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CIVILIANISATION OF MILITARY REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The classical writers on war as well as the leading statesmen and revolutionaries of twentieth century have argued for civilian control over the military. General von Clausewitz wrote about 150 years ago :

“The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War, it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible”.¹

V.I. Lenin expressed the same view stating that “war is the continuation of politics by other...means”.²

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1. General C. M. von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), Vol. III, pp. 424-5, quoted in C. E. Welch, Jr. *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1976), p. ix.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964), Vol. XXI, p. 304.

The basic operational strategy of the Chinese revolution was laid down by Mao Tse-tung in his celebrated phrase, "Politics in Command". Mao asserted: "Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party".³ Winston Churchill, war-time Prime Minister of Britain, thought it utterly inappropriate to leave war to generals only.

This theory of supremacy of politics and social control of armed forces has not worked in a large number of developing countries in this latter half of twentieth century. As many of the new states that emerged in the era of decolonisation came under military rule in late fifties and sixties, a number of very respected social scientists argued that, in the context of slow pace of modernisation and political development in the new states, military take-overs would have beneficial consequences for these nations. These scholars developed theoretical models depicting the military as a highly modern force capable of transferring its organisational and technical skill to the field of government and administration.⁴

Later empirical researches on the actual performance of the military regimes have largely belied the early theoretical expectations. Eric A. Nordlinger,

3. Quoted in Welch, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

4. See, for example, L. W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" and M. Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class" in J. J. Johnson (ed.), *The role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-89 and 277-313; G. Pauker, "South East Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade".

drawing upon the analysis of cross-national data of 74 non-western and non-communist countries finds negative and zero-order correlations between the political strength of the military and social and economic modernisation.⁵ In another cross-national aggregate study of all independent, non-communist countries of a population greater than one million, covering the period 1951-1970, R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan conclude that "there is no profound effect on economic performance produced by military regimes when MR (Military regime) and CMR (periods of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military regimes) are compared with CR900 —(low income countries which have experienced only civilian rule)."⁶ In yet another study with data covering the period 1960-1970 for 77 independent countries of the third world R.W. Jackman reports :

"In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects on social change, regardless of either the level of economic development or geographic regions".⁷

The performance of the military regimes in the sphere of political development is much more disappointing.

5. See, E. A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, 1970, pp. 1131-1148.
6. R. D. Mckinlay and A. S. Kohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Civilian Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study" in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 1975, p. 20.
7. R. W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, 1976, p. 1096.

S.P. Huntington eulogised Field Marshal Ayub Khan of Pakistan for coming close "to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or 'Great Legislator' on the Platonic or Rousseauian model".⁸ But the much vaunted institutional innovation by Ayub Khan—Basic Democracies—was designed primarily as an instrument for depoliticisation of the people. Like most military leaders Ayub Khan failed to develop legitimised political institutions and ensure meaningful participation of the people in the political process. It was no wonder that the Ayub system resulted in a mass upheaval and led finally to the break-up of the country—the ultimate in political decay.

Even comparatively more popular military rulers like Gamal Abdel Nasser failed to develop popular political institutions. Nasser launched three political movements for popular mobilisation—the National Liberation Rally in 1953; and the Arab Socialist Union in 1961. "Each of these political movements", Ruth First writes, "in turn went from torpor to paralysis, intrinsically unable to stir vitality in villages, factories and neighbourhood communities".⁹ If political development is defined in terms of popular participation and building of legitimised political institutions, for most of the new states which came under military rule, the period of military rule was sterile as far as political

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8. S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, Ninth Printing, 1975), p. 25.
 9. R. First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London, The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 443.

development is concerned.¹⁰

The disappointing performance of military regimes has made the study of the process of demilitarisation imperative. Military interventions are continuously increasing. In 1961, 12 per cent of all independent states of the world were under military rule. The percentage rose to 19 by 1966, to 27 by 1973 and to 29 by 1975.¹¹ Thus, a large portion of the populace of the world have a vital stake in the exit of military from power. Although military withdrawals from politics are not so frequent as military interventions, there are instances of military disengagements. In this paper, we shall examine some cases of military withdrawals and try to derive some generalisations about the process of civilianisation of military regimes.

The Turkish Example

Any discussion on civilianisation of military regimes has to begin with Turkey, because, as Morris Janowitz states, "the 'Ataturk' model emerges both as a political goal and a bench mark for comparative analysis."¹²

10. See, Chapter I, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Sub-Saharan Africa" in T. S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 16-17; C. E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 49-50.
11. See, Table I, F. D. Margiotta, "Civilian Control and the Mexican Military: Changing Patterns of Political Influence", in Welch (ed.) *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1976), p. 214.
12. See Preface by Morris Janowitz in H. Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. x.

In about 60 years since the founding of the republic, the Turkish armed forces directly took over power only once in 1960-1961. The military, however, quickly returned to barracks after about one and a half years. Since 1961 there have been a few occasions when the Turkish armed forces pressurised successfully the Civilian government to act according to their dictates. Still compared to many other developing countries, the Turkish political system suffered much less from the praetorian assault by the armed forces. Much of the credit for the comparative success of the Turkish political system in bringing about military disengagements from politics goes to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Kemal), who consciously and tenaciously built up the tradition of civilian supremacy in the crucial formative phases of the Republic.

Kemal's admiration for Western civilisation (including its social and political organisations) was total. He believed that the Western doctrine of civilian supremacy had to be adopted to make Turkey strong both politically and militarily. He argued with the Young Turks against direct participation of the army officer in politics. In 1909, Kemal told the annual meeting of the Committee of Union and Progress (the secret political front of the Young Turks until 1913 when it became an open political party):

“As long as officers remained in the party, we shall neither build a strong Party nor a strong Army...let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party

must resign from the Army. We must adopt law forbidding all future officers having political associations".¹³

As the party rejected Kemal's views, Kemal and Ismet Inonu (Kemal's closest associate and later his successor as President of the Turkish Republic) resigned from the party and devoted their full attention to military profession until 1919.

After World War I when the French, British and Greek armies were on the point of dividing Turkey among themselves numerous "Associations for Defence of Rights" spontaneously grew up among notables, intelligentsia, lower civil service and military in all parts of Turkey to protect the independence of Turkey.¹⁴ In July 1919, Kemal, who had been the only Turkish Commander with "a brilliant record of solid military accomplishment" in World War I and had unmatched popularity among the Turks, resigned from the army and joined the movement of national liberation. He soon brought about a merger of societies for Defence of the Rights into one nation-wide Association for the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (i.e. Asiatic and European Turkey). Kemal was elected as the Chairman of the organisation. He was also elected as head of

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13. D. Lerner and R. D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernising Force", *World Politics*. Vol. XIII, No. 1, October 1960, p. 20.
 14. K. H. Karpat, "Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics" in K. H. Karpat, (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 47.

Representative Committee of the Association. This made him the effective head of the provisional revolutionary government. In April 1920, Kemal convened a Grand National Assembly which became the sovereign legislature of the revolutionary regime. The important point for our discussion here is that, even during a period of extreme stress, Kemal had been careful in separating civilian and military roles. He claimed that his authority was derived from his election as chairman of the nationalist party. During the critical phases of liberation war, on the Assembly's insistence Kemal assumed charge of operations, with a fresh appointment as Commander in Chief by the Assembly.¹⁵

After peace treaty was signed in 1923, Kemal took further steps to civilianise his government. He persuaded his military colleagues in the government to give up their military posts. Soon the military commanders who had been members of the Grand National Assembly were requested by Ataturk to resign either from their seats in the Assembly or from their posts in the army. The Chief of General Staff, who had been a member of Ataturk's cabinet since its inception in 1920, was excluded from the cabinet in 1924.

The Turkish Constitution of 1923 clearly reflected Kemal's policy of civilianisation. According to Article 40 of the Constitution, the Grand National Assembly

15. See, D.A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic", *World Politics*, Vol. XI, No. 4, July 1959, pp. 544-547. The Assembly laid down the condition that Ataturk's appointment as Commander in Chief would have to be renewed every three months.

and its representative, the President, would be in charge of the army. The Constitution provided that the declaration of martial law for a period more than one month would require the specific approval of the Assembly. It forbade the members of the Assembly to hold a second government post.¹⁶ Pointing out the presence of a large number of former commanders of the armed forces in the post-liberation cabinet, the Republican Peoples Party (see below) and the Grand National Assembly, some writer have argued that army's influence on the Kemalist system was quite significant.¹⁷ But the very fact that, soon after the liberation war, these officers had to resign from the army to keep their posts in government, party and Assembly, clearly showed that the process of military disengagement had been started in earnest by Kemal.

After 1923, Kemal continuously glorified civilian institution. According to him, the great victory won by the Turkish army was only a prelude to greater victories in science and economics which could be achieved not by the army but by the successful offices of the government.¹⁸

Kemal's determination to carry out the programme of civilianisation was matched by his ability to build up a civilian base. Unlike many other military leaders, Kemal did enjoy the game of politics. Even during the period of independence war, he established, what has

16. See, Lerner and Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

17. See, for example, G.E. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Part I", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, pp. 54-61.

18. See, B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 250.

been rightly called, a "government by discussion". Kemal routed every major policy issue through the Grand National Assembly. He had to carry on skilful lobbying and manoeuvring to get his proposals accepted by the "proud, faction-ridden and intractable Assembly". Kemal also worked steadily to transform the Association of Defence of Anatolia and Rumelia into a political party suited to the needs of a modern independent country. In December 1922, he declared his intention to form a political party called Republican People's Party. He went out barn-storming the country, soliciting suggestions and support for the party. A manifesto, with 9 articles reiterating Kemal's views on popular sovereignty, representative government, abolition of the Sultanate and incorporating a sketch of fiscal and administrative reforms, was published on April 8, 1923. On August 9, 1923, (just two days before the first meeting of the newly elected Grand National Assembly which elected Kemal as President of the Republic) the first Congress of Republican People's Party (RPP) was held under the chairmanship of Kemal.

From that time onwards, most of the important issues were first thrashed out in the congress of RPP before they were placed in the Assembly. In 1927, Kemal chose the party forum to deliver his most famous speech. Taking 26 hours to deliver, the speech contains Kemal's description and justification of his actions from the moment of his resignation from the Ottoman army. This speech is still regarded as the classic account of the

Kemalist revolution.¹⁹ Kemal continued to give his close attention to the growth of RPP until his death in office in 1938.

Ismet Inonu was elected unanimously by the Grand National Assembly to succeed Kemal as President of the Republic. Inonu had resigned from army soon after the war of independence and served as Prime Minister under Kemal until 1937. Inonu shared fully Kemal's view on civil-military relations. He acted consistently on the principle of civilian supremacy. As both Kemal and Inonu were former top ranking military officers, the armed forces remained assured that their interests were well-represented at the highest decision-making level of the government. Excepting a plot against Kemal's life in 1926, there had not been any military attempt to challenge the regimes of Kemal and Inonu. By the time Inonu went out of office, over two decades had already elapsed. The *mystique* of political neutrality of army had been established and the tradition of civilian supremacy had been built up.

Why did the Turkish army intervene in politics in 1960, violating the Kemalist tradition? Although it sounds paradoxical, a detailed study of the events of 1960-61 shows that, since the majority of the officer corps adhered to principle of non-involvement in politics, the Turkish armed forces were able to return to the barracks within a very short period of time.

The young officers of the Turkish army, recruited during the forties and after, were greatly dissatisfied with

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-256; 270.

low salary and poor prospect of promotion. Before the 1950 elections the Democratic Party (DP), fearing that the army might oppose the transfer of power from the RPP to DP, courted many officers of the army. This created great expectations among the junior officers. But the DP had no deep or abiding interest in the army and expectations of the younger officers were fast disappointed. These officers formed cliques within the armed forces and sent feelers to Inonu about staging a coup de etat for toppling the DP government. Inonu, as President, had presided over the transfer of power from RPP to DP in 1950. Naturally, he disapproved of the proposal of military take-over and advised the "emissaries" to keep away from his RPP.²⁰ It was only when the Menderes government began to play on religious prejudices of people, resorted to anti-democratic practices like control of the press and opposition parties, and began to use the army to suppress anti-Menderes agitations that the army high command decided to strike at Menderes regime.

Soon after taking over, a National Unity Committee (NUC) of 38 officers was formed under the chairmanship of General Cemal Gursel. Serious differences split the junta in no time. 14 members of NUC belonging to lower ranks headed by an ambitious colonel sharply opposed the proposal of the rest of members to hand over power to a civilian government in the shortest possible time. These junior members of NUC argued

20. See, G. S. Harris, "The Role of Military in Turkish Politics, Part II", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1965, pp. 171-72,

for the establishment of party-system on the pattern of Russia, China and Yugoslavia. The senior members of the junta were backed by majority of the officers of armed forces and by Inonu and his RPP in their desire for quick terminaion of army rule soon after the framing of a new constitution and holding a fresh election. In a sudden, secret and swift move, the senior members of the junta arrested the 'rebel group, and exiled them to embassies abroad.²¹ Five thousand officers of the armed forces were also retired.²²

Soon a Constituent Assembly was convened to approve a draft Constitution prepared by a committee of five professors. As devices for checking the abuse of power by an autocratic majority, the draft Constitution provided for a constitutional court, a bicameral legislature and a system of proportional representation. After its approval by the Constituent Assembly, the constitution was ratified by the people in a referendum. In the general election held under the new constitution, the RPP and the Justice Party (founded by former members of DP) won almost equal number of seats in the Assembly.²³

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21. See, N. Yalman, "Intervention and Extrication: The Officer Corps in the Turkish Crisis", in H. Bienen, *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 133-136.
 22. See, C. H. Dodd, "The Turkish Experience" in *Collected Seminar Papers on the Politics of Demilitarisation, April-May, 1966* (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London), pp. 22. The total strength of Turkish armed forces is estimated at 250,000 to 400,000 men. See, Yalman, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
 23. Karpat, "Social Groups and the Political System after 1960" in Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-249.

The High Command of the armed forces (Commanders-in-Chief of three services and Chief of General Staff)²⁴ persuaded the two parties to form a coalition government under Inonu. The military leaders secured written guarantee from all groups in the Assembly that the question of legitimacy of the army coup and execution of former Prime Minister Menderes would not be challenged. The political parties and groups gave a formal undertaking that they would not use the religious susceptibility of the people to rouse political passions.²⁵ The military leaders also made clear that General Cemal Gursel should be elected as President of the Republic.²⁶

Possibly to provide a constitutionalised channel for articulating the demands of armed forces, former members of NUC were made life members of the Senate (second chamber) under the new constitution.²⁷

For ensuring discipline and depoliticisation of the officer corps, the High Command of armed forces made it clear to political parties that all officers "politically tainted" and dismissed during the period of army rule as well as members of NUC would not be allowed to return back to their jobs in armed forces.²⁸

Some members of the Justice Party, however, failed to exercise self-restraint on the questions of the army coup and execution of Menderes. These led the

24. NUC was dissolved after the elections.

25. Yalman, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

26. Dodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

28. Yalman, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

High Command of the armed forces to write formally to the government twice (in 1962 and 1964) demanding that undertakings by the political parties be honoured. The firebrand of the Justice Party could easily see that the armed forces were not going to intervene. So they ignored the "warnings" from the High Command. The provocative speeches of Justice Party extremists encouraged the support of the "rebel group" of NUC to make two successive attempts of coup d'état—one in 1962 and another in 1963. The military High Command stood firm and suppressed the coup attempts.

The senior officers of Turkish armed forces had genuine faith in the Kemalist tradition of exclusion of the military from politics as much as possible. To act up to this tradition, they did not even hesitate to suppress the dissident elements in armed forces. The military's exit from politics was also facilitated by the responsible and constructive roles played by Inonu and the moderate section of Justice Party. Inonu was magnanimous enough to release most of former Democrats sentenced by the junta under one pretext or the other. Criticism of the role of armed forces in the Assembly calmed down when the moderates won ascendance at the Justice Party congress toward the end of 1964. Confidence between Justice Party and the armed forces grew steadily. The military did not object to a coalition government led by Justice Party Government after the general elections of October 1965.²⁹

29. Dodd, *op. cit.* p. 26.

Mexico : Protracted Civilianisation

That developing nations need not be doomed to an irreversible process of military coups and counter-coups is clearly borne out by the Mexican example of successful demilitarisation. Among Latin American countries, Mexico possibly suffered most from military interventions during the 19th century. After the 1920s the Mexican military was gradually pushed out of politics and a strong political party was built up to safeguard in the political system from military assault. As in the case in Turkey, two general-presidents — Calles (1928-1934) and Cardenas (1934-1940) — took major steps towards demilitarisation.

The task of Calles and Cardenas was more difficult than that of Kemal and Inonu. The Turkish leaders inherited a defeated but disciplined army. But the Mexican presidents had to create a professional army out of localised and disorderly armed bands. Kemal could transform a nationalist movement into an organised political party but the Mexican leaders had to start from scratch to organise a nation-wide political party.

Calles in 1929 founded the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) which gradually emerged as the dominant political party of Mexico. Calles, however, could not break the influence of the local commanders who easily took over the control of local offices of PNR. It was Cardenas, often described as the leader of Second Mexican Revolution, who moved decisively but skilfully to break down the power of Mexican regional *caudillos*.

Cardenas introduced a series of reforms to build up a professional army. So far promotion in the army depended largely on an officer's record in the revolutionary war and his loyalty to the commanding officer. Cardenas introduced proficiency tests for officers below majors. Recruitment of suitable officers from the ranks was also started.

While the senior officers who had association with the revolutionary wars, were not required to undergo proficiency tests, Cardenas sought other means to get them out of the army. He got laws passed reducing the officers' career span from 35 years. This law would have retired all officers serving before 1915 by 1940. Cardenas, however, did not implement the law immediately fearing complete alienation of senior officers. As an alternative measure, he brought a large number of active command posts and placed them in military as well as civil administrative posts. This measure did not create too much resentment among senior officers, created promotion opportunities for the junior ranks and separated the local commanders from their bases.

Cardenas took two other measures to reduce the army's political power. Most local commanders used their army position to further their pecuniary interests which in turn further increased their overall influence. Cardenas made part-time non-military interests incompatible with army service. More important than this measure was the transfer of responsibility for law and order from the area commander to the newly raised militia with recruits from peasant and working classes.

As Cardenas took measures against the senior officers, he simultaneously courted the junior officers to split the army on senior-junior axis. Although Cardenas did not implement the law regarding retirement from the army, the passing of the law created prospects of promotion of junior officers in no distant future. Cardenas set up military hospitals and schools for children of enlisted men, raised the pay of both officers and privates and introduced an insurance scheme for all army men. The result was that even when Cardenas raised a para-military force which armies resent most, senior officers refrained from organising a revolt against Cardenas.³⁰

By reducing the power of local commanders Cardenas created the possibility of transforming the PNR into a genuine popular political force as counter-weight to the army. Cardenas brought the Mexican revolution to the lower classes through land reforms and recognition of trade union activities. The conflict between vested interests and peasants and workers led the latter group to join the PNR almost en masse.³¹

In 1938, Cardenas re-organised PNR into four separate sectors to represent four major interests of the country: Labour, peasants, Army and popular (Others). This was a move by Cardenas to prevent the army from

30. For a good discussion of the various measures introduced by Cardenas to curb the political power of Mexican army, See, G. Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World*, (London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 1974), pp. 127-131.

31. See, Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

adoption of techniques of violence and encourage it to resort to methods of elections and bargaining. Each sector of the party was allocated 40 seats in the party congress which nominated the presidential candidate. In justifying this reorganisation of the party Cardenas stated :

“We did not put army in politics. It was already there. In fact, it had been dominating the situation and we did well to reduce its influence to one vote out of four”.³²

The generals of the army decided to meet Cardenas on the ground of his choosing—the hustings. 34 senior officers of the army took leave to campaign for General Juan Almazon who contested the presidential elections in 1940 on the platform of the Revolutionary Party of National Unification.

Since the Mexican constitution provided that nobody could hold presidential office for more than one term, Cardenas himself could not contest General Almazon. The PNR was renamed the Party of Mexican Revolution (PMR) and nominated General Camacho against Almazon. Camacho was Minister of Defence in Cardenas government and shared the latter's views on civil-military relations. During the revolutionary wars, he was a junior officer and got his promotions later. Thus two gnerals fought 1940 election on the clear and single issue of the role of military in politics.

General Almazon lost heavily to Camacho and accepted the results in spite of the provocations

32. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

from his supporting officers. Cardenas also displayed foresight and magnanimity and requested the senior officers to return to their duties in army at the end of their leave. The party was again renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and military sector of the party was disbanded. The law on retirement framed during Cardenas rule was implemented in 1945. 550 officers were retired in the first instance. The army got rid of most of the senior *caudillo*-type officers.

A civilian politician was elected as President in 1946 elections on the ticket of PRI. Since then all Presidents have been civilian politicians and have been elected on PRI ticket. Since 1964, the Presidents of PRI have also been civilian politicians. The number of military governors decreased from 15 in 1968 to one in 1972.

Following Cardenas, the civilian Presidents have been using the techniques of "pay-off and co-optation" to keep the armed forces under their control. Military officers are still recruited to the PRI, cabinet and state provincial governments. To prevent the army officers from developing "a sense of status-deprivation", Mexican Presidents take particular care in paying tributes to the army in glowing terms on important state celebrations. Although there has been a gradual reduction in budgetary allocations for defence, army officers and enlisted men enjoy a fairly high standard of life. This has been possible because Mexican governments avoid buying sophisticated and costly weaponry and spend most of the defence allocations on salaries and other amenities of army personnel. Besides, officers are deliberately kept

engaged in various types of developmental and civic programmes. Mexico which had the worst record of military interventions in the past is now unique among the Latin American countries in having its armed forces under civilian control.³³

Emulating the Kemalist Model ?

Some of the military leaders of Third World countries have been trying to civilianise their regimes through personalist transformation in Kemalist tradition. In Africa, General Joseph Mobutu of Zaire has been the first in taking steps in this direction.

Mobutu has an extraordinary career which indicates his diverse interests and skills. He started his career as a school teacher. In 1950, he joined *Force Publique*. In 1956, he left the army to pursue a career in journalism. His political interests soon led him to join the nationalist movement led by Lumumba with whom he soon developed close friendship. His seven years' service in the army enabled him to develop wide acquaintances among the non-commissioned officers. As a journalist and an active member of nationalist party in Leopoldville, Mobutu developed contact with powerful political and administrative circles. His appointment as Chief of Staff of Congolese National Army (ANC) was not, therefore, surprising.

33. For an excellent discussion on the techniques of military control used by civilian presidents in Mexico see, F. D. Margiotta, "Civilian Control and the Mexican Military: Changing Patterns of Political Influence" in C. E. Welch, (Jr.), *op. cit.*, pp. 213-253.

Conflict between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, who fired each other, led Mobutu to take over power in 1960. Mobutu soon withdrew to the barracks. During 1962-64, he was a powerful member of Binza group, the informal cabal of high officials which pulled behind-the-scene strings of political power in Leopoldville.³⁴ All these singular experiences stood him in good stead when he took over again in 1965 following another conflict, this time, between Kasavubu and Tshombe. Mobutu has now the unique distinction of having been in power for over a decade in country like former Congo which in early sixties was almost synonymous with anarchy.

Since his second take over, Mobutu has kept the armed forces out of politics as far as possible. Excepting in the politically unstable areas where military officers were given only temporary appointments, Mobutu replaced military officers by civil authorities in the provinces. Mobutu soon brought about two major reforms in ANC. First, a new system of military justice was begun and hundreds of officers and men were tried and convicted on charges of corruption, indiscipline and incompetence. Secondly, through a series of decrees in 1965-1967, the number of officers in senior ranks was increased and number of junior and non-commissioned officers was decreased. The democratic practices of 1960-65, especially election of officers by their men, were abolished. Thus hierarchy and discipline in ANC were

34. J. C. Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 141.

restored.³⁵ Besides, the high-ranking officers in ANC feared that their involvement in politics would undermine the army's painfully acquired discipline.

The Zaire military is well-paid and equipped. Mobutu has placed "ethnically and otherwise reliable personnel in all the garrisons within one day's drive of the capital"³⁶ and has appointed his own uncle as the Chief of Staff of ANC.

The above measures seem to have prevented ANC from being overtly political. On three occasions the army high command successfully pressurised Mobutu to act according to their desires. These interventions were related to security affairs.³⁷ The high command seems to have kept Mobutu quite free in civilian affairs.

Mobilising the educated elite Mobutu has skillfully developed a vast bureaucratic hierarchy with relevant rules and regulations. He has increasingly relied on talents and expertise of such social groups as university and technical students. In particular, Mobutu has created a Presidential Advisory Board of 15 members. The Board has been his personal brains trust and all the members of the Board are former graduate students of Lovanium University. The Board enjoys considerable prestige and influence in the Zaire capital. Graduates of the University constitute at any one time about half of the cabinet and hold important portfolios.³⁸ As one keen observer of Zaire has written :

35. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

36. W. F. Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa* (London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1975), p. 145.

37. Willame, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

38. Gutteridge, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

“..we can now see that his regime is not a military dictatorship it first appeared to be. Rather, it is a Caesarist bureaucracy, a type of rule characterized by a single authority figure at the head of a bureaucratic governmental structure. The bureaucratic structure is usually manned by diverse social groups that have come into existence during a preceding era of patrimonial politics.”³⁹

In May 1967, Mobutu launched his Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR). The MPR has been described by Mobutu as a nationalist movement aimed at affirming the “uniqueness of the Congolese personality” and “mobilizing the popular masses for their education, information and edification”.⁴⁰ The party consists of a President, a Congress that meets every four years, a Political Bureau with 34 members and National Executive Council consisting of 6 members. All members of the Bureau and Council are appointed by the President. Mobutu is the only soldier with official status in the Political Bureau and Executive Council.

A referendum was held in June 1967 for ratification of a new constitution providing for a presidential form of government. Mobutu was elected President uncontested under the new constitution on November 1970. Legislative elections were also held in the month. The legislature declared MPR as the only legal party in Zaire.

39. Willame, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

However, the real test of success of Mobutu in civilianizing his regime will come at the time of his departure from the political scene when the problem of peaceful succession will loom large. Although Mobutu has recruited a number of politicians in his MPR, army officers are very much distrustful of politicians. "The ANC has won victory after victory, but the politicians of our dear Congo have ruined the country"—such is a typical statement of Mobutu.⁴¹ Mobutu also does not like any civilian politician to become popular and powerful. "In the years 1965-70, Mobutu reshuffled his cabinet eight times, as against nine comparable changes for the tense years 1960-65, each time for reasons largely obscure. Thus in Kinshasa, promotion to minister is increasingly viewed as a passport to exile."⁴² Moreover, it is not yet clear how far the MPR is growing as a popular political party and whether it would survive without Mobutu's leadership.

Another example of personal transition of a military ruler into an elective head of government is provided by Upper Volta. The Chief of Upper Volta army, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana assumed political power in January 1966 when the armed forces refused to quell by force trade union protests against President Maurice Yameogo's austerity measures.⁴³

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

43. See, W. A. E. Skurnik, "The Military and Politics: Dahomey and Upper Volta", in C. E. Welch, Jr., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Change* (Evanston, North-western University Press, 1970), pp. 68-71.

From the very start of his regime, Lamizana tried to revive the political process. At first he encouraged Upper Volta's four political parties to unite and develop a consensus on country's future political structure. After having series of Round Table discussions with political leaders, Lamizana could easily understand that the political parties would neither unite themselves into one or two parties nor agree on future shape of politics.⁴⁴ In November 1969, Lamizana lifted the restrictions on political parties. In the elections that followed all the four parties were allowed to participate. Lamizana was elected President unopposed for a four year term.⁴⁵

Togo's General Etienne Eyadema has been trying to institutionalise his regime on the lines developed by Mobutu whom he admires as his ideal. In 1969, Eyadema organised the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) as the only legal political party in Togo. In a calculated move to gain support of the Ewe tribe, predominant in the southern half of Togo, a highly competent Ewe official was elected Secretary-General of the party.⁴⁶

The first congress of RPT was held in November 1971 in a southern district of Togo. By this time the incumbent Secretary General had become ambitious and popular. The Congress abolished the post of Secretary-General and established a 15-man civil-

44. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

45. C. E. Welch, "The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa", *African Studies Review*, April 1974, p. 218.

46. Eyadema comes from Kabre tribe of Northern Togo.

military political bureau. The Congress recommended the holding of a referendum on the question of Eyadema's continuation in office. The referendum was held in January 1972 and 99.09 per cent of votes cast were in favour of Eyadema's continuation in office.⁴⁷

The military component in Eyadema regime is much more prominent than it is in Mobutu's government. The RPT is far less than a popular and national party. The support of the party is limited to certain sections of people in north Togo. The Ewes of southern Togo, whose leader former President Olympio, was killed in 1963 by Eyadema himself during a coup staged by Kabre-dominated army and veterans, have not been so far enthusiastic about joining the RPT. Thus the level of institutionalisation in Togo is still quite low and its political future is still uncertain.⁴⁸

In Asia, the efforts of general Park Chung-hee of South Korea to civilianise his regime provided the example of an abortive attempt at Kemalist transformation. The coup, led by General Park Chung-hee (Park) in 1961, did not evoke enthusiastic support from either military or the Confucian population in general.⁴⁹ The pressures for gaining legitimacy was urgently felt by Park regime. The Park government sought the help

47. See, S. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 114-117.

48. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 118-121.

49. See, C. I. U. Kim, "Transition from Military Rule: The Case of South Korea", in H. Bienen and D. Morell, *Political Participation under Military Regimes* (Beverly Hills/London, Sage Publications, 1976), p. 25.

of some of the college and university professors and other legal authorities to prepare a constitution providing for a presidential form of government. The constitution was approved by the people through a referendum. Again a coalition of intellectuals and politicians favourably disposed towards the military junta launched a new political party—the Democratic-Republican Party (DRP). Soon the core members of the junta resigned from active duty to become members of DRP.⁵⁰ The elections for electing a President a legislature under the new constitution were held in 1963 and every four years since then. Park did not legislate the opposition parties out of existence. In an endeavour, unusual among military rulers, Park allowed the opposition parties to contest in the elections and organised free and fair elections. Park did not get the 99 per cent of votes cast. His performance in elections (46.7 per cent in 1963, 51.4 per cent in 1967, and 53.2 per cent in 1971) seems modest enough for a working democracy. In the legislative assembly elections the DPR received 32.4, 52.8 and 47.7% of total votes cast in 1963, 1967 and 1971.⁵¹

The salutary effects of Park regime's early measures on South Korea's political development were largely negated by the regime's policy of personal idolisation of General Park since 1969. In that year the constitution was amended to allow Park to contest for a third term of presidency. (The original constitution limited one

50. See, J.S. Sohn, "Political Dominance and Political Failure : The Role of the Military in the Republic of Korea", in H. Bienen, *op. cit.*, p. 111

51. See, Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

person to two consecutive terms of presidential office.) Park's refusal to stand for a third term and his presiding over his successor's election would have created a great democratic precedent in South Korea, as George Washington's unwillingness paved the way for democratic and constitutional succession of power in the U.S.A. in the critical founding years.

In 1972, the supporters of Park went even further. The constitution was amended to create a National Conference for Unification composed of 2,000-5,000 members. Members would be directly elected by voters and candidates for membership in the Conference must not have any affiliation to any political party. This National Conference, "embodying the general will of the people", would elect the President. The amended constitution fixed the tenure of President as six years. The limitation of term of presidency for single person was waived altogether. A National Conference constituted in December 1972 elected Park for a fourth term. Since then the Park government assumed increasingly authoritarian powers on the pretext of critical international situation and North Korea's "aggressive designs".⁵²

With these developments DRP gradually lost its vigour as a political party. Park's attitude of "less politics" and his preference for technocrats rather than party politicians placed DRP into secondary roles. The loss of political efficacy resulted in the growth of factionalism in DRP which further weakened it as a political

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.

force. The dilution of popular legitimacy of Park's election in 1972 because of the induction of "non-partisan" electoral college for presidential election, on the other hand, increased popular opposition to the Park regime. The ultimate result was the assassination of Park and re-introduction of direct military rule.

Military Withdrawal and Recurrence of Intervention

Amos Perlmutter categorises military interventions into two types: arbitrator-type and ruler-type. According to Perlmutter, the arbitrator-type army tends to be more professionally oriented, imposes the time-limit on army rule and arranges to hand over power to an acceptable civilian regime. The ruler-type army, on the other hand, develops an independent political organisation and a fairly coherent and elaborate ideology, not even considering a return to barracks.⁵³ The Free Officers of Egypt and National Liberation Council (1966-69) in Ghana typify respectively the ruler-type and arbitrator-type armies.

Experiences of most of the developing countries under military rule indicate that armies first intervening for purposes of arbitration withdraw to barracks only to reintervene. Unless overthrown, withdrawal of army is caused primarily by dissention and splits within the armed forces.

53. A. Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army : Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. I, No. 3, April 1969, P. 392.

The very birth of a junta rule contains the seeds of its disintegration. Division within the army may occur on the line of those who exercise political power as members of ruling junta and those who stay back in army command. The ruling junta gradually fall to the very vices of which they had accused the politicians at the time of take-over—corruption, unwarranted use of force, electoral and ethnic manipulation and the like. This gives the officers at the military command the excuse for counter-coup. Since the resources remain scarce, whether civilians or military officers rule, the rank and file may easily suffer from frustrated expectations. Moreover, the military may be fratricidally split on ethnic, regional and generational lines. Under such circumstances, when the corporate integrity of army is threatened the military generally prefer to withdraw to barracks at least for a temporary period.⁵⁴

Dahomey furnishes one of the many examples of this chain of intervention, withdrawal, and recurrence of intervention. The continuous political feuds among “the big three” regional leaders and trade union unrests created a political impasse in Dahomey in 1963. Colonel Christophe Soglo, the chief of Dahomean army, took over power, arranged general elections and returned to barracks. As economic situation worsened, trade union unrest persisted and bickerings of “the big three” showed no sign of ebbing, Colonel Soglo intervened again toward the end of 1965.

54. See, Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

Soglo, however, soon lost the confidence of younger officers. Problems remained as much unsolved under Soglo as they had been under the civilians. Young officers thought that the "mess" created by Soglo was due to his policy of excluding the younger officers from responsible positions.⁵⁵

In a swift and bloodless military *Putsch*, the younger officers ousted Soglo on December 7, 1967 and formed a Revolutionary Military Committee. A draft constitution providing for a one-party presidential system was approved in a referendum held on March 31, 1968. By that time the young officers became seriously split on the role of "the big three" and the trade unions and upon personal animosities. Competing and shifting cliques tired out each other in continuous manoeuvrings for influence and positions. Lacking the seasoning of Soglo and other senior officers, who fought their ways up through ranks and had the experience of work in three continents, the junior officers then tried to hurry back to cantonment. They hastily arranged a presidential election on May 5, 1968. "The big three" were debarred from contesting the elections. Five politically nondescript candidates were allowed to run. Two of "the big three" called for a massive boycott of the election. The result was a disaster for the young officers. Only 27% of the registered voters went to the polls. The results of the elections only exacerbated tensions among the "Young Turks". They appointed

55. For a discussion on the "generational cleavage" in Dahomean army see, *Skurnik op. cit.*, pp. 103-107.

Dr. Zinsou, a well-known but politically neutral personality as President and went back to the barracks.

Dr. Zinsou legitimised his mandate by calling for a referendum in which he gained the support of 53.25% of total registered voters. There was, however, no end of ambitions of the various cliques in the army. Sometime afterwards Dr. Zinsou was arrested by his Chief of Staff. A Supreme Council and a Directorate of armed forces was set up. After prolonged and stormy sessions army officers decided to withdraw from political arena and bring back "the big three" who had been exiled soon after 1967 coup. The triumvirate hammered out a unique constitutional formula of rotating Presidents. Conspiracies against the civilian government continued. Ultimately, in a "third generation coup", Major Mathieu Kerekous took over power in October 1972. All the senior officers of armed forces were transferred to jobs in civilian sectors. Kerekous formed an all-military cabinet and, assisted by several radical ideologues, proclaimed the goal of establishing a Marxist-Leninist state in Dahomey.⁵⁶

Sierra Leone is another state which had been a victim of coups and counter-coups by its small one-battalion army with only 90 officers.⁵⁷ Political decay in Sierra Leone began after severe and mutually reinforcing fissures developed within Sierra Leone's poli-

56. For a vivid description of kaleidoscope political changes in Dahomey, see Decalo, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-85.

57. For an excellent study of civil-military relations in Sierra Leone see, T.S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976).

tical and military elites. In the 1967 elections the opposition African Peoples Congress (APC) won a narrow victory over the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and APC leader Siaka Stevens was sworn in as Prime Minister. The army chief Brigadier David Lansana, who had developed close relations with SLPP leaders and feared his own personal career in the army under Stevens intervened and took over power soon after the swearing-in ceremony, Lansana, in turn was removed from power within two days by younger officers who formed a National Reformation Council (NRC). NRC appointed a commission to enquire into the election results and to find out which of the two parties won the majority of votes. The commission under Justice Dove-Edwin reported that "APC won their elections on their own merit" and appointment of Stevens as Prime Minister "cannot be properly challenged".⁵⁸

But the chairman of NRC, Colonel Juxon-Smith, refused to accept the majority view of NRC for early restoration of civilian government. The neglect of the rank and file by NRC and instigation by army officers ousted from army during SLPP rule, as well as APC, led the warrant officers to revolt on April 17, 1968. The rebels arrested all commissioned officers in the army and gazetted officers of police force. They formed an anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement. They also declared that "soldiers and police have no business in the running of this country". Within 9 days of the revolt,

58. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

Stevens was installed as Prime Minister as the head of a coalition government of APC and SLPP and the warrant officers went back to barracks.

As in Dahomey, assaults on the government by military officers continued. But unlike those in Dahomey, coups in Sierra Leone failed mainly because of military support of Guinean President, Sekou Toure, for Stevens' regime. By 1975 many of the senior officers were either hanged or shot by firing squads following their abortive attempts to take over

Scheduled Demilitarisation : Ghana (1966-1969).

One unique example of arbitrator-type intervention is provided by the members of National Liberation Council (NLC) of Ghana who took over on February 24, 1966. The memoirs of two prominent members of NLC—Colonel A.A. Afrifa and Major-General A.K.A. Ocran—reveal that at least these two officers sincerely believed in the British military ideology of separation of political and military spheres.⁵⁹ The NLC leaders argued that there was no other way for restoration of proper civil-military relations excepting the forcible deposition of Kwame Nkrumah. That the junta members were serious about the restoration of civilian rule

59. See, Colonel A.A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup, 24th February 1966*, (New York, Humanities Press, 1966); Major-General A.K.A. Ocran, *A Myth is Broken : An Account of the Ghana Coup d' Etat of 24th February 1966*. (London : Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1968). See also R.M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New states : Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case" *World Politics*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, April 1971, pp. 399-430.

was early indicated by the appointment of a Political Committee consisting primarily of politicians who had been in opposition during Nkrumah rule to advise the NLC. Immediately an atmosphere of trust and consensus grew between the NLC members and former opposition politicians. The abortive attempt at a second coup, led by a Lieutenant frustrated over his promotional tests and occasional factional disputes within NLC quickened the process of civilianisation.⁶⁰ Still at the end the junta hesitated and pressurised the Constituent Assembly to incorporate in the constitution a provision for a three-year Presidential Commission composed of NLC Chairman and Deputy Chairman, and Chief of Defence Staff.⁶¹ The elections held by NLC in August 1969, brought Kofi Busia and his Progress Party to power. The members of Presidential Commission then felt secure about their own safety as well as army's interests. The Commission was dissolved in less than a year. But soon the military intervened. The officers passed over in promotion during NLC rule toppled the government of Busia taking advantage of the general dissatisfaction in the armed forces over Busia's "refusal to exclude the military and police forces from the general cutback in government expenditure".⁶²

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60. See, R. Dowse, "Military and Police Rule" in D. Austin and R. Luckham, (ed.), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972*, (London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1975), pp. 16-36.
 61. See, R. Pinkney, *Ghana Under Military Rule, 1966-1969*, (London, Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1972), pp. 134-135.
 62. See, V.P. Bennett, "Epilogue : Malcontents in Uniform—The 1972 Coup D'Etat", in Austin and Luckham, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-332.

Overthrow of Military Regime and Disorderly Transition

Sudan provides an example of the overthrow of a military regime through mass agitation, bringing in its wake a civilian government. Conflict between the south and north regions of Sudan and continuous manoeuvrings for power among the sectarian political parties paralysed the government of Prime Minister, Abdalla Khalil. Khalil, a former brigadier in the Sudanese army encouraged the senior army officers to take over. Fearing that the junior officers, who had already secretly formed a Free Officers Organisation, might take over if they failed to do so, the senior officers intervened and assumed power on November 17, 1958—under leadership of General Abboud.⁶³

But the military regime proved as inefficient as the previous civilian government in tackling the problems facing Sudan. As is usual with military government, the Sudanese military government pursued a military solution in southern Sudan and escalated the conflict between *Anya Nya* (southern guerrillas) and Sudanese armed forces. The government of General Abboud following Ayub Khan of Pakistan established multi-tiered local councils.⁶⁴ As was the case in Pakistan, the local councils came under the control of the traditional local elites and the politically conscious section of the people became increasingly alienated from the military regime. The Abboud regime also

63. See, R. First", *op. cit.*, pp. 222-232.

64. See, N. Kasfir, "Civilian Participation under Military Rule in Uganda and Sudan", in Bienen and Morell, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

lost the support of civil servants as frictions developed between civil and military officers. The widespread corruption among the high officers of the regime further increased people's disenchantment.⁶⁵

General discontent among the people took on an explosive character in October 1964. Academics, lawyers, teachers, doctors, students, trade union members and *Gegira* tenants joined together in a spontaneous movement against the Abboud regime. A professionals' Front was formed and the Front organised processions and demonstrations demanding the immediate restoration of civil government. Political leaders soon became united against the military under another Front. The great upheaval, usually described as revolution by writers on Sudan, began after a student was killed by police on the University campus on October 21. The seasoned underground communists of Sudan urged the use of the general-strike weapon. The general-strike brought the country to stand-still. The capital and other urban centres became paralysed for successive days.

The crisis brought conflict between senior and *Free Officers* into open. The Free Officers opted for complete withdrawal of the army and immediate restoration of civilian government. The generals had no other alternative but to hand over power to a transitional government consisting of representatives of professionals' and political parties' Fronts.⁶⁶

65. See, M. Abdel-Rahim, *Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Sudan*, (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), pp. 18-19.

66. See, First, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-270.

But the syndrome of intervention—withdrawal—reintervention was not yet complete. The hopes generated by October revolution were soon frustrated. The civilian leaders failed to arrive at a consensus on a permanent constitution and on measures for ending the problem of southern Sudan. Acute disagreements among the political parties led to quick changes in government.

On May 25, 1969, a second military coup took place. The coup was engineered by a group of younger officers who had been admirers of Gamal Abdal Nasser and belonged to the secret Free Officers Organisation. The new Revolutionary Council, headed by Colonel Numeiri retired all generals and brigadiers from the army. Following Nasser's model, the new military rulers soon founded the Sudanese Socialist Union and declared it as the only legal party in Sudan. Dissension within the ruling council began to grow on the degrees of leftism to be followed by the government. Officers, upholding extreme radical views, and the communists brought about a coup on July 19, 1971. The communist regime lasted only 3 days. A popular rising brought back Numeiri to power.⁶⁷

Thailand is another country where the military was overthrown by a popular movement. A student led mass uprising took place in Thailand in October 1973. The armed forces made a brutal attempt to suppress the uprising by shooting the unarmed crowds and causing hundreds of deaths but the attempt failed. The junta

67. See, Abdel-Rahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-28.

leaders fled the country. A civilian government headed by an ex-Judge and Rector of Tammasat University was formed. However, political fragmentation and factionalism among the civilian leaders later gave the military leaders an excuse to intervene again.

Conclusion

What generalisations can we derive from above discussion of processes of military withdrawal from politics? It is clear that the civilianisation of military regimes has occurred in several ways in different countries. Some military rulers in Africa have been trying to emulate Kemal of Turkey and have subjected themselves to some form of election to provide their regimes with a resemblance of civilianised regimes. But, as the example of General Park in South Korea showed, without a high degree of civilian institution-building, the attempts at transforming military regimes into civilianised systems are likely to prove abortive.

Through a protracted process of gradual diminution of the military components of government, Calles and Cardenas of Mexico brought about nearly complete civilianisation of the Mexican political system.

In two countries (Dahomey in May 1968 and Sierra Leone in April 1968) the military withdrew from politics because the armies concerned became split into mutually hostile factions threatening total disintegration of armies themselves. In Sudan (1964) and Thailand (1973) military regimes were overthrown by mass movements and civilian governments took their place. Lastly,

there were several cases of military withdrawal following the "arbitrator-type" of interventions (Ghana in 1969, Zaire in 1960 and Dahomey in 1963).⁶⁸

Whatever are the processes of military withdrawals, recurrence of intervention seems to be the persistent problem for civilianisation. Finer argues that military hasten back to power "as soon as their quondam political enemies came within their sight of regaining power". Valerie Bennett contends that the army reintervenes after withdrawal because the first intervention served to inform the army how easy it was for them to take over.⁶⁹

The present writer, however, feels that the syndrome of intervention—withdrawal—intervention is more a function of a faction-ridden army, with weak command structure and low morale, and lacking even a reasonable degree of professionalism. When an army takes over, it is not the whole army that rules. It is the faction in the ascendant in the army at the time of the coup that rules in the name of the army. When, for one reason or other, the ruling military group goes back to the barracks, other groups in the army remain in the wings to make predatory assaults on the new civilian government. As the army today has hardly any occasion to fight a war, boredom with barrack life provides additional stimulant for coupmanship.

How can this chain of recurring military interventions be broken? What strategies are to be adopted

68. See, D. Morell, "Alternatives to Military Rule in Thailand", Bienen and Morell, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-36

69. See, V.P. Bennett, "Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa", October 1974, p. 15.

to bring about, not a temporary withdrawal of the army but a permanent civilianisation? In view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph, one can easily say that the first requirement would be the professionalisation of the armies of underdeveloped countries. As we know more about developing nations we find that nothing in underdeveloped countries (including professionalisation of army) can be achieved without time and multi-pronged approach. Thus to tackle the problem of lasting civilianisation developing countries would require a long-term programme. It is here that the Turkish and Mexican experience in demilitarisation can help the other new states most.

As shown earlier, Kemal in Turkey and Cardenas had strong "determination to civilianise which cut wide and deep". Their primary strategy was to develop political institutions, particularly a national political party which could function as a countervailing force against the army.

The political leaders in Asia and Africa who have tried to follow the path of Kemal have been rather casual about the political parties that they have organised. DRP in South Korea, MPR in Zaire and RPT in Togo seem to be hollow structures which may not provide vehicles for peaceful succession by civilian leaders. The personalist transformation of military rulers in these countries is likely to provide a temporary period of peace between periods of political crises.

It is often stated that military rulers soon discover the virtues of the "administrative traditional" model of

the colonial period.⁷⁰ While most of the military rulers try to revive the colonial framework, what they really rediscover is "the post-World War II lesson of the colonial administrators—namely that the era of the administrative state has passed"⁷¹ in developing nations of to-day. The more intelligent the military ruler, more quickly does he see the need for politics. The difficulty is that the military leaders are caught in a difficult situation. They cannot but condemn the politicians and political process to justify their take-over. After having blamed politicians and politics, they find it difficult to advocate the revitalisation of the political process and build up rapport with the politicians. This seems to be the case with Park, Mobutu and Lamizana. These leaders have been only half-hearted in their attempts to build a viable and self-sustaining political system. Unless there is a total commitment to restore political and social control over the means of violence, military leaders are likely to stumble in bringing about civilianisation of their regimes.

Since civilian control of military has proved so difficult to achieve, a slow and protracted process of civilianisation seems to be more helpful in the long-run. In the initial stages, the military may be given a voice in the political system through constitutional channels. Former military officers having influence in the army

70. See, for example, E. Feit, "Military Groups and Political Development : Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria", *World Politics*, Vol. XX, 1968, pp. 179-93.

71. See Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

may be encouraged to seek the membership of legislature and executive. The presence of highly respected military leaders at the highest level of decision-making in Turkey during the first 27 years of the founding of the Republic possibly helped depoliticisation of Turkish army. Again in the 1961 constitution of Turkey, the military voice was given constitutional recognition by making the junta leaders of 1960 coup life Senators. Besides two military leaders were elected in succession as constitutional Presidents of Turkey under 1961 constitution.

In Mexico, Cardenas induced the military to participate in politics through constitutional methods by assuring them a role in the selection of the presidential candidate by Mexico's dominant party. Still now the Mexican PRI recruits army personnel as members of the organisation.

The abrupt withdrawals and interventions of the army seem to have dysfunctional effects for permanent civilianisation of governments. There have been several spasmodic military interventions and withdrawals in Syria since early fifties and Syria is still under military rule. On the other hand, there has been a degree of civilianisation in Egypt. In 1974, only the President, the Prime Minister, one Vice-President, one Deputy Prime Minister and two Ministers, were former military officers, out of three Deputy Prime Ministers and thirty Ministers.⁷² In Africa, a country like Dahomey, undergoing

72. See, G. Ben-doa, "Civilianization of Military Regimes in the Arab World", in Bienen and Morell, *op. cit.*, p. 44,

several military take-overs and withdrawals, has much less a chance of having a stable civilian government than Zaire which has been free from military interventions since 1965.

As the only two relatively successful examples of civilianisation (Turkey and Mexico) suggest, by assuring the armed forces a voice in political decision-making, new states might avoid recurring military interventions and gradually eliminate military's role in civilian affairs. With Greece and Soviet Russia along Turkish borders, the Turkish army has much to keep busy. To overcome the boredom of barrack life, the army personnel in other countries might be encouraged to participate in civic and nation-building works as is being done in Mexico and China.

To conclude our discussion, disengagement of the military from politics is a difficult process. The civilianisation of politics in any country which has experienced military intervention would have to be accomplished by degrees. Gradual withdrawal of the army combined with steady growth of civilian institutions and governmental effectiveness alone can lead to permanent demilitarisation of politics. About a decade ago, L.W. Pye wrote that what was required most for democratic development in developing countries was *responsible* politicians.⁷³ Today, it seems that the political growth of new states requires *responsible* politicians as well as *responsible* soldiers.

73. See, L.W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in J.J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 89.