise that Taiwan would be excluded from the new security guidelines. A kind of fait accompli is clearly articulated in the following statement,

Japanese insistence on the domestic nature of the conflict between Beijing and Taipei, however, may not suffice in future crises. More than any other issue, Taiwan’s status potentially confronts Japan and the United States with serious difficulties in defense cooperation should China seek to resolve this issue through military means.

100 Kyoko Hatakeyama, op. cit., p.19.
102 Qingxin Ken Wang, op. cit., P.368.
Again an assessment given by the Chinese specialists appears to be quite interesting and revealing,

... the ultimate aim of Japan’s post-Cold War Taiwan policy is to use the ‘Taiwan card’ to constrain China, which is perceived as its principal rival in the Western Pacific region. A united China that combines the economic strengths and strategic advantages of the PRC and Taiwan will present Japan with a huge challenge in the twenty-first century. As long as Beijing and Taipei remain divided, it is said, they will not be able to take effective measures to deal with the issue of sovereignty in the Spratly and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. It is therefore not in Japan’s interests to see the reunification of China and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{104}

Any reasonable assessment drawn from the facts as given in the preceding paragraphs concludes that America, as envisioned in 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, would get involved in the Taiwan affairs in case China resorts to force to unify Taiwan. That would then draw Japan to the fray when American military operations would ask for Japanese logistical support in the Taiwan Strait. Seeing it from another perspective, Japan has a legal obligation to include Taiwan as stipulated in the guidelines. According to Article 6 of the revised security treaty of 1960, “Japan is obliged to provide bases for the US not only for the defense of Japan, but also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East”.\textsuperscript{105} In extrapolating this clause further South China Sea may come in the focus. Beginning in the 19th and 20th Centuries, China laid claims both to the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and it continues to do the same till date.

Again in the late 1930s, Japan established a strong presence in the South China Sea using Itu Aba ( Portions of the islands) as a submarine base for intercepting commerce in the region as already mentioned. This area, therefore, carries potential for conflict where Japan may also be dragged in. Australian Defense White Paper 2009, thus, warns all the stakeholders that “Taiwan will remain a source of potential strategic miscalculation, all parties will need to work hard to ensure that developments in relation to Taiwan over the years ahead are peaceful ones”. The wave does not, as examined, stop there. It flows down south also. One Chinese expert commented that “Once

\textsuperscript{104} Rex Li, op. cit., p.109.

\textsuperscript{105} Japanese government defined “Far East” as “Primarily the region north of the Philippines, as well as Japan and its surrounding area”, including South Korea and Taiwan. However, when rear-area support operations would be necessary, these areas may not necessarily be limited to East Asia. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi clarified before the Lower House Budget Committee that the “Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the other side of the globe” can not be conceived to be meant in the new guidelines (Source: J. J. Suh, et al., (ed.), op. cit., P.112).
the Taiwan front is closed, we may turn to the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{106} No wonder, China is possibly going for aircraft carrier to take care of South China Sea also.

\textbf{Map 4: Map of South China Sea}

Another interesting issue may be raised here. America has yet to formally recognize Taiwan as part of China. There are ambiguities in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué which may provide a vague legal basis for the United States to intervene in the Taiwan Strait in the event if China uses force. US Pacific Commander Admiral Keating assures China that there is but one China. This is a fine statement but something appears different when he further elaborates, “the fundamental goal of the US Pacific Command is to make sure a war doesn’t happen in this region. We will watch carefully and evaluate any element we see as destabilizing”.\textsuperscript{107} Any development drags Japan in an unwanted war with China, which may place Japan at the mercy of China's nuclear missiles. The resultant action-reaction is covered later. It may be pointed here that the present American Administration’s recent sale of US$6.4 billion worth of sophisticated weapons to Taiwan works as a catalyst to that cycle.


Apart from vexed Taiwan issue, given Japan’s strategic background and having its interests involved, Japan is reshaping itself to appropriately meet the security challenges of the region, notwithstanding still being under American protection. Professor Chong-ki Choi candidly portrays Japan’s projected role and its defense obligations, “With the expansion of China’s sphere of influence and with Japan’s emergence as a world power, the role of Japan, not only in Asia but also in the entire world, is given new significance. The important role that Japan is forced to accept... will make Japan fulfill its defense obligations” 108.

3.3 Japan’s Security Policy

3.3.1 Yoshida Doctrine

Japan’s lukewarm attitude towards military affairs after the Second World War originates from its dismal defeat following nuclear strike in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US-dominated Allied occupation, Japanese demilitarization, adoption of Pacifist Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution of 1947, and lingering suspicions among neighboring East Asian states.109 The famous Yoshida doctrine basically contained three elements: “continued alliance relations with the United States, emphasis on overseas economic relations that contributes to strengthening internal economy and maintaining a low profile in international politics”. However, the doctrine caught between entrapment and abandonment and piloted by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, accepted alignment, so to say, not necessarily alliance, with the US. He visualized the option of limited rearmament. Yoshida’s vision was focused in large-scale rearmament and Japan’s reemergence as an independent military power when the time was propitious. Yoshida envisioning the vision signed the 1951 Security Treaty with the United States. This was a skilful diplomatic maneuver par excellence.

The Treaty initiated an implicit grand strategic bargain with the U.S. Under the Treaty, Japan was obliged to provide U.S. the bases that would enable U.S. power projection capability in the East Asia. In separate agreements, Japan committed a degree of responsibility for national self-defense, light rearmament and the formation of National Police Reserve in 1950 and the National Safety Force (NSF) in 1952, the forerunners of the Japanese Self-defense Force (JSDF). Yoshida was aware of being entrapped. As such, he emphasized that Japan’s security policy be predicated upon the

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principle of individual national self-defense, and avoided any attempt to integrate it into collective defense arrangement designed along the line of NATO.

3.3.2 Mutual Security Cooperation with US

probably America had a vision of keeping Japan unarmed under international supervision but the rapid change of events in the late 40's in the international scene provided different rationale to rethink about such a course. Chiang Kai-shek, America's wartime ally got defeated by the communists in 1949 and fled to Taiwan, another wartime ally Soviet Union quickly turned out to be America's greatest Cold War rival challenging American supremacy, and in 1950, Korean War pitted the communist forces primarily against the pro-democracy American forces. In the circumstances, American policy makers realized Japan to be a good bastion for the defense of American interests and democracy in the Far East. And as such, the rearmament of Japan and military alliance with the U.S. got underway.

The 1960 revised Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation between Japan and U.S. set out more clearly, though not unequivocally, the security responsibilities of Japan and the U.S. with regard to each other. Guarantee was provided in the Article 5 of the Treaty that any attack on the territory of Japan was recognized as an attack on both the partners. Article 6 of the Treaty stipulated that Japan would provide bases to the U.S. for the maintenance of security in the Far East. It is interesting to see a kind of quid pro quo scenario existing where Article 5 of Japan-US Security Treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan while Article 6 grants the United States the use of facilities and areas in Japan. It also provides a kind of balance which should again be seen differently from NATO "which provides only for shared defense by the contracting states".

When the Nixon or Guam Doctrine was espoused by America in 1969, that called for retrenchment of American forces after the debacle in the Vietnam War, America expected the treaty partners to take over more responsibilities for their own and regional security. In the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of November 1969, Japan was obliged to acknowledge that South Korea and Taiwan were respectively 'essential' and 'important' factors for Japanese security. Japan was fearful of being entrapped by the U.S. in getting drawn in security linkage, but they had to acquiesce to the American presence in the region; they were, however, rewarded by the Americans when they finally returned Okinawa back to the Japanese in 1972. Japanese again, as a countermove to hedge against abandonment, formulated National Defense

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110 Adelphi Paper 368-9, op. cit., p.25.
Outline Program (NDOP) in 1976. This was the first attempt by the Japanese to set out principles of its defense policy alongside the military force structure. It showed Japan's determination to maintain forces sufficient to defend itself initially from direct aggression; however, if the mission became impossible it would fall back to the U.S. support as a last resort. Japan's Diplomatic Blue Book makes no bone in articulating Japan's dependency for security on America, "Japan must maintain its security under the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the forward deployment of U.S. forces, as not all the situations that might threaten Japan's national security can be managed solely by Japan's own defense capabilities".\footnote{111 Diplomatic Blue Book 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, p.130.}

During 1970s and 1980s, U.S. and Japanese strategic interests converged due to the common threat of the then USSR. In 1990's, Japan's security concerns got exacerbated by China's nuclear tests in 1995, launching of missiles in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 presumably to intimidate Taiwan, China's inclusion of Senkaku Islands in its 1992 Territorial Waters Law and its crossing of the meridian line in the South China Sea. China's spectacular economic strides that have serious security implications further added to the concerns.\footnote{112 Greg Austin and Stuart Harris, Japan and Greater China: Political Economy and Military Power in the Asian Century, Hurst and Company, London, 2001, p.93.} Japan, basically, continued to act on the principle of self-defense; it kept on expanding its military capabilities that would ease the U.S. efforts to defend Japan under Article 5 of the Security Treaty. Japan's individual national self-defense meant that it provided for the conventional defense of Japan and the U.S. forces based therein in the event of a conflict. Japan was not honor bound to assist the U.S. outside Japanese territory; Japan, however, was greatly dependent on U.S. forward deployed forces to deal with any regional crisis that could impact Japan's security.

It needs no emphasis that there is deep convergence of security interests between the two countries; as such they embarked on the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) in 2002. As part of the initiative, both the governments spelt out how the two defense forces would determine their roles, missions, and capabilities. It also mentioned how best to facilitate realignment of U.S. forces, and the military facilities and areas to be provided by Japan. DPRI produced a series of policy documents starting with February 2005 '2+2' (Foreign and Defense Ministers of both the countries) document, first time in the history of US-Japan Alliance, formulated 'common strategic objectives'. This was followed by a 2005 document (again decided at the '2+2' meeting) titled "US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future". The document identified 15 areas of cooperation that called
for emphasis and improvement. Those include ballistic missile defense; counter-proliferation operations; counter-terrorism operations; search and rescue operations; humanitarian relief operations; peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations’ peacekeeping efforts. The coordination of two forces’ functioning at the practical field level is covered in Chapter 4.

3.3.3 Alignment with India and Australia

Apart from extensive strategic relations with America, Japan also cultivates good military cooperation with India and Australia. Japan wants to come out of the hub-and-spoke security arrangement and go for multilateral approach. That can be called, in an implied way, attempting to come out of entrapment. However, there are definite geopolitical reasons for Japan to go for such cooperation especially with India and Australia. This is called for by the imperative of keeping the oil lifeline open from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, and the South China Sea to Japan. The other imperative is the rise of China as a reckonable military and economic power when Taiwan imbroglio is also haunting different players. However, in official jargons, although Japan and United States see China not only as a “source of concern” but more importantly as a responsible “partner that could help to preserve the stability of the international order”. But the reality is: Japanese Defense White Paper has branded China as a security threat. “Lingering tensions between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan and on Korean Peninsula will continue, and flare-ups into actual fighting, with opportunities for serious escalation, will be a possibility.” Japan-India-US trilateral exercise in April 2007 off the Japanese coast and “Malabar 07-2” multilateral joint exercise in 2008 that involved the United States, Japan, India Australia and Singapore in the Andaman in the Bay of Bengal are concrete action plans towards a multilateral approach to security. The Bay of Bengal naval exercise is an extension of the Quadrilateral Initiative. It is also known as Quad, composed of India, Japan, the US and Australia. Beijing feels the Initiative is “an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance or ring to contain a rising China”.

114 Charles D. Lutes et al., op.cit., p.6.
of enlargement of the left over Cold War alliances which is echoed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army,

_Historical experiences have provided positive and negative evidence that exclusive alliances and military means cannot settle disputes in a radical sense and that national security cannot be guaranteed at a cost of other countries’ national security. China opposes the enlargement of the existing bilateral military alliances in Asia-pacific which were left over from the Cold War._

Japan and India have signed a bilateral defense exchange agreement called “Japan-India Global Partnership in the twenty-first Century” in August 2000. The Agreement entails an action plan called the “Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership”. In August 2007, both countries adopted the Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India. The agreement confirmed that both sides shared “common interests in such fields as maintaining the safety and security of sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, and fighting against transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”. All such exercises show Japan’s eagerness for cooperative ties with India not only to improve the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean but also for the overall security of Japan. Such eagerness is being carried forward with the installation of the present DPJ government in Japan. In a joint statement during the recent visit of Indian Defense Minister to Japan, both Japan and India expressed their “determination to take forward bilateral defense exchanges and cooperation in a meaningful way in 2010.”

As a matter of fact, both Australia and Japan want anchoring U.S. commitments to the Asia-Pacific security, as emphasized by Yoichiro Sato, “through closer coordination, cooperating on regional, extra-regional security matters delegated to them by the United States, and cooperating independent of the United States on non-military regional security initiatives”. The objective of getting U.S. commitment is clearly articulated in the 1995 two

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117 One of the eight goals outlined by the plan was for both sides to enhance bilateral security dialogue and cooperation by: (a) further developing dialogue and exchanges, including through full utilization of existing consultation forum; (b) strengthening service-to-service exchanges between defense establishments of the two countries; (c) working to ensure the safety and security of maritime traffic through joint exercises against piracy and the annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian Coast Guard talks; and (d) building up cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian Navy in recognition of the importance of maritime security.

Prime Ministers’ Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, “The Governments of Australia and Japan reaffirm their strong support for the United States’ presence and strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific as being of fundamental importance to the peace and prosperity of the region.” 119 Both Australia and Japan remain apprehensive about China’s role especially when they see China’s simultaneous efforts towards multilateral security initiatives and military modernization. In such a state of uncertainty Australia and Japan want U.S. engaged through alliances, may be bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral, in regional security basically to hedge against a potentially strong China.

As a latest move, following two Prime Ministers’ meeting in March 2007, there was the release of Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. This has been called the groundbreaking event in the sense that ever since Cold War, Japan issued a joint bilateral statement on security with a country other than the United States. 120 SDF worked alongside the Australian armed forces in UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992, in East Timor from 2002 to 2005 and in Iraq’s humanitarian assistance and reconstruction mission. Both countries are, otherwise, engaged in “high-level, working-level, and unit-to-unit” exchange based on Australia-Japan Creative Partnership.

Such cooperation draws attention to two specific areas. First one is the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) which pledges cooperation in such areas like transnational crime, border security, counterterrorism, disarmament and counter proliferation of WMD, peace operations, exchange of strategic assessments, maritime and aviation security. The list covers a wide arena that may be viewed critically. In fact, the Joint Declaration was followed up with a Japan-Australia-US Defense Ministers’ meeting in June, 2007 which is expected to boost region-wide response capabilities. This is further reinforced with deepening trilateral engagement called Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) involving Japan, Australia and United States “as well as in the area of practical defense and security cooperation, and reaffirmed the importance of the continuing presence and engagement of the United States in the region.” This was called for in the Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations Statement 2007. Ministers committed to further expansion of bilateral defense cooperation like “unit-to-unit exchanges through aircraft visits, including P-3c

and U-4, and ships, as well as enhancement of defense personnel exchanges”. The second area is UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) where Australia has substantial experience as shown. This would give Japan greater fillip to participate more actively in international peace keeping operations.\(^{121}\) Japan’s strategic posture is clearly articulated in the Australian Defense White Paper (Strategic Outlook),

> Japan is, and will remain, a significant military power. Within its alliance with the US, Japan is likely to expand slowly its strategic engagement, including by way of contributions to UN operations and multinational coalitions. Japan’s alliance with the United States has been a key stabilizing feature of the postwar regional security environment and will continue to play a vitally important role. Were Japan unable to rely on that alliance, its strategic outlook would be dramatically different, and it would be compelled to re-examine its strategic posture and capabilities.

3.3.4 Japan’s Security Vision\(^{122}\)

We may have a glance at the Preamble of Japan’s Constitution which envisioned Japan’s ideals with regard to security when the Cold War was making its way,

> We, the Japanese people,... have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving people of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize

\(^{121}\) Persian Gulf War in 1991 was a turning point in Japan’s participation in international peace keeping operations. The SDF dispatched a minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted and in the same year Japan dispatched ground forces to Cambodia in September as part of UN peace keeping operations. Following the September 11 attacks on the United States Japan enacted Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law; and its succeeding law the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law was enacted in January 2008. On the basis of these laws MSDF has been conducting refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was promulgated in 2003. Following this Law GSDF provided medical care, water supply and assistance for the recovery and improvement of infrastructure. Presently ASDF provides supplies for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from its base in Kuwait. In addition to these Japan had been or is still providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support in Rwanda, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sudan and Nepal.

\(^{122}\) Japan’s Geographical Characteristics: Approximately 380,000 km\(^2\) of land area (World’s 60\(^{th}\)), Approximately 4,470,000 km\(^2\) of territorial waters + EEZ (World’s 6\(^{th}\)), 6,852 Islands, 33,889 km of coast lines, and 22.9% of earthquakes strike Japan (Source: Overview of Japan’s Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, Japan).
that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

However, with the onset of the Cold War, Japan started drifting from its high ideals. This Preamble should be read in conjunction with the Article 9 of its Constitution (highlighted in Chapter 1). New stark realities made Japan to reconsider these ideals. Japan had to work as a bastion of anti-communism in the Far East, obviously at the behest of the United States. As such, Japan kept on moving forward on defense program. In implementing such a program, Japanese security experts and academics consider a wide array of factors/variables that determine its security policy,

National interests (maintaining reliable security at low cost), constitutional constraints on the military (Article 9 and its interpretation over the right of collective defense), institutional inertia (alliance-related bureaucracy and procedures), strategic balancing (against a rising China), gaiatsu (diplomatic pressure from Washington), threat perception (North Korean nuclear and missile programs), economic considerations (budgetary limitations and burden sharing), among other variables.\(^{123}\)

Japan’s security policy is founded on three pillars: “a) securing Japan’s appropriate defense capability, b) firmly maintaining the Japan-US security arrangements, and c) making diplomatic efforts to ensure the stability of the international environment surrounding Japan.”\(^{124}\) These factors/pillars may be considered as essential basic elements in crafting perspective plan for any military. Such variables help the policy planners to look at the horizon. All such variables are relevant and important but the budget remains the overriding constraining factor. Official defense budget of Japan for the year 2008 was US$47.3 billion\(^{125}\) and in the year 2009, it was US$50.23 billion which were one of the highest in the world. If America is kept aside, it is quite substantial even compared to China. Japan faces a budgetary dilemma as it is undergoing economic recession and its competitors, especially China, ramp up spending. There is also pressure from US to boost defense spending level.

As a matter of fact, Japan’s defense budget has consistently exceeded 1% of GNP limit since the 1980s. It fluctuated between 1.1% and 1.5%. Japan’s annual Defense of Japan White Papers does not show the military pensions and the costs of Paramilitary Japan Coast Guard (JCG). During mobilization, JCG can be directly brought under the Minister of Defense and it is increasingly possessing lethal force for “meeting the external maritime threat

\(^{123}\) Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, *op. cit.*, p.47.
from North Korea and China." Another source shows Japan’s defense expenditure for the year 2008 decreased by 0.8% from the preceding fiscal year. However, if the expenses related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and realignment of U.S. forces are taken into consideration then the decrease represents 0.5% from the previous year. And this decrease continued for the sixth consecutive year. Again new BMD budget has been appropriated as a space-related project. Total budget for space development for the year 2009 is shown to be about 349 billion Yen, a 10% increase over the 2008 budget. Most of the increase is in the military fields such as Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), space-related part of the BMD system, GX rockets, and the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). The Ministry of Defense has been allocating between US$1.10-1.99 billion annually to the missile defense project since 2004. Here the ‘veil of military secrecy’ may be working which makes it somewhat difficult to fathom the actual data.

The basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability are premised, as outlined in its official Defense Policy, on “Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks, Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces, Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands, Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan’s Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and other Vessels, Response to Large-scale and Special Disasters, and Preparation for full-scale invasion”. Fundamental elements of Japan’s defense capabilities would entail enhancement of joint operation capabilities, strengthening intelligence capabilities, incorporating the progress of science and technology in Japan’s defense capabilities, and effective utilization of Human Resources.

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Table 1: Last Five Years Defense Budget of Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Billion US$</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>44.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>Military Balance 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>Military Balance 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50.23</td>
<td>Jane’s Intelligence and Insight</td>
</tr>
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</table>


From the above objectives it can be deduced that Japan is aiming for a modern military machine that can cater for all types of likely contingencies. Contingencies range from missile attacks, Special Forces attacks, full-scale invasion, terrorism, natural disasters or limited war in any of its offshore islands. Its military machine is constantly updating its technologies, human resources, joint operations, and intelligence and air surveillance capabilities. Its perspective modernization and procurement plan is covered in Chapter 4. A fully responsive, flexible and all-weather state-of-the-art military meeting the requirements of Japan and its surrounding areas in the 21st Century is what Japan is striving to reach. It has clear cut goals, motivation, money, technology and the guaranteed support of the U.S. Military and cooperation from other militaries. So, any stakeholder would have to count the Japanese Military as a reckonable force at least in this part of the world.

It formulated the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in the past, once in 1976-77 and the other in 1995-96. Even the 1976 NDPG gave directives for a gradual, progressive improvement in Japan’s defense capability up to certain force levels that would make the SDF competent to carry out two main tasks. First, full surveillance during peacetime and, second to deal with limited acts of aggression.131 The current guidelines of NDPG 2004 was formulated (in 2005) to especially take care of the international security climate after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. NDPG calls on Japan to be more militarily active in the Indian Ocean from Middle East to Southeast Asia, "permit military exports to the United States for development of joint missile defense, mention China as a security problem

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(the first mention in a five year plan), and increase the size of rapid reaction forces, whose main mission is to prevent infiltration from North Korea). 132

It basically shows the principles of Japan’s security policy and the basic guidelines of Japan’s defense capability in the future. It includes specific organization of the SDF and the projected levels of major defense equipments. “The NDPG prescribes a major transformation of the SDF between 2005 and 2015 from its Cold War posture designed for defense of the homeland against full-scale invasion”. 133 The NDPG provides direction for Japan’s military transformation in the manner that ‘Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries’. In pursuing this Japan will make efforts to increase interoperability and connectivity with the US forces. Another point to emphasize would be cost-efficiency and digitization. IT-based defense transformation or a kind of RMA as the Chinese are pursuing may be the way forward for the Japanese SDF. 134

4. Japan’s On-going Defense Structure and Program

4.1 Objectives

The National Defense Program Guidelines define following two objectives for security, as enunciated in its defense policy:

“(1) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and in the event it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and

(2) to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.” 135

In order to achieve the objectives Japan would like to follow three approaches i.e., “Japan’s own efforts”, “cooperation with alliance partners” and “cooperation with the international community” and those are to be applied in an integrated manner.

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The phrase “international security environment” is seen obliquely by a security expert who thinks focus of Japan’s defense policy has expanded from homeland defense to one of maintaining international security. This can be linked up with the idea that Japan will take more active part in international peacekeeping activities.136

4.2 Japan’s International Peacekeeping Initiative

Apart from Japan’s own effort and collaboration with its alliance partners, being covered later in greater detail in the paper, cooperation with the international community needs a special mention here. In NDPG 2004, SDF involvement in international peace cooperation activities is seen as a major element of cooperation with the international community and “as a voluntary undertaking that Japan will proactively pursue in tandem with diplomacy”.

Ryu lists at least three reasons why peacekeeping and humanitarian activities became one of the core areas of Japanese foreign policy. Firstly, it suits Japan's strategy of multilateral approach to global issues. Secondly, it contributes in lessening the spectre of revival of Japanese militarism. And thirdly, the peacekeeping and humanitarian activities, perceived to be non-military as these do not involve the use of force, would not be construed as unconstitutional and would be accepted as legitimate international activities. The language describing SDF's overseas activities changed from "international contribution" to "international peace cooperation activities" which implies Japan would like to get involved actively, to meet various challenges faced by the world, as a responsible member of the international community. This has been shown as the primary mission of the SDF; however they call it "Second Priority Mission". Elaborating, the NDPG 2004 specified certain measures like "develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense forces units overseas and carry out missions continuously; make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces Missions".

In order to accommodate these objectives, SDF Act has been amended in January 2007. Upon America's bidding, Aso Cabinet decided to dispatch SDF units to Somalian waters on "anti-piracy mission". The government is even thinking of enacting a law "to dispatch units overseas and allow them to use force in violation of the Constitution". A question arises here: is Japan aspiring to involve itself overseas more actively under the garb of international peace cooperation activities? Although Japan has already undertaken many such operations overseas, it is still premature to come to such a conclusion. However, case wise crisis situations that tend to directly affect Japan's security will unfold Japan's implied agenda, if any. The Economist's comments reinforce the apprehension,

Soon after 2001 attacks, parliament passed a special law authorizing ships from the Maritime SDF to help America's fleet in the Indian Ocean. The law restricted cooperation to refueling and logistics, but Japan's navy, in effect, provided rear support for the invasion of Afghanistan.

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137 Yongwook Ryu, *op. cit.*, p.73.
139 Politicalaffairs.net - Marxist Thought Online, 1-28 February 2009 (Original Source: Akahata, Japan).
140 "From Pacifism to Populism", *The Economist*, 8 July 2004.
In a similar vein, Japan’s Defense Minister clearly articulates Japan’s position,

... the Self-Defense Forces have to prepare for long-term international activities, amid increasingly extensive, multi-functional and protracted forms of recent international peace operations. It is also important to establish comprehensive and general domestic legislation to enable swift and effective participation in wider range of international peace operation.\footnote{141}

4.3 Nuclear Capability?

For nuclear threat, Japan would like to depend on U.S. umbrella while at the same time play an active role for disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, a question may be raised here: is there any possibility of Japan going nuclear itself because of North Korea’s nuclear tests? Waltz raises a question: “How long can Japan live alongside other nuclear states while denying itself similar capabilities?”\footnote{142} Japan has plenty of fissile materials and its space program’s advanced rockets could easily be used to carry nuclear payloads. 1970 Japanese Defense White Paper mentioned that “obtaining defensive nuclear weapons would not violate Japan’s peace Constitution”. In addition to super computer capabilities, “Japan has acquired sophisticated laser enrichment technology which makes it possible to produce weapons grade 90 percent enriched uranium very quickly in a relatively small plant”. In June 1994, Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata disclosed in the Diet that, “It is certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them”.\footnote{143} Japan is unlikely to go for nuclear weapons, but it is no longer a taboo; “and unlikely has now replaced inconceivable” which was the case earlier.\footnote{144}

Such a move may not be viewed positively by the Americans. Masahiro Matsumura substantiates such a hunch that “Japan’s nuclearization may jeopardize the US-Japan alliance, should the US regard the move as a challenge to US superiority or a manifestation of Japanese mistrust in the US nuclear umbrella.”\footnote{145} Such a view is also shared by an American expert Michael Green who thinks that there is likely to be increasing debate over

\footnote{141}{“The Major Powers and Asian Security: Cooperation or Conflict?” Speech by Yasukazu Hamada, Minister of Defense of Japan, at Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2009.}
\footnote{142}{K. N. Waltz, “Structural realism after the Cold War”, \textit{International Security} 25 (1), 2000, p.34.}
\footnote{144}{Gerald Curtis, \textit{op. cit.}, p.11.}
\footnote{145}{Masahiro Matsumura, “Prudence and Realism in Japan’s Nuclear Options”, The Brookings Institution, 10 November 2006.}
how much Japan should have its own nuclear capability and how much it should rely on American umbrella. He suggests Japan should ultimately rely on American extended nuclear deterrence. Moreover, by going nuclear, Japan's impeccable image as a champion of nuclear disarmament would be greatly tarnished. Nonetheless, Japan vows to develop "adequate scale of defense capability" in addition to relying on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements that include extended nuclear deterrence. In the final analysis, the possibility of Japan going nuclear may not be totally ruled out.

Japan is determined to fill the power vacuum and, thereby, restrain destabilizing the surrounding region. Japan, therefore, wants to develop the future defense capability that can become "multifunctional, flexible, and effective that can take care of various contingencies through flexible response and induction of varieties of defense equipment". As regards Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Japan would continue to have Strategic Dialogue with the United States like strategic objectives, role-sharing, and military posture. To put it concretely, Japan would like to go for information sharing, various operational cooperation, and cooperation on BMD. The role envisaged in the vision for the future defense capability includes "effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies preparation to deal with full scale-invasion and proactive efforts, on Japan's own initiative, to improve the international security environment".

4.4 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

Japanese BMD capabilities are being reinforced by American X-Band Radar System and U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities, which, put together, make a formidable defense against missile attacks in the Japanese territories. Japan, in 2005, embarked upon, with the support of the United States, jointly develop and produce a next-generation sea-based interceptor missile. Japan is committed to go for licensed production of PAC-3 missiles. Japanese and Americans conducted the Aegis-based missile-defense system off Hawaii in November 2005 and March 2006.

146 “Seven Questions: Reshaping Japan's Security”, Foreign Policy, Washington, DC, Posted August 2006, and WEB EXCLUSIVE.
In March 2007, Japan deployed its first ever BMD system with PAC-3 battery at an Air Self-defense Force base near Tokyo. This follows North Korea’s test launch of ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan in 1993 and Japan’s decision to go for BMD deployment in 2003. US BMD capabilities, in the areas surrounding Japan, had already been strengthened by the deployment of Forward-based X-band Transportable (FBX-T) radar set in Tsugaru city, Aomori Prefecture in June 2006 and stationing of the USS Shiloh, a SM-3 equipped Aegis guided missile cruiser in Yokosuka in the following August.\(^{148}\) The country will establish a system to counter missile attacks, including one approved in 2003. By the end of 2008 MSDF refurbished its Kongo and Chokai Aegis destroyers with SM-3s and ASDF deployed Patriot PAC-3 missiles to five of its fire units, and Air Defense Missile Training Group and 2\(^{nd}\) Technical School. Japan plans to develop a system by 2011 “to link the various types of command, control, and battle management and communications systems, starting with Japan Air Defense Ground Environment (JADGE), four Aegis destroyers (with added BMD capability), 16 Patriot PAC-3 FUs (fire units), four FPS-5 radars and seven FPS-3 upgraded radars (improved model) … a Japanese–US joint development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced from

Japan is involved with US in developing missile defense technologies; such technologies are so sophisticated that those could be used for offensive capabilities as well.

...the historic transformation in US-Japanese relations and their far-reaching strategic cooperation on ballistic missile defense pushed through by Abe’s predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, will not be quietly slowed down, strapped of funds, or bureaucratically sidelined. The great US Japanese strategic alliance on developing BMD is here to stay.

4.5 Japan’s Military Space Program

Militarization of Japan’s space activity started in mid-1980s. Japan’s BMD program and the deployment of spy satellites are taking it to “breach entirely the anti-militaristic principle on the peaceful use of space”. Reconnaissance spy satellites, called the “information gathering satellites” (IGS), were put into operation in 1988; such acronym was ostensibly used to avoid violation of “the principle of peaceful use of space”. It is believed IGS were primarily meant to “monitor military activities of ‘possible’ threats”. In 2000 the first Japanese astronaut participated in the US second Shuttle flight mission. The mission was meant to “military use of satellite data of the global three dimensional land surfaces for guided missiles”.

Both LDP and DPJ passed the Basic Law for Space Activities in May 2008. Its Article 2 states that “Japan will conduct activities in space in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, thereby permitting the use of space for ‘defensive’ purposes.” The revision of the meaning of “peaceful” use in the Law implies from “non-military” use to “non-aggressive” use. This may be viewed contradicting the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution, which declares that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained” (mentioned in Chapter 1). The Law permitted establishment of a Strategic Headquarters for the Development of Outer Space (SHDOS) in August 2008, directly under the Prime Minister. The SHDOS in its draft report in November 2008 suggested that “Japan might need to introduce infrared early-warning satellites for detecting ballistic missiles in their launch phase”. Japan’s space capability opens a new

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151 Maeda Sawako, op.cit. The author further mentions that the four IGS systems, two of them having optical sensors and other two imaging radar capabilities, can scout any point on the Earth at least once a day. The project was completed in 2007. Three more new generation IGS are poised to be launched between 2009 and 2014.
152 Christopher W. Hughes, op.cit., pp.48-49.
dimension and horizon for its SDF. This is likely to provide further stimulus to action-reaction cycle.

4.6 Self-Defense Force (SDF)\textsuperscript{153}

Chinese observers believe that Japan’s SDF is much stronger than what it apparently appears. They stress that it is the best-equipped military force in Asia and its defense budget is the second highest in the world.\textsuperscript{154} Jason T. Shaplen and James Laney in the \textit{Foreign Affairs}, asserts that “the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are also well equipped, with 1,000 tanks, a blue water navy, and an air force that is scheduled to accept delivery this year of midair refueling tankers, an addition that will extend Japan’s operational reach beyond self-defense.”\textsuperscript{155} However such assertions deserve a review and a separate study. Having said so, patrol and surveillance round the clock in the sea and the airspace in and around Japan remain an important role of SDF and, therefore, Japan maintains the defense structure that consists of state-of-the-art warships, aircraft and other equipment. Japan is concerned about the North Korean armed spy vessels and Chinese submerged nuclear submarines in Japanese territorial waters. Japan is determined to take effective preventive measures against any such encroachments. Now in order for this defense capability to function effectively, Japan would like to retain and utilize advanced intelligence capabilities. Japan vows to strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities.

\textit{In particular advance command and communications systems, and information communications network shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems as well as speedy intelligence-sharing systems, which are indispensable for the SDF’s joint operations... in tune with advanced information and communication technologies available at home and abroad.}\textsuperscript{156}

Apart from ensuring the territorial integrity, SDF’s primary role has been further expanded like UN peacekeeping operation, international emergency relief, and other international peace cooperation activities, rear area support under the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Safety of Japan in areas.


\textsuperscript{154} Jian Yang, \textit{op.cit.}, p.98.


surrounding Japan, minesweeping, and emergency transport of Japanese nationals overseas. And these are to be shared by all components of SDF. The new guideline directs the downsizing of SDF, manpower wise, and to acquire sustained capability of fighting against nuclear, chemical and biological threats, and of maritime operations overseas for prolonged period.

4.7 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

Japan has reorganized the formation and deployment of Basic Strategic Units of GSDF geared to respond to the new security environment. GSDF is generally organized into Northern, Northeastern, Eastern, Middle, Western armies, and a Central Readiness Force. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief for the US Congress (Updated 31 March 2006) shows GSDF has to have a rapid-response headquarters at Camp Zama and a bilateral and joint operations centre at Yakota Air Base (about 23 miles northwest of Tokyo). In 2007, GSDF established a Central Readiness Group (CRG) consisting of 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, 101st Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Unit and Special Operations Group (SOG) to work “as a rapid-reaction force for coordinating nationwide mobile operations, responding to domestic terrorism, guerilla incursions and NBC warfare, and training personnel for overseas deployment”.157 Each Army has two to three divisions with other varieties and types of brigades (As of 31 March 2008). There are two such types of formations like Modernized Readiness Divisions and Brigades having heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery to allow quick and effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies. The second variety is Modernized Comprehensive Divisions and Brigades—with focus placed on total balance to allow response to all situations. The entire Japanese island territories have been divided into 14 sections considering Japan’s geographical features like mountains, rivers and straits which either the Modernized Comprehensive Division/Brigade or Modernized Readiness Division/Brigade would take care.158 The Force is also being tailored to react quickly to various low-intensity military contingencies and defending important installations. It is also being refurbished to respond quickly to overseas missions.

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157 Christopher W. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p.41.
4.8 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

MSDF has a Self-Defense Fleet comprising Fleet Escort Force, Fleet Air Force and Fleet Submarine Force. It has other fleets called Yokosuka District, Kure District, Sasebo District, Maizuru District and Ominato District (As of March 31, 2008). Submarine units of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) have been reorganized to respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. A total of 16 submarines have been assigned to four Divisions (Four vessels for each Division). They have been deployed in important traffic points in East China Sea and the Sea of Japan to detect new threats that may emanate and taking possible actions to meet diverse contingencies. MSDF maintains around 150 combat aircraft that includes patrol aircraft, minesweeping and transportation helicopters. For fixed wing patrol aircraft P-3 successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance are being introduced.\footnote{Ibid., pp.131-132.} The Force has been directed to put emphasis on the defense of off-shore islands, defense against ballistic missiles, and dealing with incursions by “armed special-operations” vessels.

4.9 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

two Air Wings, two Air Defense Missile Groups and other support services. It has auxiliaries like Air Support Command, Air Training Command and Air Development and Test Command (as of 31 March 2008). ASDF has a fleet of around 350 combat aircrafts including fighters. Fighter aircrafts are meant for taking timely action against violation of airspace. They are, a little bit, downsizing the fleet keeping in view the less possibility of full-scale invasion of Japan. However, they are upgrading the transport and deployment capabilities in order to effectively respond to the invasion of its offshore islands and to participate in international peace keeping operations. ASDF took delivery of KC-767 tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling. Airborne early-warning group has been reorganized, through functional separation, into E-767 and E-2c units. Japanese upgradation/modernization craze asked for American F-22 aircraft which was rejected on the ground that Americans do not sell this aircraft to any ally. However, another factor, as given in a Congressional Research Service report, could be that such sale would have negative impact on Sino-U.S. relations. Americans have instead urged Japan to accept F-35 aircraft in place of F-22. However, Richard A. Bitzinger maintains that “pressure is growing to permit the export of the F-22 fighter to Japan”.

Japan is looking for fifth generation aircrafts like F-22A and Euro fighter Typhoon, F-35 Lightning II, F-18E/F Super Hornet, F-15X and Rafale along with airborne warning and control system (AWACS). In Northeast Asia, only Japan along with the United States is having AWACS system. China is likely to have full-fledged AWACS soon. China has substantial quantities of fourth-generation aircrafts like Su-27 and Su-30. So, in order to hold the balance in its favor, Japan would need fifth-generation aircrafts. Such necessity is further accentuated due to the fact that the regions encompassing the Ryukyu and Sakishima Islands would demand more attention in the days to come. This region is now covered by one ASDF base called the Naha Air Base in Okinawa. Such deficiency can greatly be overcome by fifth-generation aircraft. Japan, in order to respond more effectively to an invasion of its offshore islands and international peace cooperation activities, planned

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163 Of the six aircraft mentioned here, only F-22A and F-35 may be called “fifth-generation” fighters while the others may be referred to as “4.5 generation” fighters.
to establish new Aerial/Transports Units and induct next-generation transport aircraft (C-X).\textsuperscript{164}

\textbf{Figure 5: Deployment of Fighter Units}


4.10 Higher Defense Organization

Keeping in view the phenomenal development of Japanese Self Defense Forces, as covered, over the years Japan upgraded its Defense Agency to a ministry; the Ministry of Defense was approved by majority members of Diet and was set up in January 2007. The Ministry is expected to fulfill its responsibility of national defense. The creation of the Ministry marks a fresh start towards achievement of new policy goals including those regarding the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) and international peace keeping operations. The Cabinet has complete authority over matters related to defense. The Prime Minister representing the Cabinet acts as the supreme commander of the SDF. There are measures to strengthen command functions at the Prime Minister's Office and at the Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense is being functionally reinforced by the Bureau of Defense Policy and Joint Staff, and unification of defense capability build-up sections and so on.\textsuperscript{165}

Additionally, the Security Council, as a Cabinet organ, is primarily responsible for deliberating on critical matters related to defense and crisis management. The Security Council, somewhat following the American model, plays a critical role in government’s decision making process and is expected to play the role as the principal implementer of the Integrated Security Strategy. The Security Council is expected to be used as a forum for in-depth analysis of security policy by the Cabinet ministers. In May 2009, Japan created the Defense Council under the Ministry of Defense. The Council, comprising of the Minister of Defense and other political appointees, civilian and SDF regular personnel, would deliberate on basic policies related to matters that come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry. NDPG prescribed for the creation of Joint Staff Office- which was established in April 2006 “to improve cross-service operational planning, enhanced intelligence collection and analytic capabilities, and qualitative improvements to the force through the acquisition of technology, particularly information processing and network capabilities.”

Japan has enhanced its integrated joint staff operations posture by amending the SDF Law and JDA Establishment Law in July 2005. According to the new system, the Joint Chief of Staff, created in March 2006, is now responsible, on all operational matters of SDF, to the Minister of State for Defense. All operational matters originating from the Minister are routed through him. Administrative matters like training, logistics and personnel affairs are handled by the respective Services Chiefs. In keeping with the shift in joint operations posture, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, with better refined role, has been placed directly under the Minister of Defense. The change has brought about better synergy and high quality analysis of intelligence inputs of other intelligence organizations of the Ministry. The Ministry has established a Life-Cycle Cost Management Office to arrive at a decision-making based on defense requirements and cost performance by utilizing the Integrated Project Team (IPT) method.

All such developments show Japan’s higher defense management is being reshaped and reinvigorated, in a hierarchical and structured manner, to formalize decision-making and handle more effectively the command and control system. This is sine quo non for any modern military to take care of diversified threat scenarios in a holistic manner.

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166 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., op. cit., p.241.
167 Noboru Yamaguchi, op. cit.
4.11 Salient Features of Perspective Defense Procurement and Modernization Plan

Japan goes ahead with its mission/goal oriented, that includes its expanded role, perspective plan to bolster its defense capability. The plan is developed in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005”. The program has been approved by the Japanese Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. As indicated in the Defense of Japan 2008 (pp.403-407) published by Japanese Ministry of Defense, Japan plans to refurbish the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) and develop a new warning and control radar that could effectively detect and track ballistic missiles. It proposes joint Japan-US technical research targeting the sea-based upper tier system. Another source mentions that ASDF has upgraded its BADGE to Japan Air Defense Ground Environment (JADE) as “the principal coordinator of Japanese air defense in the event of a missile attack”.

Japan wants to go ahead with the transformation plan for GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. It wants to inject more mobility, flexibility, and preparedness in its five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades of GSDF. It will create Central Readiness Force (CRF) that can cater for nation-wide mobile and special tasks operations. This is, as understood, already operational. The authorized personnel for GSDF by the end of 2009 will be 161,000. For MSDF it will raise eight Escort divisions of destroyers for mobile operations. One of the Escort divisions will be earmarked for regional deployment. It plans to consolidate five Submarine divisions, four Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft units, and five Patrol Helicopter units. For ASDF it plans to refurbish the Early Warning Group and also establish the first ever Aerial Refueling Transport Unit. U.S. instructors are reported to have trained the Japanese pilots in air-to-air refueling skills as part of preparation for acquiring KC-767 refueling and strategic transport aircraft.

Japan plans to procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeping transport helicopters (MCH-101), modernize early warning aircraft (E-2C), procure new patrol aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and modernize early warning and control aircraft (E-767). It will modernize F-15 fighter aircraft and procure new fighters, as already mentioned, that will replace F-4s aircraft. Japan will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters and so on.

168 Christopher W. Hughes, op. cit., p.47.
Japan will create a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities and procure relevant equipment to bolster such activities. It will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct more joint exercises and take measures for effective joint operations. It proposes to modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3) and convert some of the F-15 fighters into reconnaissance aircraft.

It wants to go for advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network. It seeks to strengthen the capability to respond to cyber attacks and enhance information sharing with relevant organizations. In areas of Research and Development (R&D) Japan will promote activities to develop next generation aircraft to replace P-3Cs and C-130s and next generation tanks. It wants to put special emphasis on R&D by introducing advanced technologies of industries, government and academic worlds by using modeling and simulation methods. In such efforts Japan wants to promote cooperation with US and other nations.

4.12 SDF and USFJ Coordination

As stipulated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, SDF and U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ) will together act as deterrent to prevent an armed attack against Japan. U.S. support to SDF is a critical and core element in Japanese security, both in context of its mainland and areas surrounding Japan. However there are some ambiguities in the interpretation of the term ‘areas surrounding Japan’. When a crisis situation arises which might affect Japanese security in its different connotations both SDF and U.S. Military will, in all likelihood, get inextricably linked. There is little choice to see one separate from the other, given the language of the Guidelines and the common threats that may emanate. Threats to Japanese mainland, offshore islands, Taiwan issue, oil lifeline along the Indian and Pacific oceans, missile attacks, terrorists’ attacks, piracies etc. would trigger both the powers to fight hand in gloves to protect their mutual interests. A scrutiny of the language of the Guidelines justifies such a resolve.

Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline”. In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces...... Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan...... Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of US-Japan defense
cooperation......Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan......The Self Defense Forces will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. Forces support Self-Defense Forces' operations. U.S. Forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces.170

There is hardly any ambiguity in the language. It is loud and clear to proclaim that they would work in tandem to tackle any crisis situation in the Far East, let alone Japanese mainland. It is going to be a joint planning and rock-solid defense against any potential adversary both in the Japanese mainland and ‘areas surrounding Japan’ as the language suggests. This is further concretized by the fact that combined planning between the two forces are being undertaken at the appropriate command levels “and the creation of a new US-Japan Joint Task Force Headquarters at Camp Zama in 2008.”171 This, however, does not affect Japan from being an independent military power. Historical legacy and geopolitical compulsions have put Japan in such a sticky situation. However, DPJ, as a political party, is opposed to the agreement “to relocate the Marine Air Corps base at Futenma in Okinawa to elsewhere in the prefecture”. It also called for the revision of the status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Japan.172 Now that DPJ has formed the government, the Obama Administration is expected to engage in deliberate negotiations to come out with a win-win practical outcome for both.

Okinawa,173 strategically better located to take care of countries in East Asia, is basically housing the U.S. forces including Marine Corp, primarily

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171 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., *op. cit.*, p.244.
173 “Okinawa is historically very distinctive within the Japanese national context...The island chain is physically quite removed from the rest of the Japanese archipelago, with the Pacific Ocean on one side, and East China Sea and beyond it mainland China and Taiwan, on the other. After Japan’s defeat by the Allied Forces in 1945, Okinawa was kept under US occupation until 1972.....Even after the return of sovereignty to Japan, Okinawa remained home to heavy concentration of US troops in Asia-Pacific, by far the largest within Japan. The end of the Cold War and changes in regional geopolitics did not change Okinawa’s status as the most concentrated base for US troops.”(Source: Purnendra Jain, *Japan’s Sub national Governments in International Affairs*, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series, London, 2005, p.154.)
responsible to meet varied contingencies. Of the marine elements, apart from the Army and the Air Force, 3rd Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, equipped with F/A-18, are both deployed in Japan. US Pacific Air Force deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16 and C-130 aircraft in Japan. In case of operations to defend Japan USFJ can call for timely reinforcements. As a matter of fact, Okinawa is crucial to the security designs of the Americans. Japanese Ground Self-defense Forces (GSDF) has also operational plans for deployment in Okinawa Prefecture in case of Taiwan conflict. There is a joint proposal of landing military flights in an island, situated halfway between Okinawa and Taiwan.

5. Ramifications
5.1 Political and Military-Strategic

Japan’s rearmament, expanding its alliance-type strategy to bolster its strategic clout would have ramifications, in different dimensions, scale and intensity. Action-reaction cycle is likely to get activated or is already activated. Japan is an important edifice in the security architecture of America in the Asia-Pacific. Within the parameters of this architecture, Japan wants to build its own military capability as already indicated, independent of America, so that it could, on its own, ensure its security. It is unlikely that America may vacate the area in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Japan will have to fit into and play an active role in the scheme of things in the Asia-Pacific. Japan neither wants entrapment by America nor wants abandonment by it as already highlighted. Within the continuum, Japan wants to have enough military power to be able to mean business in the region; however, it would continue to have American protection. If America leaves the scene, the region is likely to get destabilized. Arms race will further multiply. There is a possibility that Japanese militarism might then perk up, as inferred from her imperialistic

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174 However, as per an agreement signed in February 2009, both the governments emphasize “the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014...”(Agreement Between The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam.(Source: Security Relations-Major Documents, Embassy of the United States in Japan).


expansion in Southeast Asia, Korea, China and the Pacific islands both before and during the Second World War.

Japan is concerned about its oil life line than runs from the Persian Gulf through Malacca Strait and South-China Sea to Japan. This would be critical for Japan’s economy and life sustenance. Again, in case of American withdrawal – which is most unlikely – a renewed military rivalry will reemerge between China and Japan. Even if Japan wants to diffuse major tensions with neighboring China, it may encounter snags because of Japan’s commitment to making BMD its top priority. As a reaction to this BMD, which is reinforced by American system, China is likely to expand its nuclear arsenal with more MIRV and MRV warheads, including warheads in SLBMs. This will activate China to go for better refinement, more range, more sophistication, and more penetrability. This is natural as part of action-reaction cycle in power-politics game. Even North Koreans would not lag in such initiative. North Koreans, in fact, are closer to acquiring nuclear weapons or have already acquired it as latest reports suggest. Given that North Korea may not be interested in the longer term peaceful co-existence with South Korea, Japan, or the U.S., it is unlikely that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear and missile ambitions and, thus, continue to remain a “strategic challenge” to regional security. “In the absence of a clearly stated U.S. commitment to their security, Seoul and/or Tokyo may undertake independent nuclear weapons programs to safeguard their security.” China is perturbed to the prospect that, in case North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, it would propel other states like Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan to go nuclear. This is a logical outcome in an action-reaction cycle. Such a prospective reality may give rise to the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) at the regional level.

In case of invasion of Taiwan by China, America is likely to intervene militarily. An Action-reaction cycle may be imagined hypothetically here as outlined by a Chinese expert Chu Shulong. The war on Taiwan will be mainly confined to sea and air. In case it escalates, where America gets involved, it is likely America will use its aircraft carriers and combat planes. China may retaliate by attacking the aircraft carriers with missiles. America may then react by hitting the Chinese missiles on its soil. China’s reaction may be to launch a large-scale attack against US forces in Asia and Pacific. Now if America further retaliates by targeting other assets in the mainland, then China will have no choice but to use nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, one

178 Tan Er-Win, *op. cit.*, pp.572-574.
of the objectives of China’s nuclear deterrence strategy. But the consequences of its use can be cataclysmic.

Now to see it from Japanese perspective, Japan, in all probability, will get entangled in the fray. In case China takes over Taiwan, there is every possibility that China may blockade sea lanes around Taiwan. This would be critical for the Japanese oil shipping. China could even attempt to take over the Senkaku Islands as already pointed out.\textsuperscript{181} There are also other disputed territorial claims between Japan and China, between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and Russia. There are disputes over the sea resources in the region especially, in Spratly and Paracel island groups which could be labeled as flashpoints. Japan cannot remain oblivious in case these flashpoints give rise to tensions in the region. America and China may get involved. As an appendage, Japan will be drawn in the imbroglio. An observation may be made here: through reverse logic, if China takes a hard-line policy towards Japan and America, it may prove counterproductive. Instead, normal relations with these countries may dilute the influence of China factor which otherwise contributes to the strengthening of US-Japan alliance. China may play less emotional diplomacy in order not to stoke the nationalist and revivalist voices in Japan.\textsuperscript{182} This may also contribute in deactivating the geopolitical action-reaction cycle. Flaring up of ramifications may be contained. It is, however, difficult to envision a clear and straight forward scenario since China has, as Ian Wilson observes, a polygonal view of Japan. China sees Japan as, “a cruel invader, an economic model, a military threat, and an important source of aid, investment and technology.”\textsuperscript{183} Contradictory perceptions apply and, as such, each party has to be careful in dealing with each other. Again, China would find it difficult to drive a wedge between Japan and America as America could do so between China and USSR in 1971. On the other hand, if Japan is allowed a free hand, it would reinvigorate militarism of which China itself was a victim.

Being aware of such complexities, Japan is also concerned about its own security which propels it to resurface as a strong military power, when it is already an economic super-power. It has a history of military adventurism especially in Southeast and East Asia. Such a legacy may also have its impact

\textsuperscript{181} Quoted in Qingxin Ken Wang, “Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War”, \textit{Pacific Affairs}, Vol. 73, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p.361.


on Japan’s military modernization. America is already playing the role of a sword for Japan when Japan is playing the role of a shield. Both powers are deeply entrenched in the militarization of the region. Not withstanding the constraints imposed by its Constitution and the parameters set out in the alliance framework, over the years, Japan is clamoring for the status of a normal military power. This trend would continue to grow like it has established a full-fledged Ministry of Defense, and going strong with the BMD system for the mainland and the surrounding areas. More so, after North Korea’s nuclear test, Japan and South Korea received American assurances of its extended deterrence.\textsuperscript{184} This may have serious repercussions in the balance of power and action-reaction cycle. Japan is poised to exert itself militarily. “Japan’s neighbors…….note the speed with which Japan could transform itself into a country that could project overwhelming military power throughout the region.” Japan dispatched nearly 1,000 troops plus ships, planes, and equipment to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq; \textit{Washington Post} sees it as the “most significant operation” by Japan since World War II and a “major shift in the country’s foreign policy”\textsuperscript{185}

Both America and Japan will have to be accommodative to meet their respective geopolitical or strategic objectives. Power politics dictate that America-Japan military alliance/alignment would continue to grow to checkmate Chinese influence in the region, although Japanese people would ask for more freedom in crafting its own security policy.\textsuperscript{186} However, Japan’s position for its independent force structure posture will have to be given a greater leeway; admittedly, that would also be in America’s interest. Again, Japanese decision to delineate SDF peacekeeping role, as one of its primary functions, will have far reaching consequences. Japan’s constitution may be reinterpreted to cover Japan’s growing ability to legally play a more assertive unilateral and multilateral military role. “International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) and the 1997 defense guidelines with the U.S. demonstrate that the Japanese government can avoid the supposed limitations of Article 9 to provide a mechanism to meet international obligations”\textsuperscript{187}

Japan, in 2002, dispatched vessels to waters near Afghanistan and troops to Iraq in 2003, as already mentioned; in both cases it was restricted to non-

\textsuperscript{184} Charles D. Lutes et al., \textit{op.cit.}, p.11.  
\textsuperscript{187} Mathew J. Gilley, “Japan’s Developing Military Potential within the Context of Its Constitutional Renunciation of War”, \textit{Emory International Law Review} 14, Fall 2000, p. 1716
combat roles, a position true for few other coalition members as well. Any particular crisis situation may stoke Japan to stretch such role playing. As a matter of fact, "No covering framework of UN peacekeeping operations was required as long as the SDF operated in "areas without conflicts"... Japan dispatched the SDF without the framework of UN peacekeeping operations, although Japan's cooperation with the U.S. was limited to logistical support at the rear".\textsuperscript{188} Such actions were actuated with the passage of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, 2001.

5.2 Right to Collective Self-Defense

Ruling elite is even thinking to pass a law to enable dispatching SDF without Diet approval. This may propel the SDF to procure long-range aircraft to transport units overseas which is probably underway; that will ultimately lead to the changing profile of SDF.\textsuperscript{189} There is a strong possibility that Japan will tilt more towards collective self-defense especially when it is aspiring to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, although Japan remains dependent on American security protection. Japan, has begun its transition to a collective security with some degree of regional force projection. Its dependency relationship with America is being redefined.\textsuperscript{190} This is further reinforced by Anthony Faiola, referring to Japanese Prime Minister Abe, who thinks Japan wants to be a more equal partner with the U.S. and he further adds, "He will strive for a version of Washington's relationship with Britain, which closely cooperates with the U.S. military but acts on its own as it sees fit."\textsuperscript{191} Such projection clearly corroborates Japan's implied objectives in its massive military modernization. Possible scenarios for collective security could be like ballistic missile attack on the U.S., SDF ships providing cover to U.S. vessels under attack in international waters near Japan, SDF cover to other militaries in international reconstruction assistance and extent of rear area support to U.S. in a military attack.\textsuperscript{192} Japanese policy planners are considering making it lawful to intercept any missile on its way to the U.S. as a right of collective self-defense. As a matter of fact, in May 2007, Prime Minister Abe's expert panel started deliberating whether Japan could legally exercise the right to participate in collective self-defense in similar

\textsuperscript{188} Kyoko Hatakeyama, \textit{op. cit.}, p.27.
\textsuperscript{190} Quoted in Duncan McCargo, \textit{Contemporary Japan}, Palgrave, New York, 2000, p.163.
\textsuperscript{192} Arpita Mathur, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 742.
circumstances. In June 2008, the panel submitted its report to the then Prime Minister Fukuda recommending, reinterpreting the constitution, to allow the SDF "to exercise the right of collective self-defense in certain specified situations". Its further connotations are examined in the subsequent paragraphs.\(^{193}\)

It is critical to imagine Japan is having offensive capabilities – apart from being a ‘normal’ military force – in collective security operations. Japan can claim to possess the right to collective self-defense – ‘the right to use force to stop armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations’ – on two counts: one it does so under the UN charter as well as Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty (alliance), scenarios are already visualized in the preceding paragraph. In an implied way, Security Council will be drawn in case of an armed attack and all measures taken thereof in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. International law permits Japan, being a sovereign state, to have the right of collective self-defense. However, “the Japanese government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit on self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.”\(^{194}\) Ground reality, depending on the contingencies, may prove to the contrary as already portrayed.

As an extrapolation, the Japanese policy makers would like to promote the debate on the difference between the right of collective self-defense exercised by individual nations and the collective actions or measures undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations including peacekeeping operations. Outcome of such debate may be tallied with the spirit of the Pacifist Constitution.\(^{195}\) There appears to be some leeway available to the Japanese to exercise the right of collective self-defense depending on the contingencies that may emanate. Japan’s military modernization along with American support would have security ramifications for the Japanese mainland, the areas surrounding Japan – that may include the Far East – and even beyond. If somehow hard power takes control, Japanese military may mean business in deciding the outcome.

Overall, it can be surmised that the geopolitical conditions obtaining and given the national interests, there would be a continuing basis for security cooperation between Japan and the United States. There are ample regional security concerns for the alliance and whatever else may be the ramifications, nothing is likely to rupture the U.S.-Japan relations at least in the foreseeable

\(^{193}\) Eiichi Katabara, *op.cit.*, pp.4-6.

\(^{194}\) Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2008*.

future; this would be also necessary for the stability and security of the entire region. However, a note on *modus operandi* given by an American scholar may be pertinent here. In 1980s and early 1990s the U.S. thought “Keeping Japan in a box that it wanted to stay” but today one has to help Japan “out of a box that it wants to get out of”. On this count, there should be a common vision of what constitutes a “normal” Japan and the role it aspires to play in East Asia and beyond. Any such vision will require a mutual strategy towards China. This is further corroborated by another scholar who says “Japan is once again becoming a “natural” major power ……...Japan’s military is beginning to equip itself with both shield and spear…………the Japanese are signaling their intention to play a more active role in regional security”.\(^{197}\)

However, the situation is fraught with danger. Japan’s too much tilt towards a greater participation to UN-sponsored operations may also push Japan away from its much avowed right of collective defense.\(^{198}\) Depending on the situation, Japan’s Constitution may be amended or its Article 9 may be interpreted suitably. As Gilley notes, the 1992 “International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) and the 1997 defense guidelines with the U.S. demonstrate that the Japanese government can avoid the supposed limitations of Article 9 to provide a mechanism to meet international obligations”.\(^{199}\) Yoshihide Soeya, however, argues differently, “Without changing Article 9, Japan can’t become a full-fledged middle power. It can’t become part of peacekeeping or multilateral forces like Canadian forces in Afghanistan”.\(^{200}\)

Such a statement carries a substantive and meaningful message but in reality while encountering a contingency that imperils Japan’s vital interests there is a possibility that such a restriction may be overruled. A necessity may then arise to amend the Article. A German newspaper *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* pointed out that Japan’s pacifism came to an end when Prime Minister Koizumi tied its defense policy with America’s Pacific policy.\(^{201}\)

America would probably support the revision of Article 9 which is borne out in the 2000 Armitage-Nye Report, “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation….but Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make

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\(^{198}\) Aurelia George Mulgan, *op.cit*.

\(^{199}\) Mathew J. Gilley, *op.cit.*, p.1716.

\(^{200}\) John Feffer, *op.cit*.

\(^{201}\) Quoted in Major General (Retired) Pan Zhenqiang, *op. cit*. 
a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner”. The Diet passed a bill “calling for a national referendum as early as 2010 to amend Article 9 of the constitution.... The government has also been seeking to reinterpret the constitution in order to allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense with the United States, which could theoretically include supporting the United States in a conflict with China over Taiwan”. In such a scenario, the ramifications may turn out to be like this as foreseen by Francis Fukuyama: U.S. will not be only seen as a traditional ally but also support Japan’s reemergence as a great power. It may drive South Korea closer to China and in the process U.S. and Japan may get isolated in the geopolitical game. It may give wrong signal to Beijing, Seoul and other capitals in the Asia-Pacific.

5.3 Evolving Scenario

Author fully endorses the scenario that a bipolar divide may gradually emerge “with a U.S/Japan-centered axis on the one hand and a China-centered on the other”. In Northeast Asia, US-Japanese alliance is the most potent. Nonetheless, as a kind of departure, Japan is reassessing its own security needs and is adopting more assertive posture as already highlighted keeping in view China’s rise and the possible reunification of North and South Korea. Again, looking differently, recent developments in East Asia have made the region less dependent on America “for security protection, economic prosperity, and political initiatives”. Those days are probably over when America played a domineering role in influencing policy decisions in the region. China is steadily stepping in for obvious reasons. East Asians are also reticent especially after the 1997 financial crisis. Being the second largest economy of the world, Japan wants to participate more actively in the world politics, particularly when it wants a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Again, on the other hand, China’s regional leadership is already a reality or at least perceived to be so. Now, there is a contradiction in the concept of the region where China may like to limit East Asia that excludes Australasia and India when Japan/US axis would like to include them. China may use East

203 Francis Fukuyama (2008), op. cit.
204 Charles D. Lutes, op. cit., p.11.
Asia as a hedge against U.S. power in the balancing game. In a bipolar divide, both India and Australia are already drawn in. Military exchange and interaction, as part of multilateral approach mooted by the Japanese may be at the behest of the Americans. There is a strong possibility, this will get further cemented. This is going to be the inevitable outcome of the power politics that probably rings louder than even economic issues in the long run. In the shorter term, Japan, China or Taiwan may not turn overly jingoistic, nor will U.S. withdraw from Asia in the foreseeable future. However, China is likely to remain a potential threat to Japan or at least it would be perceived so. So, Japan's paradigm shift from "commercial liberalism", as has been practiced ever since it's launching of economic nationalism immediately after the Second World War, to "reluctant realism", which has already started its operation, may shape the bilateral relations in decades ahead. Nonetheless, economic issues are a great boon for the region that put a check on the overly geopolitical manifestations in the region.

Having said so, in another perspective, in the coming decades, Japan, United States and rest of Asia will have to countenance a rising China. On the other side, China, United States and rest of Asia will also see a rising Japan, for it wants to become a 'normal' power with stronger capabilities, including probably nuclear capability. "Japan's eventual aim, argue the Chinese, is to establish itself as a truly 'ordinary nation' with an equal relationship with the United States". Unless economy doldrums in either side, the development of such a scenario is likely to continue. Again, Togo says Japan has two Post-War policy options: either strengthen U.S. alliance or reenter Asia. One is the geopolitical issue and the other is the identity crisis; both ways it has geopolitical ramifications. In case of a real political complication, Japan will have to select one of the two. Japan is likely to give preference to alliance, as Togo observes. It, therefore, leads to a zero-sum picture. He suggests Japan should achieve both the objectives to gain diplomatically and satisfy its national interests. Present DPJ government tends to tilt towards China to normalize its relations. Such a trend would give it better balancing ability resulting in its more independent decision making especially on security matters. However, Japan cannot forego alliance, at least in the foreseeable

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208 Quoting Liu and Zhang, J., in Rex Li, op. cit., p.103.

future, but it can carve out a more independent and respectable status in the region.

Inoguchi and Bacon see the prospective fifth phase of foreign policy (2005-2020) leading to "gradual consolidation of Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power". Firstly, in this phase, Japan's foreign security policy would be anchored on three components: alliance, pacifism and pro-UN orientation. Secondly, Constitution revision may take place within the period. And thirdly, Japan emulating the British model may go for tighter alliance relations with the U.S. and deeper relations with the East Asia region. However, Japan will have to encounter snags in accommodating the last option as earlier pointed out. This is further reinforced, as understood from the press reports, by the recently installed DPJ government's seemingly reluctant attitude of playing the role of 'Japan as the Britain of Asia'. It can be inferred that if such strategic competitions are not brought within a manageable, somewhat structured, framework, it will lead to, as it did between U.S. and USSR during the Cold War, a zero-sum outcome. There is a possibility that the present DPJ government, although would continue with alliance relationship, may limit its scope. They may revise the LDP's "goal of a global security partnership with the United States". DPJ, on the other hand, is likely to increase its efforts with the UN and Asian neighbors. DPJ may seek "Asian solutions for Asian problems". However, it is still premature to come to definite conclusion, since the realities may take the ideas to a different plane. The desirable plane is: competition should be positive and human-security oriented and not destructive. But power politics oftentimes sidelines such advice. This is discernible in Figure 6 which shows 66% of the respondents (Japanese) think Japan should play the leadership role in Asia and the world while only 21% of the respondents support the traditional view of Japan as an economic powerhouse and an American ally.

211 Five major foreign and security policy visions within the DPJ are: (1) pursue a more mature Japan-U.S. alliance in which Japan is less dependent on and less deferential to the United States, (2) re-establish Japan as a member of Asia through economic and trade initiatives, historical reconciliation, and multilateral institution-building, (3) contribute to international security through the UN with Japan providing financing, peacekeepers, and impetus for reform, (4) working for nuclear disarmament via international and regional strategies (e.g., the NPT and Six-Party Talks) and Japanese diplomatic efforts, including with the United States, and (5) modernize Japan's national security apparatus to prioritize citizen rights and taxpayer savings even while responding to post-Cold War threats. (Source: Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan", Asia Policy, Number 9, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington, January 2010, p.62.
Figure 6: What International Role Should Japan Play?

Present DPJ government is “obsessed with carving out a leadership role for Japan”. There is, however, a contradiction as to whether Hatoyama government would be able to do it at the cost of its alliance relationship with the world’s strongest military power.\(^\text{212}\) There is a need to rethink about how to balance such a contradiction. In spite of such a dilemma, there is a clear indication that Japan should enlarge its international role. This is substantiated by Mohan Malik, who observes,

> There are already signs that the “leash” that the United States has on the Self-Defense Force is now diminishing. This may eventually open up the possibility of Japan taking keen interest in multilateral processes and entering into bilateral defense arrangements with other nations in the Asia-Pacific in the not-too-distant future.\(^\text{213}\)

Trends are visible but the American factor may be overriding and realities may dictate something else. As such, Bill Gertz strongly proposes for a strong alliance, spearheaded by America, to include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and “other friends in Southeast Asia and India in Southwest Asia”,

\(^{212}\) Tobias Harris, “US-Japan Alliance: Time for the US to Accept New Realities”, *East Asia Forum*, Australia, 15 November 2009.

ostensibly to checkmate China. Trends are discernible from geopolitical standpoint. In terms of outcome, as a final note, we can seriously explore the possibility of Asian regional multilateralism or regional integration. Variables have been, more or less, identified though not discussed adequately. They range from geopolitics, economics, and regional leadership to unilateralism where America is involved, national identity, historical mistrust etc. These variables are again to be related to different tiers like country-specific, regional and extra-regional. What is pertinent is the regional approach. But the moot question comes to the fore: is it feasible or forthcoming? Is it going to be well structured? Are the economic issues or the geopolitics or the national identity or leadership issues overriding? Such apparently conflicting interests and orientation may continue to haunt the prospect of regional multilateralism or integration in East Asia or Asia-Pacific. However, this does not mean status quo is being maintained throughout. Several permutations-combinations are being tried with varied results. They tend to move towards better stability and more structured mechanism. More concerted and sincere efforts are necessary for better positive output. Certain direction is visualized in the following Chapter.

6. Concluding Remarks

Japan is an important actor in the security architecture of the region. More so, Japan is an economic powerhouse that radiates its vibrancy and potency all around the world especially in South, Southeast and East Asia. It now feels, having gone through different phases of its foreign relations, mere economic vibrancy would not give it enough clout to mean business in the scheme of things. Japan, therefore, is fully aware of the importance of reemerging as a potent strategic power. Such direction is also being desired and vectored by the United States. However, Japan is aware of the necessity to come out as an independent military power, although it is concurrently pledge bound to honor the security alliance obligations with the United States. It has found space, as reflected in the paper, between entrapment and abandonment. It is playing a very subtle game of strengthening its power structure. It is also playing a good game of balancing with China, although deep mistrusts and geopolitical cleavages continue to haunt the relations. It is trying to develop a kind of alliance-type relations with India and Australia putting emphasis on military cooperation.

In the backdrop of such developments, Japan may also be counted as a restraining force in the geopolitical game of the actors involved. The country

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is not likely to fall into the trap of overt geopolitical game. However, it is concerned about the contentious issues especially with North Korea and China. Its over enthusiasm about participating actively in different UN peace keeping operations around the world is, however, ominous. On the one hand, it is revitalizing its military prowess; at the same time it is going for joint economic collaboration with different actors. It is deeply involved with many of the regional organizations like ASEAN+3, ARF, EAS, and APEC. Japan tends to believe in the principles of inclusiveness and open regionalism in its vision of East Asian Community (EAC). Japan advocates inclusion of Australia, India, and New Zealand in the grouping in order to counterbalance China’s clout in the region. Hopefully, EAC may turn out to be a reality with China and Japan in the centre stage. China and Japan coming to terms is critically important, like France and Germany in Europe, to build the foundation on which better regional cooperation and integration can be structured. Otherwise, either China or Japan is likely to make their individual bid for regional leadership in the coming years. In the process, America may appear getting sidelined. By attempting to include India, Australia, and New Zealand in the community, as the process is already on, East Asian integration may get little diluted to serve better America’s interests. America may itself be interested to become its member or may diplomatically support such an idea. This will imply better image for America.

America’s strong relationship with Japan, Singapore and other non-East Asian powers like India and Australia may tame the ambitions of EU type alliance in East Asia. Newly floated idea of an Asia-Pacific community especially by Australia may also put a kind of damper on any such deeply integrated East Asian Community. "By implication, then, America’s Teritus position in Asia can endure regardless of the recession or a relative decline in its material power". However, America needs to reorient its strategy to fit into this inexorable move towards regional integration. Japan is already actively involved as a development partner of many developing countries in South and Southeast Asia. It has huge investments in China and elsewhere. It is a great champion in propagating anti-nuclear doctrine all over the world, given its horrendous experiences during the fag end of the Second World War. However, there are worries that the geopolitical compulsions may trigger this power to go nuclear itself.

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216 Deepak Nair, “Obama’s America: Why it is likely to endure in Asia”, *RSIS Commentaries*, 18 November 2009.
What then should be the prescriptions? Japan should be encouraged to extend further its collaborative efforts. Such efforts would reinforce the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) undertaken by different actors in different dimensions. CBMs may also include discussion on defense collaboration and diplomacy, transparency in weapons acquisitions and defense doctrines, and conflict management. Some of these were, in fact, part of President Clinton’s neo-Wilsonian “engagement and enlargement” strategy. Such collaboration has, in fact, made reasonable progress in this part of the world. Regional economic integration is also making substantial progress. Dialogue, communication and understanding among the powers may be enhanced. And Japan can play a pivotal role in this regard. Japan, as an important player, is always factored in the geopolitical game. Intractable issues may be kept in the backburner for the time being when the issues that need the touch of soft power may be exploited for the betterment of human security of the region. Apparently intractable issues may be handled multilaterally in a deliberate mode. This may be done within certain frameworks like ARF, although it is not being able to move beyond confidence-building mode. So, to get tangible results to hit the complex problems, an effective multilateral security mechanism involving all the major actors in the region is a sine qua non. However, there are complexities involved even in such an exercise. Japan has an obvious propensity for such betterment, given that Japan is positively working as a formidable development partner of many developing countries. Its economic assistance and investment, and human resource development assistance are a great boon rendered to the humanity as a whole. Thus said, a question may still be raised: can Japan play an effective role as a balancer?

Again all stakeholders may have to accept the fact that Japan would, sooner or later, turn out to be a major political and military power. Asia-Pacific or East Asian community may learn from the experiences of the European countries, who having fought many bloody wars, are now coming closer to successful regional integration. This can be a model for the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ARF, APEC, and EAS etc., although those are there in bits and pieces, can be seen as the foundation already being laid. Such a foundation may be elevated and cemented further by adding the superstructure and other paraphernalia in order to become a responsible and cooperative community where an effective security mechanism, can also be considered to tame the evolving conflictual scenario. These ideas are flowing from the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism. It states why and how states can cooperate through such mechanism. Given the goodwill, dialogue, communication, diplomacy, and institution building, such a possibility may not be ruled out.
However, a word of caution may be appropriate here. Japan has to harmonize geopolitics, economy, and a search for a national and Asian identity. Japan may encounter difficulties in accommodating both America and China. In multilateral arrangements, keeping American alliance intact and relations with China functional may be a difficult proposition. Japan is also involved in the act of balancing geopolitics. Geopolitics and national identity may overtake other considerations. However, let us expect leadership process to be less active in hegemonistic or geopolitical perspective and more in terms of communication, cooperation, mutuality, reciprocity and multilateralism in its normative perspective. Japan could then be an effective vehicle for the transformation. Its strategic rise would then be more useful for the common good. Let us take advantage of normative values in the Asia-Pacific or East Asia. Normative values have cascading and cooling effect on the strategic game plan.

Appendix - 1
National Defense Program Guidelines (Japan), FY 2005
(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004)

I. Purpose
II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan
III. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy
IV. Future Defense Forces
V. Additional Elements for Consideration

I. Purpose


II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today’s security environment.

Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats
and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international 
terrorist activities (hereinafter “new threats and diverse situations”). We 
need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer 
work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have 
neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual 
cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, 
as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the 
Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the 
interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and 
cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international 
community, including those within the framework of international 
organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues 
to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking 
active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in 
the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed 
conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the 
prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence 
among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to 
promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has 
drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the 
Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to 
exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to 
modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is 
unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.

North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it 
maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military 
activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to 
regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to 
international non-proliferation efforts.

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to 
modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval
and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.

4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan’s geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country’s prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

The first objective of Japan’s security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan’s alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the
fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan’s Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country’s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner—the United States—Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan’s Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government’s decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.
(3) Japan’s Defense Forces

Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan’s will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005” (Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”).

In developing Japan’s defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.
3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in “situations in areas surrounding Japan”; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan.
Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world’s only global and comprehensive international organization—the United Nations—to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan’s geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:
a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan’s Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan’s territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force
units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have the three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and
communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and form discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high-quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issues, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in Section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.
ACTIVE 230,300 (Ground Self-Defense Force 138,400; Maritime Self-Defense Force 44,100; Air 45,600; Central Staff 2,200) Paramilitary 12,250

RESERVE 41,800 (Navy 900; Air 700; General Reserve Army (GSDF) 33,800; Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 6,200)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

**Space Defense**
4 Reconnaissance (recce) satellites (2 radar, 2 optical)

**Ground Self-Defense Force 138,400**

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<th>FORCES BY ROLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 Army HQ (regional commands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composite</td>
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<td>Armored Infantry</td>
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<td>76 Spec Ops</td>
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<td>Air Borne (AB)</td>
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<td>Air Defense (AD)</td>
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<td>1 Brigade (bde)</td>
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<td>1 Brigade (bde); 2 unit</td>
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<td>4 bde; 1 unit</td>
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<td>2 bde; 2 regt</td>
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<td>2 bde; 4 gp</td>
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**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**Main Battle Tank (MBT)** 880: 560 Type-74; 320 Type-90
**Reconnaissance (RECCE)** 100 Type-87
**AIFV** 70 Type-89
**Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)** 790
  - **APC (T)** 310 Type-73
  - **APC (W)** 470: 220 Type-82; 250 Type-96

**ARTILLERY** 1,880
**Self-Propelled (SP)** 210: **155mm** 130: 80 Type-75; 50 Type-99; **203mm** 80 M-11OA2
**Towed** 155mm 420 FH-70
**Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL)** 227mm 100 MLRS
**MORTAR** 1,150
  - **SP 120mm** 20
  - **Towed** 1,130: 81mm 670; 107mm 50; **120mm** 410

**Anti-tank (AT)**
**Missile (MSL) - MANPATS** 630: 190 Type-79 Jyu-MAT; **440** Type-87 Chu-MAT
**RCL** 2,740: **SP 106mm** 30 Type-60; **84mm** 2,710 Carl Gustav
**RL** 230 **89mm**
AIRCRAFT
UTL 10 LR-1 (MU-2) / LR-2 (Beech 350) Super King Air

HELICOPTERS
Anti-tank (ATK) 80: 10 AH-64D Apache; 70 AH-IS Cobra; 100 OH-1; 20 OH-60 (MD-500);
SPT 53: 3 EC-225LP (VIP); 50 CH-47J (CH-47D) Chinook/ CH-47JA Chinook
UTL 170: 140 UH-IJ (UH-IH) Iroquois; 30 UH-60JA (UH60L) Black Hawk
AD· SAM 730
   SP 170: 60 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 110 Type-93 Kin-SAM
   TOWED 180 MTM-23B I-HAWK; 10 Type-03 Cl1u-Sam
   MAN PAD 380: 50 FIM-92A Stinger; 330 Type-91 Kin-SAM
GUNS 60
   SP 35mm 50 Type-87 SP
   TOWED 35mm 10 (twin)
MSL • SSM • COASTAL 100 Type-88

Maritime Self-Defense Force 44,100

FORCES BY ROLE
Surface units organized into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 7-8 warships each. Bases Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru. SSK organized into 2 Flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka. Remaining units assigned to 5 regional districts.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 16:
   6 Harushio each with 6 single 533mm IT each with T-89 HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon tactical USGW
   10 Oyashio each with 6 single 533mm IT each with UGM84C Harpoon tactical USGW
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 52
DESTROYERS 44
DDG40:
   6 Asagiri each with 2 triple 324mm ASIT (6 eff.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eff.) with tactical ASROC, 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eff.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 1 Mk 29 Sea Sparrow octuple with 16 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-60J/K Seahawk ASW hel)
   2 Atago (Aegis Base Line 7) each with 2 quad SSM launchers (8 eff.) with tactical SSM-IB, 1 MK 41 VLS (64 eff.) with SM-2 MR SAM, tactical ASROC, 1 MK 41 VLS (32 eff.) with SM-2 MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASIT (6 eff.) each with MK 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (Capacity 1 SH-60J Seahawk ASW hel)
2 Hatakaze each with 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eft.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with 40 SM-1 MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eft.), 2 127mm gun, 1 hellanding platform

11 Hatsuyuki each with 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eft.) with tactical ASROC, 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eft.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 1+ Mk 29 Sea Sparrow octuple with 16 RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-60J/K Sealzawk ASW hel)

4 Kongou (with hel deck) Aegis Baseline 4/5 each with 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eft.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 1 29 cell Mk 41 VLS (29 eft.) with SM-2 MR SAM, tactical ASROC, 1 61 cell Mk 41 VLS (6J eff.) with SM-2 MR SAM, tactical ASROC, 2 triple 324mm STT (6 eft.), 1 127mm gun

9 Murasame each with 2 quad (8 eft.) each with tactical SSM-IB, 1 16 cells Mk 41 VLS with up to 16 tactical ASROC, 1 16 cell Mk 48 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-60J/K Seahawk ASW hel)

1 Tachikaze each with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with 8-16 RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 32 SM-1 MR SAM, 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eft.) with up to 16 tactical ASROC, 1 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun

5 Takanami (Improved Murasame) each with 2 quad SSM launchers (8 eft.) each with tactical SSM-IB, 1 32 cell Mk 41 VLS (32 eft.) with tactical ASROC/RIM7M/ESSM Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Otobreda 127mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-60J/K Seahawk ASW hel)

DD4:

2 Haruna each with 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eft.) with tactical ASROC, 1 Mk 29 Sea Sparrow octuple with RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 2 127mm gun, (capacity 3 SH-60J/K Seahawk ASW hel)

2 Shirane each with 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eft.) with tactical ASROC, 1+ Mk 29 Sea Sparrow octuple with 24+ RIM-162A Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 2 127mm gun, (capacity 3 SH-60J/K Seahawk ASW hel)

FRIGATES FFG 8:

6 Abukuma each with 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eft.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eft.) with tactical ASROC, 2 triple ASTT (6 eft.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
2 Yubari each with 2 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (8 eft.) each with RGM-84C Harpoon tactical SSM, 2 triple ASTT (ll eft.), 1 Type 71/ 4 tube Mitsubishi 375mm Bofors (4 eft.), 1 76mm gun

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9**
- PFM 6 Hayabusa each with 4 tactical SSM-IB, 1 76Jllll11 gun
- PHM 3 Ichi-Go each with 4 tactical SSM-IB

**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 30**
- MCMSPT4:
  - 2 Nijima
  - 2 Uraga each with 1 hel landing platform (for MH-531)

- MSO 3 Yaeyama
- MSC 23: 2 Hatsushima; 12 Sugashima; 9 Uwajima

**AMPHIBIOUS**
- **LS • LST 5:**
  - 3 Osumi each with 1 hel landing platform (for 2 x CH-47) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBTs; 2 LCAC (L) ACV; 330 troops) 2 Yura (capacity 70 troops)

- **LANDING CRAFT 20**
  - LCU 2 Yusotei
  - LCM 12
  - ACV 6 LCAC (L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)

**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 74:**
- **AOE 5:** 2 Mashuu; 3 Towada
- **AS 1 Chiyoda (submarine rescue facilities)**
- **ASR 1 Chihaya**
- **ARC 1 Muroto**
- **AG 2:** 1 Kurihama; 1 Asuka (wpn trials)
- **AGOS 2 Hibiki**
- **AGS 4:** 2 Futami; 1 Suma; 1 Nichinan
- **AGB 1 Shirase**
- **ATF22**
- **TRG 6:** 1 Kashima; 1 Shimayuki; 2 Yamagiri TV35 with 2 triple ASTT (6 eff.) each with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 112 octuple (8 eff.) with tactical ASROC, 1 Type 71/ 4 tube Mitsubishi 375mm Bofors (4 eff.), 4 76mm gun; 1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); 1 KU1'Obe (trg spt ship)
- **SPT 3 Hiuchi**
- **YDT 6**
- **YTM20**
FACILITIES
Bases Located at Kure, Sasebo, Yokosuka, Maizuru, Ominato

Naval Aviation 9,800

FORCES BY ROLE
7 Air Groups

ASW 7 Squadron (sqn) (shipboard / trg) with SH-60J/K Seahawk;
MR 6 sqn(l training) with P-3C Orion
EW 1 sqn with EP-3 Orion; OP-3C
MCM 1 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon
SAR 2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk; 1 sqn with Shin MeiwaUS-IA
Tpt 1 sqn with YS-11M; LC-90
Trg 1 sqn with OH-6D (MD-500MD); OH-6DA (MD500ME); 3 sqn
with T-5;
   TC-90; YS-11T

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 80 combat capable

MP 80 P-3C Orion*
   SAR 7: 5 Shin Meiwa US-1 A; 2 Shin Meiwa US-2
   TPT 9: 4 YS-11M; 5 LC-90
   TRG 63: 33 T-5; 24 TC-90; 6 YS-11T

HELICOPTERS 91 combat capable
   ASW 91: 69 SH-60J Seahawk; 22 SH-60K
   MCM 9 MH-53E Sea Dragon
   SAR 18 UB-60J Black Hawk
   SPT 3: 2 MCH-101; 1 CH-101 (additional ac being delivered)
   UTL 4: 3. ~61A Black Hawk; 1 USH-60K
   TRG 9: 40H-6D (MD-500MD); 5 OH-6DA (MD-500ME)

Air Self-Defense Force 45,600
Flying hours 150 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE
7 Combat (cbt) wings

Fighter (Ftr) 7 sqn with F-15J Eagle; 3 sqn with F-4EJ (F-4E) Phantom II;
   2 Squadron (sqn) with Mitsubishi F-2
Recce 1 sqn with RF-EJ (RF-4E) Phantom II*
EW 2 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11E
AEW 2 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye; E-767 (AWACS)
SAR 1 wing with U-125A Peace Krypton; LR-I (MU-2); UH-60J
Black Hawk; KV-107 (Boeing Vertoll07)
TKR 1 sqn with KC-767 A
Transport 3 sqn with C-1: C-130H Hercules; YS-11; 1 sqn with B-747-400 (VIP); 4 (hy-lift) ft with CH-47 Chinook
Liaison some sqn with U-4; Kawasaki T-4
CAL 1 sqn with U-125-800 Peace Krypton; YS-11
Test 1 wing with F-15 Eagle; Kawasaki T-4
Trg F-15 Eagle* aggressor sqn; 5 trg schools with T-7 (basic), Mitsubishi F-2B and Kawasaki T-4 (advanced); Beech T-400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 270 combat capable
FTR 260: 150 F-15 Eagle; 40 Mitsubishi F-2; 70 F-4EJ (F-4E) Phantom II
RECCE: 10 RF-4J (RF-4E) Phantom II*
EW 11: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 10 YS-11E
AEW 14: 10 E-2C Hawkeye; 4 E-767 (AWACS)
SAR 20 U-125A Peace Krypton
TPT 30: 20 C-1; 10 C-130H Hercules
TKR 2 KC-767 A (2 more on order)
UTL 10 U-4
TRG 230: 170 T-4; 20 Mitsubishi F-2B; 30 T-7; 10 T-400

HELICOPTERS
SAR 40: 30 UH-60J Black Hawk; 10 KV-I07 (Boeing Vertol 107)
SPT 10 CH-47 Chinook

Air Defence
FORCES BY ROLE
Air Craft (ac) control and warning
Air Defense (AD) 4 wg; 28 radar sites; 1 (Air Base Defence) gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; FIM-92A Stinger; Type-91 KinSAM; M-167 Vulcan

Surface To Air Missile (SAM) 6 gp, comprising 24 SAM bty each with 8 launchers MIM-104 Patriot) 16+ bty of PAC-3

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Defense (AD) • SAM 208+
SP Type-81 Tan-SAM
TOWED 208+: 192+ MIM-104 Patriot; 16+ PAC-3
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; Type-91 Kei-SAM
GUNS • TOWED 20mm M-167 Vulcan

Missile (MSL)
ASM ASM-1Type-80; ASM-2 Type-93;
AAM AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM-7 Sparrow; AIM-9 Sidewinder; Type-90 (AAM-3)

FACILITIES
Radar station 28 (ac control and warning)
Paramilitary 12,250

Coast Guard
Ministry of Transport, no combat role

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 348

PSOH 24: 1 Izu; 1 Kojima (trg); 2 Mizuho; 1 Shikishima; 10 Soya; 1 Miura; 1 Nojima; 7 Ojika

PSO 60: 22 Shiretoko; 3 Aso; 14 Teshio; 2 Takatori; 15 Bihoro; 4 Amani

PCO 3 Takara
PFC 27 PS-Type
PCC 60 PC-Type
PCI 174: 170 CL- Type; 4 FM- Type

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 74: 4 ABU; 13 AGHS; 54 small tenders; 3 Trg

AIRCRAFT
MP 2 Falcon 900
SAR 2 SAAB 340B
TPT 17: 10 LR-2 (Beech 350) Super King Air; 5 Beech 200T; 2 Gulfstream V (MP)
UTL 6: 1 Cessna U-206G Stationair; 5 YS-11A

HELICOPTERS
SPT 4 AS-332 Super Puma
UTL 40: 4 Bell 206B jet Ranger II; 26 Bell 212; 8 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 3 S-76C

DEPLOYMENT
KUWAIT
Air SDF 210 (most withdrawing end of 2008)

MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNDOF 29; elms 1log bn

NEPAL
UN • UNMIN 6 obs

FOREIGN FORCES
United States US Pacific Command: Army 2,544; 1 HQ (9th Theater Army Area Command) located at Zama; Navy 3,725; 1 CVN; 2 CG; 7 DDG; 1 FFG; 1 LCC; 2 MCM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD; 1 base located at Sasebo; 1 base located at Yokosuka.

USAF: 12,504; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) located at Okinawa-Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg located at Okinawa-Kadena AB (2 ftr sqn with total of 18 F-16 Fighting Falcon located at Misawa AB); 1 ftr wg located at Okinawa-Kadena AB (1 SAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk, 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry, 2 ftr sqn with total of 24 F-15C Eagle/F-15D Eagle); 1 airlift wg located at Yokota AB with 10 C-130E Hercules; 2 C-21J; 1 special ops gp located at Okinawa-Kadena AB USMC 14,183; 1 Marine div (3rd); 1 Hr sqn with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 spt hel sqn with 12 CH-46E Sea Knight; 1 spt hel sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey; 3 spt hel sqn with 10 CH-53E Sea Stallion.


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(1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.

(2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing lifecycle costs, including purchase price of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resources in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological bases, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.

(3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.

2. The National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

(Source: Defense of Japan 2008, Ministry of Defense, Japan)

Appendix-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan’s Defense Capabilities 2009</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese Yen</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def Budget ¥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1=¥</td>
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</table>

Population 127,288,419
Ethnic groups: Korean <1%

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<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0-14</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-64</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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