

Mohiuddin Khan

THE SINO - US STRATEGIC EQUATION AND ASIAN SECURITY IN THE 1980s

The security of Asia¹ in the 1980s will largely be shaped by the changing nature of strategic-diplomatic behaviour of the major powers—the US, USSR, PRC and Japan, as well as their interaction with the countries of the Asian region. The 1970s have witnessed a series of significant developments in Asia having wider ramifications: the process of Sino-American rapprochement, culminating in the establishment of full diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979; the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty of Peace and Friendship in October, 1978; the signing of a series of security treaties by the Soviet Union with a number of Asian countries—India, Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam and Mongolia; the lingering conflict and instability in Indochina; the enduring military confrontation between North and South Korea; territorial disputes and rivalry for the resources of contested offshore areas; the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December, 1979; the continuing turmoil and revolution in Iran; the continuation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and a substantial increase in Soviet military deployments to Asia as well as other developments

1. For the purpose of this paper, Asia is defined rather broadly, beginning from Northeast Asia, the Pacific Oceania to Southwest Asia, including the Indian Ocean region.

indigenous to the region. Taken together, these developments are indicative of the changing nature of power configuration in Asian international relations which affect and, will continue to affect, the security, stability, peace and progress of the Asian region. This paper takes a macro-view of Asian security problems and seeks to examine the strategic-diplomatic moves and countermoves of the major powers in relation to Asia as well as their implications on Asian security in the 1980s. An attempt will also be made to assess the emerging Sino-American strategic equation and its potential contribution to Asian peace and security in the current decade.

For our purpose, security is conceptualized as protection both from external military aggression as well as from coercion under the overt or covert threats of such aggression. In the Asian region, the security problems of various countries are diverse, complex, and interrelated in many ways.² However, all countries have common concerns about their basic national security, including access to and use of natural resources as well as in secured and uninterrupted communications and commerce across the high seas from the Persian Gulf through the Indian and Pacific Oceans to East Asia and the Western United States. Viewed in this context, the United States as a Pacific Power has, in

2. For an elaboration of the complex nature of Asian security problems, see Fred Green, *US Policy and the Security of Asia*, New York: McGraw Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. Also, Richard H. Solomon (ed.), *Asian Security in the 1980s : Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*. A Rand Corporation Report for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1979.

addition to direct and indirect military commitments to its Asian allies and friends, on overriding security interests of its own concerning peace and stability of the Asian region. While the Chinese and Japanese security concerns are more immediate, basic and permanent in nature, the Soviet Union has also perceived security problems which affect the national security of its own as well as its allies. In addition, the Soviet Union is now seriously engaged in a strategic competition *vis-a-vis* the other major powers involved in the region. Seen from Moscow, the Soviet military presence in Asia is an expression of its legitimate security concerns, and its right to participate in Asian affairs as an "Asian Power" as well.³

Asia and the US Security Framework:

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 and the involvement in it *vis-a-vis* the communist powers prompted Washington to develop an overall Asian security strategy. This became imperative in view of the perceived adverse effects of earlier developments: the communist victory in China and the consequent expulsion of the Nationalist forces to Taiwan; the Indochinese insurgency; communist rebellion in some South and Southeast Asian countries; and the potential impact of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Mutual Assistance on the US Security interests in Asia and the

3. For the Soviet view of Asian security problems, see Howard M. Hensel, "Asian Collective Security: The Soviet View", *Orbis*, Vol. No. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 1564-1980.

world as a whole. The Asian security framework⁴ developed by the United States in the 1950s essentially formed a part of its global security strategy: a desire to "contain" the expansion of communist influence, a commitment to support the non-communist nationalist elites, and an willingness to have closer relations with the newly-emerging countries of the Asian region through developmental activities.

In order to achieve these objectives the United States, together with some of its western allies, launched the "alliance diplomacy" during the mid-1950s and sought the support and cooperation of Asian countries in a pattern of relationship characterized by the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact/CENTO. While some Asian countries responded positively and decided to join the alliance system, others like India and Indonesia not only refused to do so but also became the ardent critics of the US security approach. Because of intra-regional rivalry and conflict, some of the Asian countries even moved in the opposite direction by forging closer relations with the Soviet Union and China. This divisive Asian approach toward the US Asian security framework provided additional incentives to Moscow and Beijing to cultivate friendship with the opponents of the US strategy and, in the process, to challenge the growing American influence in Asia.⁵

4. A detailed account is given by Fred Green, *US Policy and the Security of Asia*, *op. cit.*, see also Wayne A. Wilcox, "American Policy in South Asia", *Asian Affairs*, Vol. IV. (June 1973), especially pp. 127-128.

5. For an incisive analysis on Soviet involvement in Asian Affairs, see Jukes Geoffrey, *The Soviet Union in Asia*. Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1972,

In the 1960s, a perceptible shift emerged in Washington's attitude toward Asian security problems. This change in perception was influenced by the prospect for a East-West detente, the emerging Sino-Indian hostility, the rapid development of long-range nuclear weapons (the ICBM and the Polaris Submarine) which apparently reduced the importance of foreign bases around the Soviet Union and China. During this period, Washington also found herself increasingly committed in the Vietnam War and the Middle Eastern conflict. Moreover, a congruity of interests became noticeable between Washington and Moscow not only in stabilizing their bilateral relations but also in "containing" the People's Republic of China.⁶ But the new American policy approach circumstantially worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union and, inversely, to the long-range disadvantage of both Washington and Beijing.

The United States downplayed and/or ignored many of the changes that were taking place in Asia during its military involvement in the Vietnam War. The way the conflict ended in the early seventies found the US disillusioned and since then her policy toward the Asian region was marked by "benign neglect" and inactivity. The US turned its attention to other concerns—domestic inflation, energy, and international monetary problems, adverse trends in the strategic

6. This became evident when the United States encouraged the Soviet leaders to play a mediating role in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war over the Kashmir issue, which resulted in signing of the Tashkent Declaration in January, 1966 between India and Pakistan, in presence of Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin. For details see, S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 349-353.

military balance, and NATO-WARSAW Pact deployments, SALT-II and the Middle East peace negotiations. However, during this period, the US became concerned to see the new sources of conflict and insecurity in Asia: a growing Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, extension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry to war-torn Indo-China, heightened prospects for nuclear proliferation in potentially volatile areas (e.g. Korea, and South Asia) in the Asian region. These developments obviously called for a reappraisal of the US security posture toward the Asian region—a posture that began to take some shape since the Kissinger secret trip to Beijing in July, 1971. Since then Sino-American relations began to move *away* from confrontation *toward* cooperation between the two countries. Before we examine the emerging Sino-American strategic equation, it would, however, be proper to look into the growing nature of Soviet involvement in Asian affairs.

The Soviet Involvement in Asian affairs: The noticeable expansion of Soviet influence in the Asian region is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating from the mid-1950s.⁷ Prior to this, the Soviet Union was conspicuous by its non-involvement in Asian politics. The Soviet ideology, and its obsession with World Revolution, Moscow's preoccupation with East European affairs, Stalin's inadequate understanding of the strength of Asian nationalism as well as Soviet strategic inferiority *vis-a-vis* the West contributed to this lack of involvement

7. For a detailed account, see Jukes Geoffrey, *The Soviet Union in Asia*, *op. cit.*

However, the onset of the Cold War necessitated Moscow to reappraise its Asian policy. In order to escape from the relative isolation and growing encirclement caused by the West-sponsored alliance system, Khrushchev and his successors adopted a less doctrinaire outlook toward, and assigned high priority to, the Asian region. The Kremlin began to encourage, support, and extend material help to the nationalist and "anti-imperialist" forces to undermine the Western influence and, in the process, help shape the existing "correlation of forces" in favour of the USSR and the socialist bloc.

In the late 1960s, Soviet strategic assertion in Asian affairs was prompted by Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from positions east of Suez. Considering that the British decision would create a "vacuum" in the Asian region, the Soviets apparently decided to "fill" it through increased presence of their own navy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Kremlin felt that the show of Soviet naval strength in the high seas would enhance the Soviet image among its Asian friends and allies, enabling it to back up its diplomatic initiatives in the region from a position of strength. Another important consideration was the Soviet desire to "match" the deployment of US naval forces in the region as well as to "contain" the growing Chinese influence in Asia. Despite their protestations to the contrary, the Soviets did not seem to be inimical to the idea of playing the role of the departing colonial power, since it would represent an assertion of the newly-acquired super-power.

status by the Soviet Union in the Asian countries as well.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet decision to expand its naval activities in Asia coincided with Brezhnev's (then Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) proposal for an Asian Collective Security System,⁸ enunciated on June 7, 1969 at the Moscow International Meeting of the Communist and Worker Parties. The Brezhnev proposal for a collective security in Asia was greeted with surprise by the Western leaders, who believed that it was basically directed against China. This interpretation gained considerable acceptance following the Sino-Soviet military clashes on Demansky Islands in 1969.⁹ Subsequent Soviet statements attempted to dispel this impression by stressing that the proposal was not directed against

8. In launching the proposal, Brezhnev stated, "we think that the course of events ... places on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia". See Brezhnev's speech "For strengthening the Solidarity of Communists for a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle", in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (henceforth CDSP), July 2, 1969, pp. 3-17. Subsequently, the Soviets asserted that the basic assumption underlying the proposal was the proposition that "*peace is indivisible* that, where questions of war and peace are concerned, conditions in various parts of the Globe are interdependent ... that it will ultimately lead to the triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence in Asia." See V. Mayevskiy, "Peace and Security in Asia Is All Nations' Concern", in *CDSP*, April 26, 1972, pp. 22-23; also Leonid Brezhnev, "On the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic", report to Joint Ceremonial Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, in *CDSP*, January 17, 1973, pp. 3-20.

9. For a balanced account of the incident, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 4 (December 1972).

any one country or group of countries, rather it was intended to establish "friendly" and "good neighbourly" cooperation with a number of Asian states.¹⁰ There is little doubt, however, that both China and the US were the principal targets of what appeared to be a plan of containing the former and replacing the latter in the Asia-Pacific region. Whether the policy of containment against China was to be accomplished by establishing a military alliance or through the conclusion of bilateral treaties, the vagueness of the proposal seemed to allow sufficient room for either option.¹¹

The Brezhnev proposal evoked sharp reaction in Beijing, while Washington adopted a low-key approach toward it. From the beginning China has attributed an "anti-Chinese" motivation to the collective security scheme which, it charged, was picked up from the "garbage heap of the notorious war monger John Foster Dulles"¹² The only difference was, China argued, that the so-called "System of Collective Security in Asia" was basically a proposal to create an anti-Chinese military alliance in order to "contain" the People's Republic of China.

10. Andrei A. Gromyko, "Questions on the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union", report to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in *CDSF*, August 6, 1969, pp. 4-11.

11. For various interpretations of the proposal, see Peter Howard, "A System of Collective Security," *Mizan*, July/August, 1969 pp. 199-204; Hemen Ray, "Soviet Diplomacy in Asia", *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1970, pp. 46-49; Ian Clark, "Collective Security in Asia", *Round Table*, October 1973, pp. 473-481; Alexander Ghebbardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia", *Asian Survey*, December 1973, pp. 1075-1091.

12. Xinhua (formerly Hainhua), June 28, 1969.

The Brezhnev proposal has so far failed to generate much interest among most of the Asian countries; rather, considering the opposition to the proposal, the Soviet decided to adopt a flexible approach and attempted to conclude bilateral treaties with a number of Asian countries. However, the flexibility of the proposal allows Moscow to shift emphasis from the Southwest Asian region to the Pacific Basin depending on circumstances. The Soviet success in signing friendship treaties with countries bordering China - Afghanistan, India, Vietnam and Mongolia, does indicate that Moscow will go ahead with the security proposal in one form or another.¹³

China and the Asian Security Scene:

During the 1949-56 period, the concept of Chinese national security was essentially tied to the Soviet security needs. The Chinese mood during this period was both strongly pro-Soviet and militantly anti-American. The Chinese leadership, reasoning by analogy with the history of Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks after 1917, feared some kind of American action against itself. This fear was further reinforced by the US involvement in the Korean war and American support for the nationalist forces in Taiwan. For this reason,

13. In contrast to the obstacles still to be overcome before the Asian Collective Security system can be established, the Soviets cite a number of measures that the "forces of peace" have taken toward its realization. The "first bricks for a foundation" on which to construct the proposed system, are said to be the treaties, both security and economic, recently concluded between the USSR and various Asian States. For details, see Howard M. Hensel, "Asian Collective Security: The Soviet View", *op. cit.*, especially pp. 1576-1978.

China sought a patron, ally, and ideological leader in Stalin's Russia. The Sino-Soviet alliance concluded on February 4, 1950 was directed against the United States and its allies in Asia.¹⁴ It was supplemented by a programme of Soviet economic and military aid to the PRC and by a generally close relationship between the two allies.

However, incongruity of each others national interests had begun to surface from the mid-1950s and eventually led to an open conflict between the two countries.¹⁵ Beginning from the early 1960s, the relationship between the PRC and the USSR has been marked by hostility, belligerence, and competitiveness. During this decade, Beijing had in effect been pursuing a policy of waging simultaneous political struggles against American "imperialism" and Soviet "social imperialism" or "revisionism". This policy is sometimes referred to as the dual adversary strategy. In reality, Beijing's obsession with the Sino-Soviet dispute was so intense that it unadmittedly relegated the anti-American stand to a second place, despite the fact that one of the causes of the dispute had been China's anti-American militancy and its belief that the Soviet Union was not doing enough in the fight against "imperialism".

-
14. The treaty, was primarily directed against Japan, or "any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression," meaning the United States. For the text, see M. Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953, pp 260-262.
 15. For a detailed account of the causes of Sino-Soviet dispute, see William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964; Donald S Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton 1961.

Beginning from the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, Beijing greatly reduced its subversive efforts and hostile propaganda against the non-communist governments in Aisa and proceeded gradually to woo many of them in favour of its struggle against Soviet "hegemonism" (a Chinese code word for Soviet expansionism). The rationale behind this significant shift in China's foreign policy lay in its desire to seek moral and diplomatic support from as many countries as possible in the face of perceived threat from the USSR. It is in this context that China decided to improve its relations with the United States, Japan and other Asian countries during the 1970s. In a gesture of reciprocity to the bilateral security treaties that the USSR signed with India, Afghanistan, Vietnam and Mongolia, the Chinese have concluded a peace treaty with Japan, a major power of Asia.

The Soviet-American Detente and Asian Security: The Nixon "strategy for peace" was based on the concept of detente with the Soviet Union as well as the PRC.¹⁶ The accords reached with Moscow and the opening of high-level contacts with the Chinese leadership in 1972 signified the readjustment of American policies to the changing situations produced by the gradual transformation of world politics since the early 1960s. The concept of detente had begun to replace the cold war polemics. But detente soon became a mis-interpreted

16. For details, see Richard M. Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building For Peace*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971; Also Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston; Little, Brown and co., 1979, especially pp. 73-225.

concept. To the West, detente provides the guiding principle for the diffusion of international tensions, while the Soviet interpretation is coloured by its ideology: relaxation of class tension. According to Brezhnev:

“Detente means first of all overcoming the Cold War and then a transition to normal, stable relations among states. Detente means the willingness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, not by threats or saber-rattling, but by peaceful means at the conference table. Detente means a certain trust and the ability to consider each other’s legitimate interests”.¹⁷

However, Brezhnev asserts that, “detente does not in the slightest way abolish or alter the laws of the class struggle”.¹⁸

The Soviet emphasis on class struggle seems to indicate its willingness to promote its ideology and to support the cause of national liberation movements in areas where there are opportunities to score gains without provoking a major international tension. The patterns of Soviet behaviour in the Middle East, Portugal, Angola, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan conform to the Kremlin’s public statements. While Soviet policies and behaviour suffer from inconsistencies and ambiguities in many cases, the central fact remains that the USSR is apparently determined to expand its

17. Pravda, January 19, 1979, quoted in Demitri K. Simes, *Detente and Conflict: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1972-1977*. The Washington Papers, No. 44: Beverly Hills London: Sage Publications, 1977, p. 7.

18. Pravda, February 25, 1976, quoted in *ibid*, p. 22.

strategic influence in the Asian region where the concept of detente has a limited and ill-defined applicability. As a matter of fact, detente basically covers the overall bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and those of their allies in Europe. Hence, the limited applicability of detente in Asia provides Moscow with incentives to undertake strategic-diplomatic moves toward this region.

The Chinese attitude toward the detente diplomacy is coloured by the perceived adverse effects that detente will have on Chinese national security. However, the Chinese are not opposed to the concept of detente *per se*, but they emphasize the fact that detente is being used by the Soviet Union for politico-military penetration in the developing countries. Any further expansion of Soviet strategic influence, the Chinese contend, will have adverse effects on the security interests of the major powers as well as countries of the Asian region. Clearly, Chinese policy statements on detente have ulterior motives, including a desire to prevent the United States and other Western countries from relaxing their vigilance against Soviet "hegemonism". In addition, Chinese reservations about detente can be explained in terms of the existing Sino-Soviet hostility and Beijing's hope to use the United States as a "counterweight"¹⁹

19. See, Harold C. Hinton, *Peking—Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States*. The Washington Papers, No. 34. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976, especially pp. 58-60. Henry Kissinger has now revealed that (in the context of the Indian attack on Pakistan, an ally of both China and the United States) President Nixon communicated to the Chinese leaders his intention to assist China if Beijing came to Pakistan's aid, and as a result the Soviet Union—India's ally initiated military action against China. The security aspect of "triangular politics" thus dates back to November 1971, See Henry Kissinger, *The White House Year*, pp. 910-911.

against possible Soviet pressure on China. The Chinese feel that the United States has lost its will and resolve to hold up its end of the cold war with the Soviet Union and that American dwindling policies have "allowed" the USSR to achieve approximate strategic parity with the United States. In Chinese perspective, this "American failure", in the name of detente, to cope adequately with the growing Soviet threat has emboldened Moscow to intervene in crisis situations in Asia and the world as a whole. This is why the Chinese do not want to see any further withdrawal of American forces from the Asia-Pacific region; rather they now feel convinced that the presence of US troops in the region no longer constitutes a serious threat to Chinese security. The Chinese now suggest that the United States ought not to engage in any further reduction of American forces either from Asia or Europe, because it would create a "vacuum" which the Soviets would attempt to "fill" or otherwise exploit to their advantage.

The Chinese desire to seek a "strategic linkage" with the West European countries also became evident from the early 1970s. However, the reciprocity was not forthcoming from the West European countries mainly because of their preoccupation with the process of detente and the priority they gave to Soviet-EEC relation over their relations with China. An evidence to this effect can be found in a provision of the Helsinki Agreement (Part 2, section 1) which stipulates that the participating states must give advance notice of military maneuvers near their borders, unless the maneuvering power's territory extends beyond Europe and the border

is shared with a "non-European non-participating state". The exclusion obviously covers Soviet maneuvers near the Chinese border, and the United States, alongwith its West European allies, concluded the Helsinki Agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies. The Chinese are also opposed to the Western "policy of appeasement" toward the USSR, and suggests that the main thrust of Soviet expansionim is not toward China but in some other direction, meaning Western Europe. Hence the Chinese argue:

Today, in the face of the grave threat of war by Soviet social imperialism, the trend of appeasement similar to that of the 1930s has emerged in the West....

The core of the appeasement policy championed by Chamberlain and his like in the 1930s was to maneuver, to divert the peril to the East. Their smug calculation was to induce Germany by compromises and concessions to halt in the West and drive to the East, that is, stabilizat.on *vis-a-vis* Britain and France in the West and attack on the Socialist Soviet Union in its East..

Like their precursors, the advocates of appeasement try to divert the Soviet peril to the east, to China. Helmut Sonnenfeldt., frightened the Soviet Union with the groundless prediction of "the arrival of a third superpower, China, in 20 years or so..." The Soviet Union, he clearly implied, should shift its focus of aggression from Western

Europe to the east. Historical experience and the dangers that exist at present tell us what appeasement will bring to the world's people. Not peace nor security but infinite sufferings and havoc. The fact that Soviet social imperialism is doing its utmost to encourage illusions about "detente" and foment the trend of appeasement in the West makes things clear to all. To oppose imperialist war and put off the outbreak of a new world war, it is necessary to combat appeasement with might and main.²⁰

It is hardly surprising that such concerns underlie the Chinese critique of detente. It also explains why the Chinese diplomatic strategy in the 1970s has been emphasizing the need for a "united front" to deter Soviet hegemonism in the Third World, especially in the Asian region. In a gesture of reciprocity to the bilateral security treaties that the USSR signed with some Asian countries, the Chinese have concluded a peace treaty with Japan (1978), a major power of Asia.

Japan's Changing Security Perspective: For the last three decades, Japan associated herself with the United States, lived under the exclusive US security umbrella,²¹ and engaged herself in the task of national economic reconstruction. Japan's total reliance on the United States for security matters produced inevitable

20. Jen Ku-ping, "The Munich Tragedy and Contemporary Appeasement", in *Beijing Review*, No. 50, December 9, 1977, pp. 6, 8-10.

21. For details, see Kunid Muraoka, "Japanese Security and the United States," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 95. London: IISS publications, 1973.

restraints on her foreign policy behaviour. Indeed, conformity to the US policy has become the intuitive reflex of Japanese policymakers, which seriously limited the scope of new diplomatic initiative toward the PRC or the USSR.

However, President Nixon's decision to visit China in 1972 came as a "shock" to the Japanese, which brought about a perceptible change in their attitude toward China. Since then, Japan indicated its willingness to improve Sino-Japanese relations, and thereby partly overcome the perceived security threats from the Soviet Union, a threat stemming from Moscow's unwillingness to sign a peace treaty with Tokyo and its refusal to return the northern Kurile islands²² captured during the Second World War. As a matter of fact, Soviet intransigence in this regard constituted serious problems for Japan, forcing her to rely even more closely on the United States.

Since the late 1960s, increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans caused concerns in Tokyo, but Japan was still counting on the naval superiority of the United State. However, the gradual strengthening of the Soviet navy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions²³ during the 1970s poses a new

22. For an elaboration see S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, especially pp. 133-135. The Soviet Union alleged that the territorial issues in the treaty were "settled... in conformity with the aggressive strategical plans of the Pentagon." *New Times*, No. 37, 1951 quoted in *ibid*, p. 133.

23. According to John Moore (ed.), *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1978-1979*. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1978, p. 484, the Soviet Pacific fleet is large, consisting of 755 ships, with a total displacement of 1.33 million tons. (1978

challenge to the carrier task forces and the ballistic missiles of the US Seventh Fleet. This new Soviet capability, the Japanese feel, will enable the USSR to interrupt the flow of Japan's commerce and access to energy resources through the sea line of communication. In addition, the Soviets can also challenge US abilities to reinforce its Asian deployments in crisis situations. In this context, the US and its allies in Asia will have to consider new approaches in the current decade to counter the increased Soviet presence in Asia—a problem which will be substantially compounded, should Moscow establish permanent naval and air base facilities in Vietnam.²⁴

figure). The fleet has approximately 10 cruisers, close to 30 destroyers, and more than 100 submarines of all varieties, including ballistic missile submarines deployed in the Pacific.

In the last five or six years, the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean, in terms of ship-days, exceeded its presence in the Pacific. In 1979, the Soviet Union deployed its new Kiev-class air-craft carrying ASW cruiser *Minsk* to the Pacific region which signifies Moscow's new and substantial power-projection capabilities. See Richard H. Solomon, (ed.), *Asian Security in the 1980s...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 160.

Another account notes that "between 1964 and 1976 in scale of Soviet out-of-area operations—i.e., of Soviet presence—expanded by a factor of almost 14, from less than 4,000 ship-days annually to nearly 48,000." James M. McConnel and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World", *Problems of Communism*, January—February, 1979, reprinted in *Strategic Digest*, June 1979, p. 391.

24. Presently, the Soviet Union is reportedly using the US—built naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in southern Vietnam, where not only Soviet warships but also troops are reportedly stationed. In addition, an electronic listening post has recently been completed in the Bay vicinity. During his visit to Tokyo in May 1979, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firiyubin told high ranking Japanese officials that the Soviet Union is "duty-bound" by its 1978 friendship treaty with Vietnam to maintain military presence there. Tokyo sources said, Firiyubin "virtually admitted that Russia was there to stay". See *Asiaweek*, June 8, 1979, p. 71.

Japan's tilt toward the PRC and the signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in 1978, prompted Moscow to send a delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin to Tokyo to examine ways and means to repair the deteriorating relations between the two countries. The outcome of the talks was disappointing for both sides. Japan insisted that no long term cooperation with the Soviet Union is possible without the return of the Kurile islands occupied by Russia since 1945. Moscow, on the other hand, wanted a formal peace treaty with Japan for economic and strategic reasons and firmly refused to negotiate on the island issue.²⁵

From Japan's security perspective, the presence of Soviet troops in Vietnam, alongwith military buildup, training exercise and fire-power practice sessions on Etorofu, a Soviet-held island group just north of Hokkaido, amounts to provocative behaviour. Strategic analysts believe that Moscow wants to inflict nervous cramps on Japan and its allies, i.e., the United States and China and that Soviet intention is to demonstrate its displeasure over what it sees as the rapid emergence of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis.

Thus, it appears that the psychological friction between the two countries, backed by historical reasons and ideological differences, and the vast military capacity of the Soviet Union in the Far-east will hinder the improvisation of Soviet-Japanese relations.²⁶ In the absence

26. *Asiaweek*, June 8, 1979, p. 73.

26. Every public opinion poll in Japan until 1972 has shown that the Soviet Union is the country most disliked by the Japanese people. See Appendix 4(A), p. 38 in Kunio Muraoka, "Japanese Security and the United States," *Addephi Papers*, No. -95 *op. cit.*

of a rapprochement between Japan and the USSR. Japanese security policies will remain tied to the United States. Further, she will cultivate more closer relations with the PRC, in addition to undertaking a programme of rearming Japan in order to be able to meet her peculiar security needs in the present decade.²⁷ Japan, at the time, will perhaps continue to demonstrate her willingness to resolve the conflicting issue-areas with the Soviet Union.

The Emerging Sino-US Strategic Equation:

During the 1970s, as noted earlier, the Asian security environment has been undergoing a fundamental transformation. The central elements in this transformation have been the Sino-American rapprochement and the eventual normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries; the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance and its evolution since the late 1960s into a military confrontation and worldwide geo-political rivalry; Tokyo's signing of Peace and Friendship treaty with Beijing and China's turn to Japan and the West for capital, technology and defence hardwares.

The transformation of Sino-American relations from confrontation to normalization in early 1980²⁸

27. In Japan, there is now a growing demand for raising its defence budget from 9% of the GNP to over 1%. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 14, 1980, pp. 18-24.

28. For a fuller account of the normalization move, see M. Mohiuddin Khan, "The Sino-US normalization and Its International Implications", *Bangladesh in International Affairs*, December 1979, pp. 1-77.

Also, Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Implications of Sino-American Normalization", *International Security*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Spring 1979), pp. 37-57.

paved the way for strategic cooperation between the two countries *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. The motives behind China's invitation to President Nixon in 1971 were multi-faceted: (a) China wanted to improve its maneuvering position with respect to the Soviet Union and diminish the likelihood of a Soviet attack on her; (b) China wished to dampen US interests in Taiwan which, if happened, would ease the task of "liberating" Taiwan; (c) China desired to have access to US and western goods and technology. The United States, on the other hand, hoped that, by playing the "China Card", it could impell the USSR to seek accommodation with her and that improved relations with Beijing would enable Washington to deter Soviet expansionist behaviour in the Asian region and the world as a whole. While the United States was eager to gain leverage on the USSR from its China policy, it, however, did not want this policy to be conducted in such a way as to wreck American hopes for detente with Moscow. Indeed, American policy of detente with the Soviet Union received priority over its relations with China during the Nixon and Ford administrations.

But the increased Soviet strategic thrust in Asia in the late 1970s, together with Moscow's growing involvement in the Indochinese conflict prompted Washington to reappraise its Asian Policy. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and its cosequential effects on Thai security caused serious concern in Washington. The Chinese, equally concerned, attempted to seek US support in resisting the Soviet-backed

Vietnamese hegemonism in Southeast Asia; but Washington apparently decided to maintain certain reservations about Beijing's attitude toward the Indochinese conflict. However, the "shock wave" that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan²⁹ prompted the United States to give more credibility to Chinese warning about Soviet hegemonistic policy and decided to bring its policies away from its previous cautious stance on aligning with China.

The perceptible change in Washington's attitude toward the PRC resulted in US decision (January 1980) to sell "military support equipment" to China. This single important decision gave some teeth to the "proto-alliance" between Washington and Beijing that developed during the US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's visit to Beijing. During his stay in China, Brown admitted that with regard to Southeast Asia, Washington and Beijing had "parallelism of views" and referred to the broadening of "Parallel actions where our interests converge". In addition, he said that Washington had urged countries having relations with Vietnam to impose economic penalties on that country; had increased Thailand's defence capability and had "worked with other Asian nations to apply diplomatic pressure against Vietnam". Although the US has "somewhat differing views about individual aspects of the situation",

29. In reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter stated "my opinion of the Russians has changed most dramatically in the last week (more) than even in the previous 2 years before that" and added that it was "imperative" that "their leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot have taken this action to violate world peace... without paying severe political consequences", *Time*, January, 14, 1980, p. 6.

he nonetheless stressed that the two countries agreed that Moscow—supported Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was “the central fact to which attention has to be called”.³⁰

These statements represent a departure from Washington’s earlier criticism of Chinese action—putting the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and Chinese invasion of Vietnam at par, “Both actions,” the then US Treasury Secretary, Michael Blumenthal, told his Chinese hosts shortly after the Chinese invasion, “threaten the stability of one of the world’s most important and promising regions—Southeast Asia. We have opposed both military actions”.³¹

Blumenthal’s reproach, the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (March 1979) by the US Congress formulating new American relations with Taiwan, and the signing of the SALT-II treaty in Vienna on June 2, 1979 appeared to have dampened Chinese enthusiasm for its ties with the United States. These developments, especially China’s unhappiness about SALT helped underline differences between Washington and Beijing and led the latter to open a dialogue with Moscow. The message that China wished to convey to the United States was that, if Washington could improve its bargaining position *vis-a-vis* Moscow by having relations with Peking, China could do it too.³²

30. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1980, p. 47.

31. *Ibid*, p. 48.

32. In addition to putting pressure on Washington not to downplay its “China link”, Beijing tried to use the talks with Moscow in an attempt to weaken the Soviet support to Vietnam. Beijing’s demand that Moscow reduce its military aid to Vietnam was rejected as were its other two demands: that Soviet troops strength along the Chinese border be reduced to the level of 1964 and that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Mongolia. *Ibid*, p.48

And the fact that, after years of hostility, Chinese and Soviet negotiations were going to hold talks in an attempt to improve the existing Sino-Soviet relations did cause some weariness in Washington to the extent that Washington sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Beijing, just prior to the Sino-Soviet talks, to reaffirm strong American support for China. In Beijing, Mondale stated :

“The fundamental challenges we face are to build concrete political ties in the context of mutual security, to establish broad cultural relations in a framework of genuine economic bonds with the goal of common benefit. . . . *Any nation which seeks to weaken and isolate you . . . runs counter to American interests*” (emphasis added).³³

But the Chinese leaders reportedly expressed to Mondale their disapproval of the idea (advanced by some senior US officials) for a political solution of the Kampuchean problem. They also criticised those who entertained some hopes of winning Vietnam by recognition and aid, saying “those who cherish that they can soften Hanoi by providing it with economic aid” live under illusions.³⁴

In response to Chinese criticism, Mondale reportedly assured his hosts that the United States would

33. *International Herald Tribune*, August 28, 1979. This was for the first time that an important political figure from the United States spoke openly in support of China's security needs vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Also, during his visit, Mondale's announced an agreement for US experts to help with several Chinese dam projects. In the agreement China has been designated as a “friendly country” under the US Foreign Assistance Act, the only communist country so designated besides Yugoslavia.

34. *Xinhua*, August 30, 1979.

not normalize its relations with Hanoi before the Kampuchean problem was solved. But he turned down a Chinese suggestion that Washington extend political support to the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea, while assuring Beijing of US cooperation on the Kampuchean question in the United Nations.³⁵

Thus, the American and Chinese leaders agreed to coordinate their policies in opposing Soviet-backed Vietnamese hegemonism in Southeast Asia, in conformity with the Shanghai Communique issued on February 27, 1972 at the end of Nixon's visit to China. In that important document, both the United States and China declared themselves opposed to spheres of influence, for themselves as well as for others. Both sides agreed that:

neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and *each is opposed to the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony* (emphasis added).³⁶

This 'anti-hegemony' clause was obviously directed against the Soviet Union and its allies.

That the Japanese agreed to subscribe to this common "anti-hegemony" theme in the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty showed Japan's willingness to oppose Soviet hegemonism,³⁷ along with China and the United

35. Reversing its previous stand (1975) on Khmer Rouge representation in the United Nations, the United States this time voted in favour of the Pol Pot forces in the UN Accreditation Committee Meeting and lobbied along with ASEAN and China for its continued representation.

36. *New York Times*, February 28, 1972.

27. See Article 11 of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Frindship Treaty signed in October 1978.

States, in the Asia—Pacific region. In that context, the treaty can be said to have established an anti-Soviet alignment. That is, indeed, how it was interpreted in the Soviet capital. But the Japanese pointed out that not only does Article 11 fail to mention a particular country, Article IV specifically states that “the present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.” This could be interpreted—and the Japanese interpret it in that way—as underlying the unchanging Japanese desire to develop cordial relations with the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, however, little credence is given to such Japanese protestations of impartiality. The Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* had made the Soviet interpretation clear :

Although the treaty is formally intended to settle bilateral relations, it actually extends beyond the framework established for documents of this kind. . . The enshrinement of an anti-Soviet thrust in the text of the “Peace and Friendship Treaty” thereby transforms it into a document which extends beyond the framework of bilateral relations and which *lays a foundation for an alliance between Peking (sic) and Tokyo directed against the Soviet Union* (emphasis added).³⁸

Clearly, the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty represents a watershed in Asian international relations. Soviet efforts to prevent a Sino-Japanese

38. *Izvestia*, August 15, 1978, quoted in Richard H. Solomon, (ed), *Asian Security in the 1980s. op.cit.*, pp. 78-79.

rapprochement have failed. What once could be described as an equilateral Moscow-Tokyo-Beijing triangle of tense relations has given way to a new pattern of relationship in which Japan sides with China. The Sino-Japanese rapprochement enables in United States, for the first time in 70 years, to pursue good relations with Japan and China at the same time. For the Soviet Union, these developments have wider strategic-diplomatic implications which will affect its pattern of interactions with Japan, China, and the United States.

The question for the 1980s is: What Moscow will do the undermine the Washington-Tokyo-Beijing coalition? Will the Soviets adopt policies of accommodation or will they precipitate conflict in the Asian region? While answer to these and similar questions cannot be sought with any certainty, a better gauge of Soviet potential for politico-military maneuvering in Asia can be traced from Moscow's recent record of actions in Indochina and Afghanistan.

Soviet actions in these two crisis situations represent a sharp departure from its earlier patterns of cautious involvement in the Middle East, Portugal and Angola.³⁹ In particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has contributed to regional uncertainties and tensions and has generated concern and confusion among the western industrial nations, as well as in China and Japan, about future Soviet intentions. Viewed in this

39. In each earlier case, the Soviets had displayed a degree of caution in order to avoid a collision with the West, and not jeopardize detente. Soviet behaviour in these crises did not coincide with Western interests, but it could hardly be called irresponsible.

context, a permanent presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan will affect the stability and security of Iran and Pakistan, two vulnerable states that border vital energy resources, critical to the survival of the western countries and Japan. Any further injection of Soviet power may eventually lead to a major confrontation involving the United States⁴⁰ and West European countries.

Soviet arguments⁴¹ in favour of its intervention in Afghanistan have failed to allay the fears of the regional countries. Nor does the broader definition of Soviet Security⁴² can be used to justify its action in Afghanistan. Moscow's apparent reluctance to accept anything less than "adequate defence" against all possible worst-case scenarios⁴³ makes negotiations about military

40. In his State of the Union address to the Congress on January 23, 1980, President Carter stated: "Let our position be absolutely clear. Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force..." He added that the United States "will take action to assist Pakistan in resisting outside aggression... will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region", *New York Times*, January 24, 1980.

41. Soviet line of argument is that the "imperialist" and "reactionary forces" are meddling in Afghan affairs which necessitated its intervention in support of its Afghan ally. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 25, 1980, p.10.

42. The bilateral security treaties that the USSR signed with Afghanistan, India, Vietnam, Mongolia, (as well as the WARSAW Pact countries) has broadened its concept of security which includes the protection of the Soviet State, its immediate allies (East European) and countries tied to the USSR through bilateral friendship treaties.

43. It is reported that in the SALT negotiations, the Soviet insisted that they should somehow be compensated for the Chinese threat and that, unlike the United States, the USSR is surrounded by unfriendly states, mainly China, and accordingly needs and is entitled to build superior military capabilities than the United States.

parity with it, both in strategic and conventional fields, an extremely difficult and unpromising exercise. What the Soviets consider sufficient for their defence needs would provide them with superior capabilities in most plausible politico-military contingencies in the "gray areas" of the developing world. As one analyst noted:

Since strategic competition is only a symptom of a much deeper and broader political struggle, it cannot be arrested by arms control treaties, nor can it even be seriously constrained. The only effect of limitations on any one class of weapons, on any one mode of performance, is to stimulate new efforts to develop strategic power in direction as yet unconstrained.⁴⁴

Thus, the real problem is political, and detente will be an exercise in futility unless it can restrain the politico-military behaviour of the major power in their interactions with the Third World countries.

However, a clear choice in an Asian security strategy for the 1980s will not be for the major powers alone to make; the concerns of the regional countries will also influence the policies and behaviour of the major powers involved in the Asian region. In an era of rapid economic and political change, difficult choices involving the risk of conflict may be forced upon them by initiatives of a regionally dominant country; or

44. Edward N. Luttwak, "Strategic Power: Military capabilities and Political Utility", in *The Washington Papers*, IV, No. 38. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976, p. 6.

political instability and internal conflict⁴⁵ situations in strategically located countries of the region may encourage outside powers to intervene on behalf of their respective "allies". Indeed, internal conflict is likely to become a common phenomenon which many of the Asian nations will experience during the current decade in the process of "integrating" their nation-states and in maintaining their territorial integrity and distinct political identity.

Since internal conflict denotes both common and exceptional forms of violence, and since it affects and is affected by the external environment, it may be too simplistic to separate internal conflicts from external or inter-state conflicts. As one analyst argues:

.. What happens abroad is inescapably a function of what happens within strife-ridden societies and, conversely, the dynamic of internal wars are conditioned, perhaps even sustained, by external events. The interplay between these two sets of variables is continuous and complex. . (affecting) a broad range of political and social processes, from subnational to national to international."⁴⁶

Basic to this line of argument is the notion that internal conflict takes place not only within a political system but also within the international system and that

45. By 'internal conflict' we generally mean violent acts such as "assassinations, strikes, riots, antigovernment demonstrations, mutinies, coup d'etas, civil wars including guerrilla warfare, secessionist movements and revolutions".
Hurry Harry Eckstein, (ed.), *Internal War : Problems and Approaches*. p.3.

46. James N. Rosenau, (ed), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, p.1.

the "linkages" between the two systems mutually reinforce and determine the course and outcome of the internal conflict occurring in a particular country. In the Asian context, ideological incompatibility, divergent security and strategic interests as well as contradictory political objectives of the major powers and their regional allies may force them to intervene and/or counter-intervene in internal conflict situations in order to score gains by a major power or deny the same to its adversaries. In such an eventuality, we may witness continuing polarization of Asian politics in the present decade, especially along the line of Sino-Soviet dispute which, in turn, will affect the regional peace and stability.

The prospect that internal conflict holds for Asian security in the 1980s and Soviet proneness to make strategic gains out of similar situations in the recent past have also contributed to bringing Washington and Beijing closer: both are apprehensive of the long-term strategic consequences of Soviet advance in Asia. It appears that both have reached a strategic understanding: the military and political policies of each will complement the other in checkmaking Soviet strategic moves toward the region. This Sino-American strategic "parallelism" leads Moscow to believe that the PRC and the US are on a "collusion course", directed against the USSR and, could be seriously disadvantageous to Soviet interests. This strategic equation, at the minimum, is a significant factor of uncertain proportion in the decision-making processes in Moscow which will continue to affect Soviet behaviour and policies in Asia during the present decade.

Conclusion

The trends most likely to shape the pattern of Asian security issues in the 1980s are: (1) further extension of Sino-Soviet conflict into the affairs of the region; (2) continuing Soviet-American competition for geopolitical domination and supremacy; and (3) increasing Sino-American strategic cooperation in order to deter the growing Soviet influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Kremlin persistently attempts to build an Asian Collective Security system which will give the USSR not only access to the area but also enable her to contain the PRC and constrain the American power present in the region. Its efforts are reinforced by increased Soviet naval and air deployments to the Asian theatre and the opportunistic establishment of bilateral security treaties—most recently with South Yemen, Afghanistan and Vietnam, in order to create a regional base structure. The Chinese, in response, are making parallel efforts to construct a counter-coalition of states allied on the common theme of “anti-hegemony” and opposed to further extension of Soviet influence into the Asian region. The United States, on its part, is also enhancing its naval strength in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, as well strengthening strategic links with the People’s Republic of China.

From our analysis of the major power involvement in Asian affairs, one predominant theme emerges: the catalyzing influence that Soviet Strategic thrust has, and will have, in shaping the direction of security policies of the United States, the PRC, and Japan in

relation to Asia in the 1980s. The Chinese who have emphasized "self-reliance" in their efforts to modernize China, have turned to the United States, Japan, and West European countries for capital, technology and military hardwares. The reasons are obvious. The Chinese want to make their country a modern nation by the end of the century through the implementation of its four modernizations: in industry, agriculture, defence, science and technology.

The United States and Western countries have a stake in seeing China overcome its economic and social backwardness. The recent Chinese policies, based on reason, pragmatism, and a commitment to growth will, therefore, continue to receive Western support, because these policies would have a "spread effect" on other aspects of Chinese affairs. A modern and strong China can further demonstrate its determination to maintain adequate strategic posture in Asia *Vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. It is in this sense that the United States and other Western countries have decided to sell certain types hardware and military support equipments to China. The Americans believe that a strong and well-armed China will provide a desirable "counterweight" to the Soviet Union's apparent advantage over the superpowers' arms race. Moreover, US support to China provides it with a reassurance that it is not dealing with a country that is prepared to fold up and accept a secondary strategic posture in the Asian region. Thus, the congruity of Sino-American interests in relation to Asian security problems will continue to make the process of strategic cooperation between the two

countries an irreversible trend in the 1980s and, perhaps even beyond.

The Japanese, as this analysis has tried to show, have also reached a turning point in their post-1945 foreign and security policies. The direction they will take will be influenced, above all, by the threat they feel from the USSR—now identified in the *Defence White Papers* as the country's major security concern. Japan's decision to sign a peace treaty with China and the non-resolution of the Soviet-Japanese issue-areas will make Japan more amenable to cooperate with China and the United States on security and other strategic questions.

Other issue-areas of the region, like the Korean military confrontation, continuing conflict in Indochina, internal political and ethnic instabilities, and areas of territorial and resource conflict—have their own dynamics. A basic choice in security planning of the regional countries in the 1980s is: (a) how to make their policies relevant to a period undergoing profound political transformation; (b) how to protect their national security and promote national interests in the context of the changing power configuration in the Asian region, caused largely by the opposing strategies of the major powers.

If the conflicting strategic goals of the major powers could be stabilized through the application of detente in Aisa, including a possible Sino-Soviet detente, then countries of the region would be able to pursue their own interests in loose forms of cooperation—and in the process resolve their own local conflicts to the

mutual benefit of various parties. In that eventuality, an equilibrium of relationships would probably emerge in the region with only limited relevance to the strategic interests of the major powers.

However, the more likely prospect is, as we have analyzed, the repolarisation of the region around the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the US-Soviet global competition. Unlike the 1950s, when the Sino-Soviet alliance polarized the Asian region around the cold war line; or the 1960s when the Chinese broke away from the Soviet bloc and tried to build a "third role" for China in cooperation with the Third World countries, the 1970s have seen the Chinese turn toward the United States, Japan and West European countries in order to counter Soviet "hegemonism" and to accelerate their economic modernization. The 1980s are very likely to see the evolution of a latent security coalition between the United States, China, Japan, and the West European countries in response to the growing and assertive power-projection of the Soviet Union. Whether this coalition will evolve into a security entente will be determined by the degree of threat these countries perceive from the Soviet Union.

Presently, however, each country indicates a definite willingness to communicate with the other. And despite the appearance of Washington-Beijing-Tokyo axis, the trends of development show a subtle drift back toward bilateralism.

Of all the major powers, only the United States retains tremendous capability to help shape the emerging

economic and defence programmes of the Asian region in a constructive manner. Unlike the Soviet Union, which projects its influence in the area almost exclusively through military means, the United States has the political and social access and economic and scientific resources to interact with the countries of Asia on a broad range of issues.

To a considerable extent, the role to be played by the United States will affect the Asian security despite US desires to disengage herself militarily from Asia. The 1980s will witness a growing role for the Soviet Union in Asia. The economic, political and military activities of the USSR will make substantial progress, but this progress is likely to be offset by new power arrangement, with two major Asian powers, China and Japan, playing "counterweight" roles and the US holding the strategic "balance".