INTRODUCTION

Sino-Indian relations are a complex amalgam of conflicting perceptions and interests. Since the 1962 Sino-Indian war, an enigmatic estrangement has continued unabated in their relations. Since then their divergent security interests and incompatible regional ambitions created a profound impact on their bilateral relations, which remained bedevilled by suspicion, hostility and an intense attempt by both sides to find external allies. Pakistan has been China’s main anti-Indian partner. Moreover, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States offered the opportunity of opening a reliable and discreet communication channel between Washington and Beijing. Significantly enough, until the late 1970s Beijing also encouraged whatever anti-Indian tendencies it found among India’s South Asian neighbours. This in turn contributed to India’s dependence on Soviet political and military support against the perceived threat of the Sino-Pakistan-US axis. This identifiable pattern of hostility had continued for two decades.

However, from 1970s onward, India and China began to articulate their mutual desire for a reconciliation and accordingly made some modest, nevertheless important, gains towards their objective. Significant developments in both regional and global context had obvious impact on Chinese and Indian foreign policy perspectives, its formulation and implementation. The strategic shift in China’s South Asia policy, the overall orientation of China’s independent foreign policy and expanded horizon of cooperation between India and China contributed to a positive frame in Sino-Indian relations. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in December 1988 distinctively
thawed the long-frozen relations and strengthened the resolve of both the countries to proceed towards rapprochement. The summit diplomacy represented an attempt by China and India to close the book on thirty years of hostility and to promote a better atmosphere in which long-standing contentious issues may be peacefully resolved.

The approach to the problems the leaders took during Rajiv's visit contrasts with the one adopted in the past. It was an approach imbued with pragmatism, lucid appraisal of each country's vital interests and the desire for a political settlement of border dispute as against the legalistic territorial approach followed until recently. The visit may not have produced a break-through but its outcome would nevertheless contribute to a changing security environment in the Asian landmass. No less important is likely to be its impact on the South Asian region. The proximity of China to the region and the fact that it has common borders with four countries in the region is of immense significance in the South Asian security parameters.

Although the visit was part of the new Asia-Pacific diplomacy of normalising relations between and among nations of the vast Asian region, both China and India has a number of compulsions in their quest for rapprochement. What are these compulsions? Why has a new thrust in Sino-Indian relations appeared? Is the mere understanding of each other's problem necessarily conducive to peace? What factors may limit the rapprochement? Will an improved Sino-Indian relations add any new dimensional transformation in the regional strategic scenario? What implications will the Sino-Indian thaw have on the smaller states of South Asia? Will it bring about a significant change in the security perceptions of India towards its neighbours? These are some of the questions that looms large on the eve of prospective Sino-Indian rapprochement. The paper will try to ponder over some of these issues.

The first section of the paper will concentrate on the trends in Sino-Indian interaction from 1950 to 1989. A historical evaluation
of their relations is likely to bring out the new trends and dynamics of change that characterises the present Sino-Indian relations. Such an attempt would however remain incomplete without examining such interactions in the South Asian context. So South Asian actors have been brought in wherever it was deemed relevant.

The principal aim of this work, however is not only to identify such trends but also to explore among others the compulsions for China and India for seeking a rapprochement. The second section will be composed of this objective. Having dealt with the compulsions, it will be useful to assess the bilateral power balance of China and India and to examine the prospects for the Sino-Indian rapprochement. The next two sections will attempt to focus on these. The last section will evaluate the implications of the rapprochement for the South Asian region.

2. TRENDS IN SINO-INDIAN INTERACTION

The world’s two most populous countries—China and India shares a common border that runs for almost 3,500 kilometers through some of the most impassable terrain along the Himalayan range. Both countries have been centres of ancient civilisations and have had political, economic and cultural interaction which dates back to thousands of years. However there is not much historic evidence of any prolonged and close relations between the two neighbours. It was only after the emergence of China and India as sovereign nations since the end of 1940s that a friendship flourished between them. This friendship was short lived and soon contributed to three decades of estranged relations which had its impact not only on the South and Southeast Asian region but also on the superpowers’ relations vis-a-vis them. An examination of their bilateral interaction over the four decades will bring forth the trends in their relations. It may also identify the dynamics of change, the potentials of conflicts and the prospects for reconciliation. For the convenience of treatment, the entire gamut of Sino-Indian relations may be divided into four phases, although these phases to some extent overlap.
a) **Period of Rapid Development (1950-1959)**

India was one of the first few countries which recognised Mao Tse Tung's new Communist China proclaimed in October 1949. Throughout the next decade there was an active phase of close friendship between India and China. The story of the period is replete with agreements, political understanding, exchange of visits by Prime Ministers of the two countries although there were some incidents of border intrusions.

India's military occupation of Ladakh in 1948 and Sikkim in 1949 were perceived as threats to Tibet and its vulnerable western link to Chinese Sinkiang. As early as October 7, 1950, Chinese troops entered Tibet to exercise Beijing's control over the territory. Again in 1954 a dispute between the two sides had occurred over possession of Barahati (Wu-je) on the border of North Central India and Tibet. China claimed Tibet as unquestionably an 'integral part of China'.

Beijing's May 1951 agreement with Tibet gave China the handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet, while the autonomy and political system of Tibet remained unaltered. It is interesting to note that India at that time quietly acquiesced to the Chinese actions and moved to regularise Sino-Indian relations by the October 1954 'Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India.'

2. The Anglo-Tibetan convention of 1904, Anglo-Chinese convention of 1906 and finally the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, had expressively recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet while giving the British Raj facilities for trading marts. In 1910 covert activities of the British forced the Chinese to move forces in Lhasa resulting in flight of the Dalai Lama to India. On the outbreak of revolution in China leading to fall of the Manchu dynasty, the British Raj concluded the Simla Agreement with China and Tibet in 1913, conceding both Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and demanding autonomy for it. This convention was never ratified by China but upheld by both the British and Tibetans.
This was because India was aware of both Chinese determination and its own limitations. At that time India lacked the military strength to challenge China single handedly, as the bulk of its troops were poised in Kashmir against Pakistan. Under the Agreement India accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and agreed to relinquish those extra territorial rights in Tibet which it had inherited from the British when the latter transferred power to India. The agreement was based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, latter to be known as *Panchsheel*. It also dealt with questions pertaining to Indian trade, pilgrim traffic, trading posts and communications. This agreement regularising India's position in Tibet actually prepared the ground for qualitative improvement in Sino-Indian relations.

In April 1955, India and China met as co-participants at the Bandung Conference to discuss issues of peace and cooperation. During this phase of Sino-Indian relations—India's efforts for localising the conflict in Korea, her advocacy of China's representation in the United Nations, her support to China on the question of integration of Taiwan with the mainland as well as her opposition to the Japanese Peace Treaty contributed to create a better understanding for Indian foreign policy in the Chinese mind. These international issues all of which deeply concerned China, had their impact on Sino-Indian relations. Their friendly relations, based on the five principles of *Panchsheel*, were a model for all nations. They seemed to represent the triumph of Asian nationalism, and to herald a new political consciousness and maturity in a part of the world that for so long had endured an alien colonial presence. This spirit made both parties reluctant to face the more mundane problems of rival border claims. This period was rather short lived. Soon, China's relations with India began to lose warmth.

In retrospect it may be conjectured that the brief flowering of Sino-Indian friendship in the mid 1950's was due, in large part, to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who viewed Indian independence and the Chinese Revolution as parallel expressions of resurgent
Asian nationalism, and envisioned India and China as cooperating leaders of post-colonial Asia. His Pan Asian idealism however, was rooted in the rather thin soil of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It looked toward a self-managed Asia free not only from the domination of the existing major powers but also from the politics of power itself. This turned out to be an illusion.

In March 1957, Chinese authorities announced the completion of a highway connecting Sinkiang with western Tibet across Aksai Chin. In October 1957, the road was formally opened for traffic and was used by the Chinese for regular changeover of troops from Yarkhand to western Tibet. Although there were enough intelligence reports about the construction of the road right from 1951, its implications to India’s security in Ladakh region were not properly comprehended, may be because of the inaccessibility of the Aksai Chin region. In 1958, however, a major dispute on the Western sector turned into a basic disagreement on the entire frontier question. India sent a note to China drawing attention to the fact that a motorable road linking Sinkiang with Tibet had been constructed through Indian territory which formed part of the Ladakh region. More similar Indian notes on the subject failed to elicit any reply from the Chinese.

The controversy over the maps had also begun in 1958. An Indian note drew attention of the Chinese government to a map of China which inaccurately depicted the Sino-Indian border. The map included within the Chinese territory: (1) four of the five Divisions of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (2) some parts in northern Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and (3) large areas in eastern Ladakh. It appeared that areas in eastern and north-western Bhutan were also included within China.

4. See Kodikara op. cit., p. 53.
So it seems that even before the Tibetan rebellion of March 1959, serious differences regarding the border had developed between India and China. However no armed clashes had occurred along the Sino-Indian boundary till the Tibetan rebellion.

(B) Deterioration of Relations (1959-1971)

As the days of *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai* and *Panchsheel* were coming to an end, new clouds hovered over the Himalayas as the sphere of potential conflict grew to encompass the Sino-Indian frontier as well as Tibet. Relations between India and China deteriorated during the autumn of 1959 as a result of two serious incidents along their Himalayan borders—one in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the other in the remote Ladakh area of northeast Kashmir. The most serious development in early 1959 for Sino-Indian relations was the Tibetan uprising in early May. The outbreak of anti-Chinese revolt in Tibet became the catalyst for a rapid deterioration in the relations of the two countries. Chinese imposition of its own highly centralised state structure provoked a Tibetan national uprising in 1959 and the exodus of the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s preeminent religious leader, and about 100,000 others to India. Interestingly, these Tibetans were given sanctuary in India and were allowed to set up a government-in-exile. A large section of Indian public opinion reacted unfavourably to the Chinese military measures against the rebels who were ranged against the Chinese central government for Tibetan independence. China resented the sympathy shown by many in India to the Tibetan insurgents and deemed it as interference in the domestic affairs of China. They responded with outrage and initiated a steady buildup of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in this sensitive and volatile border area.

China considered India’s granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and a large party of Tibetan refugees accompanying him to be an

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unfriendly act and charged that Kalimpong in India was the centre of the Tibetan revolt. For India, suppression of the revolt by the Chinese was seen as a breach of the spirit of the 1954 treaty, and appeared to give a new dimension to China’s military potential across the Sino-Indian border.

The Tibetan revolt of 1956 invested the Aksai-Chin area with a new strategic importance. It had been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang and Western Tibet. Guerilla fighting in Eastern Tibet made the Aksai Chin road the only land route available for communication with Tibet. Possession of this road became a matter of desperate urgency. The rebellion also further aggravated the past differences regarding border and immediately led to an intensification of military activities on the border. The first armed clash between the troops of the two countries was reported on 25 August 1959 at Longju in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). Shortly after this another border clash took place at Kongka pass in October 1959 in the western sector where nine members of an Indian police patrol were killed and the rest captured.

The mountainous borders between China and its neighbours including India are a legacy of Western colonial rule in Asia. The 3,500 kilometers long Sino-Indian border stretches from the joining point of the Pakistani-Chinese border with the line of control in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state to the tri-junction of Chinese-Indian-Burmese borders in the northeast corner of the subcontinent. The disputed segments have been divided into three sectors. The western sector is the boundary between the Ladakh area of Indian held Kashmir and China’s provinces of Sinkiang and Tibet. The disagreement over this sector composed of strategic and security considerations. Through this area runs the strategically important Aksai Chin road built by the Chinese during 1954-1957 from Sinkiang to Tibet.

The middle sector, much shorter in length, touches three Indian states, East Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and Tibet. The eastern sector separates Tibet from the Indian states of Assam and Nagaland.

China did not recognise the McMahon line in India's northeast. Nehru firmly declared that the McMahon line, a legacy of British Imperialism, was 'our boundary'. The Chinese contended that the entire boundary between the two countries was undefined and required negotiation, while India held that the boundary based on treaty, administrative usage, and tradition, should be retained as it was.

The Prime Ministers of both the countries met on 19 April 1960 and had extensive discussions on the border, but their talks could not resolve the differences. Subsequent high level meetings failed to produce any change of views on either side. Each held to the position it had assumed towards the end of 1959. Chinese were not ready to acknowledge Indian claims in NEFA until India agreed to Chinese position in the Aksai Chin area. In other words, China wanted a quid pro quo settlement based on existing realities. This India could not accept. It adhered to its argument that any compromise on the major parts of the disputed border was totally unacceptable.

In the following months both India and China engaged in a feverish pushing forward of their border checkpoints and consolidating their respective line of actual control especially in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) region. Late in 1961 India initiated the 'forward policy' as a response to the developing border dispute with

12. 'Forward policy' was evolved by Nehru in November 1961. The strategy consisted in Nehru's belief that whoever succeeded in establishing (even a symbolic) post, would establish a claim to that territory, as possession was nine tenths of the law.
China. The strategy was evolved to stake territorial claims by establishing more and more forward check-posts and more extensive patrolling of border areas. By the early 1960s however, the question of the violation of Indian territory by Chinese aggression had gone beyond the point of a compromise solution. Given the dynamics of the prevailing border situation, therefore, a major military confrontation between China and India had become inevitable. Ultimately the tension at the frontier blew up in a war in October 1962. The Chinese demonstrated military superiority throughout the period of actual fighting. India was badly defeated and a large chunk of Indian territory (about 14,000 square miles) in the western and eastern sector came under Chinese occupation.

However, on 21 November 1962, the Chinese government announced an unilateral ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border and withdrawal of its troops to positions 20 kilometers behind the 1959 line of actual control. Though India accepted the ceasefire they were not satisfied with several aspects of the Chinese announcement of 21 November. Nehru regarded the Chinese proposals as clearly aiming at securing physical control of areas (2500 sq. miles) which were never under Chinese administrative control.

Chinese Prime Minister suggested to Nehru that the two sides should meet to discuss 20 kilometers withdrawal of their armed forces to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of checkposts, and the return of captured personnel. India considered that they were being imposed to accept an arbitrary line, so no talks were possible under such circumstances. It was evident that though war between India and China had come to a halt their differences remained as insoluble as ever. There were several mediation attempts by several Afro-Asian countries which were of no avail and the animosity between the two nations continued.

One such mediation attempt was the Colombo powers’ proposal. Six non-aligned nations-Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Ghana, Burma, Indonesia and the UAR-met in Colombo from 10 to 12 December 1962. They proposed to India and China to settle their dispute peacefully. The proposals were to bring the two countries together for negotiations, to consolidate the ceasefire and to settle the boundary dispute between them. There were different interpretations of the proposal on both China and India and their clash of views continued. In light of such divergent views, Colombo proposal was shelved. The relations between the two countries sharply deteriorated, although diplomatic relations were not severed.

The situation basically remained unchanged except on one occasion in April 1964. Nehru suggested that talks could be held if China dismantled its posts in Ladakh. However, the Chinese criticised Nehru’s overture as a precondition to negotiations and declared that there was no question of China withdrawing from its own territory. It may be assumed that the question of negotiations between the two conflicting parties—India and China had gone beyond the point of return because it had been drawn into the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and the international Communist movement was on the verge of an open split.

In the meanwhile, when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out in 1965, the Chinese came out in open support of Pakistan. Apart from that there were severe strains in diplomatic relations caused by expulsion of two Indian diplomats on charges of espionage in June 1967. This invited Indian retaliation. Indira Gandhi’s government came under heavy political pressure to break off with China. Sino-Indian border intrusions and clashes also continued in the 1960s, culminating in the serious military confrontation of Nathu-La in Sino-Sikkim border in September 1967. In October, the same year there was another clash at Cho La about 3.5 miles northwest of Nathu-La. Each side blamed the other for the clash in which there were casualties on both sides. Several observations may be made concerning the breakdown of Sino-Indian relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
First, with very few exceptions, the Chinese and Indian leaders were woefully ignorant of each other’s history and culture and lacked knowledge of each other’s recent politics as well. The modernising elites of China and India had many links abroad but they had few links with each other as Asians.

Second, the two countries shared very few concrete interests. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Pan-Asian solidarity and the peaceful code of international conduct embodied in the Panchsheel were insubstantial compared to the realities of national security. In fact, anti-imperialism in China and India was expressed in various forms, including by assertiveness in international affairs. This national assertiveness which invoked the glorious past of both the countries accelerated the drift towards territorial conflict.15

Third, China’s and India’s defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity focused on remote border areas of little economic, but considerable strategic significance to both states. Moreover, the ability to pacify and incorporate these areas into their respective political systems was perceived by both Chinese and Indian leaders as proof of their political efficacy and legitimacy.16 This circumstance significantly reduced the flexibility on both sides and complicated the resolution of disputes.

Fourth, underlying the specific conflicts between China and India were competing Chinese and Indian visions of their roles in Asia and the world. Visions that touched upon questions of status, prestige, and position in the international hierarchy of nations. Maoist China saw itself as a revolutionary socialist power providing symbolic leadership to all oppressed peoples against the dominant powers. Similarly, India’s self-image in Nehru’s time was that of a major power pioneering new principles of peaceful international relations

15. Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine; op. cit, p, 32.
through the concepts of nonalignment and evolutionary change. These Chinese and Indian self-images proved mutually incompatible. Thus when concrete points of dispute arose between the two countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s they were exacerbated by symbolic political issues, as well as by the personalities of the leaders on both sides.

In addition to the boundary dispute, forces such as the Sino-Soviet rift and US President Kennedy’s new policy toward South Asia were having immense impact upon the Sino-Indian relations. Since the end of the 1950s Soviet and Chinese foreign policy interests came into conflict and their world views began to diverge dramatically, Where Beijing developed a more militantly anti imperialist policy in 1957 and 1958, drawing sharper distinctions between progressive and reactionary states, pressing governments to take a firmer stand against the Imperialist West, Moscow remained wedded to a policy of peaceful coexistence, and to a search for detente with the US. The rivalry between the two communist powers spilled over into neighbouring areas and even beyond them. The 1962 border war led to the formation of clear alignments in the South Asian region, with the Soviet Union and India forging closer ties, countered by a weaker but still significant informal alliance between China and Pakistan.

The US role in South Asia during this period facilitated the development of these alignments. President Kennedy reinvigorated relations with India largely in the interest of the containment of China. The original anti-American emphasis on Indo-Soviet ties seemed to have been superseded by the goal of Chinese containment. When the US congress cut off all arms aid to the subcontinent in 1965 in response to the Indo-Pakistani War, the US seemed relatively sanguine about the Soviet assumption of the role as major arms supplier to India and as peacemaker in the region, provided these policies contributed to the goal of containing China.17 In many respects during

this period, Washington’s and Moscow’s aims in South Asia ran parallel, as each tried to diminish Indo-Pakistani differences and to encourage the two contending states to concentrate on the threat from China. In fact as Neville Maxwell has written, ‘India moved from non-alignment to a kind of bi-alignment with the Soviet Union and US against China’. 18

As a consequence of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet hostility, the enhancement of ties with Pakistan became imperative for China. Pakistan on its part, having become totally disillusioned with its Western alliance during the early 1960s for a number of reasons, believed the time had also come for it to reappraise its foreign policy stance. The mutuality of Chinese and Pakistani interests ensured a rapid improvement in relations. So in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war—the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute and what appeared to be collusion between US and the Soviet Union in supporting India against the Chinese, produced a community of interest between China and Pakistan and strengthened the China-Pakistan axis. 19 China’s special relationship with Pakistan from 1960 through 1970 was based on mutual advantage and pragmatic reality. In the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, China supported Pakistan. In order to maintain balance of power in South Asia, China also became the main military aid supplier to Pakistan.

Over the years they broadened their base of relationship to include not only the mutuality of strategic interests but also economic and development issues. This has involved economic aid to Pakistan, an expansion of trade relations that has made China one of Pakistan’s most important trade partners and extensive road building in their border region including the Karakoram Highway which has both economic and strategic significance. 20 These close ties were further

strengthened by frequent exchanges of visits and of views as well as the coordination of policies at all levels: political, bureaucratic and military. Pakistan accepted China as an indispensable ally and gave special weight to its advice on matters pertaining to subcontinental politics.

In China’s strategic calculations, relations with smaller states of South Asia were no less important. The smaller states also considered China as a countervailing force against New Delhi’s hegemonism in South Asia. As a result of this mutuality of interest, China’s cordial relations with most of the smaller states of the region developed. This evolved with the settlement of border dispute with Nepal in 1961 and a standing offer to do so with Bhutan in 1981 which was vetoed by India. Nepal accepted Chinese economic aid, building two vital strategic roads, one connecting Kathmandu to Kodari and and Tibet, the other from Bhadrapur to Olangchung in eastern Nepal that outflanks Sikkim.21 The fear of alienating China compelled Nepal to distance itself from India and by successfully playing India and China against each other had established greater freedom of action both in domestic and foreign affairs. Nepalese King Mahendra’s desire to avoid complete Indian domination and to widen diplomatic options by cultivating amicable relations with China was deeply suspected by India. Bhutan however moved closer to India with whom they signed a treaty as early as 1949. Sikkim which albeit had the status of a protectorate was less fortunate in trying to assert its autonomy by using the ‘China card’ and ended up by being incorporated into the Union of India.22

Like Nepal, Sri Lanka too had used India’s discomfiture in the hands of the Chinese to assert a greater independence of action and decrease her economic reliance on India.23 During 1962 war Indo-Sri

Lankan relations was considerably strained. However anxious not to be drawn into a conflict between two larger powers, Sri Lanka sought to maintain equidistance between India and China.

Although China did not support Bangladesh during 1971 crisis, after 1975, Sino-Bangladesh relations rapidly developed. This was motivated to some extent by the anti-India feeling that was prevalent during the mid-seventies in Bangladesh. In the regional context India was highly sensitive to the Chinese overtures to the smaller states. In addition, the alleged involvement of China in insurgent activities within India such as the Naxalite movement was greatly resented by India. In 1968-1969, she in fact claimed to have evidence of Chinese subversion in Nagaland and among the Mizos and other tribal groups in Assam.24

However as the decade of 1960s ended, there emerged signs of possible detente between China and India. With the new orientation in Chinese foreign policy after the ninth party congress in April 1969, China was poised for a peace offensive and wanted to settle her borders with all her neighbours. In May 1970 Mao Tse Tung expressed his desire for friendly relations between China and India.25 On their part Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as early as 1969 hinted at Indian interest in establishing a dialogue. Indian envoys in various world capitals had conveyed to their Chinese counterparts, India's desire for normal relations with China. In October 1970, the Indian and Chinese Ambassadors in Cairo passed a friendly and cordial seventy-five minutes in the first such ambassadorial meeting in a third country in several years. India's relations with China were moving towards a breakthrough until mid-November 1971 although India had signed a friendship treaty with Soviet Union in August 1971.

By mid-November, the Bangladesh issue was pushing India and Pakistan into an armed conflict. China could no longer keep its options open when India evoked a vital clause in the treaty. The Chinese saw far-reaching Soviet designs in their support to India on the Bangladesh issue. So there was a setback to the process of detente in Sino-Indian relations. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war crippled the already stumbling Sino-Indian relationship, but it also proved that China was not prepared to assist Pakistan in any military confrontation with India as it did in 1965.

c) Period of Restoration of Relations (1971-1988)

After 1971 India emerged as the primary power in South Asia. She needed a new framework of relationship with the immediate neighbours. The first cautious step was taken at the Indo-Pakistan summit at Simla in 1972. Under this Simla Agreement the leaders of India and Pakistan undertook to normalise their relations through negotiations and agreed that the major issues should be discussed at subsequent talks. As regards the Sino-Indian stalemate, India’s strategy to extricate itself from the tangled situation was not yet defined, though it could be said that to some extent India’s initiative towards Pakistan had widened the scope for normalisation with China. China too refrained from opposing the Simla pact.

In the following years, in spite of Beijing’s denunciation of India’s outright annexation of Sikkim in 1975 and its criticism of Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the Chinese kept their basic policy of improving relations with New Delhi intact. There was a clear shift in China’s South Asia policy. Finally with the exchange of ambassadors in 1976, Sino-Indian relations entered a new phase. In 1977, the Janata Government in India and the new leadership in China tried to bring the two countries closer. However, it was not until 1979 when the two parties started talking to each other. The Chinese offered India a ‘package deal’ in June 21, 1980. Through this deal

China would agree to accept the McMahon line as India-China border, if India in return accepted the Aksai Chin area to be Chinese territory. In terms of claimed areas, China would forgo 90,000 square kilometres if India gave up its claim to 38,000 square kilometers. In other words, both the sides were to agree to declare the present line of actual control as their border. India did not agree. On April 8, 1981, Deng Xiaoping once again initiated a move to invite India to the negotiating table. This time he proposed to postpone the border discussion and to improve relations in other spheres. Ultimately in June 1981, both sides decided to enter the negotiation arena, which marked the beginning of a new era in Sino-Indian relations. From 1981 to 1988 eight rounds of talks were held between the two nations.

The first round of talks was held in Beijing in December 1981 after a gap of twenty years. The progress on border issue was not substantial but there were useful discussions on cultural and trade relations and Indo-Pakistani relations. The second round of talks was held in New Delhi on May 1982 but there was no agreement on the boundary question. Both the parties suggested sets of guiding principles as a basis for Sino-Indian dialogue. The Chinese put forward five principles: equality, friendly consultation, mutual accommodation, a fair and reasonable settlement, and a comprehensive solution. The Indian set comprised six principles—an early solution of the border question, a just solution taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides, a commonly agreed approach and basis for discussion, consideration of each others proposals, steps to create an appropriate atmosphere and efforts to settle the border issue in each sector.

The third round of talks was concluded at Beijing in February 1983 and they revealed the basic differences between the two sides. In

29: Indian Express, New Delhi, October, 22, 1983.
spite of lack of progress, trade relations between the two countries improved during 1981 and 1982. In 1981 the trade turnover amounted to $111.3 million and it increased to $139 million in 1982. China had a favourable balance of $33 million. Moreover China succeeded in getting a contract of supply cables and conductors for high voltage transmission in India. These trade relations kept up the optimism that the border problem could be solved. The fourth round of talks was held in October 1983. China agreed to consider India's sector by sector approach and India agreed to consider if not accept—China's package plan. They also agreed to examine the relevance of such factors as historical evidence, custom and tradition for border settlement.

K. Natwar Singh, Secretary, external affairs ministry led the delegation to Beijing in September 1984 for the fifth round of talks. They narrowed their differences over the guiding principles for an eventual solution but substantive discussions of the boundary question was postponed for the sixth round. Neither side showed urgency about solving the border question. The sixth round of talks was held in New Delhi in November 1985. Overall, like the earlier talks this round too went well enough. As usual, four groups i.e. the border issue, cultural exchanges, science and technology and issues relating to property and assets were treated separately. Regarding the border neither side indicated any change in its declared position. China insisted on a package agreement envisaging recognition by Beijing of the line of actual control in the eastern sector—the McMahon line, in exchange for recognition of status quo by India in the western sector. India on the other hand rejected this approach and insisted on sector by sector basis.

The seventh round of talks was held in Beijing in July 1986. Chinese reiteration of claims in the eastern sector created alarm in the Indian circles. In addition, the Chinese troops were reported to have intruded in Arunachal Pradesh at Sumdorang Chu valley in mid-June 1986.

On the eve of these negotiations, the Congress (I) member from Ladakh, P. Namgyal told Lok Sabha about the alleged Chinese offensive in the western sector. He said that Chinese had set up new military posts, constructed bunkers and dug trenches at several places. Under these circumstances there was little progress achieved by the talks and both the parties were back to square one, with mingling doubts and hopes about normalisation of relations.

Immediately afterwards there was marked deterioration in their mutual relations. In August 1986, K.R. Narayanan Indian Minister of State for external affairs alleged in Rajya Sabha that the Chinese had intruded in Indian territory and had built a helipad on the Sumbdorang Chu valley. The valley indeed is a very sensitive area. It lies within that triangular hedge of disputed territory known as Thagla ridge area from where the 1962 war had started. The Indian protest was not only rejected by the Chinese but China also maintained that it was India which had been violating the line of actual control. In mid December 1986 the Indian parliament voted to give Arunachal Pradesh, the status of a state in the Union. China as expected warned India of "serious consequences". India dismissed the protest and stressed that it was entirely a matter for the parliament of India to decide. The parliament pushed through legislation. In the aftermath of these two incidents the reported military buildup in the eastern sector developed into a mini crises.

India’s granting of statehood to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA prior to 1972) in December 1986 evoked a formal protest from China on grounds that this was an unilateral Indian attempt to impose the ‘illegal’ McMahon line upon China. India rejected China’s protest as ‘clear interference in the internal affairs of India.’ New Delhi had promised statehood at an appropriate time to Arunachal in the Shillong agreement of 1975, which resolved a number of problems between the northeastern state of Assam and

32. Khadim Hussain, op. cit, p. 63.
adjacent tribal peoples. The same agreement had also promised statehood to Mizoram, which was conferred in August 1986 after Rajiv Gandhi signed a widely acclaimed accord with Laldenga leader of the erstwhile separatist Mizo insurrection that China had previously supported. Once this constitutional arrangement was made with Mizoram it seemed appropriate to New Delhi to make the same arrangement with Arunachal even though there was no insur­gency there.33 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that conferring statehood on that ‘Indian occupied’ area had “seriously violated China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” Obviously, once Arunachal Pradesh became part of the Indian Union, Beijing was deprived of the ability to make a ‘concession’ in the eastern sector to gain Indian recognition of Chinese claims in Ladakh.

Chinese officials expressed contempt at India’s governmental pro­cess, as judged from its apparently uncoordinated and dangerous deci­sions on Arunachal. More obviously, China augmented its military presence in eastern Tibet. It brought in some 20,000 regular troops from the 53rd Army corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou moved in American made high altitude helicopter pads throughout the border region.34 India too was reinforcing routine administrative and police patrols in the northeast with military posts set in defensive hedgehog type patterns. In Spring 1987, India strengthened its air power in the border region and redeployed mountain divisions to the northeast. A command air land exercise followed in the east and northeast.35

Against this background, mutual Chinese and Indian accusations triggered alarm in the world press that conflict was imminent. However, no conflict took place because leaders on both sides acted in time. New Delhi sent messages to Beijing that disclaimed any

33. Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, op. cit, p. 38.
35. Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, op. cit. p. 42.
intent of provocation and avoided making official accusations. China denied rumours that they were massing troops on the border and said that they wanted to improve relations with India, Mechanisms were timely introduced to reduce the risk skirmishes or escalation of Sino-Indian conflict.

Only after the tensions subsided was it possible to hold the eighth round of talks in New Delhi in November 1987. The Indian and Chinese officials talked on a positive, cordial and friendly atmosphere. They stressed that pending a negotiated settlement on the boundary question, peace and tranquility should continue to be maintained all along the border, and they expressed the belief that there was considerable scope for strengthening and diversifying cooperation in several fields. These talks also confirmed to shift the problem in their bilateral relations to the level of top political leaders in both states.

If we look back at the balance-sheet of Sino-Indian normalization we find that steps toward detente were rather timid and faltering. In fact till 1985, despite sporadic efforts on both sides, movement toward Sino-Indian normalization had failed to develop enough momentum to push it over the rough spots along the road. Yet it seems that the two countries made enough progress in reducing the level of tension that they felt no particular urgency to press forward. The tug of existing relationships and the inertia of familiar patterns of policy and behaviour inhibited greater movement toward detente. However, the harsh realities of the events of 1986 and 1987 prompted the emergence of a new determination to achieve some Sino-Indian understanding. It must be stressed here that changes that were taking place in the international environment in the second half of 1980s also reflected upon this determination. The border talks opened the way to elevating dialogue among officials to the level of a summit meeting between heads of state. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China was the result. This was an important achievement for it marked the end of tensions to a great extent in Sino-Indian relations.
d) Quest for Rapprochement (1988 onwards)

The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's five day official visit to China during 19-23 December 1988 was a remarkable event in the history of Sino-Indian relations. It was the first time in thirty four years that an Indian Head of State visited China heralding a new era in bilateral relations. Rajiv's China visit must not be seen in isolation from the new trends and processes that formed in international relations during the end-eighties. It was an integral part of the process of transition of global politics from polarisation, confrontation and conflict to dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation. Rajiv Gandhi brought during his visit to China an approach to bear upon the border dispute that was qualitatively different from the approach of Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai or Jawaharlal Nehru. Rajiv and the Chinese leaders agreed to attempt political settlement of the border dispute against the legalistic territorial approach of the past. In the political approach, treaties and documents are not as important as national interests, national sentiments and mutual advantage. The new approach is imbued with pragmatism and a more lucid appraisal of each country's vital interests.

The major achievement of the five day goodwill visit was the establishment of a working group headed by the Foreign Secretary from Indian side and a Vice Minister from Chinese side to settle the long standing border dispute within a time frame. They have also signed three agreements dealing with air transport, cultural, scientific and technological relations aimed at improving bilateral ties. Regarding Tibet, Rajiv assured China that India accepted Tibet, as an autonomous region of China and what happens there was Beijing's internal affairs. The visit may not have produced a breakthrough but its outcome would nevertheless contribute to changing perceptions about each other. At the very least, the quest for rapprochement has been resumed after the setback it suffered in the summer of 1987.

37. For the text of the joint communique issued at the end of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China see Annexure A.
when, after the Sumbdorong Chu Valley affair, the world was speculating about the imminence of a second Indo-China war.

Mr. Gandhi's trip to China may, therefore be seen as a first but a major effort to guide Sino-Indian relations along lines that take into account the adjustments that the countries need to make to adapt to a world order which is no longer dominated by power equations based on East-West rivalries or expansionist ambitions.

The first round of talks of the Joint Border Committee which was set up during Rajiv's visit to China did not make much progress nor was it a failure. The exercise of formulating mutually acceptable guiding principles that would at a future date govern the settlement of the Sino-Indian border would necessarily take time. On the Indian side, the scale of priority the border settlement will get in 1990 will depend on who wins the November 1989 elections and with what nature of the electorates support. It is, however, noteworthy that the Chinese verbal behavior with India throughout 1989 has been positive. Beijing was pleased at the Indian government's restraint on the student upsurge in China and quite satisfied with New Delhi's correct stand on the status of Tibet.

e) Dynamics of Change

An examination of the trends in Sino-Indian interaction over the total span of their bilateral relations reveal certain distinctive features which have contributed to their quest for rapprochement.

1) The Sino-Indian border dispute both affected and reflected bigger international developments in South Asia involving the two super powers. The 1962 border war led to the formation of clear alignments with the Soviet Union and India forging closer ties countered by an informal alliance between China and Pakistan. The US role was rather enigmatic. While it facilitated Soviet-Indian moves to contain China during early 1960s it was closer to the China-Pakistan axis after Sino-American rapprochement in early 1970s.

2) Sino-Soviet dispute had direct repercussions on Sino-Indian relations. However the extreme hostility that China continued to display towards the Soviets especially in the seventies had gradually subsided in the following years. The termination of the ideological conflict and significant improvement in state to state ties between the two Communist giants were pointers away from confrontation. It had contributed towards a substantial easing of regional tensions. However the most important consideration to both China and India should be that a superpower involvement in their bilateral dispute is indisputably in the wane. This gives them considerable leverage to go ahead with their quest for rapprochement. It must be stressed here that the future course of interaction between Soviet Union and China (as in the past) would continue to influence China’s interaction with India as the issues are interdependent.

3) It is through the instrumentality of the military option exercised convincingly in 1962 that China was able to derive lasting political dividends. By humbling India on the battlefields of NEFA and the western sector, the Chinese had emerged in the narrow military sense as the more superior of the two. After that traumatic encounter in 1962, India had never underestimated the Chinese potential, be it strategic or political. The 1984 Indian Ministry of Defence Annual Report has categorically asserted that threat to Indian’s security comes from induction of new weapons to Pakistan and Islamabad’s nuclear program assisted by the external powers including China and the installations of IRBM and MRBMs by China in Sinkiang and Tibet. In light of China’s continuing military modernisation and growing nuclear capabilities so close to its vicinity, India cannot drop its guard. Such awareness has contributed to a growing realisation that India’s interests would be best served with a friendly China as its neighbour. The present trend indicates a gradual appreciation by India

that unilateralism in her approach should be given up. A favourable climate now exists in support of a speedy resolution of Sino-Indian differences.

4) Chinese attitude itself has undergone a change which qualifies to be described as positive. China's current stance on Indo-Pakistan relations quite aptly underlines the difference from its erstwhile hostile position. Twenty years ago, an accentuation of India-Pakistan conflict probably suited China but now she is sincerely interested in promoting detente between them. The Chinese side has perceptibly disengaged from the conflictual dimension of Indo-Pakistan relations. China has adopted a somewhat neutral position holding the view that India and Pakistan should resolve their differences at the bilateral level. The ideological factor which helped China to promote such revolutionary causes in South Asia as the Naxalite Movement in India is conspicuous by its absence in China's policy as well as rhetoric today. Another element of interest is the noticable absence of any references to the 'right of self determination of the Kashmiris,' always an irritant to India which characterised official Chinese pronouncements towards Pakistan till the early 1970s.

5) Although unsatisfactory in terms of tangible progress, the process of Sino-Indian normalisation has continued in an atmosphere of professed goodwill. Specifically, professional, economic and cultural exchanges have proliferated in the last few years. India and China regularly communicate with each other on matters of regional and global importance at various forums.

6) In the South Asian context, Pakistan has been China's main anti-Indian partner, but until the late 1970s, Beijing encouraged whatever anti-Indian tendencies it found in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and even Bhutan. To counter Beijing's effort New Delhi turned to the

41. Shridhar K. Khatri (ed) op. cit. p. 69.
Soviet Union and other powers hostile to China. Since about 1980, Chinese policy towards India has undergone a remarkable transformation. Beijing has explicitly acknowledged India's big brother role in South Asia, adopted a neutral position on the Kashmir issue, stopped supporting insurgencies within India, begun encouraging amity rather than enmity between India and its neighbours and sought to expand bilateral Sino-Indian relations while negotiating on the border question. Since 1986, India has also altered her rigid posture regarding the border issue and is desirous of normalising their differences.

It seems that India has clearly acknowledged that a friendly relationship with China will serve its bilateral and larger interests. The Chinese have given tentative signals that they are interested in reciprocating the Indian desire. There are strong indications that the perceptions of both India and China towards each other has changed distinctively. What were the compulsions for this change? Were any external factor responsible for such change? Are these changes real? Will it effect any major breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations in the coming years? These are some of the questions that looms large on the eve of Sino-Indian rapprochement. I shall attempt to focus on some of these in the next chapters.

3. COMPULSIONS FOR CHANGE

Both India and China are countries with similar massive problems arising from the colonial heritages, huge populations and sparsely developed resources facing the twin evils of poverty and unemployment in a world situation of stagflation. They have common stakes in the emergence of a New International Economic Order, greater availability of trade opportunities on honourable and equitable terms from international institutions, wider cooperation between 'South and South' and peace and security in their environs. Moreover as both are still predominantly agrarian societies, although industrialising quite rapidly they face the challenge of reforming their political economy and maintaining

a balance between their traditional values and modern incentives. As both the countries have come to realise these, there gradually developed a sense of accommodation between them.

The recent years have witnessed numerous gestures of goodwill in relations between India and China. Certain compulsions constitute the mutuality of interests between them. These have brought the two longheld adversaries to the negotiating table with a view to normalising their relations. The factors that compelled the two unfriendly giants to come to terms are basically of political, security related and economic in nature. Each country has its own set of compulsions. Let us examine them separately.

a) Compulsions for India

i) India seems to have poised herself to assert regional supremacy in South Asia. Her quest for *rapprochement* with China is a key ingredient in such a round of assertive diplomacy intended to underline India's emergence as a regional power. Her dependence on any of the big powers is perceived in this context to tarnish Indian image resulting in difficulties to realise her national objectives. A view prevails in India that national interests would be best served by reaching some accommodation with China and maximising India's options within the Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship. Through an improvement in bilateral relations, India hopes to undermine the basis for the Sino-Pakistani relationship, lessen its own dependence on the Soviet Union and reduce tensions on its borders with its largest neighbour. Better relations with China would also be an indication to India's South Asian neighbours to behave accordingly. Moreover all other South Asian neighbours had settled their borders with China. India realised that she needs to settle hers with China to protect her image as a burgeoning power in South Asia.

ii) India's multidimensional diplomacy aiming at the diffusion of tension from the South Asian region appears to be governed by a

thorough consideration of its options of maintaining more balanced relations with three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Considering the recent Sino-Soviet detente and the American approaches and policies towards the subcontinent especially Pakistan, India has rightly realised that any dramatic change in the Sino-Soviet relationship must therefore have its inevitable fallout on India. Unhappy relations between New Delhi and Beijing can at best be a constant source of irritation in the bilateral Indo-Soviet relationship and at worst the beginning of a new divide. India had long feared that its leverage vis-a-vis Beijing would be greatly circumscribed if the Sino-Soviet normalisation precedes the Sino-Indian rapprochement.45

iii) Although it will be a mistake to see the relations between the three countries as a zero sum game where improvement in one side leads to deterioration in another, it is in India’s diplomatic and strategic interest that symmetry be maintained between Soviet-China and India-China relations.46 Growing Sino-Soviet economic relations will also require greater alertness of India for strengthening its economic and trade relations with China. So India perceives that an improvement of relations with China may be useful at this point of time. There were also speculations in the Indian press, prior to Rajiv’s visit to China that there was some sort of Soviet pressure on India to mend fences with China on the eve of Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

iv) It is speculated that cordial relations with China will reflect on relations with India’s South Asian neighbours. India expects that there may be lesser political support and encouragement by China to Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan in their ‘confrontationist’ posture vis-a-vis India.47 Sino-US-Pakistan triangle is a threat to Indian

47. K. Subrahmanyam, World Focus, New Delhi, August 1981, p. 3.
security. It is more so when Pakistan, India's closest neighbour, is flooded with the sophisticated US weapons system, which as India perceives, is meant against India. A relaxed relationship with China could also provide India a means to restrain Pakistan's intransigence. Nepal, to maximise her diplomatic options has often played both sides against the middle. Sino-Indian cordial relations will also provide her less scope to do so. As a whole, most of the South Asian states will not be able to use the 'China card' in its relations with India as they have done on several occasions earlier. This consideration was very important in India's calculation.

v) Security consideration is also very important for India. Northeast India is a constant worry for the leadership in New Delhi. This region has been in a state of turmoil and rife with secessionist aspirations which New Delhi had never been able to subdue, leaving India vulnerable in this area to Chinese support of and intervention in struggles for 'national liberation' and 'self determination'.

Reportedly, China provides arms and training facilities to rebel Nagas and Mizos. The subversive activities of the Mizo National Front (MNF) compelled the Indian government to ban this organisation by a special decree in January 1982. The MNF leaders have openly issued a call for the creation of an independent Mizoram which according to their plans would include the territories of the states of Assam, Manipur and Tripura. Chinese made firearms and ammunitions were seized from the arrested leaders. Rapprochement with China may lead to lesser Chinese interference in the northeast.

vi) China is a major security concern for India. Chinese military strength lies close to India's main centre of population. If they normalise their border with China, a great security burden would be

50. Vinay Kumar Malhotra, op. cit; p. 41.
relieved. It will also diffuse the impact of the presence of an adversary so close.

b) Compulsions for China

i) Major changes have taken place in China's foreign policy since the late 1970s. In general terms, China's modified foreign policy represents a retreat from its single-minded efforts of the late 1970s to build a matrix of strategic relations focused on confrontation with the Soviet Union. There is now more equal stress on the goals of sovereign independence, development and security and a greater appreciation for the need to forge a complex of economic, diplomatic and military assets to pursue these aims. In projecting a close association with Third World concerns, greater independence from the United States and a willingness to deal reasonably with Moscow, China hopes to increase its flexibility and expand its interests. These broad range of interrelated changes in China's approach to international affairs have affected most of its important relationships including the Sino-Indian one.

ii) In the past, Beijing has tended to approach conflict situation (e.g. US-USSR, Indo-Pakistani, Arab-Israeli etc.) as if its sole policy option was a stark choice between one side or the other. Such dichotomous thinking is now falling out of favour as Chinese diplomacy becomes more sophisticated and nuanced. In South Asia as elsewhere, Chinese leaders are learning to manage the ambiguous complexities of international relations without making unduly restrictive choices or becoming overtly identified with one or another side. In concrete terms, China is now able to recognise India's dominant power position in South Asia and explore avenues of better relations with New Delhi without diminishing Beijing's commitment to Pakistan and its connections with the other South Asian states. Recognising that a reduction of tension

between India and Pakistan as well as movement toward regional cooperation with South Asia would reduce the conflicting pulls on China's policy, Beijing has hailed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). China's foreign policy now concentrates on the potentials to promote peace and development. This has reflected upon its relations with India.

iii) By the mid 1980s it also became evident that the Sino-Soviet conflict which had constrained both Beijing and New Delhi from pursuing opportunities for conciliation was winding down. Beijing no longer views the Soviet Union as an imminent threat to Chinese security, but rather as an important partner in the modernisation of China's economy. The commencement of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Sino-Soviet discussions on Kampuchea in the summer of 1988 set the stage for the Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989. The normalisation of relations between Moscow and Beijing removes the major external obstacle to Sino-Indian conflict resolution. Sino-Indian relations are now no longer hostage to Sino-Soviet hostility as they were in the last years of the Brezhnev era.

iv) Tibet, the soft under belly of China remains a worrying factor for the Chinese. Indian influence in Tibet, where insurgency and unrest have been a spasmodic problem since the Chinese takeover in 1950, has always been a source of tension. Renewed anxiety about Tibet reinforces China's desire to promote Sino-Indian relations. So far, Beijing has been satisfied with New Delhi's distance from the resurgent Tibetan nationalism of the past two years. During his visit to China in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as well as India's policy of not interfering in China's internal affairs. But these pronouncements have not removed Chinese worries. Although Beijing has more or less managed to keep control over

Lhasa, the possibility of a more powerful manifestation of Tibetan national sentiment cannot be ruled out. The Chinese fear that such an upsurge could generate a move for popular sympathy in India, particularly if Beijing feels compelled to use force on a wide scale to maintain its control. China realises that this could create a dilemma for the Indian government, which has already been criticised by Tibetan groups in India, as well as by opposition parties, for exhibiting a callous indifference to the principles of freedom and human rights in its pursuit of the power game with China. Chinese leaders hope to build up a network of Indian Chinese connections and a reservoir of goodwill in India to buffer the adverse fallout from another Tibetan crisis.

v) China's programme of economic and political reform has provided the rationale for Beijing's interest in better relations with New Delhi. Deng Xiaoping and his associates have concluded that the Sino-Indian confrontation was one among many dysfunctional antagonisms and conflicts inherited from the Maoist period that inhibited the rational pursuit of China's national interest.

vi) China has launched a vigorous programme of Four Modernisations. In order to realise China's modernisation programme, the Chinese leaders appear to be more objective and have moved to improve relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and other Western countries to develop trade and other forms of economic, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges. To concentrate fully on the goals of economic and technological modernisation, China needs a stable and progressive society internally and a peaceful and comparatively friendly environment outside, both regional and global, in consistence with its overall foreign policy framework. Ensuring reduction of tensions in China's borders is one of the basic objectives of this policy. China of late is engaged in a wider effort to have peaceful border with Vietnam on the South


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and its long term adversary India. As there are possibilities of settlement of her borders with Vietnam and Kampuchea as a corollary to Sino-Soviet reconciliation, China has realised the need to concentrate more on its borders with India.

vii) With the change in the strategic environment in South Asia, a shift in China’s South Asia policy became perceptible. China gradually came to recognise the reality that in South Asia India is objectively placed as the most powerful country. China no longer capitalises over the tensions between India and its neighbours. With this shift in China’s foreign policy a better climate has emerged for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations.

viii) In South Asia, China wants to encourage India’s moves towards a more equidistant position between it and Moscow and between Moscow and Washington. China also approves of India’s attempts to solve bilaterally issues in dispute with Pakistan, is pleased by India’s continuing efforts to reject the Asian Collective Security system proposal and appreciates Indian minister’s reiteration during contacts with Soviet leaders that New Delhi earnestly hopes for the normalisation of relations with China. China perceives that Soviet ambition and its influence in the region can be thwarted if China adopts flexible approach towards India and seeks normalisation. A Sino-Indian alignment would no doubt strengthen China’s position against Soviet Union. The Chinese also seem to perceive that good neighbourly relations between Asia’s two largest countries is welcome, for it would check Moscow’s bid for dominance in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area.

ix) China has also had to come to terms with the incontrovertible evidence of India’s growing military strength. Since 1964, India has spent approximately $ 30 billion on modernising its armed

forces. It now has the third largest standing army, the fifth largest air force and eighth largest navy in the world. Its domestic arms industry is the biggest among non-Communist Third World countries, and it has the world's tenth largest industrial base and third largest supply of skilled and technical manpower to support this industrial and military growth.\(^{56}\)

India's recent nuclear and space activities have also given China reason to reassess its strategic approach to the region. Beijing has inevitably been drawn into the Indo-Pakistan nuclear rivalry which has quickened since the 1974 nuclear explosion by India. Though there is little obvious benefit to Beijing in becoming involved in Indo-Pakistan nuclear politics, its long-standing friendship with Pakistan has required it to support Pakistan in the event of nuclear threat and nuclear 'blackmail'. Despite this dimension to Sino-Pakistani relationship, India's explosion and Pakistan's reaction has perhaps given China even more reason to attempt to come to terms with New Delhi. Acquisition of a nuclear capability has succeeded in exacerbating India's ties with the Soviet Union, reduced New Delhi's dependence on Moscow and raised the future prospect of India matching China in the nuclear field as it now rivals China in conventional weapons.\(^{57}\)

x) The honeymoon with the West and strategic alignment directed against the Soviet Union had the effect of downgrading China's image among the developing nations who were either disappointed or alienated. China's decision-makers apparently also recognised the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) as a link to Third World nations and an important body in terms of China's bid to gain a leadership role in the Third World bloc.\(^{58}\) An improvement of her relations with India, one of the leaders of the NAM and the Third World for that matter—may obviously be expected to be instrumental in achieving these Chinese objectives.


\(^{57}\) Rosemary Foot, op. cit. p. 199.

\(^{58}\) Current History, September 1983, p. 245,
4. CHINA VERSUS INDIA: BILATERAL POWER BALANCE

The study of Sino-Indian normalisation obviously calls for an assessment of their bilateral power balance from the strategic perspective. The two major nations of Asia are each an epicentre of power. It is thus reasonable to surmise that they may have conflicting global or regional ambitions and may continue to compete to establish their regional influence. Now that the dominant trends in their interaction suggest an impending rapprochement in their relations several questions arise. Does India and China have competitive interests in the regional context? Which nation is more powerful? Will the prospective rapprochement alter their competing claims? Which nation is the greater gainer in this rapprochement? etc. Let us ponder over this aspect of Sino-Indian relations.

In military terms, China is a growing nuclear power. China decided to acquire a nuclear weapon capability in mid January 1955. It was determined to build a nuclear weapon capability that was complete but small and entirely with its own resources. Hence, as early as 1959 a decision was also taken to simultaneously produce a hydrogen bomb. The first fission explosion was carried out in October 27, 1966. Thirty two months later, thermonuclear device was exploded, which is the shortest time in which this capability was achieved by any nuclear weapon power. Till October 1988, China had carried out at least 32 nuclear tests varying in yield from low kilotons to 4 MTS. Presently it has nuclear weapons of at least five different designs and yields.

China's submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programme commenced in 1967. Construction of Xia class nuclear powered submarine started in 1978 and the first ship was launched in 1982.

59. Basic indicators of China and India are given in Annexure B.
60. China's military balance is given in Annexure C and Chinese nuclear forces in Annexure E.
These submarines can be compared to the early Polaris class with each carrying twelve CSS-N-3 missiles with ranges up to 3300 km. Operational trials of the Xia class submarines were completed probably by 1987, though these have not yet been deployed. Another nuclear powered submarine, the Han class, carries six SY-2 cruise missiles with a range of 1600 km.

China has now had for quite some time a complete triad of nuclear delivery systems with truly intercontinental capability. The details of the capability and the numbers of missiles are given in Annexure E. In any possible deployment, some of China's intermediate range missiles (DF-2 and DF-3) would probably include South Asia in its range. In line with the strategy of minimum deterrence, China has kept its nuclear arsenal small. The intercontinental range missiles DF-4 and DF-5 are probably less than ten each. China considers that a guaranteed capability to strike at least a few high value targets within the heartland of a possible adversary to be an adequate deterrent. Yet this minimum deterrent posture against the superpowers provides a formidable capability against other nations. There is also every chance of its being sucked into the nuclear arms race and perpetually modernising its nuclear forces to overcome perceived deficiencies. Military modernisation is only fourth and last in Chinese priorities, but Chinese nuclear weapon programmes are considered separately and are not subject to any financial constraint. As discussed earlier, modernisation of its nuclear arsenal and improving its delivery means will remain high priority and recent indications justify this assumption.

China's rocket technology has progressed quite dramatically in the last two decades. China has now some 31 short range missiles in the 3 to 600 km range. There are 16 surface to surface missiles (SSM)

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four each of air to air (AAM) and surface to sub-surface (SSUBSM), three each of air to surface (ASM) and surface to air (SAM), and one sub-surface to surface (SUBSSM). In nuclear weapon technologies as well China has made significant progress of particular importance is the development of the neutron generator. The generator can produce 3,300 billion neutrons per second and was completed on August 28, 1988. The neutron generator has a role primarily in the production of a neutron bomb. China now enters a select band of nations having a neutron bomb capability. This capability is a significant advancement on China’s existing nuclear weapons systems and will need to be noted.

In recent years China has reconsidered its naval strategy and has been moving away from a coast guard role toward a limited blue-water naval doctrine. In the last few years the navy has acquired new guided missile destroyers as well as some experience in operating at long distance from home ports. It has also incorporated additional 15,000 ton Ocean going supply ships and mastered the technique of resupplying at sea. China successfully test fired submarine launched missile in October 1982. In order to hit targets in European Russia with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), the objects would have to be targeted from the Indian Ocean. The deployment of Chinese SSBMs in the Indian Ocean would increase the credibility of China’s threat to India by effectively targeting its main industrial, administrative, and population centres.

It is likely that by deployment in the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s defence planners could target simultaneously both the USSR and India with MIRV ed SLBM warheads from a far, relatively immune launching platforms, thus assuring it of second strike capability both more secure and more cost effective than any equivalent land-based nuclear missile system it could deploy. This could prove to be a major advantage for a power with limited nuclear capability as China

64. Ibid, p. 1353.
is bound to remain. Of late, China has reduced the number of military regions and combat troops and is focusing on the acquisition of advanced military technology and equipment from the West. China is also planning combined air land operations including the conduct of local or limited wars and possible border conflicts.

China has a nuclear operational force capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union and along the Asian landmass. Beijing has developed IRBM/MRBM’s and has deployed them at Nagqu in Xizang targeted towards major military installations in the USSR. With any change in Chinese perceptions they can be swung around to cover vital Indian targets with slight manipulation. So the security threat to India from China should be obvious. According to an Indian defence analyst the main security threats perceptible today to India’s security vis-a-vis China may be one or more of the following:

1. A military threat from Pakistan in conjunction with some collusion from China.
2. A politico-military threat from China in conjunction with some collusion from Pakistan.
3. A combined military attack from China and Pakistan.

So the China factor cannot be ignored in India’s calculation of strategic defence. More importantly, the involvement of China in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and other modernisation programmes indicates the level of commitment to Pakistan’s security. This commitment and involvement of China leads one to believe that in the event of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Chinese would align with Pakistan. This possibility poses serious security threats to India.

On the other hand India is a growing middle power with modest conventional capabilities. Nota bene a study carried out by the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security assessed that while it is possible that India has not yet manufactured

67. India’s military balance is given in Annexure D.
complete nuclear devices they have at least taken important steps towards doing so and have the capability of manufacturing deliverable atomic bombers in any crisis lasting more than several weeks. It is estimated that India could have produced sufficient plutonium to make as many as 38 weapons.\(^68\)

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in Indian naval forces as India aspires to be an Indian Ocean power. Indian navy is now reportedly equipped with a nuclear-submarine. In mid 1987, a second aircraft carrier was obtained from Britain and two diesel-electric submarines were under construction as were four Corvettes. An Indian built frigate was completed and two minesweepers, a ground­-missile destroyer and two diesel electric submarines were obtained. In April last year, TU-142 M Bear F Maritime reconnaissance and ASN aircrafts were acquired.\(^69\)

However, India does not as yet posses long-range delivery capacity. Her nuclear weapons would be incapable of effective deployment against China because the Chinese military and industrial concentrations are far away from India.\(^70\) Yet India’s possession of nuclear weapons and a confrontationist attitude towards China could provoke China to target her nuclear missiles on India and would be capable of serious damage. Thus by such an attitude India would only increase her security risks vis-a-vis China.

From an examination of military balance between the two Asian giants, China and India, it seems that there exists a lopsided security link between China and India. China is a major security concern for India, arguably even the principal one. Chinese military strength lies close to India’s main centres of population and China holds territory claimed by India. But by itself India is a relatively minor security

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70. Gowher Rizvi, “The Rivalry Between India and Pakistan” in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi op. cit., p. 120.
concern for China. Indian military strength sits far from China's heartland and weighs little compared with other threats to China's interests.

According to Barry Buzan, an international security expert, situation like this typically indicates the existence of a boundary between a lower and a higher level security complex. A lower level complex is composed of local states whose powers does not extend much if at all beyond the range of their immediate neighbours. This constraint on power is a key element in the existence of a relatively self-contained local security dynamics among sets of neighbouring states. In this context India's search for regional supremacy and preeminence in South Asia is notable. A higher level complex by contrast contains states like China, whose power is sufficient to impinge on several sectors of what their enormous physical size makes a vast local environment. However China's power is not yet, in itself global in reach. Whatever the status of power these states have—regional or global, deficiencies in the power capabilities of both countries make a major regional rivalry between them unrealistic at this time. Moreover they both have more pressing security problems in other directions. Indeed detente or even rapprochement seem more likely option than major rivalry.

Both India and China are developing countries with similar massive problems arising from colonial heritage, huge population and sparsely developed resources, facing the twin evils of poverty and unemployment. They have common stakes in the emergence of a new world economic order, greater availability of trade opportunities with the West, peace and security in the region and ending the system of international domination by the superpowers. Current trends in their relations also point to a direction where both India and China are pursuing similar interests and seem much more interested in establishing cordial relations than in pursuing rivalry. Having similar interests

does not mean that China does not influence India’s security doctrine. Beijing has accumulated a fair size of nuclear arsenal deliverable by aircraft and IRBMS/MRBM s and has also displayed an ICBM capability. Therefore India can ill afford to drop its guard. While every effort must be made to settle the border question and normalise relations, China’s military modernisation and its growing nuclear capabilities need to be considered by India.

A conventional arms asymmetry or an unilateral nuclear capability by itself need not threaten a nation. When these capabilities are with friends then they appear benign and may even be seen to contribute to its own security. Only when such a potential is combined with an adversarial relationship it assumes a threatening character. An asymmetric nuclear capability, however is not to be taken lightly.

5. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT

From the foregoing analysis it appears that the priorities of China and India are obviously on maintaining security on their borders and the strategies they have taken are pointers towards their attempts to understand the conflict in its entirety. Even though outstanding differences remain, there are indications of both the country’s preparedness to settle the border dispute. The past emphasis on legal and technical intricacies of the border question and the attempts by both sides to blame each other has lessened to a great extent. Today what is new in the old problem is that both China and India seems to feel that any prolongation of the trend of discord would not serve them in the changing international context. In addition, the leader of both the countries today share a common perspective on modernisation and economic emancipation and gives priority to it.

From 1981 to 1988 eight rounds of talks were held resulting in a marked relaxation of tensions. The Sino-Indian summit following Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China on December 1988 served to impart a new, more relaxed and cordial tone to the emerging relationship and paved the way for some significant agreements. The most meaning-
ful one of course relates to the new framework of consultation envisaged by the two countries to try and reach a negotiated settlement of their border dispute. A joint border committee has been set up to resolve the border dispute within a time frame. The setting up of the Joint Working Group possibly with a time bound programme, may well introduce an element of urgency that was lacking in the past. There is however a limit to which relations between two major, populous and emerging countries can improve given the fact of geography and a history of conflict. Merely agreeing to delienate a border may at best reduce tension but cannot bring lasting peace. In order to achieve that, it is essential to incorporate wider areas in this resolution. The two countries are also normalising their relations by expanding trade and cultural exchanges and cooperating in science and technology.

One cannot expect a dramatic breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations patterned by grave mistrust and lack of political understanding for long years. There remains justified doubts as to whether the new border panel would be able to produce the results which eight previous rounds of talks have failed to. Sino-Indian relations can only be normalised step by step and Rajiv’s visit was an important first step in that direction.

Indo-Chinese cooperation is likely to proceed at a snail’s pace. It will take time for a political understanding to grow between the two who have been locked in a mutually negative relationship for well over two decades. However, the negotiations helped to undo the rigid attitude of the contending powers. It also assisted them to converge on an approach to shift the preceding pattern of relationship into a more constructive one. They are also trying to concentrate on other areas of cooperation. The first meeting of the India-China Joint Commission, held in New Delhi on September 18-19, 1989 agreed on a one year trade protocol although without setting a target of increased trade. The Indian side seemed to be anxious to persuade the Chinese to buy more from India so that the minus trade gap could be made less minus. China was also asked to import more of the products of
India's modern industries and capital goods. On both accounts, the Chinese side made appropriate promises showing the very nature of the present state of Sino-Indian relationship. Indeed the wheels of Indo-Chinese cooperation move, but slowly.

The two countries hope to engage in exploring prospects of cooperation at the on-going and forthcoming global trade negotiation under GATT. US protectionism hits both the nations. If both China and India can coordinate their responses to American protectionism, other major third world countries will rally around them and thus will emerge a powerful South position on the important question of free global trade.

At this stage, however, China simply does not wish to hurt its relationship with the United States more than they have already done by the incidents related to student upsurge in May 1989. There is a kind of low ebb in China's relations with the world, even with India. The Chinese have evidently decided that this is not the best time to raise the threshold of cooperation with India dramatically. The Indian authorities too, for entirely different reasons have determined to walk slowly. The decisiveness in Indian policy towards China will take root once the elections are done and over with. But one thing is certain the wheels of change in Sino-Indian relations will continue to move giving way to emerging trends of cooperation.

One must also bear in mind that there still remains many obstacles on the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement. The issue of Tibet is complex, unpredictable and potentially explosive both in itself and in terms of Sino-Indian relations. In the past few years China has reacted sharply toward any country that offers public sympathy to the plight of the Tibetan people or that provides platform to the Dalai Lama. During this same period, the resurgence of ethno-nationalist

73. Ibid. p. 27.
consciousness inside Tibet has animated and, to a degree, radicalised the exile community. Demonstrations in Tibet against Chinese control mounted in 1988 and in March 1989. In response, Beijing imposed martial law in Tibet. Meanwhile, overseas Tibetan groups have sought to muster international support for their cause of protecting human rights in Tibet, and Tibetans in New Delhi have demonstrated in the streets. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials insist that Tibet will not be given independence, or even the degree of autonomy the Dalai Lama presently demands. They make clear that Chinese control will be maintained by whatever means are necessary and that foreign support for Tibet's cause is unwelcome and will continue to be regarded as unfriendly.

During Rajiv's visit to China in December 1988, the Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil. This bland formulation cannot entirely hide the fact that India continues to provide sanctuary and humanitarian assistance to the Dalai Lama and his followers. This assistance has enabled Tibetan culture and national identity not only to survive but to flourish. Thus New Delhi continues to face dilemmas. Recent developments within Tibet and among the Tibetan community in India—make the issue of Tibet more acute for Chinese-Indian relations. Indian officials know that any alteration in official Indian policy respecting Tibet would be highly provocative to China. On the other hand, such is the prestige and veneration that the Dalai Lama now commands in India that no Indian government could force upon him an unwelcome accommodation. China will undoubtedly remain hypersensitive to even the slightest signs of Indian support for Tibetan nationalist agitation and continue to demand that New Delhi adhere to its pledge of noninvolvement. So it seems that Tibet will

remain as the volatile issue in Sino-Indian rapprochement with the potentials of limiting its prospects. There are some other issues which still remains as irritants in their bilateral relations. Mention must be made of the Kashmir dispute which is still capable of stirring the pot even though Deng Xiaoping informally acknowledged as long ago as 1980, that it was an Indo-Pakistan issue. Moreover India has not received formal Chinese recognition of its integration of Sikkim in 1975.\textsuperscript{75} No less important is the fact that the border dispute between China and India is still unresolved although tensions of the recent past have diminished to a great extent.

Some optimism concerning the future of Sino-Indian relations is justified, in part because of the brightening prospects for overall relaxation of conflicts within Asia. Immediately after the Sino-Indian summit, during SAARC summit meeting in Islamabad, Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto pledged to seek better relations between their two countries. In May 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit in thirty years, bringing to fruition the process of Sino-Soviet normalisation.

Three pairs of long time Asian adversaries—China and India, India and Pakistan and China and the Soviet Union appear ready to approach their deep seated differences in a constructive way. In the past, hostile relations among each of these pairs of adversaries exacerbated relations among the other two as well. Now the regional linkages can work the other way. The gradual diminution of hostility within each of the pairs may exert a positive, reinforcing effect on the other two. Provided no unexpected disruptions occur, a steady if not necessarily speedy process of normalisation can be expected. Measured against the inflated hopes of the 1950's when an era of Sino-Indian friendship was proclaimed, this may not seem much. Measured against the record of hostility and conflict in the intervening decades, it is a great deal.

\textsuperscript{75} Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, \textit{op. cit}, p. 50.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

To assess the implications of Sino-Indian rapprochement for South Asia, an understanding of China’s South Asian connection is necessary. China has common borders with four of the seven South Asian states-India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan. So geographically it is well suited to exert considerable influence in the region. Over the years it has consolidated its position through a comprehensive diplomatic offensive and has become involved in South Asian politics. China’s rivalry with India, with whom they have even fought a border war in 1962, have influenced China’s relations with other South Asian countries. From Pakistan to Nepal to Bangladesh, it appears that various Chinese initiatives to gain strategic position in South Asia through diplomatic measures have borne fruit in the sense that all these states rather explicitly demonstrated considerable faith in the innate value of Chinese involvement within the region. For almost three decades China pursued a policy towards South Asia that was aimed at undermining India’s position. It has encouraged and rendered moral and political support and economic and military assistance to a number of South Asian countries, particularly India’s arch rival Pakistan in facing the Indian challenge.

In order to safeguard the precarious balance of power between Pakistan and India and prevent the emergence of an India controlled subcontinent, it supplied Pakistan with arms. China became Pakistan’s main military aid supplier and arms transfers from China to Pakistan from 1966 to 1980 amounted to more than $630 million. China also developed cordial relations with the smaller states in the region—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. China’s overall policy towards the smaller states of South Asia composed of offering economic and military aid in the form of grants and credits on generous terms. They also offered development of trade relations on favourable terms to these countries which made it a valuable trade partner. China took a

76. T. Karki Hussain, ‘Wither Relations with China,’ op. cit., p. 70.
generally supportive approach to these states’ positions in their disputes with India.

China’s strategic thinking is modelled on the percepts to neutralise threat to its security by seeking most favourable global or regional balance of power. China’s territorial proximity to South Asia and unresolved border problem with India has led it to maintain interests in the stability of the region by emphasising of the status quo rather than and on any alteration of the security environment detrimental to its interests. Consequently, China’s position in South Asia has become a crucial factor in the calculation of smaller countries’ security strategy and their conflict management.

Perhaps, three factors have been responsible in the perception of smaller countries to cast China in an important role in their strategic thinking. First, China has been a reliable conduit for the arms transfers to countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. This suggests of China’s continued desire to maintain precarious balance of power in South Asia and endorse regional security arrangements as mooted by smaller countries. Second, China has always supported smaller countries’ positions in their contentious issues with India. Finally, the sustenance of the above factors has added a new dimension to the importance of China in South Asian geopolitics. It gives credence, therefore, to the feeling in the region that what Moscow is to New Delhi, Beijing is to rest of the capitals’, functional strategy in South Asia.

These states have played the ‘China card’ effectively in their relations with India. They felt that cultivating good relations with China would offset India’s influence in the region. Some of them even derived considerable leverage from the Sino-Indian rivalry as it enabled them to keep any threat of direct Indian dominance at bay. This was the scenario until recently. Current trends in Sino-Indian relations, however, point out that both India and China seem interested in

78. Shridhar K. Khatri, (ed) op. cit, p. 77.
79. Ibid, p. 77.
establishing cordial relations than in pursuing rivalry. Although Sino-Indian normalisation was shaping up since the 1970s, the dramatic change in their relations was particularly pronounced since the Sino-Indian summit of December 1988. This quest for *rapprochement* by the two Asian giants obviously have some implications for the South Asian region.

Actually from the early 1970s, the scenario in South Asia began to change in important respects. Partly this was the result of the new balance of forces created in the region by the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. As a result of the war, the balance of power in South Asia drastically changed in India's favour. China was compelled to accept India's preeminence in South Asia and the basic thrust of her policies were guided by considerations largely centred on India. Gradually a perceptible change in Chinese attitude towards the other South Asian countries also became evident. Some of these states who earlier found in their ties with Beijing a countervailing force against New Delhi's 'hegemonism' were forced to realise that they can no longer expect Chinese support at the cost of China's relations with India. They also realised that Sino-Indian *rapprochement* would deprive them of Chinese political, economic and moral support on the levels they were used to getting. India's neighbours would also find it more difficult to play a 'China card' as they had done so far. Some recent instances and interactions clearly illustrates the shift in Chinese policy towards the region with regards to India's endemic conflicts with its neighbours.

The recent Indo-Nepalese crisis is a case in point. The crisis was touched off by suspicion in New Delhi that Tibet was shaping up as an alternative source of strategic and commercial supplier for Nepal. The suspicion was hardened when India learnt that China had laid an oil-pipeline along the Indo-Tibetan border and that this could be used to supply Nepal. To top it all, Nepal recently broke with tradition by buying anti-aircraft guns and other arms from China. New Delhi

sees closer Beijing-Kathmandu ties as a long-term military and internal security threat to itself and an unwarranted intrusion on the subcontinent. Earlier, before the shift in China’s policy, China had repeatedly warned India that any intervention in Nepal will be regarded as *casus belli* by China. But when the recent Indo-Nepalese crisis erupted, China was cautious and restrained in its policies towards Nepal. The Chinese Premier Li Peng advised the King of Nepal to settle his quarrels with India amicably. They also made sure that there was no second convoy of Chinese trucks carrying arms and weapons to Nepal. Despite the fact that the deadlock in Indo-Nepalese relations was caused by among others—Nepalese acquisition of Chinese arms, China cautiously refrained from assuming an anti-Indian posture in the conflict. Similarly, the Bangladesh President Hussain Muhammad Ershad learned from his March 1989 visit to Beijing that he could not expect any Chinese support for pillorying India on the issue of river waters. Likewise Sri Lanka knew that China while disapproving initially of the New Delhi-Colombo accord was not prepared to make an issue of it. When Sri Lankan President Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa was in Beijing recently, the reportage in *China Daily* made it clear that Beijing was unwilling to make any formulations hostile to New Delhi. Rather, the Chinese media noted with approval the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement on the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

Even on Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Chinese have not done or said anything that might offend Indian sensibilities. On Afghanistan, its advice to Pakistan, has been, and continues to be, that the issue can be settled only politically and that no settlement is possible without involving the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. On the

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85. Bhabani Sen Gupta. ‘Indo-Chinese relationship’, op. cit. p. 28,
Siachin Glacier issue, the Chinese mass media has either maintained a studied silence or expressed the hope that India and Pakistan will settle it peacefully through talks. China is gradually but steadily distancing itself from intra regional feuds in South Asia. It is clearly manifest in China's advise to its friends in the region to resolve their disputes with India through negotiations.

With the gradual withdrawal of Chinese competitive involvement from South Asia, a vacuum is created, setting the stage for India to fullfill its objectives, envisaged in the 'India doctrine' and to emerge as the self-appointed custodian of peace, security and the destiny of the entire region. It is highly heavy handed and dependent on the use of or the threat to use force in its dealings with the neighbours. Indian policy towards the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and the stationing of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in that country under a controversial treaty, its intervention in the Maldives to suppress an attempted coup and the deadlock in its relations with Nepal are only the most illustrated manifestations of this policy.

India's role of a self-appointed custodian of peace and stability in the region has, however, generated mistrust and deep suspicion in the region. Its neighbours have developed a sense of being intimidated. They are deeply concerned that what happened with Sri Lanka, the Maldives or with Nepal could be repeated with any other country of the region any time. The ineluctable dilemma facing South Asian countries is that they neither could accept the new role of India in the region nor could pose an effective challenge to the latter. More disconcerting is the fact that extra-regional great powers, China included, upon whom the smaller countries have banked so much are showing a distinct unwillingness to challenge India within the region. In the strict strategic sense, the extra-regional link was considered to be the national imperative for the smaller countries of South Asia, who feel the threat is from within. The extra-regional linkages were not only maintained as a

86. A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, op. cit. p. 16.
87. Ibid, p. 15.
security strategy by the smaller countries but were also forged with the hope to expand the arena of economic as well as commercial interdependence and reduce dependence from a single source.

The Chinese leadership has made a point of stressing that the relationship with Pakistan will be unaffected by developments in its relations with India and the USSR. Similarly Beijing has made efforts to convince the smaller countries in the region that China does not intend to allow Indian to dominate South Asia simply as a *quid pro quo* for resolving its outstanding questions with China. While China seems to have reservations about India's new role in South Asia, it has carefully avoided expressing this reservation in an unequivocal language. It is argued that since the interests of India and China are not likely to collude against the vital interests of smaller countries of South Asia, regional stability may be reinforced, not weakened by strengthening Sino-Indian peaceful coexistence.

Though an improved Sino-Indian relationship may enhance the present structure of regional stability in South Asia, it is not likely to add any new dimensional transformation in the regional strategic scenario. Even if the divisions in South Asia are softened to an extent the softening effect is likely to be limited—limited by the maintenance of the basic reasons for hostility between India and Pakistan, limited by the memory of three major wars fought between them, limited by mutual mistrust syndrome and divergent security perception between India on the one hand and other South Asian states on the other. So it is unlikely that the disengagement of extra regional powers from South Asian conflicts or the current global trend of settling conflicts through negotiations could have significant positive effect on the situation in the region. It is mainly due to the fact that conflicts in the region are primarily rooted in historical, socio-economic and political developments, particularly the current dynamics of inter-state relations in the

89. Shridhar K. Khatri *op. cit.*
region itself. Disengagement of extra regional powers has only removed
the external inputs to the conflict which has never been the determining
factor in their outbreak or sustenance or outcome⁹⁰. South Asia and
its conflicts, are left with the region itself. Therefore, the region will
have to find out a mechanism primarily on its own efforts with a view
to resolving the existing conflicts and preventing the outbreak of new
ones.

Text of the joint communique issued at the end of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, 19-23 December 1988.

At the invitation of Premier Li Peng of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made an official goodwill visit to the People's Republic of China from 19th to 23rd December, 1988.

Accompanying his excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to China were Mrs Sonia Gandhi, Mr Narasimha Rao, minister of external affairs of India, Mr Dinesh Singh, minister of commerce, Dr. B. Shankaranand, minister of law and justice and water resources, Mr K. Natwar Singh, minister of state for external affairs and other Indian officials.

Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in an atmosphere of friendship, candidness and mutual understanding.

President Yang Shankun of the People's Republic of China, general secretary Zhao Ziyang of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and chairman Deng Xiaoping of the military commission of the CPC central committee had separate meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

During his visit, the two governments signed the agreement on cooperation in the field of science and technology, the agreement relating to civil air transport, and the executive programme for the year 1988, 1989 and 1990 under the agreement for cultural cooperation. Both the Premier and the Prime Minister were present at the signing ceremony.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs Gandhi and their party also toured historical sites and scenic spots in Beijing, Xi'an and Shanghai.

During their talks and meetings, the leaders of the two countries had a wide exchange of views and ideas on bilateral relations and
international issues of mutual interest. Both sides found such talks and meetings useful, as they enhanced mutual understanding in the interest of further improvement and development of bilateral relations.

The two sides made a positive appraisal of the cooperation and exchanges in recent years in trade, culture, science and technology, civil aviation and other fields, and expressed satisfaction with the relevant agreements reached between the two countries. They emphasised the scope that existed by learning from each other.

They emphasised that the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which were jointly initiated by India and China, which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between states.

These principles also constitute the basic guidelines for the establishment of a new international political order and the new international economic order.

Both sides agreed that their common desire was to restore, improve and develop India-China good-neighbourly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles. This not only conforms to the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but will actively contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. The two sides reaffirmed that they would make efforts to further their friendly relations.

The leaders of the two countries held earnest, in-depth discussions on the India-China boundary question and agreed to settle this question through peaceful and friendly consultation.

They also agreed to develop their relations actively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question, while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this question.
In this context, concrete steps will be taken, such as establishing a joint working group on the boundary question, and a joint group on economic relations and trade, and science and technology.

The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.

With regard to the international situation, the two sides held that in the present-day world, confrontation was giving way to dialogue, and tension to relaxation.

This is a trend resulting from long years of unswerving struggle by the peace-loving countries and people of the world against power politics. It is conducive to world peace and to the settlement of regional problems. It also facilitates the efforts of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to develop their national economies.

India and China will make their own contributions to the maintenance of world peace, promotion of complete disarmament and attainment of common progress.

His excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs Sonia Gandhi and their party expressed heartfelt thanks to the government and people of the People's Republic of China for the warm and friendly hospitality accorded to them.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited Premier Li Peng to visit the Republic of India at his convenience. Premier Li Peng has accepted the invitation with pleasure. The date of the visit will be decided upon through diplomatic channels.

*Courtesy*: Times of India, December 24, 1988
### BASIC INDICATORS

#### CHINA
- **Population**: 1,072,000,000 (1988)
- **Area**: 6,596,961 sq. km.
- **GNP per capita**: $237 (1986)
- **GDP real growth**: 8% (1986)
- **Labour force**: 460 m (1983)
- **Unemployment**: 2.3%
- **Inflation**: 7.0% (1986)
- **Trade balance**: $12,000 m (1986)
- **Foreign debt**: $4.83 bn (1986)
- **Def. exp.**: $5.83 bn (1986)
- **Def. bdgt.**: $7.78 bn (1988)

#### INDIA
- **Population**: 799,727,000 (1988)
- **Area**: 3,287,590 sq. km.
- **GNP per capita**: $250 (1986)
- **GDP real growth**: 5.0% (1986)
- **Labour force**: 400 m (1987)
- **Unemployment**: 10%
- **Inflation**: 8.7% (1916)
- **Trade balance**: $5.8 bn (1984/85)
- **Foreign debt**: $26.7 bn (1985)
- **Def. bdgt.**: $9.89 bn (1988)
CHINA'S MILITARY BALANCE (1989)

TOTAL ARMED FORCES :

ACTIVE : some 3,200,000 (perhaps 1,350,000 conscripts-men and women aged 18-22), being reduced.

Terms of Service : selective conscription ; Army, Marines 3 years : Navy 5 years, Air Force 4 years. Technical volunteers can serve 8-12 more years to maximum age 35.

RESERVES : 1,200,000+ incl military and militia reserves. National Defence Reserve being formed on a province wide basis.

STRATEGIC FORCES :

OFFENSIVE (Strategic Rocket Units): (90,000)

MISSILES : org in 6 (perhaps 7) div with regt or bde and bn; org varies by msl type.

ICBM : 6:
  2 CSS-4 (DF-5); mod tested with MIRV.
  4 CSS-3 (DF-4).

LRBM : 60 CSS-2 (DF-3), some updated.

MRBM : 50 CSS-1 (DF-2)(may now be retiring).

SUBMARINES : 1

SSBN : 1 Xia with 12 CSS-N-3 (J-1) Range est 2,200-3,000 km, 1×2 MT warhead.

(Note : Production of Chinese SSBN is continuing, but extremely slowly. A further 3 Xia-class are under construction.)

DEFENSIVE :

(a) Tracking stations: Xinjiang (covers central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border).
(b) Phased-array radar complex. Ballistic missile early warning.

**ARMY:** 2,300,000 (perhaps 1,075,000 conscripts).
(reductions continue).

7 Military Regions, 29 Military Districts (Provincial Regions),
1 indep MD, 3 Garrison Comds.

**Integrated Group Armies:**

22 Integrated Group Armies (GA, equivalent to Western corps
were Field Armies before reorganization) comprising,
80 inf div (some being mech ('all arms'))
10 armd div (normally 3 regt, 323 MBT).
5-6 field and AA arty div.
Some indep arty AA regt.
50 indep engr regt.
Avn: hel group reported.

AB (manned by Air Force):
1 corps of 3 div
1 indep div.
Spt tps.

**EQUIPMENT:**

T-54, 6,000 Type-59, 80 T-69 (mod Type-59 : not incl T-69 11, which is export only),
Type-79/-80 reported.

LIGHT TANKS 1,200 Type-62, 800 Type-63 amph.

APC : 2,800 Type-531 C/-D/-E. Type-85 (YW-531H).
Type-55 (BTR-40). -56(BTR-152),-63,
Type-77-1/-2 (Sov BTR-50pk amph): Type-523.

TOWED ARTY : 14,500:
100mm: Type-59 (fd/ATK). Type 86:
122mm: Type-54, Type-60, Type-83- D-30:
130mm: Types-59/-59-1 ;
152mm : Type-54, Type-66.
SP ARTY: 122mm: Type-54-1 (Type-531 chassis), YW-302; 152mm: Type-83.

MRL: 1,250: 107mm: Types-63 towed/-81 sp (being replaced by 122mm);
122mm: Type-81, Type-81 minelayer, Type-83, Type-85; 130mm: Type-63, Type-70 sp.
Type-82; 132mm: BM-13-16; 140mm:
BM-14-16; 253mm: Type n.k. sp, minelayer.
284mm: Type-74 minelayer.

MORTARS: 100mm: Type-71; 120mm: Type-55, W-86, WZ-381 sp; 160mm: Type-56.

SSM: launchers: M-9 (range 600 km); M-11 (range 120-150km); under development-in service 1989.

ATGW: HJ-73 (Sagger-type) HJ-8 (TOW/Milan-type).

RCL. 82mm: Type-65; 105mm: Type-75 sp.

RL. 90mm: Type-51

ATK GUNS: 57mm: Type-55; 76mm: Type-54; 100mm: Type-73.

AD: GUNS: 15,000: 12.7mm: Types-54,-77; 14.5mm:
Types-75,-75-1 towed, Types-56,-58,-80 twin sp; 23mm: (ZSU-23 type); 37mm:
Types-55/-65/-74,-63 twin sp; 57mm: Types-59,-80 SP; 85mm: Type-56; 100mm: Type-59.

SAM: HN-5, HN-5A/-C(SA-7 type); HQ-61 twin sp.

RESERVES: (undergoing radical reorganization on a provincial basis) inf div, cbt spt regt; no numbers available.

DEPLOYMENT: (Detailed information on current deployment after reorganization is not available. These figures assume unchanged proportions from estimated deployment.
(Excl arty and AA div.)

North-East Shenyang MR (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning MD):
4 GA, 2msl, 4 armd, 16 inf.
North. Beijing MR (Beijing, Tianjin Garrison Comds; Nei Monggol, Hebei, Shanxi MD):
5 GA, 1 msl, 3 armd, 17 inf; 1 AB (Air Force);
West: Lanzhou MR (incl Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang MD):
  2GA, 2 msl, 1 armd. 9 inf;†
South-West: Chengdu MR (incl Sichuan, Sanxia, Guizhou. Yunnan, Xizang MD)
  3 GA. 1 msl, 10 inf:
South: Guangzhou MR (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong;†
  Guangxi, Hainan (MD-equivalent)): 3 GA 10 inf;‡
Centre: Jinan MR (Shandong, Henan, MD):
  2 GA, 1 armd, 7 inf, 3 AB (Air Force)s
East : Nanjing MR (Shanghai District: Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian. Jiangxi, Anhui MD):
  3 GA, 1 armd. 11 inf.
NAVY: 300,000 incl Coast Defence, Marines and Naval Air (some 115,000 conscripts);
BASES : see Deployment and Bases below.

SUBMARINES: 115 :
STRATEGIC SUBMARINES: 1 SSBN:
TACTICAL SUBMARINES: 113
SSN: 3 Han with 533mm TT.
SSG: 3 Improved Ming (Type ES5G), with 6 C-801 (YJ-6, Exocet derivative) SSM; plus 533mm TT.
SS: 107 :
  3 Improved Ming (Type ES5E) with 533mm TT.
  84 Romeo (Type ES3B) with 533mm TT.
  20 Whiskey with 533mm and 406mm TT.
(Note: probably only about half the older Romeo and Whiskey classes fully operational)
OTHER ROLES ; 1 Golf (SLBM trials)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 53

DESTROYERS: 19:

1 new construction (possibly Wuhan-B (ASUW) with $8 \times C-801$ SSM, 1 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin) hel (OTHT), i 100mm gun.

16 Luda (Type-051) (ASUW) with $2 \times 3$ CSS-N-2 (HY-2 Styx derivative Silkworm) SSM, $2 \times 2$ 130mm guns; plus $2 \times 12$ ASW RL (1 modernized with $8 \times C$ 801 vice C-SSN 2, hel deck vice after $2 \times 130$mm gun).

2 Anshon (Sov Gordy) with $2 \times 2$ CSS-N-2 SSM. $2 \times 2$ 130mm guns.

FRIGATES: 34:

23 Jianghu; 4 variants:

About 10 Type I, with $4 \times$ ASW RL. plus $2 \times 2$ CSS-N-2 SSM, $2 \times 100$mm guns.

About 9 Type II, with $2 \times 5$ ASW RL, plus $2 \times 2$ CSS-N-2, $2 \times 2$ 100mm guns.

About 3 Type IV, with $2 \times 3$ ASTT, plus $8 \times$ C-801 SSM, $2 \times 2$ 100mm guns

About 1 Type V, with 1 Z-9A hel, $2 \times 5$ ASW RL. $2 \times$ CSS-N-2 SSM, $2 \times 100$mm guns.

2 Jiangdong with $2 \times$ ASW RL, $2 \times 2$ 100mm guns.

5 Jiangnan with $2 \times$ ASW RL, $3 \times 100$mm guns.

4 Chengdu with $1 \times 2$ CSS-2 SSM, $3 \times 100$mm guns.

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: About 850:

CORVETTES: About 10 misc WW2 (and earlier) escorts.

MISSILE CRAFT: 235:

125 Huang/feng/Hola (Sov Osa-type) with $4 \times$ CSS-N-2 or $8 \times C$-801 SSM.

110 Hegu/Hema (Komar-Type) with $2 \times$ CSL-N-2 or $4 \times C$-801 SSM.
TORPEDO CRAFT: About 185:
105 Huchuan, 60 P-6, 20 P-4 all (with $2 \times 533\text{mm}$ TT (more in store)).

PATROL: About 420:

COASTAL: 91:
1 Haijui (improved Hainan),
70 Hainan with $4 \times \text{ASW RL}$.
20 Kronshtadt with $2 \times \text{ASW RL}$.

INSHORE; 380:
290 Shanghai, about 90.

RIVERINE: about 50.
(Note: some minor combatants are reportedly being assigned to para-military forces-People’s Armed Police. border guards and the militia-or into reserve. Additionally, substantial reductions in personnel strength and general shortage of information mean totals should be used with caution).

MINE WARFARE: 128:

MINELAYERS: None dedicated, but Luda, Anshan, Jiangnan and Chengdu class DD/FF and Hainan, Kronshtadt and Shanghai PC have minelaying capability.

MCM: 128:
28 Sov T-43 MSO.
Some 80 Lienyun MSC (trawler type).
20 Fushun MSI; plus about 60 unmanned drone MSI.

AMPHIBIOUS: 76:
5 Yukon LST, capacity about 200 tps. 10 tk.
13 Shan LST. capacity about 150 tps. 16 tk.
30 Yuliang, 4 Yuling, 4 Yudao LSM, capacity about 100 tps, 3 tk.
6 Qiong Sha LSI, capacity 400 tps.
14 Hua (US LSM-1), capacity 25 tps, 4 tk.
Plus about 400 craft: 320 LCU, 40 LCP, 10 LCT and some hovercraft.
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 104:

3 Fuqing AOR, 25 spt AO, 1 AFS, 8 submarines, 2 repair, 11 tpt, 35 survey/research/experimental, 2 icebreakers, 17 ocean tugs.

COASTAL REGIONAL DEFENCE

FORCES: 38,000.

35 indep arty and SSM regt deployed in 25 coastal defence regions with forces disposed to protect naval bases, offshore islands and other vulnerable points.

GUNS: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm.

SSM: CSS-N-2 (HY-2).

MARINES: (Naval Infantry): some 4,500.

1 bde.

Special recce units.

RESERVES: On mob to total 8 div (24 inf, 8 tk, 8 arty regt), 2 indep tk regt.)

EQUIPMENT:

MBT: T-59.

LIGHT TANKS: T-60/-63. PT-76.

APC: Type-531. LVT; some Type-77.

ARTY: how: 122mm : Type-54 (incl-54-1 SP).

MRL: Type-63.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 30,000;

some 900 shore-based cbt ac, 12 armed hel.†

Org in 3 bbr, 6 ftr div, incl:

BOMBERS: some 50 H-6, some H-6D reported with C-601 anti-ship ALCM.

About 130 H-5 torpedo-carrying It bbr.

FGA: some 100 Q-5.

FIGHTERS: some 600, incl J-5/-6/-7.
RECCE: H-5.
MR/ASW: 8 ex-Sov Be-6 Madge, 4 PS-5 (Y-8 mod).
MISCELLANEOUS: some 60 it tpt ac, JJ-5/6 trg ac.
ALCM: FL-1/C-601.
Naval fighters are integrated into the national AD system.
DEPLOYMENT AND BASES:
NORTH SEA FLEET: Coastal defence from Korean border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10'N); equates to Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan Military Regions; and to seaward:
BASES: Qingdao (HQ), Dalian (Luda), Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan.
9 Coastal defence districts.
FORCES: 2 submarine, 3 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amph sqn; plus Bohai Gulf trg flotillas, About 300 patrol and coastal combatants.

EAST SEA FLEET: Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (35°10'N to 23°30'N approx); equates to Nanjing Military Region, and to seaward;
BASES: Shanghai (HQ), Wusong Dinghai, Hangshou. 7 coastal defence districts.
FORCES: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amp sqn. About 250 patrol and coastal combatants. Marines: 1 cadre div.
Coastal Defence Regional Forces: Nanjing, Fuzhou Coastal Districts.

SOUTH SEA FLEET: Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx 23°30'N) to Vietnam border); equates to Guangzhou Military Region, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly Islands).
BASES: Zhanjiang (HQ), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai. Huangpu; plus outposts on Paracel and Spratly Is.
9 Coastal Defence districts.
FORCES: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amph sqn. About 300 patrol and coastal combatants. Marines: 1 dbe.

AIR FORCE: 470,000, incl strategic forces and 220,000 AD personnel (160,000 conscripts) some 6,000 cbt ac, no armedjhel, 7 Military Air Regions, HQ Beijing.

Combat elm org in armies of varying numbers of air div (each with 3 regt of 3 eqn of 3 fit of 4-5 ac, maintenance unit, some tpt and ac) Tpt ac in regt only).

BOMBERS:

MEDIUM: 120 H-6 (some may be nuclear-capable).
Some carry C-601 msl; some others to be converted to tkr.
LIGHT: Some 250-300 H-5 (some with C-801 msl).
FGA: 500 Q-5

FIGHTERS: 4,000, incl 400 J-5, some 60 regt with about 3,000 J-6/B7D/E, 250 J-7/J-7M, 33 J-8.

REkke: 130 J-5· 20 JZ-6 (J-6 variant), 40 HZ-5 (H-5 variant) ac.

TRANSPORT: some 420, incl 300 Y-5- 20 Y-7. 20 Y-8, Y-11, Y-12, ex-Sov Li-2, 11-14, 11-18 (to be retired), 18 BAe Trident (2-IE, 16-2E).


TRAINkkS: (some OCU) incl CJ-5/-6 (mod CJ-5), J-2, JJ-2JJ-4/-5/-6, HJ-5.

MISSILES:


ASM: (anti-ship): C-601 subs onic ALCM (perhaps HY-2 SSM derivative); C-801 surface skimmer.

AA ARTY:

16 div: 16,000 57mm, 85mm and 100mm guns:
28 indep AD regts (100 SAM units with HQ-2, 2J (CSA-1).-61 SAM).
PARA-MILITARY: some 12,000,000 Ministry of Public Security: People’s Armed Police: (1,830,000).

29 div, 1,029 bn border/mtn/internal defence.

Deployment unknown but probably parallels the previous Regional Force pattern (see The Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 143).

* The term People’s Liberation Army comprises all services; its Ground, Naval and Air components are listed separately for purposes of comparison.

‡ There are 2-3 div worth of border types in these MR.


India’s Military Balance (1989)

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

ACTIVE: 1,362,000.

Terms of service voluntary.

RESERVES: (obligation to age 60) Army 200,000.

Territorial Army 40,000 Air Force (Regular, Air Defence, Auxiliary) exist. strengths unknown.

ARMY: 1,200,000.

HQ: 5 Regional Comd (=Fd Army), 10 Corps.

2 armd div (2/3 armed. 1 SP arty (2 SP fd. 1 med regt) bde).
1 mech div (3 mech (4/6 mech bn, 3 armd regt). 1 arty dde).
20 inf div (2—5 inf, 1 any bde; some have armed regt)
11 mtn div (3—4 bde. 1 or more arty regt)
17 indep bde: 8 armd, 7 inf, 1 mtn, 1 AB/cdo.
3 indep arty bde.
6 AD bde.
4 engr bde.

These formations comprise:

46 tk regt (bn).
17 mech, 329 inf bn.
9 AB/cdo bn.
164 arty regt (bn): 1 hy. 5 MRL 50 med (incl 5 SP), 69 fd
(incl 3 SP) 39 mtn.
29 AA arty regt, perhaps 10 SAM gp (3-5 bty eac).
7 sqn, 25 ft, Air Observation.
6 ATK/tpt, 4 liaison hel sqn.

EQUIPMENT:

MBT: 3,150 (E 500 in reserve): some 800 T-55.
650 T-72, 1,700 Vijayanta.

LIGHT TANKS: 100 PT-76.

MICV: 700 BMP-1, some Sarzth (BMP-2).
APC: 400 OT-62/64, 50 BTR-60.

TOWED ARTY: some 2,165: 75mm/76mm: 900 75/24 mtn, 215 Yug M-48; 88mm: 1,000 25-pdr (retiring); 100mm: 185 M-1944: 105mm: some 800 (incl M-56 pack), some 30 IFG Mk II: 130mm 550 M-46, 140mm: 150 5.5-in (retiring); 155mm: 30 FH-77B.

SP ARTY: 105mm: 80 Abbot; 130mm: 50 mod M-46.

MRL: 122mm, 80 BM-21.

MORTARS: 120mm: 1,000; 160mm: 200.

ATGW: SS-11-B1, Milan, AT-3, Sagger.

RCL: 106mm 1,000+ M-40.

AD GUNS 2,750: 23mm: 140 ZU 23-2, 75 ZSU-23-2, 75 ZSU-23-4 SP, 40mm: 1,245 L40/60, 790 L40/70, 94 mm: 500 3.7-in


HELICOPTERS: 99 Chetak (some with 4 AS-21, 60 Cheetak).

DEPLOYMENT:

Nort-1 Corp with 2 inf, 1 mtn div, 1 mtn, 1 indeep inf, 1 indep arty bde. 1 Corps with 4 inf div; 2 indep armd, 1 indep inf, 2 indeparty bde. West-1 Corp with 1 armd, 1 mech div; 1 Corps with 2 inf div; 1 Corps with 4 inf div.

Central-1 Corp with 1 armd, 2 inf div plus 3 indep div (2 inf, 1 mtn)

East - 3 Corps each with 3 mtn div.

South - 1 Corps with 4 div.

NAVY: 52000, 1nd naval air force.

PRINCIPAL COMMANDS:

WESTERN; BASES: Bombay (HQ) Goa

Lakshadweep (Laccadive Is), Kar war (under construction).

EASTERN, BASES: Visakhapatnam (HQ). Cakutta, Port Blair (Andaman Is).

SOUTHERN (training): Cochin (HQ).

NAVAL AIR: HQ, Goa.

SUBMARINE: HQ, Visakhapatnam.

SUBMARINE: 14.
SSGN: 1 *Chakra* (Charlie-I) with SS-N-7 *Starbright* USGW: plus 533mm TT (presence of USGW not confirmed)

SS: 13:
1. *Sindhughosh* (Sov Kilo) with 533mm TT.
2. *Shishumar* (FRG T-209/1500) with 533mm TT.
3. *Kursura* (Sov Foxtrot) with 533mm TT.

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 31:**

**CARRIERS** 2 “V” class (CVV) UK light fleet), (1 in refit) Ac 8 Sea Harrier attack, 8 Sea King ASW/ASUW (Sea Eagle ASM).

**DESTROYERS:** 5 *Rajput* (Sov Kashin DOG with 2 × 2 SA-N-1 Goa SAM; plus 4 SS-N-2 Styx SSM, 5 × 533mm TT, 2 × ASW RL, 1 Ka-25 or 27 hel (OTH).

**FRIGATE 24:**
3. *Godavari* with 2 × Sea King hel, 2 × 3 ASTT, plus 4 × SS-N-2 Styx SSM.
6. *Nilgiri* UK Leander with 2 × 3 ASSTT, 1 × Limbo ASW mor 4 with 1 Chetak hel. 2 with 1 Sea King plus 2 × 115mm guns.
2 *Talwar* (UK Whibty) with 1 × Chetak hel, 2 × SS-N-2C Styx SSM.
8 *Kamorta* (Sov Petya) with 4 ASW RL, 3 × 533mm TT.
2 *Khukri* (ASUW) with 4SS-N-2C, hel deck.
2 *Beas* (UK Leopard): Kisna (UK Black Swan), all trg.

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS:** 32

**CORVETTES:** 5:
3 *Vijay Durg* (Sov Nanuchka II) with 4 × SS-N-2B Styx.
2 *Veer* (Sov Tarantul) with 4 × SS-N-2C.

**MISSILE CRAFT:** 13 *Vidyut* (Gsa with 4 × SS-N2.

**PATROL, INSHORE:** 14:
12 SDB Mk 2/3, 2 Osa PFI.

**MINE WARFARE:** 17:

**MINELAYERS:** None but *Kamorta* FF and *Pondicherry* MSO have minelaying capability.
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17:
9 Pondicherry Sov (Sov Natya) MSO.
2 Bulsar (UK 'Ham') MSI.
6 Mahe (Sov Yevgenya) MSI:

AMPHIBIOUS: 10
1 Magar LST capacity about 12 tk. 200 tps.
9 Ghorpad (Sov Polnocny C) LSM. capacity 6 tk. 140 tps.
Plus craft: 8 Vasco da Gama LCU.

SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 18:
2 Deepak AOR, 1 spt tkr. 1 Amba (Sov Ugra) sub spt, 1 tpt, 2
ocean tugs, 5 AGHS, 5 AGOR. 1 trg.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000):
28 cbt ac, 53 armed hel.
ATTACK: 1 sqn with 8 Sea Harrier FRS Mk-51.
2 T-60 trg (more being delivered).
ASW: 1 ac sqn with 10 Alize 1050 (land-based):
5 hel sqn with 5 Ka-25 Hormone A (in Rajput DDG.Ka-27 to
replace), 18 Ka-27, 20 Sea King Mk 42 A/B 10 Chetak (for
frigate)
MR 2 sqn: 3 II-38 5 Tu-142M Bear F.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1 sqn with 10 BN-2 Islander, Do-228.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 Sea King Mk 42A/C.
TRAINING: 2 sqn 6 HJT-16, ac; 2 Chetak, 4 Hughes 300 hel.
AIR FORCE: 115,000:
714 cbt ac (plus 9 in store), 12 armed hel.
5 Air Commands.
BOMBERS: 1 It bbr sqn with 10 Canberra.
FGA: 25 sqn:
5 with 90 MiG-23 BN/UM;
7 with 90 MiG-21 MF/U;
4 with 72 Jaguar IS;
4 with 72 MiG-27;
4 with 83 Ajeet.
1 with 20 Marut

FIGHTERS: 13 sqn:
2 with 40 MiG-29;
2 with 40 Mirage 2000 (36-H, 4-TH; 9 more in store):
2 with 45 MiG-23MF/UM;
7 with 150 MiG-21/FL/bis/U.

Air Defence Ground Environment System

RECCE: 3 sqn:
1 with 8 Canberra PR-57;
1 with 6 MiG-25R, 2 MiG-25U;
1 with 4 HS-748

TRANSPORT:

AIRCRAFT: 11 sqn:
5 with 70 An-32 Sutlej;
2 with 20 An-12B;
1 with 10 DHC-3;
1 with 15 DHC-4;
2 with 16 HS-748, 12 II-76 Gajraj;

HELICOPTERS 6 sqn with 80 Mi-8/-17, 2 Mi-26 hy tpt e 12 Mi-25 VIP: 1 HQ sqn with 2 Boeing 737.
7 HS-748.

LIAISON flt and det: 16 HS-748, C-47.

TRAINING:

20 Canberra T-4/-13/-67, 20 Hunter T-66,5
Jaguar IB, 60 HT-2, 120 Kiran, some 20 HPT-32 (replacing HT-2), 44 TS-11 (being replaced with Kiran II), 27 HS-748 ac; 20 Chetak hel.

AAM: R-23R/T Apex, R-60 Aphid, R-550 Magic,
AA-2 Atoll.

ASM: AS-30; AS-IIIB (ATGW), AS-7 Kerry (with MiG-27).

FORCES ABROAD:

SRILANKA: some 53,000; Army: 50,000: 4 inf div
HQ. Plus naval, air, and Central Reserve Police Force.

PARA-MILITARY:

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARDS: 3,000 (to be 5,000): anti-terrorism contingency deployment force. Comprises elements of the Armed Forces, CRPF, Border Guard.

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF): 90,000; Reserves: 250,000; 83 bn, internal security duties and army first-line reserves.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE: 90,000; some 95 bn
(to add 49 bn by 1991), small arms, some lt arty, tpt/ liaison air spt.

ASSAM RIFLES: 40,000
LADAKH SCOUTS: 5,000.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE: 14,000.

SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE: 8,000.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE: 55,000.

DEFENCE SECURITY FORCE: 30,000.

RAILWAY PROTECTION FORCES: 70,000.

PROVINCIAL ARMED CONSTABULARY: 250,000.

COASTGUARD: 2,500;

FRIGATES: 1 Kuthar (UK Type 14).

PATROL CRAFT 29:
4 Vikram PCO, 2 Tara Bai PCI, 8 Rajhans PFI,
7 Jija Bai PCI, 8.

AVIATION: 3 air sqn with 2 Do-228, 2 Fokker F-27,
5 BN-2 Islander ac, 4 Chetak hel.

*Def bdgt reduced by Rs 5 bn to provide funds for drought relief*
# CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons Systems</th>
<th>Warheads</th>
<th>No. in Stockpile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il-28 Beagle (B-5)</td>
<td>15-30 1974</td>
<td>1,850 1 x 1 bombs 15-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-16 Badger (B-6)</td>
<td>100 1966</td>
<td>5,900 1-3 bombs (20-30 KT) 100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS-1 (DF-2)</td>
<td>40-60 1966</td>
<td>1,100 1 x 20 KT 40-60</td>
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<td>CSS-2 (DF-3)</td>
<td>85-125 1972</td>
<td>2,600 1 x 1-3MT 85-125</td>
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<td>CSS-3 (DF-4)</td>
<td>-10 1978</td>
<td>7,000 1 x 1-3MT 10</td>
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<td>CSS-4 (DF-5)</td>
<td>-10 1980</td>
<td>12,000 1 x 4-5MT 10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine-based missiles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS-N-3</td>
<td>24 1983</td>
<td>3,300 1 x 200 KT 26-38</td>
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Source: SIPRI yearbook, 1988, p.44.