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## SUPER-POWER RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA : RESPONSE FROM THE LITTORAL STATES

In little more than a decade super-power force deployment and naval competition in the Indian Ocean has risen from practically zero to its present level of 28 U.S. warships and 29 Soviet war-ships.<sup>1</sup> In terms of ship-days (one ship deployed in the region for one day) by surface combatants<sup>2</sup> the super-power naval presence in the Indian Ocean is truly one to make littoral and hinterland states most anxious. But, it is the pace of acceleration of super-power naval deployment in the Indian Ocean in the last one decade that causes concern. In the late 60s it seemed that there would be a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean when Britain declared in 1968 her intention to curtail her military presence

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1. NEWSWEEK, October 6, 1980, p. 8.

2. There is no official information on the deployment of strategic nuclear missile-firing submarines although their presence has been accepted as real by some Western analysts e.g. G. Jukes, *The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy* (London : I. I. S. S., 1972) *Adelphi paper* no. 87, pp. 4-12, O. M. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry in the Indian Ocean : An Analysis" in *The Indian Ocean*, edited by A. J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell (New York, 1972), pp. 337-355. On the other hand, Rodney Jones argues that "it is highly improbable that the U.S. has routinely deployed Polaris/Poseidon submarines in the Indian Ocean in the past, and equally unlikely that it would deploy SSBN there in the foreseeable future," in "Ballistic missile Submarines and Arms Control in the Indian Ocean" *Asian Survey*, March 1980, p-269.



"East of Suez".<sup>3</sup> At that time, the Indian Ocean was essentially a British lake although the United States had maintained a three-ship Middle East Force consisting of the commandship La Salle and two other destroyers since the late 40s.

Since 1968, the force posture in the Indian Ocean began to undergo a dramatic change. That same year saw the entry of Soviet ships into the Indian Ocean although not primarily as a reaction to the British decision. In 1968 the Soviet Union officially set up their Indian Ocean Division fleet and by 1969 began to station their warships permanently in the region. With the introduction of Soviet naval presence, the American naval activity in the Indian Ocean accelerated. Indeed the U.S. Navy utilised the Soviet naval presence to seek increased funding from the U.S. Congress and there were some who boasted in Washington that "the Soviet Union's growing sea power is the U.S. Navy's biggest breadwinner."<sup>4</sup> In 1968, the U.S. Navy proposed to construct a modest logistic support base at Diego Garcia, a strategically located small island in the Indian Ocean.

This study will seek to evaluate the reasons for the acceleration of Soviet-American naval deployment in the Indian Ocean and the possibility of any future super-power arms control or disarmament. The discussion will also focus on the response from the various littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean and

3. Jukes, 1972, p. 11.

4. W.A.C. Adie, *Oil politics, and Seapower : The Indian Ocean Vortex* (New York : Crane, Russak and Co. 1975), p. 21.



seek to explore whether they will be able to decide on one unified response to the super-power rivalry and to what extent the littoral states will be able to achieve their primary objective of containing or curtailing the military presence of the super-powers in the Indian Ocean. Such an evaluation would require us to delve into the Soviet and American interests in the region and the level of political stability or instability in the Indian Ocean area. If the region remains as an unstable "are of crisis" then it is possible that super-power force posture in future will increase rather than decrease. The American-Soviet naval deployment in the Indian Ocean increased from their existing levels everytime there appeared to be a crisis in the region. The number of naval forces of the two super-powers increased during the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh war in 1971 and the Middle East war in 1973. Following the Middle East War America started deploying major task forces in the Indian Ocean and by late 1974 it seemed that the "two nations were entering the early stages of a build-up in the area".<sup>5</sup> In terms of ship-days the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean increased from nil in 1967 to a peak of over 2,500 ship-days in 1973<sup>6</sup> and then stabilizing to slightly above 2,000 ship-days in 1976. The American

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5. Barry Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments* (Washington, D.C., : Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 64.

6. But Soviet ship-days are inflated by the fleet of 20 ships which spent nearly 2 years in Bangladesh waters, clearing mines and sunken vessels from the approaches to the port of Chittagong. See Charles C. Peterson, "The Soviet Port-Clearing Operations in Bangladesh" in *Soviet Naval Policy : Objectives and Constraints*, edited by M. MccGwire et al. (New York : Praeger, 1975), pp. 319-328.



naval presence remained between 1100 to 1400 ship-days during the years 1968 to 1976.<sup>7</sup> In 1979, there was a renewed upsurge in the naval activity by the super-powers in the Indian Ocean. This has been a response to the revolution in Iran, the seizure of U.S. hostages in Tehran, the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, all of which were seen by the United States as affecting the security of the Persian Gulf. The American response included a variety of steps designed to increase its naval forces in the area "to provide future support capabilities for a Rapid Deployment Force for certain regional contingencies."<sup>8</sup> The U.S. is operating three air-craft carrier battle-groups in the Arabian Sea which is the highest level of American naval deployment ever. In addition, the U.S. is also seeking military use of facilities at Mombasa in Kenya, Berbera in Somalia, and Masirah in Oman and have announced further steps to expand the air and naval support capabilities of Diego Garcia. The U.S. is also considering the creation of a new fleet command for the Indian Ocean. All this is a response from the direct stimulus of regional crises in the Indian Ocean region. The American naval response also acts as a stimulus to the Soviet Union which responds by increasing her

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7. From Fig. 1 in Richard Haass "Naval Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean" *Survival* vol. 20, March-April, 1978, p. 52. Ship-days, however, is not a very good indicator of the quality of naval presence. The various American task forces in the Indian Ocean led by nuclear-powered aircraft-carriers were clearly superior to the naval forces fielded by the Soviets. Another measurement is ship-ton-days. But, clearly both quantitative and qualitative aspects need to be measured.

8. *Rodney Jones*, 1980, p. 270-271, Footnote 3.



own naval presence and seeking naval bases and facilities among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region.

### **The Unstable "ARC"**

The Indian Ocean basin is characterized by political instability, economic under-development (except for Union of South Africa and Australia) and military weakness, and is dependent on great powers for weapon supplies. In addition, there are many issues of conflict among the littoral countries which can be seized and exploited by the super-powers for the enhancement of their own interests. In the Southern African coast, there is the issue of Racism and Apartheid producing a confrontation between the black African nations (especially the front-line states) and South Africa. The Somali-Ethiopian-Kenyan dispute deriving mainly from Pan-Somalism (all Somalis under one flag) has already embroiled one super-power (the USSR) in the Horn of Africa. And if Ethiopia attacks Somalian territory the other super-power may become committed too. Another issue concerns the liberation of Eritrea.

In the Horn of Africa, not only the interests of the super-powers are involved but also those of the regional powers, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel; all fearing the extension of Russian influence in the area. Furthermore, ethnic antagonism (Afars vs. Issas) in newly independent Djibouti produces a highly unstable political situation and may become embroiled in the Somali-Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. The Eastern African coast is one of the most explosive area in the Indian



Ocean basin. The strait of Bab el Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea can also figure prominently in any future Arab-Israeli fighting as each side seeks to control it.<sup>9</sup> It is for this reason Israel provided technical assistance of a military nature to Ethiopia, because if Eritrea achieves independence and Somalia annexes Ogaden then the strategic situation will turn overwhelmingly in favor of the Arabs.

In the Arabian peninsula, the South Yemen regime has attempted to export revolution to more conservative states, e.g. in Oman where it has supported the Dhoffar rebellion.<sup>10</sup> Saudi Arabia has sought to restrain the revolutionary zeal of both South and North Yemen through liberal infusions of petro-dollars. The recent revolution in Iran and its policy of exporting revolutions is causing concern to Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Jordan.

In the Persian Gulf there is a longstanding enmity between Iran and Iraq mainly over territorial disputes, which has recently erupted into a full-scale shooting war. This has threatened the security of the Persian Gulf area, the production and supply of Persian Gulf oil, and the safety of the oil-route through the Strait of Hormuz. With the decline of Iranian hegemony over the Persian Gulf after the fall of the Shah, Iraq sought to take advantage of the situation and achieve its territorial objectives and possibly emerge as the dominant power in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia, a potential power in the region is suspicious of Iranian motives

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9. Dale R. Tahtinen, *Arms in the Indian Ocean* (Washington, D.C., : AEI, 1977), p. 34.

10. *Ibid.*



and revolutionerary zeal. The present Iranian policy of exporting revolution has caused even more concern.

Pakistan is bedeviled with many more secessionsist movements. Of particular concern are the separatist movements for a Pashtoonistan (comprising Pathans in Pakistan and Afghanistan) and a greater Baluchistan (comprising Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran). The situation has become more fluid by the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran. The old dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir still remains. In the eastern sub-continent, India and Bangladesh are in conflict over the sharing of Ganges waters (an agreement was achieved in 1977 for a period of five years) and a dispute over the demarcation of their maritime boundary, made especially difficult because of the funnel-shape of the Bay of Bengal. The "seven sisters" in Northeast India are also in a state of turmoil. In Sri Lanka, the ethnic antagonisms between Tamils and Singhalese can produce situations of external intervention, particularly by India.

In Burma, Thailand and Malaysia there are communist guerrilla movements receiving some support from the Soviet Union and China. These various insurgencies threaten to become an expanded conflict. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea has brought the former on the borders of Thailand with ominous implications for the security of ASEAN countries. Thus, the tremendous potential for conflict and instability in the Indian Ocean basin has destined the region to be a "chessboard for super-power rivalry".<sup>11</sup>

11. *Ibid.*, p. 44.



## Soviet and American Interests in the Region

The principal objectives of the use of Soviet naval power have been outlined by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov.<sup>12</sup> First, the naval power is intended to defend the socialist community from external aggression, to protect the interest of this community from external aggression to protect the interest of this community beyond its borders, and to demonstrate the economic and military might of the Soviet Union in all parts of the globe. Second, a powerful navy would enable the USSR, as it has other powers throughout history, to "solve problems of ties between peoples", that is, to reward allies, create new friends, and punish enemies. Third, the navy would provide an effective support to negotiations with Soviet adversaries. Soviet political and military analysts are clearly aware of the economic, political and strategic importance of the Indian Ocean basin. A considerable portion of Soviet east-west trade flow through this ocean; the volume of which is predicted to greatly increase in the 1980s especially with the need to transfer larger quantities of Siberian oil to European Russia. In addition, the Soviet Union is aware of the enormous economic profits that the United States is reaping from the Indian Ocean rimland. One Soviet military analyst notes that the Indian Ocean basin is "one of the strongest resources of raw materials (oil, rubber, tin, gold, diamonds and so forth), from whose rapacious exploitation American and other Western

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12. E. T. Woolbridge, "The Gorshkov Papers: Soviet Naval Doctrine in the Nuclear Age" *Orbis*, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 1975.



monopolies derive fabulous profits.”<sup>13</sup> The prime objective of Soviet naval policy, as one analyst has noted, is sea denial rather than sea control.<sup>14</sup>

It is for this reason that the Soviet Union is ever ready to help the littoral states dislodge the Western powers and end their exploitation of the regions wealth. The Indian Ocean area falls within the national liberation zone and contains much of the “vanguard” of the national liberation struggle. The Soviet Union is bound to a number of countries by treaty relations e.g. India, Afghanistan, Iraq and till recently Somalia. At present the Soviet Union is gambling everything on Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.

Strategically the U.S. Polaris-Poseidon and the future Trident fleet (which may achieve a 6000 mile range)<sup>15</sup> poses a direct nuclear threat to the heart of the Soviet Union. By achieving naval parity in the Indian Ocean the Soviet Union seeks to deter the American nuclear submarines in addition to gaining a bargaining counter which may prove very useful in any future arms control negotiations with Washington. It must be emphasised, however, that the “main Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean lies not upon its sea lanes, but on its shores,

13. G. Melkov, “The Sources of Tension” *Kransaya Avezda*, June 9, 1974. Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond* (New York : Prager, 1976), p. 111. Also V. F. Davydov and V. A. Kremenyuk, “United States Strategy in the Indian Ocean “in U. S. A : Economics, *Politics, Ideology*, no, 5 (May 1973), Quoted in *Sen Gupta*.
14. Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis : U.S. Naval Institute, 1968).
15. Tahtinen, 1977, p. 17.



where the bolstering of established non-aligned states, such as India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the wooing towards non-alignment of aligned states such as Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, and the encouragement of newly-independent states, such as South Yemen, in non-alignment (the more welcome if it has an anti-Western and/or anti-Chinese tinge) have been major objectives of Soviet policy ever since the death of Stalin."<sup>16</sup> The increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean contributes to the achievement of these objectives.

The American objectives in the Indian Ocean area are as complex as those which stimulated the Soviets. One was to fill the vacuum supposedly created by the British decision announced in 1968 to withdraw from "East of Suez". More important were the economic military-strategic and political interests. Since the end of the Second World War and especially since the adoption of the policy of "Containment" in the early 1950s the United States poured billions of dollars in economic and military assistance to certain states in the Indian Ocean rimland (mainly in Asia) to check the expansion of Communism and the spread of Soviet influence. Thus, the U.S. had a natural interest to maintain the political and economic stability of the countries in the Indian Ocean region. In addition to this "political-military" investment the United States had over \$10 billion in commercial investments in the area of which approximately \$3.5 billion was in oil. The Persian Gulf possessed the world's largest known

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16. *Jukes*, p. 23.



reserves of oil and supplied a significant amount of the oil imports of U.S. allies like Japan (90%) and Western Europe (60%).<sup>17</sup> In the 1980s the U.S. herself will have to import a much larger amount from the region than the present.

Thus, the increased Russian naval presence fostered American fears that the Soviet Union will gain the capability to interfere with the oil shipment from the Persian Gulf. The Soviet direct involvement in Afghanistan has increased that capability and regional conflicts among oil producing countries such as the Iraq-Iran war has added a new dimension to the concern for the production and supply of oil, as well as the protection of the oil-route. The Americans also want to deny the Russians from gaining enough political leverage with the littoral states that would create difficulties in American relations with oil-producing countries. It for this reason that the United States has shown moderation towards Iran inspite of the latter's seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages and threats by Iranian militants to put them on trial. The U.S. did not want to push Iran into the arms of the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomacy in line with it's policy of wooing littoral states away from the U.S. and into its own fold responded with enthusiasm to Iran's anti-U.S. attitudes, only to be rebuffed in its expression of support. The Soviet naval power could also prevent the shipment of oil by military means although such action is a remote possibility since it ultimately could lead to a nuclear exchange between the super-powers.

17. Ferenc A. Vali, *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region* (New York : Free Press, 1976), p. 185.



The phenomenal rise of oil prices have produced in the non-oil producing countries of the Indian Ocean basin a "general deceleration of development against a background of world recession and inflation."<sup>18</sup> The growing gap between the prices of poor country exports and their imports from rich, industrialized nations provides a tremendous potential for aggravating the already existing social unrest in those countries, and which can be exploited by the Soviet Union. The United States will make every effort to thwart such Soviet moves to accrue political and economic advance in the region. The U.S. is fearful of Soviet intentions in the Persian Gulf, in the Horn of Africa and possible future aggrandizement in Southern Africa.

### **Responses from The Littoral States:**

The growth of super-power military force levels in the Indian Ocean caused great apprehension among the littoral states. They feared that the region would become an arena for super-power conflict with consequences for their domestic and foreign policies. From the very beginning, therefore, the Indian Ocean littoral states showed an interest in mitigating the super-power competition in the region.

As early as October 1964, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka called for the denuclearization of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. But it was not until September 1970, at the Lusaka Conference of the Heads of States of non-aligned countries that the idea

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18. *Adie.*, p. 5.



of declaring the Indian Ocean as a peace-zone was formulated. On 16 December 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2832 (XXVI) by which the Indian Ocean was declared "for all time as a zone of peace."<sup>19</sup> The resolution was adopted by only 61 votes with 55 abstentions. The General Assembly—

"called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to : (a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean ; (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry."<sup>20</sup>

In 1972, the General Assembly called for the support of the Peace Zone concept, and the number of states voting in favour increased from 61 in 1971 to 95 in 1972. The Assembly also formed an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean which produced a detailed report on the extent and composition of military deployments by external powers. The first extensive report appeared in May 1974 and was received with much criticism by the great powers. Thereafter, a revised and much toned down version appeared in July 1974. The United

19. U.N. document A/AC. 159/1 (3 May 1974), p. 4.

20. *Ibid.*



Nations is continuing its efforts for the achievement of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace".

The thirty-third session of the U.N. General Assembly adopted, under the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", resolution 33/68 of 14 December 1978, which among other things decided to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as a step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. The July meeting was very important for various reasons. It was the first move by the littoral states to take a step towards the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). Second, it achieved a wide participation. Forty-four littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean participated in the meeting.<sup>21</sup> China, Greece and Japan participated as members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. The great powers and major maritime users (11 states) were invited to participate at the inaugural session of the meeting and thereafter to participate in all subsequent meetings as observers. Thirdly, the July meeting showed the divergence of position and attitudes of the various littoral and hinterland States regarding the implementation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Fourthly, the Final Document of the July 1979 meeting is the first significant step calling for concrete measures necessary for the implementation of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone.<sup>22</sup> The document

21. See the "Report of the meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean" UNGA official records : Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No, 45 (A/34/45), p. 4,
22. *Ibid.*, p. 10,



noted the concern of the littoral and hinterland states at the recent indications of further escalation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean area. The intensification of great power rivalry was seen as posing a serious threat to the security of the littoral and hinterland states. Furthermore, the littoral states pronounced that this great power "arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>23</sup>

Paragraph 16 of the Final Document, therefore, calls upon the great powers to :

(a) Halt forthwith the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean... ..

(b) Desist from conducting military manoeuvres, exploding nuclear devices and the deployment of military forces for the purposes of threatening or using force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.<sup>24</sup>

(c) Enter into immediate consultations with the littoral and hinterland States with a view to formulating an agreed programme for the elimination of . . . every manifestation of their military presence.'<sup>25</sup>

23. *Ibid.*

24. The Chinese delegation maintains that the "great Power rivalry" referred to in the Final Document precisely means the "super-power rivalry". See *Ibid.*, p. 9.

25. U.N. document A/34/45, p. 14.



The Final Document has not been unanimously agreed upon by all the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Their attitudes and position greatly differ from one another. On one extreme is the position taken by Australia and Japan. The Australian delegation has noted that :

“... the document as a whole, carried the implication that the present level of great Power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean is the only threat to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Australia has argued that this is neither an accurate nor realistic claim . . . a major responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security of the region lies with countries in the region itself and have sought reference in the Document for the recognition of this responsibility.”<sup>26</sup>

Japan has also expressed its serious reservations on some of the substantive part of the Final Document, especially paragraphs 14 and 15, which deals with the delimitation of the Indian Ocean ; paragraph 16, which deals with great power military activities and paragraphs 19 and 20 which presupposes the recognition of the primary role, it not the exclusive role, of the countries of the region in the maintenance of peace and security in the Indian Ocean.<sup>27</sup>

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26. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.



On the other extreme are countries like Iran and Pakistan which are highly critical of the military activities of one super-power or the other especially since most of the naval activity and super-power force deployment is taking place in and around the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. These countries feel immediately threatened by the super-power military activities and they are, therefore, most vocal in condemning the super-powers in the negotiating table and seek to incorporate very strong language against them in the various resolutions adopted with regard to the implementation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Somewhere between these two extremes falls the position of countries like Bangladesh. The Bangladesh position has been spelled out by her foreign minister Professor Muhammad Shamsul Huq in the United Nations General Assembly :

“Bangladesh believes that peace and security would be promoted by the creation of zones of peace in areas like the Indian Ocean... We hope, the recommendations of the meeting regarding the expansion of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to include the super-powers and the major maritime users would facilitate necessary preparatory work for reaching an international agreement for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.”<sup>28</sup>

28. Statement by His Excellency Professor Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Bangladesh Delegation to the Thirty-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, *Bangladesh Mission to the United Nations Press Release*, 11 October, 1979, p. 11.



Bangladesh thus believes in working with the super-powers and not against them in order to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Her position is that the ultimate success depends on the follow-up of the present work by an expanded body, in which the great powers and the major maritime users will participate.

### Conclusion

The super-powers have not responded with much enthusiasm to the call from littoral States for participation in the meetings on the Indian Ocean. This is not due to the fact that the super-powers do not desire arms control or disarmament in the Indian Ocean. As early as 1971 President Brezhnev said :

“We have never considered it an ideal situation to have the fleets of the great powers plying the seas for long periods at great distances from their own shores. We are prepared to resolve this problem, but on an equal footing.”<sup>29</sup>

The Carter Administration also laid emphasis on bringing about a naval arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean.

President Carter advocated either the complete “demilitarization” or limited “mutual military restraint.” A joint Soviet-American working group was established in March 1977 which undertook four negotiating sessions. But there has been no agreement and since then the super-power force posture in the Indian Ocean has in-

29. *Pravda*, 12 June 1971 (CDSP, 13 July 1971). Quoted in *Richard Haass*, p. 52.



creased manifold. One theory as to why the super-powers are unenthusiastic about participating in the meetings of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean is the difficulty of achieving successful international arms control negotiation. Multilateral negotiation is immensely more difficult to achieve than bilateral negotiation, since it is more complicated. The complication arises because "nations inevitably differ in their capabilities, priorities, problems, and interests,"<sup>30</sup> The littoral States of the Indian Ocean also has divergent capabilities and interests. To achieve successful arms-control agreements there must be a confluence of interests. In other words, there must be a situation of "non-zero sum game" where the parties concerned see the agreement is of mutual benefit. When the players are two in number the "non-zero sum game" situation is more easily achievable than when the number of players are many as in the case of the Indian Ocean area. The two super-powers perceive that they can achieve better results through bilateral negotiation regarding their force levels in the Indian Ocean without the necessity of having to include or consult other powers. Furthermore, the super-powers find it discomforting to hear from the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean that their military rivalry is a threat to the maintenance of peace and security in the region and that they are acting in contravention to the pur-

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30. F. A. Long "Arms Control from the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies" in F. A. Long and G.W. Rathjens (ed.) *Arms, Defence Policy, and Arms Control* (New York; W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 5.



poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the foreseeable future, there is little hope of progress regarding the reduction of super-power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. There is no confluence of interests among the super-powers to opt for a naval arms limitation treaty (NALT) and the "non-zero sum game" situation in the Indian Ocean seems unattainable. Instead there is a "zero-sum game" situation between the super-powers where the loss of one is seen as the gain of the other, especially in and around the Persian Gulf. For the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean the threat to their security is increasing rather than decreasing.